

This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King's Research Portal at <https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/>



**Public Opinion on Democracy
Democratic Support, Understanding, and Knowledge in Indonesia and Southeast Asia**

Nugroho, Aurelia

Awarding institution:
King's College London

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement.

END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT



Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed

under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

licence. <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>

You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work

Under the following conditions:

- Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).
- Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes.
- No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work.

Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above.

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Public Opinion on Democracy:

Democratic Support, Understanding, and
Knowledge in Indonesia and Southeast Asia

Aurelia Ananda

*Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph. D.) in Politics
at the Department of Political Economy, King's College London
December 2022*

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgment.

Contents

Declaration of Authorship	iv
Abstract	v
List of Tables	vi
List of Figures	viii
Chapter 1	1
Structure of Dissertation	4
Democratic Support in Developing Democracies	6
Democratic Understanding in Developing Democracies	9
Political Knowledge: A Case for Political Education	11
Authoritarian Legacies in Developing Democracy	15
Support for (Asian-style) Democracy in Southeast Asia	19
Democracy in Indonesia: History and Development	20
Methodology	23
Chapter 2	23
Defining Democracy in SEA	28
The Role of Gender in Shaping DU	30
Intersection of Gender and Socioeconomic Factors	31
DU Gap in Regime Context	33
Empirical Strategy	34
Results	38
Discussion	45
Chapter 3	48
Knowledge and Support of Democracy: Past Findings and New Leads	49
Mixed Conceptions and Democratic Support: The Case of Indonesia	50
Connecting Democratic Understanding with Democratic	52
Empirical Strategy	53
Results	59
Discussion	64
Chapter 4	66
Authoritarian Legacies and Democratic Support in Developing Democracy	68
Political Knowledge and Democratic Support in Developing Democracies	71

Case Study: 2019 Indonesian Presidential Election	72
Hypotheses	74
Empirical Strategy	77
Results	84
Discussion	87
Chapter 5	89
Democracy in SEA: What Happens Next?	89
Summary of Findings	91
Broader Implications	93
Future Research Avenues	98
Appendix A	100
A.1. Coding	100
A.2. Full logit regression results of gender effects on DU moderated by education and income, and separated by regime type	101
A.3. Full logit regression results of gender effects on DU with and without moderation by education and income per country	103
A.4. Full logit regression results of gender effects on DU with and without moderation by education and income (without Thailand)	108
Appendix B	112
B.1. Survey questionnaire (in English)	112
B.2. Balance test and manipulation check	114
B.3. Full regression results without weights	115
Appendix C	118
C.1. Survey questionnaire (in English)	118
C.2. Validity checks for political knowledge variable	121
C.3. Comparison of regression results between treatment and control groups	122
C.4. Robustness check: variation of age cut-offs	124
C.5. Robustness check: removing potential cheaters of political knowledge items	126
C.6. Voting intention in 2019	128
Bibliography	129

Declaration of Authorship

I, Aurelia Ananda, hereby declare that this dissertation and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have jointly collaborated with others, I have duly acknowledged below and clearly outlined my contribution.

Chapter 3, “Knowing It is Loving It? A Survey Experiment on Democratic Understanding and Support in Indonesia” is a joint work with Dr. Damien Bol. My contribution to the paper was the following: identification and framing of the research question, development of the survey design and political knowledge questions, translation of survey items from English to Indonesian, and setting up Facebook advertisement for respondent recruitment. I also provided information on Indonesian politics and designed and conducted the empirical analysis. Dr. Damien Bol identified and framed the research question and designed and framed the empirical analysis. Both contributed equally to the writing and final editing of the paper.

I attest that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original and does not, to the best of my knowledge, break any UK or Indonesian law, infringe any third party or intellectual property copyrights, or contain any sensitive or confidential material. The original survey on which Chapters 3 and 4 were based was approved by the ethics’ committee of King’s College London prior to its conduct. I further confirm that no part of this dissertation has been previously submitted for the award of a degree by this or any other university. The copyright of this dissertation rests with the author and no quotation or information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author.

Abstract

This dissertation explored the theoretical and empirical questions related to public opinion of democracy.

Chapter 1 outlines the motivation of the study with an overview of literature on support for democracy, democratic understanding, political knowledge, and authoritarian legacies in developing democracies. I further discuss the history, development, and perceptions of the concept of democracy in the case study region Southeast Asia (SEA) as well as case study country Indonesia.

Chapter 2 examines gender gap in democratic understanding (DU) in six countries in SEA using open-ended meaning of democracy questions from Asian Barometer (AB). DU was measured as three levels of complexity: self-efficacy, identification of substantive definition of democracy, and multidimensional understanding. My findings revealed a substantial DU gap between men and women, with women showing lower levels of self-efficacy, likelihood of providing substantive definition, and holding multidimensional DU compared to men. However, equalizing educational attainment and income opportunities substantially narrowed the gender DU gap. Furthermore, citizens of democracy have higher levels of gender DU gap compared to those living in authoritarian regimes, with varying effects of education and income in closing the gender gap.

Chapter 3 seeks to contribute new insights on the validity of support for democracy question using an original survey experiment. Co-author Dr Damien Bol and I sampled respondents in five major cities in Indonesia, and randomly exposed half to a list of procedural characteristics of democracy as treatment. Both the treatment and control group were then asked to evaluate their support for democracy. We found that being provided with additional information significantly changed levels of support and satisfaction with democracy, but only among women and respondents from lower education background.

Chapter 4 empirically tests how democratic socialization and political knowledge shape voting intentions in Indonesia using an original survey. Using the 2019 presidential election between Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and Prabowo Subianto as the background of my study, I examined how socialization under different regime contexts influence support for either candidate. The first democratic election in 1999 was used as a demarcation line between the pre-democratization cohort, who spent their most formative years educated in politics under Suharto’s authoritarian regime, and post-democratization cohort, who mostly learned about politics and democracy after democratization. I found that members of the pre-democratization cohort were less likely to vote for the pro-democracy candidate Jokowi compared to the post-democratization cohort. However, political knowledge could substitute the effect of democratic socialization and increased support Jokowi.

Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of this dissertation and outlines their contribution to the larger literature on public opinion on democracy. I offer possible trajectories of future research on the topic of support for democracy, democratic understanding, political knowledge, and authoritarian legacy in developing democracies.

List of Tables

Chapter 2

2.1. Descriptive statistics of total respondents, percentage of female respondents, and Polity IV score at the time of the survey	35
2.2. Distribution of responses	36
2.3. Distribution of responses for women	37
2.4. Descriptive statistics of control variables	38
2.5. Logit regression of gender effects on democratic understanding (DU)	39
2.6. Logit regression of gender effects on democratic understanding (DU) moderated by education and income	39
2.7. Logit regression of the effect of gender on DU by regime type	42

Chapter 3

3.1. Distribution of respondents' characteristics in the sample (S) relative to population (P)	56
3.2. Descriptive statistics of dependent variables	58
3.3. Regression of treatment effects on preference and satisfaction with democracy	60
3.4. Regression of treatment effects on preference and satisfaction with democracy, moderated by gender	61
3.5. Regression of treatment effects on preference and satisfaction with democracy, moderated by education	62

Chapter 4

4.1. Distribution of respondents' characteristics in the sample (S) relative to population (P)	78
4.2. Difference in means between Jokowi and Prabowo supporters on democracy support questions	81
4.3. Difference in means between pre- and post-democratization cohorts on democracy support indicators	82
4.4. Descriptive statistics of control variables	84
4.5. Regression table of cohort and political knowledge effect on likelihood of voting for pro-democracy candidate	85

Appendix A

A.1.1. Example of coding categorization	100
A.2.1. Logit regression of the effect of gender on DU by regime type, moderated by education	101
A.2.2. Logit regression of the effect of gender on DU by regime type, moderated by income	101
A.3.1. Logit regression of gender effects on likelihood of providing an answer	103
A.3.2. Logit regression of gender effects on likelihood of providing substantive definition of democracy	103
A.3.3. Logit regression of gender effects on likelihood of providing a multidimensional definition of democracy	104
A.3.4. Logit regression of gender effects on likelihood of providing an answer moderated by education and income	105

A.3.5. Logit regression of gender effects on likelihood of providing substantive definitions moderated by education and income	106
A.3.6. Logit regression of gender effects on likelihood of providing multidimensional definition moderated by education and income	107
A.4.1. Logit regression of the effect of gender on DU by regime type (without Thailand)	108
A.4.2. Logit regression of the effect of gender on DU by regime type, moderated by education (without Thailand)	108
A.4.3. Logit regression of the effect of gender on DU by regime type (without Thailand)	109
A.4.4. Logit regression of the effect of gender on DU by regime type, moderated by education (without Thailand)	109
A.4.5. Logit regression of the effect of gender on DU by regime type, moderated by income (without Thailand)	110
Appendix B	
B.2.1. Balance test	114
B.2.2. Manipulation check for all respondents and by gender category	114
B.3.1. Regression of treatment effects on preference and satisfaction with democracy	115
B.3.2. Regression of treatment effects on preference and satisfaction with democracy, moderated by gender	116
B.3.3. Regression of treatment effects on preference and satisfaction with democracy, moderated by education	116
Appendix C	
C.2.1. Proportion of DK and correct answers for political knowledge items	121
C.2.2. Correlation matrix and 2-sample independence t-test of knowledge items	121
C.3.1. Regression table of cohort and political knowledge effect on support for pro-democracy candidate within treatment group	122
C.3.2. Regression table of cohort and political knowledge effect on support for pro-democracy candidate within control group	122
C.4.1. Regression table of cohort and political knowledge effect on support for pro-democracy candidate (aged 5 in 1999)	124
C.4.2. Regression table of cohort and political knowledge effect on support for pro-democracy candidate (aged 25 in 1999)	124
C.5.1. Regression table of cohort and political knowledge effect on support for pro-democracy candidate without presumed cheaters	126
C.6.1. Regression table of cohort and political knowledge effect on likelihood of voting in the 2019 presidential election	128

List of Figures

Chapter 2	
2.1. Distribution of democracy definitions	36
2.2. Effect of gender on DU moderated by education and income levels	41
2.3. Effect of gender on DU moderated by education and income levels in non-democracies	43
Chapter 3	
3.1. Facebook advertisement for the main survey experiment	55
3.2. Conditional treatment effects by education levels	63
Chapter 4	
4.1. Distribution of correct answers to knowledge items	83
4.2. Predicted probability of voting for the pro-democracy candidate by cohort as political knowledge varies	86
Appendix C	
C.5.1. Distribution of survey response time	126

Chapter 1

Introduction:

The Role of Informed Citizens in Establishing Democratic Longevity

"What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."

(Fukuyama, 1989: 4)

In 1989, Francis Fukuyama delivered the claim that the end of history has arrived: liberal democracy had become the ruling ideology in the world. The collapse of Soviet Union was imminent and post-communist countries in Eastern Europe had begun their transition to democracy, with support from the European Union. Latin America in the mid to late 1980s witnessed the removal of military dictators and the establishment of democratically elected governments. In the same time frame, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan toppled their personalist leaders and permanently embedded in their respective constitutions that democracy is guaranteed for all.

By 1999, the majority of the world were democracies. Over half of the world's population in more than 170 countries lived under a democratic system or were undergoing a democratization process. The Third Wave of Democratization—composed of former colonies and countries who endured decades of authoritarian rule—defied the conventional wisdom that democracy belongs only to rich nations in the West (Lipset, 1959) or that non-Western cultures are incompatible with the principles of democracy (Huntington, 1993). Support for democracy continued to increase even among those living under a dictatorship, and nearly 30 years after Fukuyama's claim, nine in ten global citizens reported strong support and desire for democratic governance (Shin, 2015).

Despite the promising outlook, however, the global shift toward democracy was closely followed by a wave of democratic backsliding. Between 2005 and 2019, the average Freedom House score among Third Wave democracies fell by 13.2 points (Diamond, 2020: 7). The biggest offenders seemed to be countries previously hailed as success stories. After winning the election in 2016, Benin President Patrice Talon banned critical newspapers, imprisoned political opponents, and modified the electoral rules to keep out potential party challengers (Diamond, 2021: 39). Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega reinvented his authoritarian image after winning a previously unconstitutional third term in 2016. His main appeal to the voters was that a strong leadership is necessary for the return of political and economic stability (Thaler, 2017). Both Malaysia and the Philippines witnessed the return of political dynastic powers. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad returned to office in 2018, ruling a total of 24 years until he once again resigned in 2020 (Jalli and Idris, 2019). Bongbong Marcos, son of former dictator Ferdinand Marcos, won the Filipino presidential election in 2022, replacing incumbent Rodrigo Duterte who himself was a close ally of the elder Marcos (Smith, 2022).

The most common thread of these democratic regressions is that they “unfold in a more clandestine and gradual fashion than its historical precedents” (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019: 1098). The authors used the term *autocratization* to denote movements away from democracy—essentially a mirror image to the democratization process—which encompasses *democratic breakdown* and *democratic backsliding*. While the two terms have been used interchangeably, they referred to different stages of autocratization. Democratic breakdowns refer to autocratization processes that take place within a democratic setting while democratic backsliding indicates that a democracy has returned to authoritarianism.

Diamond (2020) observed that in almost all cases of Third Wave breakdowns and backsliding, the states often lack sufficiently entrenched democratic institutions, have higher levels of unequal resource distribution and modernization levels, and rarely have truly independent civil societies (see also Haggard and Kaufman, 2016). The absence of these structural features has led to the establishment of a ‘hollow’ democracy—one that is susceptible to the gradual erosions of democratic institutions and principles. Authoritarian threats facing current democracies are no longer the large, sudden acts of usurpation but have been replaced by “protracted undermining of democratic institutions” by elements within the democratic system itself (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019: 1099).

Indeed, findings from Svoboda (2013) confirmed that authoritarian practices like military *coups d'état* and electoral fraud rarely happen anymore. Instead, aspiring autocrats tend to be democratically elected. Once in office, they proceed to erode the scope of power of democratic institutions, centralize decision-making pathways, and place restrictions on civil liberties. Bermeo (2016: 10) used the term ‘executive aggrandizement’ to describe this process, where “elected executives weaken checks on executive power one by one, undertaking a series of institutional changes that hamper the power of opposition forces to challenge executive preferences.”

Pepinsky (2017) warned that some developing democracies are more susceptible to these actions than others, particularly when the state experienced costly democratic transitions, either economically or politically, or fails to sustain the transformative effects of the transition. In such cases, democracy has a short window to overperform in order to show that the benefits of democracy outweigh the costs of transition, and that the new system can provide concrete solutions to socioeconomic and political issues it has inherited from its authoritarian predecessor (Doorenspleet, 2012). For a former authoritarian populace, democracy must be “seen to work” in order for democratic support to develop (Evans and Whitefield, 1995). In practice, however, traces of authoritarian norms, institutions, and practices continue to exist and diffuse through social and organization networks in the same way and within the same space as democratic norms, institutions, and practices (Brinks and Coppedge, 2007).

To a society still learning to distinguish between elements of democracy and autocracy, subtle authoritarian pressures can be difficult to identify. Autocratic elements that seeped into a public’s perception and conceptualization of democracy tend to develop into what Kirsch and Welzel (2019) called authoritarian notions of democracy: an ideation of democracy without the explicit rejection of non-democratic norms. This does not mean that individuals who hold authoritarianized views of democracy are not themselves supportive of democracy. In fact,

many of these individuals place high levels of importance on democratic governance for their own country but express equally high levels of dissatisfaction with how democracy had been implemented. Doorenspleet (2012) argued that this is a potentially more dangerous threat to democratic stability in developing democracies. In a political environment with already weakened institutions, dissatisfaction creates passive citizens who do not vote, do not engage in politics, and do not mobilize against violations of democratic norms by the government. When they do act, they often seek for an alternative to the current political ailment, which often means an alternative to democracy.

The timing of the wave of autocratization and increased support for authoritarianized conceptions of democracy is no accident. The authoritarian-leaning leaders spearheading this wave are mostly democratically elected through free and fair elections (Zakaria, 2019). They are voted in by ambivalent democrats who may not be supporters of authoritarianism but are certainly willing to accept “significant limitations on popular control, liberal democratic procedures, and freedoms” as a trade-off for “effective governance, political order, and economic necessity” (Pietsch, 2015: 4). Anderson et al. (2021), for example, observed that while support for democracy has remained high and stable for the past 20 years, global support for strong leadership has also steadily risen almost in parallel.

The survival of democracy thus depends on highly committed democrats acting as a checking mechanism against authoritarian elements. For consolidation of democracy to take place, a strong majority should believe that democracy is the best way to govern their country (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Widespread popular support for democracy ensures that democracy remains the ‘only game in town’—this not only lends legitimacy to the democratic regime, but also minimizes any opportunity of authoritarian elements to emerge and thrive. Prior to becoming committed democrats, however, citizens must first possess a concrete understanding of democracy (Canache, 2012a). Principles, procedures, and institutions are important elements of democratic understanding, but citizens must also have a firm grasp on their role as political agents within their own democratic environment in order to develop a set of critical but informed expectations of democracy (Norris, 2011).

The following section in this introductory chapter will outline the structure of the dissertation, discuss the theoretical and empirical contribution to the literature, and summaries of each chapter. I then discuss the theoretical framework linking democracy support and democratic understanding in general and specific to developing democracies. This is followed by a review of the literature on political knowledge. I then touch briefly on the most prevalent authoritarian legacies of democracy in new democracies, including why such narratives can be particularly appealing. This includes a justification of dissertation’s focus on Southeast Asia (SEA), a region that has so far been resistant to liberal interpretations of democracy. The next section provides a brief overview of the history of democracy in Southeast Asia and Indonesia. Finally, I conclude the chapter with a brief explanation of various methodologies used to address the research questions in this dissertation.

Structure of Dissertation

What this dissertation will examine in the next three chapters is the cognitive origins of citizens' conceptualizations of political concepts and how they inform and shape citizens' support for democracy. My research addresses three questions:

- 1) What role do socioeconomic and political contexts play in shaping democratic understanding?
- 2) How does political information affect existing levels of democratic understanding and support for democracy?
- 3) How does socialization to democracy influence attitudes and support for democracy?

The choice to focus on developing democracies is a deliberate one: societies in new democracies do not yet enjoy a deeply rooted democratic culture, nor are they protected from authoritarian pressures by strong democratic institutions. The recency of the authoritarian regime is often coupled by the inability to completely remove elements of the *ancien regime* from the new democratic government. As a result, there is greater uncertainty that democracy will persist or even suitable in the first place, and this may lead citizens of developing democracies down the path of authoritarian nostalgia. Furthermore, democratic socialization in developing democracies is frequently uneven, be it due to high levels of socioeconomic inequality, wide gaps in democratic experience, or limited access to complete and unbiased political information. These factors contribute to the conceptualization and formation of attitudes towards democracy, which in turn, affect levels of support for democracy.

To note, developing democracies are not the only ones who are susceptible to democratic breakdowns. Authoritarian rhetoric remains prevalent and is increasingly adopted by swathes of citizens in developed democracies in Europe and the United States. Former democracy promoters like the United Kingdom have supported non-democratic policies that limit the right to freely protest the government and enact immigration policies that violate basic human rights. Former US President Donald Trump based his election campaign and administration policies on anti-minority, anti-LGBT, anti-immigration, and nationalistic rhetoric. Far-right parties in Germany, France, Spain, and most recently, Italy have strong footing in national politics, and push forward with platforms that promote nationalism and supremacist beliefs.

What differentiates developed from developing democracies is the existence of strong checks and balances mechanism that could prevent democratic backsliding (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). Furthermore, citizens in developed democracies have more experience with long-term and stable democracy and are socialized to democracy from an early age equipping them with the knowledge and tools to engage in politics. Part of this knowledge is the ability to identify non-democratic elements in rhetoric and policies, which allows them to mobilize against further dismantling of democratic institutions within the system.

There have been a number of regional studies on democratic understanding in developing democracies, most notably in Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Bratton and Mattes, 2001; Mattes and Bratton, 2007; Mattes, 2012; Ottomoeller, 1998; Marcus et al., 2001; Mattes and Bratton, 2016); Middle East and North Africa (e.g., de Regt, 2013; Khatib, 2022; Hecan and Farhaoui, 2021; Alessandri et al., 2016); East and Southeast Asia (e.g., Ananda and Bol, 2021; Huang, et al, 2008; Shin and Kim, 2018; Cho, 2014, 2015; Pietsch, 2015); East and post-communist Europe (e.g., Fuchs, 1999; Mishler and Rose, 2007; Auerbach and Petrova, 2022; Fuchs and

Roller, 2006); and Latin America (e.g., Canache, 2012a, 2012b; Baviskar and Malone, 2004; Kiewiet de Jonge, 2016; Crow, 2010; Carrión, 2008). There have also been global level studies on democratic understanding and conceptualizations (e.g., Dalton et al, 2007; Shin, 2017; Anderson et al., 2021).

This dissertation contributes to the literature on democratic understanding, political knowledge, and support for democracy in developing democracies in several ways. First, I analyzed the origins and factors influencing democratic understanding, in particular, the presence and extent of a gender gap (Chapter 2) and its consequences (Chapter 3). Second, I analyzed the causes of democratic support, specifically, how democratic understanding affect levels of support for democracy (Chapter 3) and whether socialization to democracy under a period of authoritarian regime shape democratic support (Chapter 4). Finally, I look at how socioeconomic factors, such as gender and education (Chapters 2 and 3) as well as political knowledge (Chapter 4), moderate the formation of support for democracy.

My research also hopes to contribute to the literature on political knowledge studies in developing democracies. The difficulty in accurately measuring what citizens know about political institutions, processes, policies, and actors lies in creating knowledge items that take into consideration the unique political landscape of developing democracies, such as socioeconomic inequality and availability of political information. To further this research agenda, I developed a battery of knowledge items specifically tailored to Indonesian citizens, which can hopefully serve as a stepping-stone for political knowledge research in Indonesia and surrounding countries.

The geographical focus of this research is Southeast Asia (SEA), a region that has long been resistant to liberal democratic ideals. Although other developing regions have adapted democracy to suit their respective needs, SEA is unique in how solid their conception of Asian-style democratic governance, how deeply embedded it is in the region's democratic history, and how consistent the preference for this form government is among SE Asians. As such, SEA provides nuances unavailable in other regions of how democracy is conceptualized and supported.

The dissertation is structured as four independent but complementary chapters. Chapter 2 examines the gender gap in democratic understanding in 7 countries in Southeast Asia. Understanding is measured using an open-ended question included in Asian Barometer and divided into multiple levels of complexity: levels of self-efficacy, substantive understanding, and multidimensionality. My findings show that gender is a strong predictor of democratic understanding: women are more likely to offer a Don't Know (DK) response, but less likely to provide a substantive definition or hold a multidimensional understanding when asked to define democracy. However, I also found that improving educational attainment and income levels help close the gender gap, confirming findings from previous studies that increased socioeconomic equality helps alleviate gender disparities and strengthens positive attitudes towards democracy. Furthermore, the chapter compares the gender gap in democratic and autocratic political contexts. Gender gap in democratic understanding seemed to be greater in democracies, likely because men and women are more exposed to varying definitions and experiences with democracy.

Chapter 3 explores the mechanism behind democratic understanding and democratic support using an original survey experiment in Indonesia. The objective is to test whether increasing information about democracy affects individual-level support for democracy, which tends to vary between genders and education levels. In the experiment, respondents are randomly exposed to a complete but brief procedural definition of democracy. They are then asked to answer three democracy support questions: whether democracy is always preferable to other types of government, whether living in democracy is important, and whether they are satisfied with democracy in the country. My findings show that the treatment is particularly effective in improving support for democracy among women and low-education individuals. This suggests that improving access to political education, especially among groups traditionally considered to be 'political have-nots', also increases levels of political efficacy and commitment to democracy.

Chapter 4 examines the practical consequences of socialization to democratic principles and political knowledge on support for democracy in Indonesia. Using an original survey, I test the variation of support for pro-democracy candidate Joko Widodo and authoritarian-leaning candidate Prabowo Subianto during the 2019 Indonesian presidential election. Respondents were divided into two cohorts: those whose most formative years were spent under the authoritarian period in Indonesia, where democratic learning was mixed with justification for authoritarian rule; and those whose formative years were spent under democratic rule, where there should be a clearer demarcation between democracy and autocracy. The goal is to determine whether authoritarian legacies in democratic socialization affect support for democracy, as reflected by the respondents' candidate preference. I also design a battery of eight knowledge items, to see if current levels of political knowledge can overcome any cohort effects. The findings show substantial and significant cohort effect in the likelihood of voting for the pro-democracy candidate—pre-democratization cohort were less likely to vote for incumbent Jokowi compared to the post-democratization cohort. However, increasing political knowledge negated this cohort effect, potentially substituting the influence of socialization to democracy.

Democratic Support in Developing Democracies

"[democracy] is no longer treated as a particularly rare and delicate plant that cannot be transplanted in alien soil; it is treated as a product that can be manufactured wherever there is democratic craftsmanship and the proper zeitgeist."

(Shin, 1994: 141)

Easton (1975: 436) defined political support as "the way in which a person evaluatively orients himself to some object through either his attitudes or his behaviour." He distinguishes support into diffuse, where individuals develop an identification with the state and its political institutions; and specific, where individuals develop attachments to political actors and policies. Norris (1999) expanded this into five conceptualizations of political support. The first is diffuse support for political community, or an attachment to the nation and willingness to cooperate with fellow nationals. The second is support for regime principles, which in this case is support for the ideals of democracy. The third focuses on regime performance—a more practical evaluation of the quality of democratic functions and implementations. The fourth

aspect is support for regime institutions, which refers to various political structures in the system, including government, parliament, and the justice system. Trust in institutions builds political legitimacy for new democratic governments, which in turn fosters positive evaluations of democratic performance and satisfaction with democracy. This encourages the development of a democratic culture where democracy is always expected to produce greater positive benefits compared to other forms of democratic alternatives. Finally, the fifth is support for specific political actors or authorities based on the evaluation of their performance.

Shin (2006) narrowed down Norris' conceptualizations of support into two types. The first is normative support or democracy-in-principle, where democracy is viewed as an ideal. This refers to loose psychological attachments that citizens have to various positive symbols of democracy, such as rights and freedoms. Strong attachments to these symbols strengthen the desire for democracy and inspire citizens to mobilize to prevent attempts at restricting them. The second is practical support or democracy-in-practice, where democracy is defined in terms of its implementation and output. Here, individuals rely on their own evaluations of regime structures and behaviors to determine their own agency within the democratic system. Citizens participate in voting and protests because they believe that the system not only guarantees their right to vote and mobilize, but also because they believe that they can enact changes and are part of the political decision-making process.

Political support for specifically—and only—democracy is thus critical to maintaining new democracies' trajectory towards consolidation. Democratic consolidation can only occur when democracy becomes 'the only game in town'—that is, when authoritarian actors are deterred from taking political actions that foster democratic breakdowns or political conflicts and a condition where changes are addressed within the parameters of a democratic system, even in times of political or economic crises (e.g., Linz and Stepan, 1996; Carothers, 2007). Pro-democratic attitudes stabilize individual and social preferences for more democratic improvements.

Furthermore, democracy requires democrats that *actively* rejects notions and support for authoritarian alternatives (Bermeo, 2003). Claassen (2020) warned that expression of support for democracy does not always equal to demand for (more) democracy, especially in developing democracies. The fact is, enclaves of authoritarian rhetoric and movements exist in democracies exactly because the system guarantees freedom of expression. Democracy is by nature responsive to the demands of the public, and this may include the demand for less democracy. Post-transition regimes often struggle to find footing in the new system. Democratic processes are unfamiliar and complex; democratic institutions are still navigating uncharted waters; and political actors have not yet built a reputation for performing well or demonstrated that they themselves are supporters for democracy (Svolik, 2013).

Under such conditions, citizens of developing democracies find themselves without a benchmark to assess democratic performance effectively and critically. The obvious choice would be to compare the current democratic regime with the previous autocratic regime (Pietsch et al., 2015). If the new chapter of democracy did not bring to a close problems rooted in authoritarianism, then what was the point of the costly democratic transition they just experienced? If the faces of political elites remain relatively unchanged, then is not the current system simply a continuation of the past system?

Support for democracy is typically measured using survey questions that capture individual-level democratic preferences, satisfaction, and institutional trust. Democratic preference taps into various dimensions of diffuse democratic support by juxtaposing democracy against various authoritarian alternatives, such as military rule, as well as by mapping out democratic expectations, such as whether democracy can or has solved problems in the country (Diamond et al., 1999). Respondents are also often asked if they agree with the Churchill hypothesis: that despite being imperfect, democracy is still the best form of government compared to others. Mishler and Rose (1996) argue that the inclusion of this question is useful to sift through the previous regime's influence on individual-level views of democracy.

Shin (2015: 13) argued that “democratic novices”, or those with little experience and limited sophistication about democratic politics, tend to “end up embracing both democratic and authoritarian propensities concurrently, instead of always choosing one or the other.” The proportion of the population in developing democracies who wished to return to authoritarianism is always small, but many will not hesitate to support the ‘good’ elements of autocracy to address sociopolitical and economic issues that they believe democracy has not been able to solve (Shin and Kim, 2018). Svolik (2013: 686) called this the “trap of pessimistic expectations”, where repeated failures of government performance are misconstrued as a failure of the democratic system.

Such conditional support for democracy is inevitably fickle. Instrumental support positions democracy as a tool or a means to pursue non-political opportunities, largely in economic terms. Ake (1996: 138), for example, contended that “the democracy movement in Africa will emphasize concrete economic and social rights rather than abstract political rights”, such as “economic opportunities, the social betterment of people, and a strong social welfare system.” Bratton and Mattes (2001: 454) confirmed this, describing how in the immediate aftermath of Apartheid, 91.3% of South Africans equated democracy with “equal access to houses, jobs, and a decent income”, with 48.3% stating that these goods are “essential to democracy.”

Similar conditional support can also be found in new democracies in Southeast Asia. Pietsch (2015: 38) observed that citizens in the Philippines (72.5%), Indonesia (78.9%), and Malaysia (62.2%) rated “economic performance and the capacity to provide health and welfare” more highly than “the more abstract concept of democracy.” Again, this is consistent with other findings that significant portions of the population in developing democracies perceive democracy in terms of public goods delivery and good governance. When the regime fails to fulfill these ‘essential’ to the people, the declining popularity of the regime also inevitably affect the perceived effectiveness of democracy. Magalhães (2014) found that low levels of effective governance correspond strongly with lower prevalence of positive views of democracy as well as lower rejection of non-democratic alternatives. Chu et al. (2008) also suggested that under poor economic conditions, citizens are more easily persuaded to support illiberal social policies in favor of policies aimed at sustaining economic growth.

It is, perhaps, easier to argue that committed democrats would not have viewed democratization from this perspective. However, the creation of committed democrats is inextricably linked to how democracy is defined and why democracy is desired by the individual in the first place (Doorenspleet, 2010). A committed democrat holds intrinsic support for

democracy—that is, democracy as an end in and of itself—which requires cognitively complex ideas, and more importantly, a firm understanding of what democracy is and is not (Bratton and Mattes, 2001).

My research contributes to the literature on democratic understanding in two ways. In Chapter 3, I tested the effect of DU on democratic support. The underlying assumption is that DU is spread heterogeneously in the population, and this affects the strength of commitment to democracy among different groups in society, particularly, along the socioeconomic cleavage. Plenty of studies have been published on the idea that ‘to know democracy is to love it’ in East and SE Asia, but I offer a novel survey experiment design to test this relationship. In Chapter 4, I analyzed how understanding of democracy affect real behavior beyond the expression of personal support. I did this by testing how DU translates into support for political actors who advocate democratic principles—that is support for pro-democracy candidates when presented with those who support democratic alternatives.

In the next section, I discuss the patterns and distribution of DU with a particular focus on developing democracies.

Democratic Understanding in Developing Democracies

“In newly democratic or democratizing countries, where people are just beginning to learn the arts of self-government, the question of citizen competence possesses an obvious urgency.”

(Dahl, 1992: 45)

Cho (2014) explains how being well-informed about democracy serves as a biased framework to develop positive or negative democratic attitudes. First, being informed indicates the extent of intellectual involvement in democratic issues, events, and messages. Such involvement allows individuals to integrate the distinct characteristics and unique functions of democracy into their long-term memory. Second, the framework helps individuals to identify and reject information that is incongruent with their knowledge of democracy and further crystallize these attitudes thus removing the conditionality aspects of democratic support. This stability ensure that democratic integrity continues to be the top priority in citizens’ minds when faced with exogenous shocks that may destabilize the regime. Finally, constant positive exposure to democracy leads to the development of consistent favorability towards it (see also Gibson and Caldeira, 2009). Separating the inherent principles and values of democracy from its implementation helps citizens to evaluate democracy more positively, and accurately hold those in power accountable.

Cultivating democratic understanding is a two-step process. First, the individual must learn to identify democratic and authoritarian characteristics (McClosky and Zaller, 1984). These characteristics stem from how democracy has been defined, mainly by scholars.¹ Unidimensional conceptions narrowly define democracy as one of its dimensions, most

¹ Unidimensional conceptions of democracy are also referred to as narrow, thin, or minimal in political science literature, while multidimensional conceptions are often referred to as broad, thick, or minimal (e.g., Coppedge, 1999).

commonly as procedures like election and universal suffrage. Schumpeter (1976: 250) encapsulated this, defining democracy as an

“[...] institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will.”

Elections and competition in general are the most common definition shared by citizens of new democracies. During the authoritarian period, citizens are most likely limited in their ability to express their political preferences; as such, the experience of freer and fairer elections participated by multiple political parties bring procedural characteristics to the forefront of definitions of democracy.

A multidimensional democratic understanding suggests that the individual is able to cognitively construct a complex, interconnected design of the various components of democratic governance (Canache, 2012b). These dimensions stem from Dahl's (1989: 233) definition of a *polyarchical* system, in which he included as essential the need for

- 1) Control over governmental decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.
- 2) Elected officials are chosen and peacefully removed in relatively frequent, fair and free elections in which coercion is quite limited.
- 3) Practically all adults have the right to vote in these elections.
- 4) Most adults also have the right to run for the public offices for which candidates run in these elections.
- 5) Citizens have an effectively enforced right to freedom of expression, particularly political expression, including criticism of the officials, the conduct of the government, the prevailing political, economic, and social system, and the dominant ideology.
- 6) They also have access to alternative sources of information that are not monopolized by the government or any other single group.
- 7) Finally, they have an effectively enforced right to form and join autonomous associations, including political associations, such as political parties and interest groups, that attempt to influence the government by competing in elections and by other peaceful means.

Multidimensionality evolved to include other inclusive and liberal aspects of democracy and goes beyond a simplistic identification characteristics. The most important part of this understanding is that these multiple components—which additionally include alternation of power, protection of minorities, and legitimate pathways of accountability—should build up in such a way that the removal of any one of them is immediately flagged as a signal of democratic breakdown (Baviskar and Malone, 2004).

Second, individuals must be able to discriminate against authoritarian elements (McClosky and Zaller, 1984). This emphasizes not only support for democracy, but also rejection of non-democratic alternatives, such as strong unchecked leaders, military rule, and one-party systems. Studies consistently found that while most citizens of developing democracies are able to pass the first step with flying colors, they often struggle with differentiating and discriminating against autocratic features. For this reason, Canache (2012a: 1151) stressed that the ability to discriminate between elements of democracy and nondemocracy must be “causally prior” to attitudes or preferences, while Welzel (2013: 309, 315) emphasized the importance for demand for democracy to be supported by its “proper notion” to prevent redirection towards nondemocratic goals.

Shin and Kim (2018) discovered a concerning trend that nearly 40% of global democratic citizens are unable to differentiate between characteristics of democracy and non-democracy. Furthermore, the study found that over 90% of respondents in Sub-Saharan Africa and East/SEA are either uninformed or misinformed on whether a system is democratic or autocratic.² The findings are echoed across regional surveys. While the modal response among Afrobarometer respondents is civil liberty, procedural definitions, like popular participation in government, and economic outcomes, like the delivery of political goods and economic benefits, are almost as prevalent (Mattes and Bratton 2007; Bratton 2010; Ottomoeller 1998). Similarly in Asia, ‘elections’, ‘good governance’, and economic security are single keywords most commonly associated with democracy compared to any type of freedom (Shin and Kim 2018: 237; Chu, et al 2013: 33; Cho 2015).

This partly explain why in countries where democratic support incongruence is high, citizens also report high levels of democracy satisfaction. Norris (2011), for example, observed an 80% rate of democratic satisfaction in Zimbabwe, where semi-regular elections are often eclipsed by one-party rule, pervasive corruption, electoral malpractice, and voter suppression. Similarly in the Philippines, Duterte’s extrajudicial war against ‘drug personalities’ that has claimed over 5,000 lives earned the president a consistently high approval rating of over 80% (Dressel and Bonoan, 2019).

This supports the argument that while democratic understanding is a necessity for citizens in developing democracies, it serves mostly as a gateway for more complex political learning. Democratic knowledge is often static, system related, and abstract—it taps into one dimension of citizenship that motivates active engagement, positive attitudes, and support for democracy. To participate wholly and meaningfully, citizens must also possess knowledge of broader political concepts, policies, and institutional actors to inform their decision-making in the political sphere. The following section discusses the composition and consequences of political knowledge, as well as the factors that shape access to political information.

The research in this dissertation adds to the DU literature in two ways. In Chapter 2, I explored the gender gap, a previously unexplored cleavage in DU studies in SEA. Using combined methods from previous DU studies in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, I tested not only what citizens know about democracy but also levels of self-efficacy and complexity of understanding. In Chapter 3, I added a test of causal effect of DU for democratic support using an experimental design. The next section discusses how political knowledge levels complement DU in order to fully inform citizens’ support for democracy.

Political Knowledge: A Case for Political Education

Lupia (2016) defined information as a means of communicating particular attributes of object, observations, and ideas; while knowledge is defined as the ability to remember these attributes and assign relationships between the various objects. In other words, knowledge is the organization of pieces of information. Hence, possessing incorrect or biased information can

² Shin and Kim (2018: 238-242) used vignettes describing three to four different political systems included in Afrobarometer and Asian Barometer to measure respondents’ ability to correctly identify the political system as democratic or autocratic.

reduce one's knowledge of the subject matter. Not only do information and knowledge relate on a hierarchy of complexity, but they also increase in acquisition cost. Neuman (1986) states that developing knowledge requires a more cognitively sophisticated system of obtaining new information and integrating new input into an existing knowledge schema. Political knowledge is a central component that mediates political salience and the more complex process of understanding.

To understand a subject matter, Lipton (2004) argued that the individual must accompany their knowledge with a "knowledge of causes", which involves not only the what but also the how and the why. Where political knowledge measures the ability to recall stored information, political understanding examines the capacity to explain the information and incorporates, among other things, experience, and extrapolation of existing knowledge (Greco, 2014). As such, understanding of political constructs is the coherent organization of complex and multi-layered knowledge items.

Barabas et al. (2014) separated knowledge items into two types. Fixed knowledge, which refers to long-term information on political systems, such as a country's constitution or structure of checks and balances in a presidential system. This information is most often introduced in civic classes but may be expanded through consistent exposure to relevant information, such as news about the supreme court. Dynamic knowledge often changes and consists of short-term inflow of information, such as electoral campaign messages and issue advocacy. The knowledge type requires higher cognitive preparedness to integrate and update existing information quickly and may be more costly for individuals to acquire. Jerit and Barabas (2017) further classified knowledge in terms of generality and specificity. General knowledge usually includes information on institutional functions or offices, while specific knowledge covers public policies or political actors.

However, political knowledge studies in developing democracies are difficult to come by. Elff (2009) explained that not only do knowledge items tap into different dimensions in different countries, different political conditions also significantly impact the distribution of knowledge. For example, one of Delli Carpini and Keeter's (1996) political knowledge items asked respondents about the succession line for the presidency after the vice president. While this may be a relevant measure in the United States, this may not be the case in countries with different political structures, or even one where fundamental political information about the regime is simply not openly shared.

Setzler (2002) highlighted that developing democracies often share traits, such as incoherent party and ideological systems, and poor socialization efforts, that render standard evaluations of individual issue consistency or policy preferences useless. Instead, he argued in favor of using less complex measures of political sophistication that included identifying key political actors, the extent of which citizens gather and process basic news, and voting information as the new standard. Issues that are more salient to individual political life would have been more reflective of political knowledge and are less contingent upon egalitarian contexts, such as socioeconomic inequalities.

To simplify this cross-national transference issue, Mattes and Bratton (2007: 202) illustrated political information as "cognitive hooks on which [individuals] can hang accumulated

information gleaned from the news or everyday experience". Pande (2011) demonstrated that when citizens in rural India are given better access to political information, they report greater voter turnout, higher levels of responsiveness, improved perception of political freedom, and increased criticalness in evaluating government performance. In fact, when citizens are able to shift the blame from flaws in democratic ideals onto dysfunctions caused by the regime, they are more likely to vote out under-performing incumbents and demand for better governance. It shows that widening the availability of political information in developing democracies is crucial in fostering healthy democratic discourse and behavior. Lup (2015) further suggested that political information is an important motivator for informal political discussions in former authoritarian countries that used to strictly regulate political expressions. Knowledgeable individuals are more likely to openly discuss and disagree on political issues without fear of retribution, because they understand that a democratic system has afforded them these freedoms.

Knowledgeable individuals are also more likely to turn out to vote and vote in accordance with their interests. Although the common wisdom is that most individuals have low levels of information, proponents of correct voting argue that low information effects correct itself as individual-level random errors cancel out at an aggregate level (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997). However, politically uninformed voters are not a neutral force. In some cases, informing uninformed voters actually alter election results in both established and developing democracies (Bartels, 1996; Tóka and Popescu, 2007). Jankü and Libich (2019) also found that countries with large proportions of low-informed voters are more likely to fall into the ignorance trap, where politicians who advocate policies that deliberately reinforce voter ignorance continued to be elected.

Studies on the origins and factors shaping political knowledge is relatively extensive. An individual's socioeconomic background is touted to be a reliable determinant of political knowledge levels. Of these, education has been found to be the "strongest single predictor" of political knowledge (e.g., Carpini and Keeter, 1996). Civic classes are typically the first introduction to political information for an individual (Highton, 2009). At an early age, students learn about their country's political system, institutions, and relevant political leaders. This early exposure is also critical in educating citizens about the accepted political norms and values in the system. In settings where access to formal education may be restricted, Finkel and Ernst (2005) observed that extraneous civic programs are equally effective in introducing citizens to various political concepts, such as civic duty, accountability, and rules of electoral engagements. Their findings show that the magnitude of effects of civic education on knowledge levels is twice as large among students in developing democracies like South Africa compared to students in established democracies like the US.

Political education also encourages political interest and political efficacy among citizens. It provides individuals with the cognitive preparedness to process increasing amount of political information, which, in turn, allows them to consume more political information (Jerit et al., 2006). Wei and Hindman (2011) explained that individuals with higher levels of education use digital resources in vastly more capital-enhancing ways, in that they consume significantly more political and government information compared to individuals from low education background. Efficacious and knowledgeable individuals also tend to intentionally seek and

maintain repetitive exposure of political information as a whole rather than selectively choosing and processing the information (Prior, 2005).

The second most reliable predictor of political knowledge is gender. In particular, the political knowledge literature has identified a substantial knowledge gap between men and women. Women are exposed to fewer political information and therefore develop lower levels of political knowledge compared to men (Verba et al., 1997). The literature offers various explanations as to why this is. Dolan (2011) attributed the historically lower social positioning of women as the source of differential political socialization between men and women. The socialization of politics as "a man's world" from an early age has been linked to lower levels of self-efficacy, political interest, participation in institutional political activities, and investment in researching general political issues among adult women (Wolak and McDevitt, 2011).

Women are also typically less educated than men, often discouraged from publicly engaging in politics, and more likely to be excluded from education and training that would have afforded them the means and opportunities for political learning (Konte and Klasen, 2016). In many developing democracies with high levels of gender disparities and where gender roles are strictly enforced, women tend to be the primary caretaker in a household and therefore have different access to material resources and space for knowledge acquisition (Fraile, 2014; Frazer and Macdonald, 2003). As Baviskar and Malone (2004: 9) observed, women are expected to "assign greater importance to their own and their family's welfare than [...] elections and political and civil liberties."

Since political information rarely exists in an environmental vacuum, institutional factors also serve as regulators of its distribution. For example, Leeson (2008: 160) found that countries with higher media freedom correlates with better informed and highly engaged citizenry. In fact, the author reveals that falling from the highest level of media freedom to the lowest ranking results in a 42% increase in average political ignorance. In countries where media freedom is restricted, citizens encounter greater media monopoly by the state, pervasive censorship, and unchecked political misinformation (Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011).

This opens a society to higher degrees of political *misinformation*, where hoaxes, fake news, and alternative facts perpetuate throughout various information distribution channels. Dancy and Sheagley (2013) warned of the dangers of misinformation: less knowledgeable individuals are less able to identify inaccuracies in the political information they consume. Even when they rely on internal or external heuristics, these individuals are less likely to question the accuracy of these cues. When opinion leaders signal changes in their heuristics, less knowledgeable individuals often do not reassess the impact of such changes on their own preferences. Furthermore, misinformed individuals are more likely to perform selective cognitive assessments where new inputs that negatively affect their existing knowledge are rejected and integrate only those that reaffirm their perception (Berinsky, 2017).

As such, misinformed individuals rarely use political information in a manner that positively contributes to the improvements of democratic quality. Even when citizens are moderately informed about democracy, such as through formal education and daily exposure to democratic norms, disengagement from political news and ongoing reduces their ability to identify and respond to non-democratic norms while it is happening. Both uninformed and

misinformed individuals are less likely to support genuine democratic endeavors—the combination of low levels of democratic understanding and political knowledge instead create a citizenry that is more susceptible to authoritarian influences.

I further contribute to the political knowledge and democratic support literature by testing how knowledge of political systems, institutions, policies, and actors moderates the effect of authoritarian legacies on the formation of support for democracy in Chapter 4. In the section below, I discuss the origins and implications of authoritarian legacies and notions of democracy.

Authoritarian Legacies in Developing Democracy

“Being democratic, or claiming to be, is like a currency: Credibly holding it adds political capital to those who claim it as their type of rule.”

(O’Donnell, 2007: 6)

An individual’s political environment determines the type of political norms and values to which they are socialized. In democracies, learning about democracy is encouraged and facilitated, for example, through civic and history classes. Democratic norms are also socialized through opportunities to engage in political experiences, such as voting and participating in protests, which further inform them of various political concepts (Norris 1999). The freedom of access political information through various independent media is linked to higher motivation to seek those information. Rhue and Sundararajan (2014) argued that growing Internet penetration in developing democracies—more specifically, ownership of mobile devices with Internet capabilities—has a positive impact on maintaining high levels of civil liberties. Citizens not only have access to a wider variety of sources and political information, but they can also observe their own government in action with greater visibility, transparency, and accountability.

In autocracies, democratic socialization is highly restricted—the norms learned through education and daily exposures are those that align with the interests of the state (Sanborn and Thyne, 2014). The goal is to amplify the narrative surrounding government accomplishments and obscure those that pertain to regime failures. Sources of authoritarian political narratives typically originate from the regime, often distributed via the media (Geddes and Zaller, 1989). Political elites, especially those in power, tend to produce discourses that are supportive of their own regime and political alliances. State-controlled media work hand-in-hand to circulate these opinions and control the extent to which people are exposed to the principles and practices of democracy (Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011).

However, these harder forms of repression are no longer the norm among authoritarian regimes. Highly restrictive state control and blatant violations of rights and freedoms are more likely to contribute to the destabilization and delegitimization of the regime in the long run (Rozenas and Zhukov, 2019). Instead, Escriba-Folch (2013) argues, soft repression more effectively preserves autocratic authority. It is no accident that electoral authoritarianism has become increasingly more prevalent—participation in elections manages citizens’ political

efficacy and expectations of good governance and makes rebranding of state image to that of a 'democracy' easier to accept (Schedler, 2002).

These finer forms of control, where the state employs subtle restrictions to political and civil liberties, are largely un-identifiable to those unfamiliar with democracy. Practices such as fragmentation of opposition forces, informal disenfranchisement, redistributive electoral rules by way of institutional bias, and preventing elected officers from exercising their constitutional power can go unnoticed as they take place behind the scenes and affect only segments of the population (Schedler, 2002: 37-39). To citizens who associate regular elections with democracy, the ability to vote and universal suffrage is considered a sufficient fulfillment of their political agency (Pietsch, 2015).

Most concerningly, the same strategies are also found in developing democracies, though perhaps to a lesser extent and enforcement. Curato and Fossati (2020: 1009) referred to this as 'authoritarian innovations', a set of practices that "emphasize novel developments in authoritarian practices in both democracies and autocracies." These practices promote exclusion of voices, concentrate political decision-making power, constrain political conversations, control political information, and increase the cost of participation. Furthermore, these innovations are often enacted within a legal democratic context—as policies, application of new technology, or shift in rhetorical styles. Mietzner (2019: 1028) called this the "weaponization of political agents", where elite political actors breed dissension among the populace to amplify support for non-democratic regime measures.

The adjacence between practices of electoral authoritarianism and electoral democracies has thus given rise to a redefinition of democracy. When democratic understanding is informed by a political education that ignore or justify these practices, and by experiences that consistently uphold and apply non-democratic norms, citizens' conceptions of democracy become skewed. As a result, Shin (2015) explained, the endorsement of liberal notions of democracy is often accompanied by support for authoritarian notions. Norris (2011) further observed that authoritarian notions of democracy is prevalent in countries that are less developed, less connected, and less democratic.

According to Kirsch and Welzel (2018: 60), authoritarian notions of democracy define democracy as "obedience to the 'guardianship' of 'wise' rulers whose authority defies constitutional checks, public criticism, and electoral contestation (or at least fair contestation)." Leaders are viewed with authority over the society, greatly influencing the type and content of political discourse in the public sphere and positioned as more knowledgeable on political matters than ordinary citizens. This perception encourages the reduction of checking mechanisms against the leader—legislative and judiciary checks are seen as interfering forces that lend no benefit to the democratic process.

This non-democratic parallels have been captured extensively in surveys on democratic support (e.g., Cho, 2015; Shin and Kim, 2018; Kirsch and Welzel, 2018; Rose and Mishler, 1996; Bratton and Mattes, 2001; Jamal and Tessler, 2008). Results from measures of support for strong leaders, leadership by religious authorities, army rule, and one party systems confirmed that while support for democracy remains high, they co-exist with preferences for authoritarian governance. Mishler and Rose (1996), found that some post-communist societies

continue to personal dictatorships, primarily in the form of economic technocrats that can assert control over economic policies without much challenge. In their analysis of the World Values Survey covering a 15-year period, Anderson et al. (2021) found that while support for democracy remains high and stable, the level of support for strong leaders still continued to increase over the years, particular among Latin Americans.

Perhaps the most prevalent and successful authoritarian notion of democracy is the Asian values. While it has Confucian origins, the set of values was first popularized and implemented in governance in SEA. Thompson (2015) argued that the Asian values discourse specifically targets Western-style liberal democracy, which is portrayed by various SEA leaders as a threat to the Asian way of life. Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad, for example, launched “Look East” in 1982 as a broader campaign against Western values (Sani, 2008). The sentiment is echoed by former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in a quotation that has become the basis of arguments in support of Asian values since (Zakaria, 1994: 111):

“But as a total system, I find parts of [liberal democracy] totally unacceptable [...] The expansion of the right of the individual to behave or misbehave as he pleases has come at the expense of orderly society. In the East, the main object is to have a well-ordered society so that everybody can have maximum enjoyment of his freedom. This freedom can only exist in an ordered state and not in a natural state of contention and anarchy.”

The ideas presented by two of SEA’s highly influential leaders only further embolden claims of Asia’s democratic exceptionalism elsewhere. Asian-style democracy has manifested in different ways since: ‘guided democracy’ in Indonesia under Sukarno; ‘discipline-flourishing democracy’ in Myanmar under Ne Win; and ‘Thai-style democracy’ in Thailand under Thaksin Shinawatra (Case, 2015). Under the banner of Asian-style democracy, the regimes combine democratic institutions with the outcome-oriented principles of good governance. The values emphasize five ‘claims’ (Robison, 1996: 311):

- 1) Hierarchical structure of the family, with the head of the family as the source of authority, is parallel with hierarchy of the social order
- 2) Interests of the community or the group take precedence over the interests of the individuals
- 3) Political decision-making is arrived at through processes of consensus rather than confrontation
- 4) Social cohesion and social harmony are priorities, achieved through moral principles and strong government
- 5) Economic growth and development are a concomitant of social cohesion and strong government, and a right of every citizen and country

Part of the appeal is the trade-off of democratic development for economic growth. The region looked to Singapore as a model of prosperity, cementing the perception that democracy is not necessarily an important pre-requisite to address sociopolitical and economic ailments. From this perspective, the Singapore Model is a success story, where a post-colonial island-state with third-world economy was transformed into one of the world’s richest economies in a single generation. The model applies a mix of liberal economic policies with illiberal social policies, a blend that has been adopted by neighboring countries in the region, by economic giant China—adapted into the Beijing Consensus—and by developing democracies in Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Carothers, 1997; Ortmann, 2013).

The Singapore model is consistent with instrumental conceptualization and support for democracy. Pietsch (2015) revealed that government responsiveness and accountability, as well as its trustworthiness, are the main determinants in the evaluation of democratic performance and support by SEA publics. As such, democracy in the region is not measured by any conventional characteristics that actually make up a democracy, such as elections or political rights. Instead, it is measured by the benefits citizens enjoy regardless of the system of governance. If democracy delivers potentially higher benefits than authoritarian forms of democracy, then citizens would orient themselves towards it.

In response, both electoral autocracies and developing democracies in the region prioritize the implementation of visible democratic features, such as regular elections and multiparty systems, in order to justify their adoption of the label ‘democracy.’ One-party states such as Vietnam and Laos, for example, hold regular elections and use them to portray their regimes as democratic (Pietsch, 2015). This creates a discrepancy between what citizens understand as democratic and the reality of their political environment. As Chapter 2 and 3 will discuss in greater detail, citizens in autocratic states reported much higher levels of agreement that democracy is a ‘good’ political system and levels of democratic satisfaction compared to rates found among citizens actually living in democracies.

This is not to say that there is no competing discourse against Asian-style democracy in the region. Pro-democracy activists share the same distrust as critics of Asian values and have continued to advocate for the uncompromised implementation of liberal democratic principles (Dore, 2019). The ‘Red Shirts’ in Thailand, for example, are supporters of liberal reforms and liberal democracy that have, for a long time, struggle against the pro-monarchy and pro-military ‘Yellow Shirts’ (Thabchumpon, 2016). Pro-democracy activists, in particular labor union leaders, university students, and journalists, were the forces behind demands for liberal democracy in Indonesia during Suharto’s dictatorship (Aspinall, 2005; Mietzner, 2013). During the 2014 and 2019 Indonesian presidential elections, pro-democracy activists once again mobilized against anti-democratic protests. Liberal political activists in Malaysia—and supporters of Anwar Ibrahim—have taken up the cause of establishing a “genuinely secular state” since the mid-1990s (Weiss, 2004: 144-145). In 2022, Ibrahim led “Malaysia’s first truly multi-ethnic coalition” Pakatan Harapan to victory (BBC, 2022).

Yet, Pepinsky (2017) noted that the rapid rise of populist leaders in the region—specifically those whose rhetoric centers around nationalism and ‘re-establishment’ of social order—is a sign that Asian values is unlikely to be replaced by liberal democracy anytime soon. Even in the Philippines and Indonesia, where promising grassroots-driven democratization took place in 1986 and 1998, respectively, the rise of Rodrigo Duterte and Prabowo Subianto seemed nearly inevitable.

In Chapter 4, I offer an examination of how the context within which an individual learns about democracy—whether it is under an authoritarian or democratic regime—affects democratic preferences. In particular, authoritarian notions of democracy resurface when citizens determine their choice of candidates, and that this choice is moderated by individual-level political knowledge.

Support for (Asian-style) Democracy in Southeast Asia

*"[Western] democracies are only beginning to learn that too much freedom is dangerous."
(Mahathir Mohammad in Sani, 2008: 16)*

Over 20 years since the devastating impact of the Asian Financial Crisis, SEA has experienced stable economic growth. As a result, the region experienced a massive expansion of the middle class that originated from the region's hardest poverty-stricken areas (Thompson, 2015). Although traditionally associated with being the primary drivers behind the demand for democracy, the Southeast Asian middle class is divided on democratic support. Fukuyama (2012) finds that in Thailand, the increase of well-educated, technologically connected urbanites has led them to fear the redistributive demands of the poor. For protection, they line up with political elites in rejecting the implementation of liberal democracy, which they believe would facilitate such redistribution.

Capuno (2016) also finds high levels of middle-class support in Singapore for the regime. Lee and the People's Action Party have successfully transformed the island-state from a third-world economy into one of the world's richest economies in a single generation by implementing the 'Singapore Model', which applies a mix of liberal economic policies and illiberal social policies. This blend is adopted and adjusted by neighboring countries in the region, including Viet Nam and Cambodia, who have enjoyed their own economic boom and rising middle class. The region's highest-ranking democracy is no different—Indonesia's Prabowo is supported primarily by the educated urban middle class, who would have had the most to lose from his resource nationalism platform (Mietzner, 2019).

This is what makes SEA a unique case study for scholars of democratic understanding and support. Democracies like Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines are no longer considered to be in transition or incomplete democracies, but have instead consolidated into illiberal democracies (Zakaria, 2007; Bourchier, 2019). Asian-style governance persists because they are supported by a large majority of the population in democracies. Kim (2010) found that SE Asians score higher in three of four dimensions of Asian values even compared to their East and South Asians neighbors.³ Yet, as Chapter 2 will show, over two-thirds of SE Asians in both democratic and non-democratic systems are able to correctly identify and supply substantive definitions of democracy, which revolved primarily around rights-based *liberal* definitions. This suggests that they *do* associate democracy with political freedoms, protection of civil liberties, and equality, and even value these attributes more than procedural or outcome-based aspects of democracy. There seems to be a desire for *some* liberal aspects of democracy, but these rights and freedoms must be subservient to the public good.

Shin's (2015) argued that citizens in SEA express strong preference for hybrid regimes because they believe that hybrid elements optimize governance. Where democracy provides freedom of expression, autocracy maintains social harmony. Where democracy offers independent civil

³ That is, they place much greater values on familiar values (e.g., filial duty); deference to authority (e.g., deference to hierarchy, penchant for order and stability, preference for strong leadership, and emphasis on consensual governance over competition and contention); and on work ethics and self-cultivation through education (Kim, 2010: 320-322).

societies, autocracy provides stability and order. The author's findings showed that Filipinos are the greatest supporters for hybrid regimes at 64%, followed by Malaysians (48.9%) and Indonesians (39.7%)—three of the only four democracies in the region. When we look closely at whether citizens believe democracy is a suitable form of government for their country, the trio once again reported the lowest ratings: 62.3% in the Philippines, 69.8% in Indonesia, and 80% in Malaysia. As a comparison, 64.5% of respondents in autocratic China and 82.3% in established democratic South Korea agree that democracy is suitable.

This further confirms that SE Asians have aspirations for an illiberal—but still very much democratic—form of government. These ideals are, of course, antithetical. Critics of Asian-style democracy and the Singapore model rightly observe that Asian democratic exceptionalism simply serves to “disguise, justify, and preserve semi-democratic regimes prevailing in the region” (Kim, 2010: 318). Still, popular support in SEA and the adoption of the Singapore model by other developing democracies—as well as electoral autocracies—serve as an endorsement of how persuasive Asian-style governance can be. The fact that this authoritarian notion did not elicit negative reactions from international liberal democratic actors only further entrench the belief among SE Asians that Asian values and Asian-style democracy is a legitimate form of governance.

In the following section, I narrow into the history and development of democracy in Indonesia, the country focus for Chapter 3 and 4.

Democracy in Indonesia: History and Development

“The New Order wants to implement democracy in economy. It is an order to achieve a social, political, economic, and cultural society with Pancasila and Belief in God Almighty as our moral values.”

(Inaugural Speech by Suharto, 1968)

Indonesia underwent multiple periods of authoritarianism under the country's first president Sukarno and his successor Suharto. Their regimes were characterized by nationalist discourse, strictly controlled elections, and high centralization of powers in both the executive and its capital, Jakarta. Despite Sukarno's reputation as an independence fighter, his presidency from 1945-1966 was marked by various bouts of political instability and authoritarianization of Indonesia's democratic foundations.

Van der Kroef (1957) described how Sukarno pushed through the Provisional 1950 Constitution to overrule the 1945 Constitution, effectively transforming the presidential system into a parliamentary system, and further centralizing the executive's powers. Though Indonesia had its first democratic elections in 1955, Sukarno's hostility towards Western-style majoritarian democracy led to the formation of 'Guided Democracy'. The new system sought to bring together ideologically conflicting political parties under one banner of 'national harmony' and *gotong royong* (collective collaboration). Protests by political parties and the army against this centralization led to the restoration of the 1945 Constitution and presidential system (Mujani et al., 2018). Facing weakened support, Sukarno dissolved the constitutional assembly soon after and replaced its elected members with appointed ones.

Backed by anti-Sukarno forces, Army Chief General Suharto staged a coup d'état and removed Sukarno from office in 1966. Two years later, he was officially appointed Indonesia's new president. Under Suharto's New Order, political parties were further culled and forced into aligning with one of three authorized parties: the moderate Islamist Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), the secular-nationalist Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI), and the state's main party vehicle Golongan Karya (Golkar) (Aspinall et al., 2015). Indonesia held its second election in 1971 and every five years since, where Golkar continued to dominate by a landslide over the next 30 years.

The New Order facilitated rampant corruption by Suharto's cronies, centralization of patronage politics, and violations of human rights, including forced disappearances of dissidents and enforcement of discriminatory policies against ethnic-Chinese Indonesians (Vatikiotis, 1998). Yet, the corporate-style management of Suharto also oversaw massive infrastructure and institutional growth, sustaining an annual economic growth rate of 6% over 25 years (Liddle, 1996). Liddle (1996: 59) further noted that the economic growth legitimized the regime and Suharto's strongman leadership, stabilizing support for the regime over time.

This quickly dissolved when the Asian Financial Crisis hit in 1997, collapsing the regional economies in East and Southeast Asia, including Indonesia. Davidson (2018) listed that the combination of economic collapse, persistent student *pro-Reformasi* (reformation) protests, urban middle-class dissatisfaction, elite defection, nationwide riots, and a polarized military as the main causes of Suharto's resignation in May 1998. Among the parties involved in the defense and subsequent alleged coup against Suharto during this time was General Prabowo Subianto, Suharto's son-in-law and future presidential contender.

In the years after Suharto's resignation, Indonesia experienced two important periods of liberalization. The first was the commonly overlooked interim period under Suharto's former vice president Burhanuddin Jusuf Habibie. Habibie's rule between May 1998 and October 1999 introduced five formative and fundamental reforms to Indonesian politics: a lift on barriers to amend the 1945 Constitution; a limit of two terms for presidency and vice presidency; law packages to promote regional autonomy and decentralization; an overturn of laws restricting press freedom and freedom of speech; and re-establishment of linkages with democracies around the world (Anwar, 2010). By cutting his own term short by four years, Habibie also brought forward the election from 2003 to 1999, to ensure immediate democratic governance in Indonesia.

Habibie signed off on 48 political parties to participate in the first post-*Reformasi* election in 1999. Of these 48, most relied on mobilizing "socioreligious, ethnic, or similar identity-based appeals" while the rest were catch-all parties centered around political personalities (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2019: 71-72). At the end of the election, 21 parties entered the parliament, led by Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P) an offshoot of Suharto-era PDI with Sukarno's daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri at the helm (Mujani et al., 2018). Unlike subsequent elections, however, the first post-*Reformasi* executives were elected by members of the parliament in a semi-parliamentary style system. Moderate Muslim cleric Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati emerged as president and vice president, respectively.

The new president built upon Habibie's liberalization reforms, albeit at a much smaller scale. Wahid lifted restrictions on civic organizations, such as unions and other political organizations, removed military-allocated seats in parliament, and continued Habibie's efforts of decentralization, including building negotiations with separatist movements in Aceh and Papua (Aspinall, 2010). He also lifted sanctions against the celebration of Chinese culture in Indonesia, a move welcomed by ethnic-Chinese Indonesians after Suharto's 30-year ban.

Wahid was impeached in 2001 and replaced by Megawati as president until the next election in 2004. Indonesia's liberalization stalled under Megawati, but she oversaw important electoral reforms that would serve as blueprints for future elections. The most important was the shift towards direct popular elections for the presidency and vice presidency, as well as local heads of government (Aspinall, 2010). Megawati lost the 2004 elections after a competitive two rounds against four other candidates, two of which were former New Order political actors. Her former minister General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, popularly known as SBY, won the contest.

The SBY administration was primarily marked by stagnant economic growth, poor handling of various natural disasters including the 2004 tsunami, and widely publicized corruption scandals. Aspinall and Mietzner (2014) noted that after winning a second term in 2009, SBY's approval ratings continually fell from 75% in November 2009 to 30% by May 2013. The unpopularity of his fuel subsidy cuts, political hesitancy, attempts to dismantle the Corruption Eradication Commission, and corruption charges involving Bank Century's political donations to his 2009 campaign and political party Partai Demokrat led to SBY's political downfall.

Aspinall and Mietzner (2014: 351) attributed the rise of populist candidates Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Prabowo Subianto in 2014 to the "general malaise" of Indonesian politics during SBY's presidency. By 2014, Indonesia was already showing signs of democracy fatigue. Pietsch (2015) found low levels of confidence for every state institution in the survey, the lowest being confidence in political parties (31%) and parliament (39%). Fewer Indonesians expressed support for democracy and a lower percentage refused to denounce authoritarian alternatives (24%) compared to its less democratic neighbor Malaysia (47%). In fact, Dore (2019) observed that just over ten years after its first democratic elections, about 41% of Indonesians still endorsed "having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections", and even higher levels of support for technocratic rule (53%) and army rule (52%). Mujani et al. (2018) followed with reports of low levels of satisfaction with democracy amongst Indonesians at 58.4% in 2014—a nearly 20-point drop from 2009. The authors also observe a reduction in Indonesians' commitment to democracy as the best form of government, which was linked to poorly rated government performance both locally and nationally.

Davidson (2018) outlined Indonesia's two main obstacles in the run-up to the 2019 elections. The first is Jokowi's turn from a former democracy icon during his campaigns in 2012 (for Governor of Jakarta) and 2014 into a permissive illiberal technocrat, who has turned a blind eye to violations of human rights against sexual and religious minorities, clamped down on freedom of speech and dissidents, and appease political rivals and anti-democratic elements through patronage politics. The second is increasing polarization in ideology, discourse, and most concerningly, democratic preferences among citizens. Warburton and Aspinall (2019)

warned that the growing polarization between pluralist and Islamist forces is likely to give rise to stronger authoritarian oppositions to Indonesia's consolidation efforts in the future.

Methodology

This dissertation used data from both secondary survey and original survey. In Chapter 2, I analyzed data from Asian Barometer (AB) survey, a cross-national survey of 18 states and territories in East, Southeast, and South Asia. The regional survey is part of the Global Barometer Survey group, which conducts surveys in Africa (Afrobarometer), Latin America (Latinobarometro), and Eurasia, among others. Since 2001, ABS has conducted five waves of data collection, with the fifth survey currently being released in small country batches. While the questionnaire has expanded significantly over five waves, ABS' core questions encompass items regarding economic evaluations, institutional trust, political participation, electoral mobilization, traditionalism (Asian values), democratic preferences, and socioeconomic background.

There were a few reasons why ABS was chosen. Firstly, ABS was the only survey in SEA that included open-ended meaning of democracy (MOD) questions, which is most relevant to this dissertation. The open-ended format was discontinued from Wave 3 onwards and was replaced by a series of close-ended ranked questions on characteristics of democracy. Secondly, it was the only non-state social science survey that consistently include every country in SEA in each wave (with the exception of Wave 1), which allows for longitudinal analysis.⁴ This is different than, say, World Values Survey, where certain countries may not be included in consecutive waves. Finally, ABS is the only cross-national survey in the region that include a broad range of items that measure democratic support, preferences, and values specific to SEA. I am referring to items that tap into traditional Asian values, such as filial piety, view of authority, limits on freedom of expression, and social harmony.

In Chapter 2, I manually coded responses from the open-ended MOD in Wave 2, which asks respondents, "To you, what is the meaning of democracy?" Respondents can provide up to three responses, resulting in over 7,000 unique responses. They are then categorized into three levels of democratic understanding (DU). The first level measures respondents' self-efficacy (whether they provide an answer or respond with DK); the second level measures identification of democratic characteristics (whether respondents are able to provide a substantive definition of democracy); and the third level measures the complexity of DU (whether respondents provide substantive definitions that tap into multiple dimensions of democracy).

Chapters 3 and 4 utilized data collected from an original online survey, conducted in collaboration with Dr. Damien Bol (King's College London). The survey received funding from the Department of Political Economy at King's College London and was registered and approved by the Ethics Committee in 2018. In compliance with European Union GDPR regulations, the data was collected anonymously and did not request or ask any identifying

⁴ Wave 1 only included eight countries, two of which were in SEA (Philippines and Thailand). Once data was available, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Timor Leste were included in subsequent waves.

information from respondents. Respondents were also provided with information regarding the aim of the survey, confidentiality of the results, as well as contact information for both researchers and institution (see Appendix C.1.). Finally, respondents were asked to provide consent by agreeing (choosing 'Yes') to participate in the survey and were informed that consent can be withdrawn at any point during the survey by exiting the web page.

Prior to conducting the survey, I translated the questionnaire into Bahasa Indonesia using the Asian Barometer questionnaire as guidance on language and terminology. The questionnaire was then sent to a group of 10 native Indonesian speakers who were asked to provide feedback on the clarity, conciseness, and style of formal language. This step was necessary because Bahasa Indonesia is composed of three forms: formal, informal, and daily. While both informal and daily forms are contextualized by local culture, formal language is standardized across the country and used in government documents and political news. However, because the use of formal Bahasa Indonesia is limited, respondents may not be familiar with some of the more rigid structure or political jargons common in the form. The final wording of the questionnaire took this and the feedback into account.

The survey used two digital platforms: Survey to design and host the survey and Facebook to advertise and recruit respondents. Facebook was chosen for a few reasons. First, Facebook is widely used in Indonesia. The annual digital report from Hootsuite in 2018 reported that Indonesia has the fourth highest number of Facebook users in the world, with 130 million active accounts or 6% of the total Facebook users in the world (Septania, 2018). In fact, two of the cities targeted in our recruitment, Jakarta and Bekasi, reported a combined total of 34 million users. Second, smartphone penetration rate in Indonesia reached 61.3% in 2019 (Statista, 2022). The combination of online survey format and Facebook usage meant that the survey would be accessible to more audiences.

Third, Facebook audiences has the widest diversity compared to other popular social networks in the country, like Twitter and Instagram. While our data is skewed towards younger and more educated individuals (see p. 56), Facebook has greater demographics reach than other social media platforms. Facebook was also a better alternative than Whatsapp—the most used social network in the country—since the messaging app does not allow ad placement. As such, we would have to rely on 'word of mouth' to recruit and distribute our survey, which would have further skewed our sample and create additional internal and external validity issues. Finally, Facebook has a sophisticated advertising mechanism and algorithm that allowed us to specifically target residents in each of the five cities and set additional parameters for age (in accordance with the Indonesian minimum voting age of 17). We set up a fixed budget limit and time period, which allowed us to pay based on cost per impression to maximize exposure of the ad. In total, we recruited nearly 6,000 respondents, 64% of which completed the survey. Chapter 3 discusses the recruitment process in greater detail.

Chapter 3 analyzed data from a survey experiment embedded within the online survey. Respondents were randomly exposed procedural definition of democracy (treatment), which was taken from both Schumpeter's (1976) minimalist and Dahl's (1971) maximalist definitions of democracy. They are then asked three democracy support questions. The first support question asks respondents for their agreement with either one of three statements: 1) Under certain circumstances, an authoritarian government may be better, 2) Democracy is always

preferable to any other kind of government, or 3) For people like me, it does not matter the system of government. The second support question asks respondents to rate their satisfaction with the way democracy works on a scale of 1-10. The third support asks respondents how important it is to live under a democratic system on a scale of 1-10.

Chapter 4 analyzed how socialization to democracy under various political contexts affect support for democracy. Here, greater support for democracy is represented by support for the pro-democracy candidate Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, while lower support for democracy is represented by support for the nationalist candidate Prabowo Subianto. In the second section of the survey, respondents were asked to indicate whether they had voted in both presidential and legislative elections in 2014, whether they plan to vote in the upcoming 2019 elections, and preference for either Jokowi and his running mate Ma’aruf Amin or Prabowo and his running mate Sandiaga Uno (see Appendix C.1.)

I also examined whether levels of political knowledge moderate this vote choice, especially for those who were politically socialized during Suharto’s regime. The knowledge items were composed of questions regarding political institutions, procedures, and political actors, which tapped into both fixed and dynamic knowledge types (Jerit and Barabas, 2017). I used two theoretical considerations in formulating the knowledge items. First, Setzler (2002) recommended simplifying the standards of political sophistication measurement. Considering high levels of socioeconomic inequality and access to political information, it was reasonable to tailor the questions to these contexts. Unfortunately, there are only a handful of political knowledge research available in Indonesia, resulting in limited information on baseline knowledge levels in the country (e.g., Prihatini, 2018; Suntana and Tresnawaty, 2020). As such, I restricted the knowledge questions to dimensions most relevant to the 2014 presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. The goal was to ensure that the knowledge items remain accessible to Indonesian citizens while still providing accurate measure of individual-level knowledge.

Chapter 2

Examining Gender Gap in Democratic Understanding in Southeast Asia Using Open-Ended Survey Question

Do men and women understand 'democracy' differently? The question is important as research on attitudes towards democracy relies on the assumption that the public shares a common understanding of the concept. Yet, evidence shows that there is variation in democratic understanding (DU), especially in developing democracies. To examine this, I manually coded over 7,000 responses to Asian Barometer Survey's open-ended meaning of democracy question to measure levels of understanding. The results show a systematic gender gap across all levels of indicators of DU complexity: women are less likely to offer a definition of democracy, and are less likely to hold complex multidimensional DU. However, they also suggest that equalizing education and income levels can moderate the DU gender gap for women, which pave the way for more promising avenues in DU research as well as has the potential to improve women's role and participation in democracy.

Possessing a concrete democratic understanding (DU) that inform citizens' expectations and critical assessment of democracy is a requisite in producing committed democrats. Examinations of DU in developing democracies in East Asia (e.g., Cho, 2014; 2015), Latin America (e.g., Canache, 2012b), Middle East (e.g., de Regt, 2013), Europe (e.g., Ferrin and Kriesi, 2016; Quaranta, 2018), and Africa (e.g., Mattes and Bratton, 2007) show that most people define democracy in terms of procedures, such as elections and party competition. Some complement this definition with conception of protection of rights and freedom, while others imbue expectations of social and economic outcomes into the definition.

This insight is invaluable because DU is a strong predictor of democracy support and democratic attitudes. Individuals who view democracy in both procedural and substantive terms tend to exhibit unwavering support for democratic ideals, whereas those who define democracy by its social or economic outcomes show less stable democratic support (Canache, 2012a; Cho, 2014). Full understanding of democracy also allows individuals to identify subtle violations of democratic norms and prevent further democratic regressions through the rejection of non-democratic alternatives (Pietsch, 2015).

DU studies have identified the sources and factors of these conceptions—socioeconomic factors like education and income levels, as well as degree of modernization and institutional support, facilitate access to information and increase DU levels. Yet, few have focused on the effect of gender on shaping DU (e.g., Baviskar and Malone, 2004; Cho, 2014) and even fewer has systematically examined gendered DU across multiple national contexts (e.g., Hansen and Goenaga, 2019).

This paper fills the literature gap by examining the gender DU gap in democracies and non-democracies in Southeast Asia. Specifically, variations in depth and complexity of DU between men and women. To overcome the scarcity of literature specifically on gender DU gap, I borrow from the more established literature on gender gap in political knowledge and combine them with existing theoretical framework in DU literature. The gender knowledge gap literature provides an important framework to prevent what Gidengil (2007) termed the gender gap

research pitfall—that is, the categorical thinking that the gender gap exists solely because there are inherent differences between men and women. Instead, this paper also considers intersection with other socioeconomic variables and structural contexts that contribute to this gap, both at individual and country level.

The gender lens is important in two ways. First, DU is developed through the political learning, either in a formal (e.g., school) or informal (e.g., political discussion) setting. Although there is greater socioeconomic parity between gender, women continue to lag in terms of educational attainment and employment opportunities in societies with higher levels of inequality (Grant and Behrman, 2010). Additionally, women also participate less in political discussions (Beauvais, 2020), have political interests that diverge from traditionally male and more prevalent political issues (Ferrin et al., 2018), and consume less political news (Benesch, 2012; Toff and Palmer, 2018). These factors condition the means and opportunities for women to gain access to political information, which in turn form their understanding of democracy.

Second, DU is developed through experiences with democracy. Konte and Klasen (2016), for example, found that women's interactions with institutions and the degree of gender-based discrimination faced inform the perception of their political environment and what they understand to be democratic. In highly patriarchal and conservative societies, women are often prevented from engaging in the same political activities as men, especially those that take place in the public sphere (Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Desposato and Norrander, 2009). Gendered and certain religious expectations of women to fulfil their familial duties further restricts their participation in democratic processes and familiarization with democratic norms. Married women with children, for example, are less likely to participate in political activism because they have been isolated from the necessary political networks (Schlozman et al., 1999). There is plenty more evidence from developing regions showing a gender gap in political representation (e.g., Liu, 2018; Sharma and Singh, 2021), participation and engagement (e.g., Liu, 2022; Robinson and Gottlieb, 2021), and policy preferences (e.g., Hansen and Goenaga, 2019; Gottlieb et al., 2018) and further shape democratic experiences for women. The differential experience of democracy not only results in gendered DU, but also in gender DU gap.

Southeast Asia (SEA) is chosen as a case study because the region offers a unique mix of democracies and non-democracies. The proximity of both regime types facilitates diffusion of DU as well as diffusion of authoritarian rhetoric across borders. This presents a unique challenge for citizens of new democracies, who only need to look at their neighbouring countries for vastly different definition and experience with democracy. Thompson (2015) notes that most of SEA's 650 million citizens are aware of democracy as a concept and have, to a certain extent, experienced some democratic elements, such as voting. In cases like Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, who have had strong authoritarian leaders in the past, and Thailand and Myanmar, who have alternated between democracy and military dictatorship, DU is mired with authoritarian notions of democracy (Kirsch and Welzel, 2019). Democratic countries in SEA have also embraced Asian-style democracy, characterized by strong leadership, social order, and hierarchical social structure. This combination strongly influences how individual citizens understand the democratic system. Furthermore, the proximity of these countries, both geographically and diplomatically under the ASEAN banner, raises the expectations that citizens in countries that have never experienced democracy like

Vietnam, Singapore, and Cambodia would have a basic procedural understanding of democracy.

This paper asks three research questions: 1) do women have lower levels and less complex understanding than men?; 2) do individual-level factors contribute to the gender DU gap?; and 3) does regime type contribute to the gender DU gap? Using Asian Barometer Wave 2 data, I manually recoded over 8,000 open-ended responses from three democracies and three non-democracies into four levels of DU complexity. I then systematically test the gender gap by looking at the interaction between gender on one hand, and income, education, and regime type on the other.

Overall, I found a consistent gender gap in DU. SEA women are less likely to be able to define democracy compared to men, and less likely to have a complex and multi-faceted understanding of the concept. Furthermore, the gender gap is resistant to the inclusion of a wide range of control variables. To address RQ2 regarding intersectionality, I found that increasing education and income levels for women can virtually close the gender gap in self-efficacy, and to some extent, low levels of DU. However, these variables only have a limited moderating effect on facilitating reduction of gender gap at higher levels of DU. Finally, I complemented my individual-level analysis with a discussion on cross-national differences in the sample. Contrary to expectations, there is only a slight difference in gender DU gap between democracies and nondemocracies, which suggested that the gap is particularly pervasive in Southeast Asia.

The following section discusses contemporary findings on DU and gender knowledge gap—the two fields bridged in this paper—as well as the socioeconomic and regime factors that further shape DU. The third section presents the empirical strategy, while the fourth section presents analyses of the gender DU gap. The paper concludes with a discussion on the implication of these findings and importance of further research into the subject.

Defining Democracy in SEA

DU refers to individual conception of democracy that includes associations with the word democracy, as well as the cognitive capacity to distinguish between democratic and nondemocratic elements (McClosky and Brill, 1983; Shin and Kim, 2018). The definition incorporates two measurement components of DU levels: *identification*, or the cognitive ability to recognize attributes of democracy, and *discrimination*, or the cognitive ability to separate democratic attributes from non-democratic ones. Attributes used to determine complexity of DU are derived from two separate paradigms. The first is Schumpeter's (1976) minimalist definition of democracy, a procedural-based conception portrayed as a unidimensional or thin understanding of democracy. This definition encapsulates electoral procedures and competition, universal adult suffrage, and alternation of power. The second is Dahl's (1971) maximalist definition, a multi-layered definition that combines procedures, substantive definitions (e.g., rights and freedoms), and outputs (e.g., provision of public goods) often referred to as multidimensional or thick understanding.

DU is typically measured using survey items that asks respondents to articulate personal associations of democracy (open-ended) or rank a series of democratic attributes in order of importance (closed-ended). The formats tap into different aspects of an individual's knowledge schema: open-ended items help ascertain the foundations of an individual's basic democratic knowledge, while the closed-ended items determine the most and least common conceptions of democracy (Dalton et al., 2007). Both formats also determine how citizens of each democracy prioritize their system's most important attributes, although open-ended questions offer greater clarity in identifying interpretations of democracy compared to other formats.

Overall, the public associate democracy with its procedures (i.e., popular participation, political institutions) and substantive aspects (i.e. political and social rights, equality), thus echoing the definitions of Schumpeter and Dahl presented above (Canache, 2012a). The literature has identified several factors that shape and vary DU. First, (Dalton et al., 2007) find that increasing democratization, age, and stability of democratic regime supply individuals with experience of a democratic system, which informs their expectations as well as a future ideal conception democracy. However, these factors are heavily context dependent, and as a result, regional DU can vary widely. For example, Sub-Saharan Africans and Latin Americans emphasize civil and political liberties in their democratic definitions (Bratton, 2010); Canache, 2012b), while citizens in post-communist Europe and East/SEA prioritize the delivery of political goods (Fuchs and Dieter, 2006); Cho, 2015).

The second considers the proximity of individual democrats to authoritarian elements. This is not necessarily a concern in established democracies, where strong institutions can serve as a deterrent against authoritarian mobilizations. In a developing democracy where authoritarianism is recent and not entirely eliminated, popular misunderstandings of democracy is more common. Kirsch and Welzel (2019) warns of the development of 'authoritarian notions of democracy', a conception that questions liberal principles of democracy and legitimizes non-democratic elements in governance. Shin (2015) confirms the pervasive presence of these notions in East/SEA, where large subsets of the population continue to express preferences for hybrid regimes even in democratic systems, such as the Philippines and Indonesia. In a later study, Shin and Kim (2018) reaffirms these findings, stating that long term exposure and experience with democracy do not significantly negate the persistent refusal of East/Southeast Asians to "reject old methods of autocratic policymaking".

Why is this 'redefinition' of democracy popular in the region? Asian-style democracy stems from the rejection of Western influences in the region, particularly in viewing democracy promotion as 'soft imperialism' (Sen, 1999). Asian-style democracy embodies Asian values, which emphasizes 'Eastern' values of social harmony, law and order, and hierarchical governance structure that juxtaposes the perceived disorder and immorality of Western societies (Zakaria, 1994). In the decades since Zakaria's interview with Lee Kuan Yew—one of the most vocal proponents of Asian values—support for Asian democracy remains strong. There seems to be a persistent desire for citizens to willingly accept "significant limitations on popular control, liberal democratic procedures, and freedoms" as a trade-off for "effective governance, political order, and economic necessity" (Pietsch et al., 2015: 4). We have seen this in action with the election of authoritarian-leaning populist leaders in the Philippines and Malaysia, whose popularity grew in response to massive corruption scandals and perceived foreign intervention. Even Indonesia, arguably the most democratic country in the region,

often flirted with authoritarian populist leaders, as witnessed in the near election of Suharto-linked Prabowo Subianto in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections.

The Role of Gender in Shaping DU

Both Fuchs (1999) and Baviskar and Malone (2004) find gender differentiation in democratic conceptualizations. Men tend to conceptualize democracy in terms of democratic means, such as rights, procedures, governance; whereas women express ends-oriented views, such as social welfare and economic equality. The differentiation in Eastern Europe and Latin America—where their research took place, respectively—were explained by differential socialization and participation of democracy. Women are expected to be the primary caretaker in a household and are expected to "assign greater importance to their own and their family's welfare than [...] elections and political and civil liberties" (Baviskar and Malone, 2004: 9). As a result, women are more interested in policy outcomes, provision of public goods, and protection of rights and freedoms than more procedural or institutional aspects of democracy.

In both studies, as well as Cho's (2014) in East/SEA, women also show much greater uncertainty and sophistication in defining democracy. Women are more likely to provide "Don't know" answers and tend to provide singular aspects of democracy compared to their male counterparts. The studies explained this gap as structural in nature: women have fewer political capital and resources than men, and this diminishes the means and opportunities for women to create networks and invest time for political learning. Engagement in political discussions and participation in political activism (among others) are important venues for political learning. Yet, women are much less likely than men to engage in either and being uninformed about democratic processes and political issues contribute to further isolation from these political activities and learning opportunities. Beauvais (2020) argues that women perceive themselves to be less knowledgeable in politics and thus more reluctant to publicly express their opinions (see also Dow, 2009; Preece, 2016; Fraile, 2014; Frazer and Macdonald, 2003).

While studies in political participation in both developed and developing democracies found that women vote at the same rate as men (e.g., Bratton et al., 2006), they fail to recognize the nuances of how women participate in politics, especially in developing democracies where gender expectations are strongly enforced. Liu (2022) addressed this by examining women's participation in political campaigns, collective action, and protests—East/SEA women do indeed vote at the same rate as men but are significantly less involved in other forms of political activities. This is consistent with previous research that shows that the socialization of politics as a "man's world" from an early age leads to lower levels of participation in institutional political activities and investment in researching general political issues (Wolak and McDevitt, 2011). Adjusting the political view at the top does not seem to change this gap either—Liu (2018: 263) discovered that increased representation of women in parliament in East/SEA actually reduces women's political engagement, likely because such representation remains symbolic and has not afforded ordinary women better political or social standing.

The development of DU is not the only source of gender gap found in various research. Gender traits and social pressure seem to have a sizable influence in survey-taking strategies that tend

to reward men more than women. Though these do not negate the actual existence of a gap, removing these situational threats reflect more reliably the size of the gender knowledge gap. Men are more likely to guess on a survey question, which increases the probability of correct answers, compared to women, who are more likely to choose ‘don’t know’ (DK) over providing an incorrect answer (Mondak and Anderson, 2004). Lizotte and Sidman (2009) suggest that women's preference for DK is rooted in lower self-efficacy levels and greater degree of risk aversion. When the survey structure is modified, such as by discouraging DK responses or using closed-ended question formats, the gender gap significantly narrows. In some cases, the gap can narrow by as much as 40 to 50% (Kenski and Jamieson, 2000). When the coding scheme is changed by separating DK from incorrect answers, the claim that women provide more incorrect definitions also becomes insignificant (Fortin-Rittberger, 2016).

This is an invaluable lesson for DU researchers and has been implemented by Canache (2012a) effectively in examining democratic conceptualization in Venezuela. By considering self-efficacy as an additional part of DU, it intrinsically removes any bias in the analysis of gender gap on actual level of understanding. It also allows this study to focus more on levels of complexity rather than mere content of DU. As such, the first set of hypotheses is as follows:

H_{1A} Women in SEA show lower levels of self-efficacy in DU compared to men

H_{1B} Women in SEA are less likely to offer meaningful or complex definition of democracy compared to men.

Intersection of Gender and Socioeconomic Factors

Formal education is often the first and primary avenue for socialization and integration of democratic knowledge. In Ottomoeller’s (1998) survey of Uganda, familiarity with the concept of ‘democracy’ is strongly correlated to the respondent’s years of formal schooling—specifically, exposure to secondary education. The effect of education is both direct and indirect. Where available, civic classes directly form the basis of an individual’s political and democratic knowledge, especially at higher levels, when knowledge becomes more specialized (Highton, 2009; Martens and Gainous, 2013). Indirectly, formal education equips individuals with the skills to process political information, which motivates political interest and consumption of political news (Wei and Hindmann, 2011; Persson, 2015). The mechanism works by exposing individuals to diverse information, encouraging the development of the cognitive capacity required to deal with complex information, lowering the cost of information acquisition, and fostering positive democratic values and behaviour (Galston, 2001; Reichert, 2016; Arensmeier, 2010).

Efforts to tackle education inequality in Southeast Asia has seen some success—all countries in the sample have overall achieved stable educational attainment parity since the 1990s. For example, both men and women have on average between 10 to 12 years of schooling, indicating greater enrolment in secondary education. Upon closer look, however, women’s access to education heavily intersects with other socioeconomic factors. Ethnic minority women in Vietnam are the least educated groups in the country, and the gap in educational attainment between men and women in rural areas in Thailand and Indonesia are some of the

widest in the region (UNICEF, 2019). UNDP Report (2019) shows that SEA countries spend the lowest proportion of their GDP in education: 5.7% in Vietnam, 4.8% in Malaysia, and 3.7% in Indonesia—much less than countries in other regions with similar HDI rankings. Most countries in the region also do not promote further educational attainment for girls and women, where only 3 in 20 women going into university, further training, or employment post-secondary (UNICEF, 2019).

The effect of income on DU is less straightforward because it intersects with other aspects of socioeconomic determinants. Its underlying effect is on the individual's ability to exert greater personal influence and overcome limitations in access to political information. For example, high-income individuals are more likely to vote and engage actively in politics, which motivates them to seek political information to accompany their engagement (Erikson, 2015). This breaks down some of the structural barriers for women—being able to afford childcare, gaining employment outside the home, and experiencing less rigid gender expectations allow women to expand their political network and become more involved in political activities, such as discussion and activism (Dow, 2009; Fraile, 2014). Women from higher income families are also more likely to pursue higher levels of education. A report by Parthenon (2016) shows that urban middle class population in Southeast Asia spent almost US\$60 billion on private schooling per year in 2015. There is much greater gender parity at this socioeconomic level in all countries sampled, with women disproportionately pursuing university education more than men in Malaysia and Thailand as a result. This effect is also intergenerational: the odds of children of educated Indonesian women attaining equal or higher levels of education nearly doubles with each successive level of the mother's attainment (Mare and Maralani, 2006: 13).

Yet, women still make up about two-thirds of the poor in Asia, are mostly concentrated in the lowest paid roles, and take up nearly all the unpaid care work (Oxfam, 2016). This reduces their choices and decision-making power, especially since the mostly informal nature of their employment means they rarely have access to work benefits, such as sick pay or maternity leave. As a result, they cannot allocate the same time investment into political learning as men, face a different set of gender expectations, and interact with different institutions that have shaped their perception and understanding of what democracy is, their role in the system, and whether democracy is truly beneficial for them (Konte and Klasen, 2016).

More recently, gender political gap literature has focused on ways to better condition socioeconomic and political positioning of women. Although women receive exponentially lower positive gains than men from formal education, they do exhibit a steeper learning curve when placed in an informal information-rich environment compared to men (Dow, 2009; Jerit and Barabas, 2017). This suggests that certain structural factors, like post-secondary education and employment, can indeed close the gender DU gap for women. Fraile (2014) has shown this in her study of European societies: equalizing education and income levels leads to the reduction of gender knowledge gap by half. My second hypothesis is thus:

H₂ Gender gap in DU levels is moderated by education and income levels—the gender gap is smaller between individuals with higher education and income.

DU Gap in Regime Context

Is the DU gap different in democracies compared to autocracies? There literature does not have a direct answer to this question, although there are some notable studies discussing variation in the conceptualization of democracy in both regime types. Cho (2015: 254) found that direct experience with democratic politics is as crucial as formal education in understanding and spreading the term ‘democracy’ among citizens. Zagrebina (2020: 177) confirms this in her findings, adding that the conceptualization of democracy is based on both visible—that is, “theoretically understandable and clearly pronounced” attributes of democracy, such as tangible procedural features—and invisible attributes—that is, attributes that cannot be understood without lived experience, such as interpersonal relationships (e.g., gender equality) or those that directly affects individuals (e.g., civil rights). Invisible attributes relate to the culture of democracy, an idea that is not immediately or clearly identifiable unless the individual immediately interacts with a democratic environment. In a political culture where holding the government accountable for violations of civil rights is not the norm, the individual would have no incentive to defend themselves from further restrictions on their rights.

This partly explains why the “paradox of democracy” exists—a widespread support for democracy in a society existing within a non-democracy (Welzel and Alvarez, 2014; Norris, 2011). There are two distinct motivations to support this claim. First, citizens understand that they do not live in a democratic system and thus desire or aspire to live in one. Second, citizens believe that they live in a democracy—perhaps not a Western liberal form of democracy, but democracy nonetheless—because they have been taught or have experienced some form of democratic elements despite living in a non-democratic regime. Multiple studies have confirmed the latter, including Pietsch’s (2015) findings that 93.8% of Vietnamese stated that their country is indeed a democracy. The Vietnamese are not alone in this—over 88% of citizens in Thailand, Singapore, and Cambodia also believe that they live in a well-functioning democracy (Pietsch, 2015: 37).

In non-democracies where the state has strict control of political information, democracy is defined through whichever definition is propagandized in the interest of the ruling elites (Welzel and Alvarez, 2014: 63). Kirsch and Welzel (2019) introduced the term *authoritarian notions of democracy*, in which democracy is defined as “obedience to the ‘guardianship’ of ‘wise’ rulers whose authority defied constitutional checks, public criticism, and electoral contestation (or at least fair contestation). Both Pietsch (2015) and Zagrebina (2020) also added that ‘democracy’ in developing democracies or outright autocracies is often defined as economic prosperity and its effectiveness measured in terms of economic outcomes. Pietsch (2015: 38) in particular argues that the preference for economy over democracy ideals is consistent with the “thermostatic model of responsiveness”: citizens in non-democratic countries rate democracy as more important because they do not already have it, while citizens of democratic countries rate economic outcomes and provision of public goods as more important than abstract democratic constructs because democracy is no longer a salient issue.

How does this relate to the gender DU gap? Democratic systems provide ample opportunities for citizens to learn and engage with different aspects of democracy, participate in various

political actions, and more importantly, *enact changes*. Parthasarathy et al. (2019) demonstrated that deliberative political exchanges in developing democracies, such as village assemblies in rural areas, endow citizens with agenda-setting power, facilitate demands for transparency, and open access to political information. In societies with a strong emphasis on gender roles, democracy provide women with inherently greater freedom to participate in public political avenues. Zagrebina (2020) found that citizens in democracies more readily associate with the statement that “women have the same rights as men” than in non-democracies. This is an important stepping-stone in equalizing DU between genders by guaranteeing women’s access to formal education, employment opportunities, political participation, and public goods.

The combination of learning about democracy in formal education and direct experience with democracy also presented citizens with a complex understanding of democracy through interaction with different facets of democratic procedures, values, and norms. The ‘invisible’ attributes of democracy are more apparent in democracies because they are implemented and discussed more openly, and any attempts at restricting these attributes are more easily recognized because individuals directly benefit from their existence. However, this assumes that the distribution of knowledge is homogeneous in a democracy, and that the system is experienced in a relatively similar way. This is not the case, of course, and as such, the gap between perception and experience with democracy may be much wider in terms of variation and complexity despite greater opportunities to learn about democracy.

In non-democracies, invisible attributes associated with democratic culture and values are more difficult to identify, either due to their absence or ‘reframing’ of nondemocratic attributes as democratic. The definition of democracy is therefore much narrower and the likelihood of the same set of characteristics shared among a large proportion of the population is much higher.

However, I expect that the effect of education and income in increasing DU and reducing gender DU gap is higher in democracies than in non-democracies. As discussed above, the opportunities to learn about democracy is much higher in democracies. Increasing educational attainment exposes citizens to greater and deeper knowledge about democracy, while increasing income levels helps overcome informational barriers to learn about democracy as well as experience democracy in a more uniform way as their fellow citizens. As such, I hypothesize that:

H_{3A} Gender DU gap is smaller in non-democracies than in democracies.

H_{3B} The moderation effect of education and income is larger in democracies than in non-democracies.

Empirical Strategy

Data

I used data from Asian Barometer—a cross-national survey on attitudes towards social, political, and economic issues in East/SEA—from six countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.⁵ At the time of the survey, Polity IV categorized Indonesia and Philippines as democracies and Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam as ‘anocracy’ or authoritarian. Of all the samples, only Thailand experienced a major regime change following a coup d’état and subsequent military takeover the same year as Asian Barometer fieldwork in 2006, despite being classified as a democracy the year prior. This sudden regime change, and quick successions of alternating political systems in the past, made Thailand difficult to classify properly—at least compared to other countries included in the sample. To test how Thailand affect the cross-national estimations of DU, I ran an additional series of the same regressions without Thailand as a robustness check (Appendix A.4.).

Asian Barometer conducts face-to-face interviews involving between 1,000 and 1,600 respondents per country. Wave 2 (2005-2008) was specifically chosen because it was the last wave to offer an open-ended format of the meaning of democracy (MOD) question prior to its removal in subsequent waves. This format is preferable for two reasons. First, it provides the advantage of limiting the noise created by guessing responses and preferences typical in a closed-ended formats. Second, the emphasis on personal associations with the concept of democracy means that respondents can articulate not only their knowledge but also specific perceptions that are coloured by their experiences with democracy. In total, my sample contains 7,774 respondents.

Respondents were asked, “To you, what is the meaning of democracy?” followed by an optional “What else?”. This allowed respondents to provide between one to three responses. Table 2.1. below shows the descriptive statistics of the sample.

Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics of total respondents, percentage of female respondents, and Polity IV score at the time of the survey

Country	N	% female respondents	Survey year	Polity IV score	Polity IV classification
Indonesia	1,598	50	2006	8	Democracy
Philippines	1,200	50	2005	8	Democracy
Malaysia	1,218	49.51	2007	3	Open Anocracy
Singapore	1,012	48.42	2006	-2	Closed Anocracy
Thailand	1,546	51.75	2006	-5	Closed Anocracy
Vietnam	1,200	47.58	2005	-7	Autocracy


Dependent variable: DU levels

DU was operationalized as 1) conceptualization of democratic ideals and practices and 2) expressed in degrees of substantive complexity. The definition was useful because it separated responses based on content and complexity of understanding. A total of 387 unique responses were coded, including DK (but excluding no responses).

⁵ Cambodia was excluded from the sample due to incomplete data.

Using manual text analysis, I coded four dimensions of DU.⁶ The first dimension distinguished between respondents that provided an answer from those offering DK responses to measure levels of self-efficacy. The second dimension separated respondents who provided substantive definition from those who did not. A definition is substantive if it contains procedural/instrumental (e.g., democratic procedures and institutions) or intrinsic (e.g., civil liberties, political freedoms) characteristics of democracy (see Bratton and Mattes, 2001). Following Canache's (2012a) methods, outcomes (e.g., social equality, economic prosperity) are additionally included in the substantive category as they reflect individual democratic experience and expectations. The variable also served to counter guessing response effects that may skew the rate of correct answers or the gender gap.

Figure 2.1. Distribution of democracy definitions



The third dimension categorized respondents as offering response(s) that described only one characteristic of democracy (unidimensional) and response(s) that covered two or more characteristics (multidimensional). Table 2.2. below shows the distribution of democracy definition provided by respondents in each country.

Table 2.2. Distribution of responses

Country	Provided an answer	Substantive definition	Multidimensionality
Indonesia	69.40	65.14	29.78
Philippines	68.67	57.33	9.01
Malaysia	67.82	65.85	17.21
Singapore	89.92	89.82	5.83
Thailand	63.78	61.84	16.42
Vietnam	83.08	83.00	16.27
<i>Mean</i>	<i>72.70</i>	<i>69.36</i>	<i>16.36</i>

Source: Asian Barometer Survey Wave 2 (2005-2008). Entries are in percentage. Unidimensionality is coded as 0 in variable *multidimensional*.

⁶ Further details on coding and intercoder reliability can be found in Appendix A.1.

On average, almost three-quarters of the respondents were able to provide an answer instead of DK, with the highest percentage of answers coming from Vietnam and the lowest coming from Thailand. Slightly less than 70% were able to provide a substantive definition. The lowest percentage of substantive definitions were provided by Thais at 61.84%, while nearly 90% of Singaporeans were able to provide substantive definitions. Finally, of those who provided substantive definitions, about 16% defined democracy with multiple dimensions. Indonesians registered the highest percentage of multidimensional DU at over a quarter of the respondents, while Singaporeans are the most likely to have unidimensional DU with less than 6% able to provide multidimensional definitions.

Independent variables

Gender was the main independent variable to determine individual DU level. Female respondents comprised 49.69% of the total sample. On average, women reported lower percentage of non-DK answers, substantive definitions, and multidimensional definitions. In some cases, the difference in DU between men and women was up to 30 percentage points.

Table 2.3. Distribution of responses for women

Country	Provided an answer	Substantive definition	Multidimensionality
Indonesia	44.91	44.86	40.97
Philippines	45.15	44.48	41.94
Malaysia	42.37	42.52	34.06
Singapore	47.25	47.19	35.85
Thailand	50.20	50.31	48.41
Vietnam	44.63	44.68	43.21
<i>Mean</i>	<i>45.82</i>	<i>49.69</i>	<i>41.38</i>

T-tests show significant mean differences across all DU levels, suggesting that fewer women than men provided an answer other than DK (diff = .11, $p < .000$); provided at least one substantive definition of democracy (diff = .11, $p < .000$); and presented multidimensional DU (diff = .03, $p = .004$).

Control variables

We moderated the relationship between gender and DU with education and income. Education is composed of four categories, ranging from 1 “No education” to 4 “Tertiary education”. The median education level is secondary school. According to the UNDP Gender Inequality Index (GII)⁷, a lower percentage of women have at least a secondary level education compares to men in the population by 6.6 to 10.5 percentage points. One exception is Philippines, where more women have secondary level education by 2.3 percentage points.

Income is measured in terms of quintiles, with the median respondents falling into the second quintile. On average, women report lower income levels and participation in the labour force

⁷ Data corresponds to the AB survey year of each country.

compared to men. The highest gender discrepancy in labour force participation is found in Indonesia (36.6 percentage points lower) and Malaysia (33.2 percentage points lower) (UNDP, 2022).

The estimations also included control variables age, rural/urban residence, and marital status, as well as political interest, frequency of political news consumption, and political self-efficacy. Political interest dictates the level of personal investment in enhancing one's political knowledge. Interested individuals are more likely to research political information, keep up with current events, engage in political discussions, and are more likely to retain the political information they have learned (Hollander, 2014). Similarly, efficacious individuals are more likely to engage with a constant stream of political information input, which in turn, makes them more political knowledgeable compared to less efficacious individuals. In DU studies, less efficacious individuals are less likely to vote because they do not believe they have influence over the decision-making process. I used subjective political competence (SPC) survey item available in Asian Barometer as a measure of political self-efficacy.⁸

Finally, I included participation, a composite variable covering four political activities beyond voting (political discussion, attendance in political meetings or rallies, participation in protests, and signing a petition). The binary variable indicates low (0) or high (1) participation levels. Table 2.4. below shows the distribution of the control variables.

Table 2.4. Descriptive statistics of control variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Female	7,774	0.50	0.50	0	1
Education	7,769	2.76	0.77	1	4
Income	7,443	2.55	1.42	1	5
Age	7,768	41.72	14.97	17	95
Urban	7,774	0.52	0.50	0	1
Married	7,755	0.75	0.43	0	1
Interest	7,626	2.45	0.95	1	4
Discussion	7,665	3.72	1.35	1	5
SPC	7,277	2.15	0.79	1	4
Participation	7,092	0.44	0.30	0	1

Results

The results confirmed the first (H_{1A} and H_{1B}) and second hypotheses. Women in SEA show lower levels of DU compared to men across every level of efficacy and understanding. This pattern is robust even with the introduction of socioeconomic and control variables. I also found that education and income did reduce the gender DU gap, although this moderation effect is limited to specific aspects of DU. Finally, gender DU variation seemed to be larger in democracies than in non-democracies, though this only applies to the lower two DU levels. I also found that the impact of education and income in reducing gender DU gap is more

⁸ SPC survey item asked respondents: "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can never understand." Respondents were asked to rank their agreement with the statement (strongly disagree to strongly agree).

significant in non-democracies than in democracies. As such, the study can confirm H_{3B} and partially confirmed H_{3A}. I discuss the findings in greater details below.

Gender DU gap

SEA women were less likely to have higher levels of DU compared to men overall. In terms of percentage points, women are 10.8 points less likely to provide an answer to the MOD question, 10.3 points less likely to provide a substantive definition of democracy, and 2.8 points less likely to conceptualize democracy multidimensionally. Although a 2.8-point difference might not seem substantial of a gap, the fact that only 16% of the sample had multidimensional DU means that less than 7% of women in the total sample held conceptually complex understanding of democracy.

Table 2.5. below, however, shows a pattern of diminishing gender DU gap as the measurement of DU complexity increases. This suggests that once women overcome the barrier of self-efficacy, they can potentially close the DU gap given improvements in factors that may have hindered them in the first place. Holding constant socioeconomic and political literacy variables, such as education and political interest, we find smaller gender DU gaps for across all DU levels. The gap varies between a 3.6 percentage points reduction of DK responses to .3 percentage points more conceptually complex DU among women.

Variables	Provide answer		Substantive definition		Multidimensional	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.108*** (0.024)	-0.072*** (0.019)	-0.103*** (0.022)	-0.069*** (0.018)	-0.028*** (0.008)	-0.025*** (0.006)
Education		0.109*** (0.024)		0.109*** (0.021)		0.031*** (0.006)
Income		0.027*** (0.007)		0.028*** (0.008)		0.012 (0.008)
Age		0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)		0.000* (0.000)
Urban		0.003 (0.027)		0.014 (0.030)		0.004 (0.021)
Married		-0.032*** (0.009)		-0.037*** (0.008)		-0.015 (0.018)
Interest		-0.002 (0.006)		-0.001 (0.007)		0.012 (0.008)
Discussion		0.043*** (0.006)		0.046*** (0.006)		0.000 (0.007)
SPC		0.001 (0.009)		0.001 (0.009)		-0.013 (0.008)
Participation		0.035*** (0.009)		0.031*** (0.008)		0.026* (0.014)
N	7,774	6,458	7,774	6,458	5,392	4,619

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients estimated as marginal values with country fixed effects.

Moderation effect of education and income on the gender DU gap

Can the gender DU gap be closed with improvements in educational attainment and income? I find significant, albeit limited, moderation effects of both variables on DU levels. Table 2.6. shows that education increases the likelihood for women to provide answers other than DK by 3.9 percentage points and the likelihood of providing substantive democracy definition by 4 points. Potentially due to the small gap size at the multidimensional DU level, higher education levels do not seem to further reduce the DU gap between men and women.

Table 2.6. Logit regression of gender effects on democratic understanding (DU) moderated by education and income


Variables	Provide answer		Substantive definition		Multidimensional	
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Gen x Edu	0.039*** (0.014)		0.040*** (0.014)		-0.001 (0.015)	
Gen x Inc		0.011 (0.008)		0.011 (0.008)		0.018** (0.007)
Female	-0.173*** (0.038)	-0.095*** (0.020)	-0.175*** (0.040)	-0.094*** (0.021)	-0.020 (0.047)	-0.080*** (0.025)
Education	0.086*** (0.012)	0.109*** (0.008)	0.086*** (0.012)	0.109*** (0.008)	0.031*** (0.011)	0.031*** (0.009)
Income	0.027*** (0.005)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.028*** (0.005)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.012*** (0.005)	0.005 (0.006)
Age	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Urban	0.004 (0.013)	0.003 (0.013)	0.015 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.004 (0.013)	0.004 (0.013)
Married	-0.034*** (0.013)	-0.032** (0.013)	-0.039*** (0.013)	-0.037*** (0.013)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.014 (0.013)
Interest	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.012* (0.007)	0.012* (0.007)
Discussion	0.043*** (0.004)	0.043*** (0.004)	0.046*** (0.004)	0.046*** (0.004)	0.000 (0.005)	0.000 (0.005)
SPC	0.001 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.013* (0.008)
Participation	0.036* (0.019)	0.036* (0.019)	0.032* (0.019)	0.031 (0.019)	0.026* (0.016)	0.027* (0.016)
N	7,774	6,458	7,774	6,458	5,392	4,619

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients estimated as marginal values with country fixed effects.

Instead, a reverse pattern is observed for income. While increasing income levels do not reduce the gender DU gap at the efficacy or substantive definition levels, it does increase the likelihood of women providing multidimensional DU by 1.8 percentage points. This suggests that in place of education, women benefit most from increases in income to potentially close the gender gap at the highest DU level. Indeed, Figure 2.2. below confirms that starting from the 4th income quintile, the multidimensional DU gap between men and women is minuscule at less than 1 percentage point—at the top quintile, women overtake men in terms of

likelihood of providing multidimensional definition of democracy by nearly 1.2 percentage points.

Figure 2.2. Effect of gender on DU moderated by education and income levels



Gender DU gap in different regime contexts

Gender DU gap generally exists in both democracies and non-democracies across almost all DU levels. The results are consistent with our expectations in H_{3A} , but surprisingly, not H_{3B} . At the two lower DU levels, the gender DU gap is nearly twice as large in democracies than in non-democracies. Table 2.7. below shows that women seem to be much less likely than men to provide an answer by 10 percentage points in democracy compared to a gap of ‘only’ 5.3 points in non-democracies. Similarly, women in democracies are 9.4 percentage points less likely to provide a substantive definition while women in non-democracies are ‘only’ 5.2 points less likely to do the same. However, my assumptions in H_{3A} are partially confirmed with findings from the highest DU level. While there is a gender DU gap in of 2.1 percentage points in non-democracies, there does not seem to be any gap between women and men in democracies in terms of providing multidimensional definitions. This suggests that those who have experience with democracy and those who likely have unrestricted access to political information have a more complex understanding, which includes elements of procedural, rights-based, and outcomes of democracy.

Table 2.7. Logit regression of the effect of gender on DU by regime type


VARIABLES	<i>Provide an answer</i>		<i>Substantive definition</i>		<i>Multidimensional</i>	
	Non-democracy (13)	Democracy (14)	Non-democracy (15)	Democracy (16)	Non-democracy (17)	Democracy (18)
Gender	-0.053*** (0.012)	-0.100*** (0.017)	-0.052*** (0.013)	-0.094*** (0.018)	-0.021* (0.013)	-0.028 (0.021)
Education	0.073*** (0.011)	0.160*** (0.013)	0.072*** (0.011)	0.162*** (0.013)	0.030*** (0.011)	0.030* (0.017)
Income	0.032*** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.006)	0.020** (0.008)	0.008 (0.006)	0.020** (0.009)
Age	-0.000 (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Urban	0.006 (0.018)	-0.000 (0.019)	0.017 (0.019)	0.013 (0.020)	0.009 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.022)
Married	-0.025* (0.015)	-0.048** (0.023)	-0.025 (0.015)	-0.063*** (0.024)	0.008 (0.015)	-0.063** (0.026)
Interest	0.003 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.011)	0.017* (0.009)	0.007 (0.013)
Discussion	0.047*** (0.006)	0.038*** (0.006)	0.047*** (0.006)	0.046*** (0.007)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.006 (0.009)
SPC	0.004 (0.009)	0.000 (0.011)	0.006 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.025 (0.016)
Participation	0.024 (0.022)	0.052 (0.034)	0.019 (0.022)	0.048 (0.035)	0.027 (0.018)	0.022 (0.032)
N	4,011	2,447	4,011	2,447	3,049	1,570

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Coefficients estimated as marginal values with country fixed effects.

However, the assumption that the moderating effect of education and income on reducing the gender DU gap would be greater in non-democracies than democracies (H_{3B}) was not confirmed (full regression tables in A.2.). Education is only significant in reducing the gender gap in non-democracies, particularly for the likelihood of providing a non-DK answer by 5.5 percentage points and the likelihood of providing at least one substantive definition by 5.6

percentage points. Income takes over the moderating role at the highest DU level, where it reduces the gender DU gap by 2.7 percentage points for the likelihood of providing a multidimensional DU in non-democracies. Neither education nor income seem to have any effect on the gender DU gap in democracies.

Figure 2.3. Effect of gender on DU moderated by education and income levels in non-democracies



Analysis of individual countries showed that the gender DU gap only existed in several countries—both democracies Indonesia and Philippines, as well as Malaysia, the highest scoring non-democracy in the sample (full regression tables in Appendix A.3.). Additionally, the gap is only significant for providing non-DK answers and substantive definition but not at the highest DU level of multidimensional conceptualization. In Indonesia, women are 9.87 percentage points less likely to provide an answer and 9.78 points less likely to provide a substantive definition. In the Philippines, the gap is slightly larger, where women are 11.73 percentage points less likely to provide an answer and 10.60 points less likely to provide a substantive definition. Finally, the gender DU gap is largest in Malaysia. Women in the country are 14.39 percentage points less likely to provide an answer and 14.03 points less likely to provide a substantive definition of democracy.

The role of education and income on moderating gender effects on DU is also limited to certain countries. Education reduces the gender gap in Malaysia and Thailand by 12-13 percentage points in terms of providing an answer and substantive definitions. For other countries and multidimensional DU, education does not seem to have a significant role in moderating the relationship between gender and DU. The same can be said for income, with one exception for reducing the gender DU gap in providing multidimensional definition in Vietnam.

Robustness check without Thailand

As briefly discussed above, Thailand is a subject of contention in evaluating gender, education, and income effects on levels of democratic understanding. At the time of the survey, Thailand was considered non-democratic. After the general elections held in April 2006—won by now exiled Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party—King Bhumibol Adulyadej declared the election process and subsequent results to be unconstitutional. In September 2006, the Royal Thai Army staged a *coup d'état* and moved to cancel a new election scheduled to take place in October 2006. It was the first coup to take place since 1991, after 15 years of democratic governments.

Although the country first became constitutional democratic monarchy in 1932, it had also undergone a series of military takeovers and had spent the majority of the period since authoritarian military rule. Dore (2014) noted that support for democracy in Thailand remains high, though democracy meant different things for different political groups. For most of rural Thailand and learned elites, democracy embodies principles akin to traditional Western liberal democracy. The urban middle-class and political elites embrace Asian style of democracy, supporting highly regulated political freedoms and civil liberties in the name of social order and stability. For this group, the military is a stalwart of political stability, far from the chaos and corruption of democratically elected leaders like Shinawatra's administration.

As such, it is reasonable to assume that Thais understand democracy, learned through formal and informal education as well as experience with democracy. Unlike Indonesia and the Philippines, Thailand has not had long periods of democracy without the threat of authoritarian forces, especially from the military. Yet, unlike Singapore or Vietnam, Thailand has had periods of democracy accompanied by relatively fair and free elections.

Taking this into consideration, I re-ran the regressions removing Thai respondents from the sample, in order to understand the effect that Thailand has on my estimations (see Appendix A.4. for full regressions). In general, the results are relatively similar in size and strength. Without Thailand, the gender DU is the same for provision of answer, larger by 8 percentage points for the likelihood of providing a substantive definition, and slightly smaller by 2 points for the likelihood of having multidimensional DU. The moderating effect of education is more varied: education is only significant in terms of substantive definition, increasing its likelihood for women by 2.9 percentage points as education levels increase. Meanwhile, income interaction effect is relatively similar in size and strength.

When Thailand is removed from regressions estimating DU levels in non-democracies, I found that the gender DU gap is larger by 13 percentage points more for both the likelihood of providing an answer and providing a substantive definition of democracy. However, without Thailand, there does not seem to be gender differences in the likelihood of having multidimensional DU. This suggests that Thais largely drive the gender gap at the highest level of understanding. The interaction effect of education and income remains relatively similar as estimates that include Thailand in the sample, with the effect generally slightly smaller for the moderating effect of education across all DU levels and income effect at the highest DU level.

Discussion

This study seeks to answer three research questions with regarding to democratic understanding (DU): 1) do women have lower levels and less complex understanding than men?; 2) do individual-level factors contribute to the gender DU gap?; and 3) does regime type contribute to the gender DU gap? Using data from Wave 2 of Asian Barometer, I look at gender DU gap in six Southeast Asian countries. A total of 7,774 responses were manually coded into five categories, including three that corresponded to definitions of democracy proposed by Schumpeter (1976) and Dahl (1971): procedural, right-based, outcomes, others, and Don't Know (DK). I further measure DU based on *levels* and *complexity* of understanding, including a measure on DU *efficacy*, a concept borrowed from literature on gender gap in political knowledge. The resulting dependent variables are *provide an answer*, capturing whether respondents provided any answer other than DK; *substantive definition*, capturing whether respondents provided procedural, rights-based, or outcomes definitions; and *multidimensional*, capturing whether respondents provided definitions that combine multiple elements of democracy.

The results revealed a systematic and sizeable gender DU gap in SEA, where on average women had lower DU efficacy and levels compared to men. The gap size is substantially larger for the propensity for provision of non-DK answer and substantive definition than providing multidimensional definitions, and robust to the introduction of socioeconomic and political literacy control variables. I also found that education and income only have a limited moderating effect on gender DU gap. Increasing educational attainment significantly reduced the gender gap in non-DK answers and substantive definition, while increasing income levels virtually closed the gender gap for provision of multidimensional DU. However, they do not necessarily address the gender DU gap across the board.

Finally, my findings reveal several things with regards to regime differences in DU. First, the gender DU gap is larger in democracies than in non-democracies for provision of non-DK answer and substantive definitions. However, although there is relatively small but significant DU gap between women and men in non-democracies at the highest DU level, there is no gender difference in the likelihood of providing multidimensional DU in democracies. Second, education and income play no significant moderating roles in democracies but do so in non-democracies. Specifically, education reduces the gender DU gap in the lower DU levels, while income reduces the gender DU gap in terms of complex multidimensional DU.

There are tentative explanations as to why this is the case. Non-democratic regimes tend to hold a monopoly on the narrative of democracy. On one hand, democratic experience and learning opportunities are limited in these countries, and so there are fewer *variations* of what democracy might mean between individuals. This also means that it is possible for men and women to have greater equality in DU. In a democracy, on the other hand, effective socialization of democratic values typically highlights different characteristics of the system that compose a functioning democracy. As such, there is a greater variation of democratic conceptualization, some of which may not fall within the purview of procedural, rights-based, or outcomes categories.

Democratic citizens also tend to have varied democratic experience, shaped by their socioeconomic standing. Encounters with democratic elements may be different between an individual in low-income brackets and an individual at higher income brackets. Liu (2018) illustrated this perfectly in her study of women parliamentarians in SEA, where political aspirations are often equated with moneyed elites from established political dynasties. In this case, women parliamentarians are not perceived as democratic representatives or role models for women in lower socioeconomic classes because the latter group's experience with the democratic process is often discriminative in nature. Indeed, the two democracies in the sample score the lowest in terms of gender equality, with highest gender gaps in secondary school attainment and participation in labour force, compared to the non-democratic countries in the sample.

These findings are important because there has not been a definitive study on gender gap in democratic understanding literature. I have shown that gender DU gap does exist in the region and that given equal distribution of knowledge by way of improving educational attainment and income levels, women can hope to close this gap. What these findings ultimately highlight is a deficiency in political education and high levels of socioeconomic inequality that originated the gender DU gap in the first place. There is no incentive in educating citizens on democracy in non-democratic countries, and democratic ones do not fare better in terms of political education. Even in countries like Indonesia, arguably the highest-ranking democracy in the region, the national curriculum does not necessarily portray Suharto or his 32-year dictatorship as undemocratic and or negative (Komara, 2017). Without educating citizens to distinguish between democratic and non-democratic norms, Southeast Asians will continue to embrace authoritarian notions of democracy.

Of course, it is important to note that defining democracy as a unidimensional concept is not automatically a sign of poor political sophistication (Przeworski, 1999). It does, however, signal

a limited understanding of what democracy could be and should be, how individuals can benefit from such a system, and how they can contribute and safeguard its future. In regions like SEA, where there are competing conceptualizations of democracy, it is difficult to disentangle democracy from arguments of cultural exceptionalism. Future research can benefit from formulating more refined citizens' conceptions of democracy that incorporate definitions influenced by Asian values in its measure. This study is limited in that it has largely ignored negative responses, which compose less than 5% of the total responses. Integrating these anti-democratic sentiments would provide a clearer picture on not only democratic understanding but also support for democracy. Unfortunately, the removal of open-ended meaning of democracy question in subsequent Asian Barometer waves prevents longitudinal DU comparisons. The inclusion of Myanmar in Wave 4, however, is promising for future cross-national comparisons, considering regional developments over the last ten years.

Chapter 3

Knowing It is Loving It? A Survey Experiment on Democratic Understanding and Support in Indonesia

With Damien Bol, King's College London

The validity of democratic support survey questions has been questioned due to wide variations of democratic understanding (DU) levels among respondents, especially in new democracies. Citizens with poor DU tend to offer less informed answers and preferences. To give new insights on the subject, we conduct an original survey experiment in Indonesia with over 2,000 respondents. We expose respondents to a short list of characteristics that define democracy before asking them to rate their own levels of support for democracy. We find that the treatment lowers democracy support and satisfaction levels, especially among women and low-educated respondents. Overall, our study offers an important nuance to critiques on the unreliability of individual-level democratic support in cross-national surveys.

Democratic support survey questions—where citizens are asked if they support the idea of having a government run by the people, or the idea of concentrated political power in the hands of a single leader or a small group—are a staple of comparative politics. Decades of empirical studies find evidence that country-level democratic support is critical for the survival of democratic regimes (Easton, 1965; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Lipset, 1959), and recent studies continue to support this (e.g., Brunkert et al., 2019; Claassen, 2020; Dahlum and Knutsen, 2018).

Yet scepticism shrouds the reliability of democratic support surveys on the individual level. In particular, poor public understanding of the concept ‘democracy’ has been proposed as one of the causes of this scepticism: because democracy is not understood nor experienced uniformly by everyone, the benchmark used to report support for democracy is often inconsistent or even inaccurate (Norris, 2011; Shin and Kim, 2018). The issue is particularly acute in new democracies, in which the application of democratic rules is often partial, with little to no democratic experience otherwise or unequal scope and reach of its socialization (Dalton et al., 2007; Fuchs and Roller, 2006; Mattes and Bratton, 2007). Since there is strong and positive association between DU and support for democracy (Baviskar and Malone, 2004; Canache, 2012a), questioning the potentially misleading results of the latter require an examination of the former.

Yet, we still do not know whether the association between DU and democratic support is causal. It may well be that other factors, like socioeconomic status, are confounding, or that the causal link between the two is reversed. To provide further new insights, we conduct a survey experiment in Indonesia, a developing democracy with a strong blend of authoritarian history and democratic experience. At random, we expose half of the respondents to a short definition of democracy, while the control group receives no definition at all. The aim is to induce DU among treated individuals, before asking them to report their support for democracy. A manipulation check shows that respondents notice and respond to the treatment. We found that exposure to a democracy definition lowers democracy support and satisfaction among Indonesians, especially among women and low-educated respondents.

Knowledge and Support of Democracy: Past Findings and New Leads

DU refers to the capacity to conceptualize fundamental democratic principles by correct identification of its characteristics and discrimination of such characteristics from those that oppose them, in this case, those authoritarian in nature (McClosky and Brill, 1983; Cho, 2015: 243-246). Typically, this capacity is measured via open-ended meaning of democracy questions, where respondents can freely articulate personal associations of democracy, or closed questions, which ask respondents to order democratic characteristics by order of importance. Both methods are limited in their own way. The former does not examine respondents' ability to distinguish democracy from nondemocracy—respondents are only asked to identify associations with the word 'democracy'. Meanwhile the latter does not determine actual level of understanding, because having definitions readily provided meant that respondents do not have to articulate their actual knowledge levels. As expected, open-ended approaches yield greater proportion of 'don't know' responses compared to closed survey questions, for which democratic characteristics are readily provided.

Overall, the literature finds that meaning of democracy questions reveal two things about public DU. Firstly, there is great awareness of democracy, even in nondemocracies, though the levels vary equally greatly from 58% in Lesotho (Bratton et al., 2005: 67) to 92% in Ukraine (Miller et al., 1997). Secondly, citizens are most likely to define democracy in liberal-procedural terms, such as 'freedom of speech' or 'fair elections', compared to outcome-driven definitions, such as 'economic growth' (Fuchs, 1999; Dalton et al., 2007; Canache, 2012a).

However, there are three caveats to these findings. Despite relatively high democratic awareness and ability to correctly identify democratic characteristics, there are still pockets of populations where DK responses are much higher than average. Typically, this is found in new or electoral democracies, where the democratic rule of law still competes with elements of authoritarian governance (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Dore, 2014). For example, DK rates vary between, 10-50% in Latin America (Dalton et al., 2007; Crow, 2010; Canache, 2012b) and between, 10-36% in East and Southeast Asia (Dore, 2014), depending on recency of democratic transition and level of modernization.

Secondly, even if the core idea of democracy seems to be well understood, a substantial portion of the population struggle to distinguish finer nuances of democratic and nondemocratic elements. Shin and Kim (2018: 240-242) found that 73% of Sub-Saharan African and 56% of East/Southeast Asian respondents are misinformed on differences between authoritarian, electoral democratic, and liberal democratic political systems. In a study of 57 countries worldwide, Cho (2015: 247) discovered that 40% could not discriminate democratic from nondemocratic practices and misunderstood, on average, one regime characteristic. Such discrepancies in democratic conceptualization are emphasized further by high rates of democratic satisfaction in nondemocratic countries like China, Singapore, or Vietnam. What this seems to suggest is that not only is democratic understanding generally incomplete but that there exists a conception of democracy and democratic expectations that aligns with authoritarian governance (Dore, 2014; Pietsch, 2015).

Which leads to the third caveat of DU: how democracy is understood also depends on how democracy has been defined for each individual. In countries where the state has a vested

interest in maintaining strict control of political information, claims of democratic-ness is used as a “currency” to bargain for political capital (O’Donnell, 2007: 6). This is most evident in societies with authoritarian legacies in post-communist (Fuchs and Roller, 2006; Mishler and Rose, 1996; Fuchs, 1999) and East Asian countries (Thompson, 2015; Case, 2015). Kirsch and Welzel (2018: 2) summarize this phenomenon well:

“In *liberal* cultures, where emancipative values are widespread, most people internalize a correspondingly liberal notion of democracy, seeing in democracy a system that grants people basic freedoms. By contrast, in *authoritarian* cultures, in which emancipative values are rare, people adopt respective authoritarian notions of democracy, viewing democracy as a form of ‘guardianship’ by ‘wise’ rulers whom people owe obedience because the rulers govern in people’s best interest.”

Studies show that individuals showing more sophisticated understanding of democracy also show higher and more consistent support for democratic principles, independent of regime performance (Fuchs, 1999; Mujani and Liddle, 2015; Zhai, 2019). Less knowledgeable individuals, on the other hand, tend to be more satisfied with democracy—the benchmark for their democratic expectations is often incomplete or inaccurate, and they often find no further need for democratic improvements (Norris, 2011). Alternatively, low DU individuals may express indifference, motivated by low self-efficacy or misinformation (Cho, 2014).⁹ In both scenarios, low capacity to distinguish democratic and nondemocratic practices leads to inability to hold their government accountable for violations of democratic norms (Baviskar and Malone, 2004; Shin, 2015). With DU variations lending unwitting support for ‘alternative’ brands of democratic governance, redirection towards nondemocratic goals is becoming much more likely (Welzel, 2013: 310-315).

Mixed Conceptions and Democratic Support: The Case of Indonesia

In 1999, Indonesia held its first democratic election since, 1955. The elections were preceded by two years of protests and transition period called *Reformasi* (reformation), which many considered to be a grassroots success story, that ended with the deposition of Suharto’s autocratic New Order regime. Two decades on, the country with, 260 million population has seen its rapid albeit unequal democratization efforts stagnate and even decline (Davidson, 2018; Aspinall et al., 2015). In, 2013, the country fell from ‘free’ to ‘partly free’ on the Freedom House index due to lowered ratings in protection of ethnic minorities, LGBT communities, as well as religious freedom (Freedom House, 2018). The country also inherited systemic issues from the previous regime, such as deep-rooted corruptions, weak checks and balances, outdated policies, clientelist electoral and political mechanisms, and non-independent media sources (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2019).

Despite setbacks, support for democracy in Indonesia remains relatively strong and stable since democratization, although satisfaction with democratic performance is borderline positive for the most part (Sukma, 2011; Pietsch and Clark, 2015; Mujani and Liddle, 2015: 215). Some optimistic studies like Chu and Huang’s (2010: 117) concluded that Indonesia has

⁹ This is typically expressed as non-answers or DK responses. In some questions, ambivalent answers such as, “For people like me, it does not matter the system of government” used in this study is also classified as relating to low self-efficacy.

higher rates of “consistent democrats”, or a firm belief “in a political system anchored to liberal democratic principles”, compared to its neighbors.

At the same time, a large proportion of Indonesians still express support for some authoritarian elements, in particular, strong (executive) leaders and army rule¹⁰ (Magalhães, 2014: 85-86; Lussier and Fish, 2012). Pietsch and Clark (2015: 200) also revealed that only, 24% of Indonesians reject having a strong leader while expressing support for democracy. To top this off, Shin and Kim (2018) found that only 49% of Indonesians are able to correctly recognize pre-*Reformasi* Indonesia as authoritarian and their current system as democratic. Such mixed conceptions are also congruent with public opinion findings on the rest of Southeast Asia, where the demand for democracy is often accompanied by preference for authoritarian methods of governance (Shin and Kim, 2018; Anderson et al., 2021).

The conception originates from ‘Asian democracy’, a redefined form of democratic governance that serves as an ideological contrast to Western liberal conception of democracy. Supporters of Asian democracy argue that cultural relativism respects the traditions and values of Asian (or Eastern) society; conversely, critics of Asian values debate purports that ‘Asian democracy’ is a thinly veiled attempt to undermine democracy by centralizing political power under the premise of social order (Thompson, 2015). Peou (2015) noted that Indonesia’s *Guided Democracy* in the, 1950s is evidence of Asian democracy’s existing footprints in the country. Furthermore, Pietsch et al. (2015: 4) observed that a significant portion of the Indonesian population is “sympathetic of authoritarian values”.¹¹ Despite the partly free ranking, recent legal and political developments have caused concerns for the return of authoritarian elements to the country’s governance.

The presidential election in 2014 marked the turning point for democracy in Indonesia, after which the quality of democracy continued to decline. For the first time, Indonesian voters faced a highly polarizing political campaign from Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, a political ‘outsider’ heralded as a champion of democracy, and Prabowo Subianto, former general and son-in-law of Suharto accused of undermining Indonesia’s democratic progress with his association with ultraconservative religious figures and former New Order elites.

Jokowi’s win initially assured Indonesians and the international community that liberal democracy has been safeguarded against ‘New Order nostalgia’ (Pepinsky, 2017). Yet, between 2014 and 2022 alone, Indonesia’s Freedom House score has fallen from 64 to 59—the main driving force behind this decline had been increased restrictions on civil liberties. Critics have accused Jokowi of such nostalgia after the implementation of anti-defamation law, weakening of the Corruption Eradication Commission, revision of criminal codes that threaten

¹⁰ These are measured by asking respondents if “having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliaments and elections” or “having army rule” is a “very bad, fairly bad, fairly good, or very good way of governing this country”. The questions are commonly included in cross-national attitudes surveys, such as World Values Survey or Asian Barometer.

¹¹ *Guided democracy* is a system of governance developed and implemented by Sukarno in, 1959. The ideology is based on Indonesia’s, 1945 constitution, which Mietzner (2013: 35) describes as “so vague that a sitting president was largely free to tailor the polity to his or her needs.” Such ‘tailoring’ enables a head of state to not hold elections, appoint legislators, and limit political parties’ influence by banning or splitting them into smaller organizations.

Indonesians' civil rights, and accommodation of ultraconservative Muslim clerics in his policies (Aji, 2019; Farisa, 2019).

Within the populace, Muhtadi (2020) found that levels of democratic support and satisfaction also began to diverge substantially post-election in 2014 between Jokowi's and Prabowo's supporters. This polarization revealed a clear divide in democratic conceptions—Jokowi's supporters are more likely to consistently support liberal conceptions of democracy, while Prabowo's supporters increasingly embrace authoritarian elements echoing Asian-style democratic governance (Jayasuriya, 2020). In fact, the main electoral theme among voters in 2014 was that support for Jokowi was equivalent to the struggle to maintain the course of democracy in the country.

Aspinall and Mietzner (2019), however, observed that the salience of democratic cleavage between the two groups slowly faded over time, as Jokowi himself became less interested in protecting the nation from democratic regression. With Prabowo joining Jokowi's cabinet as Minister of Defense in 2019, Jokowi voters are further divided into disaffected former supporters who continue to uphold liberal democratic ideals and Jokowi's loyal supporters who have accepted the administration's concessions to authoritarian forces at the highest levels. This ideological tension is why Indonesia proves to be an interesting case study for democratic understanding in the region.

Connecting Democratic Understanding with Democratic Support

Public support for democracy is especially crucial in new democracies. Inglehart (2003) suggested that the establishment of democratic culture—that is, the formation of shared beliefs in upholding democratic values that simultaneously rejects authoritarian alternatives—leads to long-term democratic stability and consolidation. The formation of such shared belief is driven by a well-informed citizenry, whether it is through socialization in formal education setting, through experience with the system, or both (Gibson and Caldeira, 2009). This allows citizens to recognize and differentiate between democratic and non-democratic elements and respond to any violations of democratic norms (Cho, 2014). It also equips them with the tools to distinguish between failures of implementation of democracy by the country's rulers and actual shortcomings of democracy (Baviskar and Malone, 2004).

Several studies have shown that increasing public knowledge of democratic procedures and politics in general also increases participation and support for democracy. In a study taking place in rural India, Pande (2011) observed that when citizens are provided with better access to political information, they report higher levels of responsiveness to government policies and criticalness in evaluating government performance. Finkel and Lim (2021) found that participants across four provinces in the Democratic Republic of Congo, who attended democracy workshops aimed at improving democratic knowledge, registered higher levels of support for core democratic values, such as expansion of political rights to minority groups. Finally, Mont'Alverne et al. (2022) showed that Brazilians reporting intermediate and higher levels of political knowledge—consisting of a better understanding of democratic processes and civil rights—also reported greater preference for democracy over autocracy, and stronger objection to the dismantling of checks and balances.

So far, few studies have examined the relationship between improving DU with support for democracy in countries like Indonesia, where there is strong competition between democratic and authoritarian notions of democracy. We argue that placing greater emphasis on democratic knowledge should increase unconditional support for democracy over other forms of government. Our first hypothesis states:¹²

H₁ An exposure to a definition of democracy increases support for democracy.

In Chapter 2, findings from secondary survey analysis using Asian Barometer suggest significant and substantial gender gap in democratic understanding (DU). Women are 9.9 percentage points less likely to provide an answer other than Don't Know (DK) and 9.8 points less likely to provide a substantive definition compared to men when asked to define democracy.¹³ Considering that participation is an important tool in informing DU as well as enhancing support for democracy, Indonesian women's disengagement—or rather, de-identification—with democratic participation suggests a possible gender gap in both DU and support for democracy. As such, our second hypothesis is:

H₂ An exposure to a definition of democracy increases support for democracy, especially among women.

Additionally, we acknowledged that high DU individuals made up a significant portion of the population, even in new democracies. Not only are democratic practices and knowledge more common and accessible after compared to prior to democratization, a greater degree of modernization also gives rise to higher proportion of well-educated individuals—a strong predictor of high DU (Canache, 2012a; Shin and Cho, 2010). Furthermore, high DU individuals tend to have better access to diverse quality information, report higher self-efficacy, and show greater interest and participation levels in politics. We hypothesized that they treatment would thus be less likely to have a sizable effect among higher educated individuals, since they would already hold a clear(er) idea of democracy. This led to our third hypothesis:

H₃ An exposure to a definition of democracy increases support for democracy, especially among low-education respondents.

Empirical Strategy

Sample recruitment

To recruit respondents for our survey experiment, we used a Facebook advertisement that redirected those who clicked on the ad to a web-based survey hosted on Survey Monkey. Facebook is becoming an increasingly common tool to recruit survey respondents, especially

¹² Note that although we did not formally pre-register the study, we defined the hypotheses before conducting it. Upon request, we can provide the project proposal that we sent to the funding body prior conducting the experiment that laid out the two hypotheses presented here.

¹³ The survey item asked respondents: "To you personally, what is the meaning of democracy?". The question has an open-ended format and respondents are allowed to provide up to three responses.

in geographically dispersed countries like Brazil (Samuels and Zucco, 2013), Chile (Boas, 2016), and India (Boas et al., 2018). Facebook is chosen as the recruitment platform because the latest figures show that around 61% of over 136 million active users are viable advertisement target audience (Hootsuite, 2019). However, it is worth noting that recruitment via Facebook tend to suffer from sample bias as Facebook users tend to be younger, better educated, and male compared to the rest of the population (Kosinski et al, 2015). Despite this, studies do show that the sample bias stops there: in term of political attitudes, Facebook samples produce similar results to representative samples (Mellon and Prosser, 2017; Wang et al, 2015). In the analysis below, we used weights to correct for sample bias.

Social media recruitment also maintains higher cost-effectiveness and efficiency for hard-to-reach populations compared to other data collection methods like face-to-face, telephone, or snail mail. For these reasons, social media recruitment for surveys and survey experiments have been used in political science (e.g., Boas et al., 2018; Samuels and Zucco, 2013; Zhang et al, 2018), psychology (e.g., Kosinski et al, 2015), and medical research (e.g., Kapp et al., 2013).

Prior to conducting the survey, we tested the English to Indonesian translation on a group of Indonesian native speakers to ensure that the translation was clear and precise. This included comparing similar questions used in the Indonesian fieldwork documentation and questionnaire provided by the Asian Barometer. Following this feedback, we launched a 3-day pilot survey on 25 February 2019 to test Facebook's advertising mechanics. Primarily, the goal was to ensure that the ad algorithm targeted the exact audience that we are interested in: Indonesian citizens over the age of 17 (voting age) residing in five most populated Indonesians cities of Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, Bekasi, and Medan. We included screening questions at the beginning of the survey to exclude respondents who do not meet to these criteria. The questions are important because the Facebook targeting algorithm is not flawless. For example, uploading the new location of a user who moved from a city to another may take some time. The pilot was also a test of Survey Monkey's A/B testing tool, which we relied on to split respondents into control and treatment groups. In total, the pilot ad generated over 300,000 impressions over three days resulting in approximately 300 unique respondents.

The main survey experiment was conducted between 15 – 25 March 2019, approximately three weeks before the 2019 Indonesian general elections on 17 April 2019.¹⁴ The main survey ad generated a total of over 2.2 million impressions and 19,705 clicks. The final copy of the ad stated clearly that it is a sponsored content and positioned itself as a test of political knowledge ("Survei Pengetahuan Politik Indonesia"). A short description of the survey included a neutral language that encouraged Facebook users to test their understanding of Indonesian politics ("Tes pemahaman politik Indonesia Anda dengan survei pengetahuan politik ini").¹⁵

¹⁴ The survey is funded by the Department of Political Economy at King's College London, granted to the authors in 2018. The survey experiment was approved by the Research Ethics Office of King's College London.

¹⁵ It is important to note that both the ad and survey used formal Bahasa Indonesia to be inclusive of respondents in the five targeted cities. While Bahasa Indonesia is the official language in Indonesia, there are over 200 local languages spoken in different regions, provinces, and town/cities in the country. Daily conversations tend to use informal versions of Bahasa Indonesia. However, formal versions are taught in schools and typically used in official government communication and national newspapers, government-owned radio broadcasts, and television news.

Respondents were not paid for their participation, and we relied on the presentation of the survey as test of political knowledge to attract their interest.

The image chosen in Figure 3.1. below was taken from official campaign materials provided by the Indonesian General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum/KPU) to further maintain neutrality. In Indonesia, individuals are asked to dip their little finger in a bottle of ink immediately after casting their ballot to show that they have voted. As such, it is a recognizable association with voting in the country.

Figure 3.1. Facebook advertisement for the main survey experiment



Data

In total, 3,836 unique respondents completed the survey, a completion rate of 65% from a total of 5,902 participants. Table 3.1. shows the distribution of key sociodemographic characteristics compared to official population statistics of the targeted cities. Together, population in the five cities represented about 15% of the country's total population and have the greatest Facebook coverage compared to other large cities and the countryside combined, thus maximizing the representativeness of the sample.

Overall, we had a reasonably diverse sample for each sociodemographic category, with the exception of citizens over 65 and those from low education backgrounds. we observed little to no discrepancies for gender and city of residence. However, the discrepancy between our sample and actual population make up is substantial for education, which was to be expected given Facebook's actual demographics. More specifically, our data contains only a small proportion of respondents with lower secondary education levels and lower (a total of 4.81% of the sample). This may potentially skew out results, as we do not have sufficient low education respondents to properly test our treatment. However, we overcome this limitation by applying Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) to our analysis.

Table 3.1. Distribution of respondents' characteristics in the sample (S) relative to population (P)

	Jakarta		Bandung		Surabaya		Bekasi		Medan	
	S	P	S	P	S	P	S	P	S	P
Female	48.45	49.74	49.29	48.50	50.54	50.60	50.84	49.04	44.44	50.61
17-24	48.24	20.79	55.05	25.39	48.91	22.89	53.56	25.44	61.46	29.17
25-34	32.45	27.37	27.62	23.05	26.64	23.17	28.21	28.19	29.11	23.65
35-44	10.48	22.29	9.57	19.84	13.50	19.98	12.54	22.13	6.47	19.40
45-54	5.99	15.58	4.87	15.70	6.57	16.57	3.60	14.67	2.70	14.41
55-64	1.91	9.06	2.17	9.69	3.28	10.96	0.85	6.34	0.00	8.54
65+	0.92	4.91	0.72	6.33	1.09	6.43	1.14	3.23	0.27	4.82
No education	0.34	11.33	0.00	7.32	0.37	14.83	0.00	5.76	0.54	1.65
Primary	0.42	17.59	0.37	20.66	1.47	18.64	0.29	9.84	0.54	31.40
Lower Secondary	4.05	19.10	2.40	21.56	2.21	19.85	1.45	13.72	0.80	22.20
Higher Secondary	42.48	36.99	41.88	35.59	38.24	33.11	52.91	45.58	34.32	35.48
University	52.70	14.99	55.35	14.88	57.72	13.56	45.35	25.09	63.81	9.27
Pop. > 17y	43.87	49.63	20.01	12.49	9.88	14.71	12.70	12.99	13.55	10.18

Note: Entries are %. S refers to data from our sample. Population (P) data taken from provincial-level *Badan Pusat Statistik* (Center of Statistics Agency) in DKI Jakarta (Jakarta), West Java (Bandung and Bekasi), East Java (Surabaya), and North Sumatra (Medan).

Egami and Hartman (2022: 4) suggested that when dealing with a difference in unit composition between sample and target population, the most appropriate general approach is to “adjust for variables that affect selection into an experiment.” We determined that using weights in our analysis is necessary for three reasons. First, Facebook users are skewed towards younger, better educated, and male compared to the rest of the population—a similar composition to Indonesian users of the social media platform (Statista, 2019). As such, these categories are over-represented in our sample. Second, the nature of our politics-oriented advertisement inevitably leads to self-selection of individuals with higher interest in national politics. Relevant literature found that this group tends to comprise of men and individuals from higher education and income backgrounds (e.g., Ferrin and Fraile, 2020). Finally, Egami and Hartman (2022) argued that adding weights in survey experiments allowed researchers to obtain estimates that are externally valid.

To address the sample-population discrepancy, we calculated an IPW estimator by dividing the proportion of the sample by the proportion of the population for each gender, age, and education categories in each city. We multiplied these three weights to use in our estimations. To ensure that these estimates are robust, we also ran the same regression without weights (Appendix B.3.).

Survey Design

Respondents who clicked on the Facebook ad were redirected to the first page of the survey containing information regarding the aim of the survey, protection of personal data through double-blind anonymity and confidentiality, as well as information regarding the researchers

and King's College London (see Appendix B.1.). We also informed respondents that they cannot return to a previous page once the survey has begun and that they are able to withdraw their participation consent at any point during the survey by exiting or closing the web page. The statement also included that survey would take approximately 10 minutes to complete. At the end of the page, the respondent must explicitly declare that they have read the information provided and that they have chosen to participate willingly in the survey. In line with ethical guidelines of King's College London, we did not collect any information that may personally identify respondents.

Following this section, respondents were asked to state whether they have Indonesian citizenship, to further filter out non-citizens that Facebook might have included in their algorithm. Respondents were subsequently asked to provide demographic information, such as gender, age, highest education level obtained, average monthly income, and city of residence. The next sections in the survey contained the treatment (for treatment group only), democracy support questions, and an open-ended meaning of democracy (MOD) question.

Treatment

Respondents were randomly split into two groups using an A/B test method, where half were exposed to a short definition of democracy (treatment, $n = 1,569$) while the other half received no definition (control, $n = 1,585$). The definition as treatment was taken from the core points of Dahl's (1971) maximalist definition of democracy (see Diamond and Morlino, 2004: 2):

"At a minimum, democracy requires: 1) universal adult suffrage; 2) recurring, free, competitive, and fair elections; 3) more than one serious political party; and 4) alternative sources of information."

The balance test in Appendix B.2. shows that the probability of receiving the treatment is not associated to any observables. To ensure that respondents noticed the treatment, they are asked to provide a definition of democracy using an open-ended format.¹⁶ In line with DU literature, responses were coded into four categories: (1) references to procedural aspect of democracy (e.g., elections, parliament, checks and balances); (2) references to liberal aspects of democracy (e.g., rights, freedom, equality); and (3) references to perceived outcomes of the system (e.g. economic prosperity, peace, welfare provisions). We code those who did not provide any answer separately (e.g., DK), as well as definitions that are not related to democracy, as missing.

Appendix B.2. shows that the proportion of respondents who did not provide any definition of democracy decreases only by .82 percentage points when exposed to the treatment. When the sample is split between genders, the proportion of male respondents not providing any definition decreases by 5.6 percentage points while the proportion of female respondents who did not provide any definition increases by 3.3 points. In terms of provision of procedural definitions, male respondents in the treatment group provided fewer procedural definitions of democracy, likely because the statement used as treatment already provided core aspects of the democratic procedures as part of the definition; we did not observe any changes among

¹⁶ Respondents were asked, "To you personally, what is the meaning of democracy?". Similar questions can be found in cross-national surveys, such as World Values Survey and Asian Barometer.

female respondents. Conversely, the proportion of providing rights-based definitions and non-meaningful increases for both genders in the treatment group compared to the control group. Finally, the proportion of providing outcome-related definitions decreases for both genders after being exposed to the treatment. Post-treatment variations of ‘alternative’ definitions—that is, a definition that is not related to procedures—suggests that the treatment successfully inform both genders, especially women.

Dependent variables

We used three of the most common democratic support survey questions as the main dependent variables, which are also commonly used in cross-national surveys, such as World Values Survey and Asian Barometer.¹⁷ First, respondents were asked to state agreement with one of the following *democracy vs. autocracy* statements:

“1) Under certain circumstances, an authoritarian government may be better, 2) Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government, or 3) For people like me, it does not matter the system of government”.

Responses to the above statement were further divided into three binary variables. The first variable captures whether respondents responded with ‘Don’t Know’ (DK) (0) or provided an answer (1). The second variable captures the absence or presence of political efficacy—that is, whether they expressed ambivalence (0) or showed definitive preference for either democracy or autocracy (1). Finally, the third *democracy vs. autocracy* variable categorized whether respondents considered autocracies to be a viable alternative to democracy (0) or democracy is always the preferred system of governance (1). Over 80% of the respondents provided non-DK responses and showed greater preference for either form of political system. However, only 63.6% of respondents in the latter group expressed consistent preference for democracy.

We then asked respondents to rate their satisfaction level with the way democracy works in their country on a similar 1-10 scale (*satisfaction*). Although the aforementioned questions can be seen as indicators of support for the principles of democracy, satisfaction also taps into an evaluation of the current government’s performance. Answers to this question are thus also affected by instrumental motivations about the composition of the current government (Canache et al., 2001). In this paper, we study both instrumental democratic support questions (SWD), as well as others aiming at uniquely measuring support for democratic principles. As such, we also asked respondents to rate how personally important it is to live in a democracy on a scale of 1-10 (*living in democracy*).

Table 3.2. below shows the distribution of responses in all five dependent variables. While Indonesians emphasized high levels of importance in living under a democratic system, the average level of satisfaction with the implementation of democracy is relatively low at 3.99 out of ten.

¹⁷ For the control group, respondents are immediately asked democratic support and DU questions. For a full list of the survey questions, see Appendix B.1.

Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics of dependent variables

Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Democracy v. autocracy					
<i>DK v. Provided preference</i>	3,154	0.843	0.364	0	1
<i>Efficacy: absent v. present</i>	2,659	0.847	0.360	0	1
<i>Democracy always preferred</i>	2,659	0.636	0.481	0	1
Living in democracy important	3,154	8.044	2.441	1	10
Satisfaction with democracy	3,154	3.991	2.719	1	10

Control variables

We included gender, age, education, and income as control variables in our estimations. Individuals aged 55 and over were collapsed into one category, resulting in five distinct age groups (see Table 3.1.). Education levels were also collapsed into three categories, collapsing individuals with no and primary education into ‘low’; junior and secondary levels into ‘mid’; tertiary levels into ‘high’. We did not recode monthly income and maintained all five levels.

Results

To test H_1 , we estimate a series of regressions in which the treatment predicts democratic support, with and without sociodemographic controls (gender, age group, education, and income). Table 3.3. reports that exposure to treatment reduces the likelihood of providing an answer by 4.6 percentage points, increases the likelihood of providing a preference instead of ambivalence, but has no effect on the preference for democracy over autocracy. Introducing control variables to the models strengthens the treatment effect on provision of answers, further reducing its likelihood to 7.7 percentage points. Inclusion of controls also strengthens the treatment effect on preference for democracy, in which exposure of treatment reduces preference for democracy by 4.9 percentage points. Controls rendered treatment effect to null in terms of provision of preference versus ambivalence.

Table 3.3. Regression of treatment effects on preference and satisfaction with democracy

VARIABLES	Provide an answer		Provide a preference		Prefer democracy		Living in dem. important		Satisfaction with democracy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Treatment	-0.046** (0.017)	-0.077*** (0.020)	0.057*** (0.017)	0.023 (0.017)	-0.042 (0.022)	-0.049* (0.024)	0.053 (0.106)	-0.146 (0.121)	-0.469*** (0.129)	-0.397** (0.147)
Female		-0.068*** (0.019)		0.013 (0.018)		0.031 (0.025)		-0.035 (0.117)		-0.555*** (0.143)
Education		0.092*** (0.013)		-0.011 (0.012)		-0.072*** (0.017)		0.127 (0.081)		-0.458*** (0.099)
Age		0.015 (0.008)		0.033*** (0.008)		0.069*** (0.010)		0.111* (0.049)		0.552*** (0.059)
Income		0.007 (0.008)		-0.004 (0.008)		0.001 (0.011)		0.025 (0.051)		-0.057 (0.062)
Constant							7.786*** (0.091)	7.482*** (0.209)	4.663*** (0.111)	4.555*** (0.255)
N	2,440	1,879	2,089	1,622	2,089	1,622	2,176	1,692	2,176	1,692
R ²							0.026	0.063	0.076	0.169

Note: Entries are marginal effects estimated with logit regression (provide an answer, provide a preference, prefer democracy) and coefficients estimated with OLS regressions (satisfaction with democracy, living in democracy important). Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. All models estimated using city fixed effects.

Our treatment does not seem to have any effect in changing the importance of living under a democracy but does reduce democracy satisfaction by .469 points on a 10-point scale. The effect is also robust to the introduction of control variables, though the effect is smaller at .397 points.

We then set to test H_2 by estimating the same regressions as H_1 and adding an interaction between treatment and gender. Table 3.4. shows that the treatment increases the likelihood of providing an answer other than DK more for women than men by 8.1 percentage points. However, women exposed to the treatment are less likely than men to provide a preference by 9 percentage points and less likely to prefer democracy over autocracy by 12.3 percentage points. There is no gender differentiation in the effect of treatment on the importance of living with democracy and democracy satisfaction.

Table 3.4. Regression of treatment effects on preference and satisfaction with democracy, moderated by gender

VARIABLES	Provide an answer (11)	Provide a preference (12)	Prefer democracy (13)	Living in dem. important (14)	Satisfaction w/ democracy (15)
Treatment	-0.117*** (0.028)	0.061** (0.023)	0.004 (0.032)	-0.055 (0.162)	-0.623** (0.197)
Treatment x Gender	0.081* (0.039)	-0.090* (0.035)	-0.123* (0.049)	-0.203 (0.242)	0.506 (0.294)
Gender	-0.110*** (0.028)	0.054* (0.024)	0.092** (0.035)	0.058 (0.162)	-0.787*** (0.196)
Education	0.089*** (0.013)	-0.010 (0.012)	-0.070*** (0.017)	0.132 (0.081)	-0.470*** (0.099)
Age	0.020* (0.009)	0.030*** (0.008)	0.064*** (0.010)	0.100* (0.050)	0.579*** (0.061)
Income	0.005 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.001 (0.011)	0.027 (0.051)	-0.063 (0.062)
Constant				7.452*** (0.212)	4.630*** (0.258)
N	1,879	1,622	1,622	1,692	1,692
R ²				0.065	0.177

Note: Entries are marginal effects estimated with logit regression (provide an answer, provide a preference, prefer democracy) and coefficients estimated with OLS regressions (satisfaction with democracy, living in democracy important). Jakarta is used as reference city. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Estimations are weighted.

We found more significant relationships (at $p < .05$) for the interaction between treatment and education. Table 3.4. shows that the treatment effects were larger in terms of providing an answer and preference for democracy when the respondent's education level was higher. Conversely, the treatment effects were smaller for providing a non-ambivalent preference. Higher education levels also correspond with larger treatment effect on satisfaction with democracy, increasing the effect by nearly three-quarters of a point on a 1 to 10 scale. However, we do not see any significant effect on respondents' emphasis that living in a democracy is important to them.

Table 3.5. Regression of treatment effects on preference and satisfaction with democracy, moderated by education


VARIABLES	Provide an answer (11)	Provide a preference (12)	Prefer democracy (13)	Living in dem. important (14)	Satisfaction w/ democracy (15)
Treatment	-0.237*** (0.048)	0.154** (0.048)	-0.230*** (0.067)	-0.702* (0.311)	-1.749*** (0.378)
Treatment x Education	0.098*** (0.027)	-0.067** (0.023)	0.091** (0.032)	0.297 (0.153)	0.723*** (0.186)
Gender	-0.073*** (0.019)	0.013 (0.018)	0.031 (0.025)	-0.046 (0.117)	-0.582*** (0.142)
Education	0.045* (0.018)	0.017 (0.016)	-0.112*** (0.022)	-0.004 (0.105)	-0.775*** (0.128)
Age	0.011 (0.008)	0.036*** (0.008)	0.065*** (0.010)	0.096 (0.049)	0.516*** (0.060)
Income	0.012 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.002 (0.011)	0.037 (0.052)	-0.027 (0.063)
Constant				7.732*** (0.246)	5.163*** (0.298)
N	1,879	1,622	1,622	1,692	1,692
R ²				0.065	0.177

Note: Entries are marginal effects estimated with logit regression (provide an answer, provide a preference, prefer democracy) and coefficients estimated with OLS regressions (satisfaction with democracy, living in democracy important). Jakarta is used as reference city. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Estimations are weighted.

Figure 3.2. better illustrates the conditional treatment effect on all five dependent variables moderated by levels of education. The treatment effect is substantial and significant especially for low-education respondents, and generally insignificant for mid- or high-education respondents. Among respondents with low levels of education, the treatment effect decreases the likelihood of providing answer by 23.58 percentage points, suggesting that an exposure to a definition of democracy may disrupt their understanding of democracy, therefore inflating the proportion of DK responses. Within the same subgroup, the treatment effect slightly increases the likelihood of providing a non-ambivalent preference by 6.53 percentage points but once again lowers the likelihood of preferring democracy over autocracy by 16 percentage points. This last finding is important: in contrast with observational studies, we found that inducing greater levels of DU actually decreases democratic support among low-education respondents.

Figure 3.2. shows an interesting pattern of the treatment effect on various levels of education. It seems that the treatment effect is negative for low- and high-education respondents, but positive for mid-education respondents. The treatment reduces the importance living under democracy by .71 points among low-education respondents ($p < .000$) and only slightly increases the same rating by .35 points among mid-education respondents ($p = .073$) on a 1 to 10 scale. Furthermore, the treatment reduces satisfaction with democracy by 1.62 points among low-education respondents and increases satisfaction by .97 points among mid-education respondents. Both interactions are significant at $p < .000$. Among high-education respondents, the treatment seems to reduce democratic satisfaction by .53 points, although this is only borderline significant at $p = .065$.

Figure 3.2. Conditional treatment effects by education levels



We also ran the same series of regressions without weights as a test of robustness: we do not find significance in the effect of treatment on any of the five dependents variables. Furthermore, there were no significant interaction effects between treatment and gender, or between treatment and education. Full regression tables are included in Appendix B.3.

Discussion

Public support for democracy is a key factor in maintaining the stability of democratic regimes. Yet, individual-level answers to democratic support surveys are wrought with issues that threaten the validity of such measurements, particularly in new and developing democracies. The main criticism lies with democratic understanding, whose deficits are often magnified by socioeconomic inequality. The literature generally agrees that ‘meaningful’ support for democracy—that is, support for democratic governance regardless of regime setbacks—are strengthened when citizens are fully informed on democratic values and principles (Baviskar and Malone, 2004; Canache, 2012a; Kruse et al., 2019).

To offer new insights on the topic, we conducted a web survey involving over 2,000 participants from Indonesia’s five largest cities. The survey experiment exposes the treatment group with a short list of characteristics that define democracy and then asks all respondents to answer three democracy support questions. The aim is to test if having a uniform definition of democracy changes how respondents perceive Indonesian democracy and their level of support for it. Furthermore, we are interested in how gender plays a role in how democracy is understood and perceived by Indonesian citizens. Manipulation check shows tangible response to the treatment, which changes the way respondents define democracy in the subsequent open-ended question. In particular, it decreases procedural definitions of democracy and rate of DK responses among men, while increasing rights-based definitions of democracy and substantially reducing outcome-based definitions among women.

Our results both confirm and contrast some findings in past democracy support literature. Overall, the treatment lowers support for democracy in three out of five questions compared to individuals in the control group, and these effects are significant at $p < .05$ level. When gender is taken into account, it has opposing effects on democratic support for both men and women. Increasing democratic understanding leads to higher likelihood in providing an answer but lowers the likelihood of explicitly stating a preference and preferring democracy over autocracy. We did not observe differential treatment effect for either gender in terms of importance of living in a democracy and satisfaction with democracy.

This confirms that individuals with higher democratic understanding report lower satisfaction rates but challenges the assumption that higher DU also leads to greater support for democracy. We posit that democratic context and experience with democracy play a role in generating such patterns. The fact that Indonesia has been a democracy for 20 years, has had multiple free and fair elections, and have made significant improvements to protect the rights and freedoms of its citizens makes authoritarian nostalgia all the more curious phenomenon. Partially, nostalgia could be explained by how democratic governance is perceived by Indonesians. On average, satisfaction with democracy is quite low at only four out of ten. The persistence of oligarchic power structures, coupled with their control over pivotal national assets and media, portrays an unconvincing narrative that democracy has delivered something radically different from Suharto’s New Order regime (Robinson and Hadiz, 2017). Being informed or reminded of what democracy *is* may have even contributed to the perceived ambiguity of Indonesia’s democratic accomplishments, especially since the country’s current economic and political stagnation means that the benefits of democratic progress remain

unequal across institutions, provincial lines, as well as socioeconomic levels (see Davidson, 2018).

Our original survey had focused on urban populations, which were easier to access via social media recruitment. Of course, this provided additional challenges and limitations to measuring the true level of DU and democratic support in the country, as it excluded respondents in rural area. Rural residents, especially in SEA, tend to have fewer access to political information, especially in terms of access to education and political news, and tend to have much lower income levels compared to their urban counterparts. For this study, the decision to exclude rural residents was made due to difficulty in reaching these populations for online surveys. Although Facebook itself is widely used across Indonesia, the quality of Internet further away from urban areas are low and unreliable. Indonesian internet providers offer cheap but limited internet packages that included social media access at the time of the survey. However, broader access may require more expensive packages, which may not be accessible to many outside of urban areas. As such, we were not convinced that we would be able to recruit enough rural residents, who would have difficulty accessing the online survey hosted outside of Facebook. Since Covid-19, however, the Indonesian government has made a concerted effort to expand Internet infrastructure and lower the cost of Internet access to accommodate online learning. Future online surveys in Indonesia may be able to take advantage of this expansion and conduct more inclusive survey on public opinion and political behavior.

Nevertheless, our findings are not a study of Indonesian pessimism. Rather, we hope to impart an important nuance to the skepticism surrounding individual-level support for democracy in developing democracies: socialization of democratic principles works best in tandem with efforts to improve gender equality in the general population. Future research could benefit from larger studies covering more areas in Indonesia, and therefore, greater diversity in democratic understanding as well as socioeconomic composition. This study pursues the most cost-efficient strategy, which limits the scope to five of Indonesia's most populated cities. Our sample also contained only a small proportion of individuals with low education, which would have affected the statistical power of our estimations. Further, the timing of the survey—a month before one of the most contentious presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia's history—potentially primes people into thinking about politics and democracy more. Most likely, our treatment effect is underestimated, and a non-election year survey can further enrich the democratic understanding and support literature in Southeast Asia and other developing democracies.

Chapter 4

Rock the (Informed) Vote: The Effects of Political Knowledge and Socialization to Democracy on Voting in Indonesia

Informed citizenry is central to a well-functioning democracy—political knowledge helps define and stabilize preferences as well as inform vote choices. In this paper, I studied the effect of political knowledge on vote choice in the context of high polarization and democratic challenges during the 2019 Indonesian presidential election. Additionally, I looked at how the timing of individual's first exposure to democratic principles affect their conception and attitudes towards democracy in the present. Using original survey data collected in five major cities in Indonesia ($N = 2,500$), I found strong cohort effect: those socialized under authoritarianism are less likely to vote for the pro-democracy candidate compared to those socialized after Indonesia's democratization. However, I also found that political knowledge could be a substitute to socialization to democracy: increasing political knowledge increases the likelihood of voting for the pro-democracy candidate.

Informed citizenry is central to a well-functioning democracy. A society where voters have high levels of democratic understanding (DU) as well as political knowledge about policies, events, and relevant actors shows greater capacity for holding the government accountable when faced with violations of democratic rights and norms (Converse, 1964). The two complement one another—DU represents the capacity to understand large abstract concepts about one's political environment, while political knowledge represents the capacity to observe and utilize knowledge about specific mechanisms and institutional actors involved in a political system.

Yet, the literature demonstrates that most people are uninformed and are likely to remain uninformed. First, studies show that citizens tend to have low levels or partial knowledge of politics (Converse, 1964; Bartels, 1996; Carpini and Keeter, 1996). Second, large portions of the citizenry struggle to keep up and update their knowledge, especially when faced with new but incongruent pieces of information (Berinsky, 2017). Finally, political information is rarely neutral and individuals who are less aware of this bias are more likely to be misinformed on political matters (Neuman, 2018).

In new democracies, biased political information is almost always a given when viewing their own country's past. Narratives of authoritarian history shape citizens' attitudes towards the present democratic system—pre-democratization times were framed as either bleak and repressive, or not referenced negatively enough that it may provide a degree of justification among those who may view the transition process as chaotic and the resulting institutions with distrust (e.g., Karp and Milazzo, 2015; Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2019). As a result of the latter treatment of authoritarian history, new democracies often face ongoing threats not only from political elites who have a vested interest in sustaining authoritarian pressure, but also from citizens whose beliefs and knowledge of democracy and politics carry notions of authoritarianism.

The rise of support for hybrid political systems is a symptom of this phenomenon, particularly among democracies in Southeast Asia (SEA) and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (e.g., Shin

and Kim, 2018; Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). In SEA, especially, conceptions of liberal democracy must compete with Asian-style democracy, which arose from the rejection of Western influences on Eastern values advocated by political elites since the 1950s (Sen, 1999). Within this trap of cultural relativism, democracy is redefined with a focus on social harmony by restricting divisive political ideas and expression and with emphasis on law and order to reinforce economic growth after the devastating 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (Pepinsky, 2017). As such, authoritarian notions of democracy persist even after successful democratic transitions and there is evidence to suggest that the continued support for hybrid systems means that these authoritarian values are generational, transferred from those who directly experienced authoritarian rule to those who have only ever experienced democracy (Darden and Grzymala-Busse, 2006; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017).

This chapter examines two research questions: 1) How do democratic attitudes vary between those who were socialized to democracy during an authoritarian period and after democratic transition? and 2) How does this variation affect support for democracy? This paper further argues that a firm grasp of DU and political knowledge can potentially overcome the influences of authoritarian indoctrination, which tends to have a long-lasting effect on democratic attitudes. My contribution is twofold. First, I offer a systematic look at political knowledge and socialization effects on voting in the context of high polarization and in the presence of serious threats to democratic institutions in a country. Second, I do so in the context of a less structured political system and in a developing democracy.

I used the 2019 Indonesian presidential election as a case study to examine these questions. In a broader context, the 2019 election marked a turning point in the country's democratic history—one that was a long time coming despite only democratizing 24 years ago—as voters chose between two candidates who held vastly different attitudes towards democracy and energized opposing democratic sentiments. The event holds significance as it followed the first highly contentious presidential election in 2014, which resulted in further polarization between factions of pro-democracy supporters and nostalgic Suharto supporters in the years since. By the time the 2019 election came, support for anti-democratic politicians and laws have reached its zenith, fuelled further by incumbent Joko “Jokowi” Widodo unexpected turn towards less democratic policies and challenger Prabowo Subianto's strengthening anti-democratic rhetoric and embrace of ultraconservative Muslim movements. In this instance, an individual's voting preference in the 2019 presidential election is thus a direct reflection of their attitudes toward democracy.

I analyzed the effect of political socialization period and political knowledge on voting preferences using an original survey of 2,500 respondents residing in five major cities in Indonesia. Respondents were divided into two cohorts: those who lived under Suharto's dictatorship during their formative school years and those whose formative school years take place after democratization in 1998. Additionally, respondents were asked to answer a battery of knowledge items on political institutions, actors, and procedures. The findings show significantly lower likelihood of voting for pro-democracy candidate Jokowi among those who were politically socialized during the authoritarian period. However, having high levels of political knowledge negated this effect, suggesting that knowledgeable individuals are key to breaking the influence of authoritarian legacies on future democratic progress.

Authoritarian Legacies and Democratic Support in Developing Democracy

Linz and Stepan (1996: 5-6) argued that a new democracy is consolidated when it becomes the “only game in town”, where democracy enjoys the support from the majority of its citizens. Torcal (2007: 196) proposed that unconditional support for democracy is the only type of support that guarantees the formation of attitudinal ‘safety area’ that is “immune to daily politics, economic and political crises, and the general performance of the system.” This entails that positive attitudes towards democracy must also be accompanied by negative attitudes towards its authoritarian past.

The foundation of this support does not surface in an instant—rather, democratic support often forms when a country is still under authoritarian rule. With increases in modernization levels, access to education, and linkages with democracies that facilitate diffusion of political information, citizens living under a dictatorship can and do learn about democracy. Shin and Kim (2018) reported that most of the world’s population is aware of the concept of democracy, with around 81% expressing that democracy is ‘good’ or ‘very good’ and 86% being in favor of living in a democracy. In some ways, these are surprising numbers, considering that nearly half of the world’s population continues to live under authoritarian rule (Neundorf and Pop-Eleches, 2020).

Whether this support is genuine remains contested, especially since democracy can mean different things to different people. With support for hybrid regimes continuing to be prevalent even in countries under decades of democratic rule (Shin and Kim, 2018: 224-225), the question of what people learn about democracy and democratic governance is a legitimate one. Achen and Bartels’ (2016: 6) observation that “most people everywhere accept the proposition that their own political system is (somehow) democratic” lends legitimacy to the claim that socialization to democracy under non-democratic rule skews how democracy is defined and how citizens evaluate their political environment. Indeed, multiple studies have shown that citizens in countries like China and Vietnam overwhelmingly believe that their country is a democracy, despite living in a one-party autocratic regime (e.g., Pietsch, 2015; Chu and Huang, 2010).

As such, it is important to examine how democracy is socialized under authoritarian rule. Democratic socialization is defined as the process of changing attitudes as a consequence of exposure to democratic rules, norms, and decision-making practices (Hyden et al., 2004). In autocracies, such exposure is inevitably limited. The state typically plays an active role in restricting or censoring political information, both in the media and in national education (Sanborn and Thyne, 2014). The goal is to maintain control over the political narrative without ‘corruption’ from anti-regime rhetoric. Even an established democracy like Japan is not immune to such censorship—revisionism of Japan’s history had erased all traces of the country’s former colonial and autocratic past in its history textbooks (Takayama, 2009). With the development and greater access to the internet, autocratic governments have also taken to online censorship and monitoring, particularly of social media discourse (Luqiu, 2017).

Repression of rights and freedoms are the main tool of authoritarian states. Hard repression, which includes political killings, torture, and imprisonment, often lead to strong rejection of the regime and its principles and contribute to the destabilization and delegitimization of the

regime (Rozenas and Zhukov, 2019). Post-transition democrats have an easier time recognizing that such regimes are not democratic and tend to express greater support for the new democratic regime and its principles. In contrast, soft repression relies on subtler violations or restrictions of civil liberties, such as allowing but limiting freedom of political expression. Escriba-Folch (2013) argued that this strategy more effectively preserves autocratic regimes' stability and legitimacy, and studies on citizen support for Asian-style democracy would support this observation (e.g., Thompson, 2015; Pepinsky, 2017). Ultimately, open or electoral autocracies, who hold regular elections but heavily regulates civil liberties, are nearly indistinguishable from democracy to many citizens of new democracies. This is especially true when the transition process has been costly or when the implementation of democracy has fallen short of their expectations.

Another factor that shapes citizens' views of democracy post-transition is the level of inclusivity of the preceding authoritarian regime. On one hand, inclusionary regimes, where there is wider redistribution of socioeconomic and political benefits, tend to lead to stronger anti-democratic sentiment because citizens had internalized that regime support provided them with greater access to these benefits (Neundorf et al., 2020; Neundorf and Pop-Eleches, 2020). Consequently, these citizens tend to report higher levels of democratic dissatisfaction and higher levels of authoritarian nostalgia post-democratization (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2017). Indonesia, for example, continues to refer to Suharto as the 'father of development', a title he received for building the country's infrastructure and economy during his 32-year dictatorship (Bunte and Ufen, 2009).

On the other hand, exclusionary regimes tend to focus resource redistribution among few political elites in exchange for their loyalty while simultaneously denying ordinary citizen's access to the same resources (Neundorf et al., 2020). In this instance, citizens may instead disengage completely from the regime, leading to the creation of ambivalent democratic supporters, or to reject regime propaganda in support of an opposite ideology, leading to the creation of more stable and stronger democratic support-post democratization. Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020), for example, found that citizens of former repressive right-wing autocracies are subsequently more likely to embrace leftist ideology.

As such, there seemed to be diverging responses to authoritarian nostalgia post-democracy. Multiple studies have demonstrated that there are significant differences in level of support and commitment to democracy between cohorts who grew up in autocratic and democratic systems (e.g., Van den Broek, 1999). While there is of course heterogeneous experience between different groups in society, individuals belonging to the same generation tend to share a common political culture and are exposed to similar levels and content of political information (Mishler and Rose, 2007). Not only that, but members of the same cohort are also taught using the same national curriculum, which forms the basis of the earliest exposure to the country's democratic and political knowledge.

However, the impact of democratization on democracy attitudes is unclear. Some find that voters who receive political socialization during the authoritarian period tend to be more protective and committed to democracy compared to younger citizens who are born or socialized after democratization (Resnick and Casale, 2014; Mattes, 2012). However, others find that the pre-democratization cohorts are prone to authoritarian nostalgia and are

generally less satisfied with democracy (Dalton and Shin, 2014; Huang, 2019; Mishler and Rose, 2007).¹⁸

On one hand, the literature review outline above seems to support the notion that older generations are more resistant to democratic sentiments. In a study of 71 countries, Neundorff et al. (2020) observed generally higher levels of authoritarian nostalgia and weaker democratic support among individuals who spend their formative years under authoritarianism. In Russia, specifically, Mishler and Rose (2007: 826) older generation of Russians are 24 points (on a 100-point scale) more supportive of the former communist regime compared to the younger generation.

Similarly, Dalton and Shin's (2014) study of five Asian countries found that support for the previous authoritarian regime tend to increase among older generations raised in the system. The average gap is nearly 15 percentage points higher between the cohort who experienced authoritarianism the longest and the cohort who have only ever experienced democracy, with the highest gap observed among Taiwanese. A more recent study in Taiwan by Huang (2019) further confirmed this large gap: older pre-democratization Taiwanese show greater preference for Taiwan-People's Republic of China reunification and express stronger dissatisfaction with democracy than young post-democratization cohort.

On the other hand, other studies suggest that older cohorts seem to show greater appreciation and support for democracy because they have experienced repression in the past. Those whose most formative political socialization occurs prior to democratization tend to be more satisfied with democracy, show lower political disaffection, more politically engaged, and are more committed to democratic ideals and governance compared to those socialized in a democracy (Mattes, 2012; Sanches and Gorbunova, 2016; Fuks et al., 2018; Resnick and Casale, 2014). Mattes and Bratton (2007: 135) noted that in post-Apartheid South Africa, one-third of the country's electorate is too young to directly remember the oppression of apartheid, such as race classification and segregation, or the popular resistance and their brutal shutdowns. By and large, South Africans who were old enough to have received political socialization prior to 1996 show greater commitment to democratic principles and governance compared to the younger 'Born Frees', explicitly because Apartheid invoked negative associations with authoritarianism.

Karp and Milazzo (2015: 103) also found that younger citizens in Europe are more likely to be skeptical about democracy compared to older citizens, especially among Eastern Europeans

¹⁸ This does not mean that cohorts socialized under authoritarian rule do not change their attitudes towards democracy later on in life. Democratization is often the defining political event that causes mass shifts in democratic attitudes and citizenship (Bratton et al., 2005; Chu et al., 2008). An important follow-up question is how long authoritarian socialization lasts after democratic transition. This question is critical to understanding the extent of authoritarian imprint in new democracies, and how it shapes current support and preferences for democracy. Neundorff and Pop-Eleches (2020: 1846) postulated that the extent of such imprint depends on the strength of initial indoctrination and strength of influence of new information about democracy. This supports the theory of life-long political learning model (or life-cycle effect) where individuals gain more information and experience as well as have more opportunities to develop the capacity to process new information about democracy and to integrate this information into their existing knowledge bank as they grow older (see Mishler and Rose, 2007). However, the cross-sectional nature of this chapter's survey experiment means that I cannot test for the life-cycle effect.

whose experience with post-communist autocracies are much more recent. However, younger cohorts show lower likelihood of being dissatisfied with democracy compared to older cohorts. Fuks et al. (2018) identified similar patterns in their study of Latin American countries: older cohorts who were socialized under authoritarianism were more likely to prefer democracy over other alternatives. Furthermore, older cohorts who experienced democracy prior to the authoritarian period, and later witnessed another democratization, show even greater commitment and support for democracy compared to their 'authoritarian legacy' and the much younger 'democratic legacy' counterparts.

Political Knowledge and Democratic Support in Developing Democracies

Political knowledge is defined as factual knowledge of political issues, institutions, actors, and constructs, integrated and organized into long-term knowledge (Carpini and Keeter, 1996). Multiple studies have shown that, on average, the public possesses low levels of political knowledge, scoring even lower on knowledge items that refer to specific policies, political structures, and current events (e.g., Jerit and Barabas, 2017; Fraile, 2013).

Out of the many consequences of political knowledge levels on democratic attitudes and behaviours, three are particularly relevant in the context of this study. First, individuals with low knowledge levels tend to be less critical and are unreliable evaluators of democratic performance (Norris, 2011). When exposed to new political information, they are more likely to find that doubling down on their own, perhaps outdated, political cues is less costly than reassessing their existing knowledge and accommodating new information input (Berinsky, 2017). This renders them more susceptible to misinformation about democracy, especially if this information is distorted or biased towards supporting the authoritarian regime. In contrast, more knowledgeable individuals tend to be more critical of any new information they receive and more cognitively prepared to process them.

Second, knowledge levels determine the level of support for democracy. Low knowledge individuals are more likely to demonstrate less stable and weaker espousal of democratic values (Dahlberg et al., 2015). Baviskar and Malone (2004) suggested that individuals with limited understanding of democratic characteristics, institutions, and functions are less able to identify subtle violations of democratic norms, such as soft repressive policies, and therefore less likely to mobilize or hold the offending institutions accountable. Pande (2011), for example, finds that creating an information-rich environment in rural India leads to higher demands for better governance and higher levels of democratic engagement. Furthermore, political knowledge builds self-efficacy, one of the primary motivators for political participation (Reichert, 2016; Johann, 2012). Efficacious individuals consume more information and engage in political activities, because they believe that their actions can meaningfully effect change, which in turn strengthens their belief that democracy is the best form of government over any other alternatives.

Finally, studies show that high levels of political knowledge produce informed voters that are more likely to vote correctly—that is, to vote for issues or candidates that align most with their own interests (Lau and Redlawsk 1997, 2006; Lau et al. 2008). Political knowledge equips citizens with all the necessary information to develop stable preferences, use them to critically

analyse and develop political decisions, and familiarize themselves with political rules and procedures (Lupia et al., 1998). Unfortunately, the real world imposes constraints on such conditions: voters do not always have access to all relevant information, the capacity to process information input, or are simply persuaded to vote for short-term interests that may be incompatible with long-term ones.

There are two views on the effect of knowledge levels on correct voting. On one hand, voting outcomes tend to be stable, rational, and “correct” at the aggregate level even if the underlying individual-level vote choice is ill-informed (Shapiro and Page, 1992). Lau and Redlawsk (1997) found that most voters were able to vote correctly despite limited cognitive capacity and knowledge through the use of heuristics such as partisanship or cues from opinion leaders. On the other hand, uninformed votes still show substantial deviations from ‘correctness’ even at the aggregate level (Bartels, 1996; Fowler and Margolis, 2014).

In new democracies, where individuals may not have equal access to political information and continues to face competing narratives about democracy, the proportion of uninformed voters is much higher. Klačnja (2017) observed that such political settings obfuscate the “correct” choice, even for some knowledgeable individuals, and tend to be exacerbated by large socioeconomic disparities, high levels of polarization, and indistinguishable policy platforms between parties and candidates. If left unaddressed, incorrect voting not only traps a substantial portion of the populace in a cycle of voting for underperforming representatives and disadvantageous policies that perpetuates ignorance, but also widens the political knowledge gap between the political ‘haves’ and political ‘have-nots’ (Jankū and Libich, 2019). As such, increasing individual-level political knowledge can profoundly mitigate incidents of incorrect voting and safeguard the democratic interests of the broader society.

Case Study: 2019 Indonesian Presidential Election

Jokowi in 2014 was a political outsider from a humble background, hailed as a representative of Indonesia’s pro-democracy forces. With a grassroots campaign mostly funded by ordinary citizens, he ran on a platform of improving and widening access to democracy by building the supporting infrastructure and an educated workforce (Tyson and Purnomo, 2017). His developmentalist policies are reminiscent of those found in established Asian democracies like Japan and South Korea—his brand of technocratic populism appeals most to Indonesians who are highly committed to democracy but lament its poor implementation by incompetent politicians (Warburton, 2018). Though Mietzner (2015) described his platform in 2014 as a “piecemeal compilation of ideas and proposals”, Jokowi’s campaign successfully underlined his past achievements in wealth distribution during his time as Solo mayor and Jakarta governor, most notably his subsidized health and education programmes.

Despite his success in increasing voter mobilization, grassroots activism, and political engagement among the socioeconomically underprivileged, Jokowi first term was also criticized for his accommodation of patronage politics, despite previous insistence that he will not engage in such practices (Warburton, 2016). Further, his administration was accused of weak responsiveness against the ultraconservative Muslim movement, one of which resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of Jokowi’s former deputy governor Ahok (Davidson, 2018).

Unlike his liberal campaign platforms, Jokowi's first term was perceived to have failed many minorities by appearing to be indifferent towards human rights violations, particularly against the LGBT community and religious minorities.¹⁹ Faced with a polarized constituent and increasing disillusionment of his nondemocratic turn, Jokowi doubled down on pragmatic economic outcomes to maintain approval ratings (Warburton, 2016). While campaigning for his re-election, Jokowi downplayed the democratic goals from his previous campaign platform and focused instead on attainable economic goals. Mietzner (2019) noted that his supporters' disappointment when Jokowi chose conservative Muslim cleric Ma'aruf Amin as his vice-presidential candidate, a political move seen as bowing down to religious and nativist political pressure.

Conversely, Prabowo's campaign platforms and rhetoric resonated with explicitly authoritarian elements in Indonesia's history. First, Prabowo's economic nationalism centred around the hypothetical theft of natural resources and intervention by a nebulous foreign enemy, calling this an attempt to create a nation of *kacung* (slaves) (Aspinall, 2015). Second, Prabowo's anti-elite sentiment contained similar anti-establishment rhetoric common among populist politicians. He often invoked images of politicians who have "betrayed the people", and often talk of national loyalty as a leadership quality he embodies (Pepinsky, 2017). Both populist rhetoric stood on the idea that Indonesia's democracy and its economy had been stolen by corrupt elites in collaboration with foreign agents at the expense of the people. Yet, Prabowo himself was part of the elites: he was a former Commander of the Special Forces and the Army Strategic Reserves, and personally oversaw violent human rights violations against civilians in Aceh, East Timor, and the 1998 anti-Suharto Reformation protests in Jakarta (Warburton and Aspinall, 2019). Against these allegations, he claimed to be a "victim" of Reformation, discarded for standing up against violent chaos and the oppressive government while defending Indonesia's democratic sovereignty (Aspinall, 2015).

Third, Prabowo's persistent call to return to the original 1945 Constitution was not new by any means, but controversial, nonetheless. Written immediately after Indonesian's independence, the document is known for expanding presidential powers and term limits by minimizing parliamentary scope of power, as well as centralizing decision-making authority, among others (Satrio, 2019). The constitution has seen various changes and amendments; most notably as the basis of the 1950 constitution, used by President Sukarno to dissolve the Parliament and abolish elections. Since then, Connors (2011) describes how Indonesia's long history of strongmen leaders is often accompanied by rejection of Western liberal democracy in favour of 'Asian-style democracy', a form of governance based on cultural relativism. Asian democracies place greater emphasis on order and stability, social harmony, hierarchy and centralization, as well as collectivism over individualism. In Indonesia, such governance is based on Pancasila, a set of five principles that nearly all Indonesian presidents have claimed to be

¹⁹ Basuki "Ahok" Tjahaja Purnama became governor of Jakarta following Jokowi's election as president in 2014. He was accused of blasphemy for misusing an Islamic quote and his Chinese Christian minority background were the primary drivers of mass demonstrations by various Islamist groups, allegedly mobilized by Jokowi's political rivals. Ahok was subsequently removed from office and charged with anti-blasphemy law. His 18-month imprisonment was controversial due to its discriminatory nature, tampered evidence, and Jokowi's perceived passiveness of his mistreatment (see Davidson, 2018).

superior to ‘Western notions of democracy and human rights’ (Robison and Hadiz, 2017).²⁰ In practice, however, Asian-style democracy is a thinly veiled effort to authoritarianize democracy by expanding the powers of the state and limiting the rights and freedoms of the people (Zakaria, 2007).

Prabowo’s revival of this rhetoric thus seems jarring against the background of Indonesia’s growing democracy. Jokowi won 53.15% of the popular vote in 2014 in, backed by two major parties and two minor parties.²¹ Prabowo, meanwhile, was supported by five major and one minor parties; under the banner of Koalisi Merah Putih (Red-White Coalition), Prabowo’s coalition won the majority seats in parliament against Jokowi’s minority Koalisi Indonesia Hebat (Great Indonesian Coalition). By 2016, the political map has shifted. Jokowi once again won with 55% in 2019, this time backed by seven parties, two of whom were former Prabowo supporters. Yet, Jokowi’s small victory margins brought little relief to pro-democracy supporters—they had expected a much larger mobilization against the threat of a second New Order (Davidson, 2018). Even after Jokowi’s re-election, the country continues to witness increased polarization between his pro-liberal democracy supporters and Prabowo’s pro-Asian-style democracy supporters (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2014; Lim, 2017).²²

Hypotheses

To answer my research questions on how democratic attitudes vary between cohorts who were socialized to democracy during authoritarian and democratic periods, I draw on both political socialization and political knowledge literature as the basis of my theoretical framework. Given conflicting findings on variations between pre- and post-democratization cohorts, it is best to consider the nature of Indonesia’s past authoritarian regime under Suharto, the process of democratization in 1998 and subsequent first democratic election in 1999, and how Indonesians are socialized to politics and democracy during their most formative years.

The *coup d’état* against Indonesia’s first democratically elected president Sukarno occurred in 1966, led by General Suharto who at the time was one of the highest-ranking members of Indonesian national military. Suharto’s first decade of rule was marked by mass killings of

²⁰ Pancasila is comprised of five principles of governance formulated around the same time as the 1945 Constitution. The principles reference monotheistic worship, morality and humanity, united sovereignty, deliberative and consensus-based governance, and social justice. Despite changes in national curriculum, Pancasila is consistently taught and recited during weekly national flag ceremonies conducted in schools (up to secondary) and in many government institutions.

²¹ Presidential election in Indonesia typically consists of one round, although two rounds are likely if no candidates receive more than 50% of the popular vote. The only occasion where two rounds of election were held was in 2004, where five presidential candidates were nominated. The subsequent second round in 2004 narrowed down the candidates to two. The elections in 2009, 2014, and 2019 only required one round. In the first election in 1999, the president and vice president were voted in by members of the parliament, not through direct elections (although MPs were directly elected by the people).

²² Indonesian-style democracy refers to a type of democratic implementation that combines elements of Asian values as well as its national ideology Pancasila as the main basis for democratic governance.

Communist leaders and sympathizers (Hooker, 1993: 277).²³ In the next two decades, Suharto's 'New Order' became known for corruption, patronage dealings, forced disappearances of political oppositions, and strict censorship of the media (Dore, 2019). Although the extent of his corruption remains unknown, as is the fate of many missing opposition figures, Suharto rehabilitated his image in the 80s with his government program *Pelita Harapan*, a series of five-year plans promoting growth and nationalism. During this period, he was titled the 'Father of Development' for his efforts in building national industrial and agricultural infrastructure (Slater, 2012). Part of his propaganda program was to build agricultural self-sufficiency, centered around rice production and food security for many of Indonesia's poorest, and yearly reports of 7% economic growth (Liddle, 1996: 59).

The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis severely damaged Indonesia's and many neighboring countries' economy. Coupled with surfacing allegations of massive corruption and nepotism, university students and pro-democracy activists led mass national protests against Suharto, demanding his resignation and imprisonment. The *Reformasi* protests took a turn on 12 May 1998, when the army and police force—allegedly with the involvement of General Prabowo Subianto who at the time was the son-in-law and close ally of Suharto—opened fire at protestors, killing 6 students and wounding dozens of others (Arfiansyah, 2022). The incident attracted international attention and within weeks, Suharto announced his resignation. Over a year later, on 7 June 1999, Indonesia held its first democratic election since 1955.

Despite many democratic progresses since, many lamented the lack of accountability faced by former Suharto's allies the perceived continuity of domination and resource control by political elites. Indonesia was showing signs of democracy fatigue common in developing democracies. Dore (2019) found that even after ten years from its first democratic election, the level of support for strong leaders (41%) and army rule (52%) remains high. Mujani et al. (2018) added that democracy satisfaction level was at its lowest in 2014 with only 58.4% of Indonesians reporting they are satisfied with the way democracy works in the country—a nearly 20-point drop from the previous election in 2009.

A large part of this is due to the increasingly obvious stagnancy of Indonesia's political and economic conditions that drove the democracy fatigue in the first place. Diamond (2008) argued that when economic growth is limited and corruption is high, the efficiency of a strongman or CEO-style technocrat can tempt citizens' aspirations away from democracy. The freedoms that came with *Reformasi* were increasingly viewed with disapproval as anti-Western and anti-liberalism sentiments grew: Indonesia post-democratization is deemed by many as being 'too free' (Long, 2016: 77). Unbridled political competition, ineffective policies addressing socioeconomic inequalities, and 'abandonment' of Pancasila's principles of mutual support and co-operation in favor of individualism were often cited as rooted in democracy that has been implemented without control (Long, 2016; Pepinsky, 2017).

The return of Suharto as a stalwart of political stability and economic prosperity began in 2014, six years after his death in 2008, where he received honors traditionally bestowed upon those who fought during the 1945 struggle for independence. Supporters of Prabowo displayed and

²³ Now known as G30S PKI, which continues to be taught in schools and commemorated as a monumental achievement in eradicating members of PKI every 30 September. Prior to democratization in 1998, school children would watch an anti-communist propaganda film of the events taking place during the communist purge.

shared an image of a smiling Suharto, accompanied by a text saying, “How are you, bro? Still better in my time, no?!” (Rondonuwu, 2014). On Twitter, the hashtag *#EnakJamanku* (‘good during my time’) trended for months in reference to Suharto’s ‘golden era’ (Wargadiredja, 2017). Suharto’s strongman qualities—like the ability to maintain control by ‘crushing protesters’—and hand in establishing economic security were widely hailed as necessary to fix Indonesia’s ‘failing’ democracy (Muhtadi, 2020).

Authoritarian nostalgia continued to grow in the run up to the 2019 elections. Politicians openly discussed their affiliation with New Order, pitting it as a selling point and received positive responses from many voters in return. Jokowi, previously hailed as the extra-establishment figure that Indonesia’s elitist politics needed, were framed as ‘more of the same’ when his administration turned to old guards and ultraconservative Muslim figures for electoral support (Mietzner, 2019). Prabowo, who initially attempted to distance himself from Suharto, began to embrace Suharto’s reformed image by emphasising their similar military background, tough policies on ‘anti-Indonesian’ sentiments, and economic nationalism in order to court nostalgic older and conservative voters (Fionna and Hutchinson, 2019).

In response, both Indonesian scholars and politicians publicly complained about how the lack of political education has driven Indonesian voters to viewing Suharto and authoritarian leaning Prabowo with positivity and admiration. Eddyono (2020) argued that history and civic education textbooks in the past, which advocated New Order’s historical revisionism, contributed to the formation of Indonesian nationalism by refusing to condemn Suharto and his 32-year rule as autocratic. The author criticized how democratic concepts, such as civil societies and individual freedoms, are taught as necessary but with the emphasis on moderation and in deference to social harmony.

Vickers (2022: 17) further argued that human rights abuses during Suharto’s era are often framed in a way that “legitimized the use of violence as the last resort [to address] anti-government groups” in the name of order. Additionally, New Order textbooks touted economic nationalism and aggressive defense policies against foreign intervention as hallmarks of Suharto’s achievements—something that post-*Reformasi* textbooks never sought to challenge. In 2016, government proposal to remove history education from the national curriculum was met with protests, with teacher alliances citing that multiple revisions of the curriculum in the past had already diluted history education in the country (Cipta, 2020).

I argue that the combination of Suharto’s turn to soft repression in the later part of his dictatorship, coupled with revisionism in history and civic education during the New Order era, meant that cohorts socialized to democracy during this time formed more authoritarian views of democracy compared to those who grew up after *Reformasi*. Since political information post-*Reformasi* never explicitly challenged this view, Prabowo’s rise to prominence was unlikely to be seen as problematic by this cohort. Conversely, Jokowi’s popularity among younger voters—with parallels drawn to US President Barack Obama due to his lack of *ancien regime* affiliations—indicated that younger cohorts view the New Order regime, and anyone associated with it, with disapproval. While younger cohorts expressed similar levels of dissatisfaction with democracy as older cohorts, they show greater commitment to democracy over any other alternatives and place higher emphasis on the importance of living in a

democratic system (Mujani et al., 2018). Most importantly, I do not assume that there will be a life-cycle cohort effect. My first hypothesis is thus:

H₁ Voters who were politically socialized under authoritarian rule are less likely to vote for the pro-democracy candidate.

This paper further argues that a firm grasp of DU and political knowledge can potentially overcome the influences of authoritarian indoctrination, which tends to have a long-lasting effect on democratic attitudes. Studies have shown that Indonesians' perception and knowledge of its own democracy is ambiguous at best. Shin and Kim (2018), for example, discovered that less than half of Indonesian respondents are able to identify Indonesia's previous authoritarian regime as nondemocratic and the current one as democratic. If past findings are correct, increasing political knowledge should direct all voters to vote for the candidate with pro-democratic rhetoric and platforms. Furthermore, I expect the effect of political knowledge would be greater for older cohorts than younger cohorts. The second and third hypotheses are thus:

H₂ Voters who have high levels of political knowledge are more likely to vote for the pro-democracy candidate.

H₃ Voters who were politically socialized under authoritarian rule are less likely to vote for the pro-democracy candidate but will do so if they possess sufficient levels of political knowledge.

Empirical Strategy

Sample recruitment

Respondents were recruited via Facebook advertisement between 15 25 March 2019, about three weeks prior the presidential election in Indonesia. Those who clicked on the ad were then redirected to a web-based survey; those who consented to their data being used and passed the screening question then proceeded to the survey. Recruitment via Facebook was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, social media survey recruitment is an increasingly common cost-effective alternative to face-to-face, telephone, or mail-in surveys, particularly in political science (e.g., Boas et al., 2018; Samuels and Zucco, 2013), psychology (e.g., Kosinski et al., 2015), and medical research (e.g., Kapp et al., 2013). It is also an efficient data collection method for geographically dispersed countries like Brazil (Samuels and Zucco, 2013), and India (Boas et al., 2018). Although social media inherently suffers from sampling bias—active users tend to be male, better educated, and younger compared to the rest of the population—studies on political attitudes and preferences have shown that Facebook samples produce similar results to representative survey sampling (Mellon and Prosser, 2017; Wang et al., 2015).

Secondly, Indonesians are among the most active Facebook users and social media consumers in the world. About 123 million or half of the total Indonesian population are active Facebook users, making them the third largest Facebook advertising audience in the world (Hootsuite, 2019). Since I targeted Indonesian citizens over the voting age of 17 in five major Indonesian

cities, internet penetration and social media usage rates are presumed to be higher than the national average of 56% and 57%, respectively (Hootsuite, 2019). Together, Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, Bekasi, and Medan represent 15% of the total population of 268.2 million.

The survey questions were first distributed to a group of Indonesian native speakers to ensure clear and precise translation between English and Bahasa Indonesia. Following feedback from the group, a pilot survey was conducted in February 2019 to test Facebook’s advertising mechanics and Survey Monkey’s A/B testing tool, where the survey was hosted. The main survey was launched on 15 March 2019 and lasted ten days, after which the Facebook ad and access to the survey was discontinued. The ad stated clearly that it is a sponsored content and positioned itself as a test of political knowledge (“Survei Pengetahuan Politik Indonesia”). Respondents were not paid for their participation—instead, I relied solely on the personal interest of the target audience by including a neutral language that encouraged Facebook users to test their understanding of Indonesian politics (“Tes pemahaman politik Indonesia Anda dengan survei pengetahuan politik ini”). Overall, the advertisement generated a total of 2.2 million impression and 19,705 clicks.

Data

At the end of the data collection period, the completion rate reached 65% from nearly 6,000 respondents, resulting in 3,836 unique respondents. Table 4.1 below shows the distribution of voting preferences as well as sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents compared to official population statistics of the targeted cities. The table also shows the distribution of presidential candidate preference per city. Although Jokowi won the 2019 elections by an 11.4% margin, respondents in the sample prefer Prabowo over Jokowi by nearly three times. The discrepancy is most likely because supporters of Prabowo tend to be educated, urban middle-class constituents whereas Jokowi appeals largely to the working class and the least educated (Mujani et al., 2018). As such, Prabowo’s voter profile overlapped with the social media user profile evident in the sample.

Table 4.1. Distribution of respondents’ characteristics in the sample (S) relative to population (P)

	Jakarta		Bandung		Surabaya		Bekasi		Medan	
	S	P	S	P	S	P	S	P	S	P
Female	48.45	49.74	49.29	48.50	50.54	50.60	50.84	49.04	44.44	50.61
17-24	48.24	20.79	55.05	25.39	48.91	22.89	53.56	25.44	61.46	29.17
25-34	32.45	27.37	27.62	23.05	26.64	23.17	28.21	28.19	29.11	23.65
35-44	10.48	22.29	9.57	19.84	13.50	19.98	12.54	22.13	6.47	19.40
45-54	5.99	15.58	4.87	15.70	6.57	16.57	3.60	14.67	2.70	14.41
55-64	1.91	9.06	2.17	9.69	3.28	10.96	0.85	6.34	0.00	8.54
65+	0.92	4.91	0.72	6.33	1.09	6.43	1.14	3.23	0.27	4.82
No education	0.34	11.33	0.00	7.32	0.37	14.83	0.00	5.76	0.54	1.65
Primary	0.42	17.59	0.37	20.66	1.47	18.64	0.29	9.84	0.54	31.40
Lower Secondary	4.05	19.10	2.40	21.56	2.21	19.85	1.45	13.72	0.80	22.20
Higher Secondary	42.48	36.99	41.88	35.59	38.24	33.11	52.91	45.58	34.32	35.48
University	52.70	14.99	55.35	14.88	57.72	13.56	45.35	25.09	63.81	9.27

Voting preference

Joko Widodo	20.52	51.7	18.27	38.5	24.40	70	24.30	36.2	20.53	45.6
Prabowo Subianto	58.97	48.3	65.38	61.5	56.46	30	59.36	63.8	64.26	54.4
Not voting	3.14		3.12		2.87		0.80		0.76	
Don't know (DK)	17.38		13.23		16.27		15.54		14.45	

Pop. > 17y	43.87	49.63	20.01	12.49	9.88	14.71	12.70	12.99	13.55	10.18
------------	-------	-------	-------	-------	------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

Note: Entries are %. S refers to data from our sample. Population (P) data taken from provincial-level *Badan Pusat Statistik* (Center of Statistics Agency) in DKI Jakarta (Jakarta), West Java (Bandung and Bekasi), East Java (Surabaya), and North Sumatra (Medan).

Additionally, there is a clear sampling bias for younger and highly educated participations. Respondents with education levels below secondary made up only 4.81% of the sample. The sample also over-represented younger respondents, who are much more likely to use social media compared to older respondents. The total number of respondents in the age 35 and over bracket, who would fall into the older cohort category compose 19.3% of the total sample.

To address the socioeconomic bias in the sample, I calculated an inverse probability weighted (IPW) estimator by dividing the proportion of the sample by the proportion of the population for each gender, age, and education population subgroups in each city. I then multiplied all three weights to produce a single weight for the analysis. Egami and Hartman (2022) argued that using weights for survey data is necessary to ensure that the estimates are externally valid.

Since the data used in this chapter is the same data used for the survey experiment in Chapter 3, I also ran an additional robustness test independently on respondents in the treatment and sample groups. The results show relatively similar size, direction, and strength of effect between the two groups (Appendix C.3.).

Survey design

Respondents who were redirected from the Facebook ad to the survey landed on the first page of the survey containing information on the survey, including the aim, protection of personal data through double-blind anonymity and confidentiality, and information regarding the researchers and King's College London (see Appendix C.1. for full question list). We further informed respondents that the format of the survey prevents them from returning to the previous page to amend any answer, and that they would be able to withdraw their participation consent at any point by exiting the survey (i.e., closing the web page). Respondents are then asked to explicitly state their consent to participate in the survey and to declared that they have Indonesian citizenship. The purpose is to ascertain that respondents are eligible to vote in Indonesian elections.

The survey contained 24 questions. The first section asked respondents about their socioeconomic backgrounds (gender, age, education, income, and city of residence), political interest and media habits (political interest, frequency of political news consumption, and preferred news source), and democracy preferences (democracy versus autocracy, importance of living in a democracy, and satisfaction with democracy).

The second section contained eight political knowledge questions on key institutions and political actors, followed by the third section containing questions on past voting behaviour (voted in presidential and legislative elections in 2014), voting intention in the 2019 election, as well as voting preferences (Joko Widodo or Prabowo Subianto).

Dependent variable: support for incumbent

Support for incumbent was measured as support for President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, who had won the election in 2014. The dependent variable was binary: vote for Jokowi (1) over Prabowo (0) in the 2019 presidential election. Overall, support for Jokowi among respondents in the sample was at 20.89%, whereas support for Prabowo was much higher by nearly three times at 60.49%. A minority of respondents stated that they did not intend to vote (2.48%), while the remaining respondents were still unsure of their vote choice (DK) (3.84%) or had preferred not to answer (12.31%).

The link between candidate preference and support for democracy is much clearer during the 2019 election campaign period. Although Jokowi’s first term was marked with controversial policies that were inconsistent with his claims of safeguarding democracy, public opinion still considered him to be the pro-democracy candidate in the race (Mietzner, 2019). After his victory in the 2014 elections, various scholars of Indonesian democracy published articles heralding Jokowi as the “savior of democracy” (see Mietzner, 2015; Pongsudhirak, 2014). By 2017, the same scholars published studies that observed how Jokowi’s policies had taken an illiberal turn but still warned against his potential challenger Prabowo Subianto as the more explicitly authoritarian of the two (see Power, 2018; Mietzner, 2018; Warburton, 2016).

Simultaneously, Prabowo ramped up his nationalistic rhetoric by openly embracing isolationist policies, economic nationalism, and ultraconservative Muslim groups (Pepinsky, 2017). He also ceased attempts to distance himself from Suharto, he never openly endorsed his supporters’ support for a return of the New Order. Aspinall (2015), who called Prabowo’s challenges to election results and subsequent years-long campaign against Western democracy “oligarchic populism”, and later expressed concerns about “nondemocratic pluralism” brewed and fuelled by Prabowo and his allies (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2019).

The disparity in democracy support between supporters of Jokowi and Prabowo was also evident in the sample.²⁴ With the exception of ambivalence about either political system, Jokowi’s supporters are generally more supportive of democracy compared to Prabowo’s supporters (at $p < .000$) (Table 4.2.). A larger proportion of those who stated that they intend to vote for Jokowi stated explicitly that they believe that democracy is always better than any other forms of government. Furthermore, Jokowi’s supporters reported greater importance on living in a democracy as well as more than double the rate of democratic satisfaction. This dissatisfaction may be related losing the election in 2014, which concurs with literature on the relationship between electoral wins/losses and reported satisfaction with democracy

²⁴ I further describe this measure in the section on control variables. For full question wording, see Appendix C.1.

(Anderson and LoTempio, 2002). I suspected that this might have also contributed to greater intolerance for Jokowi's missteps during his first term among Prabowo supporters.

Table 4.2. Difference in means between Jokowi and Prabowo supporters on democracy support questions

	Prabowo	Jokowi	Diff.	<i>p</i>	N
Democracy over autocracy	.63	.73	-.11	.000	2,659
Living in democracy important	8.05	8.60	-.55	.000	3,154
Satisfaction with democracy	3.13	6.63	-.350	.000	3,154

Independent variable: pre- and post-democratization cohorts

The event of the first post-Reformation democratic election in April 1999 was selected as a cutting-off point for cohort classification. Since is some disagreement in the literature concerning the best age cut-off to determine the effects of an event, Bartels and Jackman (2014: 11) argued that it is important to consider not just how political experiences are internalized, but also the extent of these experiences. Such considerations help identify the stage of life that is “distinctly formative” in order to properly identify the effect of generational imprinting.

Consequently, the pre- and post-democratization cohorts were separated based on their estimated level of education at the time of the first democratic election in 1999. More specifically, whether the respondent was undergoing secondary schooling, which is when history and civics education typically touched on more complex concepts of democracy and covers New Order history more extensively. The idea was that at this point, a respondent's political education is still strictly controlled by the contents of the national curriculum. Even if they finished the remaining of their secondary schooling after the election, the national curriculum did not change significantly until a few years after democratization (Lim, 2017). As such, nearly all their formative years prior to pursuing tertiary education—where civics and history education are no longer applicable—are spent learning about democracy and politics through propagandized textbooks. Furthermore, while the *Reformasi* protests took place during this cohort's formative years, the protests were mainly driven by university students and young democracy activists. Most of the population, though they might have disapproved of Suharto's regime, did not partake in the protests (Arifiansyah, 2022).

Cohorts were classified using their age, which indicates their (presumed) education level in 1999. Those who were aged 15 and over in 1999 (over 35 years in 2019) were classified as belonging to the *pre-democratization* cohort (1). Those who were younger than 15 in 1999 (between 17 and 34 in 2019) were classified as *post-democratization* (0). In total, there were more respondents in the post-democratization cohort (82.01%) than in the pre-democratization cohort (17.99%).²⁵ Of this sample, 22.02% would have been first-time voters in 2019, which suggests that over a third of the post-democratization cohorts were born several years after the 1999 elections and thus have lived under a democracy their entire lives.

²⁵ Weighted distribution of cohorts shows relatively equal proportions of pre-democratization cohort (50.87%) and post-democratization cohort (49.13%). Of these, the percentage of first-time voters is 28.95%.

Table 4.3. Difference in means between pre- and post-democratization cohorts on democracy support indicators

	Post	Pre	Diff.	<i>p</i>	N
Democracy over autocracy	.68	.63	.05	.040	2,611
Living in democracy important	8.26	8.02	.24	.028	3,085
Satisfaction with democracy	4.06	3.98	.08	.501	3,085

Table 4.3. above shows the mean difference in democracy support between pre-and post-democratization cohorts. Overall, the post-democratization cohort is slightly more efficacious and supportive of democracy at a significant level of at least $p < .05$. However, I do not find any significant difference in democracy satisfaction, though post-democratization cohort seems to be .08 points more satisfied than their pre-democratization counterparts.

To test the robustness of the cohort classification, I re-ran the same regressions modifying only the age cut off (aged 5 and 25 in 1999) to determine allocation into pre- and post-democratization cohort (full regression results in Appendix C.4.)

Independent variable: Political knowledge

Political knowledge questions were formulated based on recommendations from previous studies. Most of the literature had measured political knowledge in advanced Western democracies, where there are lower levels of socioeconomic inequality, more equal access to political information, and minimal censorship and intervention on political narratives by the state. In the context of this study, these factors are less applicable. As such, knowledge items were adjusted to fit into the socioeconomic and political conditions in Indonesia.


Mondak (2001) recommended discouraging DK responses by using multiple-choice format to stimulate higher self-efficacy among survey takers and generate higher rates of responses overall. The topic of the knowledge items was selected based on information that are relevant to political institutions, actors, and procedures. Barabas et al. (2014) advised that questions should explore the temporal aspects of knowledge, both dynamic information inputs and long-term facts that define the political environment. I argue that in highly unequal societies, this consideration is helpful to prevent biases against respondents from less privileged socioeconomic standing, who would have limited access to political information, compared to respondents from who would be considered ‘political haves’.

I limited the temporal range to the last five years in part to ensure that as many respondents as possible could answer at least one of the questions. For example, I asked respondents to articulate the functions of the higher courts in Indonesia by relating the question to Prabowo’s legal challenge of elections results in 2014. The strategy was a pragmatic solution that sufficiently addressed unequal distribution of knowledge across sociodemographic groups. I speculated that high voting turnout in each of the five cities, widespread media coverage, and heightened political interest should condition election-related political knowledge to be widely

shared—at least much more than knowledge that rely on individual means. Full knowledge question wording is included in Appendix C.1.

The political knowledge variable is a composite of the number of correct answers to the eight knowledge items provided by each respondent. The result is a continuous variable between 0 and 8.²⁶ Figure 4.1. below shows that 53.6% of the respondents are able to answer between seven to eight questions correctly, which is above the mean number of correct responses of 6.27. The number of respondents who provided no correct answers is negligible at .63%.

Figure 4.1. Distribution of correct answers to knowledge items



Control variables

Sociodemographic. The literature suggested that education, income, and gender are the strongest socioeconomic predictors of support for democracy. To overcome the uneven distribution of education and income in the sample, I collapsed the education variables into low (none and primary), mid (secondary), high (tertiary) education levels. Formal education and civic classes are where most individuals learn about politics and democracy—they help foster positive democratic attitudes and the self-efficacy needed to participate meaningfully in adulthood (Jennings and Niemi, 2014).

In developing democracies, an increasing proportion of educated middle class also serves as the primary driver of democratic progress, although some studies specific to SEA have cast doubt on the generalizability of non-SEA findings. Capuno (2016), for example, found that the middle class in Singapore provides the strongest support for the authoritarian regime. Similarly, Glassman (2010) observed that the Thai urban middle class was the most likely group to support the military coup, while rural Thais are more likely to support democratic governance.

²⁶ More detailed descriptions of these tests and descriptive information on the political knowledge variable are included in Appendix C.2.

Official statistics of both candidates' voters in 2014 seemed to support these findings. Prabowo was supported primarily by the educated middle class while Jokowi supporters mainly come from rural residents and the working class (Mietzner, 2019). The proportion remained relatively unchanged in the 2019 elections, although some defections were observed among the middle class who supported Jokowi's camp.

Political literacy. The literacy variables were composed of political interest, frequency of news consumption, and participation in the 2014 presidential election. Respondents were asked to rate their interest in politics on a scale of 1 ("Not at all interested") to 4 ("Very interested"). Approximately 82% of the sample expressed that they are "somewhat interested" or "very interested" in politics. Respondents were also asked to estimate their news habit—how often they follow news about politics and government—on a scale of 1 ("Never") to 4 ("Several times a week"). Nearly 63% of respondents reported that they consume political news at least several times a week, while only 11.58% reported that they never do.

Democracy support. Support for democracy was measured using two indicators. The first is whether respondents chose democratic ("democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government") (1) over authoritarian ("under certain circumstances, an authoritarian government may be better") (0) forms of governance. The second and third indicators asked respondents to rate the importance of living under a democracy on a scale of 1-10 and level of satisfaction with democracy in Indonesia on a scale of 1-10, respectively.

Table 4.4. Descriptive statistics of control variables

Variables	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Gender	3,476	0.49	0.50	0	1
Education	3,363	2.51	0.57	1	3
Income	2,561	3.03	1.40	1	5
Political interest	3,267	3.12	0.77	1	4
News consumption	3,257	3.38	0.99	1	4
Prefer democracy over autocracy	2,659	0.64	0.48	0	1
Living in democracy important	3,154	8.04	2.44	1	10
Satisfaction with democracy	3,154	3.99	2.72	1	10

Results

I estimated logit regressions predicting the probability to vote for the pro-democracy incumbent to test the three hypotheses outlined above.²⁷ By and large, the results confirmed the hypotheses. Table 4.5. below shows strong cohort effect: the pre-democratization cohort is less likely to vote for the pro-democracy candidate Jokowi by 8.6 percentage points ($p = .003$) compared to the post-democratization cohort (Model 1). This contributes to clarifying the ambiguity in past literature regarding generational variation in support for democracy. In this case, the results are consistent with findings that cohorts who were socialized under authoritarian conditions showed lower support and commitment to democracy post democratization (e.g., Dalton and Shin, 2014; Huang, 2019).

²⁷ I also ran a robustness check to identify respondents who might have cheated and removed them from the analysis (Appendix C.5.). The regression yielded similar results as the main models.

Conversely, increasing levels of political knowledge increases the likelihood of voting for Jokowi by 5.6 percentage points ($p < .000$). Considering how narrowly Jokowi won the 2014 elections against Prabowo, this would have widened the gap even more in 2019. This is also consistent with the literature on political knowledge that informed voters are more likely to show greater support for democracy and democratic candidates.

Table 4.5. Regression table of cohort and political knowledge effect on likelihood of voting for pro-democracy candidate

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pre-dem cohort	-0.086** (0.028)	-1.665*** (0.187)	0.013 (0.026)	-0.504* (0.202)
Knowledge	0.056*** (0.011)	0.007 (0.011)	0.045*** (0.009)	0.035*** (0.009)
Pre-dem cohort x Knowledge		0.223*** (0.026)		0.072** (0.028)
Gender	0.081** (0.026)	0.046 (0.025)	-0.010 (0.021)	-0.015 (0.021)
Education	0.022 (0.020)	0.050** (0.019)	-0.018 (0.021)	-0.014 (0.021)
Income	-0.025* (0.012)	-0.033** (0.012)	0.000 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.009)
Political interest	-0.079*** (0.021)	-0.097*** (0.021)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.072*** (0.017)
News habit	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.011 (0.017)	0.006 (0.013)	0.006 (0.013)
Democracy always preferable	0.071* (0.031)	0.089** (0.028)	0.033 (0.024)	0.035 (0.024)
Living in democracy important	0.011 (0.008)	0.010 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.075*** (0.004)	0.072*** (0.004)	0.067*** (0.003)	0.067*** (0.003)
IPW	Y	Y	N	N
N	1,099	1,099	1,099	1,099


Note: Entries are marginal effects estimated with weighted logit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Cohort is coded as 0 (post-democratization) and 1 (pre-democratization). Models 1 and 2 include inverse probability weighting (IPW); Models 3 and 4 do not.

To test the third hypothesis, I moderated cohort effects with levels of political knowledge. Table 4.5. above shows that the effect is positive, meaning that increasing levels of political knowledge help overcome the cohort effect on candidate preference. With each correct answer, the likelihood of voting for Jokowi increases by 22.3 percentage points ($p < .000$) for those in the pre-democratization cohort. Post-democratization cohort is less affected by moderation from political knowledge, though this is due their already higher likelihood of voting for Jokowi.

Figure 4.2. below better illustrates this moderation effect on candidate preference. The predicted probability suggests a meagre average increase of 1.2 percentage points in likelihood of voting for a pro-democracy candidate as levels of political knowledge increase among post-

democratization cohort. The effect of political knowledge on pre-democratization cohort, however, is nearly four times larger. Increasing knowledge levels among members of the pre-democratization cohort on average increases the likelihood of voting for Jokowi by a further 4.3 percentage points. Furthermore, when respondents in this cohort are able to provide at least six correct answers, the probability of voting for the pro-democracy candidate rockets to an average of 32.07 percentage points, despite zero effect when respondents were only able to provide fewer than 5 correct answers. This is an important finding as it shows that political knowledge can be a substitute for democratic socialization in encouraging a vote for pro-democracy candidate.

Figure 4.2. Predicted probability of voting for the pro-democracy candidate by cohort as political knowledge varies



Note: Solid lines are the predicted probabilities based on model (6) presented in Table 4.5. Dashed lines are 95% confidence interval.

Table 4.5. also included unweighted estimations of socialization effect on support for pro-democracy candidates, with and without moderation. The results suggest no cohort significant cohort effects. However, political knowledge still has a substantial positive effect in increasing the likelihood of voting for Jokowi and does seem to have a greater effect on individuals with authoritarian-influenced political education.

Roughly 19% of the sample expressed that they did not intend to vote in the 2019 elections, which is nearly half of the number of respondents who stated that they did not vote in the 2014 presidential election. It seemed that the continued contention between Jokowi and Prabowo had energized more voters to participation in the election. About 81% of respondents stated an intention to vote in the 2019 presidential election, which is consistent with turnout in the actual election at 82.83% (KPU, 2019).

So, what happens to those who did not intend to vote? There does not seem to be any difference in the likelihood to vote in the 2019 elections between pre- and post-democratization cohorts (see Appendix C.6.). However, it seems that knowledge gains actually lower the likelihood of voting by a marginal average of 2.47 percentage points ($p = .005$), in contrast to previous findings on the impact of political knowledge on participation. Still, increases in knowledge levels do positively affect an individual's likelihood to turn out to vote, especially among the pre-democratization cohort.

Discussion

An informed citizenry in a new democracy is critical in ensuring the safeguarding of democracy: the memory of its authoritarian past is still recent in the minds of its citizens, and the threat of authoritarian legacies often persist despite a successful transition to democracy. However, the literature on socialization to democracy is mixed on the effect that authoritarian propaganda has on support for democracy and democratic candidates. Some studies suggest that individuals who are socialized during their country's authoritarian regime express stronger support for democracy, likely because their conceptions of democracy as adults are accompanied by memories of their past repression under authoritarianism. Other studies suggest the opposite—those whose formative years are spent under authoritarianism are more likely to show approval for non-democratic political systems, especially when they view that democracy has failed in fulfilling its promises.

As such, this study sought to answer two research questions: 1) How do democratic attitudes vary between those who were socialized to democracy during an authoritarian period and after democratic transition? and 2) How does this variation affect support for democracy? Since there seems to be geographical variations in how authoritarian legacies affect democratic support, I also considered how respondents in this study's country case study Indonesia experienced its authoritarian past, learn about democracy and politics before and after the transition, as well as how democracy is currently framed by political elites. The strength of propaganda about democracy during Suharto's New Order and the minimal attempt at rectifying this perspective after democratization led to the first hypothesis: those socialized during the authoritarian period would be more susceptible to authoritarian nostalgia and offer support to authoritarian leaning candidates rather than pro-democracy candidates (H_1).

I further argue that a firm grasp of political knowledge can potentially overcome any possible influences of authoritarian indoctrination. I hypothesized that increasing political knowledge leads to increasing level of support for democratic candidates (H_2). Finally, H_3 hypothesized that the interaction between timing of socialization to democracy and political knowledge should have a positive effect the likelihood of voting for democratic candidates.

To test the three hypotheses, I conducted an online survey involving over 2,500 respondents sampled from five major Indonesian cities. The timing of the survey coincided with the 2019 Indonesian presidential election, where incumbent Joko "Jokowi" Widodo face against the same challenger Prabowo Subianto as in the previous election in 2014. Based on the content and rhetoric of their campaigns in 2014 and 2019, I considered support for Jokowi to be equivalent to support for pro-democracy candidate and high levels of commitment and

support for democracy itself. Conversely, support for Prabowo was considered to be support for authoritarian-leaning candidates.

The results suggested that firstly, the generation of voters who were politically socialized under authoritarianism prior to *Reformasi* were less likely to vote for Jokowi compared to younger cohorts, who were socialized after democratization. This was consistent with findings from other Asian countries, which suggested that pre-democratization cohorts are more likely to have authoritarian nostalgia. Secondly, political knowledge did increase the likelihood of voting for the pro-democratic candidate by a significant amount. This effect was particularly strong among members of the pre-democratization cohort: voters from this cohort became more likely to vote for Jokowi once they had sufficient political knowledge, which suggested that political knowledge could be a substitute to socialization to democracy.

Future research may benefit from a survey that covers greater and more diverse areas in Indonesia. Many of Jokowi's supporters are rural residents; they tend to have lower levels of education and income, which means that political knowledge may behave differently in influencing support for democracy and democratic candidates. This study's online sample was not as inclusive of these groups; as a result, there may be nuances that were missed in during analysis.

Furthermore, the cross-national nature of the data makes it difficult to definitively offer conclusions about cohort effect on support for pro-democracy candidates. Future researchers should also consider collecting longitudinal data to properly examine this relationship. Studies on generational values argued that democratic socialization and attitudes are strongly influenced by a life-cycle effect, meaning that they change over time depending on an individual's continued exposure to political information and experience with democracy.

Given the changes in Indonesia's political map, it would be interesting to explore the role of political knowledge in future elections. There were unanticipated political moves in Jokowi's second attempt at the presidency that had garnered criticisms from his supporters. His re-election campaign lacked the pro-democracy zeal that coloured his first bid and revealed his willingness to negotiate with political elites whose interests are not necessarily aligned with his own. Jokowi began his second term with the lowest approval rating he had ever received at 53%. In a surprise twist, Jokowi's new cabinet included Prabowo as Defence Minister, signalling a truce most likely aimed at overcoming the unprecedented polarization in Indonesian political history (Wijaya, 2019). Nevertheless, political observers continue to be wary of Jokowi's ability to rein in Prabowo's nationalistic tendencies as well as his own illiberal turn.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

In 2019, Lührmann and Lindberg published an article declaring that the third wave of autocratization has arrived.²⁸ The article was prompted by concerns and observations that many third wave democracies had come to a point where not only had democracy stagnated, but democratic breakdowns were severe enough to warrant caution for democratic backsliding. The year marked the first time since the end of the Cold War that democracy is not in the majority.

Two years later, Diamond (2021) further strengthened this claim with data from Freedom House. It showed that the ratio of democratic breakdowns was at its highest (18.9%) between 2009-2019 while the ratio of democratic transitions was at its lowest (18.4%) since the 1950s. All four of the largest democracies in the world—India, United States, Indonesia, and Brazil—remained mostly democratic but had shown massive declines in quality. The biggest declines in freedom scores occurred in Thailand (-35), Turkey (-33), Mexico (-18), and the Philippines (-13).

This dissertation explored why democracy in third wave countries is in a dire state. To propose an explanation for this trend, I look to public support for democracy: what factors shape support, how democracy is understood, how additional knowledge of politics can help build democratic commitment, as well as how the critical timing of socialization to democracy affect individual preferences and behaviour in democracies that continue to face pressure from their own authoritarian legacies.

In the following sections, I discuss the current conditions and development of democracy in SEA, the region of interest in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. The subsequent section summarizes the findings, followed by a discussion of the broader implications of the studies and how they fit into the literature. I conclude the chapter by proposing possible research avenues for future studies.

Democracy in SEA: What Happens Next?

SEA is home to only a few democracies, yet they have all experienced erosions in democratic quality. The election of Rodrigo Duterte in 2016 accelerated the decline of democracy in the Philippines. The former president operated extrajudicially, attacked checking institutions, and further polarized Filipino societies through populist rhetoric and policies that further marginalize minorities in the country (Curato, 2017). Despite this, the president and many of his dynastic allies continued to receive support from populace. Duterte's charismatic strong leader image was supported by his anti-elite rhetoric, and claims that previous government have lost the political will fix the nation (Maboloc, 2020).

²⁸ A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it? (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019)

The elite rhetoric is simply for show of course. The Dutertes were allies of the Marcos family during the dictatorship and had actively rebuild support for the Marcoses' political dynasty in key political positions. In 2022, Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. was elected as President with Duterte's daughter as Vice President. The return of the Marcos family to politics, as well as the strengthening of dynastic politics in general, was seen as further solidifying the country's trajectory towards democratic backsliding.

Many drew comparisons between Duterte and Indonesia's Prabowo Subianto. Both are political and economic elites who relied on anti-elite rhetoric, stoke authoritarian nostalgia through right-wing populism, and fuel anti-Western sentiments. By contrast, Joko "Jokowi" Widodo was heralded as Indonesia's Obama—an extra-establishment political figure from a humble background who rose to the top by being a competent, anti-corruption leader. This distinction, however, began to blur during Jokowi's first term. His coalition governed with a minority in parliament, causing deadlocks and inefficient governance. As a result, he had to make significant concessions to political elites. His 'illiberal turn' was further reflected in policies that limit the freedom to criticize the government, marginalize LGBT+ communities, and restrict workers' rights to fair pay and safe work environment (Warburton, 2016).

Jokowi's appeasement of the ultraconservative Muslim movement culminated in his choice of conservative cleric Ma'aruf Amin as running mate in the second election in 2019. This was seen as a betrayal by his pro-democracy supporters, many of whom criticized him for become 'more of the same'. Prabowo's appointment as the Minister of Defence in Jokowi's new cabinet was seen as a point of no return—democracy in Indonesia is in decline and is showing no signs of stopping.

The situation is not as dire as those in Thailand and Myanmar, who had undergone complete democratic reversal. Both countries are presently under authoritarian military rule with no plans for democratic elections in the future. Thailand's status as the region's oldest democracy was in reality a misnomer—the majority of Thai political history was dominated by military coups and the junta. The general election in 2019, the first since the 2014 coup, formally installed coup leader General Prayut Chan-o-cha as prime minister, who then proceed to appoint members of the parliament (McCargo, 2019). Currently, Paetongtarn Shinawatra—daughter of deposed former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra—is leading in the polls for the 2023 general elections. Considering that two Shinawatras had been forcefully removed from office and convicted of corruption in the past, many Thais are pessimistic about the future and longevity of democracy in the country.²⁹

Similarly, military rule has dominated most of Myanmar's modern history. Even with international attention on the election and the subsequent imprisonment of Aung San Suu Kyi and her allies, there was little change in the institutional arrangement of the democratic government vis-à-vis the *Tatmadaw* (Myanmar Armed Forces). As Stokke and Aung (2020: 276) observed:

²⁹ Thaksin's sister Yingluck Shinawatra was elected prime minister in 2011 and removed via military coup in 2014.

“[the] increased visibility and attention to the continued political power of the military has thus shifted the discourse on democracy in Myanmar, from cautious optimism to critical re-examination of the character and substance of the democratic opening.”

The brief experiment with electoral democracy between 2015-2021 under Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) ended when the military once again launched a coup. Results of the 2020 election, which the NLD won in a landslide, was declared unconstitutional. Aung San Suu Kyi was once again arrested to prevent future participation in the next election, at the time scheduled for February 2022. With recent postponement of the election until August 2023, Myanmar’s view of democracy remains perpetually out of reach.

Only Malaysia and Timor Leste seem to be gaining democratic grounds. After decades of electoral domination by United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the country elected a new coalition Pakatan Harapan in 2018, led by former dictator and UMNO chairman Mahathir Mohammad. His return to politics was a welcome one for many Malaysians, as UMNO’s rule had been mired in corruption, most notably the 1Malaysia Development Berhad scandal.³⁰ Among Mohammad’s campaign promises was the transfer of PH leadership and government to former rival and current ally Anwar Ibrahim, known previously for his pro-liberal democracy stance. After facing backlash two year into his prime ministership for backtracking on the promise of handover, Mohammad resigned. Ibrahim was officially elected as Prime Minister in 2022, and for the first time in 50 years, Malaysia witnessed the first true alternation of power in its parliament.

Timor Leste has similarly shown continued democratic progress after a long decade of political instability following their independence from Indonesia in 2002. Over 20 years, the small country’s freedom ranking has continued to rise despite struggling democratic institutions and inter-elite disputes (Freedom House, 2022). There are, of course, challenges that the country has continued to face—decades of occupation by Indonesia has destabilized the country’s economy, leading to high levels of unemployment and widespread food insecurity in many of its states (Kingsbury, 2014). Still, scholars are optimistic that at the rate of the country’s fulfilment of ‘expanded minimalist definition of democracy’ in the years since, Timor Lester will rapidly progress towards democratic consolidation. As of 2022, Timor Leste is rated as the only free democracy in the region.

Summary of Findings

The aim of this dissertation is to answer three research questions. What role do socioeconomic and political contexts play in the development of democratic understanding? Consequently, how does democratic understanding shape support for democracy? How does socialization to democracy influence attitudes and commitment to democracy? I address these questions in Chapters 2-4 using SEA as a regional case study and Indonesia as a country case study. The former is a region that has long been resistant to liberal democratic ideals, while the latter is a

³⁰ 1Malaysia Development Berhad, popularly known as 1MDB, was a corruption scandal involving then Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak. Nearly US\$1 billion of government funds were diverted and laundered globally, including via government officials in Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (Ramesh, 2016).

democratization success story that has fallen into the same trap of democracy fatigue as other developing democracies in this new wave of autocratization.

In Chapter 2, I systematically tested the effects of sociodemographic determinants on individual-level DU. Specifically, I asked whether gender can significantly predict the depth and complexity of DU, and whether the equalization of educational attainment and income opportunities can ‘solve’ the gender DU gap. I manually coded responses from an open-ended meaning of democracy question included in Asian Barometer (AB) Wave 2 into three levels of DU. The first level measures respondents’ self-efficacy (whether they provide an answer or respond with DK); the second level measures identification of democratic characteristics (whether respondents are able to provide a substantive definition of democracy); and the third level measures the complexity of DU (whether respondents provide substantive definitions that tap into multiple dimensions of democracy).

The analysis showed a systematic and sizeable gender gap in DU in six democracies and nondemocracies in Southeast Asia. First, women reported much lower efficacy levels than men, preferring to provide Don’t Know (DK) responses instead of a definition, meaningful or otherwise. Second, women were less likely than men to provide a substantive definition and to hold a multidimensional understanding of democracy, though the gender gap here were smaller. Despite this, the results also yielded a few promising outcomes. My findings showed that equalizing access to education and income opportunities significantly reduced the gender DU gap. On one hand, equalizing educational attainment had a larger impact on women for improving self-efficacy levels—as education level increased, level of DK responses among women was reduced. Education also increased the capacity to identify substantive definitions of democracy among women. On the other hand, multidimensional DU was strongly moderated by income levels. Again, the effect was greater for women than men, and at the highest income quintile, women actually surpassed men in possession of cognitively complex conceptualization of democracy.

In Chapter 3, I explored the mechanism behind DU’s influence on democratic support using a survey experiment involving over 2,500 respondents in five major cities in Indonesia. Half of the respondents were randomly exposed to a procedural definition of democracy, which included universal suffrage, multiparty competition, free and fair regular elections, and independent sources of political information. Both the treatment and control groups were then asked to rate their level of democratic support using three indicators: whether democracy is always preferable to other political systems, the importance of living in a democracy, and satisfaction with democracy.

Overall, the treatment seemed to reduce efficacy levels—that is, respondents are less likely to provide an answer other than DK—but increased appeared to stabilize democratic preferences and reduce ambivalence among those who provided an answer. Interestingly, the procedural definition seemed to reduce both preference for and satisfaction with democracy. The treatment was especially effective in shaping democratic preferences among women and individuals with low levels of education. For women, exposure to additional information about democracy increased their levels of self-efficacy but did not stabilize women’s preferences for any political system. Among women who did articulate an explicit preference for a political system, they reported an overwhelming preference for autocratic methods of governance.

I also tested the treatment effect on various levels of education. On average, exposure to a definition of democracy led to improved levels of self-efficacy as levels of educational attainment increases but lowered respondents' levels of political efficacy. Unlike the gender interaction in the previous analysis, however, the treatment further increases unconditional support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy, particularly among individuals with mid-level education. Interestingly, the pattern is reversed for individuals from low education background. Additional information about democracy actually lowered self-efficacy among low education respondents, but increased the likelihood of providing a preference, especially preference for more autocratic methods of governance. Respondents with low education also reported lower satisfaction with democracy.

In Chapter 4, I examined the practical consequences of socialization to democratic principles under different regime contexts on support for pro-democracy candidates. The 2019 Indonesian presidential election served as the backdrop for the original survey, when incumbent Joko "Jokowi" Widodo once again competed against Prabowo Subianto following their first contest in 2014. The electoral and political context was unique in the history of Indonesia—both candidates were representations of the growing polarization of democratic preferences due to democratic stagnation and poor socioeconomic development in the past 24 years of democracy. Jokowi represented the pro-liberal democracy movement on one side, while Prabowo represented the nationalistic elements of Indonesian politics, especially those who espoused the belief that liberal democracy is unsuitable for the country.

Respondents were divided into two cohorts: those whose most formative years were spent under Suharto's authoritarian regime, and those whose first political socialization mostly took place after the first democratic election in 1999. My findings suggested that there was a significant cohort effect in candidate preferences—specifically, members of the pre-democratization cohort were less likely to vote for the pro-democracy (i.e., Jokowi) than their post-democratization counterparts. However, these less democratic views and preference for more authoritarian-leaning leaders (i.e., Prabowo) could be overcome by greater knowledge of an individual's political environment, such as knowledge of political systems, institutions, and actors. The analysis showed that the effect of political knowledge is strongest among the pre-democratization cohort, and that increasing knowledge levels also increased their likelihood of voting for the pro-democracy candidate Jokowi.

Broader Implications

In developing democracies, the experience of a repressive authoritarian regime, chaotic democratic transition process, high uncertainty regarding the capabilities of the new government may make democracy seem unable to fulfil citizens' expectations of 'a better life'. There is indeed a danger that democracy is expected to over-perform in order to provide immediate solutions to issues inherited from the previous regime. Unfortunately, there are fewer means and opportunities for citizens to truly learn about democracy and of the value of living under such a system to better inform their expectations. Without widespread and equal levels of democratic learning, democratic culture will be slow to develop and take root. As Bermeo (1992: 275-276) put it:

“The likelihood of democratic reconstruction is greater than if learning occurs in just one group. Learning need not occur across the political spectrum, but a ‘critical mass’ of learners must develop before the risky game of building democracy can begin.”

If the absence of a large proportion of knowledgeable individuals is met with continuous exposure to negative democratic performance, citizens would instead develop negative attitudes towards democracy. In such cases, support for democracy becomes contingent upon what the system can deliver instead of what the system inherently represents. Whitehead (1986: 69) warned that “a failed democratization teaches lessons that may be harmful to future [democratic] endeavours”; among others, greater susceptibility to authoritarian support.

This dissertation empirically explores public opinion on democracy in developing democracies by specifically looking at its four core elements: democratic understanding (DU), autocratic legacies, political knowledge, and support for democracy. The four elements are intertwined closely with each other—DU and political knowledge provide complementary, and therefore comprehensive, view of what democracy is and is not. This in turn shapes attitudes towards democracy. Further, the more value is assigned to democracy within the society and the more positive reinforcements individuals receive—such as through well-performing democratic institutions and full protection of rights and freedoms—the more deeply entrenched democratic culture become. Consequently, these attitudes crystallize into unconditional support for democracy.

The gender DU gap identified in Chapter 2 and the gender gap in democratic support discovered in Chapter 3 spoke to the broader literature of gender gap in politics. Studies show that women are less efficacious, less knowledgeable, less interested, and less participative in politics due to a gender gap in socioeconomic factors like education and income (e.g., Fraile, 2014; Preece, 2017; Wolak and McDevitt, 2011). The cumulative effect of these factors isolates women from opportunities to learn about democracy. Women generally have lower educational attainment compared to men and are often excluded from training and employment that would have afforded them the means and opportunities for political learning. This provides women with not only different, but also fewer access to material resources and space for knowledge acquisition compared to men (Frazer and Macdonald, 2003). Being uninformed on politics lowers not only levels of internal self-efficacy—that is, the cognition that one can participate in politics—but also levels of political efficacy, or the belief that one’s political actions and behaviours can impact political decision-making on a larger scale.

As such, women’s interaction and experience with democratic norms and institutions can diverge far from men’s because they must additionally consider whether these normative rules and institutional functions afford them greater agency and political influence (Hansen and Goenaga, 2019). Since women are on average less likely to participate and more often experience varying degrees of restrictions of rights and freedoms, they are much more likely to interact with aspects of democracy that are concerned with resource distribution and access to public goods (Baviskar and Malone, 2004; Warburton and Power, 2020). This, in turn, determines how women conceptualize and evaluate democracy. If democracy is first and foremost associated with good governance and government capacity to provide economic

resources, then personal measures of satisfaction with democracy will rely on fulfilment of these criteria.

The divergence in support for democracy between individuals with low and high levels of education could also be explained by variation in democratic conception. Wei and Hindmann (2011) found that political learning is cyclical. The first exposure to politics typically occurs in formal education settings: history classes teach students about political leaders, events, and policies in the past; while civics classes teach students about the political system, institutions, procedures, and norms. Political education also grows in complexity and components as education level increases—students in primary schools may learn about who the prime minister or president is, and what their role is as the country’s leader. In secondary schools, students then learn about the legislative and judiciary systems, why these institutions are necessary, and how they serve as checks and balances in government. With this foundational knowledge of politics, political information from other sources like the media are easier to understand and internalize. Informed individuals are more likely to have higher levels of self-efficacy and political efficacy, which incentivize them further to intentionally seek and maintain repetitive exposure to political information.

As such, more educated individuals tend to have a clearer and more comprehensive grasp of democracy. The political learning they received through education also allow them to meaningfully experience democracy—that is, it provides them with greater understanding of whether their experience is actually democratic or if it is an anomaly, a violation of democratic principles. As such, more educated individuals are more likely to critically evaluate democracy using multiple benchmarks. This is likely why the treatment introduced in Chapter 3 had little to no effect—a procedural definition might already form a part of their democratic conception and the treatment simply reaffirmed this knowledge.

Conversely, less educated individuals may have had limited exposure to political information and therefore have weaker knowledge foundations. In processing political news, less educated individuals may struggle with cognitively processing and integrating the information into their knowledge bank. Furthermore, their experience with democracy is likely informed by more abstract understanding of what democracy is. If democracy is associated simply with voting for a candidate in an election, then violations like vote buying or redistricting may go unnoticed. Consequently, when evaluating whether or not democracy works in the country, they do not take into account that the election may neither be free nor fair.

As such, the treatment presented individuals traditionally associated with lower DU levels with other aspects of procedures that they might not have been familiar with. This may explain why it had a particular strong effect on women and low education group. Respondents might have felt that perhaps their initial understanding of democracy was invalidated by the multi-component procedural definition, leading to increased rates of DK among parts of the group. For others, however, the definition provided them with a benchmark with which to evaluate their own democracy as reflected in the increased likelihood of providing a preference for one of the political systems. This is consistent with Pande’s (2011) findings that increasing knowledge of political processes also enhances understanding of an individual’s role in politics as well as their political efficacy.

Yet, the treatment did not increase support for democracy. This speaks to citizens' expectations of democracy. If the process of transition had been costly but had not paid off in the long run, citizens may be inclined to believe that perhaps the stability and order that the previous autocratic regime offered may be acceptable to rein in the new democratic regime that seems to struggle to find footing and accommodate too many interests. To less educated individuals, the procedural definition of democracy may not sufficiently distinguish between the current political conditions under democracy from conditions in the previous authoritarian regime. As such, the nuance might have been overlooked in the evaluation of democratic properties.

But what happens when individuals do have sufficient foundations of democratic knowledge, but had received it from a source that intended to distort this knowledge? Chapter 4 found differential cohort effect that is consistent with findings from studies in other parts of Asia (e.g., Huang, 2019; Dalton and Shin, 2014; Neundorff, et al., 2020). Many older generations in new democracies received their political education during the authoritarian regime where, in addition to simply learning who the president is or what the office represents, for example, students may also be taught to venerate the individual holding the office. Instead of learning about the checking function of the legislative and judiciary, students may instead be informed that both institutions are subservient to the executive. In this case, cohorts whose most formative years were spent under an authoritarian system would claim to have a clear conception of democracy, despite its misinformed nature.

Misinformed individuals may develop what Berinsky (2017) called 'false competency'. In this case, less knowledgeable individuals are exposed to incomplete or misleading political information; without the capacity or ability to parse through this information and determine that they are inaccurate, these individuals would form preferences and support candidates who promote agendas that diverge from their interest or disadvantage them outright (Jankü and Libich, 2019; Mettler, 2011). Political participation of misinformed individuals, Berinsky (2017) concluded, may instead threaten their own democracy.

The legacy of this education is the formation of authoritarian notions of democracy. When soft repression during the autocratic period became acceptable, developing democracies face an uphill battle to dismantle this view. In Indonesia, this notion is a by-product of New Order's political education that emphasized economic development while simultaneously framing the minimal level of party competition as democratic. Nishimura (1995: 309) explained that the "aim of education [in Indonesia] was changed to foster a 'development-oriented person' (*manusia pembangunan*), who can contribute to the promotion of the national development plan." Complementary to this is the national education's emphasis on Indonesian 'morality', reinforced through ideals delineated in Pancasila (Eddyono, 2020). Each citizen has a place in society, in which responsibilities and duties of citizenship must come before rights and freedom. Co-operation and collaboration (*gotong royong*) was held in the highest esteem in Indonesian society—democracy, conversely, encouraged the kind of individualism deemed 'too Western' and incompatible with *kearifan timur* (Eastern wisdom) (Suwignyo, 2019).

There is, however, a silver lining. Every chapter in this dissertation concluded that improving access to political information can mitigate gaps in understanding and autocratic preferences. Closing education and income gaps between men and women can potentially close the gender

DU gap. Providing additional information about democracy increases individuals' capacity to develop democratic preferences, especially among those who are socioeconomically disadvantaged. Finally, increasing knowledge about democracy and politics allows individuals to overcome authoritarian conditioning, and directs them to support political leaders who are most committed to maintaining democracy.

Overall, the findings from this dissertation point to three important takeaways. The first is that there are fundamental gaps in public understanding of democracy and politics in general that are caused—and further exacerbated—by high levels of socioeconomic inequalities. Individuals that are considered to be political have-nots (i.e., women, low-income and low-educated individuals) are less likely to have a good grasp of what democracy is and is not, as well as the political machinations of their country, compared to the political haves. Furthermore, information about democracy and politics are not uniformly distributed across every group in society. What my findings have shown is that gaining access to political information is only the first step to developing knowledge and understanding; the second step is developing the capacity to process and internalize the information. In a political environment where there are high levels of inequality, citizens from lower socioeconomic levels face multiple barriers in forming democratic understanding.

Second, gaps in democratic understanding corresponds to lower levels of democratic support. As the analyses in this dissertation have shown, without the capacity to distinguish between democratic shortcomings and regime failures, less informed individuals are more to blame democracy for any crisis or poor performance. This increases their susceptibility to authoritarian nostalgia and will likely seek an alternative to democracy or a political leader who can deliver the type of governance that can guarantee better social, political, and economic outcomes. To less informed individuals, democracy may simply be more of the same (authoritarian) thing and as such, it matters less which political system they live under. Integrating some 'good' authoritarian practices, such as a focus on infrastructure development and economic growth, is thus an appealing option to optimize the benefits of democracy.

Finally, this dissertation highlighted the importance of examining how political information build political understanding. The treatment given in the survey experiment (Chapter 3) contained a straightforward static information, yet the processing of this information varied widely between individuals from different socioeconomic backgrounds. What the results seemed to inadvertently show is a side effect of providing factual but ultimately incomplete political information. Democracy is composed of multiple components beyond its procedural elements; yet less knowledgeable individuals seemed to depend solely on this sliver of information to form their preferences and evaluate democracy.

There is, of course, no such thing as a 'perfect' political information. Ordinary citizens also cannot be expected to learn everything about democracy in which they live. But these findings point to a deeper question about whether a threshold exists where political information can sufficiently and optimally inform preferences and support. Providing a piece of information on a single component of democracy may help illustrate what democracy is or can be, but to appropriately assess its performance and to develop unconditional support for democracy requires a full understanding of the nuances of democracy and the political environment with which citizens interact directly and indirectly. To further mobilize citizens to demand for more

democracy or prevent democratic backsliding requires citizens who also understand their role as political agents.

Future Research Avenues

Chapter 4 confirmed the delicate relationship of individual level conceptions of democracy and political knowledge, with support for democracy and its future trajectory. Without full understanding of their own political system, their agency as democratic citizens, and the fundamental good of democracy, citizens will not be able to discern that democracy is ultimately a better system than more autocratic options. Without this distinction, support for democracy is meaningless, and citizens who are dissatisfied with the performance of democracy—despite it being a failure of its implementation rather than shortcomings of democracy itself—would be more susceptible to authoritarian nostalgia. The rose-coloured view of the past is a dangerous legacy in developing democracies.

Hopefully, I have shown that there are policies and actions that can be taken to mitigate the influence of authoritarian legacies. These are not studies that seek to confirm pessimism of the current state or future of democracy in SEA. Rather, it seeks to identify and understand the origins of support for democracy in a unique context and offer solutions to educate and inspire greater commitment to democracy among citizens of developing democracies.

There are a few limitations in my research that could be addressed by future researchers. While AB is perhaps the most comprehensive and accessible source of democracy measures presently for the region, it is still limited in terms of facilitation of longitudinal analysis of democratic understanding and preferences. The removal of the open-ended meaning of democracy question after the second AB wave is a missed opportunity to better understand how personal association with democracy has evolved over the years. The format allows respondents to articulate what they do and do not know about democracy, which taps into respondents' actual levels of knowledge. With closed-ended formats, respondents risk being prompted to think about democracy a certain way, tapping into their preferences instead of democratic understanding.

Furthermore, future research on SEA democracy could also examine the effect of exposure to a more comprehensive and balanced definition of democracy to equip respondents with better means of evaluating democracy. A more refined measure would overcome many of the criticisms that Claassen (2020) included in his study—that indicators of attitudes towards democracy are often ambiguous—by introducing questions that separate public opinion on democracy and the regime. For example, in addition to positive aspects of democracy, researchers may consider including negative aspects of democracy—such as lack of quick and decisive actions due to the rigidity of democratic checks or less efficient governance by a legislative containing many political interests—to test the strength of commitment to democratic principles in times of crisis.

This research avenue is becoming increasingly relevant as democracy encounters greater resistance from both political elites and citizens. Future research can measure DU effect on support for democracy with greater nuance, taking into account intersectionality between subgroups of political-haves and nots that were not included in this dissertation. For example,

despite the expansion of rights and freedoms post-democratization, Indonesian ethnic Chinese minorities continue to face discrimination, both socially and institutionally. The rise and demise of Ahok, one of a few visible minorities in government, coincided with the rise of intolerance promoted by ultraconservative Muslim figures as well as political elites (Lamb, 2019). Jokowi's silence during Ahok's trial and imprisonment was deafening, and a sign to his supporters that he had joined the ranks of the illiberal elites.

The removal of the meaning of democracy question and the lack of other viable alternatives also removed the possibility of longitudinal analysis of DU. Future studies may benefit from examining how democratic conceptualization evolves over time with greater experience with democracy, or relatedly, with greater *threat* to democracy from authoritarian nostalgia. While my findings did show diverging support for pro-democracy candidate between pre- and post-democratization cohorts, a multi-wave panel survey would have facilitated additional measures of life-cycle effect, something that my cross-national data structure was not set up to do. This was not possible at the time due to budget and time constraints, but the survey had intended to be used as a blueprint for other research focusing on the influence of authoritarian legacy and mitigating effect of political knowledge on support for democracy.

Appendix A

A.1. Coding

Wave 2 of Asian Barometer contains three open-ended meaning of democracy (MOD) variables. The coding process combined categorization outlined in Canache (2012a) and definition of democracy as proposed by Schumpeter (1976) and Dahl (1971). This combination allows the manual coding to capture the nuances of democracy definition, particularly by separating responses that allude to the outcomes of democracy as a representation of not only expectations of democracy as a system of governance but also in terms of experience with living in a democratic environment.

Table A.1.1. Example of coding categorization

Procedural	Rights-based	Outcomes	Others	DK
Voting	Freedom of speech	Free market	Too much freedom	Don't know
Government of the people	Freedom of individual choice	Economic performance	Positive appraisal of democracy in general	
Majority rule	Political liberty	Social justice	Universal acceptance	
Participation	Political equality		Does not exist	

Following the process of manually coding the responses, a second coder was given the same set of rules along with a full list of coding categorization to test reliability between coders. An example of the categorization is included in Table A.1.1. above was given to the second coder as a guideline. The coded responses were tested against the original set of coding and measured using Cohen's Kappa. The results show high levels of intercoder consistency at 88.65%.

A.2. Full logit regression results of gender effects on DU moderated by education and income, and separated by regime type

Table A.2.1. Logit regression of the effect of gender on DU by regime type, moderated by education

VARIABLES	<i>Provide an answer</i>		<i>Substantive definition</i>		<i>Multidimensional</i>	
	Non-democracy (1)	Democracy (2)	Non-democracy (3)	Democracy (4)	Non-democracy (5)	Democracy (6)
Gender	-0.197*** (0.048)	-0.126* (0.065)	-0.198*** (0.048)	-0.147** (0.069)	-0.061 (0.054)	0.065 (0.090)
Gen x Edu	0.055*** (0.018)	0.010 (0.024)	0.056*** (0.018)	0.020 (0.025)	0.013 (0.018)	-0.031 (0.030)
Education	0.042*** (0.015)	0.154*** (0.019)	0.041*** (0.015)	0.151*** (0.019)	0.024* (0.013)	0.043** (0.020)
Income	0.032*** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.006)	0.020** (0.008)	0.008 (0.006)	0.020** (0.009)
Age	0.000 (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Urban	0.007 (0.018)	0.000 (0.019)	0.017 (0.018)	0.013 (0.020)	0.009 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.022)
Married	-0.027* (0.015)	-0.049** (0.023)	-0.028* (0.015)	-0.064*** (0.024)	0.008 (0.015)	-0.063** (0.026)
Interest	0.003 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.017* (0.009)	0.007 (0.013)
Discussion	0.047*** (0.006)	0.038*** (0.006)	0.046*** (0.006)	0.046*** (0.007)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.006 (0.009)
SPC	0.004 (0.009)	0.000 (0.011)	0.006 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.024 (0.016)
Participation	0.027 (0.022)	0.052 (0.034)	0.021 (0.022)	0.048 (0.035)	0.028 (0.018)	0.023 (0.032)
N	4,011	2,447	4,011	2,447	3,049	1,570

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients estimated as marginal values with country fixed effects.

Table A.2.2. Logit regression of the effect of gender on DU by regime type, moderated by income

VARIABLES	<i>Provide an answer</i>		<i>Substantive definition</i>		<i>Multidimensional</i>	
	Non-democracy (1)	Democracy (2)	Non-democracy (3)	Democracy (4)	Non-democracy (5)	Democracy (6)
Gender	-0.089*** (0.026)	-0.108*** (0.032)	-0.085*** (0.026)	-0.110*** (0.034)	-0.099*** (0.029)	-0.043 (0.047)
Gen x Inc	0.016 (0.010)	0.004 (0.012)	0.015 (0.010)	0.007 (0.013)	0.027*** (0.009)	0.005 (0.013)
Education	0.073*** (0.011)	0.160*** (0.013)	0.072*** (0.011)	0.162*** (0.013)	0.031*** (0.011)	0.030* (0.017)
Income	0.024*** (0.008)	0.018* (0.011)	0.025*** (0.008)	0.016 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.018* (0.010)
Age	-0.000	0.002***	-0.000	0.002**	0.000	0.001

	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Urban	0.006	0.000	0.017	0.013	0.008	-0.003
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.022)
Married	-0.024	-0.048**	-0.025	-0.063***	0.009	-0.063**
	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.026)
Interest	0.003	-0.008	0.002	-0.003	0.016*	0.007
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Discussion	0.047***	0.038***	0.047***	0.046***	-0.004	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.009)
SPC	0.004	0.000	0.006	-0.003	-0.008	-0.025
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.016)
Participation	0.025	0.052	0.019	0.049	0.029*	0.023
	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.017)	(0.032)
N	4,011	2,447	4,011	2,447	3,049	1,570

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients estimated as marginal values with country fixed effects.

A.3. Full logit regression results of gender effects on DU with and without moderation by education and income per country

Table A.3.1. Logit regression of gender effects on likelihood of providing an answer

VARIABLES	Indonesia (1)	Philippines (2)	Malaysia (3)	Thailand (4)	Singapore (5)	Vietnam (6)
Gender	-0.099*** (0.023)	-0.117*** (0.026)	-0.144*** (0.025)	-0.021 (0.027)	-0.024 (0.020)	0.016 (0.022)
Education	0.190*** (0.017)	0.125*** (0.020)	0.155*** (0.022)	0.035 (0.024)	0.047*** (0.014)	0.043** (0.019)
Income	0.013 (0.008)	0.045** (0.020)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.057*** (0.014)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.008 (0.009)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Urban	-0.037 (0.023)	0.050* (0.029)	0.044 (0.033)	0.065 (0.041)		-0.082*** (0.021)
Married	-0.073** (0.036)	-0.011 (0.032)	-0.033 (0.032)	-0.026 (0.032)	0.000 (0.022)	-0.007 (0.028)
Interest	-0.010 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.016 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.013)	0.019 (0.015)
Discussion	0.036*** (0.008)	0.037*** (0.010)	0.041*** (0.010)	0.041*** (0.016)	0.040*** (0.008)	0.048*** (0.010)
SPC	0.001 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.023 (0.021)	0.002 (0.014)	0.040*** (0.013)
Participation	0.015 (0.042)	0.090 (0.055)	0.029 (0.046)	0.038 (0.050)	-0.082 (0.071)	0.002 (0.029)
N	1,392	1,055	1,093	1,185	879	854

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients estimated as marginal values with country fixed effects.

Table A.3.2. Logit regression of gender effects on likelihood of providing substantive definition of democracy

VARIABLES	Indonesia (7)	Philippines (8)	Malaysia (9)	Thailand (10)	Singapore (11)	Vietnam (12)
Gender	-0.098*** (0.024)	-0.106*** (0.028)	-0.140*** (0.026)	-0.018 (0.027)	-0.027 (0.020)	0.016 (0.022)
Education	0.181*** (0.018)	0.141*** (0.021)	0.146*** (0.023)	0.041* (0.024)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.039** (0.020)
Income	0.015* (0.009)	0.040** (0.020)	0.050*** (0.014)	0.058*** (0.014)	-0.003 (0.009)	0.008 (0.009)
Age	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Urban	-0.030 (0.024)	0.069** (0.031)	0.065* (0.034)	0.082** (0.041)		-0.085*** (0.022)
Married	-0.062* (0.036)	-0.049 (0.035)	-0.035 (0.033)	-0.019 (0.033)	-0.001 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.028)
Interest	-0.013 (0.015)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.011 (0.017)	0.022 (0.023)	-0.014 (0.013)	0.019 (0.015)
Discussion	0.044*** (0.008)	0.047*** (0.011)	0.042*** (0.010)	0.036** (0.016)	0.041*** (0.008)	0.049*** (0.011)
SPC	0.010	-0.008	-0.005	-0.019	0.003	0.041***

	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Participation	0.032	0.057	0.031	0.026	-0.081	-0.004
	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.071)	(0.029)
N	1,392	1,055	1,093	1,185	879	854

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients estimated as marginal values with country fixed effects.

Table A.3.3. Logit regression of gender effects on likelihood of providing a multidimensional definition of democracy

VARIABLES	Indonesia (13)	Philippines (14)	Malaysia (15)	Thailand (16)	Singapore (17)	Vietnam (18)
Gender	-0.036 (0.031)	-0.006 (0.023)	-0.048* (0.029)	-0.026 (0.026)	-0.009 (0.017)	0.012 (0.027)
Education	0.029 (0.025)	0.028 (0.019)	0.021 (0.026)	0.038* (0.020)	0.024* (0.013)	0.014 (0.026)
Income	0.025** (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.007 (0.013)	0.047*** (0.012)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.022** (0.011)
Age	0.002 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Urban	-0.013 (0.033)	0.021 (0.028)	0.046 (0.048)	-0.096*** (0.035)		0.053* (0.029)
Married	-0.074* (0.040)	-0.042 (0.026)	-0.023 (0.035)	-0.020 (0.030)	0.016 (0.022)	0.097** (0.042)
Interest	0.028 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.013)	0.017 (0.018)	-0.002 (0.021)	0.028** (0.012)	0.010 (0.020)
Discussion	0.004 (0.012)	0.006 (0.011)	0.014 (0.012)	-0.024 (0.016)	-0.021*** (0.007)	0.030* (0.018)
SPC	-0.008 (0.029)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.005 (0.020)	0.015 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.029* (0.016)
Participation	0.031 (0.046)	0.006 (0.043)	0.039 (0.039)	0.070* (0.040)	0.085*** (0.031)	0.003 (0.032)
N	959	611	741	765	796	747

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients estimated as marginal values with country fixed effects.

Table A.3.4. Logit regression of gender effects on likelihood of providing an answer moderated by education and income

VARIABLES	Education						Income					
	Indonesia (1)	Philippines (2)	Malaysia (3)	Thailand (4)	Singapore (5)	Vietnam (6)	Indonesia (7)	Philippines (8)	Malaysia (9)	Thailand (10)	Singapore (11)	Vietnam (12)
Gender	-0.173** (0.083)	-0.112 (0.108)	-0.480*** (0.108)	-0.351*** (0.099)	-0.004 (0.065)	-0.032 (0.097)	-0.092* (0.049)	-0.137** (0.061)	-0.209*** (0.056)	-0.058 (0.061)	-0.039 (0.041)	0.076 (0.063)
Gen x Edu	0.032 (0.033)	-0.002 (0.037)	0.121*** (0.037)	0.135*** (0.039)	-0.008 (0.023)	0.018 (0.035)						
Gen x Inc							-0.003 (0.015)	0.014 (0.039)	0.035 (0.027)	0.018 (0.027)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.016 (0.016)
Education	0.171*** (0.026)	0.127*** (0.028)	0.088*** (0.030)	-0.032 (0.030)	0.052** (0.021)	0.033 (0.029)	0.190*** (0.017)	0.125*** (0.020)	0.154*** (0.022)	0.036 (0.024)	0.046*** (0.014)	0.043** (0.019)
Income	0.014 (0.008)	0.046** (0.020)	0.047*** (0.014)	0.059*** (0.014)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.008 (0.009)	0.015 (0.012)	0.037 (0.034)	0.029 (0.019)	0.048*** (0.019)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Urban	-0.037 (0.023)	0.050* (0.029)	0.048 (0.033)	0.056 (0.041)		-0.082*** (0.021)	-0.037 (0.023)	0.050* (0.029)	0.045 (0.033)	0.063 (0.041)		-0.083*** (0.021)
Married	-0.075** (0.036)	-0.011 (0.032)	-0.038 (0.032)	-0.025 (0.032)	0.000 (0.021)	-0.009 (0.028)	-0.073** (0.036)	-0.011 (0.032)	-0.033 (0.032)	-0.024 (0.032)	-0.000 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.028)
Interest	-0.010 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.015 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.013)	0.019 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.016 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.013)	0.020 (0.015)
Discussion	0.036*** (0.008)	0.037*** (0.010)	0.040*** (0.010)	0.038** (0.016)	0.040*** (0.008)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.036*** (0.008)	0.037*** (0.010)	0.042*** (0.010)	0.041*** (0.016)	0.041*** (0.008)	0.048*** (0.010)
SPC	0.001 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.025 (0.020)	0.002 (0.014)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.001 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.024 (0.021)	0.002 (0.014)	0.041*** (0.013)
Participation	0.016 (0.041)	0.090 (0.055)	0.029 (0.045)	0.042 (0.048)	-0.084 (0.071)	0.003 (0.029)	0.014 (0.042)	0.090* (0.054)	0.026 (0.046)	0.039 (0.050)	-0.080 (0.071)	-0.000 (0.030)
N	1,392	1,055	1,093	1,185	879	854	1,392	1,055	1,093	1,185	879	854

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients estimated as marginal values with country fixed effects.

Table A.3.5. Logit regression of gender effects on likelihood of providing substantive definitions moderated by education and income

VARIABLES	Education						Income					
	Indonesia (1)	Philippines (2)	Malaysia (3)	Thailand (4)	Singapore (5)	Vietnam (6)	Indonesia (7)	Philippines (8)	Malaysia (9)	Thailand (10)	Singapore (11)	Vietnam (12)
Gender	-0.188** (0.088)	-0.144 (0.119)	-0.491*** (0.111)	-0.341*** (0.100)	-0.004 (0.065)	-0.050 (0.099)	-0.098* (0.052)	-0.155** (0.061)	-0.198*** (0.057)	-0.058 (0.062)	-0.032 (0.042)	0.072 (0.064)
Gen x Edu	0.037 (0.034)	0.013 (0.040)	0.125*** (0.038)	0.132*** (0.039)	-0.009 (0.023)	0.024 (0.035)						
Gen x Inc							0.000 (0.016)	0.033 (0.037)	0.031 (0.027)	0.019 (0.027)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.016)
Education	0.161*** (0.026)	0.134*** (0.029)	0.079*** (0.031)	-0.025 (0.031)	0.053** (0.021)	0.026 (0.030)	0.181*** (0.018)	0.141*** (0.021)	0.145*** (0.023)	0.041* (0.024)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.040** (0.019)
Income	0.015* (0.009)	0.039** (0.020)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.059*** (0.014)	-0.003 (0.009)	0.008 (0.009)	0.015 (0.012)	0.022 (0.030)	0.033* (0.019)	0.048** (0.019)	-0.005 (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)
Age	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Urban	-0.030 (0.024)	0.070** (0.031)	0.069** (0.034)	0.074* (0.041)		-0.085*** (0.022)	-0.030 (0.024)	0.069** (0.031)	0.065* (0.034)	0.080* (0.041)		-0.086*** (0.021)
Married	-0.063* (0.036)	-0.049 (0.035)	-0.040 (0.033)	-0.019 (0.033)	-0.001 (0.022)	-0.009 (0.028)	-0.062* (0.036)	-0.048 (0.034)	-0.035 (0.033)	-0.018 (0.033)	-0.001 (0.022)	-0.006 (0.028)
Interest	-0.013 (0.015)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.017)	0.020 (0.023)	-0.014 (0.013)	0.019 (0.015)	-0.013 (0.015)	0.004 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.017)	0.022 (0.023)	-0.014 (0.013)	0.019 (0.015)
Discussion	0.044*** (0.008)	0.047*** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.010)	0.033** (0.016)	0.041*** (0.008)	0.048*** (0.011)	0.044*** (0.008)	0.047*** (0.011)	0.042*** (0.010)	0.036** (0.016)	0.041*** (0.008)	0.049*** (0.010)
SPC	0.010 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.018)	-0.020 (0.021)	0.003 (0.014)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.010 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.021)	0.003 (0.014)	0.041*** (0.013)
Participation	0.033 (0.042)	0.057 (0.057)	0.031 (0.046)	0.031 (0.049)	-0.083 (0.072)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.032 (0.043)	0.058 (0.057)	0.028 (0.046)	0.028 (0.050)	-0.080 (0.071)	-0.006 (0.029)
N	1,392	1,055	1,093	1,185	879	854	1,392	1,055	1,093	1,185	879	854

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients estimated as marginal values with country fixed effects.

Table A.3.6. Logit regression of gender effects on likelihood of providing multidimensional definition moderated by education and income

VARIABLES	<i>Education</i>						<i>Income</i>					
	Indonesia (1)	Philippines (2)	Malaysia (3)	Thailand (4)	Singapore (5)	Vietnam (6)	Indonesia (7)	Philippines (8)	Malaysia (9)	Thailand (10)	Singapore (11)	Vietnam (12)
Gender	0.168 (0.127)	-0.027 (0.130)	-0.143 (0.141)	-0.105 (0.100)	0.003 (0.053)	-0.045 (0.140)	-0.051 (0.080)	-0.042 (0.050)	-0.137* (0.071)	-0.123* (0.064)	0.029 (0.036)	-0.159* (0.096)
Gen x Edu	-0.071 (0.043)	0.006 (0.038)	0.031 (0.044)	0.028 (0.034)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.020 (0.048)						
Gen x Inc							0.004 (0.021)	0.019 (0.023)	0.038 (0.027)	0.035 (0.021)	-0.014 (0.012)	0.043* (0.023)
Education	0.059** (0.030)	0.025 (0.023)	0.010 (0.028)	0.024 (0.025)	0.026 (0.016)	0.006 (0.032)	0.029 (0.025)	0.027 (0.019)	0.021 (0.026)	0.038* (0.020)	0.025** (0.013)	0.013 (0.026)
Income	0.025** (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.007 (0.013)	0.048*** (0.012)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.022** (0.011)	0.024 (0.015)	0.005 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.015)	0.031** (0.015)	0.008 (0.008)	-0.038*** (0.013)
Age	0.002* (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Urban	-0.014 (0.033)	0.022 (0.028)	0.046 (0.048)	-0.099*** (0.035)		0.054* (0.029)	-0.012 (0.033)	0.021 (0.028)	0.047 (0.048)	-0.100*** (0.035)		0.054* (0.029)
Married	-0.074* (0.039)	-0.042 (0.026)	-0.024 (0.035)	-0.022 (0.030)	0.016 (0.022)	0.096** (0.042)	-0.074* (0.040)	-0.042 (0.026)	-0.022 (0.035)	-0.019 (0.030)	0.015 (0.022)	0.092** (0.041)
Interest	0.028 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.013)	0.017 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.021)	0.028** (0.012)	0.010 (0.020)	0.028 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.013)	0.018 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.021)	0.029** (0.012)	0.009 (0.020)
Discussion	0.005 (0.012)	0.006 (0.011)	0.013 (0.012)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.021*** (0.007)	0.030 (0.018)	0.004 (0.012)	0.006 (0.011)	0.015 (0.012)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.022*** (0.007)	0.028 (0.018)
SPC	-0.007 (0.029)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.005 (0.020)	0.015 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.029* (0.016)	-0.009 (0.030)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.015 (0.020)	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.029* (0.016)
Participation	0.031 (0.046)	0.006 (0.043)	0.038 (0.039)	0.071* (0.040)	0.085*** (0.031)	0.004 (0.032)	0.031 (0.046)	0.006 (0.043)	0.034 (0.039)	0.073* (0.040)	0.083*** (0.030)	0.009 (0.032)
N	959	611	741	765	796	747	959	611	741	765	796	747

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients estimated as marginal values with country fixed effects.

A.4. Full logit regression results of gender effects on DU with and without moderation by education and income (without Thailand)

Table A.4.1. Logit regression of the effect of gender on DU by regime type (without Thailand)

Variables	Provide answer		Substantive definition		Multidimensional	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.124*** (0.010)	-0.072*** (0.019)	-0.119*** (0.011)	-0.078*** (0.014)	-0.031*** (0.009)	-0.023*** (0.007)
Education		0.109*** (0.024)		0.120*** (0.012)		0.028*** (0.007)
Income		0.027*** (0.007)		0.022*** (0.007)		0.007 (0.008)
Age		0.001 (0.001)		0.001* (0.001)		0.001 (0.000)
Urban		0.003 (0.027)		0.003 (0.032)		0.018 (0.019)
Married		-0.032*** (0.009)		-0.041*** (0.006)		-0.013 (0.024)
Interest		-0.002 (0.006)		-0.003 (0.007)		0.016* (0.008)
Discussion		0.043*** (0.006)		0.045*** (0.007)		0.003 (0.007)
SPC		0.001 (0.009)		0.004 (0.009)		-0.017** (0.008)
Participation		0.035*** (0.009)		0.029*** (0.009)		0.021 (0.013)
N	6,228	6,458	6,228	5,273	4,436	3,854

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients estimated as marginal values with country fixed effects.

Table A.4.2. Logit regression of the effect of gender on DU by regime type, moderated by education (without Thailand)

Variables	Provide answer		Substantive definition		Multidimensional	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gen x Edu	0.024 (0.015)		0.029* (0.015)		-0.007 (0.017)	
Gen x Inc		0.011 (0.008)		0.011 (0.008)		0.016** (0.008)
Female	-0.145*** (0.042)	-0.105*** (0.021)	-0.155*** (0.043)	-0.103*** (0.022)	-0.003 (0.053)	-0.074*** (0.028)
Education	0.107*** (0.012)	0.121*** (0.008)	0.104*** (0.012)	0.120*** (0.009)	0.030*** (0.012)	0.028*** (0.010)
Income	0.021*** (0.005)	0.015** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.015** (0.007)	0.007 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)
Age	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)
Urban	-0.006 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.004 (0.013)	0.003 (0.013)	0.018 (0.014)	0.019 (0.014)
Married	-0.035**	-0.034**	-0.043***	-0.041***	-0.012	-0.012

	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Interest	-0.004	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003	0.016**	0.016**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Discussion	0.041***	0.041***	0.045***	0.045***	0.003	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
SPC	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.004	-0.017**	-0.017**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Participation	0.033	0.032	0.029	0.029	0.021	0.022
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.017)
N	5,273	5,273	5,273	5,273	3,854	3,854

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients estimated as marginal values with country fixed effects.

Table A.4.3. Logit regression of the effect of gender on DU by regime type (without Thailand)

VARIABLES	<i>Provide an answer</i>		<i>Substantive definition</i>		<i>Multidimensional</i>	
	Non-	Democracy	Non-	Democracy	Non-	Democracy
	democracy		democracy		democracy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gender	-0.066*** (0.014)	-0.100*** (0.017)	-0.065*** (0.014)	-0.094*** (0.018)	-0.018 (0.014)	-0.028 (0.021)
Education	0.086*** (0.011)	0.160*** (0.013)	0.082*** (0.011)	0.162*** (0.013)	0.023* (0.012)	0.030* (0.017)
Income	0.022*** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.008)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.020** (0.008)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.020** (0.009)
Age	0.001* (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Urban	-0.016 (0.020)	-0.000 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.020)	0.013 (0.020)	0.040** (0.019)	-0.003 (0.022)
Married	-0.026 (0.017)	-0.048** (0.023)	-0.028* (0.017)	-0.063*** (0.024)	0.021 (0.018)	-0.063** (0.026)
Interest	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.011)	0.023** (0.010)	0.007 (0.013)
Discussion	0.043*** (0.005)	0.038*** (0.006)	0.044*** (0.006)	0.046*** (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.006 (0.009)
SPC	0.010 (0.009)	0.000 (0.011)	0.011 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.025 (0.016)
Participation	0.013 (0.024)	0.052 (0.034)	0.010 (0.024)	0.048 (0.035)	0.020 (0.019)	0.022 (0.032)
N	2,826	2,447	2,826	2,447	2,284	1,570

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients estimated as marginal values with country fixed effects.

Table A.4.4. Logit regression of the effect of gender on DU by regime type, moderated by education (without Thailand)

VARIABLES	<i>Provide an answer</i>		<i>Substantive definition</i>		<i>Multidimensional</i>	
	Non-	Democracy	Non-	Democracy	Non-	Democracy
	democracy		democracy		democracy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)

Gender	-0.171*** (0.056)	-0.126* (0.065)	-0.180*** (0.057)	-0.147** (0.069)	-0.056 (0.065)	0.065 (0.090)
Gen x Edu	0.039** (0.019)	0.010 (0.024)	0.042** (0.020)	0.020 (0.025)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.031 (0.030)
Education	0.062*** (0.017)	0.154*** (0.019)	0.057*** (0.017)	0.151*** (0.019)	0.018 (0.014)	0.043** (0.020)
Income	0.022*** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.008)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.020** (0.008)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.020** (0.009)
Age	0.001* (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Urban	-0.015 (0.020)	0.000 (0.019)	-0.008 (0.020)	0.013 (0.020)	0.040** (0.019)	-0.004 (0.022)
Married	-0.028* (0.017)	-0.049** (0.023)	-0.030* (0.017)	-0.064*** (0.024)	0.021 (0.018)	-0.063** (0.026)
Interest	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.023** (0.010)	0.007 (0.013)
Discussion	0.043*** (0.005)	0.038*** (0.006)	0.044*** (0.006)	0.046*** (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.006 (0.009)
SPC	0.010 (0.009)	0.000 (0.011)	0.011 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.024 (0.016)
Participation	0.014 (0.024)	0.052 (0.034)	0.011 (0.024)	0.048 (0.035)	0.020 (0.019)	0.023 (0.032)
N	2,826	2,447	2,826	2,447	2,284	1,570

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients estimated as marginal values with country fixed effects.

Table A.4.5. Logit regression of the effect of gender on DU by regime type, moderated by income (without Thailand)

VARIABLES	<i>Provide an answer</i>		<i>Substantive definition</i>		<i>Multidimensional</i>	
	Non-democracy (1)	Democracy (2)	Non-democracy (3)	Democracy (4)	Non-democracy (5)	Democracy (6)
Gender	-0.109*** (0.028)	-0.108*** (0.032)	-0.104*** (0.028)	-0.110*** (0.034)	-0.092*** (0.033)	-0.043 (0.047)
Gen x Inc	0.019* (0.010)	0.004 (0.012)	0.017 (0.010)	0.007 (0.013)	0.025** (0.010)	0.005 (0.013)
Education	0.085*** (0.011)	0.160*** (0.013)	0.082*** (0.011)	0.162*** (0.013)	0.024* (0.012)	0.030* (0.017)
Income	0.012 (0.008)	0.018* (0.011)	0.013 (0.009)	0.016 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.007)	0.018* (0.010)
Age	0.001* (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Urban	-0.016 (0.020)	0.000 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.020)	0.013 (0.020)	0.040** (0.019)	-0.003 (0.022)
Married	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.048** (0.023)	-0.028* (0.017)	-0.063*** (0.024)	0.022 (0.018)	-0.063** (0.026)
Interest	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.011)	0.023** (0.010)	0.007 (0.013)
Discussion	0.043*** (0.006)	0.038*** (0.006)	0.044*** (0.006)	0.046*** (0.007)	-0.000 (0.007)	0.006 (0.009)
SPC	0.010 (0.009)	0.000 (0.011)	0.011 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.025 (0.016)
Participation	0.013	0.052	0.010	0.049	0.020	0.023

	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.032)
N	2,826	2,447	2,826	2,447	2,284	1,570

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients estimated as marginal values with country fixed effects.

Appendix B

B.1. Survey questionnaire (in English)

Thank you in advance for participating in this survey.

The survey seeks to measure support for democracy in Indonesia in the run up to the 2019 general elections. As such, the survey is solely aimed at Indonesian citizens over the age of 17 who are eligible to vote in the upcoming election.

You will be asked to answer questions related to your demographics, media usage, as well as politics and democracy in Indonesia. Respondents will not be able to return to the previous page after moving to the next page. You may withdraw your consent to participate at any time throughout the survey by closing the web page or by clicking the “Exit survey” button on the top right of each page. The survey is estimated to take 10 minutes to complete.

Your personal information and survey results will be kept anonymous and confidential, both from us as well as from third parties. This survey does not contain any questions that may be used to identify you in any way.

The survey is conducted by political researchers affiliated with the Department of Political Economy at King’s College London in the United Kingdom. Should you have any questions or suggestions, please feel free to contact us at [email] (Bahasa Indonesia) or [email] (English and French).

The statement below confirms that you have read this information and agreed to participate willingly in this survey. If you do not wish to give your consent to participate, please close the web page to exit the survey.

Thank you for your participation.

1. I have the above information regarding this survey. I hereby declare that I understand the information provided and choose to participate willingly.
2. Do you have Indonesian citizenship?
3. Gender
4. Age
5. Highest education background (if still in studying, please indicate the previous highest level achieved)
6. Average monthly income
7. City of residence

[TREATMENT] - “At a minimum, democracy requires: 1) universal adult suffrage; 2) recurring, free, competitive, and fair elections; 3) more than one serious political party; and 4) alternative sources of information.”

8. Please choose the statement with which you most agree:

- a. Under certain circumstances, an authoritarian government may be better
 - b. Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government
 - c. For people like me, it does not matter the system of government
9. How important is it for you to live in a democracy? (1-10)
10. How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Indonesia? (1-10)
11. To you personally, what is the meaning of democracy? (Open-ended, up to three answers)

B.2. Balance test and manipulation check

Table B.2.1. Balance test

VARIABLES	(1) Treatment
Gender	0.03 (0.02)
Age (in group)	-0.01 (0.01)
Education	0.00 (0.02)
Income	-0.01 (0.01)
Bandung	-0.01 (0.03)
Surabaya	-0.02 (0.04)
Bekasi	-0.04 (0.04)
Medan	-0.04 (0.04)
Constant	0.53*** (0.06)
N	1,879
R ²	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Jakarta is used as reference city.

Table B.2.2. Manipulation check for all respondents and by gender category

	All respondents		Male		Female	
	C	T	C	T	C	T
Procedural	51.84	48.16	53.63	46.37	50	50
Rights-based	49.17	50.83	49.79	50.21	48.72	51.28
Outcome	58.45	41.55	56.06	43.94	60.53	39.47
Not meaningful	45.30	54.70	45.36	54.64	45.12	54.88
<i>P-value</i>	.07		.35		.21	
<i>Chi-squared</i>	6.95		3.32		4.52	
Missing	50.41	49.59	52.80	47.20	48.35	51.65
<i>P-value</i>	.92		.53		.67	
<i>Chi-squared</i>	.01		.39		.19	

B.3. Full regression results without weights

Table B.3.1. Regression of treatment effects on preference and satisfaction with democracy

VARIABLES	Provide an answer		Provide a preference		Prefer democracy		Living in dem. important		Satisfaction with democracy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Treatment	0.004 (0.014)	-0.000 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.015)	0.008 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.021)	0.018 (0.024)	0.031 (0.096)	0.070 (0.111)	0.089 (0.108)	0.154 (0.125)
Female		-0.002 (0.016)		-0.019 (0.017)		-0.019 (0.024)		-0.006 (0.112)		-0.169 (0.126)
Education		0.034* (0.015)		0.008 (0.017)		0.002 (0.024)		-0.157 (0.109)		-0.308* (0.123)
Age		0.010 (0.009)		0.022* (0.010)		0.037** (0.013)		0.101 (0.061)		0.114 (0.068)
Income		-0.004 (0.007)		0.006 (0.007)		-0.012 (0.010)		0.053 (0.047)		-0.057 (0.052)
Constant							8.037*** (0.088)	8.092*** (0.282)	3.901*** (0.098)	4.715*** (0.318)
N	2,545	1,879	2,161	1,622	2,161	1,622	2,545	1,879	2,545	1,879
R ²							0.004	0.007	0.005	0.015

Note: Entries are marginal effects estimated with logit regression (provide an answer, provide a preference, prefer democracy) and coefficients estimated with OLS regressions (satisfaction with democracy, living in democracy important). Jakarta is used as reference city. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Estimations are unweighted.

Table B.3.2. Regression of treatment effects on preference and satisfaction with democracy, moderated by gender

VARIABLES	Provide an answer (11)	Provide a preference (12)	Prefer democracy (13)	Living in dem. important (14)	Satisfaction w/ democracy (15)
Treatment	0.008 (0.021)	0.004 (0.024)	0.023 (0.033)	0.012 (0.152)	0.122 (0.171)
Treatment x Gender	-0.018 (0.032)	0.009 (0.035)	-0.012 (0.048)	0.126 (0.224)	0.070 (0.252)
Gender	0.007 (0.023)	-0.024 (0.025)	-0.013 (0.034)	-0.071 (0.160)	-0.205 (0.180)
Education	0.034* (0.015)	0.008 (0.017)	0.002 (0.024)	-0.158 (0.109)	-0.309* (0.123)
Age	0.010 (0.009)	0.022* (0.010)	0.037** (0.013)	0.104 (0.061)	0.115 (0.068)
Income	-0.004 (0.007)	0.006 (0.007)	-0.012 (0.010)	0.053 (0.047)	-0.057 (0.052)
Constant				8.118*** (0.286)	4.730*** (0.322)
N	1,879	1,622	1,622	1,879	1,879
R ²				0.007	0.015

Note: Entries are marginal effects estimated with logit regression (provide an answer, provide a preference, prefer democracy) and coefficients estimated with OLS regressions (satisfaction with democracy, living in democracy important). Jakarta is used as reference city. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Estimations are unweighted.

Table B.3.3. Regression of treatment effects on preference and satisfaction with democracy, moderated by education

VARIABLES	Provide an answer (11)	Provide a preference (12)	Prefer democracy (13)	Living in dem. important (14)	Satisfaction w/ democracy (15)
Treatment	0.063 (0.070)	0.103 (0.081)	-0.132 (0.114)	0.343 (0.524)	0.786 (0.589)
Treatment x Gender	-0.025 (0.027)	-0.037 (0.031)	0.058 (0.043)	-0.107 (0.201)	-0.247 (0.226)
Gender	-0.002 (0.016)	-0.019 (0.017)	-0.019 (0.024)	-0.006 (0.112)	-0.169 (0.126)
Education	0.047* (0.020)	0.027 (0.022)	-0.028 (0.032)	-0.103 (0.149)	-0.184 (0.168)
Age	0.010 (0.009)	0.022* (0.010)	0.037** (0.013)	0.100 (0.061)	0.112 (0.068)
Income	-0.004 (0.007)	0.006 (0.007)	-0.012 (0.010)	0.053 (0.047)	-0.057 (0.052)
Constant				7.955*** (0.382)	4.398*** (0.430)
N	1,879	1,622	1,622	1,879	1,879
R ²				0.007	0.015

Note: Entries are marginal effects estimated with logit regression (provide an answer, provide a preference, prefer democracy) and coefficients estimated with OLS regressions (satisfaction with democracy, living in democracy important). Jakarta is used as reference city. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Estimations are unweighted.

important). Jakarta is used as reference city. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Estimations are unweighted.

Appendix C

C.1. Survey questionnaire

Thank you in advance for participating in this survey.

The survey seeks to measure support for democracy in Indonesia in the run up to the 2019 general elections. As such, the survey is solely aimed at Indonesian citizens over the age of 17 who are eligible to vote in the upcoming election.

You will be asked to answer questions related to your demographics, media usage, as well as politics and democracy in Indonesia. Respondents will not be able to return to the previous page after moving to the next page. You may withdraw your consent to participate at any time throughout the survey by closing the web page or by clicking the “Exit survey” button on the top right of each page. The survey is estimated to take 10 minutes to complete.

Your personal information and survey results will be kept anonymous and confidential, both from us as well as from third parties. This survey does not contain any questions that may be used to identify you in any way.

The survey is conducted by political researchers affiliated with the Department of Political Economy at King’s College London in the United Kingdom. Should you have any questions or suggestions, please feel free to contact us at [email] (Bahasa Indonesia) or [email] (English and French).

The statement below confirms that you have read this information and agreed to participate willingly in this survey. If you do not wish to give your consent to participate, please close the web page to exit the survey.

Thank you for your participation.

I have the above information regarding this survey. I hereby declare that I understand the information provided and choose to participate willingly.

12. Do you have Indonesian citizenship? (Yes/No)

13. Gender (Male/Female/Prefer not to answer)

14. Age

15. Highest education background (if still in studying, please indicate the previous highest level achieved)

16. Average monthly income

17. City of residence

- a. Jakarta
- b. Bandung
- c. Bekasi
- d. Surabaya
- e. Medan
- f. Other

18. How interested are you in politics?
1. Very interested
 2. Somewhat interested
 3. Somewhat uninterested
 4. Not at all interested
19. How often do you follow news about politics and government?
1. Every day
 2. A few times a week
 3. A few times a month
 4. Only when there is a significant event
 5. Never
20. Where do you receive your political news?
1. Print
 2. Television
 3. Radio
 4. Online news
 5. Social media
 6. Other people
 7. Multiple sources
 8. Other
21. Please choose the statement with which you most agree:
- a. Under certain circumstances, an authoritarian government may be better
 - b. Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government
 - c. For people like me, it does not matter the system of government
22. How important is it for you to live in a democracy? (1-10)
23. How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Indonesia? (1-10)
24. Political knowledge #1: Which party currently has the highest number of seats in parliament (2014-2019)?
- a. Golkar
 - b. Gerindra
 - c. Demokrat
 - d. PDI-P (correct answer)**
 - e. PKS
 - f. PPP
 - g. PKB
 - h. Nasdem
 - i. Hanura
 - j. PAN

25. Political knowledge #2: Immediately before becoming president, Joko Widodo held this government position.
- a. Mayor of Solo
 - b. Governor of Solo
 - c. Major of Jakarta
 - d. **Governor of Jakarta (correct answer)**
26. Political knowledge #3: Every year, the Indonesian government released an RKP for the up-coming year. What does RKP stand for?
- a. Rangkuman Keuangan Pemerintah
 - b. Rencana Kementrian Perekonomian
 - c. **Rencana Kerja Pemerintah (correct answer)**
 - d. Rekapitulasi Keuangan dan Pemasukan
27. Political knowledge #4: Match the politician with the party – Megawati Sukarnoputri
(Correct answer: PDI-P)
28. Political knowledge #5: Match the politician with the party – Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Correct answer: Demokrat)
29. Political knowledge #6: Match the politician with the party – Aburizal Bakrie (Correct answer: Golkar)
30. Political knowledge #7: Match the politician with the party – Hatta Rajasa (Correct answer: PAN)
31. Political knowledge #8: Should a presidential candidate wish to lodge a complaint against electoral results, which Indonesian court of law would have the jurisdiction to pass a verdict?
- a. **Mahkamah Konstitusi (correct answer)**
 - b. Mahkamah Agung
 - c. Mahkamah Mediasi Hukum
 - d. Pengadilan Tinggi
32. Did you vote in the presidential election in 2014? (Yes/No)
33. Did you vote in the legislative election in 2014? (Yes/No)
34. Do you plan on voting in the presidential election in 2019? (Yes/No)
35. In the upcoming 2019 election, which presidential candidate do you most support?
- a. Joko Widodo
 - b. Prabowo Subianto
 - c. Don't know
 - d. Prefer not to answer

C.2. Validity checks for political knowledge variable

Cronbach's internal validity test showed relatively high levels of scale reliability for correct answers at $\alpha = .64$. I further tested the independence of each knowledge item using tetrachoric correlation estimates and 2-sample independence t-test, shown below. I expected a moderate positive correlation between variables because individuals who were more knowledgeable were more likely to answer more questions than those who were less knowledgeable. Strong correlations (over .50) between many variables would indicate a bi-modal distribution, where some individuals were able to answer all the questions while others were unable to answer any question. To avoid this, I formulated questions with varying degrees of difficulty that tapped into different dimensions of political knowledge. Carpini and Keeter (1993) suggested that the level of difficulty of political knowledge items should be between 30 and 70% of correct answers to achieve sufficient differentiation. As Table C.2.1. below shows, the range of difficulty—measured as proportion of correct responses—is higher between roughly 55% to 95%.

Table C.2.1. Proportion of DK and correct answers for political knowledge items

Variables	DK	Correct	N
Party with highest number of seats	23.94	55.67	2,698
Joko Widodo's previous office	8.15	82.66	2,687
Explication of RKP	24.60	59.71	2,626
Match politician: Megawati Sukarnoputri	6.40	91.80	2,548
Match politician: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	1.33	94.98	2,548
Match politician: Aburizal Bakrie	5.77	90.93	2,548
Match politician: Hatta Rajasa	9.54	79.12	2,548
Court adjudication of electoral complaints	11.51	69.74	2,548

Table C.2.2. Correlation matrix and 2-sample independence t-test of knowledge items

	PK1	PK2	PK3	PK4	PK5	PK6	PK7
PK2	.21 (.000)						
PK3	.23 (.000)	.17 (.000)					
PK4	.22 (.000)	.36 (.000)	.16 (.000)				
PK5	.08 (.000)	.12 (.000)	.12 (.000)	.32 (.000)			
PK6	.17 (.000)	.28 (.000)	.16 (.000)	.44 (.000)	.34 (.000)		
PK7	.18 (.000)	.19 (.000)	.19 (.000)	.21 (.000)	.23 (.000)	.43 (.000)	
PK8	.17 (.000)	.11 (.000)	.17 (.000)	.08 (.000)	.07 (.000)	.18 (.000)	.23 (.000)

Note: All knowledge items are coded as correct answer (=1) and incorrect answers (=0). P-values from the t-test are shown in brackets.

C.3. Comparison of regression results between treatment and control groups

Table C.3.1. Regression table of cohort and political knowledge effect on support for pro-democracy candidate within treatment group

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Pre-dem cohort	-0.094** (0.034)	0.021 (0.044)	0.036 (0.036)	-0.063 (0.045)	-2.183*** (0.266)	-2.027*** (0.219)
Knowledge			0.057*** (0.013)	0.055*** (0.015)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.012 (0.015)
Pre-dem cohort x Knowledge					0.314*** (0.036)	0.283*** (0.030)
Gender		0.167*** (0.036)		0.128*** (0.038)		0.045 (0.033)
Education		0.056 (0.031)		0.049 (0.031)		0.097*** (0.028)
Income		-0.011 (0.019)		-0.013 (0.019)		-0.023 (0.016)
Political interest		-0.161*** (0.033)		-0.168*** (0.034)		-0.172*** (0.030)
News habit		0.030 (0.026)		0.013 (0.026)		0.024 (0.023)
Voted in 2014		-0.195*** (0.051)		-0.227*** (0.051)		-0.197*** (0.045)
Democracy always preferable		0.035 (0.049)		0.039 (0.047)		0.088* (0.041)
Living in democracy important		0.034** (0.011)		0.030** (0.011)		0.024** (0.009)
Satisfaction with democracy		0.081*** (0.007)		0.083*** (0.007)		0.070*** (0.006)
Observations	797	531	797	531	797	531

Note: Entries are marginal effects estimated with weighted logit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Cohort is coded as 0 (post-democratization) and 1 (pre-democratization).

Table C.3.2. Regression table of cohort and political knowledge effect on support for pro-democracy candidate within control group

VARIABLES	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Pre-dem cohort	0.001 (0.036)	0.072 (0.044)	-0.031 (0.034)	0.039 (0.043)	-1.590* (0.255)	-1.619* (0.258)
Knowledge			0.104*** (0.014)	0.063*** (0.016)	0.078*** (0.017)	-0.034 (0.019)
Pre-dem cohort x Knowledge					0.279** (0.036)	0.192** (0.036)
Gender		0.011 (0.038)		0.009 (0.037)		-0.006 (0.037)
Education		0.051 (0.034)		0.030 (0.034)		0.038 (0.033)
Income		-0.029 (0.017)		-0.034* (0.016)		-0.038* (0.016)

Political interest	-0.022 (0.032)	-0.039 (0.031)	-0.033 (0.031)
News habit	-0.000 (0.025)	-0.009 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.023)
Voted in 2014	-0.146** (0.052)	-0.141** (0.050)	-0.132** (0.049)
Democracy always preferable	0.018 (0.042)	0.045 (0.041)	0.046 (0.040)
Living in democracy important	-0.020 (0.011)	-0.023* (0.011)	-0.021* (0.010)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.079*** (0.004)	0.074*** (0.004)	0.074*** (0.004)

Observations	814	563	814	563	814	563
--------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

Note: Entries are marginal effects estimated with weighted logit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Cohort is coded as 0 (post-democratization) and 1 (pre-democratization).

C.4. Robustness check: variation of age cut-offs

Table C.4.1. Regression table of cohort and political knowledge effect on support for pro-democracy candidate (aged 5 in 1999)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Pre-dem cohort	0.018 (0.028)	0.043 (0.037)	-0.068* (0.027)	-0.085* (0.037)	-0.151*** (0.034)	-0.120** (0.041)
Knowledge			0.088*** (0.009)	0.068*** (0.011)	0.074*** (0.010)	0.061*** (0.012)
Pre-dem cohort x Knowledge					0.018*** (0.005)	0.010 (0.005)
Gender		0.099*** (0.026)		0.068** (0.026)		0.058* (0.026)
Education		0.050* (0.021)		0.039 (0.021)		0.042* (0.021)
Income		-0.017 (0.013)		-0.015 (0.013)		-0.013 (0.013)
Political interest		-0.085*** (0.022)		-0.094*** (0.021)		-0.100*** (0.022)
News habit		0.011 (0.018)		-0.008 (0.018)		-0.005 (0.018)
Voted in 2014		-0.092* (0.036)		-0.141*** (0.035)		-0.159*** (0.036)
Democracy always preferable		0.069* (0.032)		0.083** (0.031)		0.077* (0.031)
Living in democracy important		0.010 (0.008)		0.009 (0.008)		0.011 (0.008)
Satisfaction with democracy		0.078*** (0.004)		0.077*** (0.004)		0.077*** (0.004)
Observations	1,611	1,094	1,611	1,094	1,611	1,094

Note: Entries are marginal effects estimated with weighted logit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Cohort is coded as 0 (post-democratization) and 1 (pre-democratization).

Table C.4.2. Regression table of cohort and political knowledge effect on support for pro-democracy candidate (aged 25 in 1999)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Pre-dem cohort	-0.207*** (0.024)	-0.138*** (0.029)	0.141*** (0.025)	0.100*** (0.030)	0.202*** (0.035)	0.142*** (0.039)
Knowledge			0.066*** (0.009)	0.053*** (0.011)	0.072*** (0.010)	0.058*** (0.012)
Pre-dem cohort x Knowledge					-0.012* (0.005)	-0.010 (0.006)
Gender		0.059* (0.027)		0.040 (0.027)		0.040 (0.027)
Education		0.058** (0.021)		0.048* (0.021)		0.045* (0.021)
Income		-0.024 (0.013)		-0.024 (0.013)		-0.023 (0.013)

Political interest	-0.077*** (0.021)	-0.082*** (0.021)	-0.077*** (0.021)
News habit	0.008 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.018)
Voted in 2014	-0.164*** (0.033)	-0.202*** (0.033)	-0.183*** (0.035)
Democracy always preferable	0.044 (0.031)	0.060 (0.031)	0.062* (0.031)
Living in democracy important	0.016* (0.008)	0.013 (0.008)	0.013 (0.008)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.075*** (0.004)	0.074*** (0.004)	0.075*** (0.004)

Observations	1,611	1,094	1,611	1,094	1,611	1,094
--------------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

Note: Entries are marginal effects estimated with weighted logit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Cohort is coded as 0 (post-democratization) and 1 (pre-democratization).

C.5. Robustness check: removing potential cheaters of political knowledge items

While respondents were not allowed to return to the previous page to alter their responses, they may still look up answers to political knowledge questions. Presumably, this would add to the time it took for respondents to complete the survey. To correct for this, I calculated the interquartile range for the variable survey length and removed respondents who are 1.5 above the IQR from the sample—in this case, respondents who spent more than 15 minutes and 54 seconds. A total of 203 or 8.03% of respondents who completed the survey were removed because they were “presumed cheaters”. The test yielded similar results as the main models.

Figure C.5.1. Distribution of survey response time




Table C.5.1. Regression table of cohort and political knowledge effect on support for pro-democracy candidate without presumed cheaters

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Pre-dem cohort	-0.066* (0.025)	-0.022 (0.030)	0.005 (0.023)	-0.022 (0.045)	-1.532*** (0.049)	-1.307*** (0.029)
Knowledge			0.080*** (0.009)	0.063*** (0.011)	0.021 (0.023)	0.006 (0.020)
Pre-dem cohort x Knowledge					0.198*** (0.045)	0.181*** (0.034)
Gender		0.091*** (0.026)		0.066* (0.026)		0.005 (0.005)
Education		0.051* (0.020)		0.039 (0.021)		0.070*** (0.020)
Income		-0.021 (0.013)		-0.020 (0.012)		-0.031** (0.012)
Political interest		-0.081*** (0.024)		-0.084*** (0.021)		-0.101** (0.025)
News habit		0.008 (0.018)		-0.012 (0.020)		-0.007 (0.017)
Voted in 2014		-0.126*** (0.036)		-0.156*** (0.035)		-0.141*** (0.034)

Democracy always preferable	0.060 (0.032)	0.078* (0.029)	0.095*** (0.028)
Living in democracy important	0.009 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	0.007 (0.007)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.075*** (0.004)	0.076*** (0.010)	0.072*** (0.009)

Observations	1,611	1,094	1,611	1,094	1,611	1,094
--------------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

Note: Entries are marginal effects estimated with weighted logit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Cohort is coded as 0 (post-democratization) and 1 (pre-democratization).

C.6. Voting intention in 2019

Table C.6.1. Regression table of cohort and political knowledge effect on likelihood of voting in the 2019 presidential election

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Pre-dem cohort	0.001 (0.019)	-0.009 (0.025)			-0.165* (0.082)	-0.499*** (0.118)
Knowledge			0.005 (0.006)	-0.023* (0.009)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.056*** (0.012)
Pre-dem cohort x Knowledge					0.025* (0.012)	0.075*** (0.017)
Gender		0.077*** (0.022)		0.085*** (0.022)		0.065** (0.022)
Education		0.057*** (0.015)		0.060*** (0.015)		0.057*** (0.015)
Income		-0.030** (0.009)		-0.029** (0.009)		-0.024* (0.009)
Political interest		0.003 (0.017)		0.006 (0.017)		0.005 (0.017)
News habit		0.057*** (0.012)		0.062*** (0.012)		0.061*** (0.012)
Voted in 2014		-0.026 (0.029)		-0.006 (0.028)		0.000 (0.029)
Democracy always preferable		0.092*** (0.023)		0.096*** (0.023)		0.083*** (0.023)
Living in democracy important		0.001 (0.005)		0.002 (0.005)		0.002 (0.005)
Satisfaction with democracy		0.004 (0.004)		0.004 (0.004)		0.002 (0.004)
Observations	1,611	1,094	1,611	1,094	1,611	1,094

Note: Entries are marginal effects estimated with weighted logit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Cohort is coded as 0 (post-democratization) and 1 (pre-democratization).

Bibliography

- Achen, C., & Bartels, L. (2016). Democracy for Realists: Holding up a Mirror to the Electorate. *Juncture*, 22(4), 269-275.
- Aji, M. R. (2019). "Ylbhi sebut pelemahan kpk sama seperti gaya orde baru," 12 September. Available at: <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1247011/ylbhi-sebut-pelemahan-kpk-sama-seperti-gaya-orde-baru> (Accessed: October 29, 2019)
- Ake, C. *Democracy and Development in Africa*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996.
- Alessandri, E., Balfour, R., Bouchet, N. and Youngs, R. (2016). New forms of democratic citizenship in the middle East and North Africa: An alternative approach for the EU and United States. *EU and US Democracy Assistance Report*, 3.
- Ananda, A. and Bol, D. (2021). Does knowing democracy affect answers to democratic support questions? a survey experiment in Indonesia. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 33(2), 433-443.
- Anderson, C. J. and LoTempio, A. J. (2002). Winning, losing and political trust in America. *British Journal of Political Science*, 32(2):335–351.
- Anderson, C. J., Bol, D., and Ananda, A. (2021). Humanity's attitudes about democracy and political leaders: patterns and trends. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 85(4), 957-986.
- Anwar, D. F. (2010). The Habibie presidency: Catapulting towards reform. In Aspinall, E. and Fealy, G. (eds). *Soeharto New Order and its legacy: Essays in honour of Harold Crouch, Volume 2*. ANU E Press.
- Arensmeier, C. (2010). The democratic common sense: Young Swedes' understanding of democracy—theoretical features and educational incentives. *Young*, 18(2):197–222.
- Arfiansyah, T. R. (2022). Sejarah Tragedi Penembakan Mahasiswa Trisakti 12 Mei 1998," 12 May 2022. Available at: <https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2022/05/12/093000965/sejarah-tragedi-penembakan-mahasiswa-trisakti-12-mei-1998?page=all> (Accessed: November 20 2022).
- Aspinall, E. (2005). Elections and the Normalization of Politics in Indonesia. *South East Asia Research*, 13(2), 117-156.
- Aspinall, E. (2010). "Semi-opponents in power: The Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri Presidencies." In Aspinall, E. and Fealy, G. (eds) *Soeharto New Order and its legacy: Essays in honour of Harold Crouch, Volume 2*. ANU E Press.
- Aspinall, E. (2015). Oligarchic populism: Prabowo Subianto's challenge to Indonesian democracy. *Indonesia*, (99):1–28.
- Aspinall, E. and Berenschot, W. (2019). *Democracy for sale: Elections, clientelism, and the state in Indonesia*. Cornell University Press.
- Aspinall, E. and Mietzner, M. (2014). Indonesian politics in 2014: Democracy's close call. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 50(3):347–369.
- Aspinall, E., & Mietzner, M. (2019). Southeast Asia's troubling elections: Nondemocratic pluralism in Indonesia. *Journal of Democracy*, 30(4), 104-118.
- Aspinall, E., Mietzner, M., Tomsa, D., et al. (2015). "The moderating president: Yudhoyono's decade in power." In Aspinall, E., Mietzner, M., and Tomsa, D. (eds). *The Yudhoyono presidency: Indonesia's decade of stability and stagnation*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1–21.

- Auerbach, K., and Petrova, B. (2022). Authoritarian or Simply Disillusioned? Explaining Democratic Skepticism in Central and Eastern Europe. *Political Behavior*, 44(4), 1959-1983.
- Badan Pusat Statistik (2019). "Potret Pendidikan Indonesia 2019", 29 November. Available at: <https://www.bps.go.id/publication/2019/11/29/1deb588ef5fdbfba3343bb51/potret-pendidikan-statistik-pendidikan-indonesia-2019.html> (Accessed: February 15, 2020).
- Barabas, J., Jerit, J., Pollock, W., and Rainey, C. (2014). The question (s) of political knowledge. *American Political Science Review*, 108(4):840–855.
- Bartels, L. M. (1996). Uninformed votes: Information effects in presidential elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, pages 194–230.
- Bartels, L. M. and Jackman, S. (2014). A generational model of political learning. *Electoral Studies*, 33:7–18.
- Baviskar, S. and Malone, M. F. T. (2004). What democracy means to citizens—and why it matters. *Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe/European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, pages 3–23.
- BBC. (2022). "Anwar Ibrahim: The man who fulfilled his goal to lead Malaysia," 24 November. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16440290> (Accessed: November 25, 2022).
- Beauvais, E. (2019). The gender gap in political discussion group attendance. *Politics & Gender*, pages 1–24.
- Benesch, C. (2012). An empirical analysis of the gender gap in news consumption. *Journal of Media Economics*, 25(3), 147-167.
- Berinsky, A. J. (2017). Rumors and health care reform: Experiments in political misinformation. *British Journal of Political Science*, 47(2):241–262.
- Bermeo, N. G. (2003). *Ordinary people in extraordinary times: The citizenry and the breakdown of democracy*. Princeton University Press.
- Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1), 5-19.
- Bilodeau, A. (2014). Is democracy the only game in town? Tension between immigrants' democratic desires and authoritarian imprints. *Democratization*, 21(2):359–381.
- Boas, T. C. (2016). Pastors for Pinochet: Authoritarian stereotypes and voting for Evangelicals in Chile. *Journal of Experimental Political Science*, 3(2):197–205.
- Boas, T. C., Christenson, D. P., and Glick, D. M. (2018). Recruiting large online samples in the United States and India: Facebook, Mechanical Turk, and Qualtrics. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 1–19.
- Bourchier, D. M. (2019). Two decades of ideological contestation in Indonesia: From democratic cosmopolitanism to religious nationalism. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 49(5):713–733.
- Bratton, M. (2010). The meanings of democracy: Anchoring the "d-word" in Africa. *Journal of Democracy*, 21(4):106–113.
- Bratton, M. and Mattes, R. (2001). Support for Democracy in Africa: intrinsic or instrumental? *British Journal of Political Science*, 31(3), 447-474.
- Bratton, M., Mattes, R., and Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2005). *Public opinion, democracy, and market reform in Africa*. Cambridge University Press.
- Brinks, D. and Coppedge, M. (2006). Diffusion is no illusion: Neighbor emulation in the third wave of democracy. *Comparative Political Studies*, 39(4), 463-489.
- Brunkert, L., Kruse, S., and Welzel, C. (2019). A tale of culture-bound regime evolution: The centennial democratic trend and its recent reversal. *Democratization*, 26(3):422–443.

- Bünthe, M., & Ufen, A. (Eds.). (2009). *Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia*. London: Routledge.
- Canache, D. (2012a). Citizens' conceptualizations of democracy: Structural complexity, substantive content, and political significance. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(9):1132–1158.
- Canache, D. (2012b). The meanings of democracy in Venezuela: Citizen perceptions and structural change. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 54(3):95–122.
- Canache, D., Mondak, J. J., and Seligson, M. A. (2001). Meaning and measurement in cross-national research on satisfaction with democracy. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 65(4):506–528.
- Capuno, J. J. (2016). An oxaca-decomposition analysis of popular support for democracy in Southeast Asian countries: Are the middle classes different from the rest? *Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy*, 21(4):467–488.
- Carothers, T. (1997). Democracy without illusions. *Foreign Affairs*, 85-99.
- Carothers, T. (2007). How democracies emerge: The "sequencing" fallacy. *Journal of Democracy*, 18(1), 12-27.
- Carpini, M. X. D. and Keeter, S. (1993). Measuring political knowledge: Putting first things first. *American Journal of Political Science*, pages 1179–1206.
- Carpini, M. X. D. and Keeter, S. (1996). *What Americans know about politics and why it matters*. Yale University Press.
- Carrión, J. F. (2008). Illiberal democracy and normative democracy: How is democracy defined in the Americas? In *Challenges to democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: evidence from the Americas Barometer*. Nashville (TN): USAID, LAPOP.
- Case, W. (2015). Democracy's mixed fortunes in Southeast Asia: Torpor, change, and trade-offs. In Case, W. (eds). *Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Democratization*. Routledge, 15–35.
- Cho, Y. (2014). To know democracy is to love it: A cross-national analysis of democratic understanding and political support for democracy. *Political Research Quarterly*, 67(3):478–488.
- Cho, Y. (2015). How well are global citizenries informed about democracy? Ascertaining the breadth and distribution of their democratic enlightenment and its sources. *Political Studies*, 63(1):240–258.
- Chu, Y.-h., Diamond, L., Nathan, A. J., and Shin, D. C. (2008). *How East Asians view democracy*. Columbia University Press.
- Chu, Y.-h. and Huang, M.-h. (2010). The meanings of democracy: Solving an Asian puzzle. *Journal of Democracy*, 21(4):114–122.
- Chu, Y. H., Welsh, B., and Chang, A. (2013). Congruence and Variation in Sources of Regime Support in East Asia. *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, 9(1).
- Cipta, S. E. (2020). Nationalism of history education: A perspective on Indonesian history text books. *IJECA (International Journal of Education and Curriculum Application)*, 3(1), 14-21.
- Claassen, C. (2020). Does public support help democracy survive? *American Journal of Political Science*, 64(1):118–134.
- Connors, M. K. (2011). "Asian values redux? The international politics of rights, democracy and culture." In Connors, M., Davison, R., and Dosch, J. (eds). *The New Global Politics of the Asia Pacific*. Routledge, pp. 258–276.
- Converse, P. E. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In Apter, D., editor, *Ideology and Discontent*. New York: Free Press.

- Coppedge, M. (1999). Thickening thin concepts and theories: combining large N and small in comparative politics. *Comparative Politics*, 465-476.
- Crow, D. (2010). The party's over: Citizen conceptions of democracy and political dissatisfaction in Mexico. *Comparative Politics*, 43(1):41–61.
- Curato, N. (2017). Flirting with authoritarian fantasies? Rodrigo Duterte and the new terms of Philippine populism. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 47(1), 142-153.
- Curato, N., and Fossati, D. (2020). Authoritarian Innovations: Crafting support for a less democratic Southeast Asia. *Democratization*, 27(6), 1006-1020.
- Dahl, R. (1971). *Polyarchy: Participation and opposition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, R. (1989). *Democracy and its critics*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, R. (1992). The Problem of Citizen Competence. *Journal of Democracy*, 3(4): 45–59.
- Dahlberg, S., Linde, J., and Holmberg, S. (2015). Democratic discontent in old and new democracies: Assessing the importance of democratic input and governmental output. *Political Studies*, 63:18–37.
- Dahlum, S., & Knutsen, C. H. (2017). Do democracies provide better education? Revisiting the democracy–human capital link. *World Development*, 94, 186-199.
- Dalton, R. and Shin, D. C. (2014). Growing up democratic: Generational change in East Asian democracies. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 15(3):345–372.
- Dalton, R. J., Shin, D. C., and Jou, W. (2007). Understanding democracy: Data from unlikely places. *Journal of Democracy*, 18(4):142–156.
- Dancey, L. and Sheagley, G. (2013). Heuristics behaving badly: Party cues and voter knowledge. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(2):312–325.
- Darden, K., & Grzymala-Busse, A. (2006). The great divide: Literacy, nationalism, and the communist collapse. *World Politics*, 59(1), 83-115.
- Davidson, J. S. (2018). *Indonesia: Twenty Years of Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.
- De Regt, S. (2013). Arabs want democracy, but what kind? *Advances in Applied Sociology*, 3(01):37.
- Desposato, S., and Norrander, B. (2009). The gender gap in Latin America: Contextual and individual influences on gender and political participation. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(1), 141-162.
- Diamond, L. (2020). Breaking out of the democratic slump. *Journal of Democracy*, 31(1), 36-50.
- Diamond, L. (1999). *Developing democracy: Toward consolidation*. JHU Press.
- Diamond, L. and Morlino, L. (2004). The quality of democracy: An overview. *Journal of Democracy*, 15(4):20–31.
- Dinas, E. and Northmore-Ball, K. (2019). The Ideological Shadow of Authoritarianism. *Comparative Political Studies*.
- Dolan, K. (2011). Do women and men know different things? Measuring gender differences in political knowledge. *Journal of Politics*, 73(1):97–107.
- Doorenspleet, R. (2012). Critical citizens, democratic support and satisfaction in African democracies. *International Political Science Review*, 33(3):279–300.
- Dore, G. (2014). “Democracy is not the only game in town! Democratic and authoritarian attitudes in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand.” In Dore, G., Ku, J. H., and Jackson, K. D. (eds) *Incomplete Democracies in the Asia-Pacific*. Springer, pp. 13–62.
- Dore, G. (2019). The long shadow of dictatorships beyond the near East: Authoritarian legacies and citizens’ democratic attitudes in Indonesia, Myanmar and Thailand. 1–41. Working Paper.

- Dow, J. K. (2009). Gender differences in political knowledge: Distinguishing characteristics-based and returns-based differences. *Political Behavior*, 31(1):117–136.
- Dressel, B. and Bonoan, C. R. (2019). Southeast Asia's troubling elections: Duterte versus the rule of law. *Journal of Democracy*, 30(4):134–148.
- Easton, D. (1965). A systems analysis of political life. In *Systems Research for Behavioral Science Systems Research*, 428-436). Routledge.
- Easton, D. (1975). A re-assessment of the concept of political support. *British Journal of Political Science*, 5(4):435–457.
- Eddyono, S. (2020). Competing nationalisms in post-new order Indonesia. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 26(4), 421-439.
- Egami, N., & Hartman, E. (2020). Elements of external validity: Framework, design, and analysis. *Design, and Analysis*.
- Elff, M. (2009). Political knowledge in comparative perspective: The problem of cross-national equivalence of measurement. In MPSA 2009 Annual National Conference, 2–5.
- Erikson, R. S. (2015). Income inequality and policy responsiveness. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 18:11–29.
- Escribà-Folch, A. (2013). Repression, political threats, and survival under autocracy. *International Political Science Review*, 34(5), 543-560.
- Evans, G. and Whitefield, S. (1995). The politics and economics of democratic commitment: Support for democracy in transition societies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 25(4):485–514.
- Farisa, F. C. (2019). "Pengamat: Revisi KUHP seolah membawa ke Orde Baru," 20 September. Available at: <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/09/20/15193711/pengamat-revisi-kuhp-seolah-membawa-ke-orde-baru> (Accessed: October 29, 2019).
- Ferrín, M., Fraile, M., García-Albacete, G. M., & Gómez, R. (2020). The gender gap in political interest revisited. *International Political Science Review*, 41(4), 473-489.
- Ferrin, M., Fraile, M., and García-Albacete, G. (2018). Is it simply gender? Content, format, and time in political knowledge measures. *Politics & Gender*, 14(2):162–185.
- Ferrín, M., and Kriesi, H. (Eds.). (2016). *How Europeans view and evaluate democracy*. Oxford University Press.
- Finkel, S. E. and Ernst, H. R. (2005). Civic education in post-Apartheid South Africa: Alternative paths to the development of political knowledge and democratic values. *Political Psychology*, 26(3):333–364.
- Finkel, S. E., & Lim, J. (2021). The supply and demand model of civic education: Evidence from a field experiment in the democratic Republic of Congo. *Democratization*, 28(5), 970-991.
- Fionna, U., & Hutchinson, F. E. (2019). Indonesia's 2019 Elections: A Fractured Democracy? *Asian Affairs*, 50(4), 502-519.
- Fortin-Rittberger, J. (2016). Cross-national gender gaps in political knowledge: How much is due to context? *Political Research Quarterly*, 69(3):391–402.
- Fowler, A. and Margolis, M. (2014). The political consequences of uninformed voters. *Electoral Studies*, 34:100–110.
- Fraile, M. (2013). Do information-rich contexts reduce knowledge inequalities? The contextual determinants of political knowledge in Europe. *Acta Politica*, 48(2):119–143.
- Fraile, M. (2014). Do women know less about politics than men? The gender gap in political knowledge in Europe. *Social Politics*, 21(2):261–289.

- Frazer, E. and Macdonald, K. (2003). Sex differences in political knowledge in Britain. *Political Studies*, 51(1):67–83.
- Freedom House (2018). “Freedom in the world: Indonesia country report.” Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-world/2018> (Accessed: November 20, 2022).
- Freedom House (2022). “Freedom in the world: Indonesia country report.” Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-world/2022> (Accessed: November 20, 2022).
- Freedom House (2022). “Freedom in the world: Timor Leste country report.” Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/TimorLeste/freedom-world/2022> (Accessed: November 19, 2022).
- Fuchs, D. (1999). The Democratic Culture of Germany. In *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government*, ed. Pippa Norris, 123–45. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fuchs, D. and Roller, E. (2006). Learned democracy? Support of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. *International Journal of Sociology*, 36(3):70–96.
- Fuks, M., Paulino, R. O., and Casalecchi, G. A. (2018). Socialization and political regimes: The impact of generation on support for democracy in Latin America. *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 12(1).
- Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of history? *The National Interest*, (16), 3-18.
- Fukuyama, F. (2012). The future of history: Can liberal democracy survive the decline of the middle class? *Foreign Affairs*, 53–61.
- Galston, W. A. (2001). Political knowledge, political engagement, and civic education. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4(1):217–234.
- Geddes, B., and Zaller, J. (1989). Sources of popular support for authoritarian regimes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 319-347.
- Gidengil, E. (2007). Beyond the gender gap: Presidential address to the Canadian Political Science Association, Saskatoon, 2007. *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique*, 40(4), 815-831.
- Gibson, J. L. and Caldeira, G. A. (2009). Knowing the supreme court? A reconsideration of public ignorance of the high court. *Journal of Politics*, 71(2):429–441.
- Gottlieb, J., Grossman, G., & Robinson, A. L. (2018). Do men and women have different policy preferences in Africa? Determinants and implications of gender gaps in policy prioritization. *British Journal of Political Science*, 48(3), 611-636.
- Grant, M. J., and Behrman, J. R. (2010). Gender gaps in educational attainment in less developed countries. *Population and Development Review*, 36(1), 71-89.
- Greco, J. (2014). Episteme: Knowledge and understanding. *Virtues and their vices*, 285–302.
- Haggard, S. and Kaufman, R. R. (2016). Democratization during the third wave. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19, 125-144.
- Hansen, M. A. and Goenaga, A. (2019). Gender and democratic attitudes: Do women and men prioritize different democratic institutions? *Politics & Gender*, 1–30.
- Hecan, M. and Farhaoui, F. (2021). The coercive power and democratic transition in the post-uprising Middle East and North Africa. *Democratization*, 28(6), 1152-1171.
- Highton, B. (2009). Revisiting the relationship between educational attainment and political sophistication. *Journal of Politics*, 71(4):1564–1576.
- Hollander, B. A. (2014). The role of media use in the recall versus recognition of political knowledge. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 58(1):97–113.

- Hooker, V. M. (1993). *Culture and society in New Order Indonesia*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- Hootsuite (2019). *Global Digital Report*. Accessed: 2019-26-05.
- Huang, C. (2019). Generation effects? Evolution of independence–unification views in Taiwan, 1996–2016. *Electoral Studies*, 58:103–112.
- Huang, M.-h., Chang, Y.-t., and Chu, Y.-h. (2008). Identifying sources of democratic legitimacy: A multilevel analysis. *Electoral Studies*, 27(1):45–62.
- Huntington, S. P. (1993). *The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century* (Vol. 4). University of Oklahoma Press.
- Hyden, G., Court J., and Mease, K. (2004). *Making Sense of Governance. Empirical Evidence from Sixteen Developing Countries*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Inglehart, R. (2003). How solid is mass support for democracy—and how can we measure it? *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 36(1):51–57.
- Inglehart, R. and Norris, P. (2000). *Rising tide: Gender equality and cultural change around the world*. Cambridge University Press.
- Jalli, N. and Idris, I. (2019). Fake news and elections in two Southeast Asian nations: A comparative study of Malaysia general election 2018 and Indonesia presidential election 2019. In *International Conference on Democratisation in Southeast Asia (ICDeSA 2019)*. Atlantis Press, pp. 138-148.
- Jankü, J. and Libich, J. (2019). Ignorance isn't bliss: Uninformed voters drive budget cycles. *Journal of Public Economics*, 173:21–43.
- Jennings, M. K. and Niemi, R. G. (2014). *Generations and politics: A panel study of young adults and their parents*. Princeton University Press.
- Jerit, J. and Barabas, J. (2017). Revisiting the gender gap in political knowledge. *Political Behavior*, 39(4):817–838.
- Jerit, J., Barabas, J., and Bolsen, T. (2006). Citizens, knowledge, and the information environment. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(2):266–282.
- Johann, D. (2012). Specific political knowledge and citizens' participation: Evidence from Germany. *Acta Politica*, 47(1):42–66.
- Kapp, J. M., Peters, C., and Oliver, D. P. (2013). Research recruitment using Facebook advertising: Big potential, big challenges. *Journal of Cancer Education*, 28(1):134–137.
- Karp, J. A., & Milazzo, C. (2015). Democratic scepticism and political participation in Europe. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties*, 25(1), 97-110.
- Kenski, K. and Jamieson, K. (2000). *The gender gap in political knowledge: Are women less knowledgeable than men about politics*, 83–89. Basic Books: New York, USA.
- Khatib, I. (2022). Can democratic values bring the parties to the table in a protracted, Middle Eastern conflict? The attitudes of youth in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. *Democratization*, 29(4), 692-713.
- Kiewiet de Jonge, C. P. (2016). Should researchers abandon questions about “democracy”? Evidence from Latin America. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 80(3), 694-716.
- Kim, S. Y. (2010). Do Asian values exist? Empirical tests of the four dimensions of Asian values. *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 10(2), 315-344.
- Kingsbury, D. (2014). Democratic consolidation in Timor-Leste: Achievements, problems and prospects. *Asian journal of political science*, 22(2), 181-205.
- Kirsch, H. and Welzel, C. (2019). Democracy misunderstood: Authoritarian notions of democracy around the globe. *Social Forces*, 98(1):59–92.

- Klašnja, M. (2017). Uninformed voters and corrupt politicians. *American Politics Research*, 45(2):256–279.
- Komara, E. (2017). Curriculum and civic education teaching in Indonesia. *EDUCARE*, 10(1).
- KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum). (2019). “Hasil hitung suara pemilu presiden & wakil presiden RI 2019”. Available at: <https://pemilu2019.kpu.go.id/#/ppwp/hitung-suara/> (Accessed: 10 February 2019).
- Konte, M. and Klasen, S. (2016). Gender difference in support for democracy in sub-Saharan Africa: Do social institutions matter? *Feminist Economics*, 22(2):55–86.
- Kosinski, M., Matz, S. C., Gosling, S. D., Popov, V., and Stillwell, D. (2015). Facebook as a research tool for the social sciences: Opportunities, challenges, ethical considerations, and practical guidelines. *American Psychologist*, 70(6):543.
- Kruse, S., Ravlik, M., and Welzel, C. (2019). Democracy confused: When people mistake the absence of democracy for its presence. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 50(3):315–335.
- Lamb, K. (2019). “Ahok, Jakarta’s former governor, released after jail term for blasphemy,” 24 January. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/24/ahok-jakartas-former-governor-released-after-jail-term-for-blasphemy> (Accessed: December 13 2022).
- Lau, R. R., Andersen, D. J., and Redlawsk, D. P. (2008). An exploration of correct voting in recent us presidential elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(2):395–411.
- Lau, R. R. and Redlawsk, D. P. (1997). Voting correctly. *American Political Science Review*, 91(3):585–598.
- Lay, J. C. (2006). Learning about politics in low-income communities: Poverty and political knowledge. *American Politics Research*, 34(3):319–340.
- Leeson, P. T. (2008). Media freedom, political knowledge, and participation. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 22(2):155–169.
- Liddle, R. W. (1996). Indonesia: Suharto tightening grip. *Journal of Democracy*, 7(4):58–72.
- Lim, M. (2017). Freedom to hate: Social media, algorithmic enclaves, and the rise of tribal nationalism in Indonesia. *Critical Asian Studies*, 49(3):411–427.
- Linz, J. J. and Stepan, A. C. (1996). Toward consolidated democracies. *Journal of Democracy*, 7(2):14–33.
- Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. *American Political Science Review*, 53(1):69–105.
- Lipton, P. (2004). *Inference to the best explanation*. Routledge.
- Liu, S. J. S. (2018). Are female political leaders role models? Lessons from Asia. *Political Research Quarterly*, 71(2):255–269.
- Liu, S. J. S. (2022). Gender gaps in political participation in Asia. *International Political Science Review*, 43(2), 209–225.
- Lizotte, M. K. and Sidman, A. H. (2009). Explaining the gender gap in political knowledge. *Politics & Gender*, 5(2):127–151.
- Liu, S. J. S. (2018). Are female political leaders role models? Lessons from Asia. *Political Research Quarterly*, 71(2), 255–269.
- Long, N.J. (2016). “Why Indonesians Turn Against Democracy,” in J. Cook and H.L. Moore (eds) *The state we’re in: Reflecting on democracy’s troubles*. New York, NY: Berghahn Books, pp. 71–96.
- Lührmann, A., and Lindberg, S. I. (2019). A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it? *Democratization*, 26(7), 1095–1113.

- Lup, O. (2015). Informal political conversation in old and new democracies in a comparative perspective. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 27(4):497–508.
- Lupia, A. (2016). *Uninformed: Why people know so little about politics and what we can do about it*. Oxford University Press.
- Lupia, A., McCubbins, M. D., Arthur, L. (1998). *The democratic dilemma: Can citizens learn what they need to know?* Cambridge University Press.
- Lupu, N., & Peisakhin, L. (2017). The legacy of political violence across generations. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(4), 836-851.
- Luqiu, L. R. (2017). The cost of humour: Political satire on social media and censorship in China. *Global Media and Communication*, 13(2), 123-138.
- Lussier, D. N. and Fish, M. S. (2012). Indonesia: the benefits of civic engagement. *Journal of Democracy*, 23(1):70–84.
- Maboloc, C. R. (2020). President Rodrigo Duterte and the birth of radical democracy in the Philippines. *International Journal of Politics and Security*, 2(3), 116-134.
- Magalhães, P. C. (2014). Government effectiveness and support for democracy. *European Journal of Political Research*, 53(1):77–97.
- Marcus, R. R., Mease, K., and Ottomoeller, D. (2001). Popular definitions of democracy from Uganda, Madagascar, and Florida, USA. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 36(1):113–132.
- Mare, R. D., & Maralani, V. (2006). The intergenerational effects of changes in women's educational attainments. *American Sociological Review*, 71(4), 542-564.
- Marshall, M., Gurr, T., and Jaggers, K. (2018). *Polity IV Annual Time Series, 1800-2017*. Center for Systemic Peace. Version: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>.
- Martens, A. M. and Gainous, J. (2013). Civic education and democratic capacity: How do teachers teach and what works? *Social Science Quarterly*, 94(4):956–976.
- Mattes, R. (2012). The 'Born Frees': The prospects for generational change in post-Apartheid South Africa. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 47(1):133–153.
- Mattes, R. and Bratton, M. (2007). Learning about democracy in Africa: Awareness, performance, and experience. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1):192–217.
- Mattes, R., and Bratton, M. (2016). "Do Africans still want democracy?", November. Available at: https://www.africaportal.org/documents/16553/ab_r6_policypaperno36_do_africans_want_democracy.pdf (Accessed: November 20 2022).
- McCargo, D. (2019). Southeast Asia's troubling elections: Democratic demolition in Thailand. *Journal of Democracy*, 30(4), 119-133.
- McClosky, H. and Brill, A. (1983). *The dimensions of tolerance: What Americans believe about civil liberties*. Russell Sage Foundation.
- McClosky, H. and Zaller, J. (1984). *The American ethos: Public attitudes toward capitalism and democracy*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge.
- Mellon, J. and Prosser, C. (2017). Twitter and Facebook are not representative of the general population: Political attitudes and demographics of British social media users. *Research & Politics*, 4(3):2053168017720008.
- Mettler, S. (2011). *The submerged state: How invisible government policies undermine American democracy*. University of Chicago Press.
- Mietzner, M. (2013). Fighting the hellhounds: Pro-democracy activists and party politics in post-Suharto Indonesia. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 43(1):28–50.

- Mietzner, M. (2015). *Reinventing Asian populism: Jokowi's Rise, Democracy, and Political Contestation in Indonesia*, 42–43. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center.
- Mietzner, M. (2018). Fighting illiberalism with illiberalism: Islamist populism and democratic deconsolidation in Indonesia. *Pacific Affairs*, 91(2), 261–282.
- Mietzner, M. (2019). Authoritarian innovations in Indonesia: Electoral narrowing, identity politics and executive illiberalism. *Democratization*, 1–16.
- Mishler, W. and Rose, R. (1996). Trajectories of fear and hope: support for democracy in post-communist Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 28(4):553–581.
- Mishler, W. and Rose, R. (2007). Generation, age, and time: The dynamics of political learning during Russia's transformation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(4):822–834.
- Mondak, J. J. (2001). Developing valid knowledge scales. *American Journal of Political Science*, 224–238.
- Mondak, J. J. and Anderson, M. R. (2004). The knowledge gap: A re-examination of gender-based differences in political knowledge. *Journal of Politics*, 66(2):492–512.
- Mont'Alverne, C., Moraes, D., & Kemer, T. (2022). Are politically engaged citizens more democratic? A glimpse from Brazil. *International Political Science Review*, 01925121211056578.
- Muhtadi, B. (2020). 8 Electoral losers, democratic support and authoritarian nostalgia. *Democracy in Indonesia: From Stagnation to Regression?*, 141.
- Mujani, S. and Liddle, R. W. (2015). Indonesia's democratic performance: A popular assessment. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 16(2):210–226.
- Mujani, S., Liddle, R. W., and Ambardi, K. (2018). *Voting behavior in Indonesia since democratization: Critical democrats*. Cambridge University Press.
- Neuman, W. R. (1986). *The paradox of mass politics: Knowledge and opinion in the American electorate*. Harvard University Press.
- Neuman, W. R. (2018). The paradox of the paradigm: An important gap in media effects research. *Journal of Communication*, 68(2), 369–379.
- Neundorf, A., & Pop-Eleches, G. (2020). Dictators and their subjects: Authoritarian attitudinal effects and legacies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 53(12), 1839–1860.
- Nishimura, S. (1995). The development of Pancasila moral education in Indonesia. *Japanese Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 33(3), 303–316.
- Norris, P. (1999). *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government*. OUP Oxford.
- Norris, P. (2011). *Democratic deficit: Critical citizens revisited*. Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, P. (2017). The conceptual framework of political support. In *Handbook on Political Trust*, 19–32. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- O'Donnell, G. A. (2007). The perpetual crises of democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 18(1):5–11.
- Ortmann, S. (2013). The “Beijing consensus” and the “Singapore model”: unmasking the myth of an alternative authoritarian state-capitalist model. In *China's Economic Dynamics* (pp. 97–120). Routledge.
- Ottomoeller, D. (1998). Popular perceptions of democracy: Elections and attitudes in Uganda. *Comparative Political Studies*, 31(1):98–124.
- Oxfam. (2016). “Underpaid and undervalued: how inequality defines women's work in Asia,” June. Available at: <https://oxfamlibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/611297/ib-inequality-womens-work-asia-310516-en.pdf;jsessionid=44E17CEE9D736CC87ACA06BDC47EDED5?sequence=1> (Accessed: November 15 2022).

- Pande, R. (2011). Can informed voters enforce better governance? Experiments in low-income democracies. *Annual Review of Economy*, 3(1):215–237.
- Parthasarathy, R., Rao, V., and Palaniswamy, N. (2019). Deliberative democracy in an unequal world: A text-as-data study of south India's village assemblies. *American Political Science Review*, 113(3):623–640.
- Parthenon. (2016). "Education in Southeast Asia Opportunities for investors and operators." Available at: http://cdn.ey.com/parthenon/pdf/perspectives/Parthenon-EY_SE-Asia_Paper_final_092016_singles.pdf (Accessed: November 29 2022).
- Peou, S. (2014). Democratization and human rights in Southeast Asia. In *Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Democratization*, 50–65. Routledge.
- Pepinsky, T. (2017). Southeast Asia: Voting against disorder. *Journal of Democracy*, 28(2):120–131.
- Persson, M. (2015). Education and political participation. *British Journal of Political Science*, 45(3):689–703.
- Pietsch, J. (2015). Authoritarian durability: Public opinion towards democracy in Southeast Asia. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 25(1):31–46.
- Pietsch, J. and Clark, M. (2015). Critical citizens: Attitudes towards democracy in Indonesia and Malaysia. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 16(2):195–209.
- Pietsch, J., Miller, M., and Karp, J. A. (2015). Public support for democracy in transitional regimes. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 25(1):1–9.
- Pongsudhirak, T. (2014, July). Jokowi Saves Indonesia's Democracy (and Maybe Southeast Asia's Too. In *East Asian Forum* (Vol. 28).
- Pop-Eleches, G., & Tucker, J. A. (2020). Communist legacies and left-authoritarianism. *Comparative Political Studies*, 53(12), 1861-1889.
- Power, T. P. (2018). Jokowi's authoritarian turn and Indonesia's democratic decline. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 54(3), 307-338.
- Power, T., & Warburton, E. (Eds.). (2020). *Democracy in Indonesia: From Stagnation to Regression?*. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.
- Preece, J. R. (2016). Mind the gender gap: An experiment on the influence of self-efficacy on political interest. *Politics & Gender*, 12(1):198–217.
- Prihatini, E. S. (2018, September). Indonesian young voters: Political knowledge and electing women into parliament. In *Women's Studies International Forum* (Vol. 70, pp. 46-52). Pergamon.
- Prior, M. (2005). News vs. entertainment: How increasing media choice widens gaps in political knowledge and turnout. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(3):577–592.
- Przeworski, A. (1999). *Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense*. Cambridge University Press.
- Quaranta, M. (2018). The meaning of democracy to citizens across European countries and the factors involved. *Social Indicators Research*, 136(3), 859-880.
- Ramesh, R. (2016). "1MDB: The inside story of the world's biggest financial scandal," 28 July. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/28/1mdb-inside-story-worlds-biggest-financial-scandal-malaysia> (Accessed: December 2 2022).
- Reichert, F. (2016). How internal political efficacy translates political knowledge into political participation: Evidence from Germany. *Europe's Journal of Psychology*, 12(2):221.
- Resnick, D. and Casale, D. (2014). Young populations in young democracies: Generational voting behaviour in sub-Saharan Africa. *Democratization*, 21(6):1172–1194.

- Rhue, L., and Sundararajan, A. (2014). Digital access, political networks and the diffusion of democracy. *Social Networks*, 36, 40-53.
- Robertson, P. (2012). ASEAN's road to nowhere? Subverting standards within the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. *Strategic Review*.
- Robison, R. (1996). The politics of 'Asian values'. *The Pacific Review*, 9(3), 309-327.
- Robison, R. and Hadiz, V. R. (2017). Indonesia: A tale of misplaced expectations. *The Pacific Review*, 30(6):895–909.
- Robinson, A. L., & Gottlieb, J. (2021). How to close the gender gap in political participation: lessons from matrilineal societies in Africa. *British Journal of Political Science*, 51(1), 68-92.
- Rondonuwu, O. (2014). "Suharto nostalgia grows as Indonesia heads for elections," 27 March. Available at: <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/03/27/soeharto-nostalgia-grows-indonesia-heads-elections.html> (Accessed: December 2 2022).
- Rozenas, A., and Zhukov, Y. M. (2019). Mass repression and political loyalty: Evidence from Stalin's 'terror by hunger'. *American Political Science Review*, 113(2), 569-583.
- Samuels, D. J. and Zucco, C. (2013). Using Facebook as a subject recruitment tool for survey-experimental research. Available at SSRN 2101458.
- Sanborn, H., and Thyne, C. L. (2014). Learning democracy: Education and the fall of authoritarian regimes. *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(4), 773-797.
- Sanches, E. R. and Gorbunova, E. (2016). Portuguese citizens' support for democracy: 40 years after the carnation revolution. *South European Society and Politics*, 21(2):211–226.
- Sani, M. A. M. (2008, July). Mahathir Mohamad as a cultural relativist: Mahathirism on human rights. In *17th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, Melbourne*, 1-3.
- Satrio, A. (2019). A battle between two populists: The 2019 presidential election and the resurgence of Indonesia's authoritarian constitutional tradition. *Australian Journal of Asian Law*, 19(2).
- Schedler, A. (2002). Elections without democracy: The menu of manipulation. *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2), 36-50.
- Schlozman, K. L., Burns, N., and Verba, S. (1999). "What Happened at Work Today?": A multistage model of gender, employment, and political participation. *Journal of Politics*, 61(1), 29-53.
- Schumpeter, J. A. (1976). *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. Harper and Row: NY, USA.
- Sen, A. K. (1999). Democracy as a universal value. *Journal of Democracy*, 10(3):3–17.
- Septania, R. C. (2018). "Indonesia, Pengguna Facebook Terbanyak ke-4 di Dunia," 2 Maret. Available at: <https://tekno.kompas.com/read/2018/03/02/08181617/indonesia-pengguna-facebook-terbanyak-ke-4-di-dunia> (Accessed: December 1 2022).
- Setzler, M. H. (2002). The acquisition of political knowledge and electoral accountability in a developing democracy: Evidence from Brazil. In *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*, August, Vol. 29.
- Shapiro, R. Y. and Page, B. (1992). *The rational public: Fifty years of trends in Americans' policy preferences*. University of Chicago Press Chicago.
- Sharma, C., and Singh, P. (2021). Gender and Comparative Politics: Political Representation in Asia. *Journal of Polity and Society*, 13(2).
- Shin, D. C. (1994). On the third wave of democratization: A synthesis and evaluation of recent theory and research. *World Politics*, 47(1), 135-170.

- Shin, D. C. (2006). Democratization: Perspectives from global citizenries. In *Handbook of Political Behavior*. Oxford University Press.
- Shin, D. C. (2015). Assessing citizen responses to democracy. *Center for the Study of Democracy, UC Irvine*. Working Paper.
- Shin, D. C. (2017). Popular understanding of democracy. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. Oxford OUP Press.
- Shin, D. C. and Cho, Y. (2010). How East Asians understand democracy: From a comparative perspective. *Asien*, 116:21–40.
- Shin, D. C. and Kim, H. J. (2018). How global citizenries think about democracy: An evaluation and synthesis of recent public opinion research. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 19(2):222–249.
- Slater, D. (2012). Southeast Asia: strong-state democratization in Malaysia and Singapore. *Journal of democracy*, 23(2), 19-33.
- Smith, T. (2022). "Philippines election: how the Marcos clan might be heading back to power," 5 May. Available at: <https://theconversation.com/philippines-election-how-the-marcos-clan-might-be-heading-back-to-power-182477> (Accessed: November 30 2022).
- Statista. (2022). "Share of Facebook in mobile social media market in Indonesia from August 2021 to August 2022". Available at: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1257345/indonesia-facebook-share-in-mobile-social-media-market/> (Accessed: December 1 2022)
- Stockmann, D. and Gallagher, M. E. (2011). Remote control: How the media sustain authoritarian rule in China. *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(4):436–467.
- Stokke, K., & Aung, S. M. (2020). Transition to democracy or hybrid regime? The dynamics and outcomes of democratization in Myanmar. *The European Journal of Development Research*, 32(2), 274-293.
- Sukma, R. (2011). Do new democracies support democracy? Indonesia finds a new voice. *Journal of Democracy*, 22(4):110–123.
- Suntana, I., and Tresnawaty, B. (2020). Political Knowledge and Political Behavior among Highly Educated Muslims in Indonesia. *Journal of Social Studies Education Research*, 11(4), 149-174.
- Suwignyo, A. (2019). Gotong royong as social citizenship in Indonesia, 1940s to 1990s. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 50(3), 387-408.
- Svolik, M. W. (2013). Learning to love democracy: Electoral accountability and the success of democracy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(3):685–702.
- Takayama, K. (2009). Globalizing critical studies of 'official' knowledge: Lessons from the Japanese history textbook controversy over 'comfort women'. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 30(5), 577-589.
- Teehankee, J. C. and Calimbahin, C. A. A. (2020). Mapping the Philippines' defective democracy. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 47(2):97–125.
- Thabchumpon, N. (2016). Contending political networks: A study of the "Yellow Shirts" and "Red Shirts" in Thailand's politics. *Southeast Asian Studies*, 5(1), 93-113.
- Thaler, K. M. (2017). Nicaragua: A return to caudillismo. *Journal of Democracy*, 28(2), 157-169.
- Thompson, M. R. (2015). Democracy with Asian characteristics. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 74(4):875–887.
- Tóka, G. and Popescu, M. (2007). Inequalities of political influence in new democracies. *International Journal of Sociology*, 37(4):67–93.

- Torcal, M. (2007). The origins of democratic support in post-Franco Spain: learning to be a democrat under authoritarian rule? In *Spain Transformed* (pp. 195-226). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- Tyson, A. and Purnomo, B. (2017). President Jokowi and the 2014 *Obor Rakyat* controversy in Indonesia. *Critical Asian Studies*, 49(1):117–136.
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). (2019). *Human Development Report 2019: Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today: Inequalities in human development in the 21st century*. New York. Available at: <https://hdr.undp.org/content/human-development-report-2019> (Accessed: December 1 2022).
- UNICEF and SEAMEO. (2020). "SEA-PLM 2019 Main Regional Report, Children's learning in 6 Southeast Asian countries." Bangkok, Thailand: United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) & Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO) – SEA-PLM Secretariat. Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/eap/media/7356/file/SEA-PLM%202019%20Main%20Regional%20Report.pdf>
- Van den Broek, A. (1999). Does differential cohort socialization matter? The impact of cohort replacement and the presence of intergenerational differences in the Netherlands. *Political Psychology*, 501–523.
- Van der Kroef, J. M. (1957). "Guided democracy" in Indonesia. *Far Eastern Survey*, 26(8):113–124.
- Vatikiotis, M. R. (1998). *Indonesian politics under Suharto: The rise and fall of the New Order*, Vol. 5. Psychology Press.
- Verba, S., Burns, N., and Schlozman, K. L. (1997). Knowing and caring about politics: Gender and political engagement. *Journal of Politics*, 59(4):1051–1072.
- Vickers, A. (2022). 'Fake News' about the Indonesian Past. *Journal Of Global Strategic Studies*, 2(1), 6-22.
- Wang, W., Rothschild, D., Goel, S., and Gelman, A. (2015). Forecasting elections with non-representative polls. *International Journal of Forecasting*, 31(3):980–991.
- Warburton, E. (2016). Jokowi and the new developmentalism. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 52(3):297–320.
- Warburton, E. (2018). A new developmentalism in Indonesia? *Journal of Southeast Asian Economies*, 35(3):355–368.
- Warburton, E. and Aspinall, E. (2019). Explaining Indonesia's democratic regression. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 41(2):255–285.
- Wargadiredja, A. T. (2017). "Indonesia's New Order Nostalgia Isn't Going Anywhere. Here's Why," 20 October. Available at: <https://www.vice.com/en/article/7x4pq9/indonesias-new-order-nostalgia-isnt-going-anywhere-heres-why> (Accessed: December 2 2022).
- Wei, L. and Hindman, D. B. (2011). Does the digital divide matter more? Comparing the effects of new media and old media use on the education-based knowledge gap. *Mass Communication and Society*, 14(2):216–235.
- Weiss, M. L. (2004). The changing shape of Islamic politics in Malaysia. *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 4(1), 139-173.
- Welzel, C. (2013). *Freedom rising*. Cambridge University Press.
- Welzel, C., & Alvarez, A. M. (2014). Enlightening people. *The civic culture transformed: From allegiant to assertive citizens*, 59.
- Wijaya, C. (2019). *Kabinet Jokowi 2019, Prabowo jadi menteri pertahanan, pengamat militer: Pandangannya 'berbahaya'*. Accessed: 2020-20-02.

- Wolak, J. and McDevitt, M. (2011). The roots of the gender gap in political knowledge in adolescence. *Political Behavior*, 33(3):505–533.
- World Bank. (2022). “Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+) (national estimate)”. Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS> (Accessed: October 8 2022).
- World Bank (2022). “Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%)”. Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS> (Accessed: October 8 2022).
- Zagrebina, A. (2020). Concepts of democracy in democratic and nondemocratic countries. *International Political Science Review*, 41(2):174–191.
- Zakaria, F. (1994). Culture is destiny: A conversation with Lee Kuan Yew. *Foreign Affairs*, 109–126.
- Zakaria, F. (2007). *The future of freedom: Illiberal democracy at home and abroad* (Revised Edition). WW Norton & company.
- Zakaria, F. B. (2019). Religion, mass violence, and illiberal regimes: Recent research on the Rohingya in Myanmar. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 38(1):98–111.
- Zhai, Y. (2019). Popular conceptions of democracy and democratic satisfaction in China. *International Political Science Review*, 40(2):246–262.