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Explaining Security-Leadership decision-making outcome variations in crises involving the use of Big Data and Digital Technologies

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Supervisors: Professor 'Funmi Olonisakin and Professor Mischa Dohler

A thesis submitted in fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Leadership Studies with reference to Security & Development

African Leadership Centre
Faculty of Social Science and Public Policy
King's College London

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ABSTRACT

The primary question that this thesis addresses is: within situations where leadership decides disaster outcomes variations and uses digital technologies and big data, is there something about the way that they use big data and digital technologies that explains these outcomes variations? The thesis explores the use of different methods including a systematic review of literature, semantic and discourse networks of concepts, a Tobit Regression, Necessary Condition Analysis (NCA), and cross-case comparisons of 37 disaster events using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) as well as a Q-Methodology study of 2 cases (the Lagos 2014 Ebola and the Lagos 2012 and 2017 floods) to answer the question.

Contrary to findings from the literature that attribute outcome effectiveness to security leadership decisions in natural hazard related disasters involving the use of big data and digital technologies, the thesis reveals that there are cases under similar contexts with outcome ineffectiveness. The thesis finds that highly effective distributed conversation and high information quality are necessary for effective outcome in the context of interest. Low or absence of distributed leadership, Low or ineffective disaster preparation, low or ineffective information quality are individually necessary for ineffective outcomes in the stated security-leadership context.

More importantly, this thesis contributes a methodological innovativeness to the study of security-leadership and disaster management especially in small- and medium-N cases involving the use of big data and digital technologies.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BMKG	Badan Meteorologi, Klimatologi, dan Geofisika
EPSRC	Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
CAPES	Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
CNPq	Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
DFID	Department for International Development
EM-DAT	Emergency Events Database
ESRC	Economic and Social Research Council
CRED	Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
CERP	Global Zurich Flood Resilience Alliance
CS	Case Study
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DS	Descriptive Statistics
IDSS	Integrated Disease Surveillance System
LASEMA	Lagos State Emergency Management Agency
LASEPA	Lagos State Environmental Protection Agency
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency of Nigeria
NERC	Natural Environment Research Council
NHREC	National Health Research Ethics Committee of Nigeria
NIHSA	Nigeria Hydrological Services Agency
NiMET	Nigerian Meteorological Agency
NRF	National Research Foundation of Korea
NSF	National Science Foundation
ONR	Office of Naval Research
RGC	Research Grants Council of Hong Kong
SC FLOODS	2015 SC Floods Research Initiative

SHEAR	Science for Humanitarian Emergencies and Resilience programme
SNA	Social Network Analysis
SR	Systematic Review
ZURICH	Global Zurich Flood Resilience Alliance

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Leadership, Crisis, and Insecurities

Leadership implies decision-making. It is the philosophy, science, and arts of influencing others to achieve mutual goals.[1] This statement is not a restrictive, reductionist overview of the concept. It is also not a definitive declaration on the nature of leadership. Leadership has been extensively conceptualised and theorised in several sources; and so, this is not another treatise on styles, approaches, and metaphysics of leadership. It may be apt to succinctly describe this work as focusing mainly on what leaders do in situations of crisis or large-scale insecurities and the roles, if any, played by big data in mitigating these crises.

This research has three key objectives namely: to understand why big data and digital technologies produce variations in security-leadership decision-making outcomes in situations of crisis or large-scale insecurities; to analyse the factors which underpin these outcome variations, and to understand big data and digital technologies produce these outcome variations. The thesis addresses these objectives using disaster events from across the world with a special focus on the two local cases of the Lagos 2014 Ebola outbreak as well as the 2012 and 2017 Lagos flood disasters. Lagos is a state in Nigeria.

Leaders throughout history have always been looked upon to provide solutions - they were revered for their problem-solving abilities. Leaders were consulted and relied upon for their personality and intrinsic characteristics – the 'great man' theories of leadership prevailed for centuries - the study of leadership was the study of great

[1] Hughes, R. (2009). Time for leadership development interventions in the public health nutrition workforce. *Public health nutrition*, *12*(8), 1029-1029.

leaders.[2,3,4,5,6] Traits-Leadership is another understanding of leadership. 'Are leaders born or made?' is a well-worn question that still influences several modern studies on leadership; although, recent studies have shifted from distal (trait-like, dispositional) attributes to proximal (state-like or malleable) characteristics of individual leaders. This suggests that traits are not static but inherited.[7] The Behavioural Theories emerged in the 1940s and 1950s to challenge the Trait-Leadership theories. Reviews of previous works especially those closely related to the development of psychometrics reveal that social behaviour plays a significant role in leadership development; that it would be wrong to reduce leadership to traits alone.[8,9] In the 1960s, Contingency theories emerged, which is more concerned with the styles of leadership. A common denominator of these theories is the assumption that leadership is situational or context dependent. Other related theories include the Vroom-Yetton-Jago decision-making model, Path-goal theory, Fiedler's contingency theory, and Hersey-Blanchard Situational Leadership Theory.[10,11,12]

In the 1970s, two theories prevailed - the transformational and transactional Theories. The former is about the nature of leadership, 'Why should one be a Leader?' It focuses more on the leader as an inspirational figure able to transform or change the situation and the followers; vice versa. James Burns described transformational leadership as a phenomenon where 'leaders and followers help each other to advance to a higher level of morale and motivation'.[13]

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[2] Bass, B., & Bass, R., (2009), *The Bass Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*. Riverside: Free Press.
[3] Northouse, P. G., (2007), *Leadership: Theory and Practice*. London: SAGE.
[4] Yukl, G. A., (2010), *Leadership in Organizations: Global Edition*. Upper Saddle River (NJ): Pearson.
[5] Prior to the 1940s, the trait and great leaders' approach was prevalent, Thomas Carlyle and Francis Galton promoted the trait approach; to them, leadership is in-born; leaders are born as leaders. Niccolò Machiavelli's *The Prince* is an example of such approach to leadership.
[6] Carlyle, T., (1993), *On heroes, hero-worship, and the heroic in history (Vol.1)*. California: Univ of California Press.
[7] Hoffman, B. J., Woehr, D. J., Maldagen-Youngjohn, R., & Lyons, B. D., (2011), Great man or great myth? A quantitative review of the relationship between individual differences and leader effectiveness. *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, 84 (2), pp. 347-381. Doi:10.1348/096317909X485207
[8] Mann, R. D., (1959), A review of the relationships between personality and performance in small groups. *Psychological Bulletin* 56(4), p. 241.
[9] Stogdill, R. M., (1948), Personal factors associated with Leadership: A Survey of the Literature. *The Journal of Psychology* 25(1), pp. 35-71.
[10] Fiedler, F. E., (1978), The contingency model and the dynamics of the leadership process. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (pp. 59-112). 1978: Academic Press.
[11] Vroom, V. H., & Yetton, P. W., (1973), *Leadership and Decision-making*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
[12] Vroom, V. H., & Jago, A. G., (1988), *The New leadership: Managing Participation in Organizations*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, US: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
[13] Burns, J. M. (1978). *Leadership*. New York; London: Harper and Row

Burns opined that transactional and transformational leadership are mutually exclusive, a position which Bernard Bass contested. A transactional leader is more concerned with getting the job done, while a transformational leader's focus is transcendent, the aim is on change not only of situation but of values. According to Bass, a leader can be both transformational and transactional depending on the context.[14] She can inspire change while directing the followers into getting the job done. Transactional Leadership is a more management style, rational approach to leadership. It is about ensuring organisational order with the leader and follower delivering on their assigned roles. For an effective outcome, there must be a system of punishment and reward in place. Democratic, Bureaucratic, Autocratic and Laissez-faire leadership theories are other theories that focus on leadership styles just like transformational and transactional leadership. Laissez-faire leadership allows for decision-making power to be given to the followers or workers. It is the radical opposite of the autocratic leadership style.[15]

The term 'insecurity' has been well-researched alongside its antonyms – safety and security. When placed side-by-side risk, it becomes obvious that epistemic uncertainties and probabilities underlie the entire concepts of security, safety, and risk. Unstable, ever-changing, dynamic situations demand crisis leadership which most often involve relying upon massive data both structured and unstructured for effective insights into workable alternatives out of the glaring options available at such auspicious times.

Gut feelings and heuristics are dependable to certain degrees, but heuristic calls could only be trusted when made by someone exercising leadership derived from past experiences. The place of information and data-driven decision-making during situations of large-scale insecurities cannot be overemphasized. It is assumed that no group of people would follow an inexperienced leader over an expert professional in crisis situations. Throughout this thesis, the terms insecurity and crisis are used interchangeably to describe the same concept; though the two are tangentially different, they however serve as descriptors of events that challenge peaceful order in the society.

[14] Bass, B.M., (1985), Leadership: Good, Better, Best. *Organizational dynamics*, *13*(3), pp.26-40.
[15] Bass, B. M., & Stogdill, R. M., (1999), *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial*. New York: Free Press.

Leadership is crucial to the various theorisations and applications of the concept of security and insecurity in dynamic situations. The situations in and of themselves require interventions that quite often come in complex alternatives without discountenancing the fact that the nature of decision problems dictates commensurate leadership responses of equal profundities.[16]

The study of security has evolved from the traditional outlook of states and protection of territorial integrity; newer meanings have emerged to encompass all facets of human lives. Traditional security in relation to the state connotes national security: the preservation of a nation's physical and territorial integrity. It includes a state's capability to deter, defer or defeat attacks.[17] The state-centric approach to security was challenged by events following the expiration of the cold war.[18] For many years, especially throughout the war years, security was mainly state-centric until after the Cold War, when the assumption of 'mutual assured destruction.'[19]

Several civil wars broke out in countries across the world – the Balkans, Africa and Asia witnessed several internal wars with the resultant displacement of people. Climate Change and the scourge of new diseases such as AIDS led to thematic reappraisals of the original conception of that term, *freedom from want* and *freedom from fear*. Security assumed new interpretations -*freedom from want* and *fear* meanings were extended to other non-structural conflicts and non-conventional threats.[20] Human security became a rallying term for the broadening of security concepts**.** This term is now featured in several security policies of states across the globe.

According to the draft *African Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact,* Human security means 'the security of the individual concerning the satisfaction of the basic needs of life. It also encompasses the creation of the social, political, economic, military, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival, livelihood, and dignity of the individual. It extends to the protection of fundamental freedoms,

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[16] Klann, Gene (2003), *Crisis Leadership: How Military Lessons and Corporate Experiences Can Help Leaders Find Opportunity in Times of Chaos*. Greensboro, NC, USA: Center for Creative Leadership.
[17] Lippmann, W., (1943), *U.S. Foreign Policy*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
[18] Olonisakin, F., (2015), Re-conceptualising Leadership for effective Peacemaking and human security in Africa. *The Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 37(1), pp. 122-151.
[19] This was what deterred powerful nations from annihilating the world through nuclear warfare with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
[20] Wheeler, D., (2011), Freedom from want, and Freedom from Fear: A Human Security approach to a new Middle East? *Journal of Human Security,* 7(1), p. 37.

the respect for human rights, good governance, access to education, healthcare, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his/her own potential.'[21]

Several development indicators emerged from intergovernmental agencies which push the human and individual dimensions to security - a far departure from the national security-focused narratives of previous decades. This encompassing approach has been contested by what some scholars considered the watering down or broadening of security as a concept. Roland Paris and Daniel Deudney criticise the concept of human security as not more than neologism with ambiguous meanings.[22,23] According to Paris, 'it remains unclear whether the concept of human security can serve as a practical guide for academic research or governmental policymaking.'[24]

As noted by 'Funmi Olonisakin, despite these contestations, several intergovernmental agencies, regional organizations, and national security policies have incorporated human security into their peace and security policies.[25] It is more likely that when issues of security are discussed, the featured themes are around violent conflicts thereby temptingly reducing all forms of insecurities in popular discourses particularly among opinion shapers and policymakers to structural violence. There are however other forms of security threats aside from external and internal violent conflicts; some of which include food security, aviation security, internal security, economic security, and social security.[26] This broad categorisation could be subsumed under the general subject of human security.

This thesis is therefore concerned with security within the context of the broader human security with a special focus on selected sub-categories – disease and flood. This is necessary because it has been proven that these other categories have threatened the wellbeing of humans more than the most popular forms of insecurities combined. Hunger, poverty, and epidemic have killed more people globally than all

[21] African Union (2005), *The African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact*. Congo-Brazzaville: African Geopolitics.
[22] Deudney, D., (1991), Environment and security: Muddled thinking. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 47, (3), pp. 22-28.
[23] Paris, R., (2001). Human security: Paradigm Shift or Hot air? *International Security* 26(2), pp. 87-102.
[24] *Ibid*
[25] Olonisakin, F., (2015), pp. 131-133.
[26] Cilliers, J., (2004), *Human Security in Africa: A Conceptual Framework for Review*. Pretoria: African Human Security Initiative.

the world's genocides, wars and terrorist activities put together.[27] As noted in Figure 1.1 below, State-centric conflicts or security threats have reduced with more intrastate conflicts between the 1970s to 2015.



Figure 1. 1: Armed conflict by type, 1946–2015[28]

Apart from the fact that these insecurities tend to be more intrastate, some of these neo-insecurities are hybrid complexities – they are not mono-causal; there are elements of different issues responsible for the visible negative outcome. They are an amalgam of human, natural and physical insecurities. A recent study, for example, shows that the 2011 Syrian uprising could be linked to the collapse of farming in the north-eastern region of the country caused by Bashar al-Assad's regime's

[27] The Spanish Flu of 1918-1919 alone killed more than 50 million people; the Bubonic plague led to the loss of over 50 million people.

[28] Van Den Heede, P., Ribbens, K., & Jansz, J., (2018), Replaying Today's Wars? A Study of The Conceptualization of Post-1989 Conflict in Digital "War" Games. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 31(3), pp. 229-250. DOI:10.1007/S10767-017-9267-5

unsustainable agricultural policies which led to drought and triggered mass migration to cities thereby fuelling feelings of discontent.[29]

About 30 million people across Nigeria-Niger, Cameroon and Chad are affected by the shrinking of water resources, particularly around the Lake Chad region. With weak government interventions, the biting droughts triggered by the receding Lake provided the thriving motivation for recruiting people into Islamic extremism e.g., Boko Haram, illicit arms, and drugs trades.[30] The impacts of natural resources as contributing factors to the escalation of conflicts or as a leading contribution to large-scale insecurities in themselves cannot be overstated.

1.2 Research Questions, Rationale, Scope of the Study

Primarily this thesis is focused on answering the question: within situations where leadership decides disaster outcomes variations and uses digital technologies and big data, is there something about the way that they use big data and digital technologies that explains these outcomes variations? Put differently, why do big data and digital technologies produce variations in security-leadership decision-making outcomes in crisis situations? Henceforth, 'given context' is occasionally used as a diminutive in place of this context. As a corollary to this are two sub-questions: what factors underpin these outcome variations? How do big data and digital technologies produce these outcome variations in crisis situations?

Crisis or security leadership, disaster and emergency management have been studied extensively by different scholars all through the years and the impact of technologies including big data on their effectiveness have also been well-studied. However, despite the significant influence of these technologies on security-leadership decision-making, there is an apparent dearth of research studies on choices of

[29] Sample, Ian (2015), Global Warming Contributed to Syria's 2011 Uprising, Scientists Claim. *The Guardian*. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/02/global-warming-worsened-syria-drought-study [accessed 20 March 2017]
[30] Darby, Megan (2017), Boko haram terrorists thriving on climate crisis: Report. *Climate Home News*. Available at https://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/04/20/boko-haram-terrorists-thriving-climate-crisis-report/ [accessed August 11, 2017]

leadership approaches and decision outcomes.[31,32] There are several studies presented in Chapter two which address the influence of big data on disaster mitigation, disaster response, disaster communication and promotion of citizens' engagements in a crisis situation. For example, Tolbert Nyenswah *et al.* study the role of leadership in the Ebola epidemic. They examined:

> How the decisions and actions taken in each phase of the epidemic address key crisis leadership tasks, including sense-making, decision-making, meaning-making, crisis termination, and learning, and assess how leadership approaches evolved during the different epidemic phases to accomplish these tasks.[33]

These studies focus on governmental and non-governmental interventions and the roles, impacts, and effectiveness of the outcome of crisis leadership interventions. There abound in the literature recommendations from findings on the stages of intervention (e.g., the mitigation phase, and the recovery phase) for which big data digital technologies such as social media technologies can support disaster management.[34,35,36] In the same vein, the contributions of big data to effective leadership making in combating contagious diseases and other health crisis emergencies especially in underdeveloped countries have been studied.[37]

Still, on leadership effectiveness, the quality of the information was also recognised as responsible for the effectiveness of crisis communication and security leadership in crisis situations. The terseness of tweets including the 'imperative/instructional and declarative/explanatory styles of content' have been so recognised as 'essential for promoting public health during crises, and capable of

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[31] Kapucu, N., & Van Wart, M., (2008), Making Matters Worse: An Anatomy of Leadership failures in Managing Catastrophic Events. *Administration & Society*, 40(7), pp. 711-740. Doi:10.1177/0095399708323143

[32] Patton, A. (2007), *Collaborative Emergency Management*. In W. L. Waugh, & K. J. Tierney (Eds.), *Emergency management: Principles and practice for local government*. Washington, DC: ICMA Press.

[33] Nyenswah, T., Engineer, C. Y., & Peters, D. H., (2016), Leadership in times of Crisis: The example of Ebola Virus disease in Liberia. Health Systems & Reform, 2(3), pp. 194-207. Doi:10.1080/23288604.2016.1222793

[34] Chatfield, Akemi Takeoka, and Christopher G. Reddick (2018), All hands on deck to tweet# sandy: Networked governance of citizen coproduction in turbulent times. *Government Information Quarterly*, 35(2), pp. 259-272.

[35] Yates, Dave, and Scott Paquette (2011), Emergency Knowledge Management and Social Media Technologies: A Case study of the 2010 Haitian earthquake. *International Journal of Information Management*, 31(1), pp. 6-13.

[36] Watson, Hayley, Rachel L. Finn, and Kush Wadhwa (2017), Organizational and Societal Impacts of Big Data in Crisis Management. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 25(1), pp. 15-22.

[37] Amankwah-Amoah, Joseph (2016), Emerging Economies, Emerging Challenges: Mobilising and Capturing Value from Big Data. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 110, pp. 167-174.

providing information about the hazard event, its impact, and actionable instructions for self-protection.'[38]

Although significant evidence abounds on the impacts of big data and digital technologies on security leadership effectiveness in events of large-scale insecurities, nevertheless, there still exist a deficit of studies on why some combinations of factors in a big data digital technologies security-leadership decision-making process contribute to outcome effectiveness in certain disaster events while leading to ineffectiveness in other cases. Nearly all the studies on big data crisis leadership report the positive contributions of digital technologies to leadership effectiveness. It is almost a given that it must play contributory roles in positive outcomes. But the literature establishes that these assumptions fail to account for situations with the presence of big data and digital technologies in the decision-making process with unfavourable outcomes. In these cases, it is crucial to know if the contributions recorded in earlier studies are necessary or sufficient for the outcome effectiveness of ineffectiveness.

A strong justification for this study is the need to examine the roles of big data across different disaster events since most of the cases in the literature are focused on individual emergency events. Some of the findings might be limited to specific events, and they might be easily extrapolatable to other situations or cultural contexts. Tied to this is the deficit of studies on why given the preponderance and availability of big data and digital technologies by government agencies, their leadership decisions to natural hazards are sometimes inconsistent with conflictual outcomes. A typical example is the security-leadership response to the 2014 Ebola epidemic and the flood disasters by agents of the Nigerian Government.

With each crisis, there are humungous losses of lives and properties. The events seem to take on a cyclic replication because, with each passing year, the usual events are predicted (at least in the case of floods) months in advance. Yet, the governmental structures always fail to mitigate the severity of these losses despite the availability of prior big data flood predictions by the Nigerian Meteorological Agency and other weather agencies. Reactionary measures are usually undertaken after the disaster – houses on drainage channels are pulled down; temporary waterways are dredged to

[38] Sutton, Jeannette, Cedar League, Timothy L. Sellnow, and Deanna D. Sellnow (2015), Terse Messaging and Public Health in the midst of Natural Disasters: The Case of the Boulder floods. *Health communication*, 30(2), pp. 135-143.

allow for easy passage of water from the flooded areas. One would assume that precautionary measures would be appropriate and prioritise particularly with the availability of several data generated before the disaster. The 2014 Ebola on the other hand recorded a different leadership response quite uncharacteristic of Nigeria's security-leadership response, especially given the paucity of data and the poor early warning system of the country. Despite these obvious realities, the emergency response, and the security-leadership effectiveness of the Nigerian government to this epidemic have received positive commendation globally.[39]

Also scarce in the literature are studies on the gradient of outcome effectiveness and ineffectiveness. Leadership decision outcomes are commonly seen as binary – effectiveness or ineffectiveness. Hardly is the fuzziness of these judgements studied. Findings from the review of literature reveal the social reality of these assessments; because of a fixed definition of what constitutive effective or ineffective outcomes. This study recognises the importance of interrogating this part of the subject of big data digital technologies security-leadership decision-making. The recognition that the outcome spread out across a continuous spectrum such as *most effective, effective neutral, less effective and most of highly ineffective* influence part of my decision to undertake this study.

There is an apparent lack of many studies on not only the gradience of the outcome. Also, more lacking is the absence of test of some form of test of theoretical assumptions proposed for effective or ineffective crisis big data digital technologies leadership outcome. What configurations of conditions are there without which the outcome cannot be effective/ineffective? The nature of these configurations and the assessments of the model fit; are some of the concerns that justify this thesis.

Of key importance is the dearth of work done on the subject of security leadership in Africa is revealed in the systematic review of literature in Chapter Two. Although the level of digital technology access might be responsible for this lack of coverage, even the types of research done on disaster leadership and management use the models and theories developed in other cultural contexts outside of Africa. This thesis developed a theoretical approach drawn from both global and local contexts for understanding the stated problems.

[39] McClean, Denis (2016), #IDDR2016: How Nigeria won the fight against Ebola. *Relief Web*. Available at https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/iddr2016-how-nigeria-won-fight-against-ebola [accessed 26 December 2017]

Finally, the nature of the objectives of the thesis demands a multi-methods approach. As such, I have collected the methods and techniques that helps to define a Theory of Change, hypothesise this theory, test and map out the structure and the fitness of the models for a better theoretical-methodological understanding of the problems discussed afore.

1.3 Security-Leadership Decision-making Explained

Although, I use crisis and (in) security interchangeably in several sections of this thesis; this choice is largely based on convenience. As noted by Hajer Al-Dahash et al., this behaviour is common among scholars on the subject – some even use the terms: disaster, crisis and emergencies interchangeably.[40] The two terms crisis and security are proximal in their meaning; although, they are not necessarily hermeneutically similar. This section explains the concepts and the key concepts including crisis leadership, security-leadership decision-making, disaster, leadership vs management, emergencies, and their relationships as used in this thesis.

The difference between crisis and security can be likened to the difference between management and leadership. This relationship will be expounded upon later in the section. Disaster, crisis, risk, threats, and other like terms are registers accommodated in the broader security concept. They have no unified definitions therefore this leaves the concepts to diverse interpretations. Disaster definition as observed by Ibrahim Shaluf and Aini Mat is subjected to whoever is doing the definition.[41] The illustrative example used by them (taken from Paul Shrivastava's work); that is, the descriptions of the Bhopal event as used by different actors in the Union Carbide's technical report clearly summarised these complexities:

> the government of India in its report called it an "accident", the injured victims called it a "disaster" and the social activities called it a "tragedy", "massacre" and even "industrial genocide" [42]

[40] Al-Dahash, H., Thayaparan, M. and Kulatunga, U., (2016), Understanding the terminologies: Disaster, crisis and emergency. *In:* P. W. Chan and C.J. Nielson (eds) *Proceedings of the 32nd Annual ARCOM Conference, ARCOM 2016*, 5-7 September 2016, Manchester, UK, Association of Researchers in Construction Management 2, pp. 1191-1200.
[41] Shaluf, Ibrahim M., and Aini Mat Said (2003), A Review of Disaster and Crisis. *Disaster Prevention and Management* 12(1), pp. 24-32. https://doi.org/10.1108/09653560310463829
[42] Shrivastava, Paul (1992), *Bhopal, Anatomy of a Crisis*, 2nd ed., Paul Chapman Publishing, London.

The different distinctions in meaning are contingent upon the valuation imposed by the overseer of the events, the context, and the magnitude of their impacts on man and material. Amidst this flux, there are notable agreements on the types of natural hazard related disasters; they are consistently categorised into two broad parts namely: natural and man-made.

All organisations or societies aspire towards a secured state of being – a balance, devoid of chaos. This balance is security. Insecurity is its negation. Risks, threats, hazards, and other vulnerabilities are potential challenges to this balance. Events that trigger this imbalance to the reified values are identified as a crisis; all crisis events are imbued with these potentials. Stephenson Disaster Management Institute defines crisis as: "a threat to core values or life-sustaining systems, which requires an urgent response under conditions of deep uncertainty."[43] Disaster on the other hand is, "a crisis with a bad ending."[44] It is a negative valuation of a crisis outcome – the unwholesome manifestation of the potential challenges. Emergencies are unexpected or unplanned events such as floods, earthquakes, disease outbreaks and terrorist attacks. All disasters are emergencies. An emergency is a descriptor term for the occurrence or presence of these events. Insecurity is a broad term that covers the vulnerability to these events; it is a state of uncertainty that encompasses the different aforementioned concepts.

Crisis management just like the management concept is about command and control – the hierarchical ordering for the functioning of the system. The distinction between crisis management and crisis leadership is thin but different all the same.[45] Whereas a manager is trained to maintain the status quo order through efficient functioning of the system during crisis – to minimise the cost of risk, a leader is about change in process to prevent, forestall and mitigate present and future crisis. Management is visible power while leadership is latent influence. The ability to inspire the group towards a value or goal without imposing organisation will is what differentiate leaders from managers. The two concepts overlap because competent leaders are usually perceived as effective managers.[46]

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[43] SDMI, (2015), What is disaster management? *Stephenson Disaster Management Institute*. Available at https://www.sdmi.lsu.edu/about-us/faqs/ [accessed 17 March 2017].
[44] Boin, Arjen (2005), From crisis to disaster. In R. Perry & E. Quarantelli (Eds.), *What is a disaster? Further perspectives on the question* (pp. 153–172). Philadelphia, PA, USA: Xlibris Books
[45] Fener, Tugba, and Tugce Cevik (2015), Leadership in Crisis Management: Separation of leadership and Executive concepts. *Procedia Economics and Finance* 26, pp. 695-701.
[46] Kapucu, Naim, and Yusuf Ustun (2018). Collaborative Crisis Management and Leadership in the Public Sector. *International Journal of Public Administration* 41(7), pp. 548-561.

Crisis, Disasters and Emergencies are all subsumed under the broader umbrella of the Security concept. Hence, I use security to accommodate all these terms with care for their distinctions even when they are used interchangeably. In this thesis, Security-leadership is nothing more than an identification of the type of leadership just like education-leadership, religious-leadership etc. Security-leadership decision-making is about the process surrounding the decisions or choices made by actors (emergency managers, first responders, flood managers, etc.) in all situations associated with the larger security context such as crises, disasters, conflicts, and emergencies.

Crisis Management has been examined from varied but most often disparate angles with different models emerging to tackle the knotty subject of crisis leadership. Smits and Ezzat looked at crisis prevention and outcomes and suggested the place of planning and people in the spectrum of managing crisis. According to Seeger et al., three elements describe the nature of the crisis, and they include: (a) a threat to the organization, (b) the element of surprise, and (c) a short decision time.[47] Threats, surprises, and decision time define crisis but not the leadership response to managing the crisis. Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer define it as:

> A specific, unexpected, non-routine event or series of events that creates elevated levels of uncertainty and a significant or perceived threat to high priority goals.[48]

The 'uncertainty' in crisis and disaster events emphasise the need for crisis leadership decision-making. Otto Lerbinger itemised the diverse types of crises as follows: natural hazard related disaster; technological crises; confrontation; malevolence; organizational misdeeds; workplace violence; rumours; and terrorist attacks/man-made disasters.[49] This categorisation further accentuates the disruptive nature of the crisis which characterised the earlier description of crisis portrayed by Seeger et al., especially when considering the 'surprise' and

[47] Seeger, M. W., Sellnow, T. L., & Ulmer, R. R., (1998), Communication, organization, and crisis. *Annals of the International Communication Association*, 21(1), pp. 231-276. Doi:10.1080/23808985.1998.11678952

[48] Seeger, M. W., Sellnow, T. L., & Ulmer, R. R., (2003), *Communication and Organizational Crisis*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, p. 7.

[49] Lerbinger, O., (1997), *The Crisis Manager: Facing Risk and Responsibility*. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

'uncertainty' aspects of crises. This agrees with González-Herrero and Pratt's definition of crisis as 'unwelcome and sudden.'[50]

Crisis leadership is often appended to leadership theory, as noticed in the work of Nyenswah et al. where the contingency theory of leadership was used to investigate the leadership styles, processes, and outcomes in the Liberian Ebola epidemic.[51] This goes to emphasise the strong relationship between leadership theory and crisis leadership; crisis leadership can be considered an aspect of leadership. In the mediated communication sphere, leadership is crucial to the transmission, reception, and processing of crisis information. Social network theory in this regard helps to understand the power graphs and influence trends in a leadership-followership scenario during situations of extreme events. The nodal weight and the directionality of ties can provide both useful and tangential supports to impact the crises.

Big data technologies especially social media are resilient information infrastructures (RII) crucial to crisis leadership as elaborated by Hans Jochen Scholl et al. thus: 'Resilient information infrastructures How resilient a community is with respect to the impact of an extreme event depends to a high degree on how resilient its underlying infrastructures are, and vice versa.'[52] They stated that: 'a major tangible element of an RII is the IT infrastructure.' Tied to this framework are the Structural-functional systems theory of Niklas Luhmann and Everrett's Rogers Diffusion of Innovation Theory; these two theories interrogate the systemic functions of communication in a crisis situation with considerable focus on the exchange of information and the flow of meaning between leaders and the citizens.[53] Diffusion of Innovation theory covers the flow of information which involve the role of domain experts with knowledge of the situation at hand; the idea or solution proposed; the people receiving the information from the expert and the entire communication channel between the leader and the followers.

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[50] Herrero, A. G., & Pratt, C. B., (1996), An Integrated Symmetrical Model for Crisis-Communications Management. Journal of Public Relations Research, 8(2), pp. 79-105. Doi:10.1207/s1532754xjprr0802_01

[51] Nyenswah, T., Engineer, C. Y., & Peters, D. H., (2016), Leadership in Times of Crisis: The Example of Ebola Virus Disease in Liberia. *Health Systems & Reform*, 2(3), pp. 194-207. Doi:10.1080/23288604.2016.1222793

[52] Scholl, H. J., & Patin, B. J., (2014), Resilient Information Infrastructures: Criticality and Role in Responding to Catastrophic Incidents. Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy, 8(1), pp.28-48. Doi:10.1108/TG-12-2012-0015

[53] Rasch, W., (2000), *Niklas Luhmann's Modernity: The Paradoxes of Differentiation*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.

1.4 Big Data and Large-Scale Insecurities

As stated earlier, disasters of large-scale proportions have killed more humans than any form of anthropogenic killings; the Great Chinese famine between 1958 and 1961 killed between 15 million and 43 million people. The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami claimed more than 240,000 lives. The Russian famine of 1921 led to the death of 5 million people. The floods in Mozambique between February and March 2000 led to the loss of 800 lives and affected the means of livelihood of over 100,000 farmers, it was estimated that it would take about 450 million US dollars to rebuild the damaged infrastructure and properties.[54] Between 1983 and 1985, more than 300,000 lives were lost to droughts in Ethiopia.

Humans have been making dynamic decisions based on natural observations and prior events throughout history. For instance, unusual animal behaviours before seismic activities have been used by the Romans to forecast earthquakes.[55] In 2004, the tsunami costs the lives of 230,000 people in 8 countries but the inhabitants of Simulue - an island in Indonesia - were able to escape the full wrath of the tsunami despite being located 85 kilometres from the epicentre of the disaster agent. They were saved by oral stories passed on from generation to generation about prior information to look out for before the advent of a tsunami - the sudden receding sea, the exposure of the corals and the unusual behaviour of animals provided a form of early warning system for the 80,000 inhabitants of the island.[56,57] They only lost two people to the tsunami despite their proximity to the disaster area. This is an example of how humans as decision-makers have been using prior information to aid present and future decisions.

The impacts of large-scale disasters are huge and immeasurably complex unlike all the other forms of crises, like terrorist attacks, aeroplane crashes, and derailments.

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[54] Ezebuiro, Peace (2015), 10 of the Worst Natural Disasters in African History. *Answers Africa*. Available at https://answersafrica.com/10-of-the-worst-natural-disasters-in-african-history.html [accessed December 30, 2017]

[55] R.W., (2014), Can animals predict earthquakes? *The Economist*. Available at https://www.economist.com/babbage/2014/02/15/can-animals-predict-earthquakes [accessed 11 August 2017].

[56]BBC News (2007), Saved by tsunami folklore. *BBC News*. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/6435979.stm [accessed 10 April 2017].

[57] Welthungerhilfe (2014), Simeulue: "Into the mountains if the earth trembles three times". *Welthungerhilfe*. Available at https://www.welthungerhilfe.org/news/latest-articles/into-the-mountains-if-the-earth-trembles-three-times/ [accessed 11 August 2017].

The multiplex nature of natural hazard related disasters requires more than a simplistic, reductionist, linear decision-making process compared with other forms of disasters. Several disaster management actors are involved in the decision process including prevention and mitigation. The context of large-scale crisis insecurities for a leader warrants decision-relevant information- since all information or data are contextual - with need-specific demands relative to the event at a given time. To this end, the estimation of risks and vulnerabilities for effective decisions is largely dependent upon the domain expertise of both the information providers and users – in this case - the leader(s).

In several cases, the information necessary for making decisions are straightforward; quite often, however, in a disaster scenario, decision-making processes could be random. The information might be hazy or partial thereby leading to situations where leaders must decide under risk or uncertainty. Climatic and natural hazard related disasters are typical examples of events that are very often unpredictable. The non-deterministic behaviour of these disasters is representable by mathematical models. Algorithms such as Markov Chain processes, Bayesian networks, neural networks models developed over the years have contributed significantly to simulating, modelling, and providing informed deep insights for crisis leaders. Nonetheless, there are notable social factors that the algorithms cannot capture that are of equal immense importance to crisis decision-making.

The significance of data to the crisis decision-making process is inexhaustive. It is almost a given that no effective decision can be made without information about alternatives. *Guesstimation* (estimated guesses) is a form of weighting probabilities of outcomes or alternatives; terms like chances of survival, the likelihood of loss; risk probabilities are common in dynamic decision-making contexts. Even heuristic, gut-feelings reliance is predicated upon a belief in the prior experience of the deciders (leaders). With the recent development in computing powers, certain decision-making models such as decision trees, classification models, have provided automated decision support systems to aid leaders in their decision-making roles.[58] In recent

[58] The superior computing power to quickly figure out complex problems when modelled after human thinking processes has helped to solve problems that could have taken humanity thousands of years. It has helped mapped the human genes; it has helped land a satellite on a comet and helped predict climatic changes to an appreciable level.

times, big data machine learning algorithms have helped alert people to the onset of floods and other climatic disasters.[59]

Big Data and Digital Technologies are two major concepts used throughout this thesis; it is important to provide some conceptual clarifications to avoid confusion. According to Oxford Dictionary, Big Data are extremely large data sets that may be analysed computationally to reveal patterns, trends, and associations, especially relating to human behaviour and interactions.[60] It is an emerging digital technology that is an innovation over the structured database system of the early years.[61]

Big Data is just as the name implies – huge data. Big Data have the following characteristics coined as the 10 Vs – volume, variety, veracity, velocity, validity, vulnerability, volatility, visualization, value, and variability.[62] This denotes the nature and characteristics of the sorts of data that are considered *'Big Data'*. Big Data is primarily about a large volume of data - it is seen in the 150,000 Facebook logins, the 347,222 tweets on Twitter, 20.8 million messages on WhatsApp, the 150 million emails sent every minute including other digital technologies platforms illustrated in the infographic in Figure 1.2 below. According to Victoria State Government, "Digital technologies are electronic tools, systems, devices, and resources that generate, store or process data. Well known examples include social media, online games, multimedia and mobile phones."[63] Social media technologies such as Twitter and Facebook, the internet of things (IoT), sensor devices are examples of digital technologies that generate big data.

[59] De Groeve, Tom, Zsofia Kugler, and G. Robert Brakenridge, (2006), Near Real Time Flood Alerting for the Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System. *Proceedings of ISCRAM2007,* pp. 33-39.
[60] Oxford Dictionary (2017), Big data | definition of big data by oxford dictionary. *Oxford Dictionary*. Available at https://www.lexico.com/definition/big_data [accessed 26 December 2017]
[61] Big Data encompasses both structured and unstructured data; a development which affords data analysts the opportunity to draw actionable insights from otherwise seemingly incoherent cacophony.
[62] Firican, George (2017), The 10 Vs of big data. *TDWI*. Available at https://tdwi.org/articles/2017/02/08/10-vs-of-big-data.aspx [accessed 26 December 2017]
[63] See Teach with digital technologies https://www.education.vic.gov.au/school/teachers/teachingresources/digital/Pages/teach.aspx



Figure 1.2: Infographic representation of Big Data and the Internet[64]

Big Data leverage machine learning and artificial intelligence to make sense of these huge data. In disaster leadership or crisis management, the dominant source of big data is social media technologies especially for natural hazard related disasters and disease outbreaks. As established in the literature review chapter, social media, short messaging systems (SMS), satellite images and weather maps help guide emergency managers, crisis, and disaster leaders in their security-leadership decision-making process. But, in line with findings from the systematic review.

Big Data are digital technologies although not all digital technologies have big data capabilities. Contrary to most assumptions that Big Data is mainly about positivistic quantifications; although the concept of itself fits that bias, this thesis reflects a rather clear departure from that assumption. The thesis is not another study of big data or big data analytics. It focuses more on the differentiation in security-

[64] Desjardins, Jeff (2016), What Happens in an Internet Minute in 2016? *Visual Capitalist*. Availabe from https://www.visualcapitalist.com/what-happens-internet-minute-2016/ [accessed 3 March 2018]

leadership decision-making outcomes by leaders in situations of large-scale insecurities involving big data and digital technologies.

1.5 The Scope of the Study: Global and Local Disaster Events

To address the key research questions, I consulted different disaster events that fit the focus of study – natural hazard related disasters and disease outbreaks whose security-leadership decision-making process involved the use of big data and digital technologies with varied outcomes. Country cases range from Europe, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Australia. I established the configuration of conditions that are necessary and sufficient for effective and ineffective outcomes using Tobit Regression, NCA, and fsQCA. Thereafter, I narrowed down on Nigeria with the two selected cases – the 2014 Ebola epidemic and the flood disasters in Lagos between 2012 and 2017.

I chose Nigeria for several reasons; chief of which is the fact that it is an African country and a leading digital access country on the continent. This allowed me to address the study gap surrounding the subject in Africa. Other reasons for deciding on the two local cases are discussed below.

1.6 The 2014 Ebola Epidemic in Lagos, Nigeria

Ebola is a deadly disease caused by a group of viruses within the genus *Ebolavirus; they are:*

- Ebola virus (species *Zaire ebolavirus*)
- Sudan virus (species *Sudan ebolavirus*)
- Taï Forest virus (species *Taï Forest ebolavirus*, formerly *Côte d'Ivoire ebolavirus*)
- Bundibugyo virus (species *Bundibugyo ebolavirus*)
- Reston virus (species *Reston ebolavirus*)
- Bombali virus (species *Bombali ebolavirus)*

Of these strains, only four can make people sick; they are Ebola, Sudan, Taï Forest, and the Bundibugyo viruses (CDC, 2019). The Ebola virus is contagious and highly deadly; it can be transmitted through direct contact and exchange of bodily fluids with

symptoms including internal haemorrhaging and organ damages (See Figure 3.13 below).

The Ebola historical maps in Figures. 3.13 and 3.14 present the disease outbreaks from 1976 to 2014 with legends depicting the infection cases and fatality rates. The 2014-2015 Ebola epidemic resulted in 28,652 infection cases and 11,325 deaths, and it is by far the most fatal to date. The severity of the outbreak; its epidemiology of the diseases as well as its non-discriminatory transnational spread elicited worldwide concerns.



Figure 1.3: The Ebola Virus[65]

[65] AFP News Agency [@AFP] (2014, August 1), *The deadly Ebola virus and where it comes from #infographic* [Tweet]. Available at https://twitter.com/AFP/status/495187235386314752/photo/1



Figure 1. 2: Ebola historical map [66]

Nigeria has been recognisedTRYDERG_6 for its handling and management of the Ebola crisis. The 170 million population was at risk when Patrick Sawyer brought the disease into the country in 2014.[67,68] The case management system implemented by the government together with the swift contact-tracing methods helped stem the

[66] The Island Journal (2014), How did the Ebola Outbreak Start? *The Island Journal*. Available at https://theislandjournal.com/2014/10/14/how-did-the-ebola-outbreak-start-it-likely-started-at-a-funeral-in-sierra-leone/ [accessed 16 October 2017]
[67] Neporent, Liz (2014), Valuable Ebola Lessons the US can learn from Nigeria. *ABC News*. Available at https://abcnews.go.com/Health/valuable-ebola-lessons-us-learn-nigeria/story?id=26323556 [accessed 10 June 2017]
[68] Izadi, E., (2014), What We can learn from Nigeria when it comes to containing Ebola. *The Independent*. Available from http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/ebola-what-europe-and-us-can-learn-from-nigeria-in-containing-the-virus-9780273.html [accessed 9 June 2017]

spread of the epidemic in a matter of weeks. The Lagos State government took the lead and adopted a community approach together with digital technologies in fighting the virus spread.[69] Religious leaders, security agents worked together with health workers in combating the virus spread.

Digital technologies such as short messaging systems (SMS) and social media platforms were used to educate people about the symptoms and nature of the virus thereby mitigating fears which could have led to the large-scale epidemic spread of the virus. These technologies complemented the more traditional TV, Radio, and Posters/Leaflets messaging. Hoax and pranks about saltwater curative solutions of the virus were debunked instantly through social media and other big data technologies.[70] Within days, 281 people who had initial contact with the zero patient were identified, control measures and a data-driven system of monitoring were put in place to monitor them. It must be noted that when Ebola made landfall in Nigeria, the country was poorly prepared; yet the virus was curtailed in a matter of weeks. The effectiveness of the leadership response was applauded around the world; the United States and countries of Europe were advised to learn from Nigeria.[71]

1.7 The 2012-2017 Flood Disasters in Lagos, Nigeria

The Lagos 2014 Ebola epidemic is an example of how big data and digital technologies led to effective security-leadership decision-making outcomes in a situation of large-scale insecurity. However, it must be noted that the same Lagos State government and the Nigeria Federal Government could not replicate the same in the various flood upsurges which claimed lives and destroyed properties in the country in 2012 and 2017. NigComSat-2 and NigComSat- X are Nigerian satellites with the capability for:

> demography, like mapping and planning of population survey, census enumeration areas, mapping, planning and monitoring of rural and urban growth and also give advance warnings of natural disasters like floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and storms.[72]

[69] (See Footnote 65).
[70] (See Footnote 66).
[71] Ibid.
[72] Akinboade, Laide (2011), How do NigComSat-2 and NigComSat-X benefit Nigeria? Vanguard News. Available at https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/08/how-do-nigcomsat-2-and-nigcomsat-x-benefit-nigeria/ [accessed 26 December 2017]

The satellites can also to 'manage oil pollutions, desertification, erosion, forest fire and deforestation'.[73,74] These satellite technologies beam images and data to their earth stations intermittently; they help the NEMA (National Emergency Management Authority and the National Space Research and Development Agency to forecast weather and to predict floods.

Before the 2017 nationwide flood disasters in Nigeria, there were predictions about large-scale floods across the country garnered from big data technologies from weather sensors and satellites. Both NEMA – the federal emergency management agency and LASEMA – the Lagos State emergency agency were aware of the impending flood disasters. By August 2016, the Lagos State Head of Operations and Logistics Mr Femi Giwa was reported to have touted the readiness of Lagos to 'tackle the looming disaster'; even the headlines read: 'Lagos is prepared for an impending flood.' When asked about the impending flood disaster, Giwa responded:

> Right from the onset, we had always stepped up our emergency preparedness and response, and in view of the advice from the office of the security adviser to the president concerning the high level of flood that will occur in some states which includes Lagos, we have stepped up high level of preparedness at our two relief camps; the relief and emergency camp at Agbowa within the Lagos East senatorial district and the one at Igando, Lagos West Senatorial.[75]

When the floods came in 2017, many houses were destroyed, and both NEMA and LASEMA had their noses bloodied. 20 people lost their lives in Lagos alone. The popular victims of floods in Nigeria are those living in shanty towns and slums, but July 2017 floods affected high-net-worth areas of Lekki in Lagos. The inhabitants of these expensive neighbourhoods were displaced from their homes – an experience that those in the unplanned slums have grown accustomed to. Although residents of the mainland would later experience the deluge, the impacts were felt across socioeconomic strata unlike in the past when only the poor bore much of the impacts.

From the above scenarios, questions are calling for answers. Why would leadership outcome effectiveness vary in different crisis situations that engaged big data and digital technologies in their decision-making? The Lagos State government

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[73] Akinboade (2011)

[74] The Nigerian Sat 1 is touted as the country's contribution to the international Disaster Monitoring Constellation (DMC) project. It was developed as an earth observation satellites with the potential for aiding world-wide humanitarian aid efforts.

[75] Vanguard News (2016), Lagos is Prepared for Impending Flood- LASEMA Operations Boss. *Vanguard News*. Available at https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/08/lagos-is-prepared-for-impending-flood-lasema-operations-boss/ [accessed 26 December 2017]

and Nigeria's Federal government who responded effectively to Ebola could not replicate the same outcome measures during flood disasters despite the warnings gotten from large-scale big data technologies. In the flood events, decision-makers had months of early warning pre-disaster big data; yet, the damages caused by the floods could not be mitigated. The same agencies (LASEMA and NEMA) whose responsiveness during the Ebola outbreak garnered international accolades have received knocks for their handling of the recurrent flood disasters.

According to the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment carried out by NEMA with the support of the World Bank, and other development partners revealed that Nigeria lost ₦2.6 trillion (US$6.8 billion) to the 2012 flood. The report shows that: "estimated total value of infrastructure, physical and durable assets destroyed by the disaster at N1.5 trillion (US$9.6 billion) while the total value of losses across all sectors of economic activity was estimated at N1.1 trillion (US$7.3 billion)."[76]

Aside from infrastructural damage, about 363 people were lost to the flood.[77] Nigeria has experienced other losses since the 2012 disaster. According to the United Nations "The Human Cost of Weather-Related Disasters" Report:

> over the last 20 years and finds that 90% of major disasters have been a result of weather-related events, such as floods, storms, heatwaves, and droughts. In fact, during that time as many as 6,457 weather related disasters occurred.[78]

This seems to justify why most of the studies about big data and disasters as revealed from the review of literature are weather-related and topped by a flood. A study by Nkwunonwo *et. al* finds that:

> over the period 1985 to 2014, flooding in Nigeria has affected more than 11 million lives with a total of 1100 deaths and property damage exceeding US$17 billion. Lagos state has experienced most of the floods while more frequent floods are recorded in Niger, Adamawa, Oyo, Kano and Jigawa

[76] Premium Times (2013), Nigeria lost N2.6 trillion to 2012 floods. *Premium Times*. Available at https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/136208-nigeria-lost-n2-6-trillion-to-2012-floods.html/ [accessed 16 October 2017]
[77] Scan News (2013), 363 people, N2.6 trillion lost to flood last year. *Scan News Nigeria*. Available at http://scannewsnigeria.com/news/363-people-n2-6-trillion-lost-to-flood-last-year/ [accessed 26 December 2017]
[78] Davies, Richard (2016), UN – 1995 to 2015, Flood Disasters affected 2.3 Billion and Killed 157,000. *Floodlist*. Available at http://floodlist.com/dealing-with-floods/flood-disaster-figures-1995-2015/ [accessed 14 February 2018]

states possibly due to the influence of rivers Niger, Benue, Ogun and Hadeja.[79]

Despite all the big data technologies, early warnings systems, the leadership decision-making process in 2017 failed expectations. These disparities in disaster response involving big data digital technologies warrant researching. The two cases (the 2014 Ebola disease and the Flood disasters in Lagos between 2012 and 2017) help to understand these complexities in outcome effectiveness and ineffectiveness.

Using Power-Influence Matric and Q-Methodology (See Chapter 6), participants were drawn from government agencies civil society organisations, media, security, academics for a more localised investigation of the thesis questions. The theoretical model developed from the global cases is placed side-by-side with the local studies for deeper insights.

1.8 Summary of Initial Observations

Before commencing the research, it is important to provide a summary of initial observations of the objectives of interest – variations in outcome effectiveness in disaster situations involving the use of big data and digital technologies by security leaders. In the 2014 Ebola case, LASEMA and NEMA collaborated with different local organisations, media, and international actors to combat the epidemic outbreak. There was little or no interagency rivalry. This suggests a form of devolved leadership often involving dialogue or multilogue rather than monologue – the usual pattern of top-down leadership favoured by governments.

In the 2012 and 2017 flood disasters, there were little or no interagency interaction; non-governmental actors- local and foreign were not engaged. In addition, there was an almost complete absence of networked engagements between the media, and civil society. Also, a preliminary observation suggests socioeconomic class differences in the leadership responsiveness to the two crises. In the Ebola case, the fact that Patrick Sawyer came in through the nation's airport meant that everyone was a potential victim, and air travel is synonymous with the elite. Hence, the prompt leadership response from the decision-makers: Ebola is non-discriminatory, Flood is. The usual victims of flood disasters are the poor.

[79] Nkwunonwo, U., W. Malcolm, and B. Brian., (2015), Flooding and flood risk reduction in Nigeria: Cardinal gaps. *Journal of Geography & Natural Disasters* 5(1), pp. 136-148.

Initial observations seem to lend credence to the opinion that social economic differences motivated the differences in leadership response to the two cases. This position appears strong especially when a similar observation could be made in the September 2013 Westgate mall attack by al-Shabaab in Nairobi. The attack gained global attention only because - as some assumed - it affected a place frequented by the elites. Before the attack, al-Shabaab had killed several people in the suburbs without the same media coverage as the Westgate attack.

This observation is challenged by the fact that Nigeria weather and emergency agencies have regularly issued warnings and flood advisories; yet, flood disasters always occur. The 2017 flood disasters in Lagos Nigeria did not spare the rich neighbourhoods. Therefore, it would be overly simplistic to adduce the non-responsiveness or ineffectiveness of the emergency managers as security leaders to elitism. This thesis aimed to address factors responsible for these differentials in outcome effectiveness. For ease of operationalisation, the terms large-scale insecurities, crisis situations, disaster events, and emergencies are used interchangeably throughout the thesis.

1.9 Structure of the Thesis

Chapter One (this present chapter) provides a background introduction to the thesis. It justifies the need to research the roles of big data and digital technologies on differences in outcomes of security-leadership decision-making in situations of crisis and large-scale insecurities. This chapter also includes sections on the research objectives and research questions and justifications of the study. There are also sections on the choice of case samples – The 2014 Ebola and the flood disasters in Lagos, Nigeria between 2012 and 2017 alongside an exposition of a summary of the multi-methodological approaches. The structure of the thesis outlining the thesis chapters and a summary of the thesis findings are contained in this chapter.

Chapter Two includes a systematic review of relevant literature. This chapter is divided into different sections. The first section contains the review methodology, with emphasis on the search strategy: keywords and search terms; inclusion and exclusion criteria. The next section discusses the quality assessments of the selected literature, the sensitivity and precision measures of the search databases. The third section presents the general findings from the examined literature. The other sections include

the discussions of the thematic categories, the key gaps, and limitations of the existing literature and the systematic review.

Chapter Three discusses the epistemic paradigm, the conceptual mapping and the conceptual framework that undergirds the study. It is divided into several sections. The first section is about the explanation of the research paradigm of the thesis as derived from the studies of the literature. The second section discusses big data epistemology and its knowledge-making processes; the challenges of the perceived observation vs active experimentation debate is also addressed in this section. The third section outlines the process of constructing semantic and discourse networks using the RQDA, igraph and tidyverse packages in R. The identified concepts such as *Social media*, *Twitter, Government agency*, *Disaster response*, *Disaster and Emergency Management*, *Crisis Communication, Big Data*, etc. are presented using network layouts such as Fruchterman-Reingold in different tiers of first- and second-level concepts.

The interconnectedness between these concepts are their tiers are also clearly presented in the section. The last section examines the various theoretical and conceptual frameworks and models prevalent in the study of crisis leadership and disaster management as revealed in the literature review. It also concentrates on the interrelationships between the concepts (as variables) for the theories. It knits together all the concepts in a conceptual framework in preparation for the development of the theory of change in the next chapter.

Chapter Four comprehensively discusses the fsQCA (Fuzzy-set QCA) method and a subset of the broader QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis) set-theoretical methodological framework which I consider appropriate for addressing the objectives of this thesis. It discusses the suitability of this method/methodology for small-, medium- and large-N cases. The first section makes these clarifications. The next section expounded on causal-comparative reasoning and J. S. Mill's methods of logical enquiry. The next section discusses the differences between QCA vs variable-oriented vs case-oriented research approaches. This ties with a discussion of the distinction between *equifinality* and *multifinality*. The section after that explains the set-theoretic framework and set relations; it includes the variations of this framework – csQCA and msQCA and adduces reasons for the preference of fsQCA over these other variants. The next section contains a formulation of the Theory of Change (ToC) from the conceptual framework in the previous chapter as a tool for operationalising the

fsQCA condition and outcome sets. While developing the ToC, I implement a series of natural language processing textual analytics techniques for drawing insights from big data social media (Twitter) datasets. This supports the development of the theory of change. There are also sections on fsQCA hypothesis and reframing of the research questions, calibrations of the outcome and conditions with their set-membership values (SMV).

Chapter Five contains configurational narratives and causal pathways for understanding variations in the outcome of disaster or crisis security-leadership decision-making involving the use of big data and digital technologies. It delves into several cases from around the world with different outcomes to illustrate and propound different hypotheses linked to these differential outcome behaviours. The first section contains the Tobit regression analysis of the cases. This method is appropriate for examining censored or truncated datasets like the fsQCA data with set membership values ranging between 1 (Upper) and 0 (Lower). The next section contains the Analysis of Necessity using first, the necessary condition analysis (NCA) and the fsQCA analysis of necessity to establish those conditions without which there cannot be any outcome. The exercises in this section help generate the hypotheses in the next section. The section after that contains a summary of the findings of the NCA scatterplots using the CE-FDH ceiling lines. NCA helps pinpoints the necessary condition(s) in-degree while the fsQCA analysis of necessity establishes the necessary condition(s) in-kind. This section also includes the fsQCA XY Scatterplots of Super-subset Analyses of Disjunctions of Necessity. The next sections contain the analyses of sufficiency - the combination of conditions that are sufficient for the outcome. Also included are: the logical minimisation procedures, the intermediate solution(s); the XY Plot of the relations of sufficiency alongside the negation of intervention of the theoretical evaluation, and the decision tree model.

Chapter Six narrows down to the two cases – the Ebola and the Lagos Floods using the tools of Q-Methodology. It tests the proposed theoretical models derived from the fsQCA methods in the previous chapter. The first section of this chapter introduces and justifies the reasons for the adoption of this approach to the two cases. The next section introduces Q-Methodology. The succeeding section after that discusses the process involved in the collection and definition of statements (the concourse). The next section is about the selection of the Q-set/Q-Sample. There is also a section on the selection of participants for the two cases/studies through

stakeholders' analysis or power-interest grid (P-Set). The next exercise is the Q-Sort for arranging statements by the participants. The remaining sections include the Q-Analysis (factor analysis, factor rotation etc.) and the interpretations of the factors (Q-Results)

Chapter Seven contains the summary and conclusion of the thesis. It highlights the various themes from the findings and relates them with the objectives and questions of the research. Other sections in the chapter cover the strengths, limitations, and weaknesses of the research thesis as well as the gaps for future researchers of the subject.

CHAPTER 2

Systematic Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter interrogates relevant literature, carefully selected through a systematic review process to examine emerging themes, categories and extant work which address the main overarching question of this thesis, which is: why do big data and digital technologies produce variations in security leadership decision-making outcomes in situations of large-scale insecurities? This review showcases the position of existing literature on the question. It also identifies possible gaps that have not been previously addressed. Findings from selected literature helps to understand how these gaps have been filled or not.

This chapter has different sections. The first section contains the review methodology, with emphasis on the search strategy: keywords and search terms; inclusion and exclusion criteria. The next section discusses the quality assessments of the selected literature, the sensitivity and precision measures of the search databases. The third section presents the general findings from the examined literature. The other sections include the discussions of the thematic categories, the key gaps, and limitations of the existing literature and the systematic review.

2.2 Systematic Review: Definitions and Operational Procedures

The Systematic review of literature is part of the evidence movement with the larger field of literature reviews; it is an innovative research trend favoured by the medical and the natural sciences. But it is now gaining relative ascendancy in the social sciences because of its methodological approaches which provide more rigorous frameworks than the narrative or traditional literature review.[80] The traditional literature review or the narrative approach has some challenges that are intrinsic to its

[80] Grant, M. J., & Booth, A., (2009), A Typology of Reviews: An Analysis of 14 Review Types and Associated Methodologies. *Health Information & Libraries Journal* 26(2), pp. 91-108. Doi:10.1111/j.1471-1842.2009.00848.x

epistemology. Specificity and sensitivity challenges are rarely ever considered in literature selection as the researcher is often restricted by several preconceived assumptions which lend themselves to several biases. The search strategy used in arriving at the literature collections is usually not stated; hence, limiting the reproducibility of the review. There are quite often no stated selection criteria - literature is selected from a random keyword search in specific databases or search engines. In some cases, reviewers have predetermined literature that supports their preconceived hypotheses. This behaviour greatly skews the conclusions as reviews are reduced to the subjective views of the reviewer. This subjectivity affects the quality of the research because conclusions are drawn from a 'non-representative sample.'[81] Briner and Denyer posit that most (traditional) literature reviews are short summaries at the beginning of empirical journal articles whose aim is:

> to build an argument, they involve some cherry picking: published research that supports the rationale for the study is included but research that does not is omitted'; in addition, they 'rarely tell the reader how the review was conducted or how the authors arrived at their conclusions.[82]

Some reviewers depend on 'standard texts' or dominant grand literature in their specific fields. They also have established contextual frameworks which are considered *standard practice* in the field by the domain experts - literature with higher citation and seminal works are given specific attention. All these practices lead to publication and selection biases. The traditional review has its strength as it allows for in-depth discussions. While this review is a systematic review, elements of the narrative review shall be included in the review to further strengthen the framework.

A systematic review is not a replacement for traditional narrative literature review, it however addresses some of the gaps and challenges outlined above. This chapter adopts this review method because of its strengths. This review focuses more on peer-reviewed works; that notwithstanding, it has not precluded the use of books, dissertations, grey literature, periodicals, conference proceedings from the broader analysis.

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[81] Petticrew, M., & Roberts, H., (2006), *Systematic reviews in the Social Sciences: A Practical Guide*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
[82] Briner, R. B., & Denyer, D., (2012), Systematic Review and Evidence Synthesis as a Practice and Scholarship Tool. In Denise M. Rousseau (ed) *Handbook of Evidence-Based Management: Companies, Classrooms and Research, pp. 112–129*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2.2.1 Review Guidelines and Methods

Several guides are available for the conduct of a systematic literature review. However, in line with the King's College recommended guide for Systematic Review (SR), an adaptation of the Campbell protocol was adopted because the Cochrane Collaboration protocol is more appropriate for the medical sciences and quantitative random control trial studies.[83] The frameworks and guides for this review are derived from the guidelines developed by the Evidence for Policy and Practice Information and Co-ordinating Centre (EPPI-Centre). EPPI-Centre incorporates both the Cochrane and Campbell Collaboration protocols per what is termed the 'evidence movement.'[84] It encapsulates the rigour, transparency, replicability utility values of the review approach. According to Butler *et al.:*

> *d*eveloping the protocol before undertaking the review ensures that all methodological decisions, from identifying search terms to data extraction and synthesis processes, are carefully considered and justified, enhancing the integrity and trustworthiness of the results.[85] (Butler, Hall, & Copnell, 2016).

The protocols dictate the step-by-step procedures followed by the systematic reviews worth its systematic name. These range from the search query and objectives formulations; inclusion and exclusion criteria; literature search through stipulated databases; appraisal of selected studies etc. I have taken care to document my review in line with the protocols.

2.2.2 Literature Search Question and Objective Formulation

The first step in a Systematic review is the definition of the review question. This question sets a clear boundary on what the review is or is not about. It directs the search strategy, inclusion criteria and data extraction.[86] This question helps to prevent

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[83] Systematic Review Support (2017), Review Writing. *Systematic Review Support*. Available at https://www.kcl.ac.uk/library/nhs/systrev-support/writing.aspx [accessed 19 June 2017]
[84] Daigneault, P., Jacob, S., & Ouimet, M., (2014), Using Systematic Review Methods within a Ph.D. Dissertation in Political Science: Challenges and Lessons Learned from Practice. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 17(3), pp. 267-283. Doi:10.1080/13645579.2012.730704
[85] Butler, A., Hall, H., & Copnell, B., (2016), A Guide to Writing a Qualitative Systematic Review Protocol to enhance Evidence-Based Practice in Nursing and Health Care. *Worldviews on Evidence-Based Nursing*, 13(3), pp. 241-249. Doi:10.1111/wvn.12134
[86]

overreaching the objective(s) of the review and to provide further insights into the main question.

To this end, there are several frameworks used in question formulations in systematic reviews; they include: the Population, Intervention, Comparison, Outcome (PICO) developed for quantitative review questions; the Population, Exposure, Outcomes (PEO); the Sample, Phenomena of Interest, Design, Evaluation, Research type (SPIDER); and the Setting, Perspective, Intervention, Comparison, Evaluation (SPICE) designed for qualitative studies.[87] Several developments, policy and international relations studies have adapted the PICO frameworks therefore it is safe to affirm that this method is popular in the social sciences.[88]

Jessica Hagen-Zanker and Richard Mallett stipulate a qualitative-friendly adaptation of the PICO framework (see Table 2.1 below).[89] Table 2.2 presents the modification of the framework substituting intervention with interest and comparison with context thereby making it more qualitative-friendly. The result is Population, Interest, Context (PICo) or Population, Context, Outcome (PCO) depending on the objective of the review.[90] Tables 2.1 and 2.2 contain a reconstruction of the review question using both the PICO and the PCO framework. This reformulates the question thus: To what extent do Big Data and Digital Technologies (I) influence Security Leaders' (P) Decision-making process (O) in the Context of large-scale insecurities (C)? As noted earlier, the context of insecurity is restricted to flood disasters and disease outbreaks (e.g., Ebola).

Bettany-Saltikov, Josette (2012), *How to do a Systematic Literature Review in Nursing: A Step-by-Step Guide. London*: Open University Press.

[87] Butler et al., (2016)

[88] Waddington, H., White, H., Snilstveit, B., Hombrados, J. G., Vojtkova, M., Davies, P., Ami Bhavsar, John Eyers, Tracey Perez Koehlmoos, Mark Petticrew, Jeffrey C. Valentine & Peter Tugwell (2012), How to Do A Good Systematic Review of Effects in International Development: A Tool Kit. *Journal of Development Effectiveness* 4(3), pp. 359-387. DOI:10.1080/19439342.2012.711765

[89] Hagen-Zanker, Jessica and Mallett, Richard (2013), How to do a Rigorous, Evidence-Focused Literature Review in International Development: A Guidance Note. London: ODI

[90] Riesenberg, L. A., & Justice, E. M., (2014), Conducting a Successful Systematic Review of the Literature, part 1. *Nursing* 44(4), pp. 13-17. DOI: 10.1097/01.NURSE.0000444728.68018.ac

Table 2.1: PICO Question Framework[91]

Population	Who are we looking at? One particular subgroup within a given population?	Security Leader(ship) in the context of large scale insecurities (flood and disease outbreak)
Intervention	Are we looking at the impact of a particular kind of programme/event/change that took place (e.g. the involvement of women in a peace-building process)?	Big Data and Digital Technologies
Comparison	What comparison group (if any) are we using to compare the outcomes of the intervention? Comparison groups can be constructed on the basis of different social groups, different geographical contexts, different time periods, and so on (e.g. in conflict-affected vs. stable settings)	Ebola vs. Flood
Outcome	Specify which outcome or set of outcomes we are interested in as a result of the intervention (e.g. impact on poverty).	Impact on Decision-making

Table 2.2: Modified PICO (PCO) [92]

Population	Security Leaders
Context	Context of large scale insecurities (e.g. flood and disease outbreak)
Outcome	(Big Data) Impact on Decision-making

I use the SPIDER (Sample, Phenomenon of Interest, Design, Evaluation, Research type) framework to formulate the search query terms. These query terms serve as a filter mechanism for the database of scholarly articles such as Web of Science, SCOPUS, Google Scholar etc. It helps to narrow the search to cover the terms of interest to the review. Table 2.3 and Section 2.2.3 show the search framework and strategy. As discussed in chapter 1, I use crisis and security interchangeably because they both implied the same concepts nearly all the time in the literature. Crisis draws out more relevant articles than security because the term security is broader hence triggering a lot of irrelevant results such as stock securities, uniformed services issues etc. Hence, I use crisis more in the search strategy as shown in Table 2.3 below.

[91] Ibid
[92] (Butler et al., 2016)

Table 2.3: SPIDER Framework

SPIDER Tool	Search Terms
S -Sample	"security leader*" OR "crisis manage*" OR "humanitarian actor"
P of I: Phenomenon of Interest	"big data" AND "crisis decision making" OR "digital technolog*" AND "crisis security decision making" OR "social media" AND "crisis support system"
D- Design	"case stud*" OR "focus group*" OR "survey*" OR "interview*" OR "observ*" OR "questionnaire*"
E- Evaluation	"impact" OR "effect" OR "influence"
R- Research Design	"qualitative" OR "quantitative" OR "mixed method*"

2.2.3 Search Strategy: Keywords and Search Terms

After formulating the question, the PICo framework was used to select search terms and keywords which helped in the literature search process across selected different relevant databases. A search strategy is necessary to provide step-by-step, often replicable procedures followed in the selection of the relevant literature. Search terms were generated from the title using the preceding PICo framework and through the adaptation of the SPIDER model discussed in Section 2.2.2 above; see Table 2.4 for the terms and their synonyms. Some studies may use a specific word e.g., 'leader', while others may use 'manager' for the same term; hence the need to reflect this variation in the search keywords.

To avert publication bias, grey literature was included because some relevant research studies are not published in standard journals and they may not be captured by the popular databases. Since this review is aimed at a comprehensive approach, I have taken care to include grey literature. To this end, popular search portals and grey databases such as Google Scholar, Open Grey, and Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) of the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters – CRED were scanned during a pilot exercise. In the end, Google Scholar was chosen as the grey search portal to be included in the search strategy because of its ubiquitous network.

This review however privileges peer-reviewed academic literature because of the quality of its assessment process. King's College London Library Guideline was consulted in the selection of the relevant databases for the study area. Domain experts and Scholars (both local and international) who have worked in the study area including my thesis supervisor were consulted for specific guidance in the relevant aspects of the study.

Table 2.4: Keywords and Search Terms

Population	Context- large scale insecurities	Intervention-Context-Big Data	Outcome
Leader*	Large scale insecrit*	Big Data	Decision-making process
Crisis Leader*	Natural Disaster	Digital Technolog*	Leadership Response
Disaster Manage*	Crisis Situation	Crisis Decision Support System	
Administrat*	Flood	Social media	
Emergency Managers	Disease Outbreak	Emergency management information systems	
	Emergenc*	ICT	
		Emergent Technolog*	

Note: Asterisk * is used to indicate truncating

2.2.4 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

Using Google Trends and Scopus Analytics Tools, I did a trend and timeline analysis of the keyword "Big Data" and "Disaster" (See Figures 2 and 3) to identify the publication trends of these subjects over the years. From the analysis, I was able to establish the trend of the development of the studies on my principal subjects of interest – big data and disaster. Therefore, I restricted my literature search to works published in English between January 1, 2009, and October 31, 2017, using the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) guide. I chose 2017 as my termination point because that was the year of my doctoral upgrade. I have since added more literature outside the scope of this timeline.



Figure 2.1: Google Trend Analysis of 'Big Data'

Year	Documents
2016	119
2015	76
2014	40
2013	19
2012	6
2011	0
2010	0
2009	1



Figure 2.2: Scopus Search Result: Title-ABS-KEY ("Big Data" AND disaster)*

The details of the inclusion and exclusion criteria used in sifting through the thousands of literature results pull using the search queries are listed in Table 2.5 below (see Appendix 6 for more expansive details). These queries (in the Appendix) are Boolean operators used to filter relevant articles from each database. The search operators are unique to their attributed databases. Without these Boolean operators, I would have had to scour through hundreds of thousands of mismatched articles to be able to pull out the selected articles. Even then, I, like many hapless scholars would probably have had to make do with the first sets of articles thrown up by the database search algorithms.

The selected databases SCOPUS, Science Direct, PsycINFO and others (see Table 2.6 for more details) have basic and advanced querying parameters for extracting documents. For Scopus, there are Title, Abstract and Keywords (TITLE-ABS-KEY) parameters which include the use of the conjunction AND (for joining two terms) or NOT (for excluding terms), and OR (for returning alternative terms).

Table 2.5: Inclusion and Exclusion criteria

	Inclusion criteria	Exclusion criteria
Geographical Location	Studies indicating specific geographical location, country or region	Studies without geographical location
Language	English	Non-English
Title	Include any of the search terms	Does not include any of the search terms
Publication Date	2009-2017	Pre-2009
Publication Format	Peer-Reviewed journal articles, reviews, multidisciplinary articles in social science, management, environmental, big data, social computing fields	Non-peer reviewed Books/Book Chapters, Conference proceedings, and other non-peer-reviewed journal articles
Aim of Study	Articles focusing on the impact, relationship or role of Big Data, Social Media and or Digital Technologies on Security Leadership, Crisis Management or Humanitarian Administrators' decision making in the context of crisis situations or natural disasters	Articles not focusing on the role of Big Data, Social Media or Digital technologies on Security Leadership decision making in the context of natural disasters. Articles which explores non-human subjects (e.g. financial crisis, riots and protests) were also excluded
Study Design and Methodology	Primary research including experimental, quasi experimental (Quantitative OR Qualitative Research), Case Studies OR Systematic Reviews	Theoretical, Secondary Literature Review or Articles lacking in clear explanation of Methodology

After careful consultations with domain experts, King's College Library Database Guides, and my thesis supervisor, the databases in Table 2.6 were selected for the literature search. The systematic Review method demands a justification for every step and procedure taken in the review process; hence, for this review, the choice of each database is included in the background information for each database as presented in the Sensitivity and Precision section.

2.2.5 Results of Search Strategy

After implementing the search strategy discussed above, 7510 articles were retrieved from 6 selected databases (See the PRISMA Flowchart in Figure 2.4 for the step-by-step procedures). Twenty-four (24) duplicates were removed, reducing the articles to 7486 whose titles and abstracts were further screened by me. I downloaded a total of 202 full papers (articles), and I assessed them for eligibility using the inclusion and exclusion criteria tool in Table 2.5. I compared my notes with those of an assistant that

I trained using the same strategy. This assistant is a domain expert, who was trained by me in the stated Systematic Review procedures.

The inclusion and exclusion exercises by the two sorters (myself and the assistant) were done to avoid confirmation bias by me and, also to prevent omission of relevant articles. The two raters (myself and the assistant) used nominal dichotomous yes/no ratings (Yes for Include, No for Exclude). The two ratings were then evaluated for inter-rater reliability using the Krippendorff alpha statistical test to know the extent of concord and variability in their independent ratings.[93] After running the test, the results show that the inter-coder reliability was relatively low (α = 0. 5028 as the coefficient for preferred (inter-rater) reliability (IRR) should be > 0.7).

The low IRR was however traceable to the disagreement in the operational constructs for the terms 'Big Data' and 'Natural hazard related disasters' between the two raters, as they were initially interpreting the phenomenon differently. After this issue was resolved, we engaged a different tool to assess the IRR. Articles with true positive and true negative (i.e., where both raters ticked Yes or No were automatically included). But where there were false positives and false negatives (i.e., where one rater selected Yes and the other ticked No), such articles were excluded. We met to harmonise our decisions using the same screening tool. This exercise helped to resolve the low k-alpha disagreement. By the end of the exercise, 42 articles were selected for meta-synthesis. These articles were retrieved from the following databases: Google Scholar (3), ProQuest Social Science Premium (1), PsycINFO (2), Science Direct (9), Scopus (25) and Web of Science (2). The numbers in the parenthesis are the articles count for each of the databases.

[93] Hayes, A. F., & Krippendorff, K., (2007), Answering the call for a Standard Reliability Measure for Coding Data. *Communication Methods and Measures*, 1(1), pp. 77-89.



Figure 2. 1: PRISMA flowchart of the search process[94]

2.3 Quality Assessment

2.3.1 Sensitivity and Precision of Databases

A significant challenge of every literature review is how to ensure that relevant articles are retrieved from the searched database. Sensitivity and Precision are examples of measures developed to mitigate this challenge. Sensitivity is also known as recall, true

[94] Moher, D., Liberati, A., Tetzlaff, J., Altman, D. G., & Group, T. P., (2009), Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: The PRISMA Statement. *PLOS Medicine*, 6(7), p. e1000097. DOI: doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000097

positive rate, or the probability of detection. It is the statistical measure that shows 'the ability of a database to retrieve as many as possible of the published relevant articles' on the topic of interest.[95] In document retrieval binary classification, sensitivity measures the proportion of true positives that are correctly identified. It is a computational algorithm that helps to correctly identify relevant articles.

Table 2.6: The selected databases [96,97,98,99,100,101]

Database	Background
Google Scholar	Google Scholar provides a simple way to access "peer-reviewed papers, theses, books, abstracts, and articles from academic publishers' sites, professional societies, preprint repositories, universities and other scholarly organizations."
ProQuest Social Science Premium Collection	The ProQuest Social Science Premium Collection provides abstracts, indexing, and full-text coverage of journal articles, books, dissertations, and more, including over 2,400 full-text titles. The collection includes: Sociology Database, Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts, Sociological Abstracts, Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, Political Science Database, PolicyFile, Criminal Justice Database, Social Science Database, International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, etc.
PsycINFO	PsycINFO contains about 4 million records of peer-reviewed literature in the field of psychology, behavioural and social sciences. It Shortens the amount of time spent searching by easily identifying by document types, such as journal articles, book chapters, book reviews, and editorials; specific research methodologies, such as clinical case reports, empirical studies and literature reviews; documents that have tests or assessment instruments appended; research from a specific grant or funding source.
Science Direct	Science Direct indexes articles from over 3,800 journals and more than 37,000 book titles. It provides access to peer-reviewed and open-access journals.
Scopus	Scopus is the largest abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature, featuring smart tools to track, analyse and visualize research. It contains over 22,800 titles from more than 5,000 international publishers. It covers several fields including social science, science, technology, medicine and the humanities.
Web of Science	The Web of Science platform contains regional citation indexes, patent data, specialized subject indexes, and an index of research data sets, all in all totalling over 33,000 journals.

The sensitivity of the database is measured by dividing the number of retrieved articles by the total number of known relevant studies on the topic of interest as

[95] McFadden, P., Taylor, B. J., Campbell, A., & McQuilkin, J., (2012), Systematically identifying relevant research: Case Study on Child Protection Social Workers' Resilience. *Research on Social Work Practice 22*(6), 626-636. DOI:10.1177/1049731512453209
[96] Shultz, M., (2007), Comparing Test Searches in PubMed and Google Scholar. *Journal of the Medical Library Association: JMLA 95*(4), pp. 442-445. DOI:10.3163/1536-5050.95.4.442
[97] ProQuest (2017), *ProQuest - Social Science Premium Collection*. Available at https://about.proquest.com/products-services/ProQuest-Social-Sciences-Premium-Collection.html [accessed 23 November 2017]
[98] PsycINFO (2017), *APA PsycInfo - APA Publishing*. Available at https://www.apa.org/pubs/databases/psycinfo/ [accessed 23 November 2017]
[99] ScienceDirect (2017), *ScienceDirect*. Available at https://www.sciencedirect.com [accessed 24 November 2017]
[100] Elsevier (2016), *Scopus Content Coverage Guide*. Amsterdam: Elsevier BV.
[101] Clarivate (2017), *Web of science*. Available at https://clarivate.com/webofsciencegroup/solutions/web-of-science/ [accessed 23 November 2017]

returned by the database.[102] The operational interpretation of the term 'known relevant studies' for this study is the sum of the retrieved relevant articles across the six databases listed in Table 2.6 above. The sensitivity of a database is important but despite the adoption of the inclusion and exclusion criteria outlined in the search strategy, there is the possibility of retrieving too many irrelevant articles together with relevant articles.

It is therefore important to also measure the precision of each database; this is the proportion of relevant articles retrieved during the search exercise. I measured precision by dividing the number of retrieved relevant articles by the total number of articles retrieved by the search database.[103] Hannah Wood and Mick Abber observe that 'increasing the sensitivity of a search increases the possibility of identifying all relevant studies, but also tends to reduce precision because the number of irrelevant results is increased.'[104] This is possible because of the inverse relationship between sensitivity and precision: the higher the sensitivity, the lower the precision.[105]

A further measure of precision was used to assess the quality of the databases - the Number Needed to Read (NNR) measure. NNR helps to identify the number of papers that must be read to find one paper for inclusion.[106] The lower the NNR, the higher the quality of the searched database. NNR is calculated by dividing the total number of returned hits on each database by the total number of included studies in each of the databases.[107] The database NNR scores are Web of Science (3), Scopus (5) and Science Direct (82) respectively.[108]

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[102] Taylor, B., Wylie, E., Dempster, M., & Donnelly, M., (2007), Systematically retrieving research: A case study evaluating seven databases. *Research on Social Work Practice 17*(6), pp. 697-706. DOI: 10.1177/1049731507304402

[103] Best, P., Taylor, B., Manktelow, R., & McQuilkin, J., (2014), Systematically Retrieving Research in the Digital Age: Case Study on the Topic of Social Networking Sites and Young People's Mental Health. *Journal of Information Science 40*(3), pp. 346-356. DOI:10.1177/0165551514521936

[104]Wood, H., & Arber, M., (2017), *Search Strategy Development*. Available at http://vortal.htai.org/?q=book/export/html/790 [accessed 24 November 2017]

[105] The filtering systems implemented in the search strategy through the Boolean operators and other advanced search protocols also helped in reducing some of the challenges associated with retrieving relevant articles in an online database, thereby ensuring adequate sensitivity and appreciable measure of precision.

[106] Terwee, C. B., Jansma, E. P., Riphagen, I. I., & de Vet, Henrica C. W., (2009), Development of a Methodological PubMed Search Filter for finding Studies on Measurement Properties of Measurement Instruments. *Quality of Life Research 18*(8), pp. 1115-1123. DOI:10.1007/s11136-009-9528-5

[107] Golder, S., Mason, A., & Spilsbury, K., (2008), Systematic Searches for the Effectiveness of Respite Care. *Journal of The Medical Library Association: JMLA 96*(2), pp. 147-152. DOI:10.3163/1536-5050.96.2.147

[108] The NNR score of the databases are in parenthesis. What these scores mean is that the researcher would need to read average of 5 articles on Scopus to hit the relevant articles as against reading 340

Unique relevant hits are final relevant papers extracted from only one database. They are unique to only one database, while others might have been found across different databases.

$$Number\ Needed\ to\ Read\ (NNR) = \frac{IR}{IRI}$$

Table 2.7: Number Needed to Read (NNR) and Unique Relevant Hits

Database	Items retrieved (IR)	Included relevant items (IRI)	NNR	Unique relevant hits (URH)
Google Scholar	3060	45	68	0
ProQuest Social Science Premium Collection	1022	3	340	1*
PsycINFO	2156	26	119	0
Science Direct	848	43	82	0
Scopus	392	76	5	0
Web of Science	32	9	3	1*
Total	7510	**202***		

Note: Number asterisked (*) include total number of hits after duplicates removed.

on ProQuest Social Science Premium Collection and 119 on PsycINFO. All these scores help the researcher to evaluate the relevance of each database the review objectives.

Table 2.8: Sensitivity and Precision Scores for Databases

Database	Sensitivity	Precision
Google Scholar	22.28%	1.5%
ProQuest Social Science Premium Collection	1.49%	0.29%
PsycINFO	12.87%	1.21%
Science Direct	21.29%	5.07%
Scopus	37.62	19.39%
Web of Science	4.46%	28.13%

$$Sensitivity = \frac{IRI}{\sum IRI}$$

$$Precision = \frac{IRI}{IR}$$

The Sensitivity scores show the capability of each database at retrieving relevant papers. From Table 2.8 above, Scopus records the highest sensitivity score (37.62%) followed by Google Scholar (22.28%), and Science Direct (21.29%). Precision scores show the measure of the effectiveness of the databases at avoiding the retrieval of irrelevant articles. Web of Science (28.13%) and Scopus (19.39%) have the highest Precision scores. Google Scholar (1.5%) and ProQuest Social Science Premium Collection) are databases with the lowest Precision scores. This implies (for the stated review questions) that one is more likely to be inundated with irrelevant articles using these low-scored databases than the others (with high scores).

2.3.2 Quality Assurance of Selected Articles

A noticeable weakness of 'traditional' literature review is the scantiness of mechanisms for assessing the quality of the literature reviewed. A good review of literature is not just a compilation of summarisations of selected texts from preferred literature sets. It is not every available article that is worthy of inclusion in a research review. There are several peer-reviewed articles with faulty methodologies, weak analytical tools, dodgy datasets amongst several other challenges. Drawing epistemic conclusions from nicely written but weak research articles can compromise the entire research objectives.

I adopted a two-way quality appraisal procedure for the meta-synthesis of the 42 selected articles. The first involved using the Quality Appraisal Framework for Assessing Research Evidence developed by the UK National Centre for Social Research. I adapted the framework for this purpose. I, alongside 2 assessors recruited by me as research assistants, assessed each of the articles using the 18 questions listed in the framework (see Appendix 7). The mean of the 3 appraisals was taken and entered as scores for each of the 42 articles (see Appendix 8).

The second approach involved taking the citation index of each of the articles across the selected databases. Since Scopus document citation index for one article may be different from Web of Science's, I extracted the citation index for all the 42 articles and then took the mean citation index for each of the articles (see Appendix 9 for the full matrix). From the matrix in Appendix 9, the article with the highest mean citation came from Web of Science, followed by five articles from Science Direct, and four articles from Scopus. These supported the precision measures above which reveal that Web of Science, Science Direct and Scopus databases have the most precision scores. Natural Hazards, Government Information Quarterly Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management and Technological Forecasting and Social Change have the most articles (see Table 2.9 below). These are specialised peer-reviewed journals, and they are spread across different disciplines. I used the two-pronged approach to ensure assessment quality without reducing the choice of articles to mere citation counts and also without limiting the choice to subjective opinions of 3 assessors.

Table 2.9: List of Reviewed Journals with their Frequency

Journal	Frequency
Natural Hazards	4
Government Information Quarterly	3
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management	3
Technological Forecasting and Social Change	3
Geoforum	2
Safety Science	2
Australian Journal of Communication	1
Australian Library Journal	1
Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking	1
Decision Support Systems	1
Disasters	1
Environmental Modelling & Software	1
Health Communication	1
I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society	1
Information Research	1
International Journal of Data Science	1
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction	1
International Journal of Disaster Risk Science	1
International Journal of Emergency Services	1
International Journal of Information Management	1
ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information	1
Journal of Decision Systems	1
Journal of Emergency Management	1
Journal of Flood Risk Management	1
Journal of Information Systems Education	1
PLoS one	1
Prometheus (United Kingdom)	1
Public Relations Review	1
Technology in Society	1
The Journal of Strategic Information Systems	1
Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy	1

2.4 General Findings and Characteristics of Selected Articles

2.4.1 Phenomena of Interest

This systematic review results reveal that Big data - often used interchangeably with social media and digital technologies - are employed to study the behaviour of both leaders and followers(citizens) during emergencies involving diverse natural hazard related disasters. The most common phenomenon studied are flood-related (12

instances); others are flood-related natural hazard related disasters e.g., hurricanes (5 instances), tsunamis (4 instances) etc. see Appendix 13 for a more detailed distribution of the phenomena of interest.

These variations in the pattern of the studied phenomena are intertwined with the geographical focus of the studies and the countries of residence of the authors. The areas prone to these disasters had more local authors studying them than researchers from outside of the event locales. The Ebola epidemic was an exception, with sparse or negligible studies conducted on the role of big data digital technologies in security-leadership response outcomes effectiveness by African authors. Rather, researchers outside of the continent seem more interested in the phenomenon.

2.4.2 Research Methodologies: Methods and Designs

A careful examination of the distribution of the research methodologies and designs used throughout the selected relevant studies lend credence to the justification of methodological approaches prevalent in a study of this kind. From the table in Appendix 13, it can be observed that qualitative methodology (used in 24 out of 42 studies) is the dominant methodology. This is likely due to the primary concept of focus; that is, security-leadership decision-making which is an abstract term. The prevalent methods of data analysis include thematic analysis (8 studies), document analysis (6 studies), social network analysis (5 studies) content analysis (4 studies), and others as outlined in the Appendix.

The theoretical frameworks are context-specific. Habermasian 'Public Sphere', Citizen Co-Production Theory, Coombs' Situational Crisis Communication Theory are some of the theories used in the studies. None of these theories is repeated across the 42 studies suggesting that each study is unique in its design and approach. The implication of these findings is that context, and situation should determine the development of the research methodology and method for the thesis.

2.4.3 Geographical Distribution

The geographical distribution of the articles features both the publishing countries and the studied countries. Several insights emerged from this level of analysis which includes the fact that the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom have the

most authors of the 42 articles (See Table 2.10). The publishing countries are in America, Asia, Australia, and Europe - these are the leading countries in big data and digital technologies research.

However, the distribution can also be explained as partly due to the proximity of some of the publishing countries to the occurrences of natural hazard related disasters such as tsunamis, typhoons etc. Africa is noticeably absent on the table of some of the disasters of this nature except for famine and drought. Another reason for low African representation in big data disaster research could be linked to the rate of diffusion of technological innovations and their adoption in Africa. Digital inequalities influence the sparseness of works done on the subject of interest.

Table 2.10: List of Publishing Countries

Publishing Country	Frequency
United States	17
Australia	8
United Kingdom	6
The Netherlands	2
Austria	1
Brazil	1
Bulgaria	1
China	1
France	1
Germany	1
Hong Kong	1
New Zealand	1
Poland	1



The publishing country-studied country matrix in Appendix 10 contains the pattern and direction of the article. Which author from which country studied the subject in or about what country. In this review dataset, most of the United States' authors researched phenomena in their country: 70.59% of the American authors' research studies are about natural hazard related disasters in the United States. They also studied international or global disasters occurrences (5.88%) e.g., Haiti, Indonesia, Singapore, and South Korea (countries that are either close to the US or are of strategic importance to the United States). Appendix 11 outlined the Studies' Funding and Sponsors' list, The National Science Foundation and the Office of Naval Research sponsored 3 of the studies are about the United States and 1 about Indonesia. The directionality of the funding projects the dominance of the global north on the research on big data disasters leadership. Africa is not well-represented; this further highlights the need to fill this gap.

2.4.4 Characteristics of the Selected Relevant Articles

Authors' findings and conclusions extracted from the 42 articles were examined for 'patterns, themes and categories' in a procedure that involves the 'thematic analysis' of the selected papers as a singular dataset.[109] The summaries of findings and conclusions from each of these select research papers were saved separately as a document file using the author(s) names and year of publication. The files were imported into NVivo 11 software for the exploration of prevalent themes and keywords in the dataset before conducting a term frequency query with which a list of 100 most frequent terms was extracted within the dataset (see the word cloud in Figure 2.5).

Figure 2. 2: Word cloud of the most frequent terms in the authors' findings and Conclusions

The top 10 most frequent terms in the authors' findings and conclusions provide an entry point for exploring the thematic categories (see Table 2.11 for the word frequency query results). The key terms' exploration helps to situate the main concerns in the growing cross-disciplinary epistemic field of big data technologies and

[109] Patton, M. Q., (2002), *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.

security-leadership decision-making. The assumption is that the more relevant a term is, the more likely it is to feature predominantly in major discourses within the literature.

Table 2.11: Word Frequency Query Results

Term	Count
Social/media	115/110
Information	75
Disaster	64
Crisis	41
Public	38
Management	35
Government	32
Twitter	30
Communication	29
Citizens	25

To underscore the point that social media data is part of big data, a careful look at the word frequency table provides a glimpse into the predominant nature of the term. 'Social media' (taken together as a term) accounts for the core of the discussions in the authors' findings and conclusions within the dataset. Social media is mentioned 215 times in 27 of the 42 selected literature (which is 64.2% of the sampled research papers). Further exploration of the term social media shows that the term is used in relation to these three important parts that underscore big data use in the context of natural hazard related disasters: (1) recovery processes, (2) public space (for government and citizen communication exchanges during extreme events or natural hazard related disasters), and (3) for crisis communications in general. Table 2.12 further sheds light on the significance of social media as the core term in the summaries of authors' findings and conclusions. It presents 7 out of the 27 key research papers which referenced the term 'social media' with their percentage representations.

Table 2.12: Summary of Selected Articles (Reference Count and Coverage)

Citation	Reference Count/Coverage (%) (N=215)
Graham et al. (2015)	31(7.72)
Resnyansky (2015)	28(6.27)
Kavanaugh et al. (2012)	24(5.22)
Kim et al. (2016)	20(7.03)
Anson et al. (2016)	14(4.95)
Chatfield et al. (2013)	12(2.33)
Panagiotopoulous et al. (2016)	10(1.84)

Apart from the term social media, other prominent lexemes such as 'information', 'disaster', 'crisis', 'public', 'management', 'government', 'twitter', 'communication', and 'citizen' also occur with significant frequencies in the dataset. Disaster, which also emerged in the dataset as a prominent term is copiously located in 25 articles and referenced 64 times. Within the dataset, the term 'disaster' is used more often in relation to government and organisational leadership's management of naturally occurring extreme events. It is also used together with words and statements such as 'preparedness', 'the expression of grief and support,' 'recovery efforts' and 'recovery processes' and in reference to 'response tools' during extreme events.[110,111] Disaster is used in connection with 'collection and communication implementations, and development of capabilities' by multiple government agencies and departments regarding social media data and/or social network analysis. Disaster features prominently in the reviewed literature about leadership and management of crisis communications before, during and after the events.[112]

The term frequency count also unveils 'crisis' as one of the top five dominant terms in the authors' findings and conclusions dataset. 41 references to this term were made by 11 sources out of the 42 sampled articles. I discovered that crisis as a term shares its linguistic association within the dataset when used in connection with 'response' such as in crisis responders, with 'management' in crisis management and

[110] Afzalan, N., Evans-Cowley, J., & Mirzazad-Barijough, M., (2015), From Big to Little Data for Natural Disaster Recovery: How Online and On-The-Ground Activities are Connected. *ISJLP* 11, p.153.
[111] Anson, S., Watson, H., Wadhwa, K., & Metz, K., (2017), Analysing Social Media Data for Disaster Preparedness: Understanding the Opportunities and Barriers faced by Humanitarian Actors. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction* 21, pp. 131-139. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijdrr.2016.11.014
[112] Buzzelli, M. M., Morgan, P., Muschek, A. G., & Macgregor-Skinner, G., (2014), Information and Communication Technology: Connecting the Public and First Responders during Disasters. *Journal of Emergency Management 12*(6), pp. 441-447. DOI: 10.5055/jem.2014.0207

also in crisis communication or with crisis communicators.[113,114,115] On leadership as a performed role, Adrot and Moriceau note that the 2003 French Heatwave crisis response demonstrates that coordination does not solely result from information transmission. It could stem from an intricately related set of emotions, power dynamics and actions.[116]

This sampled collection is apt for the review's objectives which is mainly exploratory; to investigate what is out there. To see what the relevant leading literature is saying about the role of big data technologies in crisis leadership and decision-making outcome processes and effectiveness. The succeeding section homed in on insights and opinions garnered so far on the review's objective as well as their implications on the overall thesis' objectives.

2.5 Discussion: Synthesis of Literature

This review set out primarily to examine prevailing perspectives, findings, and positions of extant literature about big data and digital technologies on security-leadership decision-making outcomes in crisis or disaster situations. So far, I have used the term frequency count of the prominent lexemes in the reviewed articles to illuminate the array of phenomena that emerged across the literature. Consequent upon this exploration of the dataset using the key terms presented above, five core thematic categories emerged. These are:

i. Big data and crisis decision-making
ii. Big data and crisis communication
iii. Big data and disaster preparedness information
iv. Big data and disaster recovery processes
v. Social media as public space in the context of disaster management.

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[113] Adrot, A., & Moriceau, J., (2013), Introducing Performativity to Crisis Management Theory: An Illustration from the 2003 French Heat Wave Crisis Response. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 21*(1), pp. 26-44. DOI: 10.1111/1468-5973.12011
[114] Drosio, S., & Stanek, S., (2016), The Big Data Concept as a Contributor of Added Value to Crisis Decision Support Systems. *Journal of Decision Systems, 25*(sup1), pp. 228-239. DOI: 10.1080/12460125.2016.1187404
[115] Graham, M. W., Avery, E. J., & Park, S., (2015), The Role of Social Media in Local Government Crisis Communications. *Public Relations Review 41*(3), pp. 386-394. DOI: 10.1016/J.Pubrev.2015.02.001
[116]Adrot, A., & Moriceau, J., (2013)

2.5.1 Big Data and Crisis Decision-making

A greater proportion of the sampled literature focus on social media big data uses for crisis decision-making and leadership outcomes. For instance, Afzalan *et al.* report that social media is tightly connected to the offline environment when used for disaster management and recovery efforts. They prescribed that disaster management organisations should be equipped with new skills and technologies that would afford the use of social media in disaster recovery processes. Accordingly, disaster recovery organisations should consider actively utilising social media data 'for identifying potential volunteers and stakeholders, rather than focusing on passive methods of volunteer recruitment.'[117] Big data in this regard is considered an active agent in security-leadership decision-making which complements existing offline measures.

Sill under this theme, several articles identified other significant contributions of big data digital technologies to include public resilience, national recovery processes, emergence response, relief distribution during extreme events such as floods, disease outbreaks, wildfire etc. Twitter is the most favoured platform for big data research throughout the review. Twitter has evolved into a veritable space for crisis communications between government agencies, departments, nongovernmental organisations, humanitarian bodies, and social media active citizens. Other mediated communication technologies such as SMS, Facebook, WhatsApp, Weibo – synchronous and asynchronous are also identified in the literature.[118] But, the unique nature of Twitter makes it the technology of choice for most researchers of disaster leadership and management. The terseness of the messaging platform proves useful during disaster events when rapid and clear communication are essential.[119]

From the literature on crisis big data, crisis response by governmental and non-governmental agencies have been exhaustively discussed by several scholars; however, several gaps have not been judiciously discussed, a crucial example is disaster preparedness and risk mitigation. Susan Anson *et al.* identified this gap and discovered seven other categories (language, value, financial, human resources, technology, technology and data) as barriers to the deployment of big data tools for

[117] Afzalan et al., (2015)
[118] Deng, Q., Liu, Y., Zhang, H., Deng, X., & Ma, Y., (2016), A New Crowdsourcing Model to Assess Disaster Using Microblog Data in Typhoon Haiyan. *Natural Hazards, 84*(2), pp. 1241-1256.
[119] Sutton, J., League, C., Sellnow, T. L., & Sellnow, D. D., (2015), Terse Messaging and Public Health in the Midst of Natural Disasters: The Case of the Boulder Floods. *Health Communication, 30*(2), pp. 135-143. DOI: 10.1080/10410236.2014.974124

disaster preparedness.[120] Huang and Xiao posted a coding schema for separating social media messages into different themes across the four different disaster stages: preparedness, response, impact, and recovery. They were able to establish the variations in the nature of tweets generated across these different stages.[121]

No doubt, as revealed, that big data - in this case, social media - have been used to monitor disaster events, support emergency response and coordination, but the place of disaster preparedness is still missing considerably. While crisis or disaster big data technologies in security-leadership decision-making has been extensively covered in the literature, it is important to look beyond the functional elements of the technologies. The management challenges have been thoroughly examined but there is still a need to critically take on the leadership question of variations in outcomes effectiveness and ineffectiveness. The literature is silent on this crucial leadership issue.

Big data affords humanitarian actors and government agencies the opportunity of tracking disaster events and to support emergency response and coordination efforts. It has also been used to gauge public interests and opinions about disaster events including a measure of acceptance of government policies about large-scale events.

In one of the studies reviewed, the role of Big Data was framed using Christine Bruce's theoretical lens of information literacy.[122] Four categories of the information behaviour of social media users emerged in support of using social media for rational decision-making in the event of natural hazard related disasters. The first category has to do with monitoring of the event, which involves keeping the people abreast of information regarding the safety of life and property. Bunce *et al.* exemplify this in their study of the 2011 Australia's Toowoomba and Brisbane River flooding. [123] The second category is the need to communicate and build a community of sympathisers, donors, and volunteers. This category rests on people's perceived need to communicate with one another in the affected zone for solidarity, support, and

[120] Anson et al., (2017)
[121] Huang, Q., & Xiao, Y., (2015), Geographic Situational Awareness: Mining Tweets for Disaster Preparedness, Emergency Response, Impact, and Recovery. *ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information 4*(3), pp. 1549-1568. DOI: 10.3390/ijgi4031549
[122] Bruce, C. S., (1997), *The Seven Faces of Information Literacy*. Blackwood South Australia: Auslib Press Pty Ltd.
[123] Bunce, S., Partridge, H., & Davis, K., (2012), Exploring Information Experience Using Social Media During the 2011 Queensland Floods: A Pilot Study. *The Australian Library Journal 61*(1), pp. 34-45. DOI: 10.1080/00049670.2012.10722300

encouragement during the grief period. This also extends to the third and fourth categories where Twitter proved to be useful in seeking assurance with regards to safety for self or loved ones, including for their properties and fourthly, for creating awareness regarding what is known about the consequences of the disaster. Decisions can be made following evaluation of people's expectations, affirmation of actions and creation of awareness. This is pivotal to governments and nongovernment organisations' disaster management decision-making and crisis leadership strategic plan.

Hence, social media, when properly harnessed, could be used to dispel misinformation, rumours, exaggerations, and anxieties that come with emergency insecurity situations such as flooding and epidemic. The schema in Figure 2.6 below succinctly covers the messaging typologies and descriptors of the tweets across the different phases. For example, social media as a platform for expression of grief and support describes the measure of the impacts of the technology; while, the development of capabilities categories of tweets describes the recovery phase.



Figure 2. 3: Thematic Schema of Social Media Use in Decision-making during Natural hazard related disasters

Twitter as a big data digital technology remains a vital tool in disaster management. Arjen Boin and Paul 't Hart as well as Panagiotopoulos *et al.* submit that Twitter can be of particular value in large-scale emergencies like weather conditions

when public managers face pressures to effectively allocate resources.[124,125] The two theoretical lenses in risk and emergency communication - the social amplification of risk framework (SARF) and crisis and emergency risk communication model (CERM) informed Barbara Reynolds and Matthew W. Seeger's understanding of rumour management by local government authorities during a crisis. Their study examined Twitter use by local government authorities in the UK during the heavy snow of 2010 and the summer riots of August 2011. A total of 8274 tweets for the 2010 snow and 1746 tweets for the 2011 riots were analysed for the risk communication strategies employed to influence public perception and actions as events unfolded during the two emergencies. In the case of the August 2011 riots [a non-natural hazard related disaster emergency], they discovered that the tweets by local authorities aimed towards clarifying ambiguities from publicly distributed information or dispelling rumours. As noted earlier, a similar observation was made by them to the effect that:

> The style of tweets adapted accordingly to show the alertness of authorities and decisiveness of actions in progress (e.g., legal actions, disproving rumours). Authorities' tweets deviated from traditionally official (norm) tone as many were informative in an informal way (e.g., "Colleague at meeting with police confirms nothing of note has happened in the borough. We and police will continue to keep our eyes open").[126]

Still on the prominence of Twitter as a social media tool for crisis security leadership and management, Tang, *et al.* report how California's state agencies used the major big data social media tools (Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter) for drought risk management in 2014.[127] Their SWOT analysis of the State's humanitarian actions shows that the major functions of these social media tools include: (1) one-way information sharing, (2) two-way information sharing, (3) situational awareness, (3) rumour control, (4) reconnection, and (5) decision-making, and not including other functions such as donation solicitation and volunteer management. While Twitter played an effective role in the reconnection of social networks to expedite the dissemination of drought risk information, they noted that:

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[124] Boin, A., & Hart, P., (2010), Organising for Effective Emergency Management: Lessons from Research. *Australian Journal of Public Administration 69*(4), pp. 357-371. DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8500.2010.00694.x

[125] Panagiotopoulos, P., Barnett, J., Bigdeli, A. Z., & Sams, S., (2016), Social Media in Emergency Management: Twitter as a Tool for Communicating Risks to the Public. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change 111*, pp. 86-96. DOI: 10.1016/j.techfore.2016.06.010

[126] Reynolds, B., & Seeger, M. W. (2005). Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication as an Integrative Model. *Journal of Health Communication 10*(1), 43-55. doi:10.1080/10810730590904571

[127] Tang, Z., Zhang, L., Xu, F., & Vo, H., (2015), Examining the Role of Social Media in California's Drought Risk Management in 2014. *Natural Hazards 79*(1), pp. 171-193. DOI: 10.1007/s11069-015-1835-2

> Facebook worked well in two-way information sharing for drought risk information and water conservation strategies, YouTube served as a robust platform that attracted many views on drought-related videos. Consequently, through social media, the public was able to provide information that was used in conducting a situational analysis and defining the course of action for state emergency management authorities.[128]

Shaw *et al.* identified three key phenomena of social media use in crisis communication to include: (1) for communal sense-making practices, (2) exploration of digital convergence around shared events and (3) examination of the negotiation of participant roles, and (4) digital convergence around shared events.[129] They remarked that the third category is not frequently discussed in the instrumentalist crisis informatics literature.

From the literature, other functional roles or impacts of big data (social media) digital technologies include; connecting, establishing wellbeing, coping, helping, brokerage, news/information dissemination, supplementary to other sources of information and other useful insights.[130] Furthermore, social media in disaster management will make it possible for humanitarian organisations to reach their goals more quickly and effectively. Analysing Big Data generated through social media can help understand the identity and activity of people in these networks and examine the possibility of recruiting them as volunteers in recovery processes.[131]

Although Twitter is the dominant digital technology in the literature on crisis or security-leadership decision-making: some of its characteristics have been observed by scholars researching other alternative platforms. Using the Chinese social media platform Sina Weibo during the typhoon Haiyan, Deng *et al.* fix the crowd-sourced microblog messages into three perspectives namely; disaster description, public demands, and mitigation measures from where risk assessment is conducted following weighted term frequency.[132] There is a significant benefit to understanding the style of messages generated by users during the different disaster phases; this can aid

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[128] Tang et al., (2015), p. 172
[129] Shaw, F., Burgess, J., Crawford, K., & Bruns, A., (2013), Sharing news, making sense, saying thanks: Patterns of talk on Twitter during the Queensland floods. *Australian Journal of Communication 40*(1), pp. 23-40.
[130] Yates, C., & Partridge, H., (2015), Citizens and Social Media in Times of Natural Disaster: Exploring Information Experience. *Information Research 20*(1), pp. 5-37.
[131] Velev, D., & Zlateva, P., (2016), An Analysis of the Relation between Natural Disasters and Big Data. *International Journal of Data Science 1*(4), pp. 370-381. DOI:10.1504/IJDS.2016.081372
[132] Deng, Q., Liu, Y., Zhang, H., Deng, X., & Ma, Y., (2016), A New Crowdsourcing Model to Assess Disaster using Microblog Data in Typhoon Haiyan. *Natural Hazards 84*(2), pp. 1241-1256.

decision-makers in their leadership responses. Rumours abound where quality information is scarce and delated especially during the early onset of the disaster. Given the significance of social media in the context of natural hazard related disasters, governments need to establish social media policy governance network during the preparedness stage of the disaster cycle. There is also a need to create positive network effects through network behaviours as they (security-leaders) become important nodes for the delivery of critical public services, motivating and steering citizens to take immediate actions.[133,134]

Social network analysis (SNA) of social media metadata features prominently as an analytic procedure in the literature. There are studies in the collection which evaluate spatiotemporal information in social media geolocation data for examining the effectiveness of social media big data in disaster management. Yago Martín, Zhenlong Li, and Susan L. Cutter 's findings reveal that variability in social media (Twitter) exchanges can help ascertain whether differences in information exchanges among network users are because of proximity to the areas of potential impact or not. Also, that Spatiotemporal evaluation can help establish the degree of compliance to, for instance, evacuation orders in relation to time.[135]

Despite all the benefits associated with using social media data in the context of disaster management, a few studies equally criticise over-reliance on 'Big [social media] Data' disaster information exchanges. Leskens *et al*. for instance caution that one should be careful in drawing generalised conclusions based on Social Network Analysis beyond flood disaster management because the decision-making process during inundation is context- and decision actor-specific.[136]

Aside from the style, characteristics, and roles of big data social media, the issue of the quality of information networks is germane. Mehta et al found that trust is essential to the relationships regarding the incorporation of large volume social media during emergencies by emergency responders. In this case, the Queensland Fire

[133] Chatfield, A. T., Scholl, H. J. J., & Brajawidagda, U., (2013), Tsunami Early Warnings Via Twitter in Government: Net-Savvy Citizens' Co-Production of Time-Critical Public Information Services. *Government Information Quarterly 30*(4), pp. 377-386. DOI:10.1016/j.giq.2013.05.021
[134] Chatfield, A. T., & Reddick, C. G., (2018), All Hands on Deck to Tweet #Sandy: Networked Governance of Citizen Coproduction in Turbulent Times. *Government Information Quarterly 35*(2), pp. 259-272. DOI: 10.1016/j.giq.2017.09.004
[135] Martín, Y., Li, Z., & Cutter, S. L., (2017), Leveraging Twitter to Gauge Evacuation Compliance: Spatiotemporal Analysis of Hurricane Matthew. *Plos One 12*(7), pp. 1-22.
[136] Leskens, J. G., Brugnach, M., Hoekstra, A. Y., & Schuurmans, W., (2014), Why are Decisions in Flood Disaster Management so poorly supported by Information from Flood Models? *Environmental modelling & software 53*, pp. 53-61.

Emergency Service,s and their social media followers. Three models were proposed to explore trust relationships between these networked actors; they are intelligence gathering, quasi-journalistic verification, and crowdsourcing. "The models are useful for evaluation and verification of user-generated content, at least in the context of crisis communication."[137] They noted that: "trust relationships have a tangible impact on the possibility and the efficiency of information flowing from social media sources into emergency management decision-making processes."[138] The three models were developed from the guardianship of trust model which specifically:

> explores the potential mechanisms by which emergency management organisations may come to trust the information originating from the wider community of social media users in general, and may identify especially trustworthy individual users with whom it would be valuable to develop a closer relationship built on interpersonal trust.[139]

Resnyansky *et al.* also stress that in the context of disaster management:

> A social media theme's prominence does not necessarily signify its greater importance from the perspectives of disaster management and affected populations. But data must be approached as products of social, institutional, and representational practices.[140]

Their proposed framework relies on certain assumptions already evident among developers of information technologies and is increasingly evident in areas of disaster management and communication involving social media. These assumptions are preoccupation with the quantitative-thematic approach to social media content; information-centric and social media-centric worldviews. According to them, the so-called 'disaster data-in-context framework', needs further development before it can be integrated into tools supporting social media data use in disasters (as well as the assessment criteria).[141]

In this section, I have established that the reviewed literature portrays a significant relevance of big data digital technologies, especially social media to disaster management. They are important in the different phases of the disaster cycle -

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[137] Mehta, A. M., Bruns, A., & Newton, J., (2017), Trust, But Verify: Social Media Models for Disaster Management. *Disasters 41*(3), pp. 549-565. doi:10.1111/disa.12218
[138] Mehta *et al.* (2017), p. 562.
[139] Mehta *et al.* (2017), p. 553.
[140] Resnyansky, L. (2015). Social Media Data in the Disaster Context. *Prometheus 33*(2), pp. 187-212. DOI: 10.1080/08109028.2015.1102497
[141] The framework however holds the potential of orientating technology developers in the domain-specific aspects of data, meta information and context. The framework may also aid disaster managers and capability developers in adopting a critical-reflexive stance towards social media and in approaching social media as a non-neutral participant of in disaster management.

although even more so in the recovery or response phase than in the preparation or mitigation phase. The literature abounds with studies on the style of disaster messaging by big data micro-blogging sites. There are also considerations for how the style is related to the different disaster phases – content is more informative during the disaster and consolatory post-disaster phase. Studies also reflect the characteristics of these user-generated messages; with findings showing a preference for terse messaging. The uses of social media digital technologies in the literature extend to information verification and rumour dispelling. Trust is an essential factor between social media big data content producers and consumers as followers feature prominently in the literature.

All the articles reviewed so far are related to decision-making elements of leadership which are within the purview of management. The doing aspect of leadership is management. However, the focus of this security-leadership decision-making is on positive outcomes of big data digital technologies interventions; it would be interesting to see situations where the outcomes have not been positive or effective. The next section discusses the synthesis of literature around the sub-theme of big data and crisis communication.

2.5.2 Big Data and Crisis Communication

The significance of social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook over other new technologies such as satellite GIS images and sensors for detecting disaster and receiving crisis communications was remarkably established in the reviewed articles. This significance is reflected in the information exchange throughout the disaster phases. In the literature, Graham *et al.* provide a quantitative overview of the significance of crisis social media in their survey results on the role of social media in local government crisis communications where the prevalent social media platforms used by humanitarian actors were highlighted.[142]

These authors found that among the sampled 288 public officials and government employees who performed communication functions for their respective local government councils, Facebook (with N= 157, 53%) was reported as the most

[142]Graham, M. W., Avery, E. J., & Park, S., (2015), The Role of Social Media in Local Government Crisis Communications. *Public Relations Review 41*(3), pp. 386-394. DOI: 10.1016/J.Pubrev.2015.02.001

popular social medium platform engaged for crisis communication. This is followed by Twitter (N= 81, 27%), blogs (N= 17, 6%), and YouTube (N= 13,5%). Other prominent technological platforms reported in the study are Google Plus (N= 8.3%), and other (N= 19, 6%), which may include satellite image mapping and human and non-human activated sensors. The survey results presented in the dataset also state that: 'there was a significant relationship between community size and the level of usage of social media [F (2,200) =4.81, p = .009].'[143]

Elizabeth Avery *et. al.* established that 'overall, [the] use of social media significantly differed by size of health department [$\chi^2(3, N = 281) = 7.91, p < .05$].'[144] Their analysis reveals that:

> that practitioners serving urban core areas were the most likely to use social media to release information to their publics; 26% of practitioners surveyed at departments in urban areas used social media tools (n = 19). As expected, use of social media tools dropped along with the size of the area the department served. Practitioners in suburban areas were the next greatest users of social media (22%, n = 10), followed by those in large towns (17%, n = 9), and, lastly, practitioners in small towns or rural areas (10%, n = 11).[145]

This emphasises the fact that population size determines the extent of use of big data social media digital technologies in crises as usage varies by population. Findings by M.W. Graham *et. al.* on community size and social media use also lend credence to this result(s).[146] On crisis type and social media use, they found that:

> Although the number of tools did not vary by crisis type, extent of social media use did vary by crisis type. Social media were used significantly more for crisis communication during public health crises than for natural disaster, transportation, political, social, or criminal crises. For social crises, social media were engaged significantly less than during natural related disasters, transportation, political, criminal, and the "other" category.[147]

Three modes of crisis communication (and/or crisis communicators) emerged from the literature reviewed; they are (1) government sources in crisis communication, (2) nongovernmental organisations in crisis communication, and (3) citizens (as observatories or situation sensors). A key function of governmental organisations and

[143]Graham et al., (2015), pp. 390-391.
[144]Avery, E., Lariscy, R., Amador, E., Ickowitz, T., Primm, C., & Taylor, A., (2010), Diffusion of Social Media among Public Relations Practitioners in Health Departments across Various Community Population Sizes. *Journal of Public Relations Research 22*(3), pp. 336-358. DOI: 10.1080/10627261003614427
[145]Avery, et al. (2010), p. 350.
[146]Graham *et al.* (2015), 392.
[147]Ibid

NGOs during a disaster is situation awareness. In most cases, it is the governmental institutions that lead the process as citizens craved for reputable information on the disaster and efforts to mitigate their circumstances. Only in a few examples are early warning information present; that is largely due to the suddenness of most disasters and crises. An example is Chatfield *et al.* study of the Indonesian government's use of Twitter for Tsunami early warnings. The Government agency – the Indonesian Agency for Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics (BMKG) engaged Net-savvy citizens in the co-production of time-critical public information. Social network Analysis (SNA) for analysing Twitter information flows and exchanges among the BMKG Twitter followers during the April 2012 Northern Sumatra earthquake. Tweet data for 16 days (June 18 – July 3, 2012) was collected and analysed for a pattern of information flow.[148] Findings from their study reveal that:

> The SNA results clearly showed that the Indonesian government quite effectively warned its Twitter followers of the predicted tsunami hazards through @BMKGnews within 6 min, 7 s of the occurrence of the 8.6 magnitude earthquake on April 11, 2012.[149] Early warning tweets potentially reached as many as 4,115,164 Twitter followers within the 15min acceptable lead-time.[150] However, without voluntary and collaborative efforts of Twitter followers, including individual citizens and organisations, the speed and enormous reach of BMKG Tsunami Early Warning Civic Network would not have had the dynamic and enabling effects that it finally achieved.[151]

Social media crisis communication by the government provides citizens with timely and actionable disaster information during emergencies. The observed pattern of information flow shows that the Indonesian government agency, for instance, made effective use of Twitter technology tools and active engagement of networked and comprehending citizens to warn online people of tsunami hazards promptly. This finding, according to the authors, supports Gordon P. Whitaker arguments that citizens can co-produce public services in diverse ways, ranging from passive roles to active and enabling roles.[152]

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[148] Chatfield, A. T., Scholl, H. J. J., & Brajawidagda, U., (2013), Tsunami Early Warnings Via Twitter in Government: Net-Savvy Citizens' Co-Production of Time-Critical Public Information Services. *Government Information Quarterly 30*(4), pp. 377-386. DOI: 10.1016/j.giq.2013.05.021
[149] Chatfield et al., (2013), 383-384.
[150] Chatfield et al., (2013), p. 383.
[151] Chatfield et al., (2013), p. 384.
[152] Whitaker, G., (1980), Coproduction: Citizen Participation in Service Delivery. *Public Administration Review 40*(3), pp. 240-246. DOI: 10.2307/975377

The study reveals that coproduction involves three broad types of activities; namely: (1) citizens requesting assistance from public agents; (2) citizens providing assistance to public agents; and (3) citizens and agents interacting to adjust each other's service expectations and actions.[153] This distributed collaboration reflects the behaviour of social media networked engagements using the tools of social media in emergency events. When government institutions failed in any of the above – when the conversation is not distributed – there will be disruption of the intervention process. Government emergency agencies engender a culture of close collaboration with net-savvy citizens with the power of social influence on their fellow citizens. These individuals or actors will help disseminate critical information faster during natural hazard related disasters. Citizen co-provision can help to increase the level of government efficiency in providing time-critical public information services.[154]

The reviewed literature collection has series of findings from research that describe and evaluate crisis communication concerning security-leadership decision-making activities. Elements of these findings include the social amplification capabilities of these social media technologies – these technologies imbued citizens with the ability to transmit or amplify time-critical information during emergency or disaster events. Another discovery from the literature includes big data technologies capacities to create distributed cognition or situation awareness. This affords all the actors in the security-leadership eco-system to update and pass on information to victims of disasters.

Although, government actors traditional operate a top-down hierarchical communication. Studies have shown from the literature that this approach may not necessarily work in the age of the internet. A more collaborative measure has been proven to have worked effectively as stated in the articles discussed in this section. Social media still maintains the pride of place as the technology of choice in crisis communication. The final contribution of big data digital social media technologies is in social sensing – gauging opinions and sentiments from different online discussions during natural hazard related disasters and crises. Unfortunately, sub-Saharan Africa is missing in this conversation. This is a noticeable gap partly because unlike the citizens, collaborative e-governance is still in its infancy on the continent.

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[153] Whitaker, G., (1980), p. 242.
[154] Ferris, J., (1984), Coprovision: Citizen Time and Money Donations in Public Service Provision. *Public Administration Review 44*(4), pp. 324-333. DOI: 10.2307/976078

2.5.3 Big Data and Disaster Preparedness Information

In this section, I discuss the thematic category of big data and disaster preparedness Information as observed in the reviewed literature. Disaster preparedness communication encompasses the pre-disaster phase which comprises all communication activities performed by humanitarian actors to mitigate the consequences of natural hazard related disasters. Susan Anson *et al* examined the opportunities and barriers faced by humanitarian actors in the cause of using social media analysis tools (SMAT) for disaster risk reduction (DRR); and, to assess social media data for preparedness purposes.[155]

Disaster risk reduction and preparedness are two different pre-disaster interventions that need to be clarified. DDR as a mitigation strategy refers to the systematic efforts taken to reduce disaster risks by examining and managing the causal factors of disasters, including reducing exposure to hazards, reducing the vulnerability of people and property and increased preparedness for disaster events.[156] Disaster preparedness on the other hand is concerned with taking action before a disaster. This enables individuals, households and organisations to respond effectively when a disaster does occur.[157] Disaster preparedness actions include possessing useful resources for sheltering or evacuation (e.g., food, water, communication equipment, and medication), creating a social support plan such as logging contact information and meeting points, and gaining knowledge of local government plans (e.g., the location of shelters).[158]

SMAT (i.e., Social Media Analysis Tools) are assistive tools that help decision-makers to make sense of the various interactions on social media. They are tools for sensemaking. They help forge actionable insights from the big data content generated on social media. TweetTracker, TweetDeck, Twitcicdent and Artificial Intelligence for Disaster Response (AIDR) are SMAT technologies. A study was conducted on the preparedness actions undertaken before the eruption of Mount Meripi in Indonesia

[155] Anson, S., Watson, H., Wadhwa, K., & Metz, K., (2017), Analysing Social Media Data for Disaster Preparedness: Understanding the Opportunities and Barriers Faced by Humanitarian Actors. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 21*, pp. 131-139. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijdrr.2016.11.014
[156] Anson, S., *et al.* (2017), p. 131.
[157] Perry, R. W., Lindell, M. K., & Tierney, K. J. (Eds.), (2001), *Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press.
[158] Redlener, I., & Berman, D. A., (2006), National Preparedness Planning: The Historical Context and Current State of the U.S. Public's Readiness, 1940-2005. *Journal of International Affairs 59*(2), pp. 87-103.

and Cyclone Giri in Myanmar in 2010 by Anson *et al*. Findings from the study show that the use of social media for preparedness is more entrenched for humanitarian services than the use of SMAT.[159]

Most of the survey respondents claimed they use Twitter (61.5%) and Facebook (100%) to communicate with the public about disaster preparedness while only 36.6% claimed they use SMAT to analyse the data generated on social media.[160] The different reasons for using SMAT as identified by participants align with the motivations for using social media for preparedness as noted in the literature. For instance, SMAT can be used to understand the effectiveness of preparedness information. They can also be used to detect disasters and receive information on warnings; and, identify community networks that can be mobilised for preparedness purposes. In addition, the use of SMAT is reported to facilitate humanitarian organisations in meeting their social media goals and increase the effectiveness of their engagement with social media.

Public awareness communication in preparation for a disaster is part of early warning measures but it is not the same as an early warning or disaster preparedness. Both concepts are intertwined. Social media is a communication tool; there are big data technologies that have helped decision-makers foretell, strategically plan, and prepared for emergency events. There is a study of over 6 million records of patient visits to the Accident and Emergency Departments (AED) of the Hong Kong Hospital Authority with aimed to develop a Spatio-temporal daily emergency ambulance demand forecast system for disaster preparedness.[161] Song et al. conducted a study that made use of the smartphone GPS data of 1.6 million people to develop a Spatio-temporal model that simulated and predicted the moving patterns of people in Tokyo after the 11 March earthquake in 2011.[162] This particular study could aid preparedness in future disasters.

Information is powerful. Being prescient can help influence the outcome of a disaster. Hence, big data technologies are relevant in forecasting natural hazard related disasters e.g., weather, hurricane, and earthquakes. The literature is filled with

[159] Anson, S., *et al*. (2017), p. 138.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Wong, H. T., Chiang, V. C. L., Choi, K. S., & Loke, A. Y., (2016), The Need for a Definition ff Big Data for Nursing Science: A Case Study of Disaster Preparedness. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 13*(10), pp. 1-13.
[162] Song, X.; Zhang, Q.; Sekimoto, Y.; Horanont, T.; Ueyama, S.; Shibasaki, R., (2013), Intelligent System for Human Behavior Analysis and Reasoning following Large-Scale Disasters. *IEEE Intelligent Systems* 28(4), pp. 35–42.

examples of the influence of big data digital technologies in disaster preparedness as explained in this section.

2.5.4 Big Data and Disaster Recovery Processes

Disaster recovery is viewed in the literature as a bottom-up strategy in the final phase of disaster management. The recovery process typifies the mediating social interaction and information sharing of social media big data after the disaster phase. Twenty-six out of the 42 sampled publications made a total of seventy-one references to disaster recovery taken together as a key term.

In the reviewed literature, Afzalan *et al.* study provide insight into social media and disaster recovery processes.[163] The study examines how active and influential members of Facebook groups aided in disaster recovery following Hurricane Sandy. Social network analysis (SNA) was used to analyse *influential members* of 52 Facebook groups that were created after Hurricane Sandy. Using the Hyperlink-Induced Topic (HITS) Search and i5-index score, they used Facebook's Graph API to explore social media disaster recovery processes by humanitarian actors.[164] Especially, to investigate the background and volunteer activity of influential members inside and outside of their Facebook groups. The authors report that social media is tightly connected to the offline environment when used for disaster management and recovery efforts. It facilitates the integration of offline and online disaster recovery efforts. The study shows that 'that the majority of the active online members are also actively involved in on-the-ground recovery activities. They also have the capacity and willingness to work as volunteers.'[165]

The authors advise that disaster management organisations should be equipped with skills and technologies to employ social media in their recovery processes during disasters.[166] While also advocating that disaster recovery organisations should consider 'actively searching big network data for identifying

[163] Afzalan, N., Evans-Cowley, J., & Mirzazad-Barijough, M. (2015). From Big to Little Data for Natural Disaster Recovery: How Online and On-The-Ground Activities are Connected. *ISJLP 11*, p. 1-128.
[164] Afzalan et al., (2015), p. 13.
[165] Afzalan et al., (2015), p. 1.
[166] Afzalan et al., (2015), p. 20.

potential active volunteers and stakeholders, instead of focusing on passive methods of volunteer recruitment.'[167]

Relatedly, in another study, Clayton Wukich focuses on the recovery phase as a part of US Government social media messages across disaster phases.[168] By using constructed typologies based on the development and assessment of State emergency management agencies' websites to review and identify 51 accounts for 48 agencies, the risk of selecting unofficial accounts was minimised. Thereafter, with Twitter's API, 38,682 time and date-stamped messages were downloaded into an Excel spreadsheet format for analysis.[169] Content analysis following extant categories – 22 types – as presented in several previous studies was conducted and findings show a range of messages, with response and preparedness being most prevalent. Response (55.2%) and recovery-related messages (6.8%) comprised most of all distributed messages (62.0%).[170] The messages apply to natural hazards, including both routine incidents and large-scale disasters such as tropical storms, tornadoes, and blizzards. Meanwhile, all agencies frequently posted situational awareness information and protective action messages often in the lead up to and during smaller-scale incidents.[171]

Disaster recovery task Emergency responders and security leaders more than any other phase in the disaster cycles. This is due to the humanitarian expectations from victims of the disasters. Everyone wants the impacts of the disaster to be alleviated and this phase commands more funding and attention from governments because it is also a good time to showcase the 'effectiveness of the administration.' The assessments of the leadership are usually focused on the effectiveness or otherwise of the disaster response. Although, leadership transcends the entire disaster phase. As seen from the reviewed literature, the most effective disaster response involving the use of big data technologies are those with distributed interventions, where volunteers worked with government actors both online and offline.

2.5.5 Social Media as Public Space in the Context of Disaster Management

[167] Afzalan et al., (2015), p. 22.
[168] Wukich, C. (2016)., Government Social Media Messages across Disaster Phases. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 24*(4), pp. 230-243. DOI: 10.1111/1468-5973.12119
[169] Wukich, C. (2016)., p. 234.
[170] Wukich, C. (2016)., p. 235-237
[171] Ibid.

The term public space continues to gain prominence in the discussions on social media use for participatory communication in a disaster context. In the review dataset, 18 out of 42 sources yield insights into the nature of social media big data as an expression of public space. In a research study, Yeslam Al-Saggaf and Peter Simmons explore the concept by studying the nature of social media interaction in Saudi Arabia during the 2009 and 2011 floods in Jeddah which led to the death of 120 people.[172] The exploration focused on how social media in Saudi Arabia was used as a virtual interactive space during times of intense social media use and peacetime.

Threads and comments were taken from YouTube, Facebook, Al-Saha Al-Siyasia and Al Arabiya - two prominent mainstream media in Saudi Arabia. The threads selected were all related to the Jeddah 2009 and 2011 floods. There is little consensus on what social media can do about political participation and activism in this extremely conservative Islamic society. Al-Saggaf and Simmons draw on the public sphere concept of Jürgen Habermas and the online public sphere of Nathaniel Poor, including previous research into the democratisation of social media as a space for participatory communication to understand Saudi online public space during disaster events. According to Jurgen Habermas as referenced by them, the public sphere is:

> a domain of our social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed. Access to the public sphere is open in principle to all citizens…citizens act as a public when they deal with matters of general interest without being subject to coercion.[173]

The public sphere is coextensive with an inclusive and open society where people have deliberative power over public affairs. The French Salons, British coffee houses and German *Tischgesellschaften* are classical examples of the public space or discursive arena. Building upon Habermas's original conception (as noted above), Nathaniel Poor proposed four criteria for the public sphere:

1. Public spheres are spaces of discourse, often mediated.
2. Public spheres often allow for new, previously excluded, discussants.
3. Issues discussed are often political in nature.

[172] Al-Saggaf, Y., & Simmons, P., (2015), Social Media in Saudi Arabia: Exploring its Use during Two Natural Disasters. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change 95*, pp. 3-15. DOI: 10.1016/j.techfore.2014.08.013

[173] Habermas, J., (1989), *The Public Sphere*. In: Seidman, S. (Ed.), *Jürgen Habermas on Society and Politics: A Reader*. Boston: Beacon Press, p. 231.

4. Ideas are judged by their merit, not by the standing of the speaker.[174]

He noted that 'Any online public sphere currently must be mediated by definition. Face-to-face communication, however, was an important part of the original conceptualization of the public sphere.[175,176] Although Habermas public sphere predates the emergence of social media, some of its features remain true for the online public sphere. On the other hand, the *two publics* are not the same. One is limited to face-to-face interaction; the other does now. However, this has led some scholars to contest the public sphere attribution of online social media because of certain relationship imbalance of power relations. To Lincoln Dahlberg, the discourse that the Internet facilitates does not meet the requirements of the public sphere.[177] This is due to several reasons including:

i. The autonomy of public interaction online is threatened by the growing commodification of the Internet
ii. Reflexivity does not occur very often online
iii. Discussants lack respectful listening to others and commitment to working out differences
iv. It is difficult to verify the identity of discussants and the information they present
v. Social inequalities can cause some to be excluded from joining
vi. Discourse tends to be dominated by certain individuals and groups.[178]

Despite these bottlenecks, although the line of the definition of the public sphere is blurry, nonetheless, the online public sphere has been established to exist. Poor's Slashdot study established this. Also, from Yeslam Al-Saggaf and Peter Simmons research on the 2009 Jeddah flood; they found that 'social media is a space for public discourse that is open to all, including new, previously excluded discussants (e.g., women, Christians, rappers).[179]This inclusion of traditionally excluded discussants fits

[174]Poor, Nathaniel (2005), Mechanisms of an Online Public Sphere: The Website Slashdot. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* 10(2), JCMC1028, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2005.tb00241.x
[175] Thompson, J. (1995). The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
[176] Poor, Nathaniel (2005)
[177] Al-Saggaf, Y., & Simmons, P., (2015), p. 6.
[178] Momani, N.M., Fadil, A.S., (2010), Changing Public Policy due to Saudi City of Jeddah Flood Disaster. *Journal of Social Sciences* 6, pp. 424–428.
[179] Al-Saggaf, Y., & Simmons, P. (2015), p. 8-9.

Poor's criteria for public sphere. Social media platforms as public spaces afford participants opportunities for deliberative interactions, without excluding the opinions of those on the fringes. Kavanaugh *et al*. provide an insight into these positive implications from the perspectives of the government and public.[180] The authors note that:

> The benefits, especially to citizens, in terms of greater access to information (e.g., searchable online video of meetings of interest) and greater sharing of concerns and ideas will lead to increased awareness, collective efficacy and civic participation. The benefits to government include pro-active problem solving and positive public relations that lead to greater political efficacy and public trust (including organisational resilience).[181,182]

Not minding the complexities or blurriness in the concept of the online public sphere or social media as a public space, the significance of its contribution to deliberative interactions during disaster events. Big data digital technologies (social media) have evolved as veritable public sphere tools for fostering active interactions during situations of crisis or large-scale insecurities. Some of the averred challenges above (e.g., inclusivity, discursive inequalities) are still prevalent as Africa and other developing societies are excluded because of the digital divide and accessibility imbalance.

The platforms, algorithms, content moderation and filtering are dominated by the more technologically advanced societies. They drive the discourse: they determine what is newsworthy. Technology giants like Twitter and Google with their opaque search algorithms influence what is mainstream and by implication what constitute the public sphere. Cambridge Analytica and the de-platforming of pro-Trump 'right-wing' activists have called for judicial inquiries in the former and much worry in the case of the latter. Some arguing against the unilateral powers of these Big Tech companies not only to sway popular opinions during elections but also to determine what constitute acceptable behaviours online – a position that many big data ethicists

[180] Kavanaugh, Andrea L., Edward A. Fox, Steven D. Sheetz, Seungwon Yang, Lin Tzy Li, Donald J. Shoemaker, Apostol Natsev, and Lexing Xie (2012), Social Media Use by Government: From the Routine to the Critical. *Government Information Quarterly 29*(4), pp. 480-491. DOI: 10.1016/j.giq.2012.06.002

[181] Kavanaugh, Andrea L., (2012), p490.

[182] Kyungwoo, K., Kyujin, J., & Kenneth, C., (2016), Strategies of Social Media Use in Disaster Management: Lessons in Resilience from Seoul, South Korea. *International Journal of Emergency Services 5*(2), pp. 110-125. DOI: 10.1108/IJES-02-2016-0005

find worrisome.[183] This techno-cultural imperialism has a significant impact on security-leadership decision-making during crises.

Diverse theories and frameworks are dominant in the systematic review of literature in this chapter. They are Habermasian 'Public Sphere', Information Literacy, Citizen Co-Production Theory, Information Processing Theory & Networked Governance, Cooper's Analytics Framework, Resilient Information Infrastructure etc. (see Appendix 13 for the full list). These are some of the theories used in the literature on big data technologies and their impacts on security-leadership decision-making in situations of large-scale insecurities. This theoretical heterogeneity can be attributed to the different issues investigated in the studies from which the list is drawn.

2.6 Strengths and Limitations of the Literature Review

The quality of this review was rated using the AMSTAR tool for assessing the quality of systematic reviews (see Appendix 12). It has been validated as a useful and credible tool for assessing the quality of systematic reviews.[184] AMSTAR's quality assessments summary scores are usually categorised into three ranges; namely, HIGH (9-11), MEDIUM (5-8), and LOW (0-4). The review attained a score of 9 (HIGH) (see Table 2.13 below). This review summary score is rated HIGH because it satisfies the key quality features of a good systematic review which include assessment of the quality of included studies; the provision of an *a priori* design; using of clearly stated inclusion and exclusion criteria amongst other items.

Although this review is rated highly, it, however, has several limitations. First, only articles and studies are written in English were included; this excluded several other equally useful studies written in other languages such as French, Chinese, Portuguese, and Spanish. This English factor often biases literature access in favour of publications authored by scholars in the western hemisphere. Although this factor can be excused to some extent because the English language has become somewhat standard for international publications; also, most international journals or scientific

[183] Shimron, Leeor (2021), Big Tech's De-Platforming Binge Highlights the Need for Web 3.0. *Forbes*. Available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/leeorshimron/2021/01/17/big-techs-de-platforming-binge-highlights-the-need-for-web-30/?sh=756ac141f87e [accessed 10 February 2021]
[184] Sequeira-Byron, P., Fedorowicz, Z., Jagannath, V. A., & Sharif, M. O., (2011), An AMSTAR Assessment of the Methodological Quality of Systematic Reviews of Oral Healthcare Interventions. *Journal of Applied Oral Science 19*(5), pp. 440-447.

studies have English versions of their publications; nevertheless, several relevant studies not written in English might have been excluded from the included studies.

The review focused more on peer-reviewed literature. The primary reason for this as stated in the objective is to ensure that only evidence-based studies are included in the review. Although grey literature was sourced through Google Scholar, more insights could have been garnered from grey literature published in professional databases and websites. While controlling for quality, it is usually common for a researcher to inadvertently sieve out useful literature. However, the aim of systematic reviews should not be to get all the relevant studies in the universe; but, to include as many relevant studies as possible while reducing the inclusion of irrelevant studies which can skew the review findings and conclusions.

Table 2.13: Rating of Quality of the Systematic Review

AMSTAR Question	**YES**	**NO**	**Can't Say**	**Not applicable**
"*A priori*" design provided	*			
Duplicate study selection and data extraction	*			
Comprehensive literature search	*			
Publication status as an inclusion criterion	*			
List of studies (included and excluded) provided	*			
Characteristics of the included studies provided	*			
Quality assessment	*			
Quality used appropriately	*			
Methods used to combine appropriate				*
Publication bias assessed				*
Conflict of interest stated	*			

2.7 Literature Review Conclusion

The use of big data technologies for disaster mitigation permeates the entire literature. But, the assessments of variations in security-leadership decision outcomes of large-scale insecurities involving the use of these big data technologies are rarely discussed. There are obvious gaps in the literature on the varied decision responses in comparative cases to understand what factors instigate differentials in outcome effectiveness and ineffectiveness. Another huge gap is the deficit of studies by African scholars about big data digital technologies security-leadership during crises or situations of large-scale insecurities. All this, despite the emerging ubiquity of big data and large-scale insecurities on the continent.

This review has provided different insights for understanding the positions by the relevant studies on the review objectives. It is important to bear in mind that the exploratory nature of the research objective(s) of this thesis predisposes the literature discussions toward a descriptive narrative of what is, and not so much as what ought to be. In this instance, key themes and categories were examined as they emerged from the literature collections. Several concepts, emerging themes and categories from this review serve as a groundwork for the next chapter on big data epistemologies and construction of conceptual frameworks and theory of change which guide the entire thesis.

CHAPTER 3

Epistemology, Conceptual Mapping and Framework

3.1 Introduction

The overarching intention of every scientific enquiry is to make sense of the world; however, the process and approach adopted by the investigator are largely influenced by the epistemic system guiding the entire research design. To this end, this chapter shall put into consideration the previous findings from the review of the literature and conceptual framework to help make sense of the entire design, epistemology, and framework of analysis of this thesis.

This chapter discusses the epistemic paradigm, the conceptual mapping and the conceptual framework that undergirds the study. The first section explains the research paradigm of the thesis as derived from the studies of the literature. The second section expounds on big data epistemology and its knowledge-making processes; the challenges of the perceived observation vs active experimentation debate is also addressed in this section. The third section outlines the process of constructing semantic and discourse networks using the RQDA, igraph and tidyverse packages in R. The identified concepts such as *Social media*, *Twitter, Government agency*, *Disaster response*, *Disaster and Emergency Management*, *Crisis Communication, Big Data*, etc. are presented using network layouts such as Fruchterman-Reingold in different tiers of first- and second-level concepts.

The interconnectedness between these concepts are their tiers are also clearly presented in the section. The last section examines the various theoretical and conceptual frameworks and models prevalent in the study of crisis leadership and disaster management as revealed in the literature review. It also concentrates on the interrelationships between the concepts (as variables) for the theories. It knits together all the concepts in a conceptual framework in preparation for the development of the theory of change in the next chapter.

The discussion section of the systemic literature review in the previous chapter evinces a dominant preference for a qualitative approach in most of the studies. The methodologies and frameworks of analysis of this thesis were derived from the

systematic evaluation and mapping of the core concepts and variable relationships drawn from the reviewed literature. In this chapter, I outline the process for the derivation of the conceptual framework from the networks of terms and concepts from the literature.

3.2 Research Paradigm: Methodology, Epistemology and Ontology

Within the social science research universe, there is a research paradigm that contains specific features necessary for providing probable and explicit answers to social problems. These features are ontology [what reality is], epistemology [how to know this reality] and methodology [how do you go about investigating this reality]. According to Michael Crotty, the paradigm 'establishes the parameters and set the boundaries for scientific research and, in the ordinary course of events, scientific enquiry is carried out strictly in line with it.'[185] Ontological constructs include pragmatism, constructivism, realism, postmodernism, interpretivism, positivism and post-positivism. These are paradigms that represent diverse understandings of reality; with each paradigm contributing to a specific way of projecting knowledge (epistemology).

Humans have different ways of perceiving meaning and of understanding reality. Although without sounding reductionistic, the two major epistemic positions are objectivity and constructionism. To the objectivists, reality is *outside* and *without* human consciousness. It is out there and not subject to human frail perceptions and meaning imposition. Crotty affirms that:

> Objectivist epistemology holds that meaning, and therefore meaningful reality, exists as such apart from the operation of any consciousness. That tree in the forest is a tree, regardless of whether anyone is aware of its existence or not. As an object of that kind ('objectively', therefore), it carries the intrinsic meaning of 'tree-ness'. When human beings recognise it as a tree, they are simply discovering a meaning that has been lying there in wait for them all along.[186]

Those who subscribe to this school of epistemology support positivism and post-positivism quantification approach to knowledge production. Constructionism on the

[185] Crotty, Michael (1998), *The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process*. London: Sage.
[186] Crotty (1998), p. 5.

other hand posits that reality is constructed; and, that meaning is not independent of the perceiver. While both concepts suggest an object-subject bifurcation of reality, objectivism affirms that the object is independent of the subject (perceiver or observer). Constructionism is the exact opposite of objectivism.

To the constructionists, nothing can be truly said to be known without a knower. The very fact that humans perceive the same phenomenon differently preclude any epistemic absolutes: the different interpretations confer on similar experiences interdicts any attempt at objective knowledge. In social sciences, constructivism or social constructivism is construed as an epistemic paradigm that considers knowledge as derived from social contexts. A combination of individual collective experiences (*collaborative elaborations*) can lead to newer insights and meaning.[187] The collective experiences of the people can help build knowledge.

It is not necessary to embark on social research with a pre-set epistemology. Although there are circumstances which demand following that path, the objectives of investigation should dictate the paradigm rather than forcing all experiences into specific moulds. The nature of the enquiry will determine its epistemological and methodological pathway. If the ontology is objective, then a positivistic theoretical and methodological path would be more appropriate. However, if the ontology is constructionist, then the theoretical and epistemological approaches will be largely interpretivist. See Table 3.1. below for more details of the interrelationships between the various constructs in the larger social science research paradigm.

[187] Kukla, Andre (2000), *Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science*. London: Routledge

Table 3.1: Summary of Research Paradigms[188]

Paradigm	Ontology *What is reality?*	Epistemology *How can I know reality?*	Theoretical Perspective *Which approach do you use to know something?*	Methodology *How do you go about finding out?*	Method *What techniques do you use to find out?*
Positivism	There is a single reality or truth (more realist).	Reality can be measured and hence the focus is on reliable and valid tools to obtain that.	Positivism Post-positivism	Experimental research Survey research	Usually quantitative, could include: Sampling Measurement and scaling Statistical analysis Questionnaire Focus group Interview
Constructivist / Interpretive	There is no single reality or truth. Reality is created by individuals in groups (less realist).	Therefore, reality needs to be interpreted. It is used to discover the underlying meaning of events and activities.	Interpretivism (reality needs to be interpreted) • Phenomenology • Symbolic interactionism • Hermeneutics Critical Inquiry Feminism	Ethnography Grounded Theory Phenomenological research Heuristic inquiry Action Research Discourse Analysis Femenist Standpoint research etc	Usually qualitative, could include: Qualitative interview Observation Participant Non participant Case study Life history Narrative Theme identification etc
Pragmatism	Reality is constantly renegotiated, debated, interpreted in light of its usefulness in new unpredictable situations.	The best method is one that solves problems. Finding out is the means, change is the underlying aim.	Deweyan pragmatism *Research through design*	Mixed methods Design-based research Action research	Combination of any of the above and more, such as data mining expert review, usability testing, physical prototype
Subjectivism	Reality is what we perceive to be real	All knowledge is purely a matter of perspective.	Postmodernism Structuralism Post-structralism	Discourse theory Archaeology Genealogy Deconstruction etc.	Autoethnography Semiotics Literary analysis Pastiche Intertextuality etc.
Critical	Realities are socially constructed entities that are under constant internal influence.	Reality and knowledge is both socially constructed and influenced by power relations from within society	Marxism Queer theory feminism	critical discourse analysis, critical ethnography action research ideology critique	Ideological review Civil actions open-ended interviews, focus groups, open-ended questionnaires, open-ended observations, and journals.

[188] Patel, S., (2015), The Research Paradigm – Methodology, Epistemology and Ontology – Explained in Simple Language. *Salma Patel*. Available from http://salmapatel.co.uk/academia/the-research-paradigm-methodology-epistemology-and-ontology-explained-in-simple-language/ [accessed 6 March 2018]

3.3 Big Data: Perceived Observation vs Active Experimentation

Big Data has been criticised as a knowledge approach which rather favours passive observation than active experimentation.[189] Since the primary subjects investigated in the physical sciences are mainly external objects, it follows that their epistemology will include verifiability and falsification as well as replication. The dominant knowledge approach consists of the collection and analysis of data for observable similarities, differences, and patterns. Karl Popper criticised this physicalist empiricism; according to him:

> But in fact, the belief that we can start with pure observation alone, without anything in the nature of a theory is absurd; as may be illustrated by the story of the man who dedicated his life to natural science, wrote down everything he could observe, and bequeathed his priceless collection of observations to the Royal Society to be used as evidence. This story should show us that though beetles may profitably be collected, observations may not.[190]

In furtherance of his position, Popper narrated an incidence which transpired between himself and some Physics students; he said to them:

> Take pencil and paper; carefully observe and write down what you have observed!' They asked, of course, what I wanted them to observe. Clearly the instruction, 'Observe!' is absurd. (It is not even idiomatic, unless the object of the transitive verb can be taken as understood.) Observation is always selective. It needs a chosen object, a definite task, an interest, a point of view, a problem. And its description presupposes a descriptive language, with property words; it presupposes similarity and classification, which in their turn presuppose interests, points of view, and problems.[191]

Popper's criticisms exposed the embedded frailty for solely depending on observation alone. The same criticisms can be extended to the experimentation method – another process in naturalist epistemology. To ensure objectivity, knowledge must not only be demonstrable but must also be replicable. This insistence upon replicable experiments by the natural sciences is understandable given its

[189] Pesce E., Riccomagno E., Wynn H.P., (2019), *Experimental Design Issues in Big Data: The Question of Bias*. In Greselin F., Deldossi L., Bagnato L., Vichi M. (eds) *Statistical Learning of Complex Data*. CLADAG 2017. Studies in Classification, Data Analysis, and Knowledge Organization. Cham: Springer. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-21140-0_20
[190] Popper, K. R., (1963), *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Essays and Lectures)*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
[191] Popper, K. R., (1963), p. 46.

purview. While physical objects are usually reproducible, subjective experience or social reality is not usually subject to this factor; especially given that no two human experiences (the subjects of social enquiries) are exactly alike.

The social sciences, especially sociology 'positive sciences' borrowed some of the epistemologies of the natural sciences. Through the years, social science research has evolved to accommodate divergent approaches which cater to the different experiences in human and social realities. The causal-nomological outlook of the natural sciences predisposes them to propound hypothetical-deductive methods of knowledge production where in certain instances, the relationship between variables is explained or used to predict other variables.

The very existence of known and unknown confounds or extraneous variables challenges epistemic objectivism predicated on experimentation. It is not always the case that variable *x* caused or influenced variable y. There may be some other variables that are not perceptible or obvious to the observers at the time of the experimentation which may be responsible for the observed results. Though randomised controlled trials have been developed to attend to this problem, this solution tends rather towards mere approximation or abstraction from the whole. The sample cannot be the same as the population.

Big Data epistemology could be grouped with the positivist perspective of the natural sciences since data is often construed as quantifiable. The error here is implied in the meaning of the term 'data'. Hence, the misattribution of Big data to the positivist-objectivist survey paradigm. Therefore, it will amount to an oversimplification to attribute big data to active experimentation because the concept itself is not reducible to mere quantitative data. It is a conglomeration of diverse structured and unstructured data artefacts including textual, numeric, pictorial, geo-specific, sensor and other data forms. Big data can accommodate experimentation; it also allows for observations either passive or active. According to Martin Frické: "Big Data is not incompatible with experimentation. But it is the friend of passive observation: It encourages passive observation. Conducting surveys and making observations amount to passive observation."[192]

Participant observation and ethnography are methods positions of qualitative studies; the weakness of these positions lay in the subjectivism of the observers and

[192] Frické, M., (2015), Big Data and Its Epistemology. *Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology 66*(4), pp. 651-661.

the relativism of the experience being observed. In the process of constructing meaning from shared individual experiences, so many unintended confounds are imposed on interpretations. This is not to dismiss its epistemic usefulness. Passive observations through big data epistemology address some of these challenges, although the approach is not itself immune to problems as no approach is perfect.

Big data is not only a technology, it is an epistemology – it is an innovative approach to constructing knowledge in an age of large data. These are data that are non-traditional in volume, scope, and metric. The increasing capabilities of computing and internet technologies have led to a need for a newer methodological approach to knowledge-making. Unlike the restriction of sampling small data or interviewing fewer subjects, big data by its magnitude has made both real-time active and passive observations of people possible. This digital method of data collection and analysis where the observers may not be aware of their participation thereby reducing observer bias is a strong point for big data; however, there are ethical privacy concerns. This peculiarity distinguishes big data from other methodological approaches.

As noted earlier, both observation (active or passive) and experimentation approaches fit into big data epistemologies. The significance of this statement is supported in the findings from the literature review chapter where a significant chunk of the studies adopted qualitative methodology side by side quantitative or mixed methods. To do proper justice to the objective of this thesis, I have adopted to a large extent a constructivist/interpretive research approach in keeping with scholarly works on big data methodology.[193,194] Social media data is the dominant big data technology used in disaster management and security-leadership decision-making as established in the literature.

Subsequent sections in this chapter discuss the process for constructing the conceptual framework of analysis of this study. I am starting with unbundling the various concepts and their relationships as revealed in the reviewed literature. The framework of analysis must be considered alongside the conceptual framework. This is a network of concepts as nodes and their relationships as links or edges. The disambiguation also provides the opportunity to understand the usage of the terms

[193] Gooding, David C., (1990), *Experiment and the Making of Meaning*. Dordrecht & Boston: Kluwer.
[194] Radder, Hans (2009), The Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation: A Review. *Automated Experimentation* 1(1), pp. 1-8. DOI: 10.1186/1759-4499-1-2

within the context of the research because a concept can assume different meanings in different contexts.

3.4 Conceptual Networks and Mapping

Concepts are core ingredients for meaning-making and their importance cannot be overstressed - they are the building blocks of the constructivist approach to research. Concepts are of different forms: concrete and abstract. In the physical sciences, concepts are mainly tangible and there are fundamental agreements on their nature. Oxygen in Nigeria is the same as Oxygen in India. But in the social sciences, concepts are mostly abstract representations of realities. It is easier to define a stone than it is to define peace. There are five primary theories of concepts; they are classical, prototype or exemplar, theory-theories, and atomist theories.[195] The atomist (a critical view of concepts) and neo-classical (a variation of the classical view) theories are of little concern to this study. The *classical or a rule-based* view of concept opines that a concept shares a common set of necessary and sufficient defining properties. Losing a husband is the necessary condition for being a widow. You cannot have a widow who has never lost a husband and who is not a woman. These properties (losing a husband and being a woman) are characteristics of the *widow* concept. A widow may have necessary and sufficient properties, but can we say the same about *colour*? What are the necessary properties of colour or beauty?

The *prototype or exemplar* theory is common among the positivists, it is the categorisation of concept through some typical features; according to Eleanor Rosch, "a prototype denotes a stimulus which takes a salient position in the formation of a category and it is so, because of this is the first stimulus to be associated with that category."[196] For instance, when a *robin* is mentioned, what comes to mind is the term *bird* and not a car. But caution must be exercised here because without context, robin could be the name of a man (Robin Hood) or a car (e.g., Reliant Robin). As the name suggests, prototype or exemplar denotes types and examples of the term. A robin is an example of a bird when used in the context of ornithology. With a category, certain

[195] Earl, Dennis (2018), *The Classical Theory of Concepts*. Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Available at https://iep.utm.edu/Conc-Cl/ [accessed 6 March 2018]
[196] Rosch, E. H., (1973), Natural Categories. *Cognitive Psychology, 4*(3), pp. 328-350.

members are more typical than the other.[197] This *typicality* constitutes another feature of concepts apart from *similarity*. A sparrow is more typical of a bird than an ostrich. An ostrich is atypical in that regard. When someone says a vehicle is in his backyard, one does not have the image or prototype of an aeroplane. This still emphasises the need for contextuality and properties in describing a concept.

The fuzziness of social concepts necessitates another approach - the theory-theories. Dennis Earl affirms that the *theory-theories*:

> analyze a concept in terms of some internally represented theory about the members of the extension of that concept. For example, one might have an overall theory of birds, and the concept one expresses with one's use of 'bird' is then analyzed in terms of the role that concept plays in that internally represented theory.[198]

This meaning of concept describes succinctly the constructivist use of the term. A framework constructed out of concepts serving as a structural guide for the whole research exercise. The theories, models and meso-frameworks are abstracted from the literature associated with the subject help to illuminate the study path. The traditional approach to a conceptual framework of analysis leaves room for subject bias. It is not enough to just pull out a framework from thin air or to analyse data without understanding the important role a good conceptual framework plays in the entire research process - from the choice of methodology to the analysis of data collected and the discussion of the findings. Georges Bordage defines conceptual frameworks as "ways of thinking about a problem or a study, or ways of representing how complex things work the way they do. Different frameworks will emphasise different variables and outcomes, and their inter-relatedness"[199]

There are different approaches to making a conceptual framework; the tradition, and perhaps the most common approach may not suffice if the extent of the framework is limited to the subjective interpretation (usually biased) of concepts gotten from the literature. The advent of digital methods such as social networks, natural language processing etc. has provided better alternatives to reducing this subjectivity. This approach takes care to adopt certain elements of positivism that can enhance a qualitative understanding of the issues latent in the corpus of texts. This does not

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[197] Rosch, E. H., (1973), *On the Internal Structure of Perceptual and Semantic Categories*. In T. E. Moore (Ed.), *Cognitive Development and Acquisition of Language* (pp. 111-144). San Diego: Academic Press.
[198] Earl, Dennis (2018).
[199] Bordage, G., (2009), Conceptual Frameworks to Illuminate and Magnify. *Medical Education 43*(4), pp. 312-319.

suggest in any way that machines can replace expert opinions offered by humans. That over-reliance on digital methods could potentially reduce a conceptual framework to a mere structural presentation of frequency counts of word occurrences. Instead, a mixed approach combines the quantitative with the qualitative for a more meaningful outcome. Thereby avoiding would otherwise have been a gamut of meaningless inanities or at worse a mere journalistic writing which is not worth being called an academic piece.

A nomological network of constructs (concepts) will help to ensure construct validity; that is, the variables have an operational definition that truly represents the meaning of the concept in theory (the literature) - the interrelationships between these constructs.[200] How these concepts interrelate help to provide a clear direction for the entire research process; it also helps to guide the framework of analysis. Essentially, a network is a graph (G) consisting of a set of vertices (nodes) connected by edges forming path(s). Concepts are nodes and the connections between them are the various interrelationships of terms used in the literature – in this case – the reviewed literature in the previous chapter. These concepts are coded or abstracted from the definitions of discipline-specific terms or through open coding from emerging themes in the literature.

While building a conceptual framework, concepts must be disambiguated, and construct validity must be guaranteed – construct validity ensures that concepts are operationalised. Construct validity refers to the "degree to which inferences can legitimately be made from the operationalizations in your study to the theoretical constructs on which those operationalizations were based."[201] Traditionally, validity has been defined as "the degree to which a test measures what it claims, or purports, to be measuring."[202] According to William M.K. Trochim, to achieve construct validity, Cronbach and Meehl argued that:

> you had to develop a nomological network for your measure. This network would include the theoretical framework for what you are trying to measure, an empirical framework for how you are going to measure it, and specification of the linkages among and between these two frameworks.[203]

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[200] Cronbach, L. J., & Meehl, P. E. (1955). Construct Validity in Psychological Tests. *Psychological Bulletin 52*(4), 281-302.
[201] Trochim, William M.K., (2021), Research Methods Knowledge Base. *Conjoint.ly*. Available at https://conjointly.com/kb/construct-validity/ [accessed 14 February 2021]
[202] Brown, J. D., (1996), *Testing in Language Programs*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall Regents, p. 231.
[203] Trochim, William M.K., (2021).

A Concept network or semantic network is a good practice for ensuring construct validity. The company concept keeps or in corpus linguistic term – their collocational networks can illuminate their meanings. *Red* as a term connotes nothing meaningful while standing alone as it could mean colour, brand, or a name; a *Red Car* makes more specific sense. The concept *Car* enhances the conceptual meaning of the concept *Red* through contextualisation. The immediate company that red keeps - in this case – the word car has highlighted its meaning thereby excluding other potential meanings of the term red. In a conceptual or semantic network, the texts are analysed for associated terms or neighbours to build the meaning of the core concepts together with their linkages which eventually will contribute to the construction of a conceptual framework. The first stage in constructing this network of concepts is to manually code (inductive or open coding and deductive or theoretical) the entire text collections. As stated by Yanto Chandra and Liang Shang,

> inductive coding or open coding, which is the preferred option under the constructivist approach, allows a user to code a textual unit (e.g., paragraphs, sentences, words) that is close to (i.e., the basic or lowest level) the data without being predicated on any theory, construct or concept.[204]

For example the statement: "this research shows strong evidence that strategic use of social media in crisis planning will yield positive impact on and impression of management of a crisis" is coded as *crisis planning*.[205] However, some statements contain multiple concepts and they are coded likewise, for instance, the proposition "Herein we examine the use of a social media, Twitter, and assess its value for disaster management with a focus on planning and early warnings" is coded as *Twitter, Social media*, *disaster management*, *disaster planning*, *and early warnings*.[206] Deductive coding, on the other hand, is a positivistic approach and as the name suggests, code categories are abstracted from established concepts, variables, or theories. For example, this proposition: "In crisis informatics, 'convergence behaviour' refers to the tendency of individuals during crisis events to converge on the site of the crisis, practising behaviours such as sight-seeing or disaster pilgrimage and sharing

[204] Yanto, C., & Liang, S., (2017), An RQDA-Based Constructivist Methodology for Qualitative Research. *Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal 20*(1), pp. 90-112. DOI: 10.1108/QMR-02-2016-0014
[205] Graham, Melissa W., Avery, Elizabeth J., & Park, Sejin (2015), The Role of Social Media in Local Government Crisis Communications, *Public Relations Review* 41(3), pp. 386-394.
[206] Carley, K. M., Malik, M., Landwehr, P. M., Pfeffer, J., & Kowalchuck, M., (2016), Crowd Sourcing Disaster Management: The Complex Nature of Twitter Usage in Padang Indonesia. *Safety Science 90*, pp. 48-61. DOI: 10.1016/J.Ssci.2016.04.002

expressions of support and concern for participants" is coded as *convergence behaviour* because the statement is a theoretical definition of the term without requiring a third-party inference or abstraction.[207]

I carried out the coding and analysis of the conceptual network using the RQDA, igraph and tidyverse packages involving expert coders with proficiency in R.[208] A total of 35 pieces of literature were coded. These are articles used in the systematic review of literature in the previous chapter. The coding includes text extracted from abstracts, keywords, methodology, findings, and discussion sections of each reviewed literature. Common stop words were excluded. The process involved expert abstractions of concepts. At the end of the coding, 134 concepts were extracted. See Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1 for the top 30 concepts. The topmost common concepts are *Social media*, *Twitter, Government agency*, *Disaster response*, *Disaster and Emergency Management*, *Crisis Communication, and Big Data*. These concepts reveal the thematic focus of the literature and the research. This is not surprising given the objectives of the thesis. The top terms only buttress the general representativeness of the literature and their relatedness to the focus of the study. However, a list of normalised frequency is not enough, as it only tells a part of the story, further insights can be garnered by applying network metrics to the collection. A semantic network is appropriate in this regard: making sense of the collection as a complete graph. As claimed by Eric W. Weisstein, a complete graph is:

> a graph in which each pair of graph vertices is connected by an edge. The complete graph with n graph vertices is denoted K_n and has $\binom{n}{2} = n(n-1)/2$ (the triangular numbers) undirected edges, where $\binom{n}{k}$ is a binomial coefficient.[209]

[207] Shaw, F., Burgess, J., Crawford, K., & Bruns, A., (2013), Sharing News, Making Sense, Saying Thanks: Patterns of Talk on Twitter During the Queensland Floods. *Australian Journal of Communication 40*(1), pp. 23-40.
[208] Huang, Ronggui (2016), *RQDA: R-based Qualitative Data Analysis. R package version 0.2-8.* Available at http://rqda.r-forge.r-project.org/ [accessed 2 November 2017]
[209] Weisstein, E. W., (2018), Complete Graph. Wolfram Web Resources. Available at https://mathworld.wolfram.com/CompleteGraph.html [accessed 13 February 2018]



Figure 3.1: Normalised Frequency of topics in the coded literature

Figure 3.2 below shows an example of a complete network (graphs A to D). The nodes (vertices) are connected by the lines. Each instance of the graphs represents a sample text within the corpus, while the nodes are the various topics or concepts. For example, graph A has 3 concepts (1, 2, 3); graph B also has 3 concepts or topics but a closer look at the network topology will reveal that concepts 2 and 3 are in both graphs A and B. Therefore, the two graphs must bear some similarities: they are closer compared with graph D. If the two graphs are combined, the edge or links connecting both concepts 2 and 3 will be thicker or stronger because the two concepts are present in both graphs A and B.



Figure 3.2 Examples of complete networks (A-D)[210]

Figure 3.2 above shows the different nodes in their networks, but the interrelatedness of the network across the hypothetical text A-D can be made more obvious by redrawing the networks to reveal this connection across the entire collections. This approach displays the clusters/communities interlinked by their commonly shared nodes or concepts (See Figure 3.4 below). This is achieved by creating a Document-Term-Matrix from which an adjacency matrix is generated for graph visualisation using the igraph package in R.



Figure 3.4 Communities/Clusters formation from the Networks[211]

[210] Prevos, Peter (2018). Discourse Network Analysis: Undertaking Literature Reviews in R. *R Bloggers*. Available at https://www.r-bloggers.com/2018/11/discourse-network-analysis-undertaking-literature-reviews-in-r/ [accesses 14 December 2018]
[211] Ibid.



Figure 3.5: Network Topology of the Concepts in the Literature (text) corpus collection

Figure 3.5 above is the network generated from the literature adopting the steps outlined above. The layout of the graph was done using a force-directed Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm. This algorithm "is useful for visualizing very large undirected networks. It guarantees that topologically near nodes are placed in the same vicinity, and far nodes are placed far from each other."[212] The proximity of the concept nodes represents the closeness or relatedness of the concepts. *Facebook*, *Google+*, *Tumblr*, *YouTube*, *LinkedIn*, *Pinterest*, and *WhatsApp* are tightly packed together with links to the bigger Social media concept nodes because of their similarity.

The thicker the lines or edges between concept nodes, the more they co-occur - this depicts the weight of their relationships. For instance, the lines between *Guinea*,

[212] Alencar, Aretha (2011). *Fruchterman-Reingold With Annotation (Prefuse Beta). Confluence*. Available at http://wiki.cns.iu.edu/spaces/flyingpdf/pdfpageexport.action?pageId=1704110 [accessed 13 February 2018]

Sierra Leone, *Liberia* nodes and the *Ebola* nodes is relatively thicker than surrounding lines; this shows the level of relationship between the concepts. This is attributable to the fact these countries had Ebola outbreaks. Another important observation is the size of the node. The bigger the node, the more frequent (normalised) it occurred in the entire collection. *Social media*, *Facebook*, *Big Data*, *Emergency response* have bigger nodes compared to the other nodes because these concepts occur more frequently than the other nodes. This network feature can help to abstract the prominent conceptual narrative of the literature - the dominant discussions, and to summarise the entire corpus.



Figure 3.6: Concept network communities

A better visualisation is provided in Figure 3.6 above which clearly shows the concepts clustered in different network communities because of their shared topological features. The nodes with the same colour share some similarities and their background contexts also indicate their community. Some nodes belong to different clusters because of the multi-features which they share with concept nodes in other communities. However, both networks in Figs 3.5 and 3.6 provide me with a general overview of the concepts in the literature. One key observation so far is the fact that a familiarity with the literature or subject expertise is needed to interpret and analyse the connections. It is crucial to take the procedure further to wring out more insights from the entire collection. The next method involves several in-depth processes like those above but is designed to reveal the interconnectedness of the concepts against the context of the thesis questions and objectives.

I uploaded all the texts in the sampled collection of literature to an SQL database; I then queried the database with the RQDA package in RStudio. Other R packages used are sqldf and plyr. As pointed out earlier in the chapter, I used inductive coding to abstract 134 codes from the collections: these are the *first-level* codes (concepts). These codes yielded the initial network structures for the descriptive overview discussed previously. When the communities have been abstracted, RQDA was used to plot a discourse network that not only revealed the second-level codes, but also the *first-level* codes. The *second-level* codes serve as the over-arching super-codes for the *first-level* codes (See Table 3.2 below). The *first-level* codes are also known as collocates.

Table 3.2: First and Second-level codes[213]

Second-level codes	**First-level codes (Collocates)**
Location	Australia (5)* France (1) Guinea (3) Haiti (2) Indonesia (3) Liberia (2)

[213] * Numbers in brackets indicate the relative occurrence of the concepts distributed across the texts in the corpus

	Philippines (2) Saudi Arabia (3) Sierra Leone (2) Singapore (4) United Kingdom United States (10)
Disasters and Emergencies	California drought (3) Colorado floods (1) Drought (3) Earthquake (5) Ebola (8) Floods (1) Haiti earthquake (2) Haiyan typhoon (1) Heatwave (1) Hurricane Matthew (1) Hurricane Irene (1) Hurricane Katrina (1) Hurricane Sandy (6) Jeddah floods (1) Queensland floods (4) Snowfalls (1) Tropical cyclone (1) Tsunami (8) Wildfire (7)
Disaster Management	Citizen coproduction (4) Collaborative network (1) Crisis communication (27) Damage assessment (1) Decision-making (6) Disaster and emergency management (38) Disaster mitigation phase (9) Disaster planning (6) Disaster preparedness (15)

	Disaster relief information system (1) Disaster relief operation (3) Disaster response (40) Distributed leadership (2) Early warning (8) Emergency response (4) Fundraising (1) Information infrastructure (11) Information processing (2) Insights (8) Knowledge management (6) Local government (10) Message effectiveness (5) Message style (10) Monitoring (2) Networked coproduction (1) Networked governance (1) Non-governmental organisation (2) Opinion Leaders (4) Post-disaster recovery (1) Public wisdom (1) Reconnection (3) Risk management (5) Situation awareness (15) SMAT barriers (1) Social media (73) Trust (10) Ushahidi (2) Volunteering (9) Wisdom of crowds (2)
Information and Communication Management	Actionable data (4) Ambient journalism (1) Big data (25) Citizen coproduction (4)

	Citizen engagement (15) Collective memory (1) Convergence behaviour (2) Crisis communication (27) Crisis informatics (5) Crowdsourcing (1) Data integrity (3) Decision-making (6) Digital humanitarianism (5) Disaster relief information system (1) Disaster response (40) Distributed leadership (2) Distributed conversation (1) Enactment (3) Facebook (12) Fact-checking (4) Flickr (3) Framing (3) Google+ (1) Government agency (41) Informatics (4) Information access (1) Information experience (4) Information extraction (3) Information infrastructure (11) Information processing (2) Information quality (2) Information sharing (8) Insights (8) Knowledge management (6) LinkedIn (1) Meaning-making (3) Message amplification (6) Message effectiveness (5)

	Message style (10) Microblog data (1) Mobile (6) Myspace (1) News and blog (3) Pinterest (1) Public wisdom (1) Reconnection (3) Resilient information infrastructures (3) Risk communication (7) Rumours and misinformation (4) Sensemaking (6) Situation awareness (15) Social media (73) Trust (10) Tumblr (1) User-generated content (1) WhatsApp (1) YouTube (5)
Actors	Citizen coproduction (4) Government agency (41) Local government (10) Non-governmental organisation (2) Opinion Leaders (4) Residents (4) Volunteering (9)
Risk	Risk communication (7) Risk management (5)
Social Media and Social Networks	Facebook (12) Fact-checking (4) Flickr (3) Google+ (1) LinkedIn (1) Myspace (1)

	Networked coproduction (1) Networked governance (1) Pinterest (1) Quantitative social network analysis (1) Sahana (2) Sina (1) Social media (73) Social network (4) Tumblr (1) Twitter (47) Ushahidi (2) WhatsApp (1) YouTube (5)
Digital Technologies	Al Arabiya (1) Al-Saha Al-Siyasia (3) Big data (25) Data integrity (3) Data mining (5) Disaster relief information system (1) Facebook (12) Flickr (3) Google+ (1) ICT (10) Informatics (4) LinkedIn (1) Microblog data (1) Mobile (6) Myspace (1) News and blog (3) Pinterest (1) Predictive analytics (1) Remote sensing and satellite technologies (3) Resilient information infrastructures (3) Sahana (2)

	Sina (1) SMAT barriers (1) Social media (73) Social network (4) Tumblr (1) Twitter (47) User-generated content (1) Ushahidi (2) WhatsApp (1) YouTube (5)
Big Data Analytics	Actionable data (4) Crisis informatics (5) Crowdsourcing model (2) Big data (25) Data integrity (3) Data mining (5) Facebook (12) Fact-checking (4) Flickr (3) Google+ (1) Informatics (4) Information access (1) Information extraction (3) Information infrastructure (1) Information sharing(8) Insights (8) Knowledge management (6) LinkedIn (1) Microblog data (1) Mobile (6) Pinterest (1) Predictive analytics (1) Public wisdom (1) Quantitative social network analysis (1)

	Semantic analysis (2) SMAT barriers (1) Social media (73) Social network (4) Tumblr (1) Twitter (47) User-generated content (1) WhatsApp (1) YouTube (5)
Methodologies and Methods	Case study Interpretive analysis New index analysis (2) Qualitative method (3) Quantitative social network analysis (1) Semantic analysis (2) TF-IDF method (1)

I used the data matrix from the Kamada-Kawai layout network algorithm to generate the visualization of the table above and Figure 3.7 below. The *second-level* codes or concepts are at the core of each subgraph within the entire network topology. *Location, Disasters and Emergencies, Disaster Management, Information and Communication Management, Actors, Risk, Social Media and Social Networks, Digital Technologies, Big Data Analytics, Methodologies and Methods* are second-level codes (concepts). The connecting concepts – the satellites surrounding or directed towards them are the *first-level* codes.

The second-level codes are abstracted or inferred inductively from the first-level codes. The Kamada-Kawai layout optimises the network visualisation better than the community clustering in Figure 3.6 above. It makes it possible to view the place of these concepts within the entire topology and their interconnectedness across different clusters and network communities. It is now possible to drill down to sub-networks and to declutter the whole network such that specific networks can be focused upon for further analysis. Figure 3.8 shows a sample sub-network that focuses on *second-level* concepts *Digital Technologies, Disaster Management, and Big Data Analytics* with their first-level concepts**.**



Figure 3.7: Second-level and first-level codes (concepts) visualisation with their collocates using Kamada-Kawai Layout network algorithm



Figure 3.8: Digital Technologies, Disaster Management, and Big Data Analytics sub-graphs and their collocates (first-level concepts)

3.5 The Conceptual Framework Explained

This section looks at the theoretical and frameworks and models prevalent in the reviewed literature; with a special focus on the conceptual connections and relations to propose a conceptual framework for the thesis. The systematic review of literature in Chapter two throws up various theories and concepts associated with the objectives of this thesis. These theories and models include Habermasian 'Public Sphere', Information Literacy, Citizen Co-Production Theory, Information Processing Theory & Networked Governance, Cooper's Analytics Framework, The Concept of Resilient Information Infrastructure etc. Appendix 13 has some of the common theories surrounding big data technologies and their impacts on security-leadership decision-making in crisis or disaster situations as mined from the literature. Since the disaster events varied, the theoretical models are subject to the context of the events as no two crisis events are exactly alike. Therefore, their interventions would be different.

There are different disaster phases with their corresponding leadership styles and management types. The phases include mitigation, preparedness, emergency response, and recovery. For decades, most disaster researchers and emergency managers use these categorisations to organise information and to streamline priorities and activities during a disaster.[214] There are variants of these phases such as the normative model developed by the National Governors' Association for the comprehensive management cycle. Akemi Takeoka Chatfield and Christopher G. Reddick outline the four path-dependent phases of the disaster management cycle as derived from the model thus: (pre-disaster) *mitigation* (or prevention), (pre-disaster) *preparedness*, *response*, and (post-disaster) *recovery*.[215] Chatfield and Reddick affirm that:

> The model holds that the government's better mitigation and preparedness capacity can enhance its capacity for agile and adaptive disaster response actions, including disaster risk communications, rescue and relief operations, and evacuations. The government's response phase operations in turn can affect the recovery phase outcomes.[216]

[214] Huang, Q., & Xiao, Y., (2015), Geographic Situational Awareness: Mining Tweets for Disaster Preparedness, Emergency Response, Impact, and Recovery. *ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information 4*(3), pp. 1549-1568. DOI: 10.3390/Ijgi4031549
[215] Chatfield, A. T., & Reddick, C. G. (2018), p. 260
[216] Chatfield, A. T., & Reddick, C. G. (2018)

It is glaring that different actors play different prominent roles in the different phases of the disaster cycle. The mitigation and the response phase have *government agencies* (local government*)* or local policymakers and traditional first responders such as Police, Fire and Ambulance services playing important roles because of the nature of their mandates. Even in places with rudimentary or non-existent first responder services, the first actors to be called when there are extreme events are the Police and or the Fire Services. Contrarily, the post-disaster or recovery phase quite often always involves additional actors other than the traditional actors; these include the *opinion leaders, volunteers, residents, non-government organisation personnel* in the affected communities.[217]

There is a presence of a *collaborative network* between the citizens through active citizens' engagement - mostly in the *disaster communication* process - and government agencies. In certain disaster cases with effective outcomes, these governmental agencies worked via *networked governance* amongst the various responding agencies encouraging a form of *distributed leadership*. All the italicized words are concepts used in the literature. Figure 3.9 shows the Fruchterman-Reingold network layout of first- and second-level concepts (*Disaster management* and *Actors*) for an illustration of the interconnectedness of these italicised concepts.

In ineffective disaster outcome cases, the situation is different because there is hardly any connection between responders, government agencies and local actors due to distrust and the inefficiency of government services.[218] Those affected by disasters in these cases tend to intervene on their own. Additionally, in these instances, the local government administration system is moribund; even the Fire department is under the control of the Federal and State governments. The interventions by local actors – governmental and non-governmental are pivotal to the effective outcome the disaster leadership in cases involving distributed leadership. Since disaster media is mainly local; news directly from the location of the disaster is preferred more to third-party retelling. Hence, federal and state government amplifies the messages from the local tiers. Findings from the study done by Jeannette Sutton et al. on health-related warning messages through Twitter by public safety agencies during the 2013 Boulder, Colorado flood disaster reveal that:

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[217] Chatfield, A. T., & Reddick, C. G. (2018), p. 161

[218] Brixi, Hana (2104), A Matter of Trust: Governance and Service Delivery in the Time of Ebola. World Bank Blogs. Available at https://blogs.worldbank.org/governance/matter-trust-governance-and-service-delivery-time-ebola [accessed 3 April 2017]

> that local emergency management (@BoulderOEM) took the lead in communicating emergency public health information and was the most frequently retweeted account and that state and federal agencies mainly functioned to promote or amplify local messages. This finding matches well with previous research indicating that local organizations take the lead in communicating during an event, reinforce each other, and are often amplified by organizations at the state and federal levels.[219]

Melissa W. Graham, Elizabeth J. Avery, and Sejin Park investigate local governments' crisis management using a close-ended questions survey about participant's use of social media during a crisis, the types of social media tools used, and their perceptions about social media's role in managing the crisis. The survey of local government officials (N=307) led to key findings including the following:

i. More than 70% of local government officials (N=205) engage in social media during a crisis; 29% reported they did not use social media during a crisis (N=83).
ii. Facebook (N=157, 53%) was the most popular social medium for local governments to use during a crisis followed by Twitter (N=81, 27%), blogs (N=17, 6%), YouTube (N=13, 5%), Google Plus (N=8, 3%), and other (N=19, 6%).
iii. Practitioners at local governments serving the smallest communities in this sample used social media during a crisis to a lesser extent overall and used fewer tools than officials in the larger population categories. Consistent with previous research, this survey found that as community size increased so did the extent of use and number of social media tools engaged during a crisis.[220]

The above findings suggest that local government agencies play a significant role in disaster management; though there are demographical variations to this observation because local governments in less populated communities engage fewer social media tools than those in densely populated communities. Early warning mechanisms and disaster response usually involve residents and government agencies (locals). But in places where government intervention is limited, it is important to evaluate how the

[219] Sutton, J., League, C., Sellnow, T. L., & Sellnow, D. D., (2015), Terse Messaging and Public Health in The Midst of Natural Disasters: The Case of The Boulder Floods. *Health Communication 30*(2), pp. 135-143. DOI: 10.1080/10410236.2014.974124
[220] Graham, M. W., Avery, E. J., & Park, S., (2015), The Role of Social Media in Local Government Crisis Communications. *Public Relations Review* 41(3), pp. 386-394. DOI: 10.1016/j.pubrev.2015.02.001

affected communities engage with mitigation agencies and other resilient structures throughout the disaster cycle. Governmental actors are central to disaster management; they are depended upon to provide leadership in *disaster and emergency management, decision-making, early warning, post-disaster recovery*, etc. As observed in the nodes around the *Disaster Management* concept in the network map (See Fig. 3.9).

Given the nature of large-scale insecurities, the actors with the biggest resources, including information infrastructure and legitimate means of ensuring compliance are the government. It is therefore apt, that some of the concepts will be associated with governmental actors although they are not the only sole important concepts in disaster leadership and management. From the network in Fig. 3.9, it can be observed that the *Disaster Management* and the *Actors* nodes are indirectly corrected through some first-tier nodes such as *Opinion Leaders, Volunteering, Local government, Non-governmental organisations, Governmental agency, and Residents*. This network behaviour shows that these other nodes play crucial roles in the disaster management process as well.



Figure 3.9: Disaster Management and Actors sub-graphs and their collocates using Fruchterman-Reingold Layout

Crisis Communication-related nodes occupy the bulk of the network topography. This shows the importance of information and communication in disaster and crisis management. Concepts like *situation awareness, message style, knowledge management, information infrastructure* are pivotal to crisis communication, this is also visualised in the network map. A careful exploration of the network visualisation in Figure 3.10 reveals the place of communication in security-leadership decision-making. Leading from this are the associated digital technologies and information technologies grouped as *information and communication management*; they are, *big data, big data analytics, social media, and social networks*. This highlights the relevance of technologies to *crisis communication*. Added to this is disaster messaging - this describes the nature, characteristics and dimensions of disaster messages *such as; message effectiveness, message style, situation awareness, trust, enactment, framing, insights, fact-checking, information quality, sensemaking, meaning-making, convergence behaviour, risk communication*, etc.

Information is key to disaster management and traditional knowledge management technologies may not be enough in a situation of large-scale disaster escalation. Hence, the adoption of big data technologies to cater to the peculiar demands of these events. Digital humanitarianism is the umbrella concept for the different technologies used at any of the phases of the disaster cycle. The deluge of information demands and the computing infrastructure requirements during emergency events warrant a robust approach to data processing and analysis for effective leadership decision outcomes. *Big data* is the technology whose form and attributes provide a solution capable of addressing some of these challenges.[221] These data (crisis big data), according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs:

> often originate from three different sources: individuals, governments and the private sector: This categorization is particularly useful in demonstrating that big data requires different types of stakeholders to work together to make data available to crisis managers, humanitarians, first responders and other actors. It also demonstrates some of the different

[221] These big data can be digitally generated. It can be crowdsourced or user-generated (e.g. social media data or blog posts). At times, they are passively produced data – these are data generated with little or no conscious observation or intervention: they are independent of the person producing the data. These include sensors-generated data from health fitness device, mobile device GPS data and other geotagged data devices

varieties of data that crisis informatics professionals are working within this sphere.[222]

Big data is like every other data type apart from the sheer volume which distinguishes it from the rest; although, the volume does not translate to quality. Apart from geological or weather data, most crisis or disaster big data types are social media data generated by users on the internet. From the literature and the normalised frequency chart in Figure 3.1, it is obvious that social media top the list of the most frequent concept (normalised) in the reviewed literature related to big data and security-leadership decision-making in crises. As reported in a study by Nader Afzalan et al, "in 2010, social media was ranked as the fourth most popular source for retrieving emergency information."[223] This further supports the idea that most crisis data are social data. Velev, Dimiter and Plamena Zlateva clearly expressed this view when they noted that "a big part of any Big Data use in a disaster relief operation is going to come through the use of crowdsourcing and with the advent and large-scale adoption of social media."[224]

Digital Technologies, *Social Media* and *Social Networks* are core concepts in the graph (See Fig. 3.10 below). A look at their affiliated nodes reveals their characteristics and discursive elements. Digital Technologies is linked to crowdsourcing applications, ICT and the different big data social media technologies like *Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube* etc. *Microblog data, User-generated Contents* and *Informatics* express the nature of the type of data associated with these technologies. The *Network coproduction* concept emerged from the literature as discussed even in the reveal to represent the nature of relationships across these digital technologies. To make sense of the conversation, data mining is used to extract more information. *Ushahidi, Sahana and Sina* are also social network technologies used by volunteers, responders during emergencies.

[222] Watson, H., Finn, R. L., & Wadhwa, K., (2017), Organizational and Societal Impacts of Big Data in Crisis Management. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 25*(1), pp. 15-22. DOI: 10.1111/1468-5973.12141
[223] Afzalan, N. et al. (2015), p. 5
[224] Velev, D., & Zlateva, P. (2016). An Analysis of The Relation Between Natural Disasters and Big Data. *International Journal of Data Science 1*(4), 370-381. Doi:10.1504/IJDS.2016.081372



Figure 3.10: Information and Communication Management, Big Data Analytics, Digital Technologies, and Social media and social networks sub-graphs and their collocates using Kamada-Kawai Layout

Social media exemplifies actionable data which big data technologies contribute to digital humanitarianism; the usefulness of social media during a disaster include 'sharing information and spreading awareness, for relief operations: e.g., building communities, volunteering, etc., for collecting funds, monitoring and providing insights to the whole situation.'[225] Recent advancements in high-end computing have provided more opportunities for processing information faster. They also enabled the possibilities of social networks on a massive scale.[226] Figure 3.10 shows *social media* and *social networks* surrounded by *Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Google+, Tumblr, YouTube, LinkedIn*, *Microblog data, Mobile* sandwiched between *Fact-checking, Insights, Actionable data, Digital Technologies*, etc. The network contains the interlink between the characteristics as well as salient issues and challenges of big data usage in disaster information communication. The discursive aspects of social media communication have made an enormous amount of information and misinformation possible and available across the internet space.

The recent increase in concern over fake news has called to question the issue of trust governance and guardianship of trust in relation to information quality in disaster situations. Since most of the big data are gathered in the post-disaster phase through reliance on the wisdom of the public or crowdsourcing, the quality of information collected is essential to the leadership response and decision-making process. Social media such as Facebook and Twitter were used to spread fear and misinformation about Ebola during the West Africa outbreak of the virus between 2013 and 2016. Victor Luckerson observes that the spread of false information about the diseases through social media was not limited to the affected West African communities alone.[227] The misinformation was global in scope. On the report of Joachim Allgaier, At some point, the Iowa Department of Public Health:

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[225] Velev, D. and Plamena Zlateva (2016)

[226] Social media is just an artefact of big data technologies; the relevance of this tool to disaster management is in the content generated. These social data are subject to the nuances of communication and messaging and they are only useful if they provide the relevant information to decision makers. To this end, the ability to filter out noise from insights is within the expert experience of the emergency managers and responders as leaders.

[227] Luckerson V., (2014), Fear, Misinformation, and Social media complicate Ebola fight time. *Time*. Available from: http://time.com/3479254/ebola-social-media/ [accessed 3 March 2017).

> was forced to issue a statement dispelling rumors that Ebola had arrived in Iowa and spread among its citizens. Lots of posts in social media networks also claimed that Ebola can spread through the air, water, or food, which does not correspond with the scientific information on the subject.[228]

Countering false information immediately has been proven to have worked in engendering public trust. A good example was the tactic adopted by the Queensland Police Service Media Unit with the creation of a collection of tweets under the hashtag #Mythbuster through the @QPSMedia account designed to combat rumours and misinformation.[229] This method worked and contributed to the effective security-leadership decision-decision in this situation of large-scale insecurity. The police and other emergency-related services around the world now have social media units with dedicated staff manning their various accounts to provide rapid response and information at least from government perspectives.

Trust and *Data integrity* do not necessarily go together on their own. People generally trust or tend to believe people they know or respect. Therefore, a piece of information is considered trustworthy if it can be linked to some respectable figures. This is especially common in communities with deference culture with little or no government presence. During the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, communication was nearly botched because of the disconnect between the residents of the affected communities and the lack of government presence. The communities have evolved their *resilient information infrastructure* and coping mechanisms through years of government neglects. These gaps are filled by local healers and religious leaders.[230] Trust, according to Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman is the:

> willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular

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[228] Allgaier, J., & Svalastog, A. L., (2015), The Communication Aspects of the Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak in Western Africa - Do We Need to Counter One, Two, or Many Epidemics? *Croatian Medical Journal 56*(5), pp. 496–499. DOI: 10.3325/cmj.2015.56.496

[229] Shaw, F., Burgess, J., Crawford, K., & Bruns, A., (2013), Sharing News, Making Sense, Saying Thanks: Patterns of Talk on Twitter During the Queensland Floods. *Australian Journal of Communication 40*(1), pp. 23-40.

[230]Coltart, C. E., Lindsey, B., Ghinai, I., Johnson, A. M., & Heymann, D. L., (2017), The Ebola Outbreak, 2013-2016: Old Lessons for New Epidemics. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences 372*(1721), pp. 1-24. DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2016.0297

> action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party.[231]

During the Ebola outbreaks in West Africa, a lot of residents in the affected areas expressed their lack of trust in doctors and dismissed Ebola as a hoax. This dangerous trend had to be curtailed through interventions from non-governmental organisations such as Doctors without Border and the World Health Organisation who worked with trusted community leaders.[232] This further deepens the roles of *distributed leadership* and *networked governance* in the security-leadership decision-making in disasters or crises. In Nigeria, some prominent religious leaders plugged themselves into the conversation quite controversially.

A case in point is that of the preacher Temitope Balogun Joshua who claimed that the Ebola disease was from the pit of hell and that the disease was manufactured by Satan. It was reported that the preacher later sent "4,000 bottles of 'Anointing Water' to the Ebola-stricken nation of Sierra Leone on the request of the government, alongside $50,000 in humanitarian aid."[233,234] The water therapy hoax spread amongst the citizens in affected communities and was popularised across in Nigerian media. The National Centre for Disease Control, officials of Lagos State Ministry of Health and the Federal Government had to visit the prophet, Temitope Joshua to solicit his support and cooperation to prevent Ebola victims from being brought into the country by health migrants who believed that his church could heal them. The words of the Director of the Centre for Disease Control (CDC), Professor Abdulsalami Nasidi captures the leadership influence exercise by these non-governmental actors:

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[231] Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D., (1995), An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust. *Academy of Management Review 20*(3), pp. 709-734.
[232] Nyhan, Brendan (2014), Fighting Ebola, and The Conspiracy Theories. *New York Times*. Available from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/26/upshot/fighting-ebola-and-the-conspiracy-theories.html [accessed 25 June 2018]
[233] Premium Times (2014), EBOLA is Manufactured by Satan – T.B. JOSHUA. *Premium Times*. Available from https://www.premiumtimesng.com/foreign/west-africa-foreign/167112-ebola-is-manufactured-by-satan-t-b-joshua.html [accessed 3 March 2017]
[234] These leaders are so powerful that their opinions are respected by citizens and government officials alike. If the government of the nation of Sierra Leone can request "Anointing Water" from a prophet, how would misinformation be successfully combated without considering?

> We are here to engage you positively, we know the powers of this House and your powers and we are duty-bound to protect you and your congregation. We have no doubt the power God has given you, we can't do that, but we want to help and make it work stronger.[235]

Crisis leadership or Security-leadership big data decision-making is encapsulated in crisis informatics, crisis messaging and framing of disaster for effective response to citizens expectations and needs. The link between emergency management and citizens engagement is the whole crisis communication process made possible by big data technologies. The significance of these technologies to the outcomes of crisis leadership decisions cannot be overstated. Public affect and communal awareness are sustained through the co-production of information manufactured as a distributed conversation through the instrumentality of social media technologies. Another interesting concept is *ambient journalism* – this is the transmission or production of news continuously usually from traditional media sources and shared via social media, microblogging platforms, and other new media technologies. This is demonstrable in the way users create content and ensure the virality of news from traditional news media sources.[236]

Media is expected to sharpen *collective memory* through disaster historicity in crisis. However, western news media have been criticised for their a-historicity since most situations of human suffering are considered non-newsworthy if they do not conform to public demands or advertisers' expectations.[237] Events are developmental and occurred in chronological succession, but in the words of Lucy Resnyansky "News stories lack temporal depth and use visual representations that create the effect of a simultaneous co-presence of events, rather than of their development."[238] This a-historicity is even more prominent in social media feeds where severe crisis events are

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[235] Akioye, Seun (2014), Lagos Government Warns Prophet TB Joshua not to Accept Ebola Victims at His Synagogue Church. *The Nation Newspaper*. Available from http://saharareporters.com/2014/08/03/lagos-government-warns-prophet-tb-joshua-not-accept-ebola-victims-his-synagogue-church [accessed 3 March 2017]
[236] Hermida, Alfred (2010), From TV to Twitter: How Ambient News Became Ambient Journalism. *Media/Culture Journal* 13(2). DOI: 10.5204/mcj.220
[237] Resnyansky, Lucy (2015), Social Media Data in The Disaster Context. *Prometheus 33*(2), pp. 187-212. DOI: 10.1080/08109028.2015.1102497
[238] Ibid

overridden or overwhelmed by irrelevant content e.g., adverts. These continuous distractions divert attention from crisis events. Some even reduced the severity and implications of these events to mere entertainments: this is conceptually depicted in crisis informatics as *convergence behaviour*; described as:

> the tendency of individuals during crisis events to converge on the site of the crisis, practising behaviours such as sight-seeing or disaster pilgrimage and sharing expressions of support and concern for participants.[239]

This convergence behaviour is more pronounced in the selfie culture with its many encumbrances of self-promotion. There are cases where accident victims post pictures of their survival making sure to emphasise how lucky they were to have survived the ghastly accident that claimed so many lives. This behaviour is however not all gloomy as it has also helped to sustain and maintain crisis conversations that would otherwise have been swarmed by other *news-worthy* contents. All the various *#IStandWith* hashtags have helped in this regard to sustain crisis conversation.

Information quality, information access, information experience and information sharing are concepts that explain the characteristics of crisis informatics and disaster messaging. Access to disaster information is key to *knowledge management* in the various stages of the disaster cycle. Social media produces opportunities for curating, archiving, disseminating, and sustaining *distributed conversations* in disaster communication. As observed from the analysis so far, information is pivotal to effective decision-making in emergencies as revealed in the literature and reflected in the conceptual networks presented in this section.[240] The conceptual framework map in Figure 3.11 below was abstracted from the various concepts and relationships networks discussed above.

[239] Shaw et al. (2013), p. 35.
[240] Big data security decision-making in crisis and emergency events is dependent upon crisis informatics derived from the application of various machine learning and digital technologies algorithms to filter out noise from the data deluge to derive actionable data that can influence decision-making.



Figure 3.11: Conceptual Framework diagram

The conceptual framework or model in Fig. 3.11 above summarises the entire conceptual relations presented in the different maps and networks provided in this chapter. I used elements of the different concepts to formulate a model that serves as a foundation for the development of a theory of change in Chapter 4. The boxes contained the thematic categories drawn from the different network topographies while the arrowed links express their interrelationships. This model is a summary of all the networks. At the core of

the framework are distributed leadership, distributed conversation, and big data technologies e.g., social media. These concepts are central to the discourse in the literature on big data technologies and security-leadership decision-making in crises. The concepts or terms in blue boxes are descriptors and explanans: they are feature terms for highlighting and making sense of the relationships between the core terms (the concepts in the black boxes).

Of course, the dominant big data technology in situations of crisis and large-scale insecurities is social media. Crisis informatics is the description of the deployment of big data to the management of insecurities for decision-making.[241] Crisis Informatics are used in crisis communication and messaging for soliciting help mobilise towards response and for collective memory amongst other uses. For emergency leaders and managers, these mechanisms provide insights to decision-makers. They also help in the meaning-making of complex situations through various methodological approaches including social networks analysis, predictive analysis, machine learning classification problems.

The type of leadership observed in big data crisis decision-making in the literature is distrusted leadership or networked governance depending on the study. State and Non-State actors are dominant in the networked governance procedure. They are also the types of leaders: the embodiment of the distributed leadership type. Political leaders, police and firefighters are the dominant state actors in the literature. Opinion leaders, volunteers, NGOs, and residents are the non-state actors of prominence from the reviewed literature. Just like distributed leadership, the descriptor for the term or concept for summating the preferred communication typology in the literature is distributed conversation. All the concepts point towards crisis decision outcomes.

This outcome can be either effective or ineffective. Although in the literature, there is preponderance positive evidence associated with big data security-leadership decision-making outcomes. It is therefore not unsurprising to use positive terms like distributed leadership and distributed conversation and their variants featuring prominently in the literature. In the

[241] I use crisis, insecurity, emergency, complex situations, and disaster interchangeably throughout the thesis as explained in chapter 1 and 2

next chapter, I use this conceptual model/framework to develop the theory of change that proposes different factors responsible for effective and ineffective outcomes in crisis big data security-leadership decision-making.

CHAPTER 4

Set-Theoretical Approach and Conjunctural Causation with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

4.1 Introduction

The last chapter closed with the conceptual framework which was modelled from the mapping of the relations between the concepts as presented in the literature. This framework describes an overview of the dominant concepts in the networked relationships of disaster big data digital technologies security-leadership decision-making. The issue of variations in leadership outcome (in)effectiveness in this given situation is of central concern to this thesis. To understand the factors or the configurations responsible for the differentials in security-leadership effectiveness, a more robust approach is needed. I have adopted a deductive approach in my research design: moving from the generic to the specific.

I did this to avoid extrapolating findings from just two cases of Ebola and Flood in a single state – Lagos state; interviewing just a few actors will not suffice given the contextual nature of natural hazard related disaster events. I saw it fit to include only these types of hazards – I excluded human-generated crises and disasters from my list of cases; these cases varied in their outcome effectiveness and they spread across different countries. In part, this approach enabled me to avoid limited diversity and to help sizeable generalisability across different experiences. I used this approach to develop the theoretical model using fsQCA and then test this general model derived from the general disaster events on my selected cases of interest- the Lagos Ebola and the Lagos Floods using Q-methodology.

As a first step to addressing the gaps, I have developed a Theory of Change (ToC) from the conceptual framework and the literature. This ToC helps to model a hypothetical path or proto-causal explanation of the leadership outcome effectiveness or ineffectiveness differentials. To adequately test the assumptions of the Theory of Change, I have adopted an embedded or multimethod approach starting with the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Other methods shall be discussed in the subsequent chapters.

This current chapter focuses primarily on an exposition of the fsQCA (Fuzzy-set QCA) method – a variant of the broader QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis) set-theoretical methodological framework. The first section discusses the suitability of this method/methodology for small-, medium- and large-N cases. The next section expounded on causal-comparative reasoning and J. S. Mill's methods of logical enquiry. The next section discusses the differences between QCA vs variable-oriented vs case-oriented research approaches. This ties with a discussion of the distinction between *equifinality* and *multifinality*. The section after that explains the set-theoretic framework and set relations; it includes the variations of this framework – csQCA and msQCA and adduces reasons for the preference of fsQCA over these other variants. The next section contains a formulation of the Theory of Change (TOC) from the conceptual framework in the previous chapter as a tool for operationalising the QCA condition and outcome sets. There are also sections on QCA hypothesis and rephrasing of the research questions, calibrations of the outcome and conditions with their set-membership values (SMV).

The nature of the main thesis question underscores entails peculiar methodological approaches; this necessitates multiple research methods. To answer the main question: within situations where leadership decides disaster outcomes variations and uses digital technologies and big data, is there something about the way that they use big data and digital technologies that explains these outcomes variations? The question is both bold and complex; partly because of the implicit assumption in some of the submissions from extant studies on disaster leadership outcomes – which is always positive. A lot of the papers on the subject already have an unspoken assumption that big

data influence security decision-making positively. It is now near orthodoxy to praise the sterling contributions of social media and other paraphernalia of big data digital technologies for contributing to the success of crisis and emergency management without necessarily interrogating cases with alternative outcomes – the negative and the neutral.

However, there is the knotty question: "How do big data technologies influence or produce varied decision outcomes in situations of large-scale insecurities?" This how question remains hazy in nearly all the studies; at best it is glossed over or slightly touched upon in few paragraphs close to the conclusion sections of most papers on the subject. This question is central to this thesis. To expatiate further on its utility to the study, the question seeks to know if there are differential in outcome effectiveness or ineffectiveness in disaster/ crisis security-leadership decision-making outcome. Other micro-questions embedded in the how-question are the following: what are the causal conditions appropriate for instigating these "successful" outcomes? How do these factors combine to generate the outcome? To what extent or degree can the conditions be said to be necessary or sufficiently responsible for the outcome? Are these causal factors present in all instances of these outcomes across cases? Are there other explanatory causes beyond these noticeable causal factors responsible for the outcome? Why are there outcome differentials in several instances of adoption of similar causal conditions combinations cross-cases?

These are questions far beyond the capability of the popular case study methodologies and they are beyond the scope of traditional quantitative research approaches. Therefore, a mixed methodological approach featuring the strengths of both methodologies can help address these questions appropriately. Chief of these multiple methodologies is Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA); especially the fuzzy set version of QCA (fsQCA. It helps in the formulation of the Theory of Change (ToC) and it helps to outline the conditions or factors responsible for the outcomes. This chapter discusses at length the methodology in preparation for its implementation in the next chapter.

4.2 QCA Explained

As noted in the preceding sections, the limitations of the two main traditional research approaches necessitated an alternative that is not a triangulation of the two like most mixed methodologies per se, but an alternative that takes care of the prevalent weaknesses of the two approaches. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is a novel research methodology rooted in the philosophical logical method of enquiry of John Stuart Mills and innovated by Michael Smithson and Charles Ragin.[242,243] Ragin has been credited with the development of the methodology in its present form because he has extensively researched, reviewed and revamped the approach all through the years.

In the words of Rihoux and Ragin, QCA aims "to allow systematic cross-case comparisons, while at the same time giving justice to within-case complexity."[244] It is a tool with which to unfold the different causal complexities embedded in cases. It also helps to examine how these causal configurations - in part or as a whole - necessarily and/or sufficiently contribute to the outcome of an event. Unlike most theme-centric case study approaches which privilege emerging thematic categories across cases, QCA privileges within-case and cross-case analysis. This characteristic helps to understand variations in the causal nature of the factor attributes. This is important to further enrich comparisons across cases and it also strengthens the analysis of causal features.

The problems of reliability, generalisability and replicability have plagued qualitative research studies for ages; this is so, because of the metaphysics of the science in the social sciences. How can the knowledge derived from few selected case analyses be tagged scientific if the knowledge inferred is restricted to the subjective interpretation of the researchers? Besides if these "social" experiences cannot be generalised or abstracted to a certain degree. How reliable is the sampling procedure for case selection and

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[242] Mill, John S., (2013), *System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*. Miami, FL: HardPress Pub

[243] Smithson, M. (1987). *Fuzzy Set Analysis for Behavioral and Social Sciences*. New York: Springer-Verlag.

[244] Rihoux, B., & Ragin, C. C. (2009). *Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques*. Los Angeles: Sage.

participant selection? Can the claims inferred from the individually observed categories be replicable by others? Given the same datasets or in this case, the same observable categories, will the conclusions drawn be the same? These questions have plagued qualitative case study social science research for ages; and how to address them have also been researched with different postulations to solving the three subjects of reliability, generalisability, and replicability.[245,246] Added to these complexities, is the issue of validity: both internal and external.

QCA is a systematic research approach that is adequately fit for small-medium-N cases as well as large-N cases. It is well-suited to some form of generalisability in a way that will rival statistical inference, although it is not a replacement for quantitative inferences. In addition, QCA allows for transparency of the entire research process with careful attention to choices of cases, and the development of causal propositions. Although the aim of QCA is not to generalise to the universe, it, however, supports limited generalisability.[247] It can also help to formulate propositions that can be applied albeit - cautiously to similar cases outside of the original cases of interest.[248]

In recent years, QCA has been adopted as a preferred methodological approach in a lot of published social science articles as shown in the chart in Figure 4.1. below. There has been a significant increase in the number of articles that use this approach; this is perhaps partly due to the increasing demand for scientific credibility and evidence-based studies in recent times.[249]

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[245] Leung, L., (2015), Validity, Reliability, and Generalizability in Qualitative Research. *Journal of Family Medicine and Primary Care 4*(3), p. 324.
[246] Noble, H., & Smith, J. (2015). Issues of validity and reliability in qualitative research. *Evidence-based Nursing 18*(2), pp. 34-35.
[247] Rihoux, B., (2006), Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Systematic Comparative Methods: Recent Advances and Remaining Challenges for Social Science Research. *International Sociology* 21(5), pp. 679–706. DOI: 10.1177/0268580906067836.
[248] Rihoux, B., (2006)
[249] Befani, B., (2016). *Pathways to change: Evaluating development interventions with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)*. Stockkholm: Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys (the Expert Group for Development Analysis).



Figure 4.1: Number of articles published with QCA per year[250]

4.3 Variants of QCA

QCA is a set-theoretic approach that is rooted in Boolean Algebra and Fuzzy logic. It has different variants such as crisp (csQCA), fuzzy (fsQCA) and multi-value (mvQCA) sets QCA. The first two are more popular in QCA than the last (see Figure 4.2 below). Set-theoretic thinking is premised on the assumption that social experiences could be bounded in set relations using elements of membership inclusion and exclusion.

[250] Roig-Tierno, N., Gonzalez-Cruz, T. F., & Llopis-Martinez, J., (2017), An Overview of Qualitative Comparative Analysis: A Bibliometric Analysis. *Journal of Innovation & Knowledge 2*(1), pp. 15-23.



Figure 4.2: Number of articles using the different QCA methodologies[251]

Crisp set contains dichotomous elements. These elements are depicted in the Boolean Logic of 0 and 1. With 1 denoting full membership of a given set, while 0 means fully out of the set membership. In our lived social experiences, a very good case for illustration of crisp set relationships is membership of a family. You are either a member of a family or not. With family as a set and membership of a family as an element of the family set. Membership element, in this case, can be represented by the familial statuses of son, daughter, father, and mother. In their features, they are all elements of the family set. In political science, party membership is also a typical example; no one can be and not be a member of a political party at the same time, you are either a member or not. With 1 representing membership and 0 representing non-membership. Crisp set QCA (CsQCA) captures set relations instead of mere variables; the ideal of this approach is to identify elements of sets of causal conditions responsible for elements of the outcome sets. It also allows for the absence of these elements – both presence and absence are important to qualitative comparative analysis in general.

QCA - crisp QCA in particular - uses Boolean logic, Boolean minimisation, and truth table to determine the necessary and sufficient causal conditions responsible for an outcome. However, not all social relations are

[251] Roig-Tierno, N., Gonzalez-Cruz, T. F., & Llopis-Martinez, J., (2017), p. 20.

crisp set relationships; subjects such as democracy, satisfaction, freedom, peace cannot be easily dichotomised into membership and non-membership elements. How democratic must a country be to be considered a democratic country? Set elements are not ordinal variables because they are not about which variable category is greater than the order; they are not about ranking as well. Neither are they merely categorical variables (e.g., Yes or No). Membership and Non-membership in a set relation are not about opposites like black is the opposite of white, it is about inclusion and exclusion in a membership. That's why the non-membership element of a set is also known as the set's complement. Non-membership is not the opposite of membership but its complement - elements of a given set that are not members of another set.

As noted above, there are great subjects of focus in social sciences that do not fit into the crisp set membership universe: they are fuzzy. Fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) captures this blurred relationship more adequately than the binary set membership values (SMV) of 1 and 0 of a crisp set. The degree of membership of a set is very crucial in a fuzzy set relation. To what degree is a country democratic or non-democratic? Are these countries in the fully democratic category (*fully in*) or they are in the fully non-democratic countries category. A country that is fully in the non-democratic set is *fully out* of the democratic set, *vice versa*. Nonetheless, there are recognised midpoints indicating zones of *maximum ambiguity* (not fully in, not fully out) - these are thresholds usually represented with a set membership value of 0.5.

For example, the reviewed literature suggested several contributions of social media to the successful outcome of emergency interventions in crisis situations ranging from the earthquake in Nepal and the Ebola outbreak in Nigeria. Social media in this instance may be considered an element of the set of conditions responsible for the successful or effective outcome of emergency interventions - the outcome set. Nearly all the reviewed literature followed this line of thought, but the attributes that constitute success or degree of success are not thoroughly explicated. If there are cases of successful intervention outcomes where social media technologies were not deployed (the counterfactual); then, it would be wrong to conclude that social media was fully

responsible for the reported successful outcome. In the later part of this chapter, I discussed the concept of set calibration: this is a measurement of variables in set relation i.e., determining how each case fit into specific degrees in a fuzzy set. This feature of fsQCA takes care of some of the problems outlined above. Can we conclusively affirm that the interventions were fully successful where they were reported as successful or not fully successful where they were reported as not successful? FsQCA helps to proffer a solution to this fuzziness. As reflected in chart 4.2 above, mvQCA is not popular in social research yet; there are also disputations and criticisms about this type.[252] The fittest variant of QCA for this thesis is the fsQCA. Before highlighting its strengths over other traditional research approaches, it is crucial to discuss the foundation of causal relations and its underlying philosophy. Overall, QCA as a methodology is guided by the principle of complex causality and combinatorial configuration of within-case analyses with formalised cross-case comparisons (exemplified by truth-table) among others.[253]

Causality is relevant to all social inquiries - however salient the framing of that causality - either as causal impacts or correlations, social researchers are interested in knowing how variables interrelate or interact to determine specific outcomes. To understand these causal relationships, several philosophers have propounded different logical models - J.S. Mill's methods are principal examples. The configurational set-theoretic research approach originated from Mill's methods. The next sections shall explain these methods and discuss how they relate to the subject of necessary and sufficient conditions – two tangential concepts in QCA.

4.3.1 Causal Comparative Reasoning – J.S. Mill's Methods of Experimental (Logical)

This section examines the philosophical foundation behind QCA as presented by J.S. Mill's Methods in his book titled *A System of Logic*. These methods deal with the subjects of causality and they guide understanding crisp and fuzzy sets

[252] Vink, M. P., & Vliet, O. V., (2013), Potentials and Pitfalls of Multi-Value QCA: Response to Thiem. *Field Methods 25*(2), pp. 208-213.
[253] Legewie, N., (2013), An Introduction to Applied Data Analysis with Qualitative Comparative Analysis. *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research 14*(3) DOI: 10.17169/fqs-14.3.1961

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) research approaches. They are a method of agreement, method of difference, joint method of agreement and difference, method of residue, and method of concomitant variations.

To start, it is crucial to define necessary and sufficient conditions since those terms feature a lot in this chapter. A condition is necessary if its presence leads to the presence of the outcome and if its absence leads to the absence of the outcome. In logical relations, if antecedent statement *P* is true, then consequent statement *Q* is true - *Q* cannot be true unless *P* is true. But, P can be true while *Q* is false. The relation is also expressed as if *P,* then *Q* (*P* ⇐ *Q)*. Oxygen is necessary for human life. It is impossible to sustain life without breathing oxygen. The mention of being alive conjures up the concept of oxygen. However, Oxygen is not sufficient for human life because you also need food to stay alive.

A sufficient condition is such that its presence produces the presence of the outcome; but, the presence of the outcome does not indicate the presence of the condition. In other words, *P* implies *Q* (*P* ⇒ *Q*). The statement: "If that is a rectangle, it must have four sides" is sufficient because all rectangles have four sides. However, not all shapes with four sides are rectangles; squares also have four sides. Some conditions are individually necessary but collectively sufficient. Oxygen is necessary for life, water and food are also necessary for life, but the combination of these elements or factors are collectively sufficient for life.

Some conditions can be both necessary and sufficient. In this case, an antecedent statement *P* is a necessary and sufficient condition for the consequent statement *Q* when *Q* is true if and only if *P* is also true. Either they are both true or they are both false. The logical relation is complimentary: whatever applies to *P* applies to *Q*.[254] *P if and only if* (iff) *Q;* also expressed as (P ⇔ Q). Sharing the same mother is necessary and sufficient for being a sibling.

[254] Academic Skills Kit (2018), Necessity and Sufficiency (Economics). *Academic Skills Kit*. Available from https://internal.ncl.ac.uk/ask/numeracy-maths-statistics/economics/sets-and-logic/necessity-and-sufficiency.html [accessed 16 December 2019]

4.3.2 Method of Agreement (MDSO)

According to Mill "If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon."[255] Put differently, given a collection of a group of sets of causal factors (X_i, X_{ii}, X_{iii}, ...X_n), the real causal factor responsible for outcome Y is that causal factor set that is present in all cases where Y occurs.[256] Another short form of this method is the "*most different with same outcome*" (MDSO). This statement may sound confusing without an illustrative example. Table 4.1. is a table showing a hypothetical list of individuals (Persons A to H) as cases alongside proposed causal factors (X_i, X_{ii}, X_{iii}, X_{iv}) responsible for the presence or absence of outcome factor Y (Terrorist Attack). Applying the rule of Mill's agreement, causal factor X_{ii} (Youth Unemployment) most likely caused outcome Y (Terrorist Attack) because, for every instance of its presence, the outcome always occurred. That is, in all the cases of terrorist attacks, the assailants always have youth unemployment (X_{ii}) variable marked as Yes.

Table 4.1: Mill's method of agreement illustrated[257]

Cases	**Causal factors (X_i, X_{ii}, X_{iii}, ...X_n)**				**Outcome (Y)**
Person	**Basic Education (X_i)**	**Youth Unemployment (X_{ii})**	**Non-Transparent Government (X_{iii})**	**Family Stability (X_{iv})**	**Terrorist Attack (Y)**
A	Yes (1.0)	**Yes (1.0)**	No (0.0)	Yes (1.0)	**Yes (1.0)**
B	Yes (1.0)	**Yes (1.0)**	No (0.0)	Yes (1.0)	**Yes (1.0)**
C	Yes (1.0)	**Yes (1.0)**	Yes (1.0)	No (0.0)	**Yes (1.0)**
D	No (0.0)	**Yes (1.0)**	Yes (1.0)	No (0.0)	**Yes (1.0)**
E	No (0.0)	**Yes (1.0)**	No (0.0)	Yes (1.0)	**Yes (1.0)**
F	No (0.0)	**Yes (1.0)**	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	**Yes (1.0)**

[255] Mill, J. S., (1996), *A System of Logic 1*. London: Routledge.
[256] Joe Lau & Jonathan Chan (2018), Mill's methods, *Critical thinking web*. Available from https://philosophy.hku.hk/think/sci/mill.php [accessed March 1, 2019]
[257] In this table and in the other tables, I have used 1.0 instead of 1 and 0.0 instead of 0 for convenience purposes only. They are the same.

G	Yes (1.0)	**Yes (1.0)**	Yes (1.0)	No (0.0)	**Yes (1.0)**
H	Yes (1.0)	**Yes (1.0)**	No (0.0)	Yes (1.0)	**Yes (1.0)**

4.3.3 The Method of Difference (MSDO)

The second method is a kind of response to the problems outlined above. In the words of Mill:

> If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance save one in common, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon.[258]

This method is also known as the "most similar with different outcome" (MSDO) rule. Table 4.2 explains this rule. All the causal factors (X_i, X_{ii}, X_{iii}, …X_n) but one caused terrorist attack (outcome Y). The only exemption is case G whose causal configurations of factors led to no terrorist attack. An odd distinction in the causal factor value is in the Youth Unemployment (X_{ii}) factor with a membership set variable of No (0.0). Going by the MSDO rule, the absence of youth unemployment is causally responsible for the absence of terrorist attacks; since its absence is the only instance where the outcome registered a negative.

[258] Mill J.S., (1882), *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and The Methods of Scientific Investigation. 8th Edition.* New York: Harper and brothers [online]. Available from http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/27942 (Accessed 7th December 2017).

Table 4.2: Mill's method of disagreement illustrated

Cases	**Causal factors (X_i, X_{ii}, X_{iii}, ...X_n)**				**Outcome (Y)**
Person	**Basic Education (X_i)**	**Youth Unemployment (X_{ii})**	**Non-Transparent Government (X_{iii})**	**Family Stability (X_{iv})**	**Terrorist Attack (Y)**
A	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)
B	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)
C	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)
D	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)
E	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)
F	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)
G	Yes (1.0)	**No (0.0)**	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	**No (0.0)**
H	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)

4.3.4 Joint Method of Agreement and Difference

This method addressed the problematic concerns of the two previous methods. According to Mill:

> If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance; the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon.[259] (Mill, 1996).

This method is a combination of the earlier methods. Under this method, both rules must hold. The presence of the condition must indicate the presence of the outcome (method of agreement) and the absence of the condition must lead to the absence of the outcome (method of difference). Table 4.3 demonstrates this method. Only the non-transparent government (X_{iii}) factor fulfils the condition of this rule. As shown, when this factor is present, the outcome is present; and, when the factor is absent, the outcome is absent too. It is, therefore, safe to infer that non-transparent government (X_{iii}) is responsible for the occurrence of the terrorist attack outcome Y.

[259] Mill J.S., (1882), p. 229.

Table 4.3: Mill's Joint method of agreement and disagreement illustrated

Cases	**Causal factors (X_i, X_{ii}, X_{iii}, ...X_n)**				**Outcome (Y)**
Person	**Basic Education (X_i)**	**Youth Unemployment (X_{ii})**	**Non-Transparent Government (X_{iii})**	**Family Stability (X_{iv})**	**Terrorist Attack (Y)**
A	No (0.0)	Yes (1.0)	**Yes (1.0)**	Yes (1.0)	**Yes (1.0)**
B	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	**Yes (1.0)**	Yes (1.0)	**Yes (1.0)**
C	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	**Yes (1.0)**	Yes (1.0)	**Yes (1.0)**
D	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	**Yes (1.0)**	Yes (1.0)	**Yes (1.0)**
E	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	**No (0.0)**	Yes (1.0)	**No (0.0)**
F	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	**No (0.0)**	Yes (1.0)	**No (0.0)**
G	No (0.0)	Yes (1.0)	**No (0.0)**	Yes (1.0)	**No (0.0)**
H	Yes (1.0)	Yes (1.0)	**No (0.0)**	Yes (1.0)	**No (0.0)**

4.3.5 Method of concomitant variations

This method is an improvement of the Joint method. It agrees with that method's claim that outcomes are proportional to their causal factors. It addresses the degree or the extent to which the cause influences the outcome. In the words of Mill:

> Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation.[260]

To demonstrate this method, take a given scenario where an epidemiologist is investigating the cause of a disease outbreak. She has four subjects to work with. A common issue to all the subjects but one is the fact that they ate green pawpaw. The last subject ate yellow pawpaw. Only those who took green pawpaw fell ill. Having isolated this (green pawpaw) as a joint factor, she proceeded to identify the degree of consumption to ascertain the veracity of the claim that the pawpaw caused the disease. The first ate one slice of green pawpaw and felt a little light-headed; the second ate three slices of green pawpaw and became slightly ill; the third fainted after eating six slices of green pawpaw. Judging by the degree of this causal factor - green pawpaw;

[260] Mill J.S., (1882), p. 233.

the epidemiologist can safely conclude that green pawpaw caused the disease outbreak.

4.3.6 Method of Residue

Mill described this method thus: "Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous inductions to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents."[261] This is an elimination method. All the causal factors are identified; from this array, known causal factors are removed. The remaining unknown factor is attributed as the cause of the outcome. Below is a symbolic representation of the method. Suppose we want to find the cause of outcome *z*. We can do so by following the approach below. Suppose A, B, C co-occur with effect (outcome) *x, y, z;* If A causes *x*; and, if B causes *y*; it follows that C is the of *z*. Given that all the other causal factors have been eliminated.

4.3.7 Problems of Mill's Methods

Mill's methods accentuate our default decision-making processes - the heuristic way we draw causal relations. These methods of Mill are rudimentary, and they limit cause-effect relationships to mono-causal factors. Though, this captures our approach; but social realities are often complex and multi-causal. Under this circumstance, the approaches are inadequate. Most social relations are sufficient or both necessary and sufficient causal conditions. There are diverse causal pathways; also, the outcomes are not always binary - successful or unsuccessful. They could be grey or fuzzy - with different variations, categories, or levels of the outcome - completely unsuccessful, somehow successful, completely unsuccessful, or somehow successful.

There are other methods for addressing these shortcomings such as hypothesis-testing, but this approach provides very little explanation on how these different causal factors related to the differences in the outcome factors.

[261] Mill J.S., (1846), *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and The Methods of Scientific Investigation.* New York: Harper and brothers.

In comes the set-theoretic approach of fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. [262] It is a configurational research approach for making sense of cause-effect relations and their pathways.

4.4 QCA versus Variable-Oriented and Case-Oriented Research Approaches

Equifinality and Multifinality are significant terms that describe the teleological aspirations of most social science investigations. Equifinality is when a combination of causal conditions leads to the same outcome.[263] Multifinality is the inverse of this concept; it opines that a causal condition could lead to different outcomes.[264] For example, "two children who were sexually abused could have very different outcomes despite extremely similar early experiences."[265] Closely related to equifinality and multifinality is the concept of *counterfactuality*. This is the "what ifs" of all cases. It refers to the alternative outcomes which could play out without the causal factors' interventions. For instance, would have happened without big data social media influence in disaster management? Would the outcome be similar or different? QCA with its Logical remainder and Boolean minimisation is representative of this concept.

Variable-oriented research studies especially quantitative regression analysis and correlation examine the linearity of the relationship between independent (predictor) variables and the outcome variable as well as the extent of the relationship. They look at the net effects of predictor variables on the outcome. In contrast, case study research studies deal primarily with themes and concepts at a meso-level. Their focus is primarily on the depth, rather than the breadth of the subjects of study, unlike the quantitative

[262] Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C., (2012), *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[263] Almy, B., & Cicchetti, D., (2018), Equifinality Versus Multifinality. In M. Bornstein (Ed.), *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Lifespan Human Development* (pp. 764-765). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.
[264] Ibid
[265] Penny, D., (2011), Encyclopedia of Child Behavior and Development. *Reference Reviews 25*(6), pp. 10-11. DOI: 10.1108/09504121111155932

variable-orientated approach whose main aspiration is towards generalisability.[266]

QCA is different from the two approaches because "it is not strictly focused on either the effects of causes or the causes of effects but on the mechanisms linking cause and effect."[267] QCA recognises the fact that the same causal pathways could to different outcomes. Another point to re-emphasise is the non-linearity of most causal relations that QCA seeks to investigate. Human social behaviours are not always linear. As such, they are quite often impervious to correlation and regression analyses. A spurious correlation is another problem plaquing frequentist and inferential-focused research methods – drawing relations where none existed just because they are similar in their directionality.

A typical example is a belief that since no nation with McDonald's has ever gone to war with the United States; it, therefore, follows that McDonald's prevents war against the United States. QCA counters this problem because it is not focused on strong or weak relationships between independent and dependent variables. The reality of the asymmetrical nature of several social experiences is not lost to QCA. As an illustration, tobacco is believed to be responsible for lung cancer; several Nigerian TV adverts even boldly claim that: "tobacco smokers are liable to die young". But, can it be conclusively concluded that the absence of tobacco can lead to the absence of cancer? How about a lung cancer patient who has never smoked? This is the type of complexity that QCA addresses. According to Hirzalla:

> Asymmetry means that the recipe for the occurrence of the outcome is not simply the opposite of the recipe for the non-occurrence of the outcome. Therefore, the explanation of the non-occurrence of the outcome cannot be derived from the explanation of the occurrence of the outcome. The non-occurrence of the outcome needs to be assessed separately.[268]

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[266] Onepoll (2017), Qualitative Research: What Is It and Why Should You Use It? *Onepoll*. Available from: https://www.onepoll.us/qualitative-research-what-is-it-and-why-should-you-use-it/ [accessed 3 March 2019]

[267] Small, M. L., (2013), Causal Thinking and Ethnographic Research. *American Journal of Sociology 119*(3), pp. 597-601. DOI: 10.1086/675893

[268] Hirzalla, F., (2019), Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA): Set Theory and Complex Causality. *Coursera*. Available from https://www.coursera.org/lecture/qualitative-comparative-analysis/1-3-set-theory-and-complex-causality-dhyok [accessed 18 January 2020]

From the findings in the systematic review of literature discussed in the previous chapter, it is obvious that most of the studies are qualitative case studies. This is because of the central subject of the thesis – disaster. Since disaster and emergency events tend to be situation-specific, a case study is the preferred methodology of choice. However, there is a profound limitation of case-oriented qualitative research - the non-replicability and non-generalisability of its findings. This is due to the small-N focus of the approach; and, also because of the opaque method of drawing subjective meanings from its findings.[269]

Variable-oriented research studies, on the other hand, focus on a large-N population focus but it is clear that a large number of observations does not translate to the quality of the datasets. QCA sits in between small-N and large-N data populations. It also adopts the systematic approach of the quantitative research paradigm as well as the deep insights of qualitative research providing ample room for replicability and mild generalisability. QCA combines deep theoretical knowledge of situations and in-depth case studies. A case study would help with providing depth for configuring and calibrating factors for QCA research, but it is not sufficient on its own without the presence of other methods in the framework.

4.4.1 Limitations and Weaknesses of QCA

QCA is not the silver bullet for all problems; it has its limitation. It cannot only handle cases with relatively few numbers of cases and causal conditions. Where the causal factors are too many, other research methods would be preferable. Also, if the aim of the research is about the effect size of the intervention on the outcome, other quantitative methods would perform better than QCA. The question of missing data is also a very huge problem with QCA.

Unlike other research methods, missing data will lead to the removal of the cases with the missing data in QCA. These missing data might be relevant

[269] Devers, K. J., (2013), Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to Study Patient-Centered Medical Homes: An Introductory Guide. *Urban Institute*. Available from https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/24261/412969-using-qualitative-comparative-analysis-qca-to-study-patient-centered-medical-homes.pdf [accessed 18 January 2020]

for deriving alternative outcome insights.[270,271] It is not predictive, neither is it the best method for hypothetical-deductive problems. Hence, it is not appropriate for hypothesis testing and it is not useful for small in-depth case studies.[272] The following sections discuss set theory, set notations and relations. It also discusses rules of sufficiency and necessity – these are core terms in QCA.

4.4.2 fsQCA: Set-theoretic framework and Set Relations

Fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) is a variant of QCA with a specific focus on causal and conditional variables that are not dichotomous. Unlike Crisp Set Comparative Analysis (csQCA) that works with clear Boolean logical relations (0 and 1); the truth value of fsQCA is not clear cut. Not all social relations can be represented in base 2 binaries.

The degrees of membership of a set membership can vary between fully in-membership (1) and fully-out (0) with a threshold of 0.5 representing a zone of maximum ambiguity (not fully in and not fully out). Membership values 0.6 and 0.8 are more in than out (i.e., *almost fully in*) because they are closer to 1, and they are also above the 0.5 thresholds. On the other hand, 0.4 and 0.2 are more out than in (i.e., *almost fully out*). See these calibration scores as you will see the scores on the Likert scale. These calibrations are dependent derived from expert theoretical knowledge of the phenomenon and familiarity with the cases and data.

The set-theoretic framework entails relations between supersets and subsets for determining conditional necessity and sufficiency. This set relation is operationalised through Boolean algebra. social science research makes propositional statements with truth values. Social media influences security decision-making in complex crisis situations is a declarative statement or preparation that can either be TRUE or FALSE; hence, its truth valuations.

There is a mixed-method component in fsQCA because it combines both qualitative and quantitative methods across and within cases. On the one

[270] Befani, Barbara (2016), p. 58.
[271] Befani, Barbara (2016), pp. 62-63.
[272] Kahwati, L. C., & Kane, H. L. (2018). *Qualitative Comparative Analysis in Mixed Methods Research and Evaluation* (Vol. 6). SAGE Publications. pp. 21-22.

hand, it is as iterative as traditional reflexive qualitative case-study research where the entire research process involves back and forth reflections. On the other hand, while quantitative regression measures relationships between dependent and independent variables, fsQCA is concerned with the necessity and or sufficiency of causal conditions with the outcomes. The parameters of fit in QCA is the measure of consistency and coverage. We shall discuss these concepts in the following sections.

4.4.3 Sets and Boolean operations

Sets are collections of elements. As discussed earlier in this chapter, an element is a member of a set. Laptops, desktops, and servers are elements or members of the set computer. Boolean operators are derived from logical connectives named after George Boole, and they help describe logical relations. They also connect propositions (statements). The most relevant Boolean operatives for QCA are AND, OR and NOT. They are: AND represented with a dot (.), a cap (∧) or an asterisk (*); OR is symbolised by a cup (∨), or a plus sign (+); NOT is represented by a tilde (~), or a prime (′).

In this thesis, for the sake of readability, I choose to symbolise negation with smaller case e.g., btech_access; although, in some charts and tables for the same reason, I retain the uppercase with the tilde (~) symbol e.g., ~BTECH_ACCESS for negation. The AND is also known as conjunction; standing at the junction of propositions. While OR is the Logical Union or a disjunction (∨). The interactions between sets of propositions are connected by these Boolean operators. A proposition such as the combination of community engagements and inclusive governance together or social media analytics are responsible for effective disaster response could make more sense when represented in Boolean relations. The compound composition has been reduced to its parts with Letters standing for each set of propositions.

A = community engagements
B = inclusive governance
C = social media analytics
D = effective disaster response

Propositions A, B and C are causal propositions; D is the outcome proposition (statement). The compound statement is represented as:
*(A*B) + C = D*

Another innovative way for representing set and logical relations is through the pictorial Venn diagrams; named after the mathematician, John Venn. This diagrammatic approach is useful for illustrating sets relations. It is a visual representation of the alphabet and the logical operatives. This is particularly true for depicting subset and superset relationships.

4.4.4 Conditional Logic of Necessity and Sufficiency

All combinatorial set logic including QCA are combinations of conditions and outcomes. Ragin proposed that the necessity and sufficiency of QCA relations should be assessed through set-theoretic inclusion (Ragin, Charles C., 1987; Ragin, Charles C., 2000). Although necessary and sufficient conditions have been explained in a previous section (see Section 4.3.1), I am going to reiterate the definitions here in this section for emphasis and clarity. A condition is described as necessary if, the outcome is always present with the presence of the condition.

That is, *Q* cannot occur without the presence of *P*, but the presence of Q does not translate to the occurrence of *P*. *P* on its own cannot guarantee the presence of *Q*. Logically speaking, if P, then Q ($P \Leftarrow Q$) For relations of sufficiency, "P is sufficien*t* for Q" because P being true always implies that Q is true, but P not being true does not always imply that Q is not true.[273] A condition *P*, in some instances, a combination of several conditions is said to be *sufficient* for outcome *Q*, if the outcome *Q* is always present whenever the condition *P* or the combination of conditions is always present.

Since social sciences rarely attribute a singular causal condition to the outcome of a complex social phenomenon, most of the set-relations involve a combination of several causal conditions. From the initial findings from review literature, several causal factors pathways led to the outcome. In this case, the successful or non-successful outcome of big data social media security-

[273] Bloch, E. D., (2011), *Proofs and Fundamentals: A First Course in Abstract Mathematics*. New York: Springer.

leadership decision-making in disaster situations. The complex social conditions may not be easily reducible to a binary of necessity and sufficiency; some pathways spot both necessary and sufficient conditions. For example, heavy smoking, high air pollution, and genetic history may collectively be sufficient as causal factors for lung cancer; but they are also individually necessary conditions for lung cancer.

These collective conditions constitute a causal pathway. Bear in mind that, there may be multiple causal pathways to the same outcome. Exposure to second-hand smoke, exposure to radon gas, and exposure to carcinogens e.g., asbestos can also collectively cause lung cancer. Thereby, their configuration constitutes another causal pathway. Most social experiences are like this; although more traditional social research approach, focus on one causal pathway, or they look at individual causal conditions through hypothesis testing might be responsible as a combination of conditions for lung cancer. The principle just described is termed equifinality – multiple conditions leading to an outcome.

Venn diagram can be used to demonstrate the set-theoretic relations discussed above. In a crisp-set relation of necessity, If *X* is necessary for *Y*, then *X* is a superset of *Y*. This means that whenever *X* is present, *Y* happens. Therefore, *X* is a necessary condition for *Y* by logical implication. If *X*, then *Y*. It is not possible for *Y* to be present and *X* is not. But it is possible for *X* to be present and *Y* is not - This is shown in the Venn diagram with the non-dotted *Y*. The Venn diagram in Figure 4.3 below instantiates a crisp set relation of necessity more vividly. For it to be true that Jane is a spinster, it is necessary and true that she is an adult, unmarried and single since it is a logical absurdity to affirm a married spinster. This example is fit for dichotomous crisp set relations with membership values 1 and 0: presence and absence; TRUE or FALSE.

Both Venn diagrams in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 have conditions *X* and Outcomes *Y*. As depicted in Figure 4.3, the subset *Y* is subsumed inside the superset X in both cases. But in Figure 4.4 which is a fuzzy set relation, the subset is partially subsumed in the superset. A fuzzy set has a degree of membership values, unlike a crisp set. Figure 4.4 shows a fuzzy-set relation of

necessity. *Y* is partially in *X* and partially out of *X* just as 0.8 is almost fully 1 but not fully 1; hence, its degree of membership values: it is just not 1 and 0.



Figure 4.3: Venn Diagram: Crisp Set - Relation of Necessity (X⇐Y)



Figure 4.4: Venn Diagram: Fuzzy Set - Relation of Necessity (X⇐ Y)

Apart from the Venn diagram, an XY plot is used to show set relationships like the linear regression lines in correlation plots. To use the XY plot for fuzzy-set relation of necessity involving causal condition X and an outcome Y, "if all cases fall on or below the main diagonal, this indicates

necessity. Cases falling above the main diagonal contradict necessity."[274]See the XY plot in Figure 4.6 below.



Figure 4.6: XY Plot of Fuzzy-Set Relation of Necessity (X⇐Y)[275]

The next examples are of relations of sufficiency using Venn diagrams and XY plots. In Figure 4.7 below, the crisp-set relation of sufficiency is depicted with condition *X* as a subset of outcome *Y* while *Y* is the superset of the condition or combination of conditions *X*. This is an inverse relationship of the relation of necessity, where *X* is the superset and *Y* is the subset. The Venn Diagram in Figure 4.8 is of the fuzzy-set relation of sufficiency. As observed in this diagram, the condition or combination of conditions *X* is partially subsumed in the outcome *Y*. To elucidate a subset, I am going to use a fictive example. Given two sets *A* and *B*, with {1,3,5,6} as ∈ (element) of set

[274] Legewie, N., (2013), An Introduction to Applied Data Analysis with Qualitative Comparative Analysis. *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research 14*(3) DOI: 10.17169/Fqs-14.3.1961
[275] Mello, P. A., (2019), *Qualitative Comparative Analysis: Research Design and Application*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

A; and {4,3,5,7,8} as ∈ (element) of *B*; we can conclude that A subset B ($A \subseteq B$) is {3,5} because only 3 and 5 are members of the two elements.

When shown in a Venn Diagram, items 7 and 8 are not members or elements (∉) of set *A*. In the diagram, these items would be outside (dotted) part of the *X* circle. In the Venn diagram of the crisp-set relation of sufficiency in Figure 4.7, the dotted *X* condition is subsumed inside the Y outcome. This supports the understanding that a sufficient condition is such that the presence of condition *X* is indicative of the presence of outcome *Y*. But the absence of Y – in this case, the non-dotted part of *Y* does not indicate the absence of *X*. As dotted *X* elements are still present.

However, in Figure 4.8, condition *X* is partially subsumed into outcome *Y*. Some of the elements of the condition *X* (the dotted parts) are outside outcome Y. This is indicative of the fuzziness of the relationships as some of the elements are fully in the outcome, while some others are fully out. The sufficiency of this fuzzy set is in no doubt nonetheless, because essentially, the presence of condition *X* is indicative of outcome Y to a certain degree, but the absence of Y does not rule out the presence of X. This "to a certain degree" of membership is what underscores the fuzziness of this set relation.



Figure 4.7: Venn Diagram: Crisp-Set Relation of Sufficiency (X⇒ Y)



Figure 4.8: Venn Diagram: Fuzzy-Set Relation of Sufficiency (X⇒ Y)

To XY plot of fuzzy-set relation of sufficiency, when X is plotted against Y, all cases below the diagonal line are expressive of sufficiency (see Figure 4.9 below). Relating this to the definition of sufficiency discussed in section 4.31, according to iSTAR Assessment:

> **i**f *x* is a sufficient cause of *y*, then the presence of *x* necessarily implies the presence of y with the probability of 100%. However, another cause *z* may alternatively cause *y*. Thus, the presence of *y* does not imply the presence of *x*. For example, if it is sunny outside, then it is daytime. It being sunny is a sufficient cause for one to conclude that it is daytime. But just because it is daytime does not necessarily mean it is sunny outside.[276] (iSTAR Assessment, 2011).

[276] ISTAR Assessment (2011), Causal Reasoning. *ISTAR Assessment*. Available from http://www.istarassessment.org/srdims/causal-reasoning-2/ [accessed 22 October 2019]



Figure 4.9: XY Plot of Fuzzy-Set Relation of Sufficiency[277]

The different configurational patterns of the set-theoretic approach take into consideration the importance of necessity and sufficiency within and across cases to determine the proper combination of causal factors for specific outcomes. In fsQCA, causal relations are viewed within the precepts of subset or superset relations of necessity or and sufficiency between causal factors and an outcome.[278] The two concepts of sufficiency and necessity are both embedded in the central QCA concept of causal complexity – an outcome emanating from different causal recipes. A further illustrative example is needed to demonstrate how these concepts (necessity and sufficiency) relate to causal complexity.

Given a Set of conditions X_1, X_2 and X_3 leading to an event outcome Y. Suppose configurational analysis of the set-relations reveals that condition X_2

[277] Mello, P. A. (2019), Chapter 3, p. 15
[278] Goertz, G., & Mahoney, J., (2012), A Tale of Two Cultures Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences. *Ebscohost*. Available from https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=e000xna&an=475403 [16 March 2019]

is sufficient for outcome *Y*; but that, X_1 and X_3 are jointly sufficient as a combination of conditions (or *conjunctural causation*) for the same outcome *Y*. This set relationship is known as causal complexity and the causal example is also described as *equifinality*: wherein multiple conditions lead to the same outcome. The relation is expressed as a propositional/Boolean algebra thus: $X_2 + (X_1 * X_3) = Y$. See Figure 4.10 below for a graphical representation of the conjunctural relation.



Figure 4.10: Conjunctural Causation and Complex Causality[279]

Both X_1 and X_3 conditions constitute what J.L. Mackie termed INUS which refers to "*insufficient* but *non-redundant* parts of a condition which is itself *unnecessary* but *sufficient* for the occurrence of the effect."[280] The two conditions are insufficient on their own to cause the effect, but together, they are sufficient for the occurrence of the outcome Y just as a short circuit on its own is insufficient to cause a fire outbreak (oxygen and inflammable materials amongst other conditions must be present for the fire to occur). The short circuit is nonetheless a *nonredundant* condition because, without it, the fire outbreak would not occur. After all, the other conditions such as oxygen and inflammable materials are insufficient on their own to cause a fire. The

[279] Mello, (2019)
[280] Mackie, J. L. (1965). Causes and Conditions. *American Philosophical Quarterly 2*(4), pp. 245-264.

conditions taken together as a whole are insufficient to cause fire outbreaks because other conditions external to these could also lead to the same outcome e.g., arson.[281] (fs)QCA is interested in this configuration - this drives the focus of set-theoretical analysis in the succeeding chapter(s) of this thesis.

Another interesting condition is the SUIN conditions – with SUIN anagram standing for "a *sufficient* but *unnecessary* part of a factor that is *insufficient* but *necessary* for an outcome."[282] This is a complement to the previous INUS of J.L. Mackie. This time, it is not about the conjunction of conditions but a disjunction. Take, for instance, to access a particular club where alcohol is served, any proof of identity could be requested to ascertain the age of the entrants. These could be anything from driving licence, national identity card, passport etc. Each would suffice – that is, any of the documents is sufficient to prove identity; none is the only acceptable proof. A driving licence in this case is a SUIN: *sufficient* but *unnecessary* part of a factor that is *insufficient* but *necessary* for the outcome. The disjunction when taken together is insufficient because you still need to provide your ticket to be admitted into the club (the outcome).

4.4.5 Parameters of fit: Consistency and Coverage

Although this shall come at a later stage in the thesis, preferably during the analysis stage, it is, however, important to discuss these concepts at this moment. According to Charles Ragin, Consistency "measures the degree to which solution terms and the solution as a whole are subsets of the outcome."[283] Coverage is "how much of the outcome is covered (or explained) by each solution term and by the solution as a whole."[284]

These twin concepts are used to determine how the cases fit a relation of the necessity of sufficiency.[285] McAlearney *et al.* posit that *Consistency* is a measure of the degree to which cases that share a combination of conditions

[281] Jrank (2020), Causality - INUS Conditions. *Jrank*. Available from https://science.jrank.org/pages/8545/causality-inus-conditions.html [accessed 6 March 2020]
[282] Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C., (2012), p. 79.
[283] Ragin, C., (2008). *User's Guide to Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis*. Tucson: University of Arizona.
[284] Ragin, C., (2008), p. 85.
[285] Legewie, N., (2013)

(pathway) also share the same outcome, and *coverage* measures the prevalence of a given pathway.[286] The parameters of fit would come in handy at the analysis stage of the thesis.

4.4.6 QCA: Stepwise Procedures

The best way to understand this analytical method is in its practice and the expediency of this is no less reduced in my decision to adopt stepwise procedures. Before going on, it is crucial to briefly state the steps which include realigning the research question(s) into configurational formats away from a mere inquisitive statement into something more suited to QCA/fsQCA. These steps are not fixed, they could come in any order. The main steps involve developing a Theory of Change (ToC) which serves as a bridge between the insights from the literature review and conceptual framework on the one hand and QCA/fsQCA on the other hand.

The conceptual framework presents interlinked concepts; a theory of change is needed to make sense of this networked topology concerning the objective of the thesis. ToC hypothesises how these different concepts and relationships lead to the outcome in preparation for investigation with fsQCA. It also contributes to operationalising the thesis questions. As Erica Breuer et al. observed:

> ToC provides a transparent approach to develop a contextually relevant conceptual framework and indicators which can be used to quantify the QCA condition sets and outcomes. QCA can then be used to evaluate where and how the different factors identified by the ToC affect the outcome.[287] (Breuer et al., 2018).

To develop this theory of change, I worked primarily with the literature to extract explanatory models; I also looked at theoretical models in the systematic review (see Appendix 13 and 14) for insights into how these models are framed to the outcome. Aside from the literature collections, other material

[286] Mcalearney, A. S., Walker, D., Moss, A. D., & Bickell, N. A., (2016)., Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of Key Informant Interviews in Health Services Research: Enhancing a Study of Adjuvant Therapy Use in Breast Cancer Care. *Medical Care 54*(4), pp. 400-405.
[287] Breuer, E., Subba, P., Luitel, N., Jordans, M., De Silva, M., Marchal, B., & Lund, C., (2018), Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis and Theory of Change to Unravel the Effects of a Mental Health Intervention on Service Utilisation in Nepal. *BMJ Global Health 3*(6), pp. 1-11. DOI :10.1136/Bmjgh-2018-001023

sources used in developing the ToC include archived historical tweets, newspaper articles, datasets from international organisations e.g., UNDP, ITU etc.[288] I also consulted the various relevant index reports such as the Human Development Index, Freedom House Report, international NGO reports, World Bank Reports etc.

The next step involved the identification of the cases. The cases are natural hazard related disasters involving the use of big data digital technologies (e.g., social media). These cases included apparent security-leadership decision-making with recognition of assessment of effective or ineffective outcomes. This partially served as a control mechanism to avoid confirmation bias wherein only cases that seemed to support the assumption of the researcher would have been selected. After hydrating the tweets from the different disaster events, I implemented natural language processing textual analytics procedures to enable the extraction of insights from the datasets. These datasets were grouped by the disaster events e.g., 2014 Ebola, Philippines Typhoon etc.

I next pre-processed these separate raw tweets files using regex methods with python. This led to the de-duplication of the datasets and removal of stop words like 'a', 'the', 'this' et. The next process involved the removal of special characters such as Ÿ‘ŒðŸ’,"/", "*", etc. These are of no relevance to textual analytics. I also performed text tokenisation.

Afterwards, I performed unsupervised machine learning topic modelling using the Latent Dirichlet Association (LDA) clustering techniques to categorise the different topics into related groups or topics. I also conducted sentiment analysis to assess to ascertain the level of satisfaction and dissatisfaction in the texts. This process contributed to identifying what related terms are sued with either of the affective expressions. This provided insights into how the users felt about the issues raised within the tweets. An

[288] Most big data disaster studies use Twitter because of its terse messaging characteristics and its accessibility to researchers – a factor that the other social media platforms sufficiently lack. However, Twitter policy prohibit sharing full texts of tweets; hence, only the IDs are provided. These IDs can be mined or rehydrated using a specialised software called Hydrator (see https://github.com/DocNow/hydrator). The primary source of datasets for the IDs that I used for this ToC and fsQCA is CrisisNLP (see https://crisisnlp.qcri.org/) of the Qatar Computing Research Institute of the Hamad Bin Khalifa University in Qatar. This website has collections of natural and human-induced datasets including the Zika outbreak, 2014 Typhoon Hagupit (625,976), 2014 Ebola Virus Outbreak (5,107,139), Nepal Earthquake (4,223,937), etc.

aggregation of these terms across broad gave me insights about dominant opinions on the subject.

After these steps, I used the conceptual framework developed in the previous chapter and findings from the review of literature together with the terms extracts from the literature above to develop conceptual factor(s). Other sources identified such as newspapers from the LexisNexis databases and reports were used for developing these factors – both causal and outcome. This helps to propose configurational pathways for explaining what combinations of causal conditions or factors are necessary and/or sufficient for the outcome. The next procedure includes the calibration of the dataset (causal and outcome factors). This involves determining the measures of the factors through a well-defined scoring system. This scoring must be any number between 0 and 1.

The entire process is iterative as it involves going back and forth as needs demand between the different steps. It is therefore not a fixed and linear process. The closing steps involve constructing a truth table to be used for logical minimisation using Boolean algebra and other methods. As part of the analysis process, a separate Necessary Condition Analysis and Tobit Regression Analysis were carried out before the fsQCA to strengthen its eventual theoretical models.

4.5 Developing the Theory of Change (ToC)

Forging a theory of change from diverse concepts is daunting and probably one of the most difficult tasks of the entire thesis. Nonetheless, its importance to the fsQCA process can never be overstated. The themes and categories in the literature as well as the conceptual framework discussed in the previous chapters are foundational to the development of the theory of change.

The entire theoretical expectation is situated in the findings from the reviews, which in turn leads to the drafting of hypothetical causal relations to explain the thesis objectives. To start with, the whole process is a graph of some sort and it is well captured by a collaborative network of different relations that involves different actors. It is collaborative because the elements are intertwined and worked together intricately in a dynamic fashion without privileging one unit as the sole factor responsible for the expected outcome.

Disaster situations are ever involving and dynamic with no clear-cut demarcation between phases of disasters and the interventions. Hence, QCA as an iterative approach is apt for investigating the effervescence phenomenon. Big Data technologies and their constituents are no doubt useful for successful disaster management as the literature attest. However, the contention here is not about its utility but is mainly about the interrogation of the different causal factors or combination of factors responsible for effective outcomes or otherwise given scenarios where big data technologies are deployed.

Big Data on its own is not sufficient for guaranteeing successful outcomes in disaster management as revealed in the review. There are several other exogenous factors, key of which is distributed leadership. In situations of large-scale insecurity, leadership is devolved across the different layers of interventions with several actors playing important roles in the different disaster phases. However, a common denominator visible in all effective security-leadership decision outcomes is shared or distributed leadership.

Although, the default position is to attribute outcome – especially effective outcome to one particular actor – personal or organisation the reality is that there are different functional agencies with different sub-leadership units which contributed to the larger disaster leadership.[289] From the literature, it is glaringly obvious that distributed leadership features extensively in all cases where disaster response and other markers of effective disaster leadership outcomes are noted.[290]

In more inclusive societies, distributed leadership is recognised because different actors are encouraged to exercise their agency with less friction between leading actors unlike in not-so inclusive societies. A typical example has reflected in the literature is the 2013 Boulder, Colorado flood disaster where local emergency management took the lead in communicating emergency information via their social media handle with federal agencies

[289] Bolden, R., (2011), Distributed Leadership in Organizations: A Review of Theory and Research. *International Journal of Management Reviews 13*(3), pp. 251-269. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2370.2011.00306.x

[290] As noted by Bolden (2011), p. 252. There are different concepts used in representing distributed leadership in the literature; they include collective leadership, shared leadership, co-leadership, collaborative-leadership, emergent leadership etc. Essentially, they describe the same concept - a group leadership where responsibilities and influence are devolved.

amplifying and following their lead.[291] This is contrary to what is obtainable in some countries especially in Nigeria where states' emergency management agencies tend to work independently of the federal team with the latter frequently trying to assert itself as the leader in emergencies while the state agencies do not even consider the input of local government emergency responders as anything to be considered seriously. Leadership is imbued in government decision infrastructure; the agency of non-state actors is not recognised. They are rather considered as competitors without considerable awareness and utilisation of the influence and mutuality that they wield.

It is an auspicious fact that distributed leadership is tangential to effective outcomes in crisis situations as noted in the literature. The conceptual networks in the previous chapter show the effect size (the node size) of this concept as well as its centrality to the discourse. Effective leadership in disaster situations or hazardous events is largely distributed leadership. I am therefore proposing a causal link between *distributed leadership* and *distributed conversation*. Essentially this devolved leadership type is about communication. It is made apparent in the different spaces of interaction involving social media big data technologies.

A distributed conversation is the presence of different event-based conversations taking place simultaneously; these conversations and discourses are not monopolised by the state. They are decentralised with different sub-graphs in the networks engaging with the different views, opinions, about the disaster situation. This distributed conversation is not isolated but interlinked and contributed to the general whole. As noted by, when there is a disaster, people converge on social media this event, this behaviour constitutes a *digital convergence* - an aggregation of the different opinions expressed by the users as a producer of information and drivers of the narratives. These collective opinions or distributed conversations help to provide ready information, situation-awareness to desperate disaster victims.[292]

Nested between distributed leadership and distributed conversation is *technology access* with its 5 As; namely: Availability, Affordability, Awareness,

[291] Sutton, J., League, C., Sellnow, T. L., & Sellnow, D. D., (2015), Terse Messaging and Public Health in the Midst of Natural Disasters: The Case of The Boulder Floods. *Health Communication 30*(2), pp. 135-143. DOI: 10.1080/10410236.2014.974124
[292] Shaw, F. et al., (2013), pp. 24-25.

Abilities, and Agency (see Figure 4.12 below). Access is an intervening variable; where it is not available, no digital distributed leadership and conversation can take place. Countries with high internet penetration tend to be more effective adopters of big data digital technologies for disaster response. This is a big factor though there are countries who are in the upper spectrum of these metrics whose responses during disasters have been considered not as effective as expected. This seeming contradiction shall be looked at during the analysis stage. For now, the temporary explanation is the absence of distributed leadership. Even if the technology is available, if there is little or no collaboration between the different actors, technology access is meaningless.

Two core factors are linked to distributed conversation; they are dependent on it but without them, the distributed conversation will lose its relevance in the configuration. They are *Information Quality Assurance* and *Coordinated Fragmented Attention Management*. A lot of fake news gets transmitted alongside useful information during disasters; these could affect mitigation measures and in some extreme cases lead to the loss of lives. For example, people were told that saltwater intake could cure Ebola and sleeping with virgins could cure HIV.

Apart from information quality, fragmented attention is also important, because the feed system of most micro-blogging or social media technologies creates a distractive experience where crucial information is lost amidst tons of messages competing for users' attention.[293] Social media hashtags serve as placeholders and aggregators for managing distractions. However, some marketers use disaster events to market their products; they inject their adverts into the conversation using hashtags with the hope of benefiting from the attention generated by the disaster. During the 2019 Nairobi flood disaster, advertisements for shoes were plugged into the #Nairobifloods hashtag. Since rain-boots and footwears tend to sell more during floods, they chose to make money from the situation (see Figure 4.11 below).

[293] Saputro, K. A., (2018), An audience perspective on disaster response. In *The Sociotechnical Constitution of Resilience* (pp. 173-193). Palgrave Macmillan: Singapore.



Figure 4.11: Sample fragmented attention tweet

Some trivialise the enormity of the disaster events through memes and jokes designed to benefit from the digital convergence of attention that the disaster affords. This is inimical to the plight of the victims. To combat this menace, coordinated fragmented attention management is observed in some disaster leadership response scenarios.[294]

The combinations of all these factors contribute to the effectiveness and success of the outcomes. These outcomes are represented in the literature as individual-collective action performance, post-crisis assessments, institutional reforms, and iterative feedback loops. In crisis/disaster events where Big data digital technologies are deployed, the success or effectiveness of the outcome is expressed as belonging to any of the stated categories. Although the list is inexhaustive, in cases where success is recorded these descriptors are used. The diagram in Figure 4.12 below provides a visual

[294] Several agencies with distributed leadership initiatives led by the state or some prominent individuals associated with the state help to sustain attention to the disaster using this measure. The #BigBackOurGirls hashtags went viral when Michelle Obama post a video message depicting her bearing a sign with the hashtag; her behaviour shifted global attention to the plight of the missing schoolgirls.

representation of the entire Theory of Change causal pathway process discussed in this section.[295]

[295] The dark grey round-edged boxes depict the causal factors or the causal conditions, the right-angled light grey boxes are the descriptor terms. The double arrowed lines link the different causal factors while the dashed arrowed lines link all the casual factors to the outcome. By the end of the thesis analysis, I expect to see a combination of these factors in cases which record effective or successful performance outcome and converse results in reverse situations where these conditions are absent.



Figure 4.12: The Theory of Change diagram[296]

[296] The dark grey round-edged boxes depict the causal factors or the causal conditions, the right-angled light grey boxes are the descriptor or operational terms. The double arrows connect the operational terms to the condition and outcome factors connect the different causal factors and to highlight the relationships between them. While the thick single arrows connect the factors to the outcome, the dashed arrows lines connect the descriptor or operational terms to the conditions and the outcome.
By the end of the thesis analysis, I expect to see a combination of these factors in cases which record effective or successful performance outcome and converse results in reverse situations where these conditions are absent.

From the foregoing, I can hypothesize that given big data digital technologies, *distributed leadership* (DIST_LEAD), *effective disaster preparedness* (DIS_PREP), *big data digital technologies access* (BTECH_ACCESS), *distributed conversation* (DIST_CONV), *information quality assurance* (INFO_QUAL), *democratic status* (DEMO_STATUS), *economic cost* (PERC_ECON_COST), and fatalities (PERC_FATALITIES) combined are sufficient for *effective security-leadership decision-making outcome* (OUTCOME). For ineffective *security-leadership decision-making outcome* (~OUTCOME), the negation or absence/reduction of each of the stated conditions suffice. The formal notation of the hypothesis for effective *security-leadership decision-making outcome* (OUTCOME) goes thus:

Hypothesis (Effective):

DIST_LEAD + DIS_PREP + BTECH_ACCESS + DIST_CONV + INFO_QUAL + DEMO_STATUS + PERC_ECON_COST + PERC_FATALITIES -> OUTCOME

Here is the formal notation of the hypothesis for ineffective *security-leadership decision-making outcome* (~OUTCOME):

Hypothesis (Ineffective):

~DIST_LEAD + ~DIS_PREP + ~BTECH_ACCESS + ~DIST_CONV + ~INFO_QUAL + ~DEMO_STATUS + ~PERC_ECON_COST + ~PERC_FATALITIES -> ~OUTCOME

The Theory of Change (ToC) helps to make sense of the configurational nature of the first sub-question of this thesis. It is important to reiterate the salient observation which has been repeated severally in this chapter – that is, QCA is an iterative research methodology that involves back and forth refinement of concepts and procedures as new insights emerge.

4.6 (fs)QCA and the main Research Question

The main research question: "Within situations where leadership decides disaster outcomes variations and uses digital technologies and big data, is there something about the way that they use big data and digital technologies that explains these outcomes variations?" Alternatively, "Why do big data influence security-leadership decision-making effectiveness in some instances of large-scale insecurities and not in other situations?" does not warrant a configurational approach of QCA. The chapter on Q-methodology is devoted to addressing this major question. However, the Theory of Change (ToC) proposed an explanation that addresses the second sub-question: "How do big data produce varied decision outcomes in situations of large-scale insecurities?"

The explanation is embedded in the conceptual pathway described in the previous section on ToC. The first sub-question implies a configurational outlook; that is, "What factors contribute to the choices or alternatives made under conditions of large-scale insecurities?" This question is what the fsQCA part of this thesis is all about. This question can be understood to mean: "*in situations of large-scale insecurities, what combinations of factors enable big data digital technologies to influence some security-leadership decision-making more effectively/successfully than others?*"

The research question above is configurational. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the analysis phase of the (fs)QCA process involves investigating the following: the necessary and sufficient causal relation; that is, that causal relation or intervention without which the outcome would not be possible. Sufficient causes are solely responsible for the outcome: they can independently influence the outcome. Necessary but not sufficient causal relation simply implies that the causes or conditions are important but on their own could not lead to the outcome without combining with other condition(s). Lastly, neither necessary nor sufficient causal relation suggests that other conditions or interventions could have led to the same outcome.[297] (Davies, Rick, 2012).

[297] Davies, Rick (2012), Representing Different Combinations of Causal Conditions. *Mande News*. Available from http://mandenews.blogspot.com/2012/06/representing-different-combinations-of.html [accessed 3 March 2018]

4.7 The Choice and Description of Cases

The determination of cases is dependent largely upon the expected outcome. In QCA, the case attributes are expected to follow the principle of homogeneity: they must have shared features to make them fit for purpose. At the same time, heterogeneity is a crucial necessity for the cases. For instance, this thesis is about big data technologies and security-leadership decision-making in crisis situations; it would be wrong to include non-disaster cases or cases with no defined leadership features with no definitive assessments of decisions.

Also, cases with no big data technologies interventions are excluded. The maximum heterogeneity factor comes to play when looking at the variation in the cases and the outcomes. It would be important to include cases where the expected outcomes are positive, and cases where the outcome did not take place as expected despite the presence of the conditions.[298] The differences include countries with different development indices, different event phases such as pre-disaster and post-disaster amongst other variations. This feature helps with with-in case and cross-case analysis. Instead of random sampling in statistical research, theoretical sampling is the key here. The number of cases is derived from an in-depth understanding of the case – knowledge-driven.

Considering all the above, the cases selected for this thesis spread across different continents of the globe and they share natural hazard related disaster events in common. These disasters include floods, earthquakes, mudslides, Ebola, typhoons etc. The reason for these choices was to provide enough cases from a diverse range of events for broader perspectives outside of flood and Ebola. Having this diversity allows for limited diversity. With all the aforementioned justifications, I was able to develop a theoretic model for

[298] Gross, M.E., (2010), *Aligning Public-Private Partnership Contracts with Public Objectives for Transportation Infrastructure* (Doctoral dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia, USA). Available from https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/bitstream/handle/10919/28785/Gross_ME_D_2010.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [assessed 3 March 2018]

explaining the objectives. This permitted me the opportunity to test these assumptions albeit on a limited level with the 2014 Ebola outbreak and the 2012/2017 Lagos flood disasters using Q-methodology later in the thesis.

4.8 Measurement and Calibration of Conditions and the Outcome

4.8.1 Calibration of Outcome: Effective and Ineffective Security-Leadership Decision-making

As discussed earlier, the outcome is significant to the entire QCA process. This outcome factor determines the value of the causal process. In fsQCA, this is not a binary but a theoretically determined continuum, in this thesis, the different variants in the calibration of effective or ineffective outcomes. In the literature, post-disaster assessments of a disaster event are largely about recovery, resilience, mitigation. This is a no-brainer as a return to the status quo or recovery is the measure of successful disaster intervention or security-leadership decision-making in crisis situations in most post-disaster assessments processes.[299]

However, as noted by Elizabeth Jordan citing Berke et al. this is an oversimplification, as recovery does not always follow a clearly defined path, phases may overlap and the process is not always uniform across all sectors of society.[300,301] What constitutes success is relative in disaster events involving big data digital technologies. What is the assurance that these technologies influenced or contributed to the "successful" outcome? What if there are other invisible or latent variables not captured by the configuration?

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[299] Quarantelli, E., (1982), *Sheltering and Housing After Major Community Disasters: Case Studies and General Observations*. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University.
[300] Jordan, E., (2012), *Pathways to Community Recovery: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Post-Disaster Outcomes* (Doctoral Dissertation), University of Colorado At Boulder, USA. Available from https://search.proquest.com/openview/359d7f5e6a4c6eecbe884c8d9cc16a65/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y [assessed 3 March 2018]
[301] Berke, P. R., Kartez, J., & Wenger, D., (1993), Recovery After Disaster: Achieving Sustainable Development, Mitigation and Equity. *Disasters 17*(2), pp. 93-109. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7717.1993.tb01137.x

These are important questions that challenge the fixed idea of successful or effective outcomes under this circumstance. Since most disaster events are complex and dynamic, digital technologies may be successful at the pre-disaster phase and not successful at the post-disaster phase. Therefore, it will not do this thesis well to reduce the outcome solely to these categories. Also, value judgements are sometimes subjective, and this bias may affect the definition of effectiveness or success. Depending on whom you asked, most respondents might view their interventions and outcome as successful particularly if they worked for the disaster management agencies. Similarly, the pessimistic nature of most citizens in developing societies may render their judgment equally biased because leadership by governmental institutions are not always considered favourably. Not to forget that some NGOs may report negative outcomes to justify the sustainability of their salaries and grants; or due to what Naomi Klein described as disaster capitalism.[302]

Therefore, a better angle would be to use effectiveness. This is measurable compared to rather vague success. The outcome aim is to therefore examine how the causal conditions have contributed to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the *Security-Leadership Decision-making outcome* (OUTCOME) process in crisis or disaster situations. In general, the presence of big data technologies interventions has elicited the default assumption of effectiveness in nearly all the reviewed literature. However, the reality is quite often not so clear cut. The Theory of Change (ToC) above highlights the terms to look out for when trying to measure or calibrate effective or ineffective outcomes of cases.

How is a disaster event categorised as effective? Watson et. al.; suggest that:

> Big data can support organizations in their efforts to be better informed as data are able to significantly contribute to situational awareness, which can in turn inform decision-making, such as resource allocation. In addition, this study has demonstrated that big data is also able to positively inform preparation and precrisis efforts.[303]

[302] Klein N., (2007), *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*. New York, Metropolitan Books.

[303] Anson, S., Watson, H., Wadhwa, K., & Metz, K., (2017), Analysing Social Media Data for Disaster Preparedness: Understanding the Opportunities and Barriers Faced by Humanitarian Actors. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 21*, pp. 131-139. DOI: 10.1016/J.Ijdrr.2016.11.014

They opined that social media and SMAT (social media analytics tools) enhance situation awareness and response to disaster thereby positively aided the security-leadership decision-making process particularly in the disaster preparation and pre-crisis intervention phase.[304] These observations are ubiquitous in all the findings from the literature and reports. The contribution of social media big data to early warning systems is a crucial identifier of effectiveness in disaster leadership.[305,306] This further enhances the inclusion of this element as a factor for evaluating the outcome. Other outcome depicters include the presence of collective action performance e.g., donation, volunteering, emotional support (prayers, counselling etc.), memorialisation. Provision of verifiable, actionable information; post-crisis assessments (including scholarly articles, news reports, governmental and non-governmental reports); institutional reforms are also depicters.

To forestall or mitigate future occurrences, measures are put in place from the lessons learnt from the disaster events for the sake of future occurrence: iterative (social) feedback loops. This is essential as a reflection of the dynamism of the different factors and elements in the security-leadership decision-making process. Big data provides the means for ensuring that the feedbacks between the different actors are iterative and with effective outcome cases, this is guaranteed. As the situation unfolds during the lifespan of the disaster or crisis phases, there is consistent feedback within, across and between the responsible actors (security-leadership).

The characteristics of the outcome determine the choice of *fuzzy set score* or the set membership values (SMV). An indirect calibration method was used to determine the SMV of the outcome factor. Charles Ragin noted that this method of calibration is "especially useful in situations where researchers have substantial information about cases, but the nature of the evidence is not identical across cases."[307] The alternative method of direct calibration is not

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[304] Anson *et al.,* (2017), pp. 132-135.
[305] Landwehr, P. M., Wei, W., Kowalchuck, M., & Carley, K. M., (2016), Using Tweets to Support Disaster Planning, Warning and Response. *Safety Science 90*, pp. 33-47. DOI: 10.1016/J.Ssci.2016.04.012
[306] Wukich, C., (2016), Government Social Media Messages Across Disaster Phases. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 24*(4), pp. 230-243. DOI: 10.1111/1468-5973.12119
[307] Ragin, C.C., (2009), *Qualitative comparative analysis using fuzzy sets (fsQCA)*. In: Rihoux, B., Ragin, C.C. (Eds.), *Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques*. Sage: Thousand Oaks, p. 90.

relevant for this situation because there are currently no index or measurement scores for determining what constitutes effective or ineffective disaster decision-making outcomes. Therefore, this thesis relies on the adoption of the indirect method which is heavily dependent on in-depth knowledge of the theory and the cases. The alternative would be to adopt a Delphi method where experts are asked to rate outcomes using pre-set SMVs. To avoid expert bias, I have decided to use the indirect calibration method.

To avoid flouting the replicability rule of QCA, the entire outcome calibration procedure is presented for the outcome and the causal factors (conditions). Table 4.4 below displays the outcome variables and the different fuzzy-set definitions. The *anchor-point* or *cross-over point* is usually 0.5 while 1 indicates fully in and 0 stands for fully out of the membership set. These are the thresholds, the boundaries. The 0.5 score permits maximal ambiguity because it is neither in nor out, this is not useful for purpose as this suggests that there is a causal factor that both contributes and does not contribute to the outcome. A preferable approach would be to have scores that are closer to or above 0.5 and scores that are below 0.5. This justifies why 0.5 is generally considered as an anchor point or cross over point in QCA. Set Membership Values (SMV) ranges from crisp set, five-value fuzzy set, seven-value fuzzy set and continuous fuzzy set. Table 4.4 outlines the different types of SMV. There are different adaptations of the values, but the underlying principle is the same.

Table 4.4: Calibration scores for both crisp and fuzzy sets[308]

Crisp Set	Five-Value Fuzzy Set	Seven-Value Fuzzy Set	Continuous Fuzzy Set
1 = fully in	1 = fully in	1 = fully in	1 = fully in
		0.8 = mostly but not fully in	
	0.67 = more in than out		0.5 < x<1.0 = more in than out
		0.6 = more in than out	
0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
		0.4 = more out than in	
	0.33 = more out than in		0 < x<0.5 = more out than in
		0.2 = mostly but not fully out	
0 = fully out	0 = fully out	0 = fully out	0 = fully out

Note: 0.5 is the crossover point and is usually omitted.

The data sources for these calibrations include CrisisNLP (a repository of historical disaster tweets), academic publications, governmental and non-governmental reports, and News reports as discussed in section 4.4.6. I used advanced textual analytics using tools of machine learning natural language processing to draw necessary insights for calibrating the outcome set membership value(s). The tweets were specifically selected from pre-determined search query terms, and hashtags that bear the disaster events e.g., #Ebola, #Zika, #Queenslandfloods, #HurricaneSandy etc. Due to the limitation of Twitter API, I was able to download the IDs of the tweets and not the full text of the tweets.

Except for using these textual analytical methods to extract a general overview of the prevalent concepts, I used opinion mining and sentiment analysis to assess the affective behaviours of the users to government tweets. For this, I focused on government social media handles such as @NDCDCgov, @LASEMA, @nemanigeria etc. To complement this method, I also scour the literature for works done on social media and specific disaster events. I applied similar textual methods to the news articles mined from the LexisNexis database. Due to the enormity of the analytical tasks, I trained and supervised 4 trained coders together with myself on quantitative textual analysis and the muse of manual coding to help the speed of the process.

[308] (Kane & Kahwati, 2018)

These coders alongside myself assessed the newspapers, academic articles, and post-disaster reports. All the coders are/were PhD students. 3 from a Geography department working on natural hazard related disasters, 1 epidemic historian and myself. The codes help to identify concepts, themes, and categories for determining inclusion into the causal and the outcome factors. Inclusion and Exclusion decisions were based on general agreement; where there were disagreements, meetings were held to make final decisions.

4.8.2 Data Source(s) for the Outcome

To determine the set membership value (SMV) of a particular case outcome, a systematic approach was adopted to derive a singular outcome score from the sub-factors or measures. The 4 sub-outcome factors were then averaged; the final result for each case is presented in the Fuzzy Continuous Set scores in Table 4.5. I have deliberately provided a comprehensive explanation and descriptions revealing how calibrations were done in the spirit of the systematic nature of this research approach.

For the *Situation Awareness* measure, a score of 1 = *fully contributed to situation awareness/fully in* was allotted to cases with mention of provision for regular updates before, during and after the events. This information was gleaned from the official/verified social media accounts of the responsible agencies (state and non-state actors) as well as legacy media. There must be evidence of interaction exchanges such as shared information between the state and non-state actors e.g., retweets of official information update and reference to official updates by non-governmental media. I chose Twitter because it is the platform of choice for nearly all emergency agencies as attested to by the systematic literature review. In addition, using text summarization, newspaper articles from LexisNexis were searched for mention of regular updates. Social media accounts such as Facebook and Instagram accounts of the country's major emergency agencies and accounts of International NGOs such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent were included in the selection criteria.

To qualify for the 1 score, the awareness must traverse different platforms with evidence of retweets or reference to the situation awareness

message in digital platforms such as online blogs and newspapers. This is to ensure mutuality and acknowledgement of the information diffusion. This is significantly important because there is no awareness if there is no evidence of reception and understanding or sharing of the information – an acknowledgement and a demonstrative performance. A 0.67 score (i.e., *mostly but not fully contributed to situation awareness/more in than out*) was allocated to cases where the digital technology mentioned awareness in at least 1 but not all the phase(s) of the disaster/crisis event cycle in social media messages shared by state and non-state actors. There must also be at least 1 or 2 evidence of awareness as outlined above in the different platforms. The 0.33 score = *very weak contribution to situation awareness /more out than in*; in this situation, the case has evidence of message from state actors.

However, unlike the previous two scores (1 and 0.67), there is little or no evidence of shared information between the state and non-state actors - each actor relay information almost independently. This is more like a top-down information network with no shared agenda, no retweets. Where present, retweets are made only by state actors retweeting other tweets from other government emergency agencies. Lastly, a score of 0 = *fully out* was allotted to those cases where none of the features discussed above is present; that is, a few or no updates especially from governmental agencies. No information was shared between the actors, and there was a complete absence of updates on social media. See Table 4.5 below for more detailed explanations and descriptions of the calibration scores and the rationale behind every calibration.

Table 4.5: Table showing the calibration of four fuzzy-set values for the measures of effective security-leadership decision-making.

Outcome	Measures	Fuzzy-Set Membership Value Descriptions
Effective Security Leadership Decision Making (OUTCOME)	*Situation Awareness* – Provision of up to date information on the current state of the disaster e.g. early warning systems, disaster preparedness	**1:** Fully contributed to situation awareness **0.67:** Mostly but not fully contributed to situation awareness **0.33:** Very weak contribution to situation awareness **0:** No contribution to situation awareness
	Collective Action Performance – Contributes to individual or collective action and response to mitigating, supporting and aiding victims	**1:** Fully contributed to collective action **0.67:** Mostly but not fully contributed to collective action **0.33:** Very weak contribution to collective action **0:** No contribution to collective action
	Post-Crisis Assessments – Informs post-crisis or post-disaster assessments of the management and leadership process	**1:** Fully informed post-crisis assessments **0.67:** Mostly but not fully informed post-crisis assessments **0.33:** Minimally informed post-crisis assessments **0:** Did not inform post-crisis assessments
	Institutional Reforms – Led to institutional reforms	**1:** Fully contributed to institutional reforms **0.67:** Mostly but not fully contributed to institutional reforms **0.33:** Very weak contribution to institutional reforms **0:** No contribution to institutional reforms
	Iterative (Social) Feedback Loops – provides constant feedback loop between all the actors	**1:** Fully contributed to iterative (social) feedback loops **0.67:** Mostly but not fully contributed to iterative (social) feedback loops **0.33:** Very weak contribution to iterative (social) feedback loops **0:** No contribution to iterative (social) feedback loops

Table 4.6 below contains expanded justifications for each of the set membership values (SMV) of the outcome in Table 4.5 above. The mean of the four measures corresponds to the outcome factor. It is important to restate that the outcome measures are not independent of the causal factors for each case. The set membership value (SMV) of *Effective Security-leadership decision-making outcome* (OUTCOME) = (*Situation Awareness + Collective*

Performance Action + Post Conflict Assessments + Iterative (Social) Feedback Loop)/4. Let us illustrate this with a dummy SMV outcome score where *Situation Awareness: 0.67 + Collective Performance Action* = 0.67 + *Post Conflict Assessments* = 0.33 + *Iterative (Social) Feedback Loop*; *Effective Security-leadership decision-making* outcome (OUTCOME) is therefore (0.67 + 0.67 +0.33 + 0.67)/4 = 0.585 (≈ 0.6).

From the Continuous Fuzzy Set metrics table in Table 4.6 below, 1 = *fully in*. Any score *x*, where *x* is greater than 0.5 but less than 1 (i.e., $0.5 < x < 1$) = *more in than out*; hence, it takes the equivalent score of 0.67 as shown in the table. Any score *x*, where *x* is greater than 0 but less than 0.5 (i.e., $0 < x < 0.5$) =*more out than in* and it therefore takes the equivalent score of 0.33. In the example above, *Effective Security-leadership decision-making outcome* (OUTCOME) with a score of 0.585 (≈ 0.6) is therefore calibrated as *more in than out* (0.67). The next tasks involve calibrating the causal conditions. The process is the same as the outcome calibration process with slight variations. Henceforth, for the sake of consistency, OUTCOME shall be used in place of OUTCOME.

Table 4.6: An expanded version of the outcome measures. A more detailed description of each SMV is also provided in this table.

Measures	Fuzzy-Set Membership Value Descriptions	Description
Situation Awareness	**1:** Fully contributed to situation awareness	Awareness must be across different platforms with evidence of retweets or citation of the situation awareness messages in digital platforms such as online blogs and newspapers. Evidence of Early Warning System and Preparedness. More than 5 instances should qualify for this score.
	0.67: Mostly but not fully contributed to situation awareness	Cases where the technolog(ies) mentioned or spotted awareness in at least 1 but not all the phase(s) of the disaster or crisis in social media shared by both state and non-state actors. There must also be at least between 3 and 5 evidence of awareness as outlined above in different platforms to earn this score.
	0.33: Very weak contribution to situation awareness	Evidence(s) of message from state actors, but there is little or no evidence of shared information between the state and non-state actors. Each actor relaying information almost independent. This is more like a top-down information network with no shared agenda, no retweets; or retweets done only by state actors retweeting other tweets from fellow state agencies. Less than 3 of such instances will fit this score.
	0: No contribution to situation awareness	Cases where none of the features discussed above is present; that is, few or no

		updates especially from governmental agencies, no information shared between the actors, and complete absence from social media.
Collective Action Performance	**1:** Fully contributed to collective action	Presence of collective actions by state and non-state actors in response to the disaster using big data technologies e.g crowdsourced mapping information, online volunteering, social media support groups, presence of support digital platforms such as SMS, blogs etc. Evidence of collaborative action across these big data digital platforms. More than 5 instances should qualify for this score.
	0.67: Mostly but not fully contributed to collective action	Presence of collective actions by both state and non-state actors (each working mostly independent of another) using big data technologies but the technology deployments are few (e.g. between 3 and 5 platforms). Evidence of individual action mainly. Independent response to disaster situations via social media and other big data technologies.
	0.33: Very weak contribution to collective action	Limited presence of collective action and behaviour by both state and non-state actors online and through big data technologies. Largely individual efforts with no visible collaborative efforts among the actors. Less than 3 of such instances will fit this score.

	0: No contribution to collective action	Complete absence of collective action via social media and big data technologies by both state and non-state actors.
Post-Crisis Assessments	**1:** Fully informed post-crisis assessments	Commissioned reports by security leaders to assess impacts, challenges and future planning from the experiences of the big data digital technologies' interventions in the crisis situations. Academic Articles, news article recognising and interrogating these interventions. These features are important because if it is effective or successful, then it would be written about. More than 5 instances should qualify for this score.
	0.67: Mostly but not fully informed post-crisis assessments	Assessed by any of the media listed above e.g. commissioned reports, articles or news articles. At least any 3 or 4 or 5 instances is enough to qualify for this score.
	0.33: Minimally informed post-crisis assessments	Anything less than 3 publications in any of the outlined media above will have this score.
	0: Did not inform post-crisis assessments	Absence of any post-crisis assessment publication on the interventions by big data and digital technologies.

Institutional Reforms	**1:** Fully contributed to institutional reforms	Post-conflict reforms of disaster management, response and preparedness as well as mitigation are linked to the adoption of big data digital technologies in disaster situations. Evidence of more than 5 instances should qualify for this score.
	0.67: Mostly but not fully contributed to institutional reforms	Presence of any of the above listed features with few attributions to big data digital technologies (Any instances between 3 and 5 should qualify for this score).
	0.33: Very weak contribution to institutional reforms	Presence of less than 3 of the features above with no clear attribution to big data digital technologies.
	0: No contribution to institutional reforms	No institutional reform(s) attributed to the technologies.
Iterative (Social) Feedback Loops	**1:** Fully contributed to iterative (social) feedback loops	Very large presence of feedback loops between the different actors and across the networks throughout the different big data digital technologies e.g. social media. Consistent back and forth communication updates across the distributive leadership and conversation networks. Evidence of more than 5 instances should qualify for this score.

	0.67: Mostly but not fully contributed to iterative (social) feedback loops	Close to the above but with fewer instances of such cases. At least any 3, 4 or 5 instances will qualify the case for this score. Few communication updates across the networks (3 to 5) should be fine
	0.33: Very weak contribution to iterative (social) feedback loops	Anything less than 3 instances takes this score.
	0: No contribution to iterative (social) feedback loops	Complete absence of feedback loops attributable to big data digital technologies.

4.9 Calibration of Conditions

4.9.1 CONDITION 1: Distributed leadership (DIST_LEAD)

As observed by Hester Hulpia, Geert Devos and Yves Rosseel "Systematic quantitative research on measuring distributed leadership is scarce."[309] Contrary to the dichotomisation of leadership as leadership-followership opposites, distributed leadership reflects another reality. It recognises the presence of the shared or collaborative nature of this relation of mutuality that is not hierarchical. In the literature on effective leadership decision-making, this style of leadership tends to dominate. This is also noticeable in the conceptual framework in chapter 3 going by the characteristic of the distributed leadership node in the network. It is more functional to designate responsibilities across the different spheres of influence and spaces in a leadership situation without losing the mutual goal of an effective outcome. Shared leadership, collaborative leadership, co-leadership are synonyms of distributed leadership.

Marshall Ganz succinctly captures this in his lecture on distributed leadership in the Obama Campaigns. He discussed the distributed leadership approach which took advantage of internet platforms including social media

[309] Hulpia, H., Devos, G., & Rosseel, Y., (2009), Development and Validation of Scores on the Distributed Leadership Inventory. *Educational and Psychological Measurement 69*(6), pp. 1013-1034.

on the mutually shared central message of HOPE. This, he attested, makes several volunteers and groups of leaders ran with the message at their own pace – making them own the message.[310] He avowed that the leadership centre must elicit shared purpose among the disparate groups. He gave the specific features of distributed leadership as motivation, relationship, structuring, strategy, and measurable outcome. Additionally, he stipulated five terms to explain those features; they are participation (motivation), community (relationship), structuring (collaboration), initiative (strategy) and action (measurable outcome).[311] In the absence of a standardised measure of distributive/distributed leadership, these outlined features provide a guiding template for calibrating the causal factors in this thesis.

In disaster events involving online citizenship engagements, the democratisation of the internet enhances the possibility of decentralised engagements as against the hierarchical top-down command structure approach to leadership. Disaster events are usually local actions with a national purpose. However, it must be noted that distributed leadership is synonymous with a cacophonous situation where different actors contest for power. It is more like different influential actors' networks seeking a solution to a common problem. These interested actors may not even share the same location as seen in the various international response to the Haiti Earthquake of 2010 and the recent Ebola crisis in West Africa. These two events witnessed devolved leadership with different spheres exercising influence independently with a collective goal of helping the disaster victims.

Distributed leadership is about the dependency of interdependent groups. It involves multiple locations of leadership rather than a centralised leadership structure. Radically put, a dictatorship of the people. Another factor worth considering is the issue of timing and rhythm. In disaster events, distributive/distributed leadership features across the different disaster phases. Given the above positions, I was able to calibrate distributed leadership bearing in mind the context of the thesis.

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[310] Ganz, M., (2009), Distributed Leadership in The Obama Campaign. *Tech TV*. Available from https://techtv.mit.edu/videos/16539-distributed-leadership-in-the-obama-campaign [accessed 13 February 2018]
[311] Ibid

Since cases are country-specific, I relied on key metrics or indicators derived from the Human Freedom Index to aid in the fuzzy-set membership value score of distributed leadership. This is because most distributed leadership is an attribute commonly associated with democracy and freedom. It is crucial because with little freedom of association, assembly, and civil society, freedom of expression and information will most likely not favour distributive leadership. The Human Freedom Index is a collection of over 70 indicators used in measuring the economic, civic, and personal freedom of people in a country.[312] The indicators include freedom of association, assembly, and civil society as well as freedom of expression and information. These are very useful metrics for assessing distributed leadership at a meso-level.

4.9.2 DIST_LEAD Data Source(s)

Data for this causal factor - distributed leadership (DIST_LEAD) were extracted from available tweets archives. Where tweets are insufficient, I mined news reports and academic articles on specific events. Named Entity Extraction of the collection revealed organisational actors; individual actors are not so relevant here because distributed leadership is not always leader centric. This leadership type is shared and not so hierarchical - this is well reflected in an organisation, not in individual leaders. An exploration of the network involving governmental agencies reveals this distributed leadership process.

Other than the Named Entity Extraction method, the tweets were subjected to advanced textual analysis using R package and Python NLTK module to compliment human thematic coding and content analysis methods. As discussed earlier, I worked with coding assistants using the inclusion and exclusion criteria that I developed for distributed leadership. Where disagreements existed between us over thematic code assignments, they were resolved by joint discussions and consultations between the assistants and me. On very rare occasions where we could not reach an agreement, we consulted with subject experts. If we could not reach an agreement still, we dropped that specific tweet. It must be noted that the entire process was designed by me. I

[312] Vásquez, I., & Porcnik, T., (2019), *Human Freedom Index*. Washington DC: Cato Institute

only recruited external hands (coding assistants) to avoid or limit my own personal bias. The following questions helped to guide the case selection (tweets) and the factor calibration process:

i. Is there evidence of the different groups united under a common cause?
ii. Is there recognised cooperation between the governmental actors and other non-governmental actors?
iii. Are there signs of inter-intra network frictions and rivalries?
iv. Did the various networks operate together before, during and after the events?
v. Are there hubs and spokes network topography featuring the governmental agencies as the core with the different non-governmental groups operating as the spokes attached to the hub? A sort of interdependency where the centre must elicit shared purpose among the disparate groups

Evidence of this distributed leadership structure in disaster context includes volunteering including volunteer firefighters, contact tracers in the Ebola and other epidemic outbreak cases, fundraisers, online social media groups, joint press releases between government and non-government actors etc. I have outlined the different calibration procedures for the distributed leadership factor in Table 4.7 below.

Table 4.7: Fuzzy set membership values and calibration descriptions of the distributed leadership (DIST_LEAD) condition

Condition	Fuzzy-Set Membership Value Descriptions	Description
Distributed leadership (DIST_LEAD)	**1:** Fully influenced distributive leadership	Presence of different groups using big data technologies and cooperating with governmental agencies while maintaining their own independence in the disaster context. Evidence of collaboration across different digital platforms e.g. shared information, joint press releases, etc. throughout the disaster phases. More than 5 such instances should qualify for this score.
	0.67: Influence on distributive leadership that was more 'strong' than not strong	Presence of different groups using big data technologies working together with government agencies and with other groups in the disaster context. Evidence of collaboration across different digital platforms e.g. shared information, joint press releases, etc. throughout the disaster phases. There must also be at least between 3 and 5 evidence of such instances on different platforms to earn this score.
	0.33: Very weak influence on distributive leadership that was more 'not strong' than strong	Presence of different groups using big data technologies and no cooperation with governmental agencies while maintaining their own independence in the disaster context.

		Each organisation network relaying working almost independently. Less than 3 of such instances will fit this score.
	0: No influence on distributive leadership	Top-down hierarchical leadership with government agencies leading the disaster management. No collaborative digital technologies efforts. Little or lack of inter-agency collaboration online and via other big data digital technologies.

4.9.3 CONDITION 2: Disaster Preparedness (DIS_PREP)

Effective Disaster Preparedness is about early warning systems. A good head start would most likely influence how disaster leaders will respond or make decisions. Big data digital technologies help not only to mitigate disasters but also contribute to pre-disaster planning and early warning initiatives. These systems enable government emergency agencies to "communicate effective impact-based early warnings and risk information for hydro-meteorological and climate events."[313]

According to CREWS (Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems), effective early warning systems are 'people-centred' and impact-based, in addition to being technically sound. They must address the following: Risk-informed system design, monitoring and warning service, Communication and dissemination, Public access and ability to respond to the warning. It also reckons that early warning systems be measured on their capacity to support:

i. Targets for the reduction of loss of life, injury, and loss of livelihoods.
ii. Objectives for sustainable development, vulnerability reduction and resilience building.
iii. Penetration of accurate and timely warnings.

[313] CREWS (2019), Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS). *Insuresilience*. Available from https://www.insuresilience.org/the-climate-risk-and-early-warning-systems-crews/ [accessed 13 February 2018]]

iv. The ability of people to use warnings, respond appropriately and provide feedback to the designated warning authority.[314]

There is no universally accepted metric for measuring early warnings and disaster preparedness because each disaster is event is unique. Nevertheless, the different metrics across countries follow some aspects of the elements of the CREWS initiatives described above. Countries like Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Ethiopia and nearly all the countries of Africa, Asia and the Middle East have various agencies responsible for the management of disasters. The Nigeria Hydrological Services Agency and the Nigeria Meteorological Agency have weather prediction mechanisms in place for forecasting.

The effectiveness of early warnings is judged by the level of preparedness which in turn influence the mitigation of the disaster. But, in most cases, only press releases from the weather agencies are made with no serious preparedness plans to mitigate the disaster. The information dissemination is usually top-down, and they hardly resonate with the citizens. The effectiveness of disaster preparedness is also made possible through limited frictional relationships between the weather data agencies and the emergency response agencies.

4.9.4 DIS_PREP Data Sources

Press Releases serve as an important source for this calibration. These releases are disseminated on different digital platforms by the various ministries and agencies responsible for disaster management. These press releases are usually posted via their social media accounts as accompaniments to legacy

[314] CREWS, (2017), *Draft Consultation Document on Measuring Early Warning Access and Effectiveness*. CREWS. Available from https://ane4bf-datap1.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/wmocrews/s3fs-public/ckeditor/files/infdoc4_5th_Steering_Committee_CREWS_measuring_effectiveness_0.pdf?NG58UDp1oqzeccARx0bbr5AAlfOJQlNB [accessed 11 March 2018]

news media. I applied content analysis to the digital materials. Questions such as the following helped to guide the calibration:

i. What is the duration between the early warning systems and the onset of the disaster?
ii. What was the mode of dissemination of this risk information and early warnings?
iii. What were the preparedness and planning mechanisms put in place to mitigate the risk of the disaster? For example, pre-disaster campaigns, evacuation plans, set up of displacement camps, provision of information on the nearest food bank, hospitals, and emergency shelters.
iv. Were the citizens actively engaged in the preparedness and planning process?

Whenever there are clear provisions of early warning information systems, availability of mitigation measures and pre-disaster planning using big data digital technologies, the score is 1 (*effective*). In addition, where the citizens shared the information provided by the official agencies, where risk information are actively communicated; these cases were scored 1 (*effective*); otherwise, they were scored 0 (*not effective*).

4.9.5 CONDITION 3: Big Data Technologies access (BTECH_ACCESS)

At the core of the theory of change discussed earlier in this chapter is this important causal factor that is pivotal to the entire configurational process – Big Data Technologies Access. Without big digital technologies access, the entire thesis is imperilled. Big data technology is a subunit of the larger ICT digital technologies which include the internet, satellite communications, software, social media etc. In disaster events, the dominant technologies are big data inclined because at the heart of successful disaster management is disaster informatics – another typology of disaster big data. Big data access is

delineated into 5 key elements namely: affordability, agency, availability, awareness, and abilities.[315] The 2017 index was designed to measure:

> *the level and evolution over time* of ICT developments within countries and the experience of those countries relative to others; progress in ICT development *in both developed and developing countries*; the *digital divide*, i.e., differences between countries in terms of their levels of ICT development; and the *development potential* of ICTs and the extent to which countries can make use of them to enhance growth and development in the context of available capabilities and skills.[316]



Figure 4.13: Three stages in the evolution towards an information society[317]
Note: Source ITU

Figure 4.13 above shows the ICT Development Index (IDI) conceptual framework depicting the three different stages (Access, Use, Skills) or sub-indices of the larger ICT Development Index. Big Technology access was calibrated using the measures provided by this index because it captures the 5 variables listed above. If citizens could not access, afford, were not aware, lacked the skills/agency of the technology then they will not be able to

[315] Vota, W., (2019), The Digital Divide is not Binary: The Five A's of Technology Access. *ICT Works*. Available from https://www.ictworks.org/digital-divide-technology-access/ [accessed 14 October 2020]. Several indices have been developed in the past by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) including the ITU Digital Access Index in November of 2003. This index was the first global ICT ranking to include new variables such as education (ability) and affordability (ITU, 2003). A more comprehensive index, the ICT Development Index (IDI) was developed in 2009 and it has been revised ever since with the latest revision done on March 2017.
[316] ITU (2017), The ICT Development Index (IDI): Conceptual Framework and Methodology. *ITU*. Available from https://www.itu.int/en/itu-d/statistics/pages/publications/mis2017/methodology.aspx [accessed 14 February 2018]
[317] Ibid

participate in ICT disaster management or leadership process. The final 11 indicators used in determining this index are listed below in 3 main sub-indices. They are:

1. ICT infrastructure and access indicators
    i. Fixed-telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants
    ii. Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants
    iii. International Internet bandwidth (bit/s) per Internet user
    iv. Percentage of households with a computer
    v. Percentage of households with Internet access

2. ICT usage indicators
    i. Percentage of individuals using the Internet
    ii. Fixed-broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants
    iii. Active mobile-broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

3. ICT skills indicators
    i. Mean years of schooling rate
    ii. Gross enrolment ratio (secondary and tertiary level)
    iii. Tertiary gross enrolment ratio

Just like the old Digital Access Index, countries in the ICT Development Index are categorises into one four classifications: High = 1 *(fully in)*; Upper = 0.96 *(more in than out)*; Medium 0.33 *(more out than in)* and low = 0 *(fully out)*. The calibration followed these classifications. This calibration is heavily dependent on the year of the disaster event. For example, for events that occurred in 2017, the score of *1* was allotted to countries ranked in the high quartile with ICT Development Index (IDI) scores ranging from 7.13 to 8.98 (Portugal and Iceland respectively).[318]

The *0.96* calibration score is for those countries in the IDI upper-middle quartile values of 5.15 to 7.07 (Suriname to the Russian Federation. IDI lower-middle quartile countries take the *0.33* calibration score and they are ascribed to countries with index scores ranging from 3.09 to 5.14 (Sao Tome and Albania). Lastly, low quartile countries are the least connected countries (LCC)

[318] ITU (2017), *Measuring the Information Society Report 2017 Volume 1*. Switzerland, Geneva: ITU.

and they take on the IDI value of 0.96 to 3.04 (Eritrea and Lesotho respectively); they take the calibration score *0*. They are the least connected countries and their ratings should not be misconstrued as a lack of connectedness.

In 2015, countries in the high quartile with IDI scores from 7.00 to 8.93 (Croatia to the Republic of Korea) were calibrated as *1*.[319] Those in the upper-middle quartile with IDI scores ranging from 5.05 to 6.93 (e.g., Grenada to China) were allotted the calibration score of *0.96*. The countries in the lower-middle quartile with IDI with scores ranging from 2.93 to 5.00 (Vanuatu to Mongolia) got the calibration score of *0.33*. Lastly, a calibration score of *0* is for the least connected countries in the low quartile category with IDI scores ranging between 1.17 and 2.93 (Chad to Sudan). The Big Data Technology Access calibration of each case is dependent on the IDI score of the case country for the given year of the disaster event. Therefore, the metrics and ranking score is subjected to the IDI ranking statistics for that year.

The Human Development Index in the summary of cases description table provides additional insights which will enhance the further analysis of the cases in the next chapters. The other example is the Freedom Index which also added to more insights for deeper analysis of distributed leadership and distributive conversation.

4.9.6 CONDITION 4: Distributed conversation (DIST_CONV)

This condition is like distributed leadership in essence: they both avowed collaborations. In distributed leadership, the focus is primarily on the nature of shared leadership while a distributed conversation is about the devolved discussions across different spaces on an event. Most disaster messaging in less distributed leadership is centralised around officially sanctioned source(s); distributed conversation features extensively in cases involving distributed security-leadership decision-making.

A Distributed conversation is not uncoordinated noisemaking with no organised objectives and goals. It is deliberate and coordinated, though

[319] ITU (2015), *Measuring the Information Society Report 2015*. Switzerland: Geneva: ITU.

independent with the aim of aggregating different opinions on an issue or policy. This governance approach has gained ascendancy in some democracies in recent years particularly with the advent of open government and open data. A typical example is the UK's "Duty to Involve" sets of laws of the mid to late 2000s which sought to promote citizen engagements in public policy especially in the NHS. This mandated was "all NHS bodies to involve members of the public and patients in service planning, operations and policy."[320]

Distributed dialogue is another substitute term used in place of distributed conversation. Government agency takes the lead in eliciting public opinions on matters of national importance, but they do not dictate the direction of the conversation. It is a conscious performance designed for actionable response with a view to deriving insights from the governed. In disaster situations where the outcome has been adjudged widely as effective, this form of citizen engagement has featured prominently.

A Distributed conversation is about active, participatory, collaborative, and continuous engagements across different platforms and spaces. The different digital technologies platform provides enabling environment to dissipate, aggregate, contest opinions and amplify issues of serious concerns to the citizens. It also encourages local participation and aids emergency management in collating local concerns on specific disasters events as all disasters are contextually localised.

In the West African Ebola disease outbreak example, several issues emerged including primary healthcare, diseases management, disaster preparedness and emergency response on the different online and offline platforms. There is abundant evidence of different social media influential actors managing conversations on these issues. There is evidence of networked communication between the Lagos State Emergency Agency, federal government agencies, independent NGOs, and private citizens to dispel misinformation.

Several social media groups were created to address some of these concerns. This involves distributed dialogue; however, it is important to investigate the extent to which this contributed to the eventual disaster

[320] Andersson, E., Burall, S., & Fennell, E., (2010), *Talking for a Change: A Distributed Dialogue Approach to Complex Issues*. London: Involve.

outcome. Calibrating this condition entails digging for its descriptors: participation, a multiplicity of platforms, information diffusion from a coordinated source (e.g., government agency), collaboration, active engagement during and after the disaster event. Any case which meets these criteria is considered as fully in the membership set of distributed conversations with a value of *1*; all other cases are graded according to the values listed in Table 4. Below.

Table 4.8: Fuzzy set membership values and calibration descriptions of the Distributive Conversation (DIST_CONV) condition

Condition	Fuzzy-Set Membership Value Descriptions	Description
Distributed Conversation (DIST_CONV)	**1:** Full presence of distributed leadership	Involves multiple participations across different social media and other digital platforms e.g. Twitter, Facebook, blogs, online forums etc. This includes multiple discussions on the disaster event. Information diffusion from a coordinated source (government agency). This agency coordinates but not control information flow and content. The different opinions, decision ideas and policies are interrogated and discoursed in different spaces with the aim of proffering solutions and contributing to the final decision making process. More than 5 such distributed conversation spaces should qualify for this score.
	0.67: Presence of distributed conversation that was more 'strong' than not strong	Presence of multiple collaborating platforms for active engagements on the disaster event e.g. Twitter, Facebook, blogs, online forums etc. Discussions must be coordinated and guided by the leading government agency. Though distributed conversation spaces are independent, they are also coordinated. There must also be at least between 3 and 5 evidence of distributive conversations across different platforms to earn this score.

	0.33: Very weak presence of distributed conversation that was more 'not strong' than strong	Presence of multiple conversations across different platforms with no identifiable coordination. Each distributed conversation exists independently without link any serious of collaborative discussions across the spaces. Less than 3 examples of such instances will fit this score.
	0: No presence of distributed conversation	Complete absence of distributive conversation. Most likely, the conversation spaces are government dominated with no provision for serious citizen engagement.

4.9.7 DIST_CONV Data Sources

Collection of tweets related to the disaster event. Exploration of mined newspaper articles and Facebook Posts of selected groups for deep conversation analysis provided enough information for the causal calibration.

4.9.8 CONDITION 5: Information Quality Assurance (INFO_QUAL)

This condition is connected to distributed leadership, distributed conversation, big data technologies, as well as coordinated fragmented attention management conditions. The condition underscores the axiology of the distributed conversation. The quality of information shared and the mechanism for ensuring the non-degradation of its value is essential to successful/effective decisions. The ubiquity of social media enhances rapid information dissemination as well as misinformation. Digital alterations of images in memes especially amongst people with low digital literacy exposure could have dire consequences.

With social media, charlatans and non-experts with large influence online could propagate fake news and conspiracy theories with no basis in

facts. The anti-vaccine movement is a typical example: this highlights the fact that technologically advanced societies with high democratic ideals are not immune to this problem. During the Ebola outbreaks, several people believe that drinking and bathing with saltwater could cure the disease; several initiatives had to be put in place using ICT digital technologies to stem the spread of this wrong information. In Southern Africa, there were reported cases of child rape by those who believe sex with virgins could cure HIV.

Big Data technologies represented by social media have been used to curtail the spread of misinformation during crisis and disaster events. Information quality assurance through fact-checking systems put in place by authorities and citizens have contributed immensely to reducing misinformation during emergencies. Janet E. Alexander and Marsha Ann Tate propose several factors for identifying and measuring information quality; they include:

> authority – the visibility of the author validating the information; accuracy – reliable and free of errors; objectivity – presented without personal biases; currency - information content up-to-date; orientation – clear target audience; and navigation – ease of access, intuitive design. [321]

In addition to the above, disaster information quality can be achieved through coordinated fragmented attention management. This factor is connected to distributed leadership, distributed conversation, big data technologies, and information quality assurance causal conditions. It contributed to sieving insights from noise. Disaster dialogues are dynamics and not ordered, hence, the tendency for attention to be distracted is very likely because of the nature of disaster communication. A quick look at various social media conversations lends credence to this observation. This behaviour inhibits emergency managers from adopting digital conversations in their decision-making process because the challenge of extracting meaningful insights from the cacophony is ever-present.

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[321] Alexander, J. E. & Tate, M. A. (1999). *Web Wisdom: How to Evaluate and Create Information Quality on the Web*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Social media users churn out tons of data including text, pictures, and videos every second during disaster events leading to content congestion and oversaturation. Users are inundated with useful and non-useful information by unscrupulous marketers trying to make a quick buck from the situation by peddling their wares to desperate internet users during disaster events. The distractions extend to those who want to push political messaging against incumbent political leadership. There are also those seeking to gain attention by trivialising the experiences of the victims through jokes and banters. These fragmented attention challenges if better managed can lead to effective security-leadership decision-making outcomes.

The use of hashtags for coordinated messaging during disaster events is a way to curtail the menace of fragmented attention. Hashtags are useful mechanism for collating and categorising information during an event. Anyone can generate hashtags and quite often they are hijacked by detractors using bots to redirect attention to their intent. Celebrities and governmental organisations provide leadership during these types of events by creating and promoting hashtags for those identifying with the cause they seek to advance. A common example is the popular #BringBackOurGirls hashtag which had several global figures including the former first lady of the United States Michelle Obama identifying with the missing Chibok Girls.

Coordinated fragmented attention management is important for an effective or successful outcome in crisis situations involving digital technologies deployment. Like the previous causal condition, the Boolean crisp set is applicable here too. Any case with terse messages spotting popular hashtags generated or used by credible sources which a lot of actors and private individuals identify with is coded as fully in (*1*). Any other cases without coordinated attention management are scored as *0*.

I subsume this factor under information quality (INFO_QUAL) in the next chapter because coordinated fragmented attention management (CFRAG_ATTM) is a factor that helps to determine the quality of the information in the causal pathways. Rather than having it as a standalone condition and to avoid unnecessary analytical complexities, I simply collapsed it into (INFO_QUAL) for practical purposes. It is included independently in

the theory of change (ToC) because of its presence in the conceptual network which was used to develop the explanation theory.

These elements of information quality assessment determine the quality of information distributed in the various dialogue spaces during disaster events. Any case with visible systems for information quality assurance such as a fact-check portal is calibrated as *1*. These portals are usually maintained by security leaders e.g., emergency management agencies, centres for disease controls, etc. They are platforms where citizens can verify the authenticity of information - which must be trusted and devoid of political bias, easy to use, and up to date. Cases that do not include the described categories are labelled *0*.

4.9.9 INFO_QUAL Data Sources

Newspaper articles, articles, and published reports by different disaster agencies are veritable media for sourcing and calibrating this condition. There are abundant materials online on the disaster events but in countries with a reduced digital presence, other sources were consulted: mostly post-disaster evaluation reports. On a few occasions, an opinion evaluation of tweets by leading actors reveal the embedded information quality for the calibration.

4.9.10 CONDITION 6, 7 and 8: Economic Cost, Fatalities and Democratic Status

The conditions discussed above feature prominently in the theory of change; there are other supplementary or auxiliary conditions for understanding the pathways. These conditions may not be causal factors, but they are crucial nonetheless to making sense of the configurations. They are not included in the theory of change model because they are not dominant causal factors from the conceptual model and the systematic review of the literature. But, in the initial discussions with domain experts, they are factors that came up prominently as explanatory variables for understanding security-leadership decision-making outcome effectiveness or ineffectiveness.

These factors are Economic cost (PERC_ECON_COST) and the number of fatalities (PERC_FATALITIES).[322,323] The sources for the economic cost and the fatalities are usually found in the disaster reports and databases (e.g., CRED). I also explored newspaper articles on disaster events and the affected countries. I also consulted Wikipedia where the data is not available. Since the PERC_ECON_COST and PERC_FATALITIES are continuous data, I used a different calibration procedure. Their skewed distributions suggest extreme outliers that limit setting arbitrary threshold values. Therefore, I used the QCA R package to readjust the threshold values and to control for outliers. This led to approximate values of 0.058 and 0.0004 for PERC_ECON_COST and PERC_FATALITIES respectively (See Figure 5.4).

Another factor is the democratic status (DEMO_STATUS) of the country. This factor straddles distributed leadership and distributed conversation – the democratic status of a country helps to understand these two. The democratic status of the countries was sourced from the Democratic Index published by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) in the United Kingdom for the given year of the disaster events in the listed country.[324] I allotted countries listed as Full democracies with a calibration score of [1], Flawed democracies [0.67], Hybrid regimes [0.33], and Authoritarian regimes [0].

4.10 Conclusion

In the current chapter, I operationalised the conceptual model and framework with the development of a Theory of Change (ToC) for hypothesising the

[322] Percentage Economic Cost (PERC_ECON_COST: Economic cost of deaths from natural disasters per country, as a percentage of GDP. See WHO (n.d.), Annex. WHO Regional Office for Europe. Available from https://www.euro.who.int/en/media-centre/sections/press-releases/2015/04/air-pollution-costs-european-economies-us$-1.6-trillion-a-year-in-diseases-and-deaths,-new-who-study-says/annex-economic-cost-of-deaths-from-air-pollution-outdoor-and-indoor-per-country,-as-a-percentage-of-gdp [accessed March 23, 2021]

[323] Percentage Fatalities (PERC_FATALITIES): The number of deaths from the disaster events per country, as a percentage of its population.

[324] Democracy Index 2014 (2014), *Economic Intelligence Unit*. Available from https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=Democracy0115 [accessed 17 July 2019]

different pathways to the outcomes. I also discussed QCA and narrowed it to fsQCA with justifications for the preference of this variant.

I also calibrated the condition and outcome factors in the chapter. In the next chapter, I present findings from the implementation of the fsQCA starting with cases from across the world to accommodate events in different economic and social spheres. This was designed by me to generate a model which I tested through the application of Q-Methodology to the selected cases of interest – the Lagos Ebola outbreak and flood disasters cases. This deductive approach helped me to avoid drawing inferences from insufficient cases and it provided opportunities for some limited generalisations.

CHAPTER 5

Explaining Security-Leadership Decision-Making Outcome Variations

5.1 Tobit Regression Analysis

It is crucial to commence this part of the thesis by first testing and validating the entire data matrix. This involves analysing the relationship characteristics between the different causal conditions as independent variables and the outcome as the dependent variable. So far, I have highlighted several limitations of regression (linear), there is however a particular regression that is appropriate for examining censored relations. These are relations involving censored or truncated dependent variables with lower and upper limits as typified by fsQCA membership set limitations ranging between 1 (Upper) and 0 (Lower).[325]

Table 5.2 contains the entire data matrix with the 37 disaster cases (observations) and 9 variables. Only 6 of these causal factors have set membership values. The other three are descriptor variables or factors which aid the understanding of the disaster events. The last variable is the outcome variable. Although the descriptor variables - DEMO_TYPE, PERC_ECON_COST, and PERC_FATALITIES are theoretically important for determining the membership set values for each case, DEMO_TYPE is not included in both the final analysis of Tobit regression and the fsQCA because it contains textual values that describe the set values in DEMO_STATUS. PERC_ECON_COST and PERC_FATALITIES are continuous variables with values of PERC_ECON_COST containing an upper limit value (1.2230107)

[325] Simar L., Wilson P.W., (2007), Estimation and inference in two-stage, semi-parametric models of productive efficiency. *Journal of Econometrics* 136, pp. 31–64. DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2005.07.009

which is higher than 1. QCA R package was used to calibrate the two conditions into set membership values.

PERC_ECON_COST is the percentage of the economic cost of the disaster per GDP of the country for that disaster year. PERC_FATALITIES is the percentage of fatalities recorded for that disaster event against the population of the country for that disaster year. This is computed from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) of Disaster Events. Although these factors are not included in the fuzzy set QCA analysis, they provide significant insights in the analysis of the cases – both within and across cases. See Table 5.1 below for a description of all the causal factors (variables).

Table 5.2: A full list of the disaster events in chronological order

DISASTER	DIST_LEAD	DIS_PREP	DIST_CONV	BTECH_ACCESS	INFO_QUAL	DEMO_STATUS	DEMO_TYPE	PERC_ECON_COST	PERC_FATALITIES	OUTCOME
Australia Bundaberg Flood (2013)	0.33	0.67	0.33	1	0	1	Full democracies	0.0000623	0.00000026	0.33
Australia Queensland Floods (2010-2011)	0.33	0.33	0.67	1	1	1	Full democracies	0.0101147	0.00000148	1
Bangladesh Landslides (2017)	0.33	0.33	0.33	0	0.33	0.33	Hybrid regimes	0.000893	0.000000923	0.33
Brazil Zika Virus outbreak (2015-2016)	0.67	0	0.67	0.67	0.33	0.67	Flawed democracies	0.00017279	0.000000043	0.67
Chile Earthquake (2010)	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.67	0.33	0.67	Flawed democracies	0.1372997	0.00002956	0.33
Chile Iquique Earthquake (2014)	0.33	0.33	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	Flawed democracies	0.0003837	0.00000034	0.67
DR Congo Kivu Ebola Epidemic (2018)	0	0	0.33	0	0	0	Authoritarian regimes	0.003974	0.0000266	0
Ecuador Earthquake (2016)	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.67	0.67	Flawed democracies	0.030422878	0.0000252	0.33
Guinea Ebola Epidemic (2014)	0	0	0	0	0	0	Authoritarian regimes	0.094	0.0002153	0
Haiti Earthquake (2010)	0	0	0.67	0	0.33	0	Authoritarian regimes	1.2230107	0.02	0.67
Haiti Cholera Outbreak (2010)	0.33	1	0.67	0	0.33	0	Authoritarian regimes	0.00258	0.000863	0.67
India Chennai Floods (2015)	0.33	0	0.67	0	0.67	0.67	Flawed democracies	0.004757	0.0000004	0.67
India Kerala Floods (2018)	0.67	0	1	0	0.67	0.67	Flawed democracies	0.0020588	0.0000004	0.67
India Uttarakhand Floods (2013)	0.33	0	0.33	0	1	0.67	Flawed democracies	0.000592	0.00000449	0.67
Indonesia Jakarta Floods (2015)	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.33	0.67	0.67	Flawed democracies	0.0000906	0	0.67
Liberia, Ebola Epidemic (2014)	0.33	0.33	0.67	0	0	0.33	Hybrid regimes	0.085	0.001095	0.33
Malaysia Floods (2014)	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.67	0.33	0.67	Flawed democracies	0.001889	0.0000008	0.33
Mozambique Cyclone Idai (2019)	0.33	0.33	0.33	0	0	0	Authoritarian regimes	0.1375	0.0000442	0

Nepal Earthquake (2015)	0.67	0.33	0.33	0	0.67	0.33	Hybrid regimes	0.46707	0.000309	0.67
Nigeria Floods (2012)	0.33	0.33	0.67	0	0.33	0	Authoritarian regimes	0.01409978	0.0000021	0.33
Nigeria Floods (2017)	0.33	0.67	0.67	0	0.33	0.33	Hybrid regimes	0	0.00000011	0.67
Nigeria Ebola Epidemic (2014)	0.67	0.33	0.67	0	0.67	0	Authoritarian regimes	0	0.000000045	1
Pakistan Earthquake (2013)	0.33	0.33	0.33	0	0.33	0.33	Hybrid regimes	0.004325	0.00000454	0.33
Pakistan Monsoon Floods (2010)	0.33	0.33	0.33	0	0.33	0.33	Hybrid regimes	0.24239007	0.0000104	0.33
Philippines Typhoon Hagupit (2014)	0.33	0.67	0.67	0.33	0.67	0.67	Flawed democracies	0.00040056	0.0000002	1
Philippines Typhoon Haiyan (2013)	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.67	Flawed democracies	0.051508	0.0000645	0.33
Saudi Arabia Jeddah Floods (2009)	0	0	0	0.67	0	0	Authoritarian regimes	0.000629	0.0000045	0
Sierra Leone, Ebola Epidemic (2014)	0.33	0	0.33	0	0.67	0.33	Hybrid regimes	0.048	0.0005586	0.33
Sierra Leone Mudslides (2017)	0	0	0.33	0	0.33	0.33	Hybrid regimes	0.0079491	0.0001509	0.33
Somalia, Drought (2011)	0.33	0	0.33	0	0	0	Authoritarian regimes	0.9288368	0.0208	0
Somalia Drought (2017)	0.67	0.67	0.67	0	0.67	0	Authoritarian regimes	0.4410367	0.00007462	0.67
USA California Napa Earthquake (2014)	0.67	0.33	0.67	1	1	1	Full democracies	0.000000003	0.00005737	1
USA Colorado Floods (2013)	0.67	1	1	1	1	1	Full democracies	0.0001737	0.000000025	1
USA Hurricane Sandy (2012)	1	0.67	1	1	1	1	Full democracies	0.00434	0.00000023	1
USA Joplin Tornado, Missouri (2011)	0.67	0.67	0.67	1	1	1	Full democracies	0.000180412	0.0000005	1
USA, Hurricane Harvey (2017)	1	0.67	1	1	1	0.67	Flawed democracies	0.00645	0.0000002	0.67
Vanuatu, Cyclone PAM (2015)	0.33	0.67	0.33	0	0.33	1	Full democracies	0.76237	0.00006046	0.67

5.1.1 Summary Descriptive Statistics of the data matrix of conditions and outcome

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the boxplot distribution of conditions (excluding DEMO_TYPE which is a descriptor of the DEMO_STATUS condition) and outcome in the data matrix. They provide an overview of the dataset alongside how they are distributed. A summary description of the boxplot is in Table 5.3. This table shows the mean, median, standard deviation as well as the 1st and 3rd quartile statistical parameters of the dataset.

Table 5.1: Description of Causal Variable or Condition terms

Conditions (Variables)	Description
DIST_LEAD	Distributed Leadership
DIS_PREP	Disaster Preparation
DIST_CONV	Distributed Conversation
BTECH_ACCESS	Big Data/Digital Technologies Access
INFO_QUAL	Information Quality
DEMO_STATUS	Democratic Freedom Status
PERC_ECON_COST	Percentage of Disaster Cost Per GDP
PERC_FATALITIES	Percentage of Population Killed
OUTCOME	Effective or Ineffective Big Data and Digital Technologies Security-leadership decision-making



Figure 5.1: Boxplot distribution of conditions and outcome.
Note: The red asterisk is the mean indicator.



Figure 5.2: Boxplot distribution of conditions and outcome.
Note: The red asterisk is the mean indicator.

Table 5.3: Summary Descriptive Statistics of the data matrix

Variable	N	Min	1st Quart	Median	Mean (μ)	3rd Quart	Max	SD(σ)
DIST_LEAD	37	0	0.33	0.33	0.4043	0.67	1	0.248145
DIS_PREP	37	0	0	0.33	0.3508	0.67	1	0.29039
DIST_CONV	37	0	0.33	0.67	0.5224	0.67	1	0.253477
BTECH_ACCESS	37	0	0	0	0.3154	0.67	1	0.402671
INFO_QUAL	37	0	0.33	0.33	0.4862	0.67	1	0.335215
DEMO_STATUS	37	0	0.33	0.33	0.4778	0.67	1	0.360548
PERC_ECON_COST	37	0	0.0004006	0.00434	0.1274205	0.085	1.2230107	0.278538
PERC_FATALITIES	37	0	0.00000034	0.0000045	0.0012	0.0000645	0.0208	0.004596
OUTCOME	37	0	0.33	0.33	0.5316	0.67	1	0.315607

Table 5.4 below contains the results of the bivariate relationships in the dataset. Figure 5.3 displays the scatterplot matrix of the same nonlinear relationships. It clearly illustrates the results presented in the table. The values in the Table 5.4 below are the correlation coefficients of the relationships. These are statistical measures used to compute the strength and direction of a relationship between two variables. These values ranged between a minimum of -1 and a maximum of 1; anything beneath or above these values is indicative of a measurement error. A correlation of -1 indicates a perfect negative correlation, while a correlation of 1 shows a perfect positive correlation. A correlation of 0 depicts no relationship between the movement of the two variables.

Table 5.4: Data matrix of relationships between the factors (variables)

	DIST_LEAD	DIS_PREP	DIST_CONV	BTECH_ACCESS	INFO_QUAL	DEMO_STATUS	PERC_ECON_COST	PERC_FATALITIES	OUTCOME
DIST_LEAD	1	0.484990615	0.697560594	0.435895691	0.668122915	0.456615233	-0.184669674	-0.234126717	0.630132727
DIS_PREP	0.484990615	1	0.44877541	0.362729525	0.312217393	0.349897606	-0.149296911	-0.285099751	0.488775985
DIST_CONV	0.697560594	0.44877541	1	0.329195948	0.618612526	0.360492956	-0.123995558	-0.02562714	0.743064067
BTECH_ACCESS	0.435895691	0.362729525	0.329195948	1	0.442554469	0.702496059	-0.323966894	-0.202856906	0.405104712
INFO_QUAL	0.668122915	0.312217393	0.618612526	0.442554469	1	0.589953144	-0.230502261	-0.243558495	0.824741001
DEMO_STATUS	0.456615233	0.349897606	0.360492956	0.702496059	0.589953144	1	-0.278557888	-0.331231874	0.568422543
PERC_ECON_COST	-0.184669674	-0.149296911	-0.123995558	-0.323966894	-0.230502261	-0.278557888	1	0.812818926	-0.103056038
PERC_FATALITIES	-0.234126717	-0.285099751	-0.02562714	-0.202856906	-0.243558495	-0.331231874	0.812818926	1	-0.160712104
OUTCOME	**0.630132727**	0.488775985	**0.743064067**	0.405104712	**0.824741001**	**0.568422543**	-0.103056038	-0.160712104	1

From the results in Table 5.4 above, DIST_LEAD v. OUTCOME with a correlation coefficient value of 0.630132727, DIST_CONV v. OUTCOME with a value of 0.743064067, INFO_QUAL v. OUTCOME with a value of 0.824741001, and DEMO_STATUS with a value of 0.568422543 all have values closer to 1 or at least more than 0.5. This means that the relationships are positive - that is, the higher the causal variable, the higher the outcome variable. In statistics, the standard for determining a strong relationship is 0.8. Any coefficient value that is lower than this value is considered insignificant. For a weak relationship, the standard value should not be lesser than -0.8. Anything outside of these coefficient thresholds is considered insignificant.

In the Table above. Only INFO_QUAL with a coefficient value of 0.824741001 shows a significantly strong positive relationship. On the other hand, both PERC_ECON_COST and PERC_FATALITIES with coefficient values -0.103056038, -0.160712104 respectively carry insignificantly weak coefficient values because they are greater than -0.8. In summary, the stronger the quality of information (INFO_QUAL) the more likely there would be an effective/successful security-leadership decision-making in disaster situations involving the adoption of big data digital technologies (OUTCOME)



Figure 5.3: Scatterplots showing the relationships between the factors (variables) and their correlation coefficients.

5.1.2 Tobit Regression Coefficients and Results

Table 5.5: Estimated Tobit regression coefficients for eight variables that evaluate outcome effectiveness in 37 disaster events

Condition (Variable)	Coefficient Estimate (β)	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)	Pvals***
(Intercept):1*	-0.242545946	0.093496744	-2.594164636	0.009482107	0.01174149
(Intercept):2**	-1.77887761	0.132286151	-13.44719459	3.20E-41	2.60E-20
DIST_LEAD	-0.29275039	0.205830254	-1.422290381	0.15494197	0.159797618
DIS_PREP	**0.295088438**	0.133214438	2.215138562	0.026750555	**0.030316289**
DIST_CONV	**0.666098265**	0.192718508	3.456327419	0.00054759	**0.000977831**
BTECH_ACCESS	-0.035846854	0.131610658	-0.272370451	0.785337191	0.786214023
INFO_QUAL	**0.682407904**	0.136497784	4.999406462	0.000000575	**0.00000474**
DEMO_STATUS	0.225560029	0.143687005	1.56980117	0.116461375	0.121392671
PERC_ECON_COST	0.225778597	0.209935659	1.075465686	0.282166287	0.286204003
PERC_FATALITIES	-6.921151398	14.3673139	-0.481728975	0.62999849	0.631641713

Note: **(Intercept):1*** - Constant. **(Intercept):2**** - An ancillary statistic. If we exponentiate this value, we get a statistic that is analogous to the square root of the residual variance in OLS regression**. ***pvals** - P-values. N = 37. The Upper bound of Tobit is set to 1. Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1. Names of linear predictors: mu, loglink(sd). Log-likelihood: 2.1353 on 64 degrees of freedom. The number of Fisher scoring iterations: 12. No Hauck-Donner effect was found in any of the estimates.

Table 5.5 above contains results of the Tobit model/regression with an Upper bound set to 1. The table presents the coefficients, standard errors, z-values and the p-values as well as other relevant results from the regression. The coefficient estimates indicate that for a unit increase in the condition(variable) DIST_PREP for instance, there is a 0.295088438 point increase in the OUTCOME. This is because of the positive value of this coefficient. One unit increase in DIST_CONV results in a 0.666098265 increase in the predicted value of the OUTCOME factor (variable). Similarly, a unit increase in INFO_QUAL will lead to a 0.682407904 in the OUTCOME. The same interpretation extends to all the conditions with positive coefficient estimates.

The simple interpretation of this result suggests that a highly effective disaster preparation (DIST_PREP), increase in distributed conversation (DIST_CONV) or a high Information Quality (INFO_QUAL) will most likely lead to effective or successful security-leadership decision-making in disaster situations (OUTCOME) involving the deployment of big data technologies. These three factors out of the other factors with positive coefficients are the only statistically significant factors in this dataset. They alone have p-values that are less than 0.05 (see the highlighted values in the p-values column).

A negative coefficient on the other hand suggests that as the independent variable increases, the dependent variable tends to decrease. Although conditions DIST_LEAD, BTECH_ACCESS, and PERC_FATALITIES have negative coefficients, their p-values are above 0.05 hence not statistically significant enough to fit the suggestion for negative coefficient highlighted above. The Tobit regression results presented above are suggestive and subject only to limited generations because of the small number of cases analysed. It is interesting to see how these regression results compare to the fsQCA findings.

Figures 5.4A and 5.4B below show the distribution of the values of the PERC_ECON_COST and PERC_FATALITIES conditions. They are irregular and there are too many skewed overlaps. This is corroborated by the boxplot in Figure 5.2 The default position from this observation is to drop these conditions from the truth table. Nevertheless, since they feature in the Theory of Change as factors in the pathways leading to the outcome, it is only appropriate to include them for now. Findings from the fsQCA will reveal their roles (if any) in the configuration and causal pathways.



A. PERC_FATALITIES (Threshold value through statistical hierarchical clustering using the Euclidean distance: `0.61472`)



B. PERC_ECON_COST (default threshold value: `0.0105475`)



C. PERC_FATALITIES (Adjusted threshold value: `0.0004`)



D. PERC_ECON_COST (Adjusted threshold value: `0.058`)

Figure 5.4: The distribution of the values of the PERC_ECON_COST and PERC_FATALITIES conditions

To turn the entire entries in Table 5.3 into a complete truth table ahead of the fsQCA analysis, the factors in PERC_FATALITIES and PERC_ECON_COST columns had to be calibrated into set membership score using the QCA package in R.[326] It is clear that the skewed distribution includes extreme outliers which affected the threshold values. A careful readjustment of the threshold values taking care to control the outliers gave the approximate values: 0.0004 and 0.058 respectively (See Figures 5.4C and 5.4D). DEMO_TYPE contains textual categorical variables; hence, it was dropped because it was not relevant to the analysis. Table 5.6 below is the calibrated data matrix. From the Tobit analysis above, the following model was drawn: DIS_PREP+DIST_CONV+INFO_QUAL => OUTCOME. That is; the combination of strong disaster preparation, high distributed conversation and high information quality will lead to an effective outcome. This proposition does not include an explanation for an ineffective outcome. This hypothesis together with the other hypotheses shall be revisited after the presentation of the NCA and fsQCA results. The results might validate or repudiate this model.

[326] Dusa, Adrian (2018), *Qualitative Comparative Analysis with R: A Comprehensive Resource*. New York: Springer.

5.2 Analysis of Necessity (NCA and fsQCA)

A very crucial step in identifying conditions that are necessary for outcomes is required before the investigation of all the other combinations of sufficient conditions in qualitative comparative analysis. This step involves the analysis of necessity. Necessary conditions as discussed in the previous chapters are the conditions or a particular condition without which there cannot be any outcome. The absence of the outcome is guaranteed by the absence of this condition or a configuration of conditions. Although the presence of the necessary condition does not guarantee the presence of the outcome.

A good example is the presence of air and fire. Fire cannot occur without air; hence, air is necessary for fire but there are cases where oxygen is present without fire. There are other factors such as fuel e.g., wood, petrol, heat source etc. On their own, they are necessary but not sufficient for fire. But when combined, they are necessary and sufficient for fire. A simplification of the proposition goes thus: if Y = 1, then X =1, if X =1, then Y= 1 or 0.[327] Where X stands for the condition or configuration of conditions and Y represents the outcome factor. 1 stand for presence and 0 for absence. To insatiate sufficient condition, an example would be 'Mary is a queen" which will suggest that Mary is female; therefore, recognising that Mary is a queen is sufficient to conclude that she is female. Furthermore, being a female sibling is both a necessary and sufficient condition for being called a sister. Both conditions must be true for the condition to be true.

It is imperative to establish the relevance and necessity of condition(s) for an outcome before the investigation of the sufficiency of those conditions for the outcome. NCA and fsQCA analysis of necessity will address the former, while fsQCA sufficiency analysis will address the latter. R packages for QCA and NCA are used for both analyses. After exploring literature and theories, 8 potential conditions were used in formulating the hypotheses below. Testing would be done on them to draw out the necessary conditions using NCA parameters and fsQCA analysis of necessity. The focal unit of these hypotheses is "big data digital technologies security decision-making in crisis or disaster

[327] Vis, B., & Dul, J., (2018), Analyzing Relationships of Necessity not just in Kind but also in Degree: Complementing fsQCA with NCA. *Sociological Methods & Research 47*(4), 872-899.

situations". The theoretical domain is the universe of all security decision-making process involving the deployment of big data digital technologies". This study is limited in the scope of generalisability because of the limited cases involved but the empirical, as well as theoretical potentials of the findings, are nonetheless interminable.

5.2.1 The Hypotheses for Necessary Conditions

H1: The presence of *distributed leadership* is necessary for effective big data and digital technologies security-leadership decision-making in crisis or disaster situations.

H2: Effectively high *distributed preparation* is necessary for effective big data and digital technologies security-leadership decision-making in crisis or disaster situations.

H3: The presence of *distributed conversation* is necessary for effective big data and digital technologies security-leadership decision-making in crisis or disaster situations.

H4: The presence of *big data and digital technologies Access* are necessary for effective big data and digital technologies security-leadership decision-making in crisis or disaster situation.

H5: The presence of highly effective *quality information* is necessary for effective big data and digital technologies security-leadership decision-making in crisis or disaster situations.

H6: The *democratic freedom status* of the country is necessary for effective big data and digital technologies security-leadership decision-making in crisis or disaster situations.

H7: The *Disaster Cost Per GDP* of the country is necessary for effective big data and digital technologies security-leadership decision-making in crisis or disaster situations.

H8: The *percentage of fatalities relative to a country's population* is necessary for effective big data and digital technologies security-leadership decision-making in crisis or disaster situations.

Table 5.6: The Raw Data Matrix (Calibrated)

DISASTER	DIST_LEAD	DIS_PREP	DIST_CONV	BTECH_ACCESS	INFO_QUAL	DEMO_STATUS	PERC_ECON_COST	PERC_FATALITIES	OUTCOME
Australia Bundaberg Flood (2013)	0.33	0.67	0.33	1	0	1	0	0	0.33
Australia Queensland Floods (2010-2011)	0.33	0.33	0.67	1	1	1	0	0	1
Bangladesh Landslides (2017)	0.33	0.33	0.33	0	0.33	0.33	0	0	0.33
Brazil Zika Virus Outbreak (2015-2016)	0.67	0	0.67	0.67	0.33	0.67	0	0	0.67
Chile Earthquake (2010)	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.67	0.33	0.67	1	0	0.33
Chile Iquique Earthquake (2014)	0.33	0.33	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0	0	0.67
DR Congo Kivu Ebola Epidemic (2018)	0	0	0.33	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ecuador Earthquake (2016)	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.67	0.67	0	0	0.33
Guinea Ebola Epidemic (2014)	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Haiti Cholera Outbreak (2010)	0.33	1	0.67	0	0.33	0	0	1	0.67
Haiti Earthquake (2010)	0	0	0.67	0	0.33	0	1	1	0.67

India Chennai Floods (2015)	0.33	0	0.67	0	0.67	0.67	0	0	0.67
India Kerala Floods (2018)	0.67	0	1	0	0.67	0.67	0	0	0.67
India Uttarakhand Floods (2013)	0.67	0	0.67	0	1	0.67	0	0	0.67
Indonesia Jakarta Floods (2015)	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.33	0.67	0.67	0	0	0.67
Liberia Ebola Epidemic (2014)	0.33	0.33	0.67	0	0	0.33	1	1	0.33
Malaysia Floods (2014)	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.67	0.33	0.67	0	0	0.33
Mozambique Cyclone Idai (2019)	0.33	0.33	0.33	0	0	0	1	0	0
Nepal Earthquake (2015)	0.67	0.33	0.33	0	0.67	0.33	1	0	0.67
Nigeria Ebola Epidemic (2014)	0.67	0.33	0.67	0	0.67	0	0	0	1
Nigeria Floods (2012)	0.33	0	0.33	0	0.33	0	0	0	0.33
Nigeria Floods (2017)	0.33	0	0.33	0	0.33	0.33	0	0	0.33
Pakistan Earthquake (2013)	0.33	0.33	0.33	0	0.33	0.33	0	0	0.33
Pakistan Monsoon Floods (2010)	0.33	0.33	0.33	0	0.33	0.33	1	0	0.33
Philippines Typhoon Hagupit (2014)	0.33	0.67	0.67	0.33	0.67	0.67	0	0	1

Philippines Typhoon Haiyan (2013)	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.67	0	0	0.33
Saudi Arabia Jeddah Floods (2009)	0	0	0	0.67	0	0	0	0	0
Sierra Leone Ebola Epidemic (2014)	0.33	0	0.33	0	0.67	0.33	0	1	0.33
Sierra Leone Mudslides (2017)	0	0	0.33	0	0.33	0.33	0	0	0.33
Somalia Drought (2011)	0.33	0	0.33	0	0	0	1	1	0
Somalia Drought (2017)	0.67	0.67	0.67	0	0.67	0	1	0	0.67
USA California Napa Earthquake (2014)	0.67	0.33	0.67	1	1	1	0	0	1
USA Colorado Floods (2013)	0.67	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
USA Hurricane Harvey (2017)	1	0.67	1	1	1	0.67	0	0	0.67
USA Hurricane Sandy (2012)	1	0.67	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
USA Missouri Joplin Tornado (2011)	0.67	0.67	0.67	1	1	1	0	0	1
Vanuatu Cyclone PAM (2015)	0.33	0.67	0.33	0	0.33	1	1	0	0.67

5.2.2 Necessary Conditions *in-kind* and *in-degree*

There are two common techniques for analysing relationships of necessity: they are NCA (*Necessary Condition Analysis*) and fsQCA (*Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis*). While fsQCA focuses on necessity *in kind*, NCA is about necessity *in degree*. A particularly good example is the role of teachers in imparting knowledge in schools. The statement knowledge impartation (Y) is not possible without teachers (X) is a necessary proposition because Y ≤ X (i.e., Y is a subset of X). Without X, there cannot be Y. The types of teachers (high school, or elementary) is the *in-kind* concern of fsQCA while NCA is more about the *in-degree* of the relation. Which level of teachers as conditions lead to what level of knowledge impartation as an outcome. According to Jan Dul, "in fsQCA, a necessary condition is assumed to exist if the area above the diagonal reference line in an XY scatter plot is virtually empty."[328] (ERiM, 2019). The graphics in Figure 5.5 A and Figure 5.5 B below captures these two relationships. The first image illustrates the fsQCA relation of necessity, where only a few deviant cases (clear dots) are above the diagonal lines, and a majority of the cases (darkened dots) are below the lines.



Figure 5.5: Relationships of Necessity between X and Y in fsQCA (A) and NCA (B)[329]

The second image illustrates the NCA relation of necessity, which "requires Y ≤ f(X), where f(X) can be any function. Hence, fsQCA's reference line (the diagonal) is a

[328] ERIM (2019), NCA and QCA. *ERIM*. Available from https://www.erim.eur.nl/necessary-condition-analysis/about-nca/faq/nca-and-other-data-analysis-methods/nca-and-qca/ [accessed Retrieved 8 March 2020]
[329] Ibid

special case of NCA's ceiling line."[330] Simply put, X_c is necessary for Y_c, unlike in the fsQCA image, where X is generally responsible for Y without difference in degree. NCA provides an opportunity for identifying what levels of X are responsible for what levels of Y. The ceiling line in NCA is non-diagonal, allowing for this identification. It is clear from the image that certain ranges of X conditions do not constrain the outcome Y, while certain ranges of outcome Y are not constrained by the condition X. In this instance, "X is not necessary for Y ("necessity inefficiency", …), whereas X is necessary for Y in other ranges."[331] The complementary strengths of these two techniques contribute to this chapter's analysis of necessity.

5.2.3. NCA Effect size (*d*) measure: CE-FDH and CR-FDH ceiling lines

In NCA, there are two straight lines and a step function line use in determining empty spaces for identifying necessary conditions as against a single diagonal line of fsQCA. See Figure 5.6 below for a demonstration of these lines. The step function is the *Ceiling Envelopment – Free Disposal Hull* (CE-FDH) ceiling line that is used for discrete variables or conditions. The *Ceiling Regression – Free Disposal Hull* (CR-FDH) ceiling line is used for continuous variables; the last line is the *Ordinary Least Squares* (OLS) regression line. The boundary dashed lines surrounding the plot mark are for determining the empirical *scope* of the observation, they outline the minimum and maximum observed values for X and Y.[332]

Nullification or affirmation of NCA hypotheses are dependents on the empty space above these lines – this space is also known as the "ceiling zone" and it is located within the empirical scope. The size of this zone depicts the *effect size* which is ascertained by dividing the ceiling zone by the empirical zone. The general benchmark for classifying effect size (*d*) are as follow:

i. $0 < d < 0.1$, is a 'small effect size',
ii. $0.1 < d < 0.3$ is considered a 'medium effect',
iii. $0.3 < d < 0.5$ is a 'large effect', and
iv. $d < 0.5$ is a 'very large effect'.

[330] Dul, J., (2016), Identifying Single Necessary Conditions with NCA and fsQCA. *Journal of Business Research 69*(4), pp. 1516-1523.
[331] ERIM, (2019)
[332] Dul, J., (2019), *Conducting Necessary Condition Analysis: for Business and Management Students*. London: Sage.

A general threshold for accepting or rejecting a necessary condition hypothesis is a minimum effect size of 0.1.[333] One final NCA metric is the *accuracy* or the *c-accuracy and fit* score which is defined as "the number of cases that is on or below the ceiling line divided by the total number of cases, times 100 per cent."[334]

It must be noted that a large effect size may happen by chance and may not evaluate to any statistical significance. To address this challenge, a possible permutation of random reshuffling (usually about 10,000) is done on the relationship between X and Y. A large random sample, usually, about 10,000 is drawn

> to obtain a distribution of effect sizes when the null-hypothesis is true (i.e., X and Y are not related). This distribution is used for comparison with the observed effect size and for calculating the p-value.[335] (Dul, 2020).

This test is done on the samples drawn from this permutation to determine if the observed effect size is due to chance; to do so the observed effect size is compared to the random effect size. The *p*-value is:

> the probability that the effect size of the observed sample is equal to or larger than the effect sizes if the samples where X and Y are unrelated. If this probability is low e.g., $p<0.05$), it is concluded that it is not plausible that the observed effect size is the result of a random process of unrelated variables: the null hypothesis is rejected.[336]

5.2.4 Parameters of fit Consistency, Coverage, and Relevance of Necessity in fsQCA

In fsQCA analysis of necessity, a *consistency* score plays a similar role as the effect size in NCA. This score is determined by:

> dividing the number of cases with membership in both condition and outcome set by the number of cases with membership in the outcome set…Experts recommend using a consistency threshold of at least 0.9 for establishing necessity.[337]

In some circumstances depending on the context of the study, a lower threshold value may be acceptable, but according to Charles Ragin, "values below 0.75 generate

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[333] Ibid
[334] Vis, B., & Dul, J., (2018)
[335] Dul, J., (2020), *Necessary Condition Analysis (NCA) With R (Version 3.0.3): A Quick Start Guide*. Rochester, NY: Sage Publications. Available from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/ssrn_id3626067_code344935.pdf [accessed 31December 2020]
[336] Ibid
[337] Kane, H. L., & Kahwati, L. C., (2018), *Qualitative Comparative Analysis in Mixed Methods Research and Evaluation*. Thousands Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

indicate substantial inconsistency."[338,339] *Consistency* is also known as *Inclusion measure* in some literature because "the measure represents the degree to which one set is included by another, producing evidence that is either consistent with the underlying hypothesis, inconsistent or mixed. The measure is also called Inclusion-1 index."[340] Charles Ragin recommended the following formula and logic for calculating consistency of necessity.[341]

$$\textbf{\textit{Consistency of X as a necessary condition for Y}} = \frac{Number\ of\ cases\ where\ X = 1\ and\ Y{=}1}{Number\ of\ cases\ where\ Y{=}1}$$

$$Consistency_{\text{Necessary Conditions } (X_i \geq Y_i)} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{I} Y_i}.$$

Just like in NCA's measure of statistical significance or effect size, consistency or inclusion score is not enough for drawing a conclusion from fsQCA's relations of necessity. As noticed in both techniques, a condition may be necessary but insignificant. The Coverage score of a necessary condition captures the degree to which a necessary condition is empirically relevant (i.e., observed in the data). The values range between 0 and 1, the necessary values closer to 1 are empirical relevant while those closer to 0 are irrelevant. A condition may be necessary with high consistency (inclusion) score, but with a low coverage score; under this circumstance, the condition is a *trivial necessary condition* or considered irrelevant. A lot of factors fall under this category. For example, it is common knowledge that one cannot be a professional player without being a soccer player; hence, being a soccer player is necessary for becoming a professional soccer player. Another example is adherence to school attendance requirements as a necessary condition for school graduation. Although school attendance in this regard is a necessary condition for graduation, it is

[338] Baquero, A., Delgado, B., Escortell, R., & Sapena, J., (2019), Authentic Leadership and Job Satisfaction: A Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). *Sustainability 11*(8), pp. 1-16.
[339] Ragin, C. C. (2009). *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[340] Thiem, A., & Dusa, A., (2013), QCA: A Package for Qualitative Comparative Analysis. *The R Journal 5*(1), pp. 87-97.
[341] Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C., (2012), *Set-Theoretic Methods for The Social Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

not providing any new information because it will always have a consistent score of 1. It is commonplace, hence trivial.

Metrics such as *Coverage* and *Relevance of Necessity* are used to establish the relevance and non-trivialness of a necessary condition. The values also range between 0 and 1. Less trivial necessary conditions have scores closer to 1 and more trivial scores are closer to 0. The threshold for *Relevance of Necessity* is 0.5, preferably 0.6.[342] All three measures: *Consistency*, *Coverage*, and *Relevance of Necessity* constitute parameters of fit measurement of necessity in fsQCA. The formula and logical equation for calculating coverage as defined by Ragin are as follows:[343]

$$\boldsymbol{Coverage\ of\ X\ as\ a\ necessary\ condition\ for\ Y} = \frac{Number\ of\ cases\ where\ X = 1\ and\ Y{=}1}{Number\ of\ cases\ where\ X{=}1}$$

$$Coverage\ of\ X\ as\ a\ necessary\ condition\ for\ Y = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{I} X_i}.$$

The results of the NCA and fsQCA analysis of necessity for the 8 conditions and the outcome are graphically presented in the scatterplots in Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7.

[342] Dusa, A., (2018).
[343] See Ragin, C., (2008); Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C., (2012)



Figure 5.6: Scatterplots of the 8 conditions in relation to the outcome.
Note: The dashed red step function is the CE-FDH ceiling line. The green line is the ordinary least square line (OLS), the orange line is the CR-FDH ceiling line.



Figure 5.7: Scatterplots of fsQCA analysis of necessity showing the results of the 8 conditions with the Inclusion, Coverage and Relevance scores reported atop each plot.

5.2.5 Results of the NCA Analysis of Necessity

Both Tables 5.7 and 5.8 below contains the results of the NCA analysis of necessity. The c-accuracy scores are set at maximum (100%) except for CR-FDH with 91.9% and 86.5 % per cent c-accuracy scores for the DIST_CONV and INFO_QUAL variables. A threshold value of $d \geq 0.1$ for evaluating the substantive significant effect size was set for both CE-FDH and CR-FDH results. In the CE-FDH table, the effect sizes (d) for Distributed Conversation (DIST_CONV) = 0.44 "large effect" [$0.3 \leq d < 0.5$], and Information quality (INFO_QUAL) = 0.33 are rated as "large effect" [$0.3 \leq d < 0.5$]. Distributed Leadership (DIST_LEAD) and Disaster Preparation (DIS_PREP) have medium effect size of 0.11 [$0.1 \leq d < 0.3$]. The remaining conditions have small effect values of 0.00 because they are below the 0.1 general benchmark threshold for effect size. Therefore, they are not fit enough to be considered necessary conditions for the outcome.

Table 5.7: Results of NCA using the ceiling line is step function CE-FDH. N =37

Conditions	Scope (S)	Effect size (d)	c-accuracy (%)	p-value
DIST_LEAD	1	0.11	100	0.327
DIS_PREP	1	0.11	100	0.06
DIST_CONV	1	**0.44**	100	**0.00**
BTECH_ACCESS	1	0.00	100	1.00
INFO_QUAL	1	**0.33**	100	**0.00**
DEMO_STATUS	1	0.00	100	1.00
PERC_ECON_COST	1	0.00	100	1.00
PERC_FATALITIES	1	0.00	100	1.00

Note: $0 < d < 0.1$ "small effect",$0.1 \leq d < 0.3$ "medium effect", $0.3 \leq d < 0.5$ "large effect", $d \geq 0.5$ "very large effect". CE-FDH has no slope and intercept because it is a step function unlike the CR-FDH ceiling line which is a straight line hence the equation.

Table 5.8 Results of NCA using the ceiling line is straight line CR-FDH. N =37

Conditions	Scope (S)	Effect size (d)	c-accuracy (%)	p-value	Equation
DIST_LEAD	1	0.05	100	0.327	$Y_c = 1 * X_c + 0.670$
DIS_PREP	1	0.05	100	0.06	$Y_c = 1 * X_c + 0.670$
DIST_CONV	1	**0.30**	91.9	**0.00**	$Y_c = 1.490 * X_c + 0.060$
BTECH_ACCESS	1	0.00	100	1.00	-
INFO_QUAL	1	**0.22**	86.5	**0.00**	$Y_c = 1 * X_c + 0.333$
DEMO_STATUS	1	0.00	100	1.00	-
PERC_ECON_COST	1	0.00	100	1.00	-
PERC_FATALITIES	1	0.00	100	1.00	-

Note: 0 < *d* < 0.1 “small effect”, 0.1 ≤ *d* < 0.3 “medium effect”, 0.3 ≤ *d* < 0.5 “large effect”, *d* ≥ 0.5 “very large effect”.

Only Distributed Conversation (DIST_CONV), Information quality (INFO_QUAL), Distributed Leadership (DIST_LEAD), and Disaster Preparation (DIS_PREP) conditions have the effect size values to qualify as potential necessary conditions. A threshold of p-value = 0.05 was adopted for evaluating the statistical significance of these 4 necessary conditions to ensure that their necessity values are not due to random chance of unrelated variables. Distributed Leadership (DIST_LEAD) and Disaster Preparation (DIS_PREP) with the medium effect size have p-values of 0.327 and 0.06 respectively. These p-values are above the threshold p-values of 0.05; hence, their observed effect size of 0.11 could be due to a random chance of unrelated variables. Both Distributed Conversation (DIST_CONV) and Information quality (INFO_QUAL) have p-values of 0.00 which is below the 0.05 threshold for statistical significance; therefore, both conditions are most likely not effectuated by random chance of unrelated variables.

Table 5.9 below shows the results of NCA parameters using the CR-FDH ceiling line and they demonstrate almost similar patterns as the CE-FDH ceiling line above. In this case, the effect sizes (*d*) for Distributed Conversation (DIST_CONV) = 0.30 “large effect” [0.3 ≤ *d* < 0.5], and Information quality (INFO_QUAL) = 0.22 “medium” [0.1 ≤ *d* < 0.3] respectively. The other conditions fall below the threshold value of *d* ≥ 0.1. Like the CR-FDH ceiling line results, Distributed Conversation (DIST_CONV), and Information quality (INFO_QUAL) are the conditions with significant statistical significance of p-values = 0.00 which is below the p-value threshold of 0.05. Therefore, these two conditions are significantly necessary for the outcome and it can be concluded that both conditions are most likely not caused by random chance of unrelated variables. NCA CE-FDH ceiling line was adopted for establishing the necessary conditions because the values of the conditions in the analysed cases are discrete.

Table 5.9: Summary of the findings of the NCA scatter plot using the CE-FDH ceiling line*

	Theoretical Support?	**d ≥ 0.1?**	**p-value ≤ 0.05**
DIST_LEAD	Yes	Yes	No
DIS_PREP	Yes	Yes	No
DIST_CONV	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**
BTECH_ACCESS	No	No	No
INFO_QUAL	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**
DEMO_STATUS	No	No	No
PERC_ECON_COST	No	No	No
PERC_FATALITIES	No	No	No

Note: (* See Figure 5.6 above)

The above table contains a summary of the findings using the three minimum criteria for assessing the necessary hypotheses. These criteria are: "the hypotheses' theoretical support, substantive significance in terms of an effect size of at least 0.1, and statistical significance in terms of *p*-value less than or equal to 0.05."[344] From the aforementioned, *Distributed Conversation* (DIST_CONV) and *Information Quality* (INFO_QUAL) could be regarded as necessary conditions. They meet the three compulsory three: theoretical support, with effect size $d \geq 0.1$ and p-value ≤ 0.05. Therefore, they are strong enough not to falsify the necessary condition hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3, formulated *in-kind* is:

H3: The presence of *distributed conversation* is necessary for effective big data and digital technologies security-leadership decision-making in crisis or disaster situations,

And; Hypothesis 5, formulated *in-kind* is:

H5: The presence of highly effective *quality information* is necessary for effective big data and digital technologies security-leadership decision-making in crisis or disaster situations.

Table 5.10 below shows the NCA bottleneck output (CE-FDH ceiling line) results for the conditions. The bottleneck technique provides an opportunity for quasi-simulation to view what level of a given condition X is necessary for a given level of outcome Y. It facilitates the formulation of a necessary hypothesis *in-degree*. In our

[344] See Dul, (2019).

scenario of interest, conditions X_4, X_6, X_7, and X_8 are not necessary conditions in any degree for any degree of outcome Y. Conditions X_1 and X_2 are not necessary for any degree (0, 0.33 or 0.67) of the outcome. However, to get a *fully in* outcome score (1), both conditions X_1 and X_2 must be at the 0.33 score. This makes the two conditions somewhat necessary but not to any significant degree because 0.33 (*more out than in*) is as good as *fully out* = 0. This explains why they are not selected as necessary conditions. Contrarily, conditions X_3 and X_5 are significantly necessary as shown in the table. To have an actual value of 0.33 as an outcome, a value of 0.33 is needed for both the X_3 and X_5 conditions. To have a 0.67 outcome score (*more in than out*), only a minimum of 0.33 is needed for those two conditions. Lastly, to get a maximum degree (*fully in* =1) of outcome Y, only 0.67 degree value or score is needed for both X_3 and X_5 conditions.

Table 5.10: NCA Bottleneck table for the CE-FDH ceiling line.

Y OUTCOME	X1 DIST_LEAD	X2 DIS_PREP	X3 DIST_CONV	X4 BTECH_ACCESS	X5 INFO_QUAL	X6 DEMO_STATUS	X7 PERC_ECON_COST	X8 PERC_FATALITIES
0	NN	NN	NN	NN	NN	NN	NN	NN
0.33	NN	NN	0.33	NN	0.33	NN	NN	NN
0.67	NN	NN	0.33	NN	0.33	NN	NN	NN
1	0.33	0.33	0.67	NN	0.67	NN	NN	NN

Note: Actual values used for (X1…X8) conditions and the outcome Y. NN = Not Necessary.

As discussed earlier, NCA necessity analysis enables the identification of individual factors or conditions that are necessary for a specific outcome. The NCA findings reveal that the presence of a highly effective *Distributed Conversation* (DIST_CONV) and a high *Information Quality* (INFO_QUAL) is necessary and relevant for effective big data digital technologies security-leadership outcome. This means that when these two factors are absent, it is highly likely that the decision-making will not be effective regardless of the presence of the other factors. However, the presence of an effective or successful outcome in this wise is not a guarantee that these two necessary factors are present. Other factors may also lead to a successful outcome; but whenever the outcome is not successful, these two factors will likely be absent.

NCA is particularly good with the identification of single necessary *conditions in-degree*. As noted in the bottleneck table, the degree of whose necessary condition leads to what degree of outcome is made observable through (NCA). fsQCA complements NCA by providing not only *in-kind* analysis of necessity but also other opportunities. These include scenarios include the following:

i. where the presence of conditions is necessary for the presence of the outcome,
ii. where the presence of conditions is necessary for the absence of the outcome,
iii. where the absence of conditions is necessary for the absence of the outcome; and,
iv. where the absence of conditions is necessary for the presence of the outcome.

5.2.6 Results of fsQCA Analysis of Necessity

In this section, I present the results of the fsQCA Analysis of Necessity. Table 5.11 contains a summary of the results. The table presents the conditions and the outcomes about their presence or absence – in this case, outcome effective or ineffectiveness. The consistency-inclusion and coverage scores are the parameters of fit of the necessity with the threshold of consistency or inclusion (incN) set at ≥ 0.90. The Relevance of Necessity (RoN) threshold for necessity is set at ≥ 0.6.[345] According to the principle of causal asymmetry, the presence of a necessary condition when an outcome is present does not guarantee that the absence of the outcome can be explained as an absence of the necessary condition.

Table 5.11 Analysis of Necessary Conditions (fsQCA) for effective and ineffective outcomes.[346]

	Effective/Successful (OUTCOME)			Ineffective/Unsuccessful (outcome)		
Conditions	**IncN**	**RoN**	**CovN**	**IncN**	**RoN**	**CovN**
DIST_LEAD	0.71	0.96	0.93	0.47	0.77	0.55
dist_lead	0.65	0.62	0.59	0.94*	0.72	0.74
DIS_PREP	0.61	0.96	0.92	0.38	0.79	0.51
dis_prep	0.65	0.55	0.55	0.94*	0.63	0.68
DIST_CONV	0.86*	0.88	0.88	0.57	0.65	0.51
dist_conv	0.52	0.72	0.58	0.87*	0.88	0.85
BTECH_ACCESS	0.47	0.92	0.80	0.27	0.78	0.40
btech_access	0.64	0.48	0.50	0.86	0.53	0.59
INFO_QUAL	0.85*	0.93	0.93	0.45	0.66	0.46
info_qual	0.51	0.67	0.52	0.92*	0.86	0.84

[345] Schneider & Wagemann, (2012), p. 212.
[346] The Uppercase letters refer to the presence of a condition, and lowercase letters to the absence of a condition. Inclusion or consistency score ≥ 0.90. Small case symbols e.g. (info_qual) are negations of the factors. Ineffectiveness is represented by small case (outcome).

DEMO_STATUS	0.78	0.89	0.87	0.50	0.68	0.49
demo_status	0.54	0.67	0.55	0.86*	0.80	0.78
PERC_ECON_COST	0.19	0.81	0.37	0.37	0.88	0.63
perc_econ_cost	0.81	0.48	0.59	0.64	0.39	0.41
PERC_FATALITIES	0.10	0.91	0.40	0.17	0.94	0.60
perc_fatalities	0.90	0.259	0.55	0.83	0.22	0.45

Note: *necessary conditions

The blue cells in the table above highlight instances where both the conditions and outcome are present. Only highly distributed conversation (DIST_CONV) and high information quality (INFO_QUAL) are necessary for the outcome effectiveness. These two conditions are necessary because they meet the ≥ 0.9 consistency inclusion threshold criteria (0.86 and 0.85 respectively; approximately 0.9). Their RoN scores are also close to 1 (0.88 and 0.93 respectively); these are strong scores. If the consistency or inclusion score is high but the relevance of necessity score is low, that implies that the condition is trivial, therefore not necessary. The results of the fsQCA analysis of necessity for effective outcome agrees with the findings from the NCA in the previous section. The two necessary conditions are also in the model derived from the results of the Tobit regression above; that is,
DIS_PREP+DIST_CONV+INFO_QUAL => OUTCOME.

From Table 5.11 above, the red cells are indicative of low or absent conditions with low or absent outcomes. Low distributed leadership (dist_lead), low or ineffective disaster preparation (dis_prep), and low information quality (info_qual) have very high inclusion scores of 0.94, 0.94, and 0.92 respectively. Thus, they are individually necessary for low or ineffective security-leadership decision-making outcomes under the given context of disaster big data and digital technologies. Other necessary factors for ineffective outcome are low distributed conversation and low democratic status (dist_conv) and (demo_status) with inclusion scores of 0.87 and 0.86 respectively. Ineffective security-leadership decision-making outcomes can be explained with the absence of the listed conditions in disaster situations involving the use of big data and digital technologies.

5.3 Analysis of Sufficiency

The next steps involve the analysis of sufficiency: the combination of conditions that are sufficient for the outcome. A single condition might be sufficient for an outcome

in some scenarios while a condition or combination of conditions could be both necessary and sufficient for the outcome in another instance. HIV is necessary for AIDS because the presence of AIDS (outcome) implies a presence of HIV (condition); but, the presence of HIV does not connote the presence of AIDS. Under this assumption, whenever an outcome is noticed, a condition must be there, but the absence of the outcome is not a definitive assumption of the absence of the condition.

There are times when a single condition is not enough to ascertain necessity; this is where conjunct (AND-Configurations) and Disjunct (OR-configurations) conditions come to play. This assumption stems from the pretext that two conditions can only come together as conjuncts or disjuncts. The following are good examples of these instances:

Either green or yellow apple is an apple (Disjunct OR-Configuration)

In-kind, they are both apples, but separately they are each necessary for categorising them as apples. On the other hand, we cannot conclude that only a green apple is an apple because there are yellow apples and red apples too. Therefore, green alone is not necessary without the others for apple categorisation.

A male gamete and a female gamete are necessary for pregnancy (Conjunct AND-Configuration)

Individually, they are not necessary for pregnancy, but taken together they are necessary for pregnancy because if the two gametes are absent, there can never be a pregnancy. One interesting thing about this example is that the two conditions (gametes) are also sufficient for pregnancy because there is no way pregnancy can occur without the two conditions.

Table 5.12 below lists the results of the analysis of sufficiency for each condition; highly effective distributed leadership (DIST_LEAD), effective disaster preparation (DIS_PREP), and effective information quality assurance (INFO_QUAL) are individually sufficient for effective security-leadership decision-making in a crisis situation involving the adoption of big data digital technologies. The cut-off point inclusion (inclS or consistency) score for sufficient conditions is 0.9. Since the consistency values for high distributed conversation (DIST_CONV, inclS =0.895) and

high democratic status (DEMO_STATUS, inclS =0.867) can be safely approximated to 0.9, it is safe to adduce sufficiency to those conditions as well.

Table 5.12: Table of Sufficient Conditions for Effective Decision-making (OUTCOME)

Conditions	inclS	PRI	covS	CovU
DIST_LEAD	**0.935**	**0.872**	**0.740**	**0.000**
DIS_PREP	**0.917**	**0.851**	**0.568**	**0.000**
DIST_CONV	**0.895**	**0.815**	**0.879**	**0.000**
BTECH_ACCESS	0.799	0.730	0.482	0.000
INFO_QUAL	**0.926**	**0.871**	**0.861**	**0.000**
DEMO_STATUS	**0.867**	**0.780**	**0.793**	**0.000**
expression	0.756	0.634	0.966	-

The sufficient conditions for ineffective decision-making outcomes are listed in Table 5.13 below. They include ineffective or absence of distributed conversation (~DIST_CONV) and poor or non-existent information quality (~INFO_QUAL). If these two conditions are present, the outcome of security-leadership decision-making in disaster situations involving the use of big data and digital technologies is bound to be ineffective. These two conditions also featured as necessary conditions for ineffective outcomes in Table 5.11 above. Therefore, they are both necessary and sufficient for ineffective outcomes in the considered context.

Table 5.13: Table of Sufficient Conditions for Ineffective Decision-making (~OUTCOME)

Conditions	inclS	PRI	covS	CovU
~DIST_LEAD	0.769	0.636	0.944	0.000
~DIS_PREP	0.666	0.512	0.943	0.000
~DIST_CONV	**0.871**	**0.776**	**0.887**	**0.000**
~BTECH_ACCESS	0.605	0.436	0.867	0.000
~INFO_QUAL	**0.859**	**0.765**	**0.924**	**0.000**
~DEMO_STATUS	0.792	0.658	0.866	0.000
expression	0.564	0.408	1.000	-

The abbreviations: *inclS*, *PRI, covS* and *covU* are *parameters of fit* for assessing the results of the sufficiency solutions. The first is *inclS* which is the sufficiency inclusion score or consistency score for sufficiency. According to Leila Kahwati and Heather Kane, this consistency is used to quantify the strength of the sufficiency relationship between the solution (or its terms) and the outcome.[347] While *inclS* is raw

[347] Kane, H. L., & Kahwati, L. C., (2018), pp. 137-141.

consistency, *PRI* (proportional reduction in inconsistency) is a unique consistency. It is another form of measuring consistency in a sufficiency relationship. It mainly features fuzzy sets analysis. Unlike in crisp sets, it is possible in fuzzy sets for "a causal condition to be a subset of the outcome and a subset of the negation of the outcome." … that is, both $x \leq y$ and $x \leq \sim y$ relations are true. In this circumstance, the "influence of cases that satisfy both $x \leq y$ and $x \leq \sim y$" is eliminated, the result is "fuzzy intersection of sets x, y, and ~y."[348]

This computation is the *PRI* score. The cutoff consistency score for the intermediate solution is 0.9. The closer the consistency scores are to 1, the better. Both *covS* and *covU* are measures of coverage – raw and unique, respectively. In general, Coverage "is the portion of cases in the outcome set that are also in the solution set."[349] It is a measure of relevance, and it is the extent of how much the outcome can be explained by the solution terms.[350] The raw solution term coverage *covS* is the coverage score for the solution term within the causal mechanism; while unique coverage *covU* is the proportion of the cases covered by that solution term.[351]

It is also worth noting that the two necessary conditions identified in the NCA and the Super-subset relations in the fsQCA Analysis of Necessity - DIST_CONV and INFO_QUAL - also feature prominently in the analysis of sufficiency. It is, therefore, safe to state that both conditions taken together are sufficient for effective outcome, and as independent conditions. Additionally, they are individually necessary (in-degree) for outcome effectiveness: they are necessary (in-kind) as a disjunct for an effective outcome. I decided to drop the PERC_ECON_COST and PERC_FATALITIES conditions from the data matrix partly because of the concern raised in the Tobit regression section.

Added to this consideration is the observation that disaster events are usually local, even when considered national emergencies. Therefore, using percentage economic cost and percentage fatalities benchmarked against national GDP and population figures might skew the sufficiency outcome. This does not affect the analysis of necessity results above.

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[348] Ragin, C. C., (2015), Qualitative Comparative Analysis Workshop. *GPC*. Available from https://gpc.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj8226/f/stanfordqcaworkshop2015.pdf [accessed 14 February 2018].
[349] Kane, H. L., & Kahwati, L. C., (2018)
[350] Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C., (2012)
[351] Ragin, C. C. (2008), pp. 63-68.

The first step in sufficiency analysis is to compute the truth table. This is done using the data matrix of the calibrated conditions and outcome. Each row represents each combination of conditions associated with the outcome. It is a presentation of all the universe of possible combinations of conditions or configurations. Given k conditions, there are 2^k configurations or possible combinations of conditions. In Truth Table 5.14 below, with eight conditions (k), there are 2^8 different configurations or 64 possible combinations of conditions. There are 37 cases (disaster events) and some cases may be unique to only one configuration while others may belong to several configurations. There are also some redundancies: instances where some configuration(s) may not have any case. The technical term for this phenomenon is "logical remainders" and they are usually denoted by empty rows in the truth table because they depict the absence of cases for that configuration or causal recipe. This fact is made possible because of the principle of limited diversity which is due to practical limited relations in social reality.[352]

To make sense of these many causal recipes ($M_1 \ldots M_n$) from the derived truth table, fsQCA adopts the principle of Boolean or logical minimisation. Which is simply a buzzword for rendering *complex solutions* to their bare minimum without losing its main essence. The raw sufficient solutions are known as primitive expressions and they are usually complex because they exclude logical remainders or counterfactuals.[353] The reduction leads to a minimised solution termed *parsimonious solution* - the name itself is self-explanatory: the most reduced form of the solutions. Occam's Razor assumption that the simplest explanation, is usually the best explanation motivates some researchers to stick with this solution. However, the *intermediate solution* is at the intersection between complex and parsimonious solutions with the final solution derived from the directional expectations of the investigator. Only the intermediate solution shall be reported in this chapter, the complex and parsimonious solutions are presented in the Appendix.

The enhanced Quine-McCluskey (QMC) algorithm and the truth table function of the fs/QCA package were used for the logical minimisation procedures.[354] The Prime Implicant ties were resolved using the c*hartFunctions* of the R QCA package.

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[352] Legewie, N., (2013), An Introduction to Applied Data Analysis with Qualitative Comparative Analysis. *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research 14*(3). DOI: 10.17169/Fqs-14.3.1961

[353] Ragin, C., (2008), *User's Guide to Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis*. Tucson: University of Arizona.

[354] Ibid.

All the solutions: complex, parsimonious, and intermediate solutions for both effective and ineffective outcomes are presented in the Appendix. Although there is a debate in the QCA community over the fittest solutions to present for analysis, the common assumption is subject to the researcher's substantive knowledge of the cases. In addition, an intermediate solution is popular among leadership and management QCA researchers. According to Charles Ragin, "Intermediate solutions strike a balance between parsimony and complexity, based on the substantive and theoretical knowledge of the investigator."[355] For logical simplicity, I have presented the truth table and intermediate solutions for the effective and ineffective outcomes in the sections below.

[355] Ragin, C. C. (2009), p. 175.

Table 5.14: Truth Table result constructed from the data matrix (Excluding PERC_ECON_COST and PERC_FATALITIES.

ID	DIST_LEAD	DIS_PREP	DIST_CONV	BTECH_ACCESS	INFO_QUAL	DEMO_STATUS	OUT
12	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
16	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
18	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
28	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
35	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
43	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
44	1	0	1	0	1	1	1
46	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
48	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
59	1	1	1	0	1	0	1
60	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
64	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
4	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
25	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
22	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
9	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
6	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 5.15: Truth Table result including cases, inclusion, and PRI scores

ID	n	incl	PRI	cases
12	1	1	1	India Chennai Floods (2015)
16	2	1	1	Australia Queensland Floods (2010-2011), Chile Iquique Earthquake (2014)
18	1	1	1	Vanuatu Cyclone PAM (2015)
28	1	1	1	Philippines Typhoon Hagupit (2014)
35	1	1	1	Nepal Earthquake (2015)
43	1	1	1	Nigeria Ebola Epidemic (2014)
44	2	1	1	India Uttarakhand Floods (2013), India Kerala Floods (2018)
46	1	1	1	Brazil Zika Virus Outbreak (2015-2016)
48	1	1	1	USA California Napa Earthquake (2014)
59	1	1	1	Somalia Drought (2017)
60	1	1	1	Indonesia Jakarta Floods (2015)
64	4	1	1	USA Hurricane Harvey (2017), USA Hurricane Sandy (2012), USA Colorado Floods (2013), USA Missouri Joplin Tornado (2011)
3	1	0.953232	0.66	Sierra Leone Ebola Epidemic (2014)
2	1	0.94586	0.492537	Philippines Typhoon Haiyan (2013)
4	1	0.94586	0.492537	Ecuador Earthquake (2016)
25	1	0.941281	0.75188	Haiti Cholera Outbreak (2010)
22	1	0.885906	0.492537	Australia Bundaberg Flood (2013)
9	2	0.851064	0.429185	Haiti Earthquake (2010), Liberia Ebola Epidemic (2014)
6	2	0.813699	0.326733	Chile Earthquake (2010), Malaysia Floods (2014)
5	1	0.797583	0.33	Saudi Arabia Jeddah Floods (2009)
1	10	0.562957	0.109272	Bangladesh Landslides (2017), DR Congo Kivu Ebola Epidemic (2018), Guinea Ebola Epidemic (2014), Mozambique Cyclone Idai (2019), Nigeria Floods (2012), Nigeria Floods (2017), Pakistan Earthquake (2013), Pakistan Monsoon Floods (2010), Sierra Leone Mudslides (2017), Somalia Drought (2011)

Note: OUT: output value; n: number of cases in configuration; incl: sufficiency inclusion score; PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency.



Figure 5.8: Boolean minimisation illustrated[356]

The process illustrated in Figure 5.8 above is an exemplar of the Boolean logical minimisation process which is core to the succeeding sections of this chapter. The causal mechanisms (also known as *Fundamental Intersections* (FIs)) depict different configurations of conditions that are subsets of the outcome. These causal complexities complex can be simplified or minimised further until no further reduction is possible. According to Thiem and Dusa, "if two FIs differ on the values of one condition only, then this condition can be eliminated so that a simpler term result."[357] Another term for the product of this process or Boolean minimisation is *prime implicant* (PI). In the illustration above, the prime implicant is *B*.

5.3.1 Sufficient Solution (Intermediate) for Effective Outcome

This section starts with a recap of the model for effective big data digital technologies security-leadership decision-making outcome; that is, high or effective disaster preparation, effective distributed conversation, or high information quality is sufficient for an effective outcome (DIS_PREP+DIST_CONV+INFO_QUAL => OUTCOME).

According to findings from the Necessary Condition Analysis (NCA) and the fsQCA conditions of necessity (cf. sections 5.2.5 and 5.2.6 above), highly effective

[356] Adapted from Thiem, A., & Dusa, A. (2013), p. 92.
[357] Ibid

distributed conversation (DIST_CONV) and a highly effective information quality (INFO_QUAL) are individually necessary for an effective outcome of big data digital technologies security-leadership decision-making. They are necessary because the outcome will never be effective in the absence of these conditions. These necessary conditions are found independently or collectively in nearly all the sufficient configurations for effective decision-making outcomes (See Table 5.16).

In addition, highly distributed leadership (DIST_LEAD), effective or high disaster preparation (DIS_PREP), high information quality (INFO_QUAL), high distributed conversation (DIST_CONV), and high democratic status (DEMOS_STATUS) are individually sufficient for effective outcome in the stated context (See Table 5.12 above). It can therefore be submitted that since high distributed conversation and high information quality feature in both the analysis of necessity and sufficiency, that they are both necessary and sufficient for effective decision outcome in the context of big data digital technologies security-leadership decision-making in disaster situations. From the results in Tables 5.16 and 5.17 below, all the sufficient conditions are present in all the models that best explain outcome effectiveness in the given context - paths 1a and 1c with high raw coverage scores of 0.688567 and 0.672012. In the chart dot matrix (Table 5.17), these sufficient conditions are only present (darkened/filled dots) to emphasise their sufficiency.

To get the minimised intermediate solution, the prime implicants (DIST_CONV*INFO_QUAL and DIS_PREP*btech_access*DEMO_STATUS) were used to control for logical redundancies using the SetMethods package in R and the fs/QCA software. The raw consistency cutoff threshold for the intermediate solution was set at 1. A theoretical directional expectation is set at present (1) for all conditions for the simplifying assumptions to derive the intermediate solution. The results of the fsQCA intermediate solution reveal 4 different sufficient models or paths for effective outcome in the stated context (cf. Tables 5.16 and 5.17 below).

These tables include the solution terms (paths 1a to 1d) together with their individual consistency, raw coverage, and unique coverage scores as well as the combined solution consistency and coverage. Consistency in this wise describes to what extent or percentage degree is the solution term or configuration sufficient for the outcome. Raw coverage refers to the proportion of the cases covered by each sufficient solution term. Unique coverage indicates the proportion of the cases that

are unique to the solution term or path.[358] The Solution consistency for the 4 paths is high at 0.980588 and the solution covers 86% of the cases (0.86239). The solution terms or paths have high consistency values ranging between 0.975806 and 1.

Although following the principle of equifinality, multiple paths can be sufficient for the outcome. An important metric for determining non-trivial solution term is a raw coverage score of 0.6. If a solution term or configurational path covers 60% of the cases that solution term or path cannot be described as trivial. It must be pointed out that, triviality in this case (i.e., terms with coverage below 0.6) does not mean irrelevant. A threshold of 0.3 raw coverage and above is also common in most QCA studies because of the limited quantity of some cases. Unique coverage has no set threshold, but the common practice is 0.01 and above.

Due to this non-uniformity, I retain the basic thresholds of raw coverage of 0.3 and unique coverage: 0.01. Therefore, all the solution terms except model path 1b (with raw coverage scores of 0.274703) in the intermediate solution meet the sufficiency requirement. I consider this path trivial because of its limited coverage of cases – 1b covers only 3 cases. Hence, I skipped 1b in the discussion of the fsQCA results below. Nevertheless, the solution term may offer more insights with more cases added in future studies.

[358] Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C., (2012), p. 139.

Table 5.16 Sufficiency Results (fsQCA Intermediate Solutions) for Effective Decision-making Outcome

Intermediate Solutions for Effective Decision-making Outcome					
Path	**Solution terms**	**Consistency**	**Raw Coverage**	**Unique Coverage**	**Cases**
1a	**DIST_LEAD*INFO_QUAL**	**0.975806**	**0.688567**	**0.121055**	USA Hurricane Harvey (2017), USA Hurricane Sandy (2012), India Uttarakhand Floods (2013), India Kerala Floods (2018), Indonesia Jakarta Floods (2015), Nepal Earthquake (2015), Nigeria Ebola Epidemic (2014), Somalia Drought (2017), USA California Napa Earthquake (2014), USA Colorado Floods (2013), USA Missouri Joplin Tornado (2011),
1b	DIS_PREP*~BTECH_ACCESS*DEMO_STATUS	1	0.274703	0.0346612	Vanuatu Cyclone PAM (2015), Indonesia Jakarta Floods (2015), Philippines Typhoon Hagupit (2014)
1c	**DIST_CONV*INFO_QUAL*DEMO_STATUS**	**1**	**0.672012**	**0.0869116**	USA Hurricane Sandy (2012), USA Colorado Floods (2013), Australia Queensland Floods (2010-2011), Chile Iquique Earthquake (2014), USA Hurricane Harvey (2017), India Uttarakhand Floods (2013), India Chennai Floods (2015), India Kerala Floods (2018), Indonesia Jakarta Floods (2015), Philippines Typhoon Hagupit (2014), USA California Napa Earthquake (2014), USA Missouri Joplin Tornado (2011)
1d	**DIST_LEAD*DIST_CONV*BTECH_ACCESS*DEMO_STATUS**	**1**	**0.378686**	**0.0346612**	USA Hurricane Sandy (2012), Brazil Zika Virus Outbreak (2015-2016), USA Hurricane Harvey (2017), USA California Napa Earthquake (2014), USA Colorado Floods (2013), USA Missouri Joplin Tornado (2011)
	Solution Consistency: 0.980588; **Solution Coverage:** 0.86239				
	Keys for Abbreviated cases in XY Plot				

	BG: Bangladesh Landslides (2017), **PK-2013:** Pakistan Earthquake (2013), **SE-Ebola:** Sierra Leone Ebola Epidemic (2014), **SE-M:** Sierra Leone Mudslides (2017), **CH-2010:** Chile Earthquake (2010), **LB-Ebola:** Liberia Ebola Epidemic (2014), **AU-B:** Australia Bundaberg Flood (2013), **MY:** Malaysia Floods (2014), **VA**: Vanuatu Cyclone PAM (2015), **ID-J:** Indonesia Jakarta Floods (2015), **US-M:** USA Missouri Joplin Tornado (2011), **CH-I:** Chile Iquique Earthquake (2014), **NP-E:** Nepal Earthquake (2015)

Table 5.17 Dot Matrix Chart of the Sufficiency Results (fsQCA Intermediate Solutions) for Effective Decision-making Outcome

Path	DIST_LEAD	DIS_PREP	DIST_CONV	BTECH_ACCESS	INFO_QUAL	DEMO_STATUS	Consistency	Raw coverage	Unique coverage
1a	●				●		0.975806	0.688567	0.121055
1b		●		○		●	1	0.274703	0.0346612
1c			●		●	●	1	0.672012	0.0869116
1d	●		●	●		●	1	0.378686	0.0346612
	Solution Consistency: 0.980588; **Solution Coverage:** 0.86239								

Note: Dark dot is for the presence of the condition. Empty dot is for its absence.

5.3.1.1 Model 1a: Highly distributed leadership with high information quality

In the solution term path 1a, the combination of highly distributed leadership (DIST_LEAD) and high information quality assurance (INFO_QUAL) is sufficient for effective security-leadership decision-making outcomes involving big data and digital technologies (DIST_LEAD*INFO_QUAL -> OUTCOME). The consistency of this solution term is very high (0.975806) and it covers 68% of the cases (0.688567). 9 cases (disaster events) are covered by this model.

As noted by Rich Cooper in Security Debrief, as against the 'dysfunctional and antagonistic' leadership relations which existed between the State of Louisiana and the City of New Orleans during 2017 Hurricane Katrina, there was evident cooperation between the Governor of Texas and Mayor of Houston in the management of Hurricane Harvey. This is an essential feature of distributed leadership. Aside from this inter-government cooperation, private citizens including politicians, celebrities, media also provided distinctive support on social media and they were actively part of the leadership process.[359] There was also constant effective information quality assurance across the disaster communication network. This was also distributed across the network. When the infrastructure challenges made mobile communication difficult, different actors exercised leadership such as Twitter's @HarveyRelief's map for 'directing people to shelters, resources, aid and volunteer opportunities.'[360] Other efforts include the Twitter account @HarveyRescue which used Google Doc for' people to enter their address and any details of their request for help.'[361]Facebook and Twitter hashtags helped to mobilise support for the victims of the hurricane. All these convergent behaviours worked in sync with existing disaster leadership by government agencies to lead to effective outcomes during the disaster.

Hurricane Sandy of 2012 saw this model in practice with FEMA (emergency agency) proving a 'one-stop-shop for all Sandy-related information' across multiple channels. Different government agencies and independent actors collaborated in

[359] Mirbabaie, M., Bunker, D., Stieglitz, S., Marx, J., & Ehnis, C., (2020), Social media in times of crisis: Learning from Hurricane Harvey for the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic response. *Journal of Information Technology 35*(3), pp. 195-213.
[360] Newcomb, Alyssa (2017), Social Media Becomes a Savior in Hurricane Harvey Relief. *ABC News*. Available from https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/social-media-becomes-savior-hurricane-harvey-relief-n796701 [accessed 23 March 2020]
[361] Ibid

managing the disaster. This distributed leadership process traverses the entire disaster cycle (before, during and after Sandy).[362] The advent of social media and big data technologies appears to have favoured the reduction of vulnerability in recurring emergencies. Another case is the Somalia drought of 2017 where a social media celebrity Jerome Jarre helped to mobilise support through social #LoveArmyforSomalia and #TurkishArilinesHelpSomalia for food supplies.[363]

The Federal Government of Somalia implemented its Drought Impact Needs Assessment (DINA), 'in partnership with the Federal Member States, the Banadir Regional Administration, the European Union, the UN and the World Bank.'[364] Nearly all the cases that conform to the high distributed leadership and high information quality have registered effective outcomes in the given context regardless of the socio-economic status of the affected countries. The distributed leadership demonstrated by the Lagos State Government in the management of the Ebola Crisis is another typical case of this model. Social media platforms were used to educate people about the virus and to dispel fake information about the virus. Private citizens and the media also played important roles.

5.3.1.2 Model 1c: Highly distributed conversation with high information quality assurance and high democratic status

In the solution term path 1c, the combination of highly distributed conversation (DIST_CONV), high information quality assurance (INFO_QUAL) and high democratic status (DEMO_STATUS) is sufficient for effective security-leadership decision-making outcomes involving big data and digital technologies (DIST_CONV*INFO_QUAL*DEMO_STATUS -> OUTCOME). The consistency of this solution term is very high (1). It covers 67% of the cases (0.672012). 12 cases (disaster events) are covered by this model. Unlike the interagency rivalry experiences in some countries like Nigeria, Albay province worked with the national government

[362] Cohen, Sarah E., (2013) Sandy Marked a Shift for Social Media Use in Disasters. *Government Technology*. Available from https://www.govtech.com/em/disaster/Sandy-Social-Media-Use-in-Disasters.html [accessed 23 March 2020]
[363] Africa News (2017) Millions of dollars raised through social media for famine-hit Somalia [Hi-Tech]. *Africa News*. Available from https://www.africanews.com/2017/03/28/millions-of-dollars-raised-through-social-media-for-famine-hit-somalia-hi-tech/ [accessed 23 March 2020]
[364] UN News (2018), Somali leaders, international partners and UN determined to make Somalia famine resistant. *UN News*. Available from https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/01/1001571 [accessed 29 March 2020]

of the Philippines to mitigate disaster vulnerability even before the touchdown of the Typhoon.[365] Local administrations such as the Albany province and the Tacloban city administration provided regular updates and early warning information to citizens. This characteristic emphasis the high democratic status of the Philippines which most likely contributed to the outcome effectiveness in the management of the Typhoon impacts.

Apart from citizens engagements on social media, there were other big data technologies deployed to aid the rescue conversation process; Hashtags such as #RescuePH were created to interact with citizens and affected victims on the location of help and dissemination of help messages. ArcGIS and ESRI disaster mapping initiatives were borne by the digital humanitarian organisation to aid rescue efforts. Added to this is the #resecuephmap crowd-sourcing map project and database created to help identify individuals/people in need of rescue and relief response. Another mapping project called the responders' map was initiated for easier reference for response/rescue teams. It must be added that these messages were in Filipino languages which further strengthen the reach and quality of the disaster communication process. This case highlights the significance of highly distributed conversation and effective quality information to disaster relief efforts and security-leadership effectiveness.

This model path 1c covers a lot of cases; hence, the strength of its solution term is not disputed. There is no arguing the fact that more democratic societies are more open societies with freedom of expression than less democratic societies. This is reflected in the theoretical configuration that stipulated high democratic status, high information quality and distributed conversation as combined factors for effectiveness in the stated context. Cases under this model include USA Hurricane Sandy (2012), USA Colorado Floods (2013), Australia Queensland Floods (2010-2011), Chile Iquique Earthquake (2014), USA Hurricane Harvey (2017) etc. (See Path 1c in Table 5.16 above for more cases). These are democratic societies.

[365] Asher, Saira (2014) Typhoon Hagupit: What did the Philippines do differently? *BBC News*. Available from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-30375007 [accessed February 20, 2019]

5.3.1.3 Model 1d Highly distributed leadership and conversation with big data technology access and high democratic status

According to the solution term path 1d, highly distributed leadership (DIST_LEAD) and strong distributed conversation (DIST_CONV) with big data technology access (BTECH_ACCESS) and high democratic status (DEMO_STATUS) is another sufficient model for explaining security-leadership decision-making outcome effectiveness in disaster situations involving the engagements of big data and digital technologies
(DIST_LEAD*DIST_CONV*BTECH_ACCESS*DEMO_STATUS -> OUTCOME). The consistency of this solution term is very high (1) but the raw coverage is low as the term explains about 37% of the cases (6). All the cases under this explanatory model have strong democratic institutions, with developed technologies and good information infrastructure. Democratic societies are more likely to encourage distributed leadership with devolved responsibilities among their constituent state agencies and non-governmental organisations. Cases under this model include USA Hurricane Sandy (2012), Brazil Zika Virus Outbreak (2015-2016), USA Hurricane Harvey (2017), USA California Napa Earthquake (2014), USA Colorado Floods (2013), USA Missouri Joplin Tornado (2011).

5.3.2 The XY Plot of the Sufficiency Causal Paths (Effective Outcome)

Figure 5.9 below illustrates the combined solution configurations using an XY Plot. As explained earlier in this chapter, cases above the diagonal line in the XY Plot are Consistent with the sufficiency solution. Cases that are in the upper right quadrant above the diagonal line are typical cases. They are better example cases that showcase the solution set; the solution set contains the combination of all the solution terms or paths. In the typical cases, the outcome set Y is greater than the solution set X. The most typical cases or the best illustrative cases are those with outcome set member value SMV(Y) close to or equals to 1 and the solution set SMV(X) also close to or equals to 1.[366] The most typical case for model path 1a is USA Hurricane Sandy (2012). From the XY Plot in Figure 5.10, Hurricane Sandy is the topmost case on the diagonal line –

[366] Kahwati, L. C., & Kane, H. L., (2020), p. 171.

where the outcome (Y) is closest to 1 and the solution term (X) is also closest to 1. A unique case is a type of typical case that is only peculiar to the solution term. They are not found in any other solution term or model in the causal mechanisms. Nepal Earthquake (2015) is a unique typical case as it only appears in solution term path 1a.



Figure 5.10: XY Plot of Effective Outcome Sufficiency Solution model
Solution Model: (DIST_LEAD*INFO_QUAL+DIS_PREP*~BTECH_ACCESS*DEMO_STATUS + DIST_CONV*INFO_QUAL*DEMO_STATUS +DIST_LEAD*DIST_CONV*BTECH_ACCESS*DEMO_STATUS)

In the lower-left quadrant below the diagonal line are the irrelevant cases – cases whose outcome membership is lower than the 0.5 thresholds, and whose solution term membership are also below the 0.5 thresholds. Hence, these cases are not useful for explaining the solution set. Above this quadrant - that is, above the diagonal line in the lower left quadrant are the individually irrelevant cases, although these cases agree with the solution set, they are empirically viable for explaining the solution and outcome relations. Sierra Leone Ebola Epidemic (2014) scores 0.67 in the SMV for the sufficient condition INFO_QUAL; despite this sufficiency, all the other conditions have 0 or 0.33 SMV and the outcome SMV of 0.33, thereby rendering its weak and irrelevant for explaining any of the solution terms.

The lower right quadrant contains the deviant cases consistency in kind - these are the contradictory cases.[367] They are high in the solution set (above 0.5) but are low in the outcome set. They are instances where the cases will spot the solution model, but the outcome will not be effective. There are no such cases in these fsQCA results. The cases below the diagonal line in the upper right corner are the deviant cases consistency in degree cases. Their SMV is greater than 0.5 in the solution set (X) but their outcome SMV is close to 0. They are only deviant with respect to "differences in degree", they are relevant nonetheless and are useful for cross-case analysis.[368] USA Hurricane Sandy (2012) is an example of this case.

The upper left quadrant has the deviant cases in coverage; these are cases that contain effective outcomes but do not reflect any of the solution terms. Hence, they have a high or effective outcome but are not covered by a sufficient solution set. Haiti Earthquake (2010) and Haiti Cholera Outbreak (2010) are examples of such cases. They both have a score of 0.67 in their outcome SMV, but they do not conform to any of the paths in the solution set.

5.3.3 Sufficient Solution (Intermediate) for Ineffective Outcome

Findings from analysis of analysis (fsQCA) reveal that low distributed leadership (~DIST_LEAD), weak or lack of disaster preparation mechanisms (~DIS_PREP), low or lack of distributed conversation (~DIST_CONV), low or absence of effective information quality (~INFO_QUAL), and low democratic status of the country

[367] See Schneider & Wagemann (2012), 67ff., p. 308.
[368] Kahwati, L. C., & Kane, H. L., (2020), p. 172.

(~DEMO_STATUS) are necessary for the ineffective outcome of big data digital technologies security-leadership decision-making (see sections 5.2.5 and 5.2.6 above). As usual, this implies that any instances of ineffective outcome will feature these low conditions.

For sufficiency analysis of conditions for an ineffective outcome, only low or lack of distributed conversation (~DIST_CONV) and low or absence of effective information quality (~INFO_QUAL) are sufficient (See Table 5.12). These two are both necessary and sufficient for ineffective outcomes in the context of big data digital technologies security-leadership decision-making in disaster situations. The sufficient conditions are present in all the models that best explain ineffective outcomes in the given context - path 2a with 0.936184score and a raw coverage score of 0.830221 (see Tables 5.18 and 5.19 below). In the chart dot matrix (Table 5.19), these conditions in the best qualified sufficient model path 2a feature are marked present (unfilled dots) to emphasise their sufficiency.

To get the minimised intermediate solution, the prime implicants (~DIST_CONV*~INFO_QUAL and ~DIST_LEAD*~DIST_CONV) were used to control for logical redundancies using the SetMethods package in R and the fs/QCA software. A theoretical directional expectation is set at absent (0) for all conditions except for the simplifying assumptions to derive the intermediate solution. The raw consistency cutoff threshold for the intermediate solution was set at 0.855292. The results of the fsQCA intermediate solution reveal 3 different sufficient models or paths for explaining ineffective outcomes in the stated context (see Tables 5.18 and 5.19 below). These tables include the solution terms (paths 2a to 2c) together with their individual consistency, raw coverage, and unique coverage scores as well as the combined solution consistency and coverage. Consistency in this wise describes to what extent or percentage degree is the solution term or configuration sufficient for the outcome. Raw coverage refers to the proportion of the cases covered by each sufficient solution term. Unique coverage indicates the proportion of the cases that are unique to the solution term or path.[369] The Solution consistency score for the 3 paths is 0.86157 and the solution covers more than 94% of the cases (0.943973).

As discussed in the previous section, I used a threshold of 0.3 raw coverage and a unique coverage threshold value of 0.01. All the solution terms except model path 2c

[369] Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C., (2012), p. 139.

(with raw coverage scores of 0) in the intermediate solution meet the sufficiency requirement. I consider this path trivial because of its limited coverage of cases – 2c covers only 3 cases. Therefore, I omitted this path 2c in the discussion of the fsQCA results below. However, they are important when comparing cases.

Table 5.18 Sufficiency Results (fsQCA Intermediate Solutions) for Ineffective Decision-making Outcome

Intermediate Solutions for Ineffective Decision-making Outcome					
Path	**Solution terms**	**Consistency**	**Raw Coverage**	**Unique Coverage**	**Cases**
2a	**~DIST_LEAD*~DIST_CONV*~INFO_QUAL**	**0.936184**	**0.830221**	**0.132994**	Guinea Ebola Epidemic (2014), Saudi Arabia Jeddah Floods (2009), Australia Bundaberg Flood (2013), Bangladesh Landslides (2017), Chile Earthquake (2010), DR Congo Kivu Ebola Epidemic (2018), Malaysia Floods (2014), Mozambique Cyclone Idai (2019), Nigeria Floods (2012), Nigeria Floods (2017), Pakistan Earthquake (2013), Pakistan Monsoon Floods (2010), Philippines Typhoon Haiyan (2013), Sierra Leone Mudslides (2017), Somalia Drought (2011), Vanuatu Cyclone PAM (2015)
2b	**~DIST_LEAD*~DIS_PREP*~BTECH_ACCESS**	**0.877526**	**0.810979**	**0.057159**	DR Congo Kivu Ebola Epidemic (2018), Guinea Ebola Epidemic (2014), Haiti Earthquake (2010), Sierra Leone Mudslides (2017), Bangladesh Landslides (2017), Ecuador Earthquake (2016), India Chennai Floods (2015), Liberia Ebola Epidemic (2014), Mozambique Cyclone Idai (2019), Nigeria Floods (2012), Nigeria Floods (2017), Pakistan Earthquake (2013), Pakistan Monsoon Floods (2010), Philippines Typhoon Haiyan (2013), Sierra Leone Ebola Epidemic (2014), Somalia Drought (2011)
2c	~DIS_PREP*DIST_CONV*~BTECH_ACCESS*~DEMO_STATUS	0.860417	0.467459	0	Haiti Earthquake (2010), Liberia Ebola Epidemic (2014), Nigeria Ebola Epidemic (2014)
	Solution Consistency: 0.86157; **Solution Coverage:** 0.943973				
	Keys for Abbreviated cases in XY Plot				

	BG: Bangladesh Landslides (2017), **AU-B:** Australia Bundaberg Flood (2013), **CH-2010:** Chile Earthquake (2010), **MY:** Malaysia Floods (2014), **NGR-2012:** Nigeria Floods (2012), **NGR-2017:** Nigeria Floods (2017), **PK-2013:** Pakistan Earthquake (2013), **PK-2010:** Pakistan Monsoon Floods (2010), **PH-T:** Philippines Typhoon Haiyan (2013), **SE-M:** Sierra Leone Mudslides (2017), **EC:** Ecuador Earthquake (2016), **LB-Ebola:** Liberia Ebola (2014), **SE-Ebola:** Sierra Leone Ebola Epidemic (2014), **SAUD- F**: Saudi Arabia Jeddah Floods (2009), **DRC-E:** DR Congo Kivu Ebola Epidemic (2018), **GU-E:** Guinea Ebola Epidemic (2014), **HA-C:** Haiti Cholera Outbreak (2010), BR-Z: Brazil Zika Virus Outbreak (2015-2016), **US-M:** USA Missouri Joplin Tornado (2011), **US-N:** USA California Napa Earthquake (2014), **US-S:** USA Hurricane Sandy (2012), **US-C:** USA Colorado Floods (2013) **US-H:** USA Hurricane Harvey (2017)

Table 5.19 Dot Matrix Chart of the Sufficiency Results (fsQCA Intermediate Solutions) for Ineffective Decision-making Outcome

Path	DIST_LEAD	DIS_PREP	DIST_CONV	BTECH_ACCESS	INFO_QUAL	DEMO_STATUS	Consistency	Raw coverage	Unique coverage
2a	○		○		○		0.936184	0.830221	0.132994
2b	○	○		○			0.877526	0.810979	0.057159
2c		○	●	○		○	0.860417	0.467459	0
	Solution Consistency: 0.86157; **Solution coverage:** 0.943973								

5.3.2.1 Model 2a: Low distributed leadership and low distributed conversation with low information quality

In the solution term path 2a, the combination of low or absent distributed leadership (~DIST_LEAD) and low/absent distributed conversation (~DIST_CONV) with low/missing information quality (~INFO_QUAL) is sufficient for ineffective security-leadership decision-making outcomes involving big data and digital technologies (~DIST_LEAD*~DIST_CONV*~INFO_QUAL -> ~OUTCOME). The consistency of this solution term is very high (0.936184) and it covers 83% of the cases (0.830221). 16 cases (disaster events) are covered by this model.

The countries where the disaster events with this solution path occurred are generally low democratic countries e.g., Guinea, DR Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia. These countries tend to have authoritarian or weak governance structures that do not network properly, weak civil societies, and weak media. This is not to state that these weak democracies do not record some successes in managing disaster events involving the use of big data and digital technologies. In the discussion of effective outcomes, a few of them feature therein. The causal conditions for that to happen have been discussed under that section too. Lagos leadership during the Ebola epidemic outbreak of 2014 is a typical example. Another example is the effective leadership outcome recorded by Somalia in 2017 and its management of the Drought that year.

But the same countries feature prominently here under ineffective outcomes. Somalia 2011 Drought was not effective. Also, Lagos and Nigeria emergency management authorities and leadership has consistently performed below par in their handling of flood disasters as evidenced in 2012 and 2017 despite the use of big data technologies and social media. It is worth noting that, the configuration has shown that contrary to most assumptions that big data nearly always guarantee a successful outcome, one of the primary findings of this thesis is that these technologies are not sufficient in and of themselves for effective security-leadership decision-making outcome.

Australia's Bundaberg Flood of 2013 is an example. Although the larger Australian government had a functional system in place to mitigate disaster vulnerability, the local government of Bundaberg had no effective structure to manage the disaster of the flood of 2013. The information infrastructures were not enough, the

leadership was government-dominated, and the conversation was not as effective as it should be. Post-disaster plans have since learnt from these challenges.[370]

Recognition of leadership across different nodes is crucial for effective decision-making outcomes because different actors exercise leadership and relative power across the different aspects of disaster events. There are influencers both online and offline e.g., community leaders who can help manage response and who have the currency of trust they can deploy to mobilize the community more effectively than government actors. Low or lack of distributed leadership is a primary factor in generating ineffective outcomes. The presence of distributed conversation or different spaces of conversation on the disaster especially online provides another opportunity for effective leadership outcomes. The quality of Information if not well-assured can also lead to an ineffective outcome. When these three conditions are combined in weak measures, there are high likelihood of ineffective outcome to be expected.

5.3.2.2 Model 2b: Low distributed leadership and low disaster preparation with low big data technologies access

In the solution term path 2b, the combination of low or absent distributed leadership (~DIST_LEAD) and low/absent disaster preparation (~DIS_PREP) with low/missing big data technologies access (~BTECH_ACCESS) is sufficient for ineffective security-leadership decision-making outcomes involving big data and digital technologies (~DIST_LEAD*~DIS_PREP*~BTECH_ACCESS -> ~OUTCOME). The consistency score for this solution term is 0.877526 and it covers 81% of the cases (0. 810979). 16 cases (disaster events) are covered by this model.

This model path is like the previous path as such the countries covered by the model are nearly similar. The Guinea Ebola epidemic of 2014 is relevant to this path on so many grounds. The epidemic hit hard with a 66.7% fatality rate at the beginning; this was no thanks to the centralised health system that focused on traditional command and control structure top-down epidemic management ignoring cultural practices by negotiating with community leaderships and local organising units. In a country with mistrust of government, as is prevalent in several African states, the

[370] News Mail (2017), How the 2013 floods prepared us for Cyclone Debbie. *News Mail*. Available from https://www.news-mail.com.au/news/how-the-2013-floods-prepared-us-for-cyclone-debbie/3163481/ [March 5, 2018]

initial intervention protocols failed. Latter change in leadership strategy proved effective; although this was after 2543 deaths out of 3811 infected persons have lost their lives to the virus.[371] According to Soriba Camara, the involvement of community-based organisations and leaders in raising awareness, social mobilisation "leading to the end of reluctance and mistrust."[372]

The Liberia Ebola epidemic is similar to Guinea in its initial management too. Leadership was centred around government actors; the mistrust experienced with government communication infrastructure also led to dire consequences in the loss of lives. Rumours and disbelief contributed in no small measure to the spread and eventual fatalities. According to a report on the 2014 Liberia Ebola epidemic outbreak, to help fight disbelief, the traditional method of oral communication trusted by the citizens was incorporated into the strategy for combating Ebola. Traditional leaders were convened, and their support helped gained trust amongst the people. These leaders "supported training in all of Liberia's 88 districts." In addition, "Novel methods were instituted, such as providing traditional chiefs with mobile phones to report suspected cases."[373] Thenceforth, health campaigns were worded in the 5 commonly used local languages in the fight against the epidemic.

Other instances apart from those discussed above include the Sierra Leone Ebola Epidemic of 2014, the Lagos, Nigeria Floods of 2012 and 2017, Bangladesh Landslides of 2017, etc (See Table 5.18 for more cases). All these cases reflect the model assumption that low or weak distributed leadership, low or weak disaster preparation measures and poor big data and digital technologies access taken together are recipes for the ineffective outcome. These cases (especially the Guinea and Ebola examples) are interesting because they demonstrated the consequences of the lack of the conditions in the model, at the same time, they also provided opportunity to validate the model for an effective outcome. In the effective model paths 1a (See Table 5.17 above), high distributed leadership combined with good quality of information assurance is a sufficient recipe for effective outcome in the given context. From the

[371] Camara, S., Delamou, A., Millimouno, T. M., Kourouma, K., Ndiaye, B., & Thiam, S., (2020), Community response to the Ebola outbreak: Contribution of Community-Based Organisations and Community Leaders in Four Health Districts in Guinea. *Global Public Health*, *15*(12), pp. 1767-1777.
[372] Ibid.
[373] Nyenswah, T. G., Kateh, F., Bawo, L., Massaquoi, M., Gbanyan, M., Fallah, M., ... & De Cock, K. M. (2016). Ebola and its control in Liberia, 2014–2015. *Emerging infectious diseases*, *22*(2). Available from https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/22/2/15-1456_article

reports, it is obvious that the epidemic outbreak was stopped through the implementation of this model.

5.3.4 The XY Plot of the Sufficiency Causal Paths (Ineffective Outcome)

The XY Plot in Figure 5.10 below illustrates the combined solution configurations for ineffective outcome of security-leadership decision-making in disaster situations involving the use of big data digital technologies. The most typical cases for the solution model are Saudi Arabia Jeddah Floods (2009), DR Congo Kivu Ebola Epidemic (2018), and Guinea Ebola Epidemic (2014). From the XY Plot in Figure, the Saudi Arabia Jeddah Floods (2009), is the topmost case on the diagonal line – where the outcome (Y) is closest to 1 and the solution term (X) is also closest to 1. A unique case is a type of typical case that is only peculiar to the solution term. They are not found in any other solution term or model in the causal mechanisms. The Saudi Arabia Jeddah Floods (2009) is also a uniquely typical case as it only appears in solution term path 2a.

All the cases in the irrelevant quadrants are those cases that mostly have effective outcomes; hence, they are irrelevant for explaining outcome ineffectiveness. In the lower right quadrant contains the deviant cases consistency in kind is the contradictory cases. They are high in the solution set (above 0.5) but are low in the outcome set: the cases will spot the solution model, but the outcome will not be ineffective. These are Nigeria Ebola Epidemic (2014) Path 2c, Haiti Earthquake (2010), Vanuatu Cyclone PAM (2015) Path 2a, and India Chennai Floods (2015) Path 2b.

These contradictory cases did not follow the model path or causal prediction as they did not yield ineffective outcomes despite featuring the expected configurations. Several factors might be responsible for this contradiction including latent conditions or variables not captured by the literature or this thesis or calibration measures. They would make sample cases for further research studies.



Figure 5.11: XY Plot of Ineffective Outcome Sufficiency Solution model
Solution Model: (~DIST_LEAD*~DIST_CONV*~INFO_QUAL + ~DIST_LEAD*~DIS_PREP*~BTECH_ACCESS + ~DIS_PREP*DIST_CONV*~BTECH_ACCESS*~DEMO_STATUS => ~OUTCOME)

The upper right corner quadrant is for deviant cases with consistency in degree. The SMV for these cases is greater than 0.5 in the solution set (X) but their outcome SMV is close to 0. They are therefore only deviant with respect to "differences in degree." Sierra Leone Mudslides (2017) is an example of this case. The upper left quadrant has the deviant cases in coverage; these are cases that contain effective outcomes but do not reflect any of the solution term. Hence, they have a low or ineffective outcome but are not covered by a sufficient solution set. No such case exists in this solution model as shown by the empty quadrant in the XY Plot.

This chapter provides causal explanations for outcome effectiveness and ineffectiveness in the context of concern to this thesis. The next chapter contains a Q-methodological investigation of the two cases - 2014 Lagos Ebola and Floods disasters in Nigeria (2012 and 2017). I chose this approach to investigate at a deeper level the opinions of expert parties on the two cases. This played two parts; firstly, I can interrogate the aggregate views of the different decision-making actors around the two events, secondly, I can examine the findings from the earlier fsQCA side-by-side those from this new approach for consistency and validity.

CHAPTER 6

The Two Cases: A Q-Methodology Approach

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter recommends models of factors responsible for understanding variations in effective or ineffective big data digital technologies security-leadership decision-making outcome in disaster situations. The results from the fsQCA findings cut across different social and economic regions across the globe. I deliberately followed this process to build robust models that will be derived from a systematic review of literature, conceptual mapping, and a theory of change before narrowing down to specific cases. Findings and results from fsQCA need theoretical as well as knowledge of the cases to make meaning. Hence, relying solely on my interpretations may not do justice to the case. Hence, the need for a methodological approach that will test the models on a micro-scale. This is where Q-Methodology is relevant. This chapter works apply Q-Methodology to the selected cases of floods and Ebola in Nigeria without assuming any previous theoretical conjectures to independently verify or assess the models prescribed in the previous chapter.

In a study of this nature, the huge hurdle is in getting informed opinions no matter how subjective. A qualitative study by its very nature is mainly concerned with drawing insights from subjectivity. Since this thesis is about security-leadership decision-making in disaster situations, emergency workers are usually the target focus. However, there are many problems associated with researching emergency personnel in a developing country like Nigeria. The most notable challenge is getting participants (especially government officials) who will provide expert opinions on official bureaucratic decision-making.

Post-disaster reports, assessments documents are scarcely available and where available, they are mostly propaganda pieces praising the efforts of the sitting government. Additionally, the information crucial to answering the

questions are mainly available with government institutions and civil servants leading to several other unintended issues. The poor record-keeping and organisation diary problem of these government agencies limits the quality of the information of past events. This opens an avenue for generating revised positions during interviews since the principal actors of the interested disaster events might have been transferred before the commencement of the research. There is also the problem of distrust of researchers and non-governmental actors which may lead to insufficient or skewed opinions response from the emergency managers.

During a pilot study, these problems were identified which led to the adoption of an alternative approach to the previously preferred semi-structured interviews. In some cases, participants requested interview questions beforehand. Thereby allowing them to have prepared answers which are suspiciously the official positions of the agencies. The research behaviour in the organisations visited requires that researchers first seek permission from the head of the agency. This leading staff then allocates specific staff - usually the officially sanctioned staff to attend to the interviewer. The selected often do not have any personal experience of the disaster events.

Moreover, this type of arrangement restricts the free flow of information because of the invisible presence of the agency's head. Hence, an innovative approach was put in place to address these concerns. An approach that ensured confidentiality, anonymity, and thought independence of the participants. In addition, other sources such as newspaper reports, harvested micro-blog posts (tweets), NGO reports, were consulted for opinions on the subject of interest. A stakeholder analysis was adopted to validate and identify relevant participants using the Mendelow Power-Interest Matrix. This part of the study is divided into two study parts with each part focusing on the case studies – Lagos Ebola Epidemic Outbreak in 2014 (Study I) and the 2012-2017 Lagos Floods (Study II).

6.2 Q-Methodology in brief

Q-methodology is a mixed-methodology used in studying latent views held by different participants. It is a scientific method for studying subjectivity using the mathematical and statistical tools of correlation, factor analysis, and factor

rotation.[374] The participants are chosen for their informed opinions including perspective, behaviour and attitude towards an issue or a subject. This is to guarantee the assurance of expert knowledge rather than random guesses and anecdotal claims. Unlike the R-method of normal factor analysis, Q-Method or Q-sort (another term for Q-methodology) is not concerned about the correlation between variables across a sample of participants or respondents. It focuses on the correlation between participants across a sample of variables. It is aimed at reducing large or complex observed variables to small but representative collection or abstractions of unobserved latent variables or factors.

Principal Component Analysis is a technique of dimensionality reduction that is relevant to the process; it helps to narrow down complex variables to a few clusters or factors without losing meaning. It is not a consensus assessment method as it is also a tool for identifying distinct or distinctive structures or patterns in respondents' choices or *operant subjectivity*. According to Steven Brown,

> Only subjective opinions are at issue in *Q,* and although they are typically unprovable, they can nevertheless be shown to have structure and form, and it is the task of *Q technique* to make this form manifest for purposes of observation and study.[375]

Q-methodology is also suitable for relatively small "respondents and in-depth studies of single cases."[376] This feature is important for capturing the communicative subjectivity of the experienced person and its viewpoint. Human lived experiences are encapsulated in self-referent expressions which are not mere communication of personal views, but they include that and many more – a deeper depiction of conscious "pure behaviour" or perception.

Statements such as "it is my considered opinion…", "I dis/agree with…" etc. are bearers or carriers of these self-referent expressions.[377] This methodological approach has been credited to a 1935 *Nature* article written by

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[374] Brown, S. R., (1980), *Political Subjectivity: Applications of a Methodology in Political Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
[375] Brown, S. R., (1986), *Q Technique and Method: Principles and Procedures.* In W. D. Berry, & M. S., Lewis-Beck (Eds.), *New Tools for Social Scientists: Advances and Applications in Research Methods* (pp. 58). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
[376] McKeown, B., & Thomas, D. B., (2013), *Q Methodology*. Thomas Oaks, CA.: Sage Publications.
[377] Ibid

William Stephenson. It has helped social scientists, psychologists, and health science researchers to operationalise subjective nations and viewpoints. The basic unit of analysis in a Q-Methodology is a collection of statements or "self-referent notions" also known as a *concourse of communication* ascribed to participants or respondents in the study.[378]

Deductive and inductive reasoning are two popular epistemic inferences of social science knowledge inference from observations. The former is about affirming conclusion from the general to the particular; that is, deriving meaning from observable experiences while the latter is moving from the particular to the general - making a general conclusion from pockets of observable experiences. This claim dominates the research approach involving qualitative studies. The other research inference less common is abductive reasoning. It combines the strength of the two other approaches while trying to address some of their weaknesses. It is glaring that most social science experiences or behaviours are not reducible to simple comprehensible variables. Q-Methodology is rooted in abductive epistemology. It seeks to reduce complex observation to its latent categories using the best judgement of the decision-makers.

This reminds me of the analogy often used by Professor 'Funmi Olonisakin in several of her introduction to leadership lectures; while defining the subject, she would often ask her class to identify the person they would most likely follow during a fire outbreak in a packed hall that has several known world leaders such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Nelson Mandela and others. Would you follow the advice of an ordinary-looking firefighter with expert knowledge of the exit route who would you rather follow the calm instructions of those world leaders? The answers have always remained in support of expert knowledge.

Similarly, leadership decisions in both structured and unstructured disaster situations have always highlighted the opinions of stakeholders. Q-Methodology is an approach for doing just that. It enables social science researchers to systematically investigate different opinions and perceptions held by different individuals in a group. It also helps to interrogate differences

[378] Stephenson, W., (1953), The Study of Behavior: Q-Technique and its Methodology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

and similarities in the opinion held. It is a valuable tool for theory testing and theory building. This part of the thesis is focused on doing both. The theory of change subjected to set-theoretical fsQCA can be tested in selected localised cases using Q-Methodology.

6.2.1 Methods

The two different studies which constitute the focus of this Q-methodology are selected cases selected for their characteristics which include natural hazard related disasters in a developing country involving the intervention of big data and digital technologies with different outcomes. To investigate this, two separate studies were conducted with a concourse of statements sorted by stakeholders and actors systematically drawn using stakeholder analysis and power-interest grid to select leading actors in each of the cases of interest. These selected actors or participants rank-order (sorted) statements into a Q-sort matrix ranging from most agreed to most disagreed.

In the first study (Q-study 1 (Ebola)), 37 participants sorted 35 statements by arranging the statements according to their perceptions or opinions on the 2014 Ebola virus disease outbreak in Lagos. The statements are representative of the different views and opinions collected from various sources (interviews, newspapers, social media posts, reports etc.) on big data digital technologies and the roles they play in security-leadership decision-making during this disaster situation.

The second study (Q-Study 2 (Lagos Floods)) is focused on the flood disasters in Lagos between 2012 and 2017 as well as the roles of big data digital technologies in the outcome of the security-leadership decision making. For this study, 25 participants sorted 23 statements. Figure 6.1 below highlights the procedures and steps followed in this Q-Methodology. It followed Watts and Stenner's guidelines.[379] The succeeding paragraphs expounded on the listed steps.

[379] Watts, S., & Stenner, P., (2013), Doing Q methodological research: Theory, method and interpretation. Los Angeles: SAGE.



Figure 6.1 Process flowchart for the Q-Methodology

6.2.2 Collection, Definition and Selection of statements (Concourse and Q-set)

The concourses (collection of statements) for the two studies were collected from careful selections of phrases and opinions expressed by key stakeholders, actors in newspapers, assessment reports, blog posts, official tweets of relevant organisations on the issues under consideration. The collections are not just random statements without expression of perception or opinion. To qualify for inclusion, the statement must be attributed to people who can influence decision-making in the disaster event and the opinion must reflect the personal or official viewpoint of the person.[380] Below are illustrative extracts from qualifying statements for the concourse collection in Study 2 (Lagos Floods):

"The Director-General [**OFFICE**], Nigeria Hydrological Services Agency [**ORGANISATION**], Dr Moses Beckley [**ACTOR**] said *the lack of inter-disciplinary approach and collaboration made it difficult to achieve effective flood mitigation in Nigeria* [**OPINION/STATEMENT**]" (Punch Newspapers, 2019).

[380] Van Exel, J., & De Graaf, G. (2005). Q Methodology: A Sneak Preview. *Job Van Exel*. Available from www.jobvanexel.nl [accessed 4 April 2020]

"The Chairman [**OFFICE**] of Lagos Chapter NAEGE [**ORGANISATION**], Mr Frank Ikuewan [**ACTOR**], said *that there was a need for adequate data documentation and planning in the management of flood risks. He said data was vital in the management of flooding, adding that it had been the major element lacking in flood management process in Nigeria so far. According to him, for one to effectively plan and mitigate flooding, the data on the land level, land height and hazard map, among others, must be known to serve as a guide* [**OPINION/STATEMENT**]" (Punch Newspapers, 2019)

In the two examples above, the actors expressed opinions on the flood disasters in Lagos; from their personal informed statements, it can be inferred that their prescriptions suggest certain missing gaps which could have impacted the outcome of the events. If the head of the county's National Hydrological Services Agency lament about the dearth of collaboration on flood disaster mitigation in the country, who is better informed to say otherwise? The second extract contains several opinions, hence the need for the distilling of these statements into more concise formats. Newspapers and policy documents are useful sources of publicly available information that can provide insights that may not be easily accessible to researchers. Official social media of stakeholders were mined for posts and tweets, impact assessments documents also contributed to the collection. LexisNexis Newspapers database was queried for the news sources, press releases, archived blog posts, newswires on Lagos Floods with the following terms: "Floods" AND "techn*" AND "data" with filter set to Lagos, Nigeria (Location) and 2012-2017 (Date). For the Lagos Ebola study, the programmed queries included the following terms "Ebola" AND "techn*" AND "data"; the filter was restricted to 2014 (Date) and Lagos, Nigeria (Location).

Aside from the listed data sources, a lot of the concourse contents were gathered from semi-structured interviews of leading actors across different agencies of both the national and the Lagos State governments. The agencies are the NCDC, LASEMA, LASEPA, Lagos Ministry of Health, NEMA etc. Aside from the Ethical Approval from King's (LRS-17/18-5348) on April 5, 2018, I went through additional steps to secure ethical approval to undertake the research in Nigeria.

Before this realisation, I had gotten permission from some agencies just with the ethical approval letter from King's. However, when I visited the Lagos Ministry of Health and the NCDC, I was asked to seek another ethical approval

from the National Health Research Ethics Committee of Nigeria (NHREC). As part of the Approval process, I was requested to take series of modules with the West African Bioethics Training Program (ID: 667). Below are some of the key modules taken, see Figure 6.1.1 for extracts of the modules and grades scored by me before the approval was examined and finally granted.[381]

Here are extracts from the modules taken:

- Data and Safety Monitoring in Human Subjects Research (ID: 17433)
- Belmont Report and Its Principles (ID: 1127)
- History and Ethical Principles - SBE (ID: 490)
- Defining Research with Human Subjects - SBE (ID: 491)
- The Federal Regulations - SBE (ID: 502)
- Assessing Risk - SBE (ID: 503)
- Informed Consent - SBE (ID: 504)
- Privacy and Confidentiality - SBE (ID: 505)
- Records-Based Research (ID: 5)

REQUIRED AND ELECTIVE MODULES ONLY	DATE COMPLETED	SCORE
Single Institutional Review Board (sIRB) Use and Administration: When Relying on a sIRB (ID: 17387)	04-Sep-2019	4/5 (80%)
Single Institutional Review Board (sIRB) Use and Administration: When Serving as a sIRB of Record (ID: 17388)	04-Sep-2019	4/5 (80%)
Single Institutional Review Board (sIRB) Use and Administration: Authorization Agreements (ID: 17392)	04-Sep-2019	4/5 (80%)
Data and Safety Monitoring in Human Subjects Research (ID: 17433)	04-Sep-2019	4/5 (80%)
Belmont Report and Its Principles (ID: 1127)	04-Sep-2019	3/3 (100%)
History and Ethical Principles - SBE (ID: 490)	04-Sep-2019	5/5 (100%)
Defining Research with Human Subjects - SBE (ID: 491)	05-Sep-2019	5/5 (100%)
The Federal Regulations - SBE (ID: 502)	05-Sep-2019	3/5 (60%)
Assessing Risk - SBE (ID: 503)	05-Sep-2019	5/5 (100%)
Informed Consent - SBE (ID: 504)	05-Sep-2019	4/5 (80%)
Privacy and Confidentiality - SBE (ID: 505)	05-Sep-2019	5/5 (100%)
Records-Based Research (ID: 5)	05-Sep-2019	3/3 (100%)
West African Bioethics Training Program Module (ID: 1008)	05-Sep-2019	No Quiz

Figure 6.1.1: West African Bioethics Training Program (ID: 667) Human Research Course Completion Report

While the approval process was ongoing, the research simultaneously commenced the ethical approval application process with the Directorate of Planning, Research and Statistics, Lagos State Ministry of Health with the same required documents to save time. As soon as the National Ethical

[381] NHREC Approval Number NHREC/01/01/2007-04/09/2019 and Completion Record ID: 33114522 on September 4, 2019 for a 1-year approval coverage. See Appendix 1. Here is an online link to the full Completion Report: https://www.citiprogram.org/verify/?k4b1f7654-26c7-4da1-af71-59780216ece1-33114522; the Certificate can be accessed here: https://www.citiprogram.org/verify/?wc977f775-136c-4564-bbf9-2883030a930a-33114522

Approval was granted, the letter was sent to the Lagos Health Ministry. The approval for the Lagos Study was granted (Approval Number: LSMH/HMIS/CS.47/II/155 see Appendix 2) on September 10, 2019. The consent form and the interview guide used for both studies were approved (see Appendix 3 and Appendix 4). I then completed the remaining semi-structured interviews after the approval was gotten for those that demanded additional approval different to the King's College Ethical approval.

In all, 15 principal actors and stakeholders (7 in Study 1, 8 for Study 2) were interviewed. The participants demanded strict confidentiality and anonymity because of the nature of the questions. Lagos State Environmental Protection Agency (LASEPA)permitted me to use the agency's Library to access reports and other relevant documentation. After series of sessions across the selected agencies, it was glaring that a methodology that will consider the peculiarity of the situations; that is, strict anonymity was needed. The interviews provided some insights but to avoid extreme pro-government bias, there was a need to consult secondary sources such as newspaper reports, assessments reports to validate some of the claims made. The interviews were transcribed from the notes-taken and opinion statements were extracted as part of the larger concourse of statements.

Official Twitter accounts of the NCDC, NEMA, Lagos Ministry of Health, Federal Ministry of Health (Nigeria), LASEMA, NiMet, UNICEF, WHO etc. were mined for Twitter posts for the periods and subject of interest (Lagos 2014 Ebola and the 2012-2017 Lagos Floods). A typical example involved collecting the tweets and filtering the contents for relevant tweets; for example, 7,081 tweets were collected from the NCDC official account (@ncdcgov); only 163 tweets of this collection contain the term "Ebola". These were selected for further processing. NEMA account (@nemanigeria) was also mined; only 32 of the 6,674 contain the term "Ebola". All these were considered in the collection of the statements for the concourse.

All the processed data for Study 1 (Lagos 2014 Ebola) from the diverse sources came to 6,589. Three assistants were trained by the author to help with the processing of the data. This included the removal of duplicates and the selection of statements that met the pre-set criteria of relevance. This resulted in 543 data. Eventually, 35 statements representative of the whole Ebola

concourse were selected (see Appendix 32 for the full concourse). The concourse for Study 2 (Lagos Floods) was developed from 7,850 data across the various sources highlighted above. They were narrowed down through the same process described above and finally; 23 statements fit the criteria (see Appendix 33 for the full concourse).

They are perspectives that are related to data in leadership decision-making in the Lagos floods and how they affect decision outcomes. These 23 statements are not perfect or do not cover the entire population of opinions on the issue, but they are representative enough because they were also shown to the 15 stakeholders who also contributed to the decision for the final selection. This was an importation validation procedure to ensure that covered statement samples are balanced and not too restrictive; the collections were rephrased to cover intended opinions and to avoid duplication and needless verbosity (Watts & Stenner, 2012). The next section is on the selection of the participants (P-set); it explains the process involved in the selection of participants for the two studies. The similarity and differences between the actors and stakeholders are also discussed.

6.2.3 Selection of Participants (P-set, Stakeholders Analysis and Power-Interest Grid)

Participants for the two studies were non-randomly and purposively selected because the opinions expressed must come from a place of knowledge and familiarity with the cases. Snowball sampling was also adopted to identify potential respondents. As earlier explained, the initial approach involved selecting stakeholders for semi-structured interviews – these were mainly officials from the agencies, but several issues briefly discussed above led to the demand for an innovative approach that would address some of the lapses identified. The main concern was to avoid preponderance of officious response and repetitious pro-government claims which could bias the findings of the studies. Hence, the need for a complementary method of selection of participants P-set).

In Q-methodology, the variables are the participants and not the statements, this is unlike the “R” methodology. The focus is on the pattern of

participants' sorting, how they sort distinctively or in consensus and not on the statements. This distinction is necessary to underscore the non-relevance of generalisability of Q-methodology findings – the representativeness in this instance, is not of the population of all universe of opinions of the subject, but a sample of the issues under consideration.[382] Therefore, the constructivism and interpretivism of Q-methodology as a qualitative research method come to play as part of a larger mixed-methodology approach.[383]

After collecting all the statements, textual extraction (both manual and using Natural Language Processing) was conducted on the collection to identify named entities – an example was displayed in the last section – where ORGANISATION, ACTORS/STAKEHOLDERS [PERSON] were extracted. Frequency counts of each entity determine to some extent their relevance and prominence in the discourse. Aside from this method, a stakeholder analysis was conducted to identify relevant participants as represented by the distribution of players in all the data. Although the terms actors and stakeholders are used interchangeably quite often, they are however different.

A stakeholder is an entity with some form of stake in the outcome of an action; an actor is a performance entity; this is an entity (a person or an organisation) with a decision capacity to influence an action or outcome. Actors are stakeholders, but not all stakeholders are actors. To identity those with leadership decision-making capabilities within an organisation or an issue, it is crucial to map the actors and the stakeholders – those with the ability to act and those with cursory interests on the issue. There are a lot of voices competing for attention on every public issue, it is important to devise a mechanism to know which of the opinions to privilege, which to discard; this analytical method is a useful tool for doing exactly that. Central to every stakeholders' conversation are the concepts of *power* and *interest*.

Mendelow's Matrix is a common tool for stakeholders mapping using the Power-Interest grid. It helps to categorise the participants into at least 1 of four quadrants ranked according to the principle of power (ability to influence

[382] Ramlo, Susan (2016), Mixed Method Lessons Learned from 80 Years of Q Methodology. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, *10*(1), pp.28-45.
[383] Sell, D. K., & Brown, S. R. (1984). Q Methodology as a Bridge between Qualitative and Quantitative Research: Application to the Analysis of Attitude change in Foreign Study Program Participants. *Qualitative research in education*, pp. 79-87.

an outcome) and interest (curiosity or willingness to know about something).[384] Both concepts vary from high to low. “High Power” – “High Interest” quadrant is a cell for key players or actors – this space is for those with the ability to influence the outcome and who also possess strong interest partly because they have a lot at stake on the issue. The “High Interest” – “Low Power” quadrant contains stakeholders who though are dominant in the discussions in the newspapers, and on social media; hence their high interest, but they have little decision-making power on the disaster events.

They are crucial information dissemination stakeholders. The “High Power” - “Low Interest” quadrant has stakeholders with power because of the position but who did not feature prominently in the collection. The “Low Power”- “Low Interest” quadrant features stakeholders with periphery roles and not visible presence in the conversation on the disaster events. They are not necessarily redundant, but their voices are not privileged. Figure 6.1.2 and Figure 6.1.4 are the matrices for the two studies. The final 37 participants met the criteria for Study 1 and the 25 participants for Study 2. The pie-charts in Figure 6.1.3 And Figure 6.1.5 below show the relative distribution of participants in the final P-set drawn from the Stakeholders analysis.

[384] Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J., (1997), Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. *Academy of management review*, *22*(4), pp. 853-886.



Figure 6.1.2: Power-Interest Grid and Stakeholders Mapping of the P-set for the Lagos 2014 Ebola Study



Figure 6.1.3: P-set distribution for the Lagos 2014 Ebola Study (Q-Study 1)



Figure 6.1.4: Power-Interest Grid and Stakeholders Mapping of the P-set for the Lagos Floods Study



Figure 6.1.5: P-set distribution for the P-set for the Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2)

6.2.4 Arrangement of Statements (Q-sort)

In both study cases, the participants were provided with a set of statements for ranking along a stipulated continuum – from *strongly agree* to *strongly disagree*. This sorting procedure was designed to accommodate operant subjectivity - a demonstration of the participant subjective opinion of the issue. The first step involved sorting the statements into three separate groups (disagree, neutral and agree); afterwards, they were expected to pick the statements from each opinion bin and then put them under the right grid within the expanded matrix.

I developed a web and mobile application for sorting using the Ken-Q Analysis tool.[385] The application was linked to Firebase – a Google database program. The decision to use this method of Q-sort was premised on the request of most of the participants for anonymity of not only their names but also a level of same for their thought. This request is understandable because taking out their names is not enough to guarantee that that transcribed messages cannot be traced back to them. Since there are few government agencies in charge of these disasters and the nature of government bureaucracy in Nigeria makes it easier to identify who could have made such statements.

Therefore, this Q-methodology and sorting process provided an opportunity to pool together informed opinions. It requires the selected participants to rank each statement based on their preference or agreement judgement of the issue. The application also randomly arranged the statements so that no two participants had the same statement arranged in the same order. The applications for the two studies can be accessed here: https://damilola-ebolaq.netlify.app/#/ and https://damilola-floods.netlify.app/.

The research provided two options, a paper-based printed matrix on A-4 paper for those without access to the internet, the research assistants helped to administer this survey where needed. The other alternative is the mobile/web app option afforded by the framework discussed above. Instructional guidelines were provided both online and printed for the

[385] Banasick, S. (2016). Ken-Q analysis: A Web Application for Q Methodology. *Shawn Banasick*. Available from https://shawnbanasick.github.io/ken-q-analysis-beta/index.html#section1 [accessed 4 April 2020]

participants to be familiar with the entire process. A 2-minute short video tutorial was also developed by me to provide a visual accompaniment to the guide. It can be accessed here: [https://damilola-qtutorial.netlify.app]. The statements were also made available for them to digest before proceeding to the sorting exercise. The sorting exercise took an average of 1 hour. The figure below shows the wireframes of the application on different mobile devices.



iPhone 6-8 Plump landscape · width: 736px



iPad portrait · width: 768px

Figure 6.1.6: Wireframe sample display of the Application using mobile and web emulator

The Q-sort grid matrix accommodates 1 statement each. At the extreme ends of the grid are the boxes for "mostly disagree" to the left and "mostly agree" to the right. The middleboxes are the "neutral" containers. By the end of the sorting exercise, the participants were enjoined to provide further clarifications on their "mostly agree" and "mostly disagree" statements. The sorters had to put the statements into a complete grid with a quasi-normal distribution shape showing the degrees of agreement and disagreement.[386] Although the grid shape is the same for the two studies, however, the number of statements is different for the two studies. See Figures 1 and 2 below for the two grid matrices.



Figure 6.1.7 Sorting grid/ matrix for the Lagos Ebola Study (35 Statements)

[386] Flurey, C. A., Morris, M., Pollock, J., Richards, P., Hughes, R., & Hewlett, S., (2014), A Q-methodology study of flare help-seeking behaviours and different experiences of daily life in rheumatoid arthritis. *BMC Musculoskeletal Disorders*, *15*(1), pp. 1-13.



Figure 6.1.8: Sorting grid/ matrix for the Lagos Floods Study (23 statements)

6.3 Q-Analysis

The analysis of the Q-sorts was done using PQMethod 2.35 and Ken-Q Analysis version 1.0.6 tools for interactivity and ease of computation. The analytical procedures involved the calculation of correlation between the participants as this is the main concern of Q-Methodology and not the statements as variables. Dimensionality reduction with the computation of factor analysis was done to identify the latent variables and pattern of sorting. According to Exel and Graaf,

> The analysis of the Q sorts is a purely technical, objective procedure – and is therefore sometimes referred to as the scientific base of Q. First, the correlation matrix of all Q sorts is calculated. This represents the level of (dis)agreement between the individual sorts, that is, the degree of (dis)similarity in points of view between the individual Q sorters.[387]

Factoring is about the identification of the common variance in the sorting pattern of the participants. A ranking of the factor scores with Z-scores is done as well as a factor rotation before the interpretations.

[387] Exel & Graaf, (2005)

6.3.1 Correlation Matrix Extraction for the two studies

The first task is to extract the correlation matrix from the participants' sorts because it helps to identify the pattern of agreements between two sorts. The closer the correlation score is to +1 or -1 (±), the stronger the relationship either way. Table 6.0 and Table 6.1 below illustrate this matrix. The scores in the green cells are the positive correlation, while the negative correlations are in the red cells. The bolded scores are the statistically significant scores ($p<0.01$) close to ±1. Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.2.1 blanked out the insignificant scores leaving only the values that are statistically significant for better visualisation.

Also, the closer the scores are to 1, the darker the blue circles, and the closer they are to -1, the darker the red circles are. Participant or respondent E4 and E13 (see Table 6.0) have a correlation score of 0.71 which is a positive correlation and highly significant; this simply means that both sorts share high similarity or consensus. Sorts E11:E17, E1:E29 (Table 6.1), and E6:E37 (Table 6.1) have a 0 correlation score, which means they are not related at all – extremely distinct in their sorting patterns. Sort E2 and Sort E9 have a score of 0.11: this is an exceptionally low score; this simply indicates their low relationship. Mathematically, statistical significance or significant factor loading benchmark is computed thus:

Statistical significance/
Significant factor loading = $2.58 * (1/\sqrt{number\ of\ items\ in\ the\ Q\ set})$[388]
$2.58 * (1/\sqrt{(37)}) = 0.424$

Therefore, to be statistically significant in the Lagos Ebola Study, the sorts must have a score of ±0.42 – more or less.

[388] See (Brown, 1980) for more information.

Table 6.1: Correlation Matrix (Study 1 Q-Sort)

SORT	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5	E6	E7	E8	E9	E10	E11	E12	E13	E14	E15	E16	E17	E18
E1	**1.00**																	
E2	0.29	**1.00**																
E3	0.38	**0.54**	**1.00**															
E4	0.30	**0.46**	**0.61**	**1.00**														
E5	**0.44**	0.15	0.34	0.41	**1.00**													
E6	-0.16	-0.02	-0.03	0.10	-0.24	**1.00**												
E7	0.01	0.40	0.35	0.39	-0.11	0.18	**1.00**											
E8	0.28	0.41	0.29	**0.59**	0.33	-0.26	0.18	**1.00**										
E9	0.14	0.11	0.03	0.35	**0.50**	-0.09	-0.04	**0.48**	**1.00**									
E10	**0.51**	0.34	**0.48**	**0.56**	0.28	-0.01	**0.46**	0.33	0.24	**1.00**								
E11	0.21	**0.49**	**0.52**	**0.56**	0.38	-0.08	0.28	0.36	**0.46**	0.39	**1.00**							
E12	0.22	0.25	0.26	**0.58**	0.18	0.01	0.21	**0.46**	0.37	**0.49**	0.31	**1.00**						
E13	0.28	0.08	**0.43**	**0.71**	**0.59**	-0.23	0.24	**0.51**	**0.47**	**0.54**	**0.49**	**0.60**	**1.00**					
E14	0.34	0.23	**0.49**	**0.61**	0.16	0.08	0.41	0.36	0.16	**0.79**	**0.43**	**0.48**	**0.59**	**1.00**				
E15	0.26	0.37	**0.51**	**0.53**	0.34	0.16	0.23	0.30	**0.44**	**0.48**	**0.54**	0.39	0.41	**0.61**	**1.00**			
E16	**0.44**	0.36	**0.51**	**0.69**	0.40	-0.16	0.20	**0.54**	**0.45**	**0.47**	**0.59**	**0.61**	**0.64**	**0.47**	**0.51**	**1.00**		
E17	0.11	0.10	-0.01	-0.11	0.03	-0.18	0.02	-0.10	-0.11	0.19	***0.00***	-0.23	-0.12	0.14	0.06	-0.28	**1.00**	
E18	-0.01	0.01	0.30	0.35	0.18	-0.07	0.11	0.36	0.24	0.30	0.23	0.38	0.33	0.39	0.28	0.33	-0.14	**1.00**
E19	0.14	0.20	0.41	0.41	0.42	-0.34	0.03	**0.44**	0.34	0.32	0.40	0.32	**0.58**	0.41	0.29	**0.44**	-0.03	**0.54**
E20	0.26	0.39	**0.44**	**0.65**	0.29	-0.03	0.37	**0.49**	0.34		**0.48**	**0.66**	**0.64**	**0.68**	**0.54**	**0.64**	0.04	0.40
E21	0.10	0.13	0.33	0.29	0.38	-0.18	-0.04	0.38	0.29	0.24	**0.46**	0.26	**0.56**	0.38	0.23	0.18	0.03	**0.44**
E22	0.05	0.01	0.21	0.27	0.09	-0.06	0.09	0.06	-0.07	0.38	0.13	0.36	0.39	0.24	-0.01	0.29	0.11	-0.01
E23	0.23	0.36	0.41	0.42	0.17	0.13	0.21	0.12	0.28	**0.44**	**0.54**	**0.50**	0.29	0.38	0.39	**0.56**	-0.24	**0.48**
E24	0.17	-0.17	-0.34	**-0.43**	0.04	-0.12	-0.21	-0.15	-0.18	-0.30	-0.24	-0.33	-0.34	-0.38	-0.41	**-0.51**	0.31	-0.28
E25	0.20	-0.02	0.08	0.28	0.05	-0.20	0.03	0.16	0.11	0.29	0.19	0.36	0.38	0.33	-0.03	0.35	-0.04	0.29
E26	0.30	0.14	**0.43**	0.33	0.25	0.31	0.22	0.23	0.16	0.27	0.31	0.16	0.22	0.31	0.31	0.28	-0.06	0.09
E27	0.05	0.23	0.26	0.26	0.28	-0.21	0.14	0.41	0.38	0.34	0.31	0.26	0.31	0.39	**0.52**	**0.44**	-0.08	**0.49**
E28	0.06	0.23	0.31	**0.52**	0.03	0.22	0.09	0.25	0.18	0.19	0.24	0.39	0.22	0.21	0.32	0.38	**-0.43**	0.29
E29	***0.00***	**0.44**	0.38	**0.55**	0.36	0.07	0.31	**0.52**	**0.48**	**0.48**	**0.43**	0.34	**0.46**	**0.48**	**0.51**	**0.44**	0.03	0.37
E30	0.34	0.19	0.26	0.41	**0.43**	0.04	0.26	0.34	0.29	0.41	0.31	0.40	0.39	0.29	0.23	**0.49**	-0.12	0.42
E31	0.25	0.36	0.42	**0.51**	0.24	0.03	0.21	**0.50**	0.23	0.31	0.33	0.39	0.41	0.31	0.18	**0.44**	-0.26	0.16
E32	0.16	**0.59**	0.30	0.26	0.06	-0.09	0.23	0.31	0.09	0.36	0.26	0.31	0.12	0.07	0.19	0.14	0.13	-0.13
E33	0.21	0.16	0.36	0.38	0.37	-0.31	0.16	0.42	**0.44**	**0.46**	**0.47**	0.36	**0.60**	**0.44**	0.36	0.31	-0.06	0.21
E34	0.08	0.11	0.18	0.22	0.09	0.10	0.24	0.40	0.26	0.20	0.15	0.32	0.24	0.27	0.22	0.19	-0.14	0.08
E35	0.36	-0.01	-0.02	0.25	-0.02	0.10	-0.14	0.35	0.06	0.24	0.05	0.14	0.08	0.24	0.16	0.28	-0.03	-0.01
E36	0.31	0.23	0.33	0.29	0.24	-0.01	0.01	0.28	0.19	0.36	0.23	0.34	0.24	0.28	0.13	0.28	-0.11	0.26
E37	0.16	0.29	0.21	0.05	0.30	***0.00***	-0.04	0.06	0.13	0.18	0.30	-0.13	-0.04	0.08	0.26	-0.13	0.19	0.18

SORT	E19	E20	E21	E22	E23	E24	E25	E26	E27	E28	E29	E30	E31	E32	E33	E34	E35	E36	E37
E1																			
E2																			
E3																			
E4																			
E5																			
E6																			
E7																			
E8																			
E9																			
E10																			
E11																			
E12																			
E13																			
E14																			
E15																			
E16																			
E17																			
E18																			
E19	**1.00**																		
E20	0.41	**1.00**																	
E21	**0.61**	0.36	**1.00**																
E22	0.08	0.24	0.11	**1.00**															
E23	0.41	**0.51**	0.24	0.08	**1.00**														
E24	-0.23	**-0.48**	0.04	-0.19	-0.41	**1.00**													
E25	**0.61**	0.27	0.33	0.23	**0.44**	-0.11	**1.00**												
E26	0.24	0.09	0.13	0.03	0.33	-0.13	0.04	**1.00**											
E27	**0.53**	0.39	0.39	0.04	0.31	-0.28	0.31	0.16	**1.00**										
E28	0.15	0.19	0.08	0.18	0.41	-0.31	-0.01	0.37	0.13	**1.00**									
E29	0.33	**0.57**	0.29	0.30	0.36	-0.38	-0.01	0.25	**0.43**	0.34	**1.00**								
E30	0.21	**0.46**	0.09	0.25	0.42	-0.08	0.34	0.09	0.34	0.08	0.36	**1.00**							
E31	0.22	0.34	0.19	0.11	**0.43**	-0.23	0.06	**0.50**	0.04	0.41	**0.52**	0.35	**1.00**						
E32	0.09	**0.43**	0.19	0.16	0.22	0.01	0.10	-0.03	0.21	0.05	0.27	0.13	0.23	**1.00**					
E33	0.41	**0.48**	0.42	0.08	0.30	-0.29	0.18	0.14	0.19	0.21	0.32	0.31	**0.45**	0.19	**1.00**				
E34	-0.01	0.36	0.27	-0.13	0.14	-0.01	0.05	0.07	0.12	0.09	0.24	0.26	0.33	0.34	0.33	**1.00**			
E35	-0.17	0.28	-0.05	0.21	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.14	0.01	0.37	0.25	0.16	0.25	0.04	0.04	0.19	**1.00**		
E36	0.36	**0.48**	0.33	-0.08	**0.54**	-0.12	0.27	0.41	0.28	0.28	0.12	0.14	0.28	0.28	0.34	0.19	0.11	**1.00**	
E37	0.33	0.11	0.35	-0.28	0.23	0.30	0.04	0.15	0.37	0.06	0.09	0.20	0.08	0.22	0.23	-0.06	-0.07	0.36	**1.00**



Figure 6.2: Correlogram of the Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1) matrix with the statistically insignificant scores blanked out.

Using the same computation on the Lagos Floods Study; we have:

Statistical significance/
Significant factor loading = $2.58 * (1/\sqrt{number\ of\ items\ in\ the\ Q\ set})$
$2.58 * (1/\sqrt{}(25)) = 0.516$

Therefore, to be statistically significant in the Lagos Floods (Study 2 Q-Sort), the sorts must have a score of ±0.516 – greater or lesser.

Table 6.2 Correlation Matrix (Study 2 Q-Sort)

SORTS	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8	F9	F10	F11	F12	F13	F14	F15	F16	F17	F18
F1	1.00																	
F2	-0.07	1.00																
F3	0.15	-0.09	1.00															
F4	-0.14	-0.24	0.18	1.00														
F5	0.30	0.33	-0.08	-0.13	1.00													
F6	0.50	-0.11	0.01	0.00	0.48	1.00												
F7	-0.33	-0.21	-0.10	0.20	-0.61	-0.48	1.00											
F8	0.48	0.07	0.20	-0.30	0.58	0.65	-0.79	1.00										
F9	0.46	0.47	0.03	-0.28	0.40	0.36	-0.41	0.48	1.00									
F10	-0.43	-0.15	-0.03	0.14	-0.63	-0.64	0.53	-0.71	-0.77	1.00								
F11	0.37	0.20	0.17	-0.30	0.48	0.57	-0.58	0.79	0.54	-0.61	1.00							
F12	0.16	0.22	0.03	0.00	0.23	-0.06	-0.33	0.11	0.27	-0.20	-0.14	1.00						
F13	0.26	0.20	0.58	-0.07	0.31	0.34	-0.46	0.63	0.45	-0.48	0.66	0.12	1.00					
F14	0.42	0.28	0.12	-0.13	0.21	0.58	-0.43	0.59	0.74	-0.65	0.62	0.15	0.61	1.00				
F15	0.31	0.41	0.09	-0.26	0.46	0.54	-0.38	0.53	0.51	-0.57	0.68	0.05	0.44	0.57	1.00			
F16	0.06	0.30	0.42	0.17	0.36	0.40	-0.45	0.41	0.34	-0.52	0.53	0.06	0.53	0.48	0.57	1.00		
F17	0.31	0.49	0.24	-0.16	0.62	0.54	-0.45	0.63	0.57	-0.64	0.68	0.11	0.64	0.53	0.72	0.57	1.00	
F18	0.26	0.30	0.11	-0.16	0.59	0.40	-0.55	0.61	0.48	-0.59	0.51	0.23	0.69	0.54	0.49	0.38	0.70	1.00
F19	0.22	0.45	0.32	-0.07	0.45	0.42	-0.34	0.40	0.45	-0.55	0.34	0.28	0.55	0.47	0.44	0.62	0.65	0.53
F20	-0.45	-0.40	0.00	0.40	-0.55	-0.69	0.58	-0.64	-0.54	0.59	-0.63	-0.22	-0.46	-0.57	-0.61	-0.45	-0.63	-0.51
F21	0.44	0.27	0.38	-0.06	0.41	0.42	-0.41	0.66	0.64	-0.70	0.58	0.17	0.76	0.71	0.65	0.51	0.58	0.66
F22	0.09	0.21	0.31	0.05	0.47	0.43	-0.73	0.72	0.32	-0.49	0.70	0.06	0.60	0.42	0.46	0.61	0.56	0.49
F23	0.34	-0.04	0.39	-0.18	0.32	0.36	-0.52	0.65	0.24	-0.40	0.66	-0.05	0.63	0.36	0.61	0.46	0.48	0.55
F24	0.22	0.22	0.34	-0.21	0.29	0.44	-0.47	0.54	0.34	-0.32	0.51	-0.06	0.68	0.55	0.51	0.38	0.66	0.72
F25	0.04	-0.05	0.10	0.17	0.17	0.20	-0.01	-0.11	-0.24	0.08	0.11	-0.39	0.01	-0.26	0.18	0.22	0.20	0.09

SORTS	F19	F20	F21	F22	F23	F24	F25
F1							
F2							
F3							
F4							
F5							
F6							
F7							
F8							
F9							
F10							
F11							
F12							
F13							
F14							
F15							
F16							
F17							
F18							
F19	1.00						
F20	-0.62	1.00					
F21	0.54	-0.51	1.00				
F22	0.38	-0.53	0.52	1.00			
F23	0.27	-0.43	0.65	0.70	1.00		
F24	0.43	-0.43	0.48	0.48	0.58	1.00	
F25	0.11	-0.12	-0.14	0.24	0.33	0.27	1.00



Figure 6.3: Correlogram of the Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2) matrix with the statistically insignificant scores blanked out.

The two correlograms in Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 provide visual representations of the correlation matrices of the Q-sorts in the two studies. With the statistically insignificant values blanked out to reveal decluttered matrices of significant values where $p<0.01$. From these figures, it is glaring that there are more blue circles in Q-Study 1 than in Q-Study 2. This simply means that Study 1 has more consensus or similar sorts. Study 2 on the other hand has redder circles, which can be interpreted as evidence of distinct sorts among the respondents in the second study.

6.3.2 Factor Extraction for the two studies

To extract the factors, the next step is about grouping the Q-sorts into similar patterns. In this case, a centroid factor analysis is conducted to extract 7 factors. The approach

examined 7 grounds for communalities and list the sorts according to how they fit into each of the centroids. This extraction is also known as the unrotated factor matrix, according to Simon Watts and Paul Stenner, "These factor loadings show the extent to which each individual Q-sort is associated with each of the study factors following the extraction, but before rotation has taken place."[389] As discussed earlier the measure of significance for factor loading is the same as the computation for statistical significance.

Therefore, Participant E3 in Table 6.3 below loaded 0.6484 under Factor 1, this is a positive factor loading as well as a positive correlation with high statistical significance. Factor extraction is also about variance pattern; hence, "eigenvalue represents the total amount of variance that can be explained by a given principal component."[390] See Table 6.3 and Table 6.5 for the matrices of the unrotated factor loadings for both studies. Table 6.4 and Table 6.6 report the eigenvalues, explained variance (%) and cumulative explained (%) of both studies. From Table 6.4, Factor 1 accounts for 29% of the explained variance in Study 1; and the combination of Factor 1 and Factor 2 accounts for 35% cumulative explained variance in the same study.

[389] Watts, S., & Stenner, P., (2012), p. 203.
[390] UCLA-IDRE (2016), Factor Analysis. *UCLA-IDRE*. Available from https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/spss/output/factor-analysis/ [accessed 3 March 2019]

Table 6.3: Unrotated factor matrix-based using Centroid Factor Analysis - Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1)

Participant	**Factor 1**	**Factor 2**	**Factor 3**	**Factor 4**	**Factor 5**	**Factor 6**	**Factor 7**
E1	0.3939	-0.0066	0.3098	-0.2316	-0.0995	-0.0262	**0.4825**
E2	**0.4721**	0.218	0.3812	0.2167	-0.1611	0.0521	-0.1602
E3	**0.6484**	0.1177	0.2094	0.1901	-0.212	-0.2009	-0.0402
E4	**0.8106**	0.2765	-0.0545	-0.0462	-0.0547	-0.1031	-0.0639
E5	**0.4809**	-0.403	0.0951	-0.312	-0.2039	-0.3172	-0.0716
E6	-0.052	**0.4413**	-0.0117	0.1988	-0.2475	0.1306	0.1481
E7	0.3094	0.3897	0.0871	0.3001	0.1535	-0.0957	-0.0466
E8	**0.6653**	0.0088	0.0805	-0.3129	0.1592	0.1452	-0.3002
E9	**0.4905**	-0.2011	-0.0094	-0.2253	-0.0478	-0.0063	-0.2375
E10	**0.7213**	0.0944	0.1866	0.1118	0.24	-0.1851	0.3541
E11	**0.6736**	-0.0609	0.1015	0.0889	-0.204	-0.1502	-0.1165
E12	**0.6703**	0.1501	-0.2996	-0.1179	0.1466	0.1509	0.0839
E13	**0.7639**	-0.079	-0.1042	-0.272	0.1947	-0.3692	-0.0884
E14	**0.6916**	0.1269	0.068	0.2202	0.2736	-0.2372	0.1903
E15	**0.6186**	0.1033	0.0714	0.1944	-0.1343	-0.2182	-0.0975
E16	**0.7923**	0.0738	-0.2995	-0.1855	-0.1644	-0.1303	0.0807
E17	-0.0878	-0.0525	**0.4966**	0.1873	0.3091	-0.305	0.2182
E18	**0.4841**	-0.2099	-0.3135	0.2059	0.1028	0.1418	-0.0899
E19	**0.6132**	-0.5127	-0.1366	0.2096	0.0433	-0.0606	-0.1388
E20	**0.8059**	0.1117	0.0258	0.0926	0.2713	0.0163	0.0801
E21	**0.4965**	-0.4312	0.0941	0.0535	0.1728	0.0413	-0.2273
E22	0.2304	0.1771	-0.1557	-0.035	0.3242	-0.2082	0.187
E23	**0.6451**	-0.0281	-0.1905	0.312	-0.2929	0.2243	0.2008
E24	-0.3897	-0.3279	0.4025	-0.2283	0.0309	0.2114	0.1291
E25	0.3614	-0.3502	-0.3671	0.0679	0.2605	0.0537	0.2827
E26	0.3823	0.0771	0.0893	0.0172	-0.4305	-0.0441	0.1019
E27	**0.5426**	-0.2158	-0.0473	0.2728	0.0925	0.0343	-0.1447
E28	**0.4285**	0.3329	-0.196	-0.018	-0.3222	0.1727	-0.0699
E29	**0.657**	0.232	0.0093	0.0217	0.0638	-0.0039	-0.2967
E30	**0.5411**	-0.0649	-0.0874	-0.1418	0.0489	0.084	0.1048
E31	**0.5778**	0.2368	0.0881	-0.2336	-0.1461	0.1118	-0.0503
E32	0.3492	0.1228	0.3672	0.0399	0.1065	0.293	-0.0363
E33	**0.6053**	-0.1642	0.1652	-0.1671	0.0295	-0.0737	-0.1621
E34	0.3301	0.1386	0.1902	-0.1384	0.1893	0.3042	-0.1154
E35	0.1986	0.323	0.0522	-0.3311	0.0074	0.1298	0.2494
E36	**0.4901**	-0.1349	0.0844	0.1017	-0.1299	0.3411	0.193
E37	0.2027	-0.4475	**0.4361**	0.3174	-0.1986	0.2515	-0.0576

Legend	
	Governmental
	Non/Inter-Governmental
	Technical/Research
	Religious
	Media
	Security/Paramilitary
	Business/Interest groups

Table 6.4: Eigenvalues, explained variance and cumulative explained variance using Centroid Factor Analysis Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1)

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7
Eigenvalues	10.8305	2.1928	1.7495	1.4512	1.4173	1.2319	1.2324
% Explained Variance	29%	6%	5%	4%	4%	3%	3%
Cumulative % Explained Variance	29%	35%	40%	44%	48%	51%	54%

Table 6.5: Unrotated factor matrix-based using Centroid Factor Analysis - Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2)

Participant	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7
F1	0.4465	-0.3755	0.1601	0.1969	-0.1021	-0.1043	-0.2955
F2	0.3372	0.0303	**-0.6859**	-0.3128	-0.1007	-0.0788	0.1981
F3	0.2501	0.508	0.2177	0.2361	0.2417	-0.1408	-0.0997
F4	-0.1892	0.2578	0.0344	0.1468	0.3392	0.3198	-0.1692
F5	**0.6318**	-0.1387	-0.0596	-0.3723	0.0955	0.2107	0.0503
F6	**0.6303**	-0.256	0.1878	0.0366	-0.1064	0.368	-0.319
F7	**-0.7068**	0.2184	-0.2101	0.3456	-0.2377	0.0744	-0.123
F8	**0.8324**	-0.2698	0.3428	-0.03	0.1308	-0.0728	0.1084
F9	**0.6696**	-0.2968	-0.3683	0.2593	-0.0384	-0.1701	0.0717
F10	**-0.7745**	0.3232	0.1435	-0.1987	-0.1648	-0.2105	-0.0541
F11	**0.8049**	-0.0284	0.2098	0.0901	-0.2087	0.0176	0.2946
F12	0.1531	-0.143	-0.3434	-0.0669	0.4457	-0.1812	-0.048
F13	**0.7664**	0.3085	0.0871	0.1112	0.1535	-0.2975	-0.0909
F14	**0.7178**	-0.1323	-0.076	0.385	-0.0546	-0.1599	-0.0216
F15	**0.7575**	0.0374	-0.1156	0.0824	-0.3628	0.0663	0.1876
F16	**0.6426**	0.3335	-0.0275	0.0863	0.1225	0.3265	0.0714
F17	**0.8563**	0.1554	-0.1483	-0.1137	-0.1309	0.0743	-0.0534
F18	**0.7656**	0.0714	-0.0436	-0.1969	0.052	-0.2087	-0.0987
F19	**0.6739**	0.1337	-0.3354	-0.035	0.1248	0.0954	-0.2908
F20	**-0.796**	0.255	0.0456	0.1861	0.2052	-0.0659	0.1288
F21	**0.796**	0.0478	-0.0507	0.4073	0.1626	-0.1868	0.0796
F22	**0.7171**	0.134	0.3077	-0.1221	0.1569	0.0925	0.2565
F23	**0.6834**	0.2382	0.429	0.0198	-0.0288	-0.0979	0.1858
F24	**0.6827**	0.2987	0.1323	-0.0985	-0.2052	-0.3089	-0.2253
F25	0.0641	0.426	0.2338	-0.1364	-0.3056	0.4397	-0.0619

Table 6.6: Eigenvalues, explained variance and cumulative explained variance using Centroid Factor Analysis - Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2)

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7
Eigenvalues	10.7015	1.5706	1.5828	1.0654	0.9971	1.0656	0.7175
% Explained Variance	43%	6%	6%	4%	4%	4%	3%
Cumulative % Explained Variance	43%	49%	55%	59%	63%	67%	70%

The next phase in factor extraction is to determine the number of centroids or factors that adequately explained the variance of the sorts. Watts and Steiner suggested factors with eigenvalues that is higher than or equal to 1 (*Kaiser-Guttman*

criterion: ≥1.00) should qualify for inclusion.[391] This simply means that the factor must have at least 1 sort which loads into it. All 7 factors in Study 1 have eigenvalues higher than 1. In study 2, all but Factors 5 and 7 have a value that is higher than 1. Another method for extracting the centroids or factors is to use the scree plot, which is a line graph representation of the eigenvalues.

Where slope changes on the graph marked the number of factors to be extracted for the study. The scree plot for the Lagos Ebola study (Q-Study 1) indicates that the slope changes in Factor 4; hence, Factors 1 to 4 best represents the common variance of the study. These three factors have a cumulative explained variance of 44%. Paul Kline recommended a cumulative explained variance of the minimum range of 35-40% to qualify; anything below is not fit to adequately qualify as common factors.[392] In the scree plot in Study 2, the slope changes in Factor 3 with a cumulative explained variance of 55%. Therefore, Factors 1 to 4 was extracted for Study 1 and Factors 1-3 for Study 2. This implies that the participants' sorts for both studies can be categorised into 4 and 3 different perspectives, respectively.



Figure 6.4: Scree Plot for the Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1)

[391] Watts & Stenner, (2012)
[392] Kline, Paul (1994), *An Easy Guide to Factor Analysis.* London: Routledge



Figure 6.5: Scree Plot for the Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2)

6.3.3 Factor Rotation

Since the unrotated loading is not perfect, and to address the limitation of this factor loading, a rotating manual (Judgmental) or automated (Varimax) approach is used to further process the factor loading in a way that will maximize the variance between the factors. It is an optimisation method that does not affect the outcome but provide a clearer observational perspective to generate fewer factors with maximum variance (Watts & Stenner, 2012). Varimax orthogonal rotation was applied to both matrices leading to the results in Tables 6.7 and 6.8 below.

Table 6.7: Factor loadings with Varimax rotation, including flagging (bolded) at p<0.05 (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

Q sort	***Factor Group (FG)***	**Factor 1**	**Factor 2**	**Factor 3**	**Factor 4**
E2	*F1-1*	**0.6389**	0.0508	-0.0812	0.2132
E3	*F1-2*	**0.6014**	0.2589	0.0653	0.2851
E14	*F1-3*	**0.5879**	0.33	0.1897	0.2389
E10	*F1-4*	**0.5785**	0.2933	0.1088	0.3795
E7	*F1-5*	**0.5586**	-0.0351	0.1693	-0.0568
E20	*F1-6*	0.5572	0.3691	0.2745	0.3862
E4	*F1-7*	0.5336	0.2311	0.4457	0.4493
E15	*F1-8*	**0.5238**	0.2981	0.1567	0.2201
E29	*F1-9*	0.49	0.1858	0.3124	0.3373
E11	*F1-10*	0.4286	0.3969	0.0879	0.356
E32	*F1-11*	**0.4238**	-0.0042	-0.1249	0.2798
E26	*F1-12*	0.2934	0.1245	0.0862	0.2267
E6	*F1-13*	0.2911	-0.2663	0.176	-0.2246
E19	*F2-1*	0.1401	**0.8021**	0.0112	0.1958
E25	*F2-2*	-0.0883	**0.5768**	0.2187	0.0654
E18	*F2-3*	0.1442	**0.5737**	0.2603	0.0366
E21	*F2-4*	0.1268	**0.5559**	-0.1397	0.3155
E27	*F2-5*	0.3183	**0.549**	0.0542	0.1097
E23	*F2-6*	0.4295	**0.5285**	0.2858	0.0724
E36	*F2-7*	0.2914	0.3627	0.0042	0.2438
E24	*F3-1*	-0.3332	-0.1788	**-0.563**	0.116
E37	*F3-2*	0.2396	0.3989	**-0.5578**	0.0683
E16	*F3-3*	0.2485	0.3926	0.5574	0.4803
E12	*F3-4*	0.2555	0.2983	**0.5445**	0.3532
E17	*F3-5*	0.2299	-0.0984	**-0.4789**	-0.0177
E17	*F3-6*	0.3091	0.0444	**0.4589**	0.1585
E22	*F3-7*	0.1311	0.0321	0.29	0.0874
E8	*F4-1*	0.2339	0.2082	0.2079	**0.6371**
E13	*F4-2*	0.191	0.3944	0.334	**0.6091**
E5	*F4-3*	-0.0637	0.3988	-0.0665	**0.5767**
E33	*F4-4*	0.2288	0.3241	0.0103	**0.5395**
E31	*F4-5*	0.3441	0.0262	0.2729	**0.5086**
E1	*F4-6*	0.215	0.0334	-0.0813	**0.5008**
E9	*F4-7*	0.0448	0.3239	0.1037	**0.4628**
E30	*F4-8*	0.1527	0.3079	0.2338	0.3898
E35	*F4-9*	0.1116	-0.2573	0.2409	0.3456
E34	*F4-10*	0.2528	-0.0328	0.0482	**0.3409**
%Explained Variance		13	12	8	12

Legend	
	Governmental
	Non/Inter-Governmental
	Technical/Research
	Religious
	Media
	Security/Paramilitary
	Business/Interest groups

Table 6.8: Factor loadings with Varimax rotation, including flagging (bolded) at p<0.05 (Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2))

Q sort	***Factor Group (FG)***	**Factor 1**	**Factor 2**	**Factor 3**
F13	F1-1	**0.6782**	0.3949	0.2724
F23	F1-2	**0.6757**	0.4961	-0.0718
F24	F1-3	**0.6388**	0.3563	0.1943
F3	F1-4	**0.6002**	-0.0511	-0.0717
F16	F1-5	**0.5996**	0.2512	0.3199
F22	F1-6	**0.5758**	0.5411	0.0496
F17	F1-7	0.5367	0.4702	0.5199
F25	F1-8	**0.4405**	-0.1297	-0.1712
F8	F2-1	0.3251	**0.8797**	0.0614
F7	F2-2	-0.2615	**-0.7124**	-0.1247
F20	F2-3	-0.2066	**-0.7099**	-0.3924
F10	F2-4	-0.1129	**-0.7017**	-0.4688
F6	F2-5	0.1845	**0.6723**	0.1096
F11	F2-6	0.4651	**0.6682**	0.1729
F1	F2-7	-0.0164	**0.6028**	0.0493
F14	F2-8	0.2543	**0.5692**	0.3871
F21	F2-9	0.4467	0.5256	0.4034
F5	F2-10	0.2082	**0.5169**	0.3337
F18	F2-11	0.4514	0.492	0.3839
F15	F2-12	0.3994	0.4817	0.4439
F4	F2-13	0.1149	-0.2795	-0.1101
F2	F3-1	0.0075	-0.0136	**0.7647**
F9	F3-2	0.014	0.5324	**0.6232**
F19	F3-3	0.369	0.2874	**0.6048**
F12	F3-4	-0.1307	0.0772	0.3725
%Explained Variance		17	26	13

The matrices were categorised into Factor Groups (FG), and the respondent or participant that loaded on a single Factor is bolded. The 37 sorts for Q-Study 1 were categorised into 4 Factor Groups (FG1 to FG4) after the rotation exercise. Seven respondents or participants (7) uniquely loaded on FG 1; 6 on FG2; 5 on FG3, and 8 on FG4 with combined explained variance (%) score of 45% (See Table 6.7 above) for more details. For the Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2), out of the 25 sorts, 7 uniquely loaded on FG1; 9 on FG2; and 3 on FG3 with a combined explained variance (%) score of 56% (See Table 6.8 above).

Table 6.9: Factor Characteristics (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
# of Defining Variables	7	6	5	8
Average Reliability Coefficient	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
Composite Reliability	0.966	0.96	0.952	0.97
S.E. of Factor Z-scores	0.184	0.2	0.21	0.173

Table 6.10: Factor Characteristics (Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2))

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
# of Defining Variables	7	9	3
Average Reliability Coefficient	0.8	0.8	0.8
Composite Reliability	0.966	0.973	0.923
S.E. of Factor Z-scores	0.184	0.164	0.277

Tables 6.9 and 6.10 contain the factor characteristics of the Varimax factor rotations for the two studies. The Defining variables or the sorts which uniquely loaded into a factor are listed as well as the average reliability coefficient score of 0.8 which is within the threshold recommended by Steven Brown; in addition, standard error (S.E.) of factor z-scores are listed and the lower the scores the better.[393] Any sort which does not load into any of the factors in the matrices is exempted from further analysis. This simply means that these confounding factors have no shared experiences with others. Although subjectivity was intended, to have drawn a meaningful inference from an experience, a sizeable number of people should express the same for it to be affirmed as knowledge with a degree of generalisability.

Table 6.11: Factor score correlations Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1)

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Factor 1	1			
Factor 2	0.4431	1		
Factor 3	0.2529	0.2059	1	
Factor 4	0.5613	0.5415	0.3013	1

Table 6.12: Factor score correlations Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2)

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Factor 1	1	0.6586	0.372
Factor 2		1	0.4731
Factor 3			1

[393] Steven, Brown (1980), pp.289-301

The next step is to determine to what extent each factor arrays inter-correlate. In the factor arrays in Table 6.11 above - The Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1), Factor 1 and Factor 2 are significantly correlated (0.4431) judging by the factor loading threshold of 0.424 for that study. Factor 1 and Factor 3 are not significantly correlated at score 0.2529 which is below the study threshold. The results presented in the discussion on the Differences Arrays between the Factors in section 6 below provide more insight into this correlation matrix.

Table 6.2 shows the factor correlation arrays for Study 2 (The Lagos Floods Study); in this instance, Factor 1 and Factor 2 are significantly correlated (0.6586) while Factor 2 and Factor 3 are not significantly correlated at score 0.372 which is below the study threshold of (0.516). The correlation between the factors is evidence showing that the factors are alternative manifestations of the same factor. More like the similarity between six and half a dozen. They represent or captures the same thematic categories.

The lower the correlation, the more distinct the factors are. To understand the patterns, the study looked at how the participants sorted the statements and using a normalised weighted factor score (z-score). Each statement item is examined on how they loaded on each factor. The statements are ranked in descending other using these scores. Those with the highest and the lowest scores are extracted because they provide sharp overviews of the participants. The highest score (+4, +3 and -3, -4) reveals the approximation of what the participants highly agree upon and what they disagree upon.

In addition, the ranked items are investigated for statements with nearly similar scores which are grouped as consensus statements while the distinguished statements are those with distinctly varied factor scores (z-scores). All these exercises guide the interpretation process for the two studies. The next stage of the study is factor interpretations of the two Q-studies. The first part is focused on the Lagos Ebola Q-Study interpretation of the different configurations of sort patterns of the participants; the second part contains the factor interpretation of the Lagos Floods Study.

6.4 Q-Result and Factor Interpretation (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

6.4.1 Consensus across Factors/Perspectives (Consensus Statements)

Consensus in perspectives is derived from the minimal z-score differences between sorted statements by the participant. These are illustrative of shared viewpoints among the participants. Table 6.13 below contains the statements and their z-scores; the highlighted statements in the table are the consensus statements with high similarity scores. In this table, item 5; that is, Statement SE-21 rated 3 in Factors 1, 2 and 4; but 3 in Factor 2; it is obvious that the participants agreed strongly with this statement holistically. The respondents lightly disagreed with the view that *SE-22: Social media engagements between the citizens and the government were not iterative* (SE-22: -1, -1, -2, -1).

Although the disagreement was across all factors, nonetheless, the level of disagreement is weak. -1 edged close to neutrality (0). Participants probably believe that there were no strong engagements between the government and the citizens in the Lagos 2014 Ebola epidemic. They might not believe that there was no iterative engagement at all. The 'iterative-ness' might be weak rather than non-existence. Lastly, the participants expressed positive consensus disagreement across the factors on item *SE-27:*

> *Lagos has a large population of online activists, digital hubs and social influencers thereby encouraging active participatory citizenship who are politically aware* (SE-31: +2, +2, +1, +1).

Just like the previous example, participants recognised the roles played by big data technologies access and proficiency during the Lagos Ebola epidemic of 2014; however, the weak ratings could be because the respondents were not too sure if this access and proficiency translated to significant participatory citizenship or active political engagements.

Table 6.13: Extracted Consensus Statements (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

		Factor 1		Factor 2		Factor 3		Factor 4	
#	Statement	Q-SV	Z-score	Q-SV	Z-score	Q-SV	Z-score	Q-SV	Z-score
21	SE-21: Deployment of an active dedicated website with a live-chat messaging system (Post-outbreak) for educating the public helped control the spread of the virus.*	3	1.596	3	1.114	2	1.289	3	1.381
22	SE-22: Social media engagements between the citizens and the government were not iterative.*	-1	-0.697	-1	-0.229	-2	-0.786	-1	-0.395
27	SE-27: Lagos has a large population of online activists, digital hubs and social influencers thereby encouraging active participatory citizenship who are politically aware.*	2	0.854	2	0.62	1	0.547	1	0.385

Note: Q-SV = Q-sort value. Consensus *Statements - Those that do not distinguish between ANY pair of Factors. All listed Statements are non-significant at p > 0.01, and those flagged with an asterisk * are also non-Significant at p > 0.05.*

In summary, the respondents expressed consensus in the sorting pattern on 4 statements across the different factor arrays or clusters. They agreed that shared and collaborative decision-making between the different government arms contributed to the effectiveness of the outcome. In addition, they disagreed collectively with the opinion that SMS trumped other technology platforms. They also collectively contested the statement that digital technologies and big data did not contribute to effective security-leadership decision-making outcomes during the Ebola outbreak.

They were neutral on the absence of baseline data, accessible geographic maps and how they impacted the disaster leadership response. The next sections discuss the differences in perspectives starting with the variations across factors using the descending array of differences tables. These tables summarise the differences in perspectives by showing how respondents agree or disagree on statements across multiple factors. Next, the presentation of the distinguishing statements as well as the interpretation of factors or perspectives.

6.4.2 Differences between Factors/Perspectives (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

Before examining the distinguishing statements across the factors, I examined the differences between the factors using the differences in their z-scores. The descending array of differences table shows the ranking of statements on any of the factors using their standardized factor scores (z-scores). As stated earlier, the z-score helps to identify how (on average) each respondent sorted the statements on each factor loading. The higher the differences in z-scores between factors on each item loading,

the greater their differences. The final scores are arranged in descending order. Only statement rows where one factor (column) is positive and the other negative is retained. Where the statement factors are either jointly positive or negative, they are dropped from the extracted tables.

An abstraction of the array of Differences between Factor1 and Factor 2 is presented in Table 6.14 below (see Appendix 18 for the full table). In this instance, Factor 1 and Factor 2 differ on the issues of *leadership and conversation styles, media and digital technologies access and affordability*. Respondents in Factor 2 disagree with item SE-28 which suggests that the distributed leadership demonstrated by the feedback loops of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance system (IDSS) encouraged local leadership among government actors across the different levels of government with non-rigid central coordination. Factor 1 scores positively (strong agreement) on this item (z-score=2.105) as against Factor 2 (z-score=-0.776) with a difference of 2.881 (z-score) between the two factors.

Table 6.14: Descending Array of Differences between Factor 1 and Factor 2 (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

#	Statement	Factor 1	Factor 2	Difference
28	SE-28: The feedback loops of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance system permit local leadership among government actors across the different levels of government with non-rigid central coordination - this contributed to the containment of the disease.	2.105	-0.776	2.881
23	SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.	0.293	-1.361	1.654
32	SE-32: The electronic data collection and alert system reduced the turnaround time between identification of symptomatic contacts and evacuation to the isolation facility from between 3 to 6 hours to an hour.	0.602	-0.632	1.234
...		...	...	...
4	SE-4: The government collaborated more with foreign NGOs and international institutions rather than local NGOs and CSOs.	-0.68	0.452	-1.132
2	SE-2: Federal, State and Local government health parastatals rarely cooperated in crisis communication online during the outbreak.	-1.363	0.607	-1.97
19	SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.	-0.592	1.442	-2.034
20	SE-20: Nigeria's economic middle class are predominantly in Lagos and they have high digital literacy and high digital accessibility which eventually contribute to the successful stemming of the disease spread.	-0.598	1.507	-2.105

The average Q-sort of +4 for Factor 1 and -2 for Factor 2 further highlights this difference. While respondents in Factor 1 rated the statement +4 (strong agreement),

respondents in Factor disagreed with the statement (-2). However, the nature of the disagreement needs further investigation because -2 is not too strong a disagreement. The comments of respondents who loaded on this Factor should provide more insights. Factor 1 has respondents who believe that there was weak distributed conversation, especially on social media during the disaster event (SE-23) alongside those who positively rated the intervention of the electronic data collection system (SE-32). Factors 2 has respondents who negated this assumption.

Factor 2 (z-score = 1.507) affirms that Lagos' position as the economic and news media capital of Nigeria contributed to its high digital literacy and accessibility rate. A factor that consequently impacted positively on its response to Ebola disease management (SE-19, and SE-20). Respondents in Factor 1 (z-score = -0.598) contest this position with a factor difference score of -2.104. Factor 2 (z-score = 0.607) stipulates that there were low online communication collaborations between government actors (intra-governmental distributed conversation) (SE-2). Whereas Factor 1 (z-score = -0.636) has respondents who had a contrary opinion with a Factor difference z-score of -1.197.

Also disputed is the issue of collaboration. Respondents in Factor 2 agree that some form of collaboration existed between the government and foreign NGOs more than with local NGOs during the Lagos Ebola epidemic (SE-4); Factor 1 has respondents who refuted this claim.

Factor 1 and 3 are particularly different on the issues of *distributed leadership and conversation, data and infrastructural quality, resource availability and manpower proficiency*. On distributed leadership, Factor 1 respondents believe that private sector stakeholders such as health providers, and academics were not included in the security-leadership decision-making process. They were also exempted from accessing digital technologies and data systems (SE-29), respondents in Factor 3 disagree with this opinion.

Respondents under Factor 1 and 4 are divided on early warning, *distributed leadership and inclusion, media and digital technologies access, distributed conversation, and resource availability*. Respondents who loaded on Factor 4 support the idea that there exists a negligible connection between the communication/conversation graphs. They believe that the few engagement communications were led by individuals with little crisis communication collaborations (SE-23). Those in Factor 1 opposed this submission. See the tables

below for more information on the other viewpoints' disagreements. That is, the Tables of Descending Arrays of Differences between Factors 1 and 3, 1 and 4, 2 and 3 and Factors 3 and 4 as presented in Table 6.15 and Table 6.17. See Appendices 19, 20, 21 and 22 for full presentations of these arrays. They also provide insights into how respondents differ on these perspectives.

Table 6.15: Descending Array of Differences between Factor 1 and Factor 3 (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

#	Statement	Factor 1	Factor 3	Difference
15	SE-15: A lack of interoperability between the numerous data systems used to manage data before and during the response also contributed to the unclear and asynchronous data picture.	1.587	-1.277	2.864
29	SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).	0.898	-1.398	2.296
23	SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.	0.293	-1.454	1.747
13	SE-13: The predominance of non-machine-readable (mostly paper-based) epidemiological data restricted critical response.	0.536	-1.064	1.6
…		…	…	…
9	SE-9: Efforts of Contact tracers using digital forms and data inputting contributed immensely to rapid disaster response and effective leadership outcomes.	-0.247	1.006	-1.253
20	SE-20: Nigeria's economic middle class are predominantly in Lagos and they have high digital literacy and high digital accessibility which eventually contribute to the successful stemming of the disease spread.	-0.598	0.86	-1.458
17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.	-1.057	1.514	-2.571

Table 6.16: Descending Array of Differences between Factor 1 and Factor 4 (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

#	Statement	Factor 1	Factor 4	Difference
16	SE-16: The effective security leadership demonstrated is attributable mainly to the Lagos government's early adoption of digital technologies.	1.72	-0.504	2.224
29	SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).	0.898	-0.307	1.205
…		…	…	…
20	SE-20: Nigeria's economic middle class are predominantly in Lagos and they have high digital literacy and high digital accessibility which eventually contribute to the successful stemming of the disease spread.	-0.598	0.712	-1.31
19	SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.	-0.592	0.78	-1.372
17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.	-1.057	0.357	-1.414
23	SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.	0.293	2.007	-1.714

Table 6.17: Descending Array of Differences between Factor 2 and Factor 3 (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

#	Statement	Factor 2	Factor 3	Difference
18	SE-18: Lagos has the highest number of active voice and internet subscribers in Nigeria thereby contributing to active social media engagements during the epidemic.	1.563	-0.458	2.021
29	SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).	0.209	-1.398	1.607
13	SE-13: The predominance of non-machine-readable (mostly paper-based) epidemiological data restricted critical response.	0.465	-1.064	1.529
34	SE-34: There was a poor digital early warning system, most of the disaster response operations were paper-based before the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak.	0.605	-0.916	1.521
…		…	…	…
9	SE-9: Efforts of Contact tracers using digital forms and data inputting contributed immensely to rapid disaster response and effective leadership outcomes.	-0.528	1.006	-1.534
17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.	-0.3	1.514	-1.814
7	SE-7: The local (Lagos State) Emergency Operation Center contributed to better coordination and rapid and effective response.	-0.15	1.666	-1.816
28	SE-28: The feedback loops of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance system permit local leadership among government actors across the different levels of government with non-rigid central coordination - this contributed to the containment of the disease.	-0.776	2.199	-2.975

Table 6.18: Descending Array of Differences between Factor 3 and Factor 4 (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

#	Statement	Factor 3	Factor 4	Difference
9	SE-9: Efforts of Contact tracers using digital forms and data inputting contributed immensely to rapid disaster response and effective leadership outcomes.	1.006	-0.931	1.937
16	SE-16: The effective security leadership demonstrated is attributable mainly to the Lagos government's early adoption of digital technologies.	1.358	-0.504	1.862
11	SE-11: Previous data response experience with Polio (e.g., HealthMap App) pre-trained/prepared responders for Ebola.	0.684	-0.34	1.024
…		…	…	…
15	SE-15: A lack of interoperability between the numerous data systems used to manage data before and during the response also contributed to the unclear and asynchronous data picture.	-1.277	0.01	-1.287
18	SE-18: Lagos has the highest number of active voice and internet subscribers in Nigeria thereby contributing to active social media engagements during the epidemic.	-0.458	0.912	-1.37
13	SE-13: The predominance of non-machine-readable (mostly paper-based) epidemiological data restricted critical response.	-1.064	0.763	-1.827
23	SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.	-1.454	2.007	-3.461

The next stage is essentially about the main purpose of the methodological approach – the science of identifying distinct viewpoints by the different respondents. The consensus viewpoints have been presented earlier on: these are views shared across the varied factors by the respondents. Since Q-Methodology is about abducting

viewpoints from different sorting patterns, the atomistic behaviour of other purely quantitative approaches must be avoided. Scholars have advocated a narrative form of interpretation to avoid this reductionism. Watts and Stenner proposed a 'crib sheet' method for guiding the narrative interpretation of the Q-Results as a way of guaranteeing a more holistic rather than atomistic interpretation approach.[394] To this end, the qualitative comments (of significantly loading participants) regarding the most agreed or disagreed statements are included in the analysis process.

6.4.3 Distinguishing Statements (Stakeholders' Perspectives) Explained

Distinguishing statements are defining characteristics that distinctively identify a factor from the rest. It is a measure of uniqueness derived from the positionality of the statements within the factor arrays. According to Wint,

> "The distinguishing statements are particularly of interest as they show which statements within an array have been placed in a significantly ($p<0.01$ and $p<0.05$) different place to the other factors and thus demonstrate how the factor is unique."[395]

Table 6.20 below contains the distinguishing statements for Factor 1. Distinguishing statements also help in the interpretation of the viewpoints alongside the most ranked statements across both sides of the continuum. It is crucial to know the shared viewpoints as well as the distinct viewpoints.

6.4.4 Factor 1 Interpretation and Viewpoints (Q-Study 1): Distributed Leadership and Big Data Technologies Adoption (n=7)

Seven (7) participants significantly onto this factor with an eigenvalue of 10.8305 explain 13% of the variance. These participants or respondents loaded at ±0.42 to reach statistical significance at $p<0.01$. The participants' demographic distribution ranges from Governmental, Security and Paramilitary personnel, and the Media. Two

[394] Watts & Stenner, (2012), p. 153.
[395] Wint, F.E. (2013). *'Am I bothered?' - Using Q Methodology to Explore What Bothers Young People on Facebook*. Unpublished DEdCPsy Thesis, University of Sheffield, United Kingdom.

(2) Females and Five (5) Males across different leadership levels (See Table 6.19 below).

Table 6.19: Factor 1 Demographic Distribution (Q-Study 1)

Factor 1 Demographic Distribution (Q-Study 1)			
Participant	**Sex**	**Category**	**Leadership Level**
E2	Male	Security/Paramilitary	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
E3	Female	Governmental	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
E14	Male	Governmental	Senior Leadership/Management
E10	Male	Media	Senior Leadership/Management
E7	Male	Governmental	Senior Leadership/Management
E15	Female	Governmental	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
E32	Male	Governmental	Mid-Level Leadership/Management

The most significantly relevant issues for this perspective (See Table 6.20 below) are SE-28: +4 and SE-16: +4. Participants agreed that the distributed leadership framework of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance System enabled local leadership which further contributed to the containment of the spread of the Ebola disease in Lagos Nigeria (SE-28). Also, rated significantly high is the issue of the early adoption of digital technologies in the management of diseases by the Lagos stage Government (SE-16). Both conditions were ascribed to the effective leadership decision-making process in stemming the spread of the disease in Lagos.

Table 6.20: Factor interpretation crib sheet for Factor 1 (Relative Ranking of Statements in Factor 1) - Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1)

#	**Highest Ranked Statements**	**Factor 1**	**Consensus/ Distinguishing**	**Factor 2**	**Factor 3**	**Factor 4**
28	SE-28: The feedback loops of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance system permit local leadership among government actors across the different levels of government with non-rigid central coordination - this contributed to the containment of the disease.	4		-2	4	3
16	SE-16: The effective security leadership demonstrated is attributable mainly to the Lagos government's early adoption of digital technologies.	4		0	3	-1
	Positive Statements Ranked Higher in factor 1 Array than in Other Factor Arrays					
21	SE-21: Deployment of an active dedicated website with a live-chat messaging system (Post-outbreak) for educating the public helped control the spread of the virus.	3	C*	3	2	3
15	SE-15: A lack of interoperability between the numerous data systems used to manage data before and during the response also contributed to the unclear and asynchronous data picture.	3	D**	0	-3	0

29	SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).	2	D*	0	-3	-1
27	SE-27: Lagos has a large population of online activists, digital hubs and social influencers thereby encouraging active participatory citizenship who are politically aware.	2	C*	2	1	1
32	SE-32: The electronic data collection and alert system reduced the turnaround time between identification of symptomatic contacts and evacuation to the isolation facility from between 3 to 6 hours to an hour.	1		-1	0	1
12	SE-12: An absence of baseline data, including commonly-used unique citizen identifiers and comprehensive and accessible geographic maps was a huge challenge during the outbreak response.	1		0	-1	0
14	SE-14: Poor mobile and internet connectivity limited information flow during the outbreak response.	0	D*	-2	-4	-3
	Negative Statements Ranked Lower in factor 1 Array than in Other Factor Arrays					
26	SE-26: The leading Apps were written in English including the website thereby cutting off the vast majority of the population who are illiterates from accessing real-time information on the disease.	0		2	0	2
7	SE-7: The local (Lagos State) Emergency Operation Center contributed to better coordination and rapid and effective response.	0		0	4	1
30	SE-30: The Open Data Kit/Form Hub technology were used in combination with the Dashboard technology and ArcGIS mapping for follow up of contacts, identification of cases, case investigation and management and also for strategic planning during the response.	0		1	1	0
19	SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.	-1	D**	3	1	2
20	SE-20: Nigeria's economic middle class are predominantly in Lagos and they have high digital literacy and high digital accessibility which eventually contribute to the successful stemming of the disease spread.	-1	D**	3	2	1
33	SE-33: The deployment of mobile technology and improved and speed up daily reporting of contact follow up before 5 pm.	-2	D*	0	1	0
1	SE-1: Information was disseminated vertically (top-down) via traditional legacy media and social media.	-2		-2	0	-2
17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.	-2	D**	-1	3	0
2	SE-2: Federal, State and Local government health parastatals rarely cooperated in	-3	D**	1	-1	-1

	crisis communication online during the outbreak.					
	Lowest Ranked Statements					
24	SE-24: The incidence response and general leadership were not adaptive, rather pre-set, hence fitting for structured disasters like Ebola.	-4		-2	0	0
5	SE-5: SMS helped reach more citizens than the other digital technology platforms.	-4		-3	0	-4

Note: Note: a single asterisk (*) indicates distinguished statement significance at P<0.05; double asterisks (**) indicates distinguished statement significance at P<0.01).

All the 7 participants who loaded on to this factor rated these two statements positively. The respondents or participants E2, E14, E15, E32 all strongly agreed with Statement SE-28 with a sort value of +4. They all work for the government as civil servants or security/paramilitary officers. Statement item 16 (SE-16) was also strongly rated positively by participants who loaded significantly on Factor 1 (E2: +3, E10: +3, E7: +4 and E15: +3) and they hold mid-level to senior leadership/management positions in the security/paramilitary, media, non/inter-governmental, and governmental sectors. This pattern suggests a spread of similar opinions across different sectors unlike the first opinion held by people associated with government institutions. The comments further buttress the point:

> *Lagos is the tech hub of Nigeria. When Facebook Zuckerberg and Twitter Dorsey visited Nigeria, they moved around Lagos. Lagos State government have always been at the vanguard of digital technologies adoption in line with the progressive spirit of Lagos. This early adoption prepared Lagos for Ebola. Hence, when it touched down, Lagos was prepared* (+4); *(*E14, Male, Senior Leadership, Governmental).

According to Participant 7 (E7, Male, Non/Inter-Governmental):

> *The Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response strategy of Nigeria most likely influence the decision-making and local leadership initiative of the government. This encouraged good disease surveillance, notification, and response without too many bureaucratic bottlenecks* (+4).

Statement item SE-5 is the lowest-ranked statement in Factor 1 by the significantly loaded participants E3: -4, E7: -3, and E15: -4. They were all governmental stakeholders. All the 7 participants disagreed with the suggestion that SMS was more effective than other digital technologies. For participant E3 (Female, Governmental and Mid-Level Leadership/Management):

> *We used SMS for contact tracing no doubt. The different electronic platforms used by both the Lagos and Federal government such as the*

EbolaAlert website also contributed immensely to disaster information management during the outbreak (-4).

The other strongly contested position concerns the nature of non-adaptive leadership of structured disasters such as Ebola since its epidemiology is linked to contact transmission (SE-24). This makes its spread traceable and relatively manageable without requiring complex decision-making systems as well as multiple leadership whose intervention may curtail the effective management of the disease. Participants in Factor 1 disputed this assumption. They are united in their affirmation of roles of distributed leadership in the 2014 Lagos Ebola epidemic outbreak management. On this issue, participant E7 Female, Governmental and Senior Leadership/Management) commented: *Different management people contributed to the response and management. The leadership was responsive and innovative* (-3).

There are several defining characteristics of this factor which are included in both the table of distinguishing statements (see Table 6.20 above) and the Factor interpretation crib sheet. They are distinguished at a significant value of $p<0.05$ (indicated with a single asterisk) and at $p<0.01$ with double asterisks. These values are determined by their z-score and factor q-sort value. In the Factor interpretation crib sheet in Table 6.21, the distinguished statements are tagged with the letter D. A careful observation shows that these statements are usually within the rows of positive or negative statements higher or lower in Factor 1 array than in other factor arrays. This attribute makes them unique and distinguished. Take, for instance, SE-29 and SE-2 – both items are the highest and lowest in their arrays, respectively.

The distinguishing opinions in Factor 1 are the challenge of data access (interoperability), limited data access especially to those outside of government (academics, private organisations) and poor mobile and internet connectivity (SE-15**: +3, SE-26*: +2, and SE-14*: 0) (See Table 6.21 below). The respondents positively sorted these statements more than the other factor arrays but in the case of SE-14, the sort is neutral on the main rather than positive and the other factors rated this statement as negative.

Table 6.21: Distinguishing Statements for Factor 1 (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

		Factor 1		Factor 2		Factor 3		Factor 4	
#	Statement	Q-SV	Z-score	Q-SV	Z-score	Q-SV	Z-score	Q-SV	Z-score
15	SE-15: A lack of interoperability between the numerous data systems used to manage data before and during the response also contributed	3**	1.59	0	0.07	-3	-1.277	0	0.01

	to the unclear and asynchronous data picture.								
29	SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).	2*	0.9	0	0.209	-3	-1.398	-1	-0.307
23	SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.	1**	0.29	-3	-1.361	-4	-1.454	4	2.007
14	SE-14: Poor mobile and internet connectivity limited information flow during the outbreak response.	0*	0	-2	-0.684	-4	-1.54	-3	-1.087
19	SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.	-1**	-0.59	3	1.442	1	0.194	2	0.78
20	SE-20: Nigeria's economic middle class are predominantly in Lagos and they have high digital literacy and high digital accessibility which eventually contribute to the successful stemming of the disease spread.	-1**	-0.6	3	1.507	2	0.86	1	0.712
33	SE-33: The deployment of mobile technology and improved and speed up daily reporting of contact follow up before 5 pm.	-2*	-0.74	0	-0.109	1	0.512	0	0.065
17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.	-2**	-1.06	-1	-0.3	3	1.514	0	0.357
2	SE-2: Federal, State and Local government health parastatals rarely cooperated in crisis communication online during the outbreak.	-3**	-1.36	1	0.607	-1	-0.618	-1	-0.566

Note: a single asterisk (*) indicates distinguished statement significance at P<0.05; double asterisks (**) indicates distinguished statement significance at P<0.01). Both the Factor Q-Sort Value (Q-SV) and the Z-Score (Z-SCR) are shown.

It, therefore, appears that respondents in factor 1 opposed this view than supported it – that is, they disagreed with the proposition. The participants sorts for statement SE-14 [E2: -2, E3: -2, E14: +2, E10: +2, E7: +1, E15: +1, E32: -2] shows an undecided pattern, because 3 of them ranked the statement barely negatively (-2). While 4 participants ranked it barely positively (+2 and +1). A +1 or -1 sort is closer to 0 (neutral). See Appendix 23 (Factor Scores for Factor 1 (Raw Sorts) - Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1)) for an expanded version of the Raw sorts by the participants.

Other distinguishing statements are SE-19**, SE-20**, SE-33*, SE-17**, SE-2**, they are all in the category of negative ranked statements lower in Factor 1 array than in the other Factor arrays. They are distinct in that regard. They disagreed with the proposition that the different arms of government rarely cooperated in online

crisis communication during the Ebola epidemic in Lagos Nigeria (SE-2: -3). This scenario is particularly interesting because it appears on the surface to suggest a wide recognition of distributed conversation but upon closer look at the factor arrays of participants on this statement. There was wide recognition of interagency crisis communication cooperation among government agencies across the three different arms of government in Nigeria. They include the federal, state and local governments. This attribute is almost non-existent outside of these governmental actors. This is observation is further buttressed by participant E10: -4 (Media, Male, Senior Leadership/Management):

> *The government gave out press releases and reacted to situations as they arose. This strongly showed in their communication strategy which seemed to have precluded engagements with publishers of independent media and other groups outside of government circles.*

This is further supported by this participant's sorting of Statement item SE-1 "Information was disseminated vertically (top-down) via traditional legacy media and social media.'" (E10: -3). He strongly disagreed with the proposition that there was no connected or outright lack of cooperation in information dissemination. This sort is consistent with his position in statement SE-2. Nearly all the other respondents who loaded onto this factor agreed with him that there was cooperation across the arms of government. Nevertheless, he provided more than cursory insight into this sorting. He opines that the cooperation in crisis communication was managed and led majorly within government circles without evidence of interfacing and engagements with independent media and other private individual actors.

Participants also disagreed with the supposition that the headquarters of the media houses and the availability of resources (material and infrastructural) contributed to the effective security-leadership decision-making interventions during the Ebola epidemic. Also contended is the assumption that the economic middle class are predominant in Lagos hence their ability to access digital technologies and afford the cost. All these other disagreements are mild (SE-19: -1, SE-20: -1, SE-17: -2); nevertheless, they are disagreements. Figure 6.6 below is a visual illustration of the Q-sorts or composite Q-sorts of statements by participants or respondents who significantly loaded in Factor 1.



Figure 6.6: Composite Q-sort for Factor 1 (Lagos Ebola (Q-Study 1))

Summary: Participants under this factor agreed that there was distributed leadership. A level of distributed conversation was noted by the participants in the leadership process during the Lagos Ebola epidemic outbreak in 2014. They strongly recognised the role of big data technologies in the disaster leadership process involving the 2014 Ebola epidemic in Lagos, Nigeria. However, they identified a poor data system which led to limited interoperability as a setback to the leadership process. Other concerns include the lack of data access to non-governmental actors and limited poor mobile and internet access which confined active citizens' digital engagements. There was the early adoption of digital technologies by the Lagos government due to past experiences with Polio management, but this is not evidence of a strong early warning system for all disaster incidences.

6.4.5 Factor 2 Interpretation and Viewpoints (Q-Study 1): Information Quality and Digital Technologies Access and Positionality (n=6)

Factor 2 has an eigenvalue of 2.1928 which explains 6% of the variance. Six (6) participants significantly loaded onto this factor at ±0.42 to reach statistical significance at $p<0.01$. Of these 6 participants, two were government officials in senior and mid-level management/leadership positions, two were senior leadership/management executives in the media. One was a junior leadership/management staff of a non/inter-governmental organisation; another one was a mid-level leadership/management technical/research staff (academic). Only one of the participants is female. Table 6.22 below contains the demographic distribution table.

Table 6.22: Factor 2 Demographic Distribution (Q-Study 1)

Factor 2 Demographic Distribution			
Participant	**Sex**	**Category**	**Leadership Level**
E19	Male	Governmental	Senior Leadership/Management
E25	Male	Media	Senior Leadership/Management
E18	Female	Non/Inter-Governmental	Junior Leadership/Management
E21	Male	Governmental	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
E27	Male	Technical/Research	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
E23	Male	Media	Senior Leadership/Management

Consult Appendix 24 for an expanded table of the factor scores of Factor 2 raw sorts for the Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1). As presented in Table 6.23 below (Factor interpretation crib sheet for Factor 2), the statements which the participants as a cluster strongly agreed with are (SE-6: +4) and (SE-18: +4). That is, "Rumours and misinformation about the virus were controlled through the near-instant provision of quality information (SE-6: +4)" and "Lagos has the highest number of active voice and internet subscribers in Nigeria thereby contributing to active social media engagements during the epidemic" (SE-18: +4). Individually the respondents ranked the statements thus: [SE-6 (E19: +4, E25: +4, E18: +3, E21: +3, E27: +3, E23: -1)] and [SE-18 (E19: +4, E25: +3, E18: 0, E21: +1, E27: +4, E23: +1)].

Table 6.23: Factor interpretation crib sheet for Factor 2 (Relative Ranking of Statements in Factor 2) - Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1)

#	Highest Ranked Statements	Factor 2	Consensus/ Distinguishing	Factor 1	Factor 3	Factor 4
6	SE-6: Rumours and misinformation about the virus were controlled through the near-instant provision of quality information.	4	D*	3	2	1
18	SE-18: Lagos has the highest number of active voice and internet subscribers in Nigeria thereby contributing to active social media engagements during the epidemic.	4	D*	2	-1	3
	Positive Statements Ranked Higher in factor 2 Array than in Other Factor Arrays					
20	SE-20: Nigeria's economic middle class are predominantly in Lagos and they have high digital literacy and high digital accessibility which eventually contribute to the successful stemming of the disease spread.	3	D*	-1	2	1
19	SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.	3	D*	-1	1	2
21	SE-21: Deployment of an active dedicated website with a live-chat messaging system (Post-outbreak) for educating the public helped control the spread of the virus.	3	C**	3	2	3
26	SE-26: The leading Apps were written in English including the website thereby cutting off the vast majority of the population who are illiterates from accessing real-time information on the disease.	2		0	0	2
11	SE-11: Previous data response experience with Polio (e.g., HealthMap App) pre-trained/prepared responders for Ebola.	2		1	1	-1
27	SE-27: Lagos has a large population of online activists, digital hubs and social influencers thereby encouraging active participatory citizenship who are politically aware.	2	C**	2	1	1
2	SE-2: Federal, State and Local government health parastatals rarely cooperated in crisis communication online during the outbreak.	1	D**	-3	-1	-1
34	SE-34: There was a poor digital early warning system, most of the disaster response operations were paper-based before the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak.	1		0	-2	0
30	SE-30: The Open Data Kit/Form Hub technology were used in combination with the Dashboard technology and ArcGIS mapping for follow up of contacts, identification of cases, case investigation and management and also for strategic planning during the response.	1		0	1	0
4	SE-4: The government collaborated more with foreign NGOs and international institutions rather than local NGOs and CSOs.	1	D**	-1	-2	-2
35	SE-35: There were infrastructural data inadequacies and low manpower (epidemiological big data analysts) which threatened the success of the operation.	0	D**	-1	-3	-2
	Negative Statements Ranked Lower in factor 2 Array than in Other Factor Arrays					
7	SE-7: The local (Lagos State) Emergency Operation Center contributed to better	0		0	4	1

	coordination and rapid and effective response.					
25	SE-25: In-house Big Data analytics and Machine Learning skills capabilities were lacking.	-1		0	0	2
32	SE-32: The electronic data collection and alert system reduced the turnaround time between identification of symptomatic contacts and evacuation to the isolation facility from between 3 to 6 hours to an hour.	-1		1	0	1
28	SE-28: The feedback loops of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance system permit local leadership among government actors across the different levels of government with non-rigid central coordination - this contributed to the containment of the disease.	-2	D*	4	4	3
1	SE-1: Information was disseminated vertically (top-down) via traditional legacy media and social media.	-2		-2	0	-2
10	SE-10: FG approved jingles to be produced in various languages produced for Nigerian Centre for Disease Control to be aired on Radio, TV and newspaper superseded other digital tech outlets.	-3		-2	-1	-3
	Lowest Ranked Statements					
31	SE-31: Digital technologies and Big data did not have any significant impact on effective security leadership decision-making during the Ebola outbreak.	-4		-3	0	-4
3	SE-3: Outdated news was recycled through different platforms using the same format.	-4	D	-3	-1	-3

Note: Note: a single asterisk (*) indicates distinguished statement significance at $p<0.05$; double asterisks (**) indicates distinguished statement significance at $p<0.01$).

These show that the respondents strongly believe that quality information helped stemmed the tide of misinformation, and they also affirm the uniqueness of Lagos as the state with the highest teledensity and the largest concentration of internet subscriptions which contributed to increased social media engagements. Although this other feature does not suggest overtly strong distributed conversation across the governmental and private citizens divide, it, however, highlights the active engagements of citizens as non-governmental actors in the conversation. For example, participant E18 (Female, Non/Inter-Governmental organisation, Junior Leadership/Management) commented that:

> *Lag*os *has large internet users but discussions on the Ebola epidemic were largely held among citizens. There was no serious cooperation between citizens and government personnel on the internet. The government social media accounts and pages were nothing but electronic extensions of bulletin boards where updates were passed down to the people top-down.*

This mild position was held also by participants E21 (Mid-Level Leadership/Management, Governmental) and E23 (Mid-Level

Leadership/Management, Media) who ranked the statement similarly. In the comments of E21, Lagos has '*too many independent voices with little engagements with the government*'. E23 on the other hand is concerned with the role of voice (telephony) on social engagement during the Ebola epidemic of 2014 in Lagos, in his opinion:

> *Social media as a big data technology came in handy during the epidemic,* but phone connections were *very bad, especially given the fact that not many Lagosians or Nigerians even know the hotlines of the emergency agencies. Some even complained about our platforms that these numbers don't connect when called. I doubt the roles played by telephony during the epidemic.*

Participants strongly disagreed as a group with the statements: "Digital technologies and Big data did not have any significant impact on effective security-leadership decision-making during the Ebola outbreak" (SE-31: -4) and "Outdated news was recycled through different platforms using the same format" (SE-3: -4). A granular look at the comments revealed some caveats particularly in statement item 3 (SE-3). Participants E18, E27 and E23 rated this statement -2 which is a disagreement but not a strong disagreement. Although the agreements of the group in Factor 2 comes to -4; a careful examination of the individual raw sorts could help give deeper insights. All the participants are non-governmental (NGO, academic and media) staff. According to E27: T*he news was not outdated because they were released at regular intervals, but the information was reactive rather than proactive.*

Participant E23 recognised the vibrancy of the news but pointed out that the formats were not optimised for different media platforms –

> *There were cases where a ministry uploaded signed press releases directly to Twitter and Facebook. A social media version of these announcements could have served well rather than burdening the people with wordy, lengthy press releases in JPEG format which are difficult to read and which cost the citizens a lot of bandwidth.*

The distinguished statements for this Factor 2 are listed in Table 6.24 below. Three of these statements have been discussed already SE-6*, SE-18* and SE-3. The other 2 deal with the position and location of Lagos as the economic capital of the country with a beaming middle-class who could afford internet and digital access for active engagements online (SE-20: +3). In addition, the location of Lagos is the headquarters of most online news organisations (SE-19: +3). All these factors are believed by

participants in Factor 2 to have impacted the effectiveness of security-leadership decisions and response during the 2014 Ebola epidemic in Lagos, Nigeria.

Table 6.24: Distinguishing Statements for Factor 2 (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

		Factor 1		Factor 2		Factor 3		Factor 4	
#	Statement	Q-SV	Z-score	Q-SV	Z-score	Q-SV	Z-score	Q-SV	Z-score
6	SE-6: Rumours and misinformation about the virus were controlled through the near-instant provision of quality information.	3	1.16	4	1.83*	2	0.795	1	0.646
18	SE-18: Lagos has the highest number of active voice and internet subscribers in Nigeria thereby contributing to active social media engagements during the epidemic.	2	0.77	4	1.56*	-1	-0.458	3	0.912
20	SE-20: Nigeria's economic middle class are predominantly in Lagos and they have high digital literacy and high digital accessibility which eventually contribute to the successful stemming of the disease spread.	-1	-0.6	3	1.51*	2	0.86	1	0.712
19	SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.	-1	-0.59	3	1.44*	1	0.194	2	0.78
2	SE-2: Federal, State and Local government health parastatals rarely cooperated in crisis communication online during the outbreak.	-3	-1.36	1	0.61**	-1	-0.618	-1	-0.566
4	SE-4: The government collaborated more with foreign NGOs and international institutions rather than local NGOs and CSOs.	-1	-0.68	1	0.45**	-2	-0.792	-2	-0.765
35	SE-35: There were infrastructural data inadequacies and low manpower (epidemiological big data analysts) which threatened the success of the operation.	-1	-0.47	0	0.25**	-3	-1.268	-2	-0.723
16	SE-16: The effective security leadership demonstrated is attributable mainly to the Lagos government's early adoption of digital technologies.	4	1.72	0	0.17*	3	1.358	-1	-0.504
17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.	-2	-1.06	-1	-0.3*	3	1.514	0	0.357
28	SE-28: The feedback loops of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance system permit local leadership among government actors across the different levels of government with non-rigid central coordination - this contributed to the containment of the disease.	4	2.11	-2	-0.78**	4	2.199	3	1.022
3	SE-3: Outdated news was recycled through different platforms using the same format.	-3	-1.24	-4	-1.88*	-1	-0.479	-3	-1.151

Note: a single asterisk (*) indicates distinguished statement significance at P<0.05; double asterisks (**) indicates distinguished statement significance at P<0.01). Both the Factor Q-Sort Value (Q-SV) and the Z-Score (Z-SCR) are shown.

Figure 6.7 below is a visual illustration of the Q-sorts or composite Q-sorts of statements by participants or respondents who significantly loaded in Factor 2.



Figure 6.7: Composite Q-sort for Factor 2 (Lagos Ebola (Q-Study 1))

Summary: Participants who ascribed significantly to factor 2 largely agree that positionality contextually impacted on security-leadership decision-making effectiveness during the 2014 Ebola crisis in Lagos. The status and location of Lagos in time and space concerning its economic, technological, and digital media presence determine its leadership behaviour during the epidemic. Another point presented by Factor 2 is quality information provision, access, and assurance.

6.4.6 Factor 3 Interpretation and Viewpoints (Q-Study 1): Strong Distributed Leadership, Active Distributed Conversation, Digital Infrastructure, and Data Availability Issues (n=5)

Factor 3 has an eigenvalue of 1.7495 which explains 5% of the variance. Five (5) participants significantly loaded onto this factor loaded at ±0.42 to reach statistical

significance at $p<0.01$. The demographic distribution of these participants as presented in Table 6.25 below is diverse across gender, occupations, and leadership/management statuses.

Table 6.25: Factor 3 Demographic Distribution (Q-Study 1)

Factor 3 Demographic Distribution			
Participant	**Sex**	**Category**	**Leadership Level**
E12	Female	Governmental	Senior Leadership/Management
E28	Male	Media	Senior Leadership/Management
E17	Male	Non/Inter-Governmental	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
E37	Male	Security/Paramilitary	Junior Leadership/Management
E24	Female	Media	Mid-Level Leadership/Management

The raw scores, interpretation crib sheet and visual representation of the sorting in Factor 3 are presented below. From the crib sheet for Factor 3 (see Table 6.26 below), the most positively valued statements by participants are SE-28: +4 and SE-7: +4. That is, distributed and devolved leadership across the different strata of government in Nigeria, permitting local leadership by governmental actors made possible by Nigeria's Disease Surveillance System (SE-28: +4). Equally strongly supported by the exemplars is the proposition that Lagos Emergency Operation Centre contributed to coordinated leadership at the state level and across the different local councils within the state – a mini-distributed leadership at a local scale (SE-7: +4). The strong agreement depicted by this Factor on the two items should not be taken as aggregation, a closer examination of the raw sorts by the individual participants in the Factor reveals more insights.

Table 6.26: Factor interpretation crib sheet for Factor 3 (Relative Ranking of Statements in Factor 3) - Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1)

#	**Highest Ranked Statements**	**Factor 3**	**Consensus/ Distinguishing**	**Factor 1**	**Factor 2**	**Factor 4**
28	SE-28: The feedback loops of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance system permit local leadership among government actors across the different levels of government with non-rigid central coordination - this contributed to the containment of the disease.	4		4	-2	3
7	SE-7: The local (Lagos State) Emergency Operation Center contributed to better coordination and rapid and effective response.	4	D**	0	0	1
	Positive Statements Ranked Higher in factor 3 Array than in Other Factor Arrays					

17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.	3	D**	-2	-1	0
9	SE-9: Efforts of Contact tracers using digital forms and data inputting contributed immensely to rapid disaster response and effective leadership outcomes.	2	D**	0	-1	-2
30	SE-30: The Open Data Kit/Form Hub technology were used in combination with the Dashboard technology and ArcGIS mapping for follow up of contacts, identification of cases, case investigation and management and also for strategic planning during the response.	1		0	1	0
33	SE-33: The deployment of mobile technology and improved and speed up daily reporting of contact follow up before 5 pm.	1		-2	0	0
1	SE-1: Information was disseminated vertically (top-down) via traditional legacy media and social media.	0	D**	-2	-2	-2
24	SE-24: The incidence response and general leadership were not adaptive, rather pre-set, hence fitting for structured disasters like Ebola.	0		-4	-2	0
5	SE-5: SMS helped reach more citizens than the other digital technology platforms.	0	D**	-4	-3	-4
31	SE-31: Digital technologies and Big data did not have any significant impact on effective security leadership decision-making during the Ebola outbreak.	0	D*	-3	-4	-4
	Negative Statements Ranked Lower in factor 3 Array than in Other Factor Arrays					
26	SE-26: The leading Apps were written in English including the website thereby cutting off the vast majority of the population who are illiterates from accessing real-time information on the disease.	0	D*	0	2	2
18	SE-18: Lagos has the highest number of active voice and internet subscribers in Nigeria thereby contributing to active social media engagements during the epidemic.	-1	D**	2	4	3
12	SE-12: An absence of baseline data, including commonly-used unique citizen identifiers and comprehensive and accessible geographic maps was a huge challenge during the outbreak response.	-1		1	0	0
22	SE-22: Social media engagements between the citizens and the government were not iterative.	-2	C**	-1	-1	-1
4	SE-4: The government collaborated more with foreign NGOs and international institutions rather than local NGOs and CSOs.	-2		-1	1	-2
34	SE-34: There was a poor digital early warning system, most of the disaster response operations were paper-based before the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak.	-2	D**	0	1	0
13	SE-13: The predominance of non-machine-readable (mostly paper-based) epidemiological data restricted critical response.	-2	D**	1	1	2
35	SE-35: There were infrastructural data inadequacies and low manpower (epidemiological big data analysts) which threatened the success of the operation.	-3	D*	-1	0	-2

15	SE-15: A lack of interoperability between the numerous data systems used to manage data before and during the response also contributed to the unclear and asynchronous data picture.	-3	D**	3	0	0
29	SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).	-3	D**	2	0	-1
	Lowest Ranked Statements					
23	SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.	-4		1	-3	4
14	SE-14: Poor mobile and internet connectivity limited information flow during the outbreak response.	-4		0	-2	-3

Note: a single asterisk (*) indicates distinguished statement significance at P<0.05; double asterisks (**) indicates distinguished statement significance at P<0.01).

For statement item S-28, only two participants ranked the item positively (E12: +4, Female, Governmental and Senior Leadership/Management; and E28: +4, Male, Media, Senior Leadership). It is not out of character or expectation for senior leadership of governmental agencies to have a positive outlook of their decision-making structure since they are the stakeholders and decision-making actors. On the other hand, the other three participants rated the statement item negatively (E17: -1, Male, Non/Inter-Governmental, Mid-Level Leadership/Management; E37: -2, Male, Security/Paramilitary, Junior Leadership/Management; and E24: -4, Female, Media, Mid-Level Leadership/Management). This ambivalence is common with Q-sorts. It suggests a highly contested perspective of an opinion. In this case, it is helpful to look at the comments of the dissenting sorters. Participant E24 (Female, Media) considered the framework of surveillance as helpful for disease management but she strongly objected to its relevance to distributed leadership as a whole. According to her, *the disease surveillance system is distributed within government circles but does not include active input from those outside of government.*

The most negatively rated statement items are SE-23: -4 and SE-14: -4. They disagreed with the notion that the conversation graphs were not interconnected suggesting that there were pockets of individual social media discussion spaces where individuals exercise dominant influence without interactions between the graphs. They also expressed strong disagreement with the idea that poor mobile and internet connectivity impede information flow during the outbreak response. On a granular

level, item SE-23 with relatively many negative ratings of the item by respondents or participants, item SE-14 is more ambivalent – only two respondents rated it negatively (E12: -1, Female, Governmental, Senior Leadership/Management and E28: -2, Male, Media, Senior Leadership/Management); even these rankings are not strongly negative. On the other hand, there are 3 other positive ratings of the item (E17: +4, E3: +3 and E24: +1). See Appendix 25 for the raw sorts of Factor 3 participants on this statement item for more details. Respondent E17, Male, Security/Paramilitary, Junior Leadership/Management commented in SE-14 thus:

> *During the onset of the outbreak, poor mobile communication affected citizens' response, perhaps due to bandwidth overload, but afterwards, things improved, and people had access to regular updates from the government* (+4).

According to participant E37, (Male, Security/Paramilitary, Junior Leadership/Management):

> *We hardly received complaints about poor mobile services. We planned to take care of this by bypassing our messages through the radio, television, and newspapers thereby avoiding the problems from depending too much on digital technologies* (+3).

The distinguishing features of Factor 3 include the recognition of the roles played by the structure of the Lagos State Emergency Operation Centre – both centralised and devolved: a quasi-distributed leadership framework (SE-7: +4) (See Table 6.27 below. Availability of resources and the efforts of the contact tracers are pointed out as distinctly responsible for the effective security leadership during the Ebola epidemic of 2014 (SE-17: +3, SE-9: +2). Furthermore, respondents affirm data inadequacy and experienced manpower insufficiency amongst other distinct characteristics. These include the provision of access to data and collaboration with non-governmental institutions including the academia and private sectors. The negative sort values and z-score for Statements items SE-29: -3 (z-score = -1.4**), SE-15: -3 (z-score = -1.28**) and SE-35: -3 (z-score = -0.127*) corroborated the points highlighted.

Table 6.27: Distinguishing Statements for Factor 3 (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

		Factor 1		Factor 2		Factor 3		Factor 4	
#	Statement	Q-SV	Z-score	Q-SV	Z-score	Q-SV	Z-score	Q-SV	Z-score
7	SE-7: The local (Lagos State) Emergency Operation Center contributed to better coordination and rapid and effective response.	0	0.04	0	-0.15	4	1.67**	1	0.548
17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural	-2	-1.06	-1	-0.3	3	1.51**	0	0.357

	including digital technologies to handle the disease.								
9	SE-9: Efforts of Contact tracers using digital forms and data inputting contributed immensely to rapid disaster response and effective leadership outcomes.	0	-0.25	-1	-0.53	2	1.01**	-2	-0.931
19	SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.	-1	-0.59	3	1.44	1	0.19*	2	0.78
1	SE-1: Information was disseminated vertically (top-down) via traditional legacy media and social media.	-2	-0.99	-2	-1.29	0	0.16**	-2	-0.797
26	SE-26: The leading Apps were written in English including the website thereby cutting off the vast majority of the population who are illiterates from accessing real-time information on the disease.	0	0.29	2	1.1	0	-0.37*	2	0.729
5	SE-5: SMS helped reach more citizens than the other digital technology platforms.	-4	-1.7	-3	-1.58	0	-0.38**	-4	-1.884
31	SE-31: Digital technologies and Big data did not have any significant impact on effective security leadership decision-making during the Ebola outbreak.	-3	-1.17	-4	-1.65	0	-0.41*	-4	-2.298
18	SE-18: Lagos has the highest number of active voice and internet subscribers in Nigeria thereby contributing to active social media engagements during the epidemic.	2	0.77	4	1.56	-1	-0.46**	3	0.912
3	SE-3: Outdated news were recycled through different platforms using the same format.	-3	-1.24	-4	-1.88	-1	-0.48	-3	-1.151
10	SE-10: FG approved jingles to be produced in various languages produced for Nigerian Centre for Disease Control to be aired on Radio, TV and newspaper superseded other digital tech outlets.	-2	-1.16	-3	-1.57	-1	-0.5*	-3	-1.682
34	SE-34: There was a poor digital early warning system, most of the disaster response operations were paper-based before the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak.	0	0.12	1	0.61	-2	-0.92**	0	0.196
13	SE-13: The predominance of non-machine-readable (mostly paper-based) epidemiological data restricted critical response.	1	0.54	1	0.47	-2	-1.06**	2	0.763
35	SE-35: There were infrastructural data inadequacies and low manpower (epidemiological big data analysts) which threatened the success of the operation.	-1	-0.47	0	0.25	-3	-1.27*	-2	-0.723
15	SE-15: A lack of interoperability between the numerous data systems used to manage data before and during the response also contributed to the unclear and asynchronous data picture.	3	1.59	0	0.07	-3	-1.28**	0	0.01
29	SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully	2	0.9	0	0.21	-3	-1.4**	-1	-0.307

	integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).								

Note: a single asterisk (*) indicates distinguished statement significance at P<0.05; double asterisks (**) indicates distinguished statement significance at P<0.01). Both the Factor Q-Sort Value (Q-SV) and the Z-Score (Z-SCR) are shown.

Figure 6.8 contains the visual representation of the composite Q-sorts of statements by participants or respondents who significantly loaded in Factor 3.



Figure 6.8: Composite Q-sort for Factor 3 (Lagos Ebola (Q-Study 1))

Summary: Respondents who loaded onto Factor 3 consider data availability and collaboration, active distributed conversation communities, availability of resources as defining perspectives for outcome effectiveness in the given context. Other views contained in this factor include noticeable digital infrastructure, strong leadership, and experienced manpower.

6.4.7 Factor 4 Interpretation and Viewpoints (Q-Study 1): Insufficient Big Data Analytics skills, High Distributed Leadership, Sparse Conversation (n=8)

Factor 4 has an eigenvalue of 1.4512 which explains 4% of the variance. Eight (8) participants significantly loaded onto this factor loaded at ±0.42 to reach statistical significance at $p<0.01$. The demographic spread of respondents under this factor has shown in Table 6.28 below represents an overwhelming dominance of mid-level leadership stakeholders and actors across different gender and job categories.

Table 6.28: Factor 4 Demographic Distribution (Q-Study 1)

Factor 4 Demographic Distribution			
Participant	**Sex**	**Category**	**Leadership Level**
E8	Male	Business/Interest groups	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
E13	Female	Business/Interest groups	Senior Leadership/Management
E5	Male	Governmental	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
E33	Male	Governmental	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
E31	Female	Religious	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
E1	Male	Governmental	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
E9	Female	Non/Inter-Governmental	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
E34	Male	Religious	Mid-Level Leadership/Management

As usual, the raw scores, interpretation crib sheet and visual representation of the sorting in Factor 4 are presented below. From the crib sheet for Factor 4 (see Table 6.29 below), there was clear distributed leadership between the government actors at the federal and state levels (SE-8: +4). Also, the presence of sparsely connected conversation graphs is indicative of the partial connectedness of a distributed conversation. This is revealed by influential stakeholders like the media, politicians, private individuals with large online followership dominating and leading conversation in their own space without clear interaction across different conversation spaces. Especially between government and non-governmental agents (SE-23: +4). These two are the most positively ranked statements under this perspective.

Table 6.29: Factor interpretation crib sheet for Factor 4 (Relative Ranking of Statements in Factor 4) - Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1)

#	Highest Ranked Statements	Factor 4	Consensus /Distinguishing	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
8	SE-8: There was shared, collaborative decision-making between different government agencies (Lagos state and Federal Government) with interconnected	4	D*	2	2	3

	but independent leadership procedures demonstrated during the epidemic.					
23	SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.	4	D**	1	-3	-4
	Positive Statements Ranked Higher in factor 4 Array than in Other Factor Arrays					
21	SE-21: Deployment of an active dedicated website with a live-chat messaging system (Post-outbreak) for educating the public helped control the spread of the virus.	3	C**	3	3	2
25	SE-25: In-house Big Data analytics and Machine Learning skill capabilities were lacking.	2	D**	0	-1	0
13	SE-13: The predominance of non-machine-readable (mostly paper-based) epidemiological data restricted critical response.	2		1	1	-2
26	SE-26: The leading Apps were written in English including the website thereby cutting off the vast majority of the population who are illiterates from accessing real-time information on the disease.	2		0	2	0
32	SE-32: The electronic data collection and alert system reduced the turnaround time between identification of symptomatic contacts and evacuation to the isolation facility from between 3 to 6 hours to an hour.	1		1	-1	0
24	SE-24: The incidence response and general leadership were not adaptive, rather pre-set, hence fitting for structured disasters like Ebola.	0		-4	-2	0
	Negative Statements Ranked Lower in factor 4 Array than in Other Factor Arrays					
30	SE-30: The Open Data Kit/Form Hub technology were used in combination with the Dashboard technology and ArcGIS mapping for follow up of contacts, identification of cases, case investigation and management and also for strategic planning during the response.	0		0	1	1
11	SE-11: Previous data response experience with Polio (e.g., HealthMap App) pre-trained/prepared responders for Ebola.	-1	D**	1	2	1
16	SE-16: The effective security leadership demonstrated is attributable mainly to the Lagos government's early adoption of digital technologies.	-1	D*	4	0	3
4	SE-4: The government collaborated more with foreign NGOs and international institutions rather than local NGOs and CSOs.	-2		-1	1	-2
1	SE-1: Information was disseminated vertically (top-down) via traditional legacy media and social media.	-2		-2	-2	0
9	SE-9: Efforts of Contact tracers using digital forms and data inputting contributed immensely to rapid disaster response and effective leadership outcomes.	-2		0	-1	2
10	SE-10: FG approved jingles to be produced in various languages produced for Nigerian Centre for Disease Control to be aired on	-3		-2	-3	-1

	Radio, TV and newspaper superseded other digital tech outlets.					
	Lowest Ranked Statements					
5	SE-5: SMS helped reach more citizens than the other digital technology platforms.	-4		-4	-3	0
31	SE-31: Digital technologies and Big data did not have any significant impact on effective security leadership decision-making during the Ebola outbreak.	-4	D*	-3	-4	0

Note: a single asterisk (*) indicates distinguished statement significance at P<0.05; double asterisks (**) indicates distinguished statement significance at P<0.01).

The lowest-ranked statements SE-5 and SE-31 record strong disagreements by the participants. There is a remarkable negation of the assumption that SMS predominate big data technologies used in the Ebola epidemic. This opinion limits or reduces the extent of the relevance of big data technologies to decision-making during this crisis event (SE-5: -4). The raw sorts for Factor 4 show that all the respondents rated this statement negatively. This highlights the strong disagreement by the factor's participants on this statement. Quite like the previous statement, the second statement is also strongly contested by the participants (SE-31: -4). The attempt to trivialise the role of big data technologies in effective security-leadership decision-making processes during an epidemic of the proportion of the Lagos Ebola of 2014 was strongly rebutted by these stakeholders. The raw sorts of this participants on this statement reveal the strong negation (E8: -4; E13: -4; E33: -4; E31: -3; E1: -2; E9: -2; E34: -3).

The distinguishing statements outlined in Table 6.30 below show the distinctive perspectives of respondents in Factor 4. Like most of the other respondents in the other factors, distributed leadership, and conversation in the full or partial measure were identified by them and associated with the security-leadership decision-making during the 2014 Lagos Ebola epidemic. The lack or insufficient big data analytics and skill capabilities were also identified by these respondents.

Table 6.30: Distinguishing Statements for Factor 4 (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

		Factor 1		**Factor 2**		**Factor 3**		**Factor 4**	
#	**Statement**	**Q-SV**	**Z-score**	**Q-SV**	**Z-score**	**Q-SV**	**Z-score**	**Q-SV**	**Z-score**
8	SE-8: There was shared, collaborative decision-making between different government agencies (Lagos state and Federal Government) with interconnected but independent leadership procedures demonstrated during the epidemic.	2	0.72	2	0.98	3	1.36	4	2.04*

23	SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.	1	0.29	-3	-1.36	-4	-1.45	4	2.01**
28	SE-28: The feedback loops of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance system permit local leadership among government actors across the different levels of government with non-rigid central coordination - this contributed to the containment of the disease.	4	2.11	-2	-0.78	4	2.2	3	1.02**
25	SE-25: In-house Big Data analytics and Machine Learning skill capabilities were lacking.	0	0.11	-1	-0.22	0	-0.03	2	0.86**
19	SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.	-1	-0.59	3	1.44	1	0.19	2	0.78*
7	SE-7: The local (Lagos State) Emergency Operation Center contributed to better coordination and rapid and effective response.	0	0.04	0	-0.15	4	1.67	1	0.55*
17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.	-2	-1.06	-1	-0.3	3	1.51	0	0.36*
29	SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).	2	0.9	0	0.21	-3	-1.4	-1	-0.31*
11	SE-11: Previous data response experience with Polio (e.g., HealthMap App) pre-trained/prepared responders for Ebola.	1	0.51	2	0.68	1	0.68	-1	-0.34**
16	SE-16: The effective security leadership demonstrated is attributable mainly to the Lagos government's early adoption of digital technologies.	4	1.72	0	0.17	3	1.36	-1	-0.5*
31	SE-31: Digital technologies and Big data did not have any significant impact on effective security leadership decision-making during the Ebola outbreak.	-3	-1.17	-4	-1.65	0	-0.41	-4	-2.3*

Note: a single asterisk (*) indicates distinguished statement significance at P<0.05; double asterisks (**) indicates distinguished statement significance at P<0.01). Both the Factor Q-Sort Value (Q-SV) and the Z-Score (Z-SCR) are shown.



Figure 6.9: Composite Q-sort for Factor 4 (Lagos Ebola (Q-Study 1))

Summary: Respondents who loaded onto this factor strongly affirm the presence of distributed leadership and sparsely distributed conversation. They also recognised inadequate big data analytics skills in the Lagos 2014 Ebola epidemic outbreak security-leadership decision-making process.

6.5 Q-Result and Factor Interpretation (Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2))

This section contains presentations of Q-Result and factor interpretation for the Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2).

6.5.1 Consensus across Factors/Perspectives (Consensus Statements)

Consensus statements provide a summary of the study's shared perspectives, in this case, a summarisation of the opinions shared by participants who significantly loaded on all the factors in Lagos Floods (2012-2017) study (Q-Study 2). Seven of the twenty-five statements feature on the consensus list. The issues held in consensus varied

around poor town planning regulation (SF-2), data scarcity (SF-3), poor hydrological data management (SF-15), and insufficient weather data collation stations (SF-22). The participants roundly disagree on the claim of availability of flood disaster information websites (SF-11), and they expressed neutrality on the claim that citizens' reliance on foreign disaster databases and news sources (SF-12).

Table 6.31: Extracted Consensus Statements (Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2))

		Factor 1		Factor 2		Factor 3	
#	Statement	Q-SV	Z-score	Q-SV	Z-score	Q-SV	Z-score
2	SF-2: Poorly regulated nature of town planning, impact assessments, limited data and information on how much land use contribute to people building on floodplains, reducing the surface areas for water to travel without constructing drainage systems. *	2	0.539	1	0.676	1	0.721
3	SF-3: There is a scarcity of up-to-date data on the rising sea levels in Nigeria. *	1	0.417	2	0.741	0	0.186
11	SF-11: There are popular independent websites for correcting fake news, misinformation and for actively engaging citizens during flood disasters. *	-2	-1.191	-2	-1.318	-3	-1.598
12	SF-12: Citizens and local institutions (media and researcher) trust independent actors - local and foreign for information than government actors during flood disasters. They rely more on foreign databases (e.g., EM-DAT) and sources for data than on government sources. *	0	0.339	0	0.356	0	0.01
13	SF-13: Flood modelling, early warning systems etc. require well-trained expertise which is not sufficiently available. *	1	0.423	1	0.628	2	0.993
15	SF-15: Data inconsistency is attributed to poor hydrological data management systems and lack of standards, resulting in unreliable, fabricated and data format inconsistency.	0	0.07	0	0.293	2	0.87
22	SF-22: Weather data collation stations in the state and across the country are either non-functional or not sufficient. This impacts data driven-decision for flood disaster preparedness, resilience and response. *	2	0.479	1	0.695	1	0.751

Note: Q-SV = Q-sort value. Consensus *Statements - Those that do not distinguish between ANY pair of Factors. All Listed Statements are non-significant at P > 0.01, and those flagged with an asterisk * are also non-Significant at p > 0.05.*

The next sections discuss the differences in perspectives starting with the variations across factors using the descending array of differences tables. These tables

highlight the differences in perspectives by showing how respondents agree or disagree on statements across a range of factors. Next, the presentation of the distinguishing statements as well as the interpretation of factors or perspectives.

6.5.2 Differences between Factors/Perspectives (Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2))

Before examining the distinguishing statements across factors, the differences between the factors using the differences in their z-scores was implemented. The descending array of differences table outlines the ranking of statements on any of the factors using their standardized factor scores (z-scores). As earlier explained for the Ebola Study (Q-Study 1), the z-score helps to identify how (on average) each respondent sorted the statements on each factor loading. The higher the differences in z-scores between factors on each item loading, the greater their differences.

The final scores are arranged in descending order; only arrays where one factor is positive and the other negative vice versa are retained, where both are positive or negative, these are excised from the extracted tables. This process provides insights into differences between the perspectives as represented by each factor. These differentiations helped to highlight the implicit viewpoints or perspectives and their distinct characteristics. An abstraction (extract) of the array of Differences between Factor1 and Factor 2 is presented in Table 6.32 below, see Appendix 26 for the full table. Similar procedures shall be implemented for the other Factors' Arrays of Differences.

Respondents who significantly loaded onto Factor 1 differ from those in Factor 2 on the claim that Lagos state agencies (LASEMA and LASEPA) established demonstrated presence on social media than their national counterparts (e.g., NEMA) during the floods of 2012 and 2017 (SF-9) with a z-score difference of 2.166 between the two factors (see Table 6.32). A peek into the tables of Q-sorts for the two factors (see Appendices 29 and 30) provides a clear insight into the respondents' or participants' judgement on this issue.

All the respondents under Factor 1 rated the statement (SF-9, z-score: 1.513) positively – they consist of 2 Media (F13: +2; F23: +2), 1 Religious (F24: +3), 1 Non/Inter-Governmental (F16: +3), and 3 governmental stakeholders and actors (F3: +3; F22: +3; F25: +3). Factor 2 respondents rated the statement negatively (SF-9, z-score: -0.653); unlike those in Factor 1. These respondents are predominantly

governmental actors – seven out of the nine respondents in Factor 2. The areas of differences between the two factors include the suggestion that there are no political incentives to encourage the enforcement of environmental laws which should have forestalled flood risks and disasters in affected areas (SF-4).

The differences between Factors 1 and 3 are around the idea that there is little or no inter-agency collaboration in early warning disaster and data sharing (SF-19). Also, that the emergency response agencies rarely take hydrological predictions and warnings given by NiMet and the national hydrological agency seriously since disaster response is more lucrative than mitigation and preparedness (SF-6). While respondents under Factor 1 scored positively on the z-score (1.513) for these statements, Factor 2's respondents score negatively (-1.326) with a considerable difference in z-score of 2.839 between them. Other contentious opinions are about the quality of pre-disaster information and the lack of political will to enforce environmental laws which might be due to political interferences by highly placed political actors acting on behalf of their clientele (SF-8 and SF-4).

The contestations between Factors 2 and 3 involve disagreements on the claim that the various digital platforms of emergency agencies were designed to inform rather than to engage in distributed conversation with the public (S-18). Respondents in Factor 1 agree with this claim (z-score = 1.615), while those in Factor 2 disagreed with the claim (z-score = -0.418). Also, there are differences in the claim that there are little or no inter-agency collaboration during flood disaster early warning, response, and management with sparse sharing of digital data between the emergency agencies (S19).

Additionally, there are differences with the idea that despite Lagos effective flood preparedness plans and protocols, it has failed to mitigate recurrent flood disasters which perennially inundate the state. Participants in Factor 1 contested this claim (z-score =-1.1.57), while those in Factor 2 agree with the statement (z-score=0.146).

Table 6.32: Descending Array of Differences Between Factor 1 and Factor 2 (Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2))

#	Statement	Factor 1	Factor 2	Difference
9	SF-9: LASEMA and LASEPA demonstrated more active social media engagements with the public than national agencies and other state agencies.	1.513	-0.653	2.166
23	SF-23: Nigeria has series of satellites in space for weather and communication. National emergency and space agencies such as	-0.088	-1.342	1.254

	NEMA, NASRDA and RECTAS have worked together to issue helpful charter calls for geospatial imaging for disaster response and damage assessments.			
…		…	…	…
17	SF-17: In Lagos, there are robust flood data collection procedures about different wards, urban areas and informal settlements available to emergency leaders for making location-specific decisions during flood disasters.	-1.764	-0.738	-1.026
18	SF-18: Online platforms of emergency agencies are only for informing the public not for engaging with the public.	0.429	1.575	-1.146
4	SF-4: No political incentives to enforce laws that will forestall predicted flood risks in affected areas.	-0.407	0.755	-1.162

Table 6.33: Descending Array of Differences between Factor 1 and Factor 3 (Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2))

#	Statement	Factor 1	Factor 3	Difference
9	SF-9: LASEMA and LASEPA demonstrated more active social media engagements with the public than national agencies and other state agencies.	1.513	-1.326	2.839
19	SF-19: Each agency operates independently with little or no inter-agency collaboration in flood disaster early warning, response and management. Inter-agency technology and data sharing are almost non-existent.	2.393	-0.418	2.811
6	SF-6: Flood emergency preparedness agencies hardly take flood predictions and warnings made by Nigerian Hydrological Agency and NiMet seriously because disaster response is more lucrative than preparedness and mitigation.	0.653	-0.837	1.49
…		…	…	…
8	SF-8: Pre-disaster information is insufficient, NEMA show more PR information of meetings and international conferences attended by principal officials, events and pictures of palliative distribution during flood disasters rather than useful early warning and mitigation information.	0.091	1.159	-1.068
4	SF-4: No political incentives to enforce laws that will forestall predicted flood risks in affected areas.	-0.407	1.2	-1.607

Table 6.34: Descending Array of Differences between Factor 2 and Factor 3 (Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2))

#	Statement	Factor 2	Factor 3	Difference
19	SF-19: Each agency operates independently with little or no inter-agency collaboration in flood disaster early warning, response and management. Inter-agency technology and data sharing are almost non-existent.	1.651	-0.418	2.069
18	SF-18: Online platforms of emergency agencies are only for informing the public not for engaging with the public.	1.575	-0.429	2.004
6	SF-6: Flood emergency preparedness agencies hardly take flood predictions and warnings made by Nigerian Hydrological Agency and NiMet seriously because disaster response is more lucrative than preparedness and mitigation.	0.717	-0.837	1.554
…		…	…	…
1	SF-1: Lagos State has the best flood preparedness plan in Nigeria combined with data from meteorological agencies, it has failed to effectively mitigate the perennial flood disasters and their impacts on the health of the people.	-1.157	0.146	-1.303
20	SF-20: GIS and Remote sensing are usually deployed to identify floodplain encroachment, assess flood vulnerability, and ensure strict adherence to, and enforcement of flood management policies.	-1.493	-0.02	-1.473

6.5.3 Factor 1 Interpretation and Viewpoints (Q-Study 2): Inter-Agency collaboration deficit, weak political will and incentives, and sociocultural perception of risks. (n=7)

Seven (7) participants significantly onto this factor with an eigenvalue of 10.7015 explain 43% of the variance. These participants or respondents loaded at ±0.516 to reach statistical significance at $p<0.01$. The participants' demographic distribution ranges from Media (2 Female), Religious (1 Male), Non/Inter-Governmental (1 Male), and Governmental (2 Male; 1 Female). See Table 6.35 below for their leadership levels.

Table 6.35: Factor 1 Demographic Distribution (Q-Study 2)

Factor 1 Demographic Distribution (Q-Study 2)			
Participant	**Sex**	**Category**	**Leadership Level**
F13	Female	Media	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
F23	Male	Media	Senior Leadership/Management
F24	Male	Religious	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
F3	Male	Governmental	Senior Leadership/Management
F16	Male	Non/Inter-Governmental	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
F22	Female	Governmental	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
F25	Male	Governmental	Mid-Level Leadership/Management

The interpretation crib sheet for Factor 1 (see Table 6.37 below), clearly shows that the statement that participants who significantly loaded on this factor most strongly agree with is statement SF-19: +4. All the seven participants including 3 senior governmental officials strongly agreed with the claim that: *Each agency operated independently with little or no inter-agency collaboration in flood disaster early warning, response, and management. Interagency technology and data sharing was almost non-existent* SF-19 [F13: +4, F23: +4, F24: +4, F3: +4, F16: +3, F22: +3, F25: +4].

Table 6.37: Factor interpretation crib sheet for Factor 1 (Relative Ranking of Statements in Factor 1) - Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2)

#	Highest Ranked Statements	Factor 1	Consensus /Distinguishing	Factor 2	Factor 3
19	SF-19: Each agency operates independently with little or no inter-agency collaboration in flood disaster early warning, response and management. Interagency technology and data sharing are almost non-existent.	4	D**	4	-1

	Positive Statements Ranked Higher in factor 1 Array than in Other Factor Arrays				
9	SF-9: LASEMA and LASEPA demonstrated more active social media engagements with the public than national agencies and other state agencies.	3	D**	-1	-2
6	SF-6: Flood emergency preparedness agencies hardly take flood predictions and warnings made by Nigerian Hydrological Agency and NiMet seriously because disaster response is more lucrative than preparedness and mitigation.	2		2	-2
2	SF-2: Poorly regulated nature of town planning, impact assessments, limited data and information on how much land use contribute to people building on floodplains, reducing the surface areas for water to travel without constructing drainage systems.	2	C**	1	1
22	SF-22: Weather data collation stations in the state and across the country are either non-functional or not sufficient. This impacts data driven-decision for flood disaster preparedness, resilience and response.	2	C**	1	1
12	SF-12: Citizens and local institutions (media and researcher) trust independent actors - local and foreign for information than government actors during flood disasters. They rely more on foreign databases (e.g., EM-DAT) and sources for data than on government sources.	0	C**	0	0
23	SF-23: Nigeria has series of satellites in space for weather and communication. National emergency and space agencies such as NEMA, NASRDA and RECTAS have worked together to issue helpful charter calls for geospatial imaging for disaster response and damage assessments.	0		-3	-1
	Negative Statements Ranked Lower in factor 1 Array than in Other Factor Arrays				
12	SF-12: Citizens and local institutions (media and researcher) trust independent actors - local and foreign for information than government actors during flood disasters. They rely more on foreign databases (e.g., EM-DAT) and sources for data than on government sources.	0	C**	0	0
16	SF-16: There are poor standards of hydro-meteorological data management leading to an unreliable data format which renders the data almost useless for leadership decision-making during floods disaster.	0	D*	3	2
8	SF-8: Pre-disaster information is insufficient, NEMA show more PR information of meetings and international conferences attended by principal officials, events and pictures of palliative distribution during flood	0		0	3

	disasters rather than useful early warning and mitigation information.				
15	SF-15: Data inconsistency is attributed to poor hydrological data management systems and lack of standards, resulting in unreliable, fabricated and data format inconsistency.	0	C*	0	2
14	SF-14: Social media users and content creators (images, memes) mock those in Lagos, especially the Lekki area because it is believed that a lot of Nigeria's rich elite reside there.	-1		0	1
4	SF-4: No political incentives to enforce laws that will forestall predicted flood risks in affected areas.	-1	D**	2	3
21	SF-21: Flood disasters are seasonal and predictable to a certain degree, hence, the differential in preparedness and response when compared with other disasters. Digital technologies do not affect human perception of predictable and unpredictable risks.	-3	D**	-1	-2
	Lowest Ranked Statements				
10	SF-10: Communication and Information sharing is distributed across the different levels of government. NEMA and LASEMA jointly disseminate information and data to the public.	-4		-2	-3

Note: a single asterisk (*) indicates distinguished statement significance at p<0.05; double asterisks (**) indicates distinguished statement significance at p<0.01).

According to Participant F3: +4 (Male, Governmental and Senior Leadership/Management): *We didn't have shared digital platforms for coordinating and managing disasters; each agency came up with its systems.* This observation is in tandem with the comment of Participant F25: +4 (Female, Governmental and Senior Leadership/Management):

> *It is no secret that there is inter-agency rivalry in government establishments; what made this more obvious in the case of the emergency and disaster management agencies was the competition for access to resources. Inter-agency collaboration that should involve digital collaboration or data-sharing was frustrated.*

Similarly, all the respondents strongly disagreed with the claim that there was shared information distribution by the agencies e.g., NEMA (National) and LASEMA (Lagos State) on flood disasters (SF-10: -4). These agencies scarcely or nearly never issued joint information to the public or present a joint digital data and information sharing initiative such as a joint hashtag. They also never had a joint website that could project the image of distributed leadership with active participation across the different agencies of government and non-governmental actors.

The distinguishing characteristics of this Factor as listed in the Table of Distinguished statements (Table 6.38) are of the opinion that LASEMA and LASEPA. These two are agencies of the Lagos State government in charge of emergency management and the environments, independently demonstrated more active social media engagements than their national counterparts (SF-9: +3). Statement SF-10 is also a peculiar statement to Factor 1 of this Q-Study 2.

Table 6.38: Distinguishing Statements for Factor 1 - Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2)

		Factor 1		**Factor 2**		**Factor 3**	
#	**Statement**	**Q-SV**	**Z-score**	**Q-SV**	**Z-score**	**Q-SV**	**Z-score**
19	SF-19: Each agency operates independently with little or no inter-agency collaboration in flood disaster early warning, response and management. Inter-agency technology and data sharing are almost non-existent.	4**	2.39	4	1.651	-1	-0.418
9	SF-9: LASEMA and LASEPA demonstrated more active social media engagements with the public than national agencies and other state agencies.	3**	1.51	-1	-0.653	-2	-1.326
18	SF-18: Online platforms of emergency agencies are only for informing the public not for engaging with the public.	1*	0.43	3	1.575	-1	-0.429
16	SF-16: There are poor standards of hydro-meteorological data management leading to an unreliable data format which renders the data almost useless for leadership decision-making during floods disaster.	0*	0.28	3	1.13	2	1.044
4	SF-4: No political incentives to enforce laws that will forestall predicted flood risks in affected areas.	-1**	-0.41	2	0.755	3	1.2
21	SF-21: Flood disasters are seasonal and predictable to a certain degree, hence, the differential in preparedness and response when compared with other disasters. Digital technologies do not affect human perception of predictable and unpredictable risks.	-3**	-1.5	-1	-0.787	-2	-0.605

Note: a single asterisk (*) indicates distinguished statement significance at P<0.05; double asterisks (**) indicates distinguished statement significance at P<0.01). Both the Factor Q-Sort Value (Q-SV) and the Z-Score (Z-SCR) are shown.

Another distinguished statement under this factor is the absence of political incentives to enforce environmental laws SF-4: -1. Respondents in Factor 1 collectively mildly disagreed with this claim as seen from the Q-sort arrays for SF-4 [F13: +2, F23: -3, F24: +1, F3: -2, F16: -1, F22: -1, F25: -1]. It is difficult to affirm the level of disagreement in this case because 2 participants agreed with the claim while 4 merely disagreed with the claim (-1): which is close to a neutral rating. Only respondent F23 clearly expressed strong disagreement with the statement. In this case, it would serve the interpretation very well to look at the comments for proper insight into the

ambivalence. According to Participant F23: -3 (Male, Media, Senior Leadership/Management):

> *There were political incentives to enforce environmental laws, it's just that the politicians chose when to apply these laws and who to apply them against. Houses of opposition politicians can be pull down if they are on the right of way, but those belonging to their friends and associates are left intact.*
>
> *There existed political incentives, except that these incentives are selfish. People obtained building permits with doctored vulnerability assessment documents. The poor always get the brunt and this can be seen in the case of the demolition of Makoko – a slum inhabited by the displaced poor; the officials cited environmental factors for this action; but, we all know this is a political statement because Lekki has experienced flooding incessantly because some of the houses are built on wetlands. Despite this, houses are rarely demolished in Lekki because it is an elite area.*

From these comments, it is clear that participants recognised lack of political will to implement sanctions against infractions of environmental laws in the state which could have forestalled recurrent flooding during the periods of the Lagos floods disasters under review (2012-2017) as against lack of incentives as espoused by the claim. Both assumptions are predicated upon the self-interest of the political leadership in Lagos because the political incentives and will are determined by political interests.

Statement S-21 was strongly contested distinctly by respondents in Factor 1; the claim that disaster managers are complacent because of the regularity of flood disasters and due to its predictability unlike other disasters; hence, seeing no need to prepare adequately towards curtailing their impacts and also that digital technologies do not affect human perception of risks predictability were rebutted by the respondents (-3). In the words of Participant F13: -3 (Female, Media, Mid-Level Leadership/Management):

> *It is not true that digital technologies do not influence human perception of risks. There are examples of NEMA making predictions about impending flood disasters, there are environmental impact assessments reports too available all over the internet; I think it is not about digital technologies, it is largely due to cultural values. How many people insure their properties in Nigeria?*

The comment of Participant F24: -3 (Male, Religious, Mid-Level Leadership/Management) is also insightful:

Yes, flood disasters are predictable, unlike some disease outbreaks, but I strongly disagree with the idea that digital technologies do not affect human perception of predictable and non-predictable risks. I think it is down to our religious fundamentalism: thinking and preparing against disasters is seen as a sign of lack of faith. Some don't even write their will because they think that doing so could attract death to them.

According to Participant F23: -4 (Male, Media, Senior Leadership/Management):

One would have thought that recurrent disasters should lead government leaders and civil servants to prepare to mitigate disaster effects; yet, these leaders keep showing their ineffectiveness. I think it is deliberate. They have weather reports, data, and predictions, some are reported even in the media months before occurrence; yet, almost nothing is done to avert the crises. I think it is because emergence response is more lucrative than disaster prevention.

Figure 6.10 contains the visual representation of the composite Q-sorts of statements by participants or respondents who significantly loaded in Factor 1.



Figure 6.10: Composite Q-sort for Factor 1 (Lagos Floods (Q-Study 2))

Summary: Respondents or participants under this Factor 1 (Q-Study 2) expressed strong agreement with the claim that lack of inter-agency collaboration persists in the disaster management operations during the flood events. They were ambivalent on the issue of political incentives and how they affect security-leadership decision-making

during flood disasters. The comments show that some of the agreements were not strong, but they were focused on a lack of political will for implementing or enforcing environmental laws. Lastly, respondents agreed that certain religious and socio-cultural values about risk impede adoption and reliance on predictive big data analytics for security-leadership decision-making.

6.5.4 Factor 2 Interpretation and Viewpoints (Q-Study 2): Data exclusion and Inaccessibility (n=9)

Factor 2 has an eigenvalue of 1.5706 which explains 6% of the variance. Nine (9) participants significantly loaded onto this factor loaded at ±0.516 to reach statistical significance at $p<0.01$. The demographic distribution of these participants as presented in Table 6.39 below is dominated mainly by governmental actors.

Table 6.39: Factor 2 Demographic Distribution (Q-Study 2)

Factor 2 Demographic Distribution (Q-Study 2)			
Participant	**Sex**	**Category**	**Leadership Level**
F8	Male	Governmental	Senior Leadership/Management
F6	Male	Governmental	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
F11	Male	Business/Interest groups	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
F1	Male	Governmental	Senior Leadership/Management
F14	Male	Governmental	Senior Leadership/Management
F5	Female	Non/Inter-Governmental	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
F10	Male	Governmental	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
F20	Male	Technical/Research	Senior Leadership/Management
F7	Female	Governmental	Mid-Level Leadership/Management

The raw scores, interpretation crib sheet and visual representation of the sorting in Factor 2 are presented below. From the crib sheet for Factor 2 (see Table 6.40 below). Respondents on this factor strongly agreed with the claim that each agency operates independently with the absence of distributed leadership in flood disaster early warning, response, and management SF-19: +4. They strongly negated the proposition which suggests that Lagos State demonstrated effective leadership in flood management using big data SF-7: -4.

Table 6.40: Factor interpretation crib sheet for Factor 2 (Relative Ranking of Statements in Factor 2) - Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2)

#	Highest Ranked Statements	Factor 2	Consensus /Distinguishing	Factor 1	Factor 3
19	SF-19: Each agency operates independently with little or no inter-agency collaboration in flood disaster early warning, response and management. Inter-agency technology and data sharing are almost non-existent.	4	D**	4	-1
	Positive Statements Ranked Higher in factor 2 Array than in Other Factor Arrays				
18	SF-18: Online platforms of emergency agencies are only for informing the public not for engaging with the public.	3	D**	1	-1
16	SF-16: There are poor standards of hydro-meteorological data management leading to an unreliable data format which renders the data almost useless for leadership decision-making during floods disaster.	3		0	2
3	SF-3: There is a scarcity of up-to-date data on the rising sea levels in Nigeria.	2	C**	1	0
6	SF-6: Flood emergency preparedness agencies hardly take flood predictions and warnings made by Nigerian Hydrological Agency and NiMet seriously because disaster response is more lucrative than preparedness and mitigation.	2		2	-2
12	SF-12: Citizens and local institutions (media and researcher) trust independent actors - local and foreign for information than government actors during flood disasters. They rely more on foreign databases (e.g., EM-DAT) and sources for data than on government sources.	0	C**	0	0
	Negative Statements Ranked Lower in factor 2 Array than in Other Factor Arrays				
5	SF-5: Meteorological, satellite hydrological and other associated data are not easily accessible to researchers and environmental NGOs without going through burdensome government bureaucracies thereby restricting complimentary data-driven analytics and decision making.	0	D*	3	4
12	SF-12: Citizens and local institutions (media and researcher) trust independent actors - local and foreign for information than government actors during flood disasters. They rely more on foreign databases (e.g., EM-DAT) and sources for data than on government sources.	0	C**	0	0
15	SF-15: Data inconsistency is attributed to poor hydrological data management systems and lack of standards, resulting in unreliable, fabricated and data format inconsistency.	0	C*	0	2
8	SF-8: Pre-disaster information is insufficient, NEMA show more PR information of meetings and international conferences attended by principal officials, events and pictures of palliative distribution during flood disasters rather than useful early warning and mitigation information.	0		0	3

1	SF-1: Lagos State has the best flood preparedness plan in Nigeria combined with data from meteorological agencies, it has failed to effectively mitigate the perennial flood disasters and their impacts on the health of the people.	-2	D**	-1	0
23	SF-23: Nigeria has series of satellites in space for weather and communication. National emergency and space agencies such as NEMA, NASRDA and RECTAS have worked together to issue helpful charter calls for geospatial imaging for disaster response and damage assessments.	-3	D**	0	-1
20	SF-20: GIS and Remote sensing are usually deployed to identify floodplain encroachment, assess flood vulnerability, and ensure strict adherence to, and enforcement of flood management policies.	-3	D**	-2	0
	Lowest Ranked Statements				
7	SF-7: Lagos State is effective in flood management and provision of resources to those affected by flood disasters. There are big data used in making these effective leadership decisions.	-4	D**	-2	0

Note: a single asterisk (*) indicates distinguished statement significance at P<0.05; double asterisks (**) indicates distinguished statement significance at P<0.01).

The comments are quite interesting because the dominance of government officials on this factor would have allowed for a positive review; instead, only 2 of the 6 governmental actors rated the statement negatively. In the opinion of Participant F8: -4 [Male, Governmental, Senior Leadership/Management]:

> *Yes, we have access to social media platforms and do often employ some analytics from some of our ICT guys, but that's just about it. In some cases, we even had to buy internet subscriptions for our computers.*

The distinguishing statements that clearly define this particular factor include claims such as *SF-18: Online platforms of emergency agencies are only for informing the public not for engaging with the public* +3 (Table 6.41). Participants assessed this statement very strongly although a few respondents rated the statement negatively. But as a unit, the respondents strongly agreed with the proposition that emergency agencies mostly used their online platforms for top-down information dissemination – more like digital government bulletin boards. F8: +3, F6: +3, F1: +3 are governmental actors who agreed with the statement.

Similarly, F11: +2 (Business/Interest groups) and F5: +4 (Non/Inter-Governmental) agreed with the assertion. On the other hand, F14: -1, F:10: -2, and F7: -3 are government workers who fairly disagreed with the proposition. F20: -4 (Technical/Research) strongly opposed the claim; in the words of this participant: *the*

platforms have the capacity for interactions between government and the public, but the full potentials have not been used due to insufficient manpower.

Table 6.41: Distinguishing Statements for Factor 2 - Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2)

		Factor 1		Factor 2		Factor 3	
#	Statement	Q-SV	Z-score	Q-SV	Z-score	Q-SV	Z-score
19	SF-19: Each agency operates independently with little or no inter-agency collaboration in flood disaster early warning, response and management. Inter-agency technology and data sharing are almost non-existent.	4	2.39	4**	1.65	-1	-0.418
18	SF-18: Online platforms of emergency agencies are only for informing the public not for engaging with the public.	1	0.43	3**	1.58	-1	-0.429
5	SF-5: Meteorological, satellite hydrological and other associated data are not easily accessible to researchers and environmental NGOs without going through burdensome government bureaucracies thereby restricting complimentary data-driven analytics and decision making.	3	1.03	0*	0.52	4	1.568
9	SF-9: LASEMA and LASEPA demonstrated more active social media engagements with the public than national agencies and other state agencies.	3	1.51	-1*	-0.65	-2	-1.326
17	SF-17: In Lagos, there are robust flood data collection procedures about different wards, urban areas and informal settlements available to emergency leaders for making location-specific decisions during flood disasters.	-3	-1.76	-1**	-0.74	-4	-2.036
1	SF-1: Lagos State has the best flood preparedness plan in Nigeria combined with data from meteorological agencies, it has failed to effectively mitigate the perennial flood disasters and their impacts on the health of the people.	-1	-0.5	-2**	-1.16	0	0.146
23	SF-23: Nigeria has series of satellites in space for weather and communication. National emergency and space agencies such as NEMA, NASRDA and RECTAS have worked together to issue helpful charter calls for geospatial imaging for disaster response and damage assessments.	0	-0.09	-3**	-1.34	-1	-0.313
20	SF-20: GIS and Remote sensing are usually deployed to identify floodplain encroachment, assess flood vulnerability, and ensure strict adherence to, and enforcement of flood management policies.	-2	-0.66	-3**	-1.49	0	-0.02
7	SF-7: Lagos State is effective in flood management and provision of resources to those affected by flood disasters. There are big data used in making these effective leadership decisions.	-2	-0.59	-4**	-1.53	0	-0.303

Note: a single asterisk (*) indicates distinguished statement significance at $p<0.05$; double asterisks (**) indicates significance at $p<0.01$). Both the Factor Q-Sort Value (Q-SV) and the Z-Score (Z-SCR) are shown.

Other distinguished statements include the strong negation of the claim that *GIS and Remote sensing are usually deployed to identify floodplain encroachment, assess flood vulnerability, and ensure strict adherence to, and enforcement of flood management policies* SF-20: -3. Another negated distinguished statement is the claim that the national emergency, space, and weather agencies have worked together for

disaster response and damage assessments SF-3: -3. According to the comment of Participant F6: -4 (Male, Governmental, Mid-Level Leadership/Management):

> *The agencies worked independently more than collectively; I suspect some form of inter-agency rivalry. Unless compelled by the executive branch of government or after an embarrassing national emergency, they rarely work together.*

In the opinion of Participant F8: -3 (Male, Governmental, Senior Leadership/Management):

> *Are the satellites even working? How many decision-makers are aware of the existence of these digital infrastructures? Some of them don't even know how to operate a laptop let alone understand raster, elevation modelling, and other GIS terms.*

Participants disagreed with the statement *SF-1: Lagos State has the best flood preparedness plan in Nigeria combined with data from meteorological agencies, it has failed to effectively mitigate the perennial flood disasters and their impacts on the health of the people* -2. An examination of the raw sorts for this Factor reveals an ambivalent pattern - some as many participants disagreed with the claim as those who agreed. The comments of the participants provide a better understanding of these seeming contradictions. Nearly all the participants agreed that Lagos has failed to effectively manage flood disaster impacts on the health of its citizens, the contention seems to be more about the claim of Lagos having the best flood preparedness plan in Nigeria. The weak disagreement score of -2 of this statement tilts towards a neutral position than towards any serious disagreement. Figure 6.11 contains the visual representation of the composite Q-sorts of statements by participants or respondents who significantly loaded in Factor 2.

Summary: Factor 2 respondents agreed with the claim that there was little or no interagency collaboration and that Lagos state did not effectively harness big data technologies for floods disaster management and response. They also affirmed that disaster communication was top-down with little or no room for active engagements between the different stakeholders in disaster leadership. Academics and NGOs were excluded from data access that could have helped research to aid security-leadership decision outcome effectiveness in the given context. The full potentials of the countries' satellites have not been realised due to several factors including skilled-manpower shortages and bureaucratic bottlenecks.



Figure 6.11: Composite Q-sort for Factor 2 (Lagos Floods (Q-Study 2))

6.5.5 Factor 3 Interpretation and Viewpoints (Q-Study 2): Poor hydrological data management and Poor Early Warning Management (n=3)

Factor 3 has an eigenvalue of 1.5828 which explains 6% of the variance. Three (3) participants significantly loaded onto this factor loaded at ±0.516 to reach statistical significance at $p<0.01$. The demographic distribution of these participants as presented in Table 6.43 below is dominated mainly by governmental actors.

Table 6.43: Factor 3 Demographic Distribution (Q-Study 2)

Factor 3 Demographic Distribution			
Participant	**Sex**	**Category**	**Leadership Level**
F2	Female	Non/Inter-Governmental	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
F9	Male	Governmental	Mid-Level Leadership/Management
F19	Female	Technical/Research	Senior Leadership/Management

The respondents demonstrated an important level of agreement with the claim that hydrological satellite and meteorological data were not easily available to independent researchers and non-governmental actors thereby inhibiting complementary research that could have enhanced data-driven disaster decision-making SF-5: +4. All three participants who significantly loaded onto this factor

strongly disagreed with the proposition that Lagos state had flood data collection procedures for gathering updated and regular hydrological data across the urban, rural and occupied communities in the state that could enhanced flood management SF-17: -4.

Table 6.44: Factor interpretation crib sheet for Factor 3 (Relative Ranking of Statements in Factor 3) - Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2)

#	Highest Ranked Statements	Factor 3	Consensus /Distinguishing	Factor 1	Factor 2
5	SF-5: Meteorological, satellite hydrological and other associated data are not easily accessible to researchers and environmental NGOs without going through burdensome government bureaucracies thereby restricting complimentary data-driven analytics and decision making.	4		3	0
	Positive Statements Ranked Higher in factor 3 Array than in Other Factor Arrays				
4	SF-4: No political incentives to enforce laws that will forestall predicted flood risks in affected areas.	3		-1	2
8	SF-8: Pre-disaster information is insufficient, NEMA show more PR information of meetings and international conferences attended by principal officials, events and pictures of palliative distribution during flood disasters rather than useful early warning and mitigation information.	3	D**	0	0
13	SF-13: Flood modelling, early warning systems etc. require well-trained expertise which is not sufficiently available.	2	C**	1	1
15	SF-15: Data inconsistency is attributed to poor hydrological data management systems and lack of standards, resulting in unreliable, fabricated and data format inconsistency.	2	C*	0	0
14	SF-14: Social media users and content creators (images, memes) mock those in Lagos, especially the Lekki area because it is believed that a lot of Nigeria's rich elite reside there.	1		-1	0
1	SF-1: Lagos State has the best flood preparedness plan in Nigeria combined with data from meteorological agencies, it has failed to effectively mitigate the perennial flood disasters and their impacts on the health of the people.	0		-1	-2
12	SF-12: Citizens and local institutions (media and researcher) trust independent actors - local and foreign for information than government actors during flood disasters. They rely more on foreign databases (e.g., EM-DAT) and sources for data than on government sources.	0	C**	0	0

20	SF-20: GIS and Remote sensing are usually deployed to identify floodplain encroachment, assess flood vulnerability, and ensure strict adherence to, and enforcement of flood management policies.	0		-2	-3
7	SF-7: Lagos State is effective in flood management and provision of resources to those affected by flood disasters. There are big data used in making these effective leadership decisions.	0		-2	-4
	Negative Statements Ranked Lower in factor 3 Array than in Other Factor Arrays				
3	SF-3: There is scarcity of up-to-date data on the rising sea levels in Nigeria.	0	C**	1	2
12	SF-12: Citizens and local institutions (media and researcher) trust independent actors - local and foreign for information than government actors during flood disasters. They rely more on foreign databases (e.g., EM-DAT) and sources for data than on government sources.	0	C**	0	0
19	SF-19: Each agency operates independently with little or no inter-agency collaboration in flood disaster early warning, response and management. Inter-agency technology and data sharing are almost non-existent.	-1	D**	4	4
18	SF-18: Online platforms of emergency agencies are only for informing the public not for engaging with the public.	-1	D**	1	3
6	SF-6: Flood emergency preparedness agencies hardly take flood predictions and warnings made by Nigerian Hydrological Agency and NiMet seriously because disaster response is more lucrative than preparedness and mitigation.	-2	D**	2	2
9	SF-9: LASEMA and LASEPA demonstrated more active social media engagements with the public than national agencies and other state agencies.	-2	D*	3	-1
11	SF-11: There are popular independent websites for correcting fake news, misinformation and for actively engaging citizens during flood disasters.	-3	C**	-2	-2
	Lowest Ranked Statements				
17	SF-17: In Lagos, there are robust flood data collection procedures about different wards, urban areas and informal settlements available to emergency leaders for making location-specific decisions during flood disasters.	-4		-3	-1

Note: a single asterisk (*) indicates distinguished statement significance at $p<0.05$; double asterisks (**) indicates distinguished statement significance at $p<0.01$).

They are distinguished ($p<0.01$) by their perspectives that early warning communication was insufficient. They also opined that NEMA's public information processes focused more on public-image laundering rather than effective pre-disaster

information management. This supposition is supported by the predominance of pictures of meetings attended, and palliative distributions embarked upon by senior bureaucrats. Spaces and efforts could have been devoted to active citizenship engagements, particularly during pre-disaster preparation SF-8: +3. Participants were also distinguished by statement SF-18 ($p<0.01$) which posited that online digital platforms were only for informing the public rather than engaging with the public (-1). The raw sorts for this statement did not suggest any serious negation; instead, its near neutrality indicates some inherent contentions that are not necessarily strong enough to tilt the balance of agreement either way (F2: -1, F9: 0, F19: -1).

The logical decision should tilt towards the ranked values for SF-8 since both propositions are similar to some degree. The comments of the three participants highlight this decision as they all agree that the platform did not engage with the public as it should. They disagreed with the suggestion that these platforms informed the public to any significant degree. Hence, their almost neutral rating. From these, comments, it is glaring that they agree with the proposition that the quality of information dissemination was not encouraging. The other distinguished positions suggest a mild disagreement with the idea that LASEMA and LASEPA – two Lagos environment agencies engaged more actively than their national counterparts; although this rating is relatively weak SF-9: -2. They also suggested that these agencies do not take predictions from NiMET and the National Hydrological Agency seriously thereby preventing effective decision interventions that could have curtailed the flood disasters SF-6: -2. Figure 6.12 contains the visual representation of the composite Q-sorts of statements by participants or respondents who significantly loaded in Factor 3.



Figure 6.12: Composite Q-sort for Factor 3 (Lagos Floods (Q-Study 3))

Summary: The respondents on this factor sided with the proposition that distributed leadership is lacking in the management of flood disasters. There was an absence or weak shared collaborations between academic researchers and government hydrological data agencies. The Lagos State emergency and environmental agencies were relatively active digitally compared with their national counterparts. They also lacked distributed data collection measures across the different communities within the state. The National agencies had poor information dissemination quality because quite often the digital infrastructure was top-down. They were without a distributed conversation characteristic that could have engendered citizens' engagements and promoted all-encompassing interactions.

6.6 Summary of Q-Methodology Results

Several thematic perspectives (factors) emerged in this chapter; for the Lagos 2014 Ebola Study (Study 1), they include,

i. Distributed Leadership and Big Data Technologies Adoption,
ii. Information Quality and Digital Technologies Access and Positionality
iii. Active Distributed Conversation,
iv. Digital Infrastructure and Data Availability Issues, and
v. Insufficient Big Data Analytics manpower.

Distributed Leadership (DIST_LEAD) and distributed conversation (DIST_CONV) featured consistently in the viewpoints expressed by the participants. All the participants across the different leadership spectrum agreed that big data technologies played a significant role in the successful fight against the virus. The location and position of Lagos as the technological and economic capital of the country was identified as a factor that positively impacted the state's leadership decision outcome during the epidemic.

No doubt that Study 1 is a typical example of effective security-leadership decision-making outcome in the context of disaster situations involving the use of big data and digital technologies. The perspectives further enhance the findings from the analysis of necessity of fsQCA and NCA in the previous chapter that highly effective distributed conversation (DIST_CONV) and a highly effective information quality (INFO_QUAL) are necessary for effective outcome in the context mentioned above.

On the 2012 and 2017 floods, the perspectives which emanated from the Q-methodology factor analysis are:

i. Inter-Agency collaboration deficit,
ii. Weak political will and incentives,
iii. Sociocultural perception of risks,
iv. Data exclusion and inaccessibility,
v. Poor hydrological data management,
vi. Poor Early Warning Management

These perspectives summarise all the reasons adduced for leadership decision-making outcome ineffectiveness in this exemplar. They typified what to expect in ineffective security-leadership decision-making in disaster situations involving the use of big data and digital technologies.

CHAPTER 7

Discussion and Conclusion

7.1 Synthesis of Findings

This thesis set out to answer questions related to the aforestated objectives. This chapter holds the synthesis and interpretations of the findings from the results of the analyses to relate them to the questions and aims of this research. How these relate to the theory of change described in Chapter 4 as well as how they relate or otherwise to extant literature are also considered in this chapter. Equally important to this chapter is how the Q-methodology of the two cases of the 2014 Lagos Ebola epidemic and Flood disasters (2012-2017) in Chapter 6 fit the fsQCA and the NCA models presented in Chapter 5.

Most of the literature on big data and crisis/disaster leadership focus on the decision process, the decision tools, disaster management, or at best on impacts as effectiveness. All these are captured in the systematic literature review discussed in chapter 2. There is no doubting the fact that there are significant works done on big data use in disaster management but there are gaps in the literature on systematic interrogation of the factors that are necessary for outcome effectiveness differentials.[396,397]

A major gap that motivated this thesis is the paucity of literature on big data and disaster leadership in Africa. This deficit has been filled by studies commissioned on the subject by scholars outside of the continent. Very often, working on secondary data garnered from sources that are collected by institutions that themselves are headquartered in capital cities of the global north e.g., ACLED, EM-DAT etc. Since all disasters are local, most of the dominant research done globally on big data and natural hazard related disaster management were done by scholars domiciled in the countries where the disasters occurred except for Africa. 70.59% of the American authors reviewed research that studied natural hazard related disasters in the United

[396] Akter, S., & Wamba, S. F., (2019), Big Data and Disaster Management: A Systematic Review and Agenda for Future Research. *Annals of Operations Research*, *283*(1), pp. 939-959.
[397] Yu, M., Yang, C., & Li, Y., (2018), Big Data in Natural Disaster Management: A Review. *Geosciences*, *8*(5), p. 1-26.

States. Apart from the fact that the literature pool is dominated by disaster management, leadership outcome variation is rarely ever studied.

Before proceeding with discussing the thesis findings, it is important to restate the main research question. The primary objectives are to explore the differences in security leaders decision-making outcome differentials involving the use of big data digital technologies during disaster situations. While also investigating the factors, which contribute to the choices or alternatives made by security leaders in these disaster situations. Lastly, to examine the causal configuration or pathways of these factors concerning the differential outcomes.

To address these research objectives, this main research question was developed: within situations where leadership decides disaster outcomes variations and uses digital technologies and big data, is there something about the way that they use big data and digital technologies that explains these outcomes variations? Sometimes 'given context' is used as a replacement phrase for this context in this thesis. This main research question is expounded by these sub-questions:

i. What factors underpin these outcome variations?
ii. How do big data and digital technologies produce these outcome variations in crisis situations?

7.2 Why do big data and digital technologies produce variations in security-leadership decision-making outcomes in crisis situations?

7.2.1 Re-evaluating Security-Leadership Effectiveness and Outcome

A crucial point to note is that the literature assumes a positive outlook of big data impacts on security leadership in decision situations. There is hardly any work that assesses big data or digital technologies negatively when discussing disaster management. It is almost a given that where big data or digital technologies are mentioned, the decision-making is going to be automatically possible. But findings from this thesis challenge this opinion. It must be stated that most assessments take place after the fact, and leadership is rarely interrogated; instead, human and material losses are the parameters for assessing broader impacts. This is not to say that

leadership effectiveness is not studied at all. But in the context of big data and digital technologies intervention during disaster or crisis situations, the assessment is nearly always positive.

Another point to note is the dualism of outcome assessments. Leadership outcomes are considered either effective or ineffective with little consideration for the complexities surrounding those valuations. This thesis shows that there are different levels of effectiveness and ineffectiveness. Furthermore, in crisis or disaster situations, it is difficult to ascertain the levels of effectiveness of a leadership decision outcome in the absolutes given that most value-judgements are subjective.

This subjectivity beclouds most discussion on the subject since the authors often ascribe or impose a particular notion of what success should be on their valuation of leadership outcome. Quite often, scholars project vagueness when proposing leadership effectiveness – this effectiveness is rarely ever defined. At best they are subsumed in the researcher's understanding of the term. I disambiguated the conditions or factors responsible for the outcomes using the literature, reports, news articles, reviews etc. I also defined outcome effectiveness and ineffectiveness. I did this to create a boundary of hermeneutic interpretation which restricts the adoption of the final theoretical model to the meanings intended.

The default position is to equate desired outcome or success with outcome effectiveness. Every so often, this is not the case because of the diverse perception of reality by humans. Hence, unpacking the outcome and conditions is not an overplay but an assurance of mutual conceptual comprehensibility. But it is dictated by the literature, reports, public interpretation encased in news articles, reviews and other instruments of analysis described in the thesis.

The prevailing idea of leadership effectiveness is broadly based on personality or contingency. Assessments of leadership performance outcome or effectiveness are derived from the perception of distant observers or the principal actor's subordinates. To achieve this assessment, immediate followers are asked to rate the performance of their superiors with questions largely influenced by the trait and behavioural theories of leadership.

The other perspective to understanding leadership outcome is situation-dependent e.g., Fiedler Contingency Model and Hersey-Blanchard Situational Leadership Theory. A variant of this situation or contingency evaluation of leadership effectiveness is reliant on the dominant cultural context of the environments where

the leadership is exercised. This is reflected in the findings in Chapter 6. Jun Yan and James G. (Jerry) Hunt showed five cultural dimensions to leadership perception in a cross-cultural context; namely: collectivism/individualism, power distance, masculinity/femininity, uncertainty avoidance, and fatalism.[398]

In Eastern and Asian countries such as China and Japan where the dominant culture is collectivism; regardless of the outcome of leadership decision-making, self-effacing leadership that is group-based is valued more than individualistic leadership. The success or failure of an outcome is seen from the prism of the group collective. Conformity to social norms is valued more than individual achievements; this is in sharp contrast to the personal or individualism of most western societies. Intricately linked to this is the power distance continuum, in high power distance societies, which valued hierarchies. Leadership effectiveness is considered from the point of view of paternalism.

Most African societies and India are in this category. A good or an effective leader is that person usually a man who can project a father-figure image. "No one will deny the fatherhood of a father simply because of his unsatisfactory performance."[399] In these societies, a leader's effectiveness is judged from their ability to supply support and project a fatherly image to their subordinates. In societies with low power distance, paternalistic deference is out of the question when considering leadership effectiveness. It is all about the individual achievements of the leaders.

As indicated in Chapter 6, another perspective under the cultural perception of leadership effectiveness is uncertainty avoidance and fatalism. Risk-averse cultures will consider as irresponsible any outcome of a leadership decision regardless of their positive outlook if the entire process is perceived as highly risky. In highly fatalistic societies, success or failure is attributed to some outside deciding forces or predestination unlike in low fatalistic culture. The prevailing culture in many African and oriental societies is largely fatalistic and risk-averse. In Nigeria for example, most cultures attribute all outcomes to God, this partly explains why most people do not have insurance policies even for their businesses. Only 1 per cent of Nigerians have health insurance.[400] This social-cultural factor regarding risk perception during a

[398] Yan, J., & Hunt, J. G. J., (2005), A Cross Cultural Perspective on Perceived Leadership Effectiveness. *International Journal of Cross-Cultural Management*, *5*(1), pp. 49-66.
[399] Ibid
[400] Nsofor, Ifeanyi (2018), Opinion: Only 1 percent of Nigerians have health insurance. Here's how to change that. Devex. Available from https://www.devex.com/news/opinion-only-1-percent-of-nigerians-have-health-insurance-here-s-how-to-change-that-92441 [accessed 15 December 2018]

disaster was recognised in the findings of Sonja Ayeb-Karlsson *et al*. on the Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh in 2007 where the response to early warning messaging was "God will protect us."[401]

Leaders are believed to be divinely chosen and rationalism does not always necessarily play out in the evaluation of leadership outcome effectiveness. This probably explains why despite the revelation of massive looting attributed to the country's former maximum ruler Sani Abacha, there are still public buildings named after him in Nigeria. The narrative of heroic leadership conceptualisation is also different. While activists in western societies are agitating for the pulling down of statues commemorating slave owners, their counterparts such as Jaja of Opobo, Efunroye Tinubu and Uthman Dan Fodio still have institutions and statutes named after them in Nigeria to date.

To suggest or rate these leaders as bad or ineffective leaders might generate mass uprising. This is in agreement with the observation of Jun Yan and James G. (Jerry) Hun – "effective leadership depends not only on the adequate administration of rewards and technical abilities of a leader, but also on how the leader's subordinates, peers, or even superiors interpret these actions."[402]

To circumvent these cultural constraints, I focused all the questions on the decision-making rather than on the decision-maker. Leadership surveys instruments such as Bernard Bass' and Bruce Avolio's Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ), Bass' Transformational Leadership Questionnaire (TLQ), Leadership Traits Questionnaire (LTQ) by Peter G. Northouse and Path-Goal Leadership Questionnaire by Julie Indvik may not yield validly sufficient results because of the considerations discussed above. Therefore, while researching leadership outcome effectiveness including in the given context, rather than focus on personality assessments, subjectivity instruments like Q-Methodology should be adopted solely or to complement other approaches as I did in this thesis.

7.3 What factors underpin these outcome variations?

[401] Ayeb-Karlsson, Sonja, Dominic Kniveton, Terry Cannon, Kees van der Geest, Istiakh Ahmed, Erin M. Derrington, Ebinezer Florano, and Denis Opiyo Opondo (2019). I Will Not Go, I Cannot Go: Cultural and Social Limitations of Disaster Preparedness in Asia, Africa, and Oceania. *Disasters* 43(4), pp. 752-770.
[402] See Yan, J., & Hunt, J. G. J., (2005)

A multimethod research approach was used to address the outlined objectives and questions. Tobit regression analysis in conjunction with fsQCA and NCA help to see how various levels of the conditions or variables contribute to the various levels of outcomes as against the general supposition of un-granulated variable affecting specific fixed outcomes. The result from the Tobit regression suggests that the combination of a highly effective disaster preparation (DIST_PREP), strong distributed conversation (DIST_CONV) and a high Information Quality (INFO_QUAL) will most likely lead to effective or successful security-leadership decision-making in disaster situations (OUTCOME) involving the deployment of big data technologies. This was confirmed quite significantly by the findings from both the NCA and the fsQCA. Tobit regression helped developed a proto-hypothesis which combined with the theory of change (ToC) led to the development of the various hypotheses of necessary conditions.

The analysis of necessary conditions results shows that high or strong distributed conversation (DIST_CONV) and high information quality (INFO_QUAL) are independently necessary for effective security-leadership decision-making outcome in the given context. Whenever a successful or effective outcome is present in the data matrix of disaster events, these two are bound to be present. Findings reveal that the deployment of big data technologies is not sufficient for leadership decision-making outcome effectiveness. Where effectiveness is noticed, these two conditions are necessary.

Contrary to expectations, that the ineffective outcome should be guaranteed by the absence of the necessary conditions, except for information quality, the absence of distributed conversation does not explain an ineffective outcome. Findings from this thesis show that the necessary conditions for ineffective leadership outcomes in the given context are different. They include low or absence of distributed leadership (~DIST_LEAD), ineffective or absence of disaster preparation (~DIS_PREP), and low information quality (~INFO_QUAL). The absence of these conditions portends ineffective leadership outcomes.

These conditions help explain outcome ineffectiveness in security-leadership decision-making outcomes involving the use of big data and digital technologies. Without effective or strong distributed leadership, the outcome will most likely be ineffective. The same extends to the other identified necessary conditions. The absence

of, or ineffective disaster preparation or early warning, guarantees ineffective outcome. The same applies to poor information quality.

7.4 How do big data and digital technologies produce these outcome variations in crisis situations?

This question demands a causal configuration approach. The sufficiency solution models for both effective and ineffective outcomes discussed in Chapter 5 address this question. I was able to establish that no single model or causal pathway can be adduced for the outcomes. There are different sufficient solution models for explaining how big data influence the different outcome variations.

Three solution paths came out to sufficiently explain outcome effectiveness. They are sufficient because on their own and in that causal formation, there is a high likelihood for effective security-leadership decision-making outcomes involving big data and digital technologies. The first path is the combination of highly distributed leadership (DIST_LEAD) and high information quality assurance (INFO_QUAL) (DIST_LEAD*INFO_QUAL -> OUTCOME). The second path is the combination of highly distributed conversation (DIST_CONV), high information quality assurance (INFO_QUAL) and high democratic status (DEMO_STATUS):
DIST_CONV*INFO_QUAL*DEMO_STATUS -> OUTCOME. Lastly, is highly distributed leadership (DIST_LEAD) and high distributed conversation (DIST_CONV) with big data technology access (BTECH_ACCESS) and high democratic status of the disaster event country (DEMO_STATUS):
DIST_LEAD*DIST_CONV*BTECH_ACCESS*DEMO_STATUS -> OUTCOME.

Any of the three listed paths is sufficient for an effective outcome. There are typical cases that exemplify the different paths. Table 5.16 and the XY Plot in Figure 5.10 showcase these example cases.

For ineffective outcomes, there are two sufficient paths for explaining security-leadership decision-making outcomes involving big data and digital technologies in crisis situations. The first is the combination of low or absent distributed leadership (~DIST_LEAD) and low/absent distributed conversation (~DIST_CONV) with low/missing information quality (~INFO_QUAL); that is,
~DIST_LEAD*~DIST_CONV*~INFO_QUAL -> ~OUTCOME. The second path for explaining ineffective outcomes is the combination of low or absent distributed

leadership (~DIST_LEAD) and low/absent disaster preparation (~DIS_PREP) with low/missing big data technologies access (~BTECH_ACCESS): ~DIST_LEAD*~DIS_PREP*~BTECH_ACCESS -> ~OUTCOME. Table 5.18 and the XY Plot in Figure 5.1i showcase the example cases for illustrating these causal pathways.

Other than the fsQCA configuration results for sufficiency discussed above, the Q-Methodology provides an opportunity for assessing subjective opinions of influential actors in the security-leadership decision-making process in the two sample cases. This exercise allows the thesis to minimally verify the theoretical models using selected cases with effective and ineffective outcomes.

Results from the Lagos Ebola Q-Methodology study reveal that distributed leadership loaded significantly and consistently on the factors or perspectives summaries. The aggregation of the viewpoints in the Q-sorts by the participants show that this condition features dominantly in explaining an effective outcome. This is clear from the most agreed statements in the concourse as depicted in Table 6.20. These participants strongly affirm the opinion that the country's surveillance system encouraged recognition of local leadership in the disease outbreak containment. 7 participants highly rated this opinion, 4 of them scored the opinion very highly (SE-28: +4) in Factor 1 of the Q-Results. Although this finding is consistent with the fsQCA results, it must be noted that all the participants who rated this statement highly work for the government. Their limited number and their work status notwithstanding - since they were anonymised and they all ranked at different times and location - this consistency, provide some form of validation for the opinion.

Another validation for this position can be found in the statement with the most disagreed rating in the same factor or perspective (i.e., Factor 1). They strongly objected to the idea that the leadership process in the 2014 Lagos Ebola outbreak management was not adaptive (SE-24). This is a control question that validates SE-28. The rating of -4 for this SE-24 suggests strong disagreements with the opinion. Collectively, these judgments support the attribution of effectiveness to distributed leadership as a condition for the leadership effectiveness recorded during the Ebola outbreak. Aside from Factor 1, Factors 3 and 4 have respondents that respectively strongly agreed with the opinion that distributed leadership influence the success or effectiveness of the Lagos Ebola outbreak leadership process in the given context.

Quality Information assurance was strongly recognised by participants who shared the view (Factor 2) that rumours and misinformation about the Ebola virus were dispelled and that this contributed to the eventual leadership outcome success (SE-6: +4). Tied to this is the strong affirmation of the place of Lagos as a digital access savvy state which positions it to be able to effectively manage the outbreak (SE-18: +4). A look at the two statements that the respondents who loaded on Factor 2 most disagreed with is consistent with this position. They strongly objected to the opinion that digital technologies and big data did not significantly impact effective security-leadership decision-making in the Ebola outbreak (SE-31: -4). Not to disagree with this opinion would have invalidated the agreements in SE-18. They also objected to the claim that information quality was outdated (SE-3: -4). The respondents who subscribe to these opinions worked outside of government – they were media, NGO, and academic personnel. Their acknowledgement is strong support for information quality as a condition for effective outcomes in the given context.

The Distributed conversation condition also featured prominently in Factors 3 and 4 of perspectives by respondents in the Ebola Q-Study as responsible for the outcome effectiveness. These conditions are consistent with the fsQCA, NCA and to a large extent the Tobit Regression. In the fsQCA sufficiency solution paths (See Table 5.16) especially solution path 1a, these conditions are identified in the causal models. Insufficient big data analytics manpower and problems of availability and accessibility of data are some of the issues raised by respondents in the Q-Study. They also identified poor data systems which limit contributions from researchers and non-government actors. Although these were not enough to significantly affect the effectiveness of the outcome, it is important to note them for future studies.

Factors 2 and 3 strongly emphasise data exclusion and inaccessibility, poor hydrological data management as contributing to ineffective leadership decision-making outcomes noticed during the flood disasters. Aside from these, other conditions include weak political will or incentives for making decisions that could mitigate the flood vulnerabilities. Destroying private properties erected on flood plains and embarkments could threaten the political capital or base of the party in government. On political incentives, disaster response is more lucrative and put the leaders in a good spotlight than disaster prevention.

Poor early warning management or disaster preparation is also recognised as significant for causing ineffective security-leadership decision-making outcomes. All

these are despite the use of big data and digital technologies in the decision-making process. These Q-Methodology findings for Study 2 corroborate paths 2a and 2b of the fsQCA sufficiency solution for outcome infectiveness; that is,

~DIST_LEAD*~DIST_CONV*~INFO_QUAL -> ~OUTCOME

and ~DIST_LEAD*~DIS_PREP*~BTECH_ACCESS -> ~OUTCOME.

All these findings explain the conditions and configurational pathways for outcome effectiveness and ineffectiveness in the given context. The findings also justify my adoption of the multimethod approach for answering the thesis questions. It must be restated that there are multiple explanations for explaining social phenomena (equifinality). Rather than provide specific variables as responsible for the variations in outcome effectiveness or ineffectiveness, I have been able to identify different sufficient explanatory theoretical models for explaining these outcome differentials.

7.5 Implications for Theory and Policy

As noted earlier in this chapter, there is insufficient research on Big data security-leadership decision-making in disaster situations in Africa. This thesis addresses this gap. Although the two micro-cases do not permit extensive generalisability; nonetheless, placed against the background of the 37 cases from across the world, the findings in this thesis attend to the paucity. More importantly, this thesis contributes a methodological innovativeness to the study of security-leadership and disaster management especially in small- and medium-N cases involving the use of big data and digital technologies.

Another significant contribution to theory is the recognition of cultural context for defining leadership outcome effectiveness. Although several pieces of literature as noted earlier in this chapter focused on this issue, the application to Africa and big data and digital technologies security-leadership decision-making is missing.

Furthermore, the explanatory theoretical models in the thesis contribute to the broader discussion on security-leadership outcome effectiveness and ineffectiveness. Rather than cherry-picking grand theories that may not be relevant to the developing countries of Africa, I have developed micro-theories to make sense of the research questions. These models will help future researchers who want to study the subject. Another contribution is the systematic review of literature as well as the development of the conceptual network maps which I sued to develop a theory of change (ToC) for

structuring existing opinion from the literature on the subjects of interest. All these will aid future theory and research on security-leadership decision-making outcome differentials.

On Policy contribution, findings from this thesis have implications for understanding why certain government disaster decisions fail and why others succeed. The causal configurations and models also provide abridged frameworks for formulating an effective security-leadership response in situations of large-scale insecurities. The power matrix developed in the Q-Methodology can serve as a template for determining mandatory actors whose contributions can impact outcome effectiveness. This also enables the identification of influential actors for strategic decision-making in rapidly evolving disaster events.

7.6 Limitations of Study and Opportunity for future Research

The limitation of this study is primarily centred on the limited cases studied which restricted external validity, especially for the Q-Methodology research approach**.** I was able to address this with the multi-method design that enabled me to combine the strengths of the other methods such as Tobit Regression and fsQCA. The weakness is mitigated through this approach. Despite this fact, the findings are for limited generalisability. Adding more cases, especially to the fsQCA is an opportunity that future research can address - this will extend the generalisability.

I excluded percentage economic cost and percentage fatalities as conditions because of inadequate data that are relevant to the disaster location. There are national data records on GDP and fatalities; but, narrowing down to the local sites of the disaster events especially in developing countries was problematic. Future researchers with access to these data might want to investigate the roles of these conditions to the outcome variations.

7.7 Conclusion

In conclusion, this thesis has explained why some security-leadership decision-making outcomes are effective and others are ineffective in the context of disasters involving the use of big data and digital technologies. I have also identified factors that are necessary for the outcome effectiveness and ineffectiveness in the aforestated

context. Finally, using multiple research approaches, I have established different theoretical models and casual configurations for explaining how these conditions influence big data security-leadership decision-making outcome effectiveness and ineffectiveness in disaster situations.

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APPENDIX

Appendix 1: Ethical Approval – National Health Research Ethics Committee of Nigeria

National Health Research Ethics Committee of Nigeria (NHREC)

Promoting Highest Ethical and Scientific Standards for Health Research in Nigeria

Federal Ministry of Health

NHREC Protocol Number NHREC/01/01/2007-20/08/2019
NHREC Approval Number NHREC/01/01/2007-04/09/2019
Date: 04 September, 2019

Re: Big, Data, Digital Technologies, Security Leadership Decision-making in the context of Large-Scale Insecurities

Health Research Committee assigned number: NHREC/01/01/2007

Name of Student Investigator: Peter Damiloa, ADEGOKE

Address of Student Investigator: African Leadership Center
Faculty of Social Science and Public Policy
King's College London
Email: damilola.adegoke@kcl.ac.uk
Tel: +4479187485546

Date of receipt of valid application: 30/07/2019
Date when final determination of research was made: 04-09-2019

Notice of Expedited Committee Review and Approval

This is to inform you that the research described in the submitted protocol, the consent forms, advertisements and other participant information materials have been reviewed and *given expedited committee approval by the National Health Research Ethics Committee.*

This approval dates from 04/09/2019 to 03/09/2020. If there is delay in starting the research, please inform the HREC so that the dates of approval can be adjusted accordingly. Note that no participant accrual or activity related to this research may be conducted outside of these dates. *All informed consent forms used in this study must carry the HREC assigned number and duration of HREC approval of the study.* In multiyear research, endeavour to submit your annual report to the HREC early in order to obtain renewal of your approval and avoid disruption of your research.

The National Code for Health Research Ethics requires you to comply with all institutional guidelines, rules and regulations and with the tenets of the Code including ensuring that all adverse events are reported promptly to the HREC. No changes are permitted in the research without prior approval by the HREC except in circumstances outlined in the Code. The HREC reserves the right to conduct compliance visit to your research site without previous notification.

Signed

Professor Zubairu Iliyasu MBBS (UniMaid), MPH (Glasg.), PhD (Shef.), FWACP, FMCPH
Chairman, National Health Research Ethics Committee of Nigeria (NHREC)

Department of Health Planning, Research & Statistics
Federal Ministry of Health
11th Floor, Federal Secretariat Complex Phase III
Ahmadu Bello Way, Abuja

Tel: +234-09-523-8367
E-mail: chairman@nhrec.net, secretary@nhrec.net, deskofficer@nhrec.net,
URL: http://www.nhrec.net,

Appendix 2: Human Research Ethics Certificate

Completion Date 05-Sep-2019
Expiration Date 04-Sep-2021
Record ID 33114522

This is to certify that:

Damilola Adegoke

Has completed the following CITI Program course:

Not valid for renewal of certification through CME.

Human Research
(Curriculum Group)
Group 4 - Students
(Course Learner Group)
1 - Basic Course
(Stage)

Under requirements set by:

West African Bioethics Training Program

CITI
Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative

Verify at www.citiprogram.org/verify/?wc977f775-136c-4564-bbf9-2883030a930a-33114522

Appendix 3: Interview Access and Approval – Lagos State Government



LAGOS STATE GOVERNMENT

LSMH/HMIS/CS.47/II/155

10th September, 2019.

Mr. Damilola Adegoke,
African Leadership Centre,
Faculty of Social Science and Public Policy,
King's College, London.

RE: REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW ACCESS

I hereby convey the approval of the Ministry of Health to conduct your study in Lagos and permission to interview management staff on the procedures before and after emergency/crisis situations.

2. On completion of the study, kindly ensure the research findings are shared with the Ministry.

Thank you.

Dr. Emmanuella Zamba
Director, Healthcare Planning, Research and Statistics
For: Permanent Secretary (Health)

MINISTRY OF HEALTH

Block 4, The Secretariat, Alausa, Ikeja. P. M. B. 21007, Ikeja. Tel/Fax No: 234-1-4969061
Website: www.lagosstateministryofhealth.com

Appendix 4: Consent Form for Participants in Research Studies - KCL

K1637785 – 22/01/2018
Health Research Committee assigned number: NHREC/01/01/2007
NHREC Approval Number: NHREC/01/01/2007-04/09/2019
Approval Dates: from 04/09/2019 to 03/09/2020

CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES

Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened to an explanation about the research.

KING'S College LONDON

Title of Study:

_____

King's College Research Ethics Committee Ref: _____

Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any time.

	Please tick or initial
I confirm that I understand that by ticking/initialling each box I am consenting to this element of the study. I understand that it will be assumed that unticked/initialled boxes mean that I DO NOT consent to that part of the study. I understand that by not giving consent for any one element I may be deemed ineligible for the study.	☐

	Please tick or initial
1. ***I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated [K1637785 - 22/01/2018] for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information and asked questions which have been answered satisfactorily.**	☐
2. ***I understand that I will be able to withdraw my data up to 4 weeks after my interview.**	☐
3. ***I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained to me. I understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the terms of the UK Data Protection Act 1998.**	☐
4. ***I understand that my information may be subject to review by responsible individuals from the College for monitoring and audit purposes.**	☐
5. **I understand that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it will not be possible to identify me in any publications** ***OR***	☐

6. **Anonymity is optional for this research. Please select from the following 3 options:**

    a. **I agree to be fully identified** ☐

    b. **I agree to be partially identified** ☐

    c. **I wish to remain anonymous** ☐

7. I agree to be contacted in the future by King's College London researchers who would like to invite me to participate in follow up studies to this project, or in future studies of a similar nature. ☐

8. I agree that the research team may use my data for future research and understand that any such use of identifiable data would be reviewed and approved by a research ethics committee. (In such cases, as with this project, data would/would not be identifiable in any report). ☐

9. I understand that the information I have submitted will be published as a report and I wish to receive a copy of it. ☐

10. I consent to my interview being audio/video recorded. ☐

11. I understand that I must not take part if I fall under the exclusion criteria as detailed in the information sheet and explained to me by the researcher. ☐

12. I agree to maintain the confidentiality of focus group discussions ☐

13. I understand that confidentiality cannot be guaranteed during the [focus group/team work/intervention/…] ☐

14. I understand that I will be able to withdraw my data up to 4 weeks after my interview ☐

_____	_____	_____
Name of Participant	**Date**	**Signature**
_____	_____	_____
Name of Researcher	**Date**	**Signature**

Appendix 5: Semi-Structured Interview Guide

Q1: In what ways have big data or digital technologies influenced your decision-making processes in crisis situations e.g., in flood disaster response or Ebola disease outbreak?

Q2: How do you assess the outcome(s) of your decision-making process in crisis situations involving the use of data or digital technologies?

Q3: In your opinion, how well do you think any of the big data and digital technologies have impacted your crisis leadership and decision-making in situations of large-scale insecurities?

Q4: Do early warning data access help your leadership response in crisis situations and do big data mitigate the disaster/crisis outcomes?

Q5: In your opinion, what are the preferred information and data mechanisms for leaders in crisis situations?

Q6: How would you rate the impact of big data on security leadership in crisis situations?

a. Very good
b. Good
c. Fairly good
d. Not good at all
e. I do not Know

Appendix 6: List of Search Queries

Database	Search Query	Result
Scopus	TITLE-ABS-KEY (leader* AND "big data" AND "crisis situation" OR "disaster" OR insecurit*) AND (LIMIT-TO (DOCTYPE , "ar ")) AND (LIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA , "EART ") OR LIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA , " SOCI "))	1
Scopus	**TITLE-ABS-KEY** (*"Big Data"* OR *"Social media"* AND *"Large-scale-insecurities"* OR *"Crisis Situations"* OR *"Natural Disaster"*) AND (**LIMIT-TO** (**DOCTYPE** , *"ar"*)) AND (**LIMIT-TO** (**SUBJAREA** , *"SOCI"*) OR **LIMIT-TO** (**SUBJAREA** , *"DECI"*) OR **LIMIT-TO** (**SUBJAREA** , *"EART"*) OR **LIMIT-TO** (**SUBJAREA** , *"ENVI"*)) AND (**LIMIT-TO** (**LANGUAGE** , *"English"*)) AND (**LIMIT-TO** (**SRCTYPE** , *"j"*))	83
Scopus	(**TITLE-ABS-KEY** (*"Big Data"* OR *"Digital Technology"*) AND **TITLE-ABS-KEY** (*"crisis decision making"* OR *"disaster management"* OR *"emergency management"* OR *"crisis leadership"*)) AND (**LIMIT-TO** (**DOCTYPE** , *"ar"*)) AND (**LIMIT-TO** (**SUBJAREA** , *"SOCI"*) OR **LIMIT-TO** (**SUBJAREA** , *"DECI"*) OR **LIMIT-TO** (**SUBJAREA** , *"EART"*) OR **LIMIT-TO** (**SUBJAREA** , *"ENVI"*)) AND (**LIMIT-TO** (**LANGUAGE** , *"English"*)) AND (**LIMIT-TO** (**SRCTYPE** , *"j"*))	16
Scopus	TITLE-ABS-KEY (*"Big Data"* AND *"Ebola"* OR *"disease"*) AND DOCTYPE (*ar*) AND PUBYEAR > *2009* AND (LIMIT-TO (SRCTYPE , *"j "*) OR LIMIT-TO (SRCTYPE , *" d "*)) AND (LIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA , *"SOCI "*) OR LIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA , *" MULT "*)) AND (LIMIT-TO (LANGUAGE , *"English "*))	49
Scopus	TITLE-ABS-KEY (*"Big Data"* AND *"Ebola"*) AND DOCTYPE (*ar*) AND PUBYEAR > *2009*	9
Scopus	*{Big Data}* AND *"crisis management"* AND (LIMIT-TO (SRCTYPE , *"j "*)) AND (LIMIT-	146

TO (DOCTYPE , *"ar "*)) AND (LIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA , *"SOCI "*) OR LIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA , "

	BUSI ") OR LIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA , *" EART "*) OR LIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA , *" ENVI "*) OR LIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA , *" DECI "*)) AND (LIMIT-TO (LANGUAGE , *"English "*))	
Scopus	*"leadership effectiveness"* AND *"crisis situations"*	88
Science Direct	big data AND decision-making AND natural disaster OR crisis situation **Refine by: Years:** 2009-2017; **Article type:** Review articles and Original research	848
Science Direct	crisis management AND big data **Refine by: Years:** 2009-2017; **Article type:** Review articles and Original research; **Publication title:** Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Energy Policy, Journal of Cleaner Production, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Geoforum, World Development	1553
ProQuest Social Science Premium Collection	(Big data) AND (crisis management) AND (natural disaster) **Applied filters:** Article OR Peer reviewed OR Study, Scholarly journals, 2009-2017, English	1022
PsycINFO	big data AND decision-making AND natural disaster OR crisis situation	2158
Web of Science	(TS=(social media AND decision-making AND natural disaster*)) *AND* **DOCUMENT TYPES:** (Article) *Indexes=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH, ESCI Timespan=2009-2017*	
Google Scholar	("big data") AND ("natural disaster" OR "crisis situation") AND ("management")	3060

Appendix 7: Quality Appraisal Framework

Study being appraised: .....

	a) Appraisal questions	b) Quality indicators (possible features for consideration)	c) Rating
1 **FINDINGS**	How credible are the findings?	Findings/conclusions are supported by data/study evidence *(i.e. the reader can see how the researcher arrived at his/her conclusions; the 'building blocks' of analysis and interpretation are evident)* Findings/conclusions 'make sense'/have a coherent logic Findings/conclusions are resonant with other knowledge and experience *(this might include peer or member review)* Use of corroborating evidence to support or refine findings (i.e. other data sources have been used to examine phenomena; other research evidence has been evaluated: see also Q14)	
2 **FINDINGS**	How has knowledge/ understanding been extended by the research?	Literature review (where appropriate) summarising knowledge to date/key issues raised by previous research Aims and design of study set in the context of existing knowledge/ understanding; identifies new areas for investigation *(for example, in relation to policy/practice/substantive theory)* Credible/clear discussion of how findings have contributed to knowledge and understanding *(e.g. of the policy, programme or theory being reviewed);* developments, practice or theory Findings presented or conceptualised in a way that offers new insights/alternative ways of thinking Discussion of limitations of evidence and what remains unknown/unclear or what further information/research is needed	

	a) Appraisal questions	b) Quality indicators (possible features for consideration)	c) Rating
3 **FINDINGS**	How well does the evaluation address its original aims and purpose?	Clear statement of study aims and objectives; reasons for any changes in objectives Findings clearly linked to the purposes of the study – and to the initiative or policy being studied Summary or conclusions directed towards aims of study Discussion of limitations of study in meeting aims *(e.g. are there limitations because of restricted access to study settings or participants, gaps in the sample coverage, missed or unresolved areas of questioning; incomplete analysis; time constraints?)*	
4 **FINDINGS**	Scope for drawing wider inference – how well is this explained?	Discussion of what can be generalised to wider population from which sample is drawn/case selection has been made Detailed description of the contexts in which the study was conducted to allow applicability to other settings/contextual generalities to be assessed Evidence supplied to support claims for Discussion of how hypotheses/ propositions/findings may relate to wider theory; consideration of rival explanations wider inference *(either from study or from corroborating sources)* Discussion of limitations on drawing wider inference *(e.g. re-examination of sample and any missing constituencies: analysis of restrictions of study settings for drawing wider inference)*	
5 **FINDINGS**	How clear is the basis of evaluative appraisal?	Discussion of how assessments of effectiveness/evaluative judgements have been reached *(i.e. whose judgements are they and on what basis have they been reached?)* Discussion of the nature and source of any Description of any formalised appraisal criteria used, when generated and how and by whom they have been applied divergence in evaluative appraisals Discussion of any unintended consequences of intervention, their impact and why they arose	

	a) Appraisal questions	b) Quality indicators (possible features for consideration)	c) Rating
6 **DESIGN**	How defensible is the research design?	Discussion of how overall research strategy was designed to meet aims of study Discussion of rationale for study design Convincing argument for different features of research design *(e.g. reasons given for different components or stages of research; purpose of particular methods or data sources, multiple methods, time frames etc.)* Use of different features of design/data sources evident in findings presented Discussion of limitations of research design and their implications for the study evidence	
7 **SAMPLE**	How well defended is the sample design/ target selection of cases/documents?	Description of study locations/areas and how and why chosen Description of population of interest and how sample selection relates to it *(e.g. typical, extreme case, diverse constituencies etc.)* Rationale for basis of selection of target sample/settings/documents *(e.g. characteristics/features of target sample/settings/documents, basis for inclusions and exclusions, discussion of sample size/number of cases/setting selected etc.)* Discussion of how sample/selections allowed required comparisons to be made	
8 **SAMPLE**	Sample composition/case inclusion – how well is the eventual coverage described?	Detailed profile of achieved sample/case coverage Maximising inclusion *(e.g. language matching or translation; specialised recruitment; organised transport for group attendance)* Discussion of any missing coverage in achieved samples/cases and implications for study evidence *(e.g. through comparison of target and achieved samples, comparison with population etc.)* Documentation of reasons for non-participation among sample approached/non-inclusion of selected cases/documents Discussion of access and methods of approach and how these might have affected participation/coverage	

	a) Appraisal questions	b) Quality indicators (possible features for consideration)	c) Rating
9 **DATA COLLECTION**	How well was the data collection carried out?	Discussion of: • who conducted data collection • procedures/documents used for collection/recording • checks on origin/status/authorship of documents Description of conventions for taking Audio or video recording of interviews/discussions/conversations *(if not recorded, were justifiable reasons given?)* fieldnotes *(e.g. to identify what form of observations were required/to distinguish description from researcher commentary/analysis)* Discussion of how fieldwork methods or settings may have influenced data collected Demonstration, through portrayal and use of data, that depth, detail and richness were achieved in collection	
10 **ANALYSIS**	How well has the approach to, and formulation of, the analysis been conveyed?	Description of form of original data *(e.g. use of verbatim transcripts, observation or interview notes, documents, etc.)* Clear rationale for choice of data management method/tool/package Evidence of how descriptive analytic categories, classes, labels etc. have been generated and used *(i.e. either through explicit discussion or portrayal in the commentary)* Discussion, with examples, of how any constructed analytic concepts/typologies etc. have been devised and applied	
11 **ANALYSIS**	Contexts of data sources – how well are they retained and portrayed?	Description of background or historical developments and social/organisational characteristics of study sites or settings Participants' perspectives/observations placed in personal context *(e.g. use of case studies/vignettes/individual profiles, textual extracts annotated with details of contributors)* Explanation of origins/history of written documents Use of data management methods that preserve context *(i.e. facilitate within case description and analysis)*	

	a) Appraisal questions	b) Quality indicators (possible features for consideration)	c) Rating
12 **ANALYSIS**	How well has diversity of perspective and content been explored?	Discussion of contribution of sample design/ case selection in generating diversity Description and illumination of diversity/multiple perspectives/alternative positions in the evidence displayed Evidence of attention to negative cases, outliers or exceptions Typologies/models of variation derived and discussed Examination of origins/influences on opposing or differing positions Identification of patterns of association/linkages with divergent positions/groups	
13 **ANALYSIS**	How well has detail, depth and complexity (i.e. richness) of the data been conveyed?	Use and exploration of contributors' terms, concepts and meanings Unpacking and portrayal of nuance/subtlety/intricacy within data Discussion of explicit and implicit explanations Detection of underlying factors/influences Identification and discussion of patterns of association/conceptual linkages within data Presentation of illuminating textual extracts/observations	
14 **REPROTING**	How clear are the links between data, interpretation and conclusions – i.e. how well can the route to any conclusions be seen?	Clear conceptual links between analytic commentary and presentations of original data *(i.e. commentary and cited data relate; there is an analytic context to cited data, not simply repeated description)* Discussion of how/why particular interpretation/significance is assigned to specific aspects of data – with illustrative extracts of original data Discussion of how explanations/ theories/conclusions were derived – and how they relate to interpretations and content of original data *(i.e. how warranted)*; whether alternative explanations explored Display of negative cases and how they lie outside main proposition/theory/ hypothesis etc.; or how proposition etc. revised to include them	

	a) Appraisal questions	b) Quality indicators (possible features for consideration)	c) Rating
REPORTING 15	How clear and coherent	Demonstrates link to aims of study/research questions Provides a narrative/story or clearly Provides accessible information for constructed thematic account Has structure and signposting that usefully guide reader through the commentary intended target audience(s) Key messages highlighted or summarised	
REFLEXIVITY & NEUTRALITY 16	How clear are the assumptions/theoretical perspectives/values that have shaped the form and output of the evaluation?	Discussion/evidence of the main assumptions/hypotheses/theoretical ideas on which the evaluation was based and how these affected the form, coverage or output of the evaluation *(the assumption here is that no research is undertaken without some underlying assumptions or theoretical ideas)* Discussion/evidence of the ideological perspectives/values/philosophies of research team and their impact on the methodological or substantive content of the evaluation *(again, may not be explicitly stated)* Evidence of openness to new/alternative ways of viewing subject/theories/ assumptions *(e.g. discussion of learning/concepts/ constructions that have emerged from the data; refinement restatement of hypotheses/theories in light of emergent findings; evidence that alternative claims have been examined)* Discussion of how error or bias may have arisen in design/data collection/analysis and how addressed, if at all Reflections on the impact of the researcher on the research process	

	a) Appraisal questions	b) Quality indicators (possible features for consideration)	c) Rating
17 **ETHICS**	What evidence is there of attention to ethical issues?	Evidence of thoughtfulness/sensitivity about research contexts and participants Documentation of how research was presented in study settings/to participants *(including, where relevant, any possible consequences of taking part)* Documentation of consent procedures and information provided to participants Discussion of confidentiality of data and procedures for protecting Discussion of how anonymity of participants/sources was protected Discussion of any measures to offer information/advice/services etc. at end of study *(i.e. where participation exposed the need for these)* Discussion of potential harm or difficulty through participation, and how avoided	
18 **AUDITABILITY**	How adequately has the research process been documented?	Discussion of strengths and weaknesses of data sources and methods Documentation of changes made to design and reasons; implications for study coverage Documentation and reasons for changes in sample coverage/data collection/analytic approach; implications Reproduction of main study documents *(e.g. letters of approach, topic guides, observation templates, data management frameworks etc.)*	

	a) Appraisal questions	b) Quality indicators (possible features for consideration)	c) Rating
17 **ETHICS**	What evidence is there of attention to ethical issues?	Evidence of thoughtfulness/sensitivity about research contexts and participants Documentation of how research was presented in study settings/to participants *(including, where relevant, any possible consequences of taking part)* Documentation of consent procedures and information provided to participants Discussion of confidentiality of data and procedures for protecting Discussion of how anonymity of participants/sources was protected Discussion of any measures to offer information/advice/services etc. at end of study *(i.e. where participation exposed the need for these)* Discussion of potential harm or difficulty through participation, and how avoided	
18 **AUDITABILITY**	How adequately has the research process been documented?	Discussion of strengths and weaknesses of data sources and methods Documentation of changes made to design and reasons; implications for study coverage Documentation and reasons for changes in sample coverage/data collection/analytic approach; implications Reproduction of main study documents *(e.g. letters of approach, topic guides, observation templates, data management frameworks etc.)*	

Appendix 8: Interrater Ranking

	Adrot & Moriceau, 2013	Afzalan et al., 2015	Al-Saggaf & Simmons, 2015	Amankwah, 2016	Anson et al., 2017	Bunce et al., 2012	Buzzelli et al., 2014	Carley et al., 2016	Chatfield et al., 2013	Chatfield & Reddick, 2017	Cinnamon et al., 2016	Deng et al., 2016	Drosio & Stanek, 2016	Graham, 2015	Goh & Sun, 2015	Guan & Chen, 2013	Horita et al., 2017	Huang & Xiao, 2015	Kavanaugh et al., 2012	Kim et al., 2016	Landwehr et al., 2016
1. How credible are the findings?	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	U	Y
2. How has knowledge/ understanding been extended by the research?	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
3. How well does the evaluation address its original aims and purpose?	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
4. Scope for drawing wider inference – how well is this explained?	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
5. How clear is the basis of evaluative appraisal?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
6. How defensible is the research design?	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
7. How well defended is the sample design/ target selection of cases/documents?	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
8. Sample composition/case inclusion – how well is the eventual coverage described?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
9. How well was the data collection carried out?	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
10. How well has the approach to, and formulation of, the analysis been conveyed?	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
11. Contexts of data sources – how well are they retained and portrayed?	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
12. How well has diversity of perspective and content been explored?	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
13. How well has detail, depth and complexity (i.e. richness) of the data been conveyed?	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	U
14. How clear are the links between data, interpretation and conclusions – i.e. how well can the route to any conclusions be seen?	N	U	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
15. How clear and coherent is the reporting?	Y	U	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
16. How clear are the assumptions/theoretical perspectives/values that have shaped the form and output of the evaluation?	Y	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Total %	62.5	75	75	31.25	43.75	56.25	75	93.75	100	100	86.67	81.25	75	100	93.75	93.75	93.75	93.75	93.75	80	86.67

	Leidner et al., 2009	Leskens et al., 2014	Martín et al., 2017	McCallum et al., 2016	Mehta, 2017	Panagiotopoulos et al., 2016	Peckham & Sinha, 2017	Resnyansky, 2015	Scholl & Patin, 2014	Shaw et al., 2013	Smith et al., 2017	Sutton, 2015	Szymcza, 2016	Tang et al., 2015	Velev & Zlateva, 2016	Wang et al., 2016	Watson et al., 2017	When & Evers, 2011	Wukich, 2016	Yates, 2011	Yates & Partridge, 2015
1. How credible are the findings?	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y		N	Y	Y	Y
2. How has knowledge/ understanding been extended by the research?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y
3. How well does the evaluation address its original aims and purpose?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y
4. Scope for drawing wider inference – how well is this explained?	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y		N	Y	N	N
5. How clear is the basis of evaluative appraisal?	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y
6. How defensible is the research design?	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y		N	Y	Y	Y
7. How well defended is the sample design/ target selection of cases/documents?	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y		N	Y	Y	Y
8. Sample composition/case inclusion – how well is the eventual coverage described?	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y		Y	Y	N	Y
9. How well was the data collection carried out?	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y		Y	Y	Y	N
10. How well has the approach to, and formulation of, the analysis been conveyed?	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y		Y	Y	N	Y
11. Contexts of data sources – how well are they retained and portrayed?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y
12. How well has diversity of perspective and content been explored?	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N		N	Y	N	N
13. How well has detail, depth and complexity (i.e. richness) of the data been conveyed?	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y		Y	Y	N	Y
14. How clear are the links between data, interpretation and conclusions – i.e. how well can the route to any conclusions be seen?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y
15. How clear and coherent is the reporting?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y
16. How clear are the assumptions/theoretical perspectives/values that have shaped the form and output of the evaluation?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	Y	N	Y		U	Y	Y	Y
Total %	87.5	100	87.5	37.5	100	87.5	87.5	56.25	43.75	93.75	81.25	100	100	62.5	18.8	93.75		62.5	100	68.75	81.25

Rating	
Quality Assessment Checklist Score	**Frequency**
0-40% Poor	3
40%-70% (Satisfactory)	8
70-100% (Good)	26
Missing	5

Appendix 9: Full Matrix list of Selected Articles Ranked by Citation Index

Authors	Year	Title	Journal	Database	Scopus	Science Direct	Web of Science	Proquest Social Sci.	Mean Citations
Adrot, A., & Moriceau, J.	2013	Introducing Performativity to Crisis Management Theory: An Illustration from the 2003 French Heat Wave Crisis Response	Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management	Scopus	3		2	3	2.7
Afzalan, N., Evans-Cowley, J., & Mirzazad-Barijough, M.	2015	From Big to Little Data for Natural Disaster Recovery: How Online and On-The-Ground Activities are Connected	I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Socie	Google Scholar					
Al-Saggaf, Y., & Simmons, P.	2015	Social Media in Saudi Arabia: Exploring its Use during Two Natural Disasters	Technological Forecasting and Social Change	Science Direct	3	7	0	4	3.5
Amankwah, A.	2016	Emerging Economies, Emerging Challenges: Mobilising and Capturing Value from Big data	Technological Forecasting and Social Change	Scopus	3	3	2		2.7
Anson, S., Watson, H., Wadhwa, K., & Metz, K.	2017	Analysing Social Media Data for Disaster Preparedness: Understanding the Opportunities and Barriers faced by Humanitarian Actors.	International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction	Scopus	2	2	0		2
Bunce, S., Partridge, H., & Davis, K.	2012	Exploring Information Experience using Social Media during the 2011 Queensland Floods: A Pilot Study	Australian Library Journal	Scopus	27			9	18
Buzzelli, M. M., Morgan, P., Muschek, A. G., & Macgregor-Skinner, G.	2014	Information and Communication Technology: Connecting the Public and First Responders during Disasters	Journal of Emergency Management	Scopus	0				0
Carley, K. M., Malik, M., Landwehr, P. M., Pfeffer, J., & Kowalchuck, M.	2016	Crowd Sourcing Disaster Management: The Complex Nature of Twitter Usage in Padang Indonesia	Safety Science	Scopus	5	5	5		5
Chatfield, A. T., & Reddick, C. G.	2017	All Hands on Deck to Tweet #Sandy: Networked Governance of Citizen Coproduction in Turbulent Times	Government Information Quarterly	Science Direct	0	0			0
Chatfield, A. T., Scholl, H. J. J., & Brajawidagda, U.	2013	Tsunami Early Warnings via Twitter in Government: Net-Savvy Citizens' Co-Production of Time-Critical Public Information Services	Government Information Quarterly	Science Direct	39	39	25	3	26.5
Cinnamon, J., Jones, S. K., & Adger, W. N.	2016	Evidence and Future Potential of Mobile Phone Data for Disease Disaster Management	Geoforum	Science Direct	3	3	1		2.3
Deng, Q., Liu, Y., Zhang, H., Deng, X., & Ma, Y.	2016	A New Crowdsourcing Model to assess Disaster Using Microblog Data in Typhoon Haiyan	Natural Hazards	Scopus	3		2		2.5
Drosio, S., & Stanek, S.	2016	The Big Data Concept as a Contributor of Added Value to Crisis Decision Support Systems	Journal of Decision Systems	Scopus	0		0		0
Goh, T. T., & Sun, P.	2015	Teaching Social Media Analytics: An Assessment Based on Natural Disaster Postings	Journal of Information Systems Education	PsycInfo	1				0
Graham, M. W., Avery, E. J., & Park, S.	2015	The Role of Social media in Local Government Crisis communications	Public Relations Review	Scopus	11	11	6	9	9.25
Guan, X., & Chen, C.	2014	Using Social Media Data to Understand and Assess Disasters	Natural Hazards	Scopus	15		10		12.5
Horita, F. E. A., de Albuquerque, J. P., Marchezini, V., & Mendiondo, E. M.	2017	Bridging the Gap between Decision-making and Emerging Big Data Sources: An Application of a Model-Based Framework to Disaster Management in	Decision Support Systems	Scopus	1	1	1		1
Huang, Q., & Xiao, Y.	2015	Geographic Situational Awareness: Mining Tweets for Disaster Preparedness, Emergency Response, Impact, and Recovery	ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information	Scopus	13		4		8.5
Kavanaugh, A. L., Fox, E. A., Sheetz, S. D., Yang, S., Li, L. T., Shoemaker, D. J., ... & Xie, L.	2012	Social Media Use by Government: From the Routine to the Critical	Government Information Quarterly	Science Direct	137	136	28	32	83.25
Kim, K., Jung, K., & Chilton, K.	2016	Strategies of Social Media Use in Disaster Management: Lessons in Resilience from Seoul, South Korea	International Journal of Emergency Services	Scopus	1		0		0.5
Landwehr, P. M., Wei, W., Kowalchuck, M., & Carley, K. M.	2016	Using Tweets to Support Disaster Planning, Warning and Response	Safety Science	Scopus	3	3			3
Leidner, D. E., Pan, G., & Pan, S. L.	2009	The Role of IT in Crisis Response: Lessons from the SARS and Asian Tsunami Disasters	The Journal of Strategic Information Systems	Science Direct	41	41	24	14	30
Leskens, J. G., Brugnach, M., Hoekstra, A. Y., & Schuurmans, W.	2014	Why are Decisions in Flood Disaster Management so Poorly Supported by Information from Flood Models?	Environmental Modelling & Software	Science Direct	20	20			20
Martin, Y., Li, Z., & Cutter, S. L.	2017	Leveraging Twitter to gauge evacuation compliance: Spatiotemporal analysis of Hurricane Matthew	PLoS one	Google Scholar	0		0		0
McCallum, I., Liu, W., See, L., Mechler, R., Keating, A., Hochrainer-Stigler, S., . . . Moorthy, I.	2016	Technologies to support Community Flood Disaster Risk Reduction	International Journal of Disaster Risk Science	Scopus	2		2		2
Mehta, A. M., Bruns, A., & Newton, J.	2017	Trust, but Verify: Social Media Models for Disaster management	Disasters	Scopus	0		1		0.5
Panagiotopoulos, P., Barnett, J., Bigdeli, A. Z., & Sams, S.	2016	Social Media in Emergency Management: Twitter as a Tool for Communicating Risks to the Public	Technological Forecasting and Social Change	Science Direct	7	7	1	1	18
Peckham, R., & Sinha, R.	2017	Satellites and the New War on Infection: Tracking Ebola in West Africa	Geoforum	Science Direct	0	0	0		0
Resnyansky, L.	2015	Social Media Data in the Disaster Context	Prometheus (United Kingdom)	Scopus	0		0		0
Scholl, H. J., & Patin, B. J.	2014	Resilient information infrastructures: Criticality and role in responding to catastrophic incidents	Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy	PsycInfo	6			2	4
Shaw, F., Burgess, J., Crawford, K., & Bruns, A.	2013	Sharing News, Making Sense, Saving Thanks Patterns of talk on Twitter during the Queensland floods	Australian Journal of Communication	ProQuest Social Sci				3	3
Smith, L., Liang, Q., James, P., & Lin, W.	2017	Assessing the Utility of Social Media as a Data Source for Flood Risk Management using a Real-time Modelling Framework	Journal of Flood Risk Management	Scopus	0		6		3
Sutton, J., League, C., Sellnow, T. L., & Sellnow, D. D.	2015	Terse Messaging and Public Health in the Midst of Natural Disasters: The Case of the Boulder Floods	Health Communication	Scopus	18		13	10	13.7
Szymczak, M., Kücükbalaban, P., Lemanski, S., Knuth, D., & Schmidt, S.	2016	Trusting Facebook in Crisis Situations: The Role of General Use and General Trust toward Facebook	Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking	Scopus	1		1		1
Tang, Z., Zhang, L., Xu, F., & Vo, H.	2015	Examining the Role of Social Media in California's Drought Risk Management in 2014	Natural Hazards	Scopus	8		7		7.5
Velev, D., & Zlateva, P.	2016	An Analysis of the Relation between Natural Disasters and Big Data	International Journal of Data Science	Google Scholar					
Wang, Z., Ye, X., & Tsou, M.	2016	Spatial, Temporal, and Content Analysis of Twitter for Wildfire Hazards	Natural Hazards	Scopus	8		6		7
Watson, H., Finn, R. L., & Wadhwa, K.	2017	Organizational and Societal Impacts of Big Data in Crisis Management	Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management	Scopus	0		0		0
Wehn, U., & Evers, J.	2015	The Social Innovation Potential of ICT-enabled Citizen observatories to increase eParticipation in local Flood Risk Management	Technology in Society	Web of Science	9	9	8		8.7
Wukich, C.	2016	Government Social Media Messages across Disaster Phases	Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management	Scopus	1		0		0.5
Yates, C., & Partridge, H.	2015	Citizens and Social Media in Times of Natural Disaster: Exploring Information Experience	Information Research	Scopus	1		2		1.5
Yates, D., & Paquette, S.	2011	Emergency Knowledge Management and Social Media Technologies: A Case Study of the 2010 Haitian Earthquake	International Journal of Information Management	Web of Science	315	315	195	115	235

Appendix 10: Publishing Country-Studied Country Matrix

			Studied Country/Region																							
Publishing Country	Studied Country/Region	Publishing Country	United States	Global*	Australia	Guinea	Liberia	Sierra Leone	United Kingdom	Europe	Germany	Indonesia	The Netherlands	Brazil	China	France	Haiti	Mali	New Zealand	Nigeria	Saudi Arabia	Senegal	Singapore	South Korea	Bulgaria	Poland
France	France	United States	70.59%	5.88%								5.88%					5.88%						5.88%	5.88%		
United States	United States	Global*		Nil																						
Australia	Saudi Arabia	Austria	Nil	100%																						
United Kingdom	Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Nigeira, Mali, Senegal	Australia	12.50%	12.50%	50%							12.50%									12.50%					
United Kingdom	Global*	Guinea				Nil																				
Australia	Australia	Liberia					Nil																			
United States	United States	Sierra Leone																								
United States	Indonesia	United Kingdom		16.67%		33.33%	33.33%	33.33%	33.33%	16.67%																
Australia	United States	Europe								Nil																
Australia	Indonesia	Germany	Nil							100%																
United Kingdom	Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia,	Indonesia										Nil														
China	China	The Netherlands							50%				100%													
Poland	Global*	Brazil												100%												
New Zealand	New Zealand	China													100%											
United States	United States	France														100%										
United States	United States	Haiti															Nil									
Brazil	Brazil	Mali																								
United States	United States	New Zealand																								
United States	United States	Nigeria																								
United States	South Korea	Saudi Arabia																								
United States	United States	Senegal																								
United States	Singapore	Singapore																								
The Netherlands	The Netherlands	South Korea																								
United States	United States	Bulgaria		100%																						
Austria	Global*	Poland		100%																						Nil
Australia	Australia																									
United Kingdom	United Kingdom																									
Hong Kong	Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone																									
Australia	Global*																									
Australia	Australia																									
United Kingdom	United Kingdom																									
United States	Global*																									
United States	United States																									
Germany	Europe																									
United States	United States																									
Bulgaria	Global*																									
United States	United States																									
United Kingdom	Europe																									
The Netherlands	United Kingdom and Netherlands																									
United States	United States																									
Australia	Australia																									
United States	Haiti																									

Appendix 11: Studies' Funding and Sponsors List

Citation	Year	Title	Journal	Funding Sponsor/Conflict of Interest
Adrot, A., & Moriceau, J.	2013	Introducing Performativity to Crisis Management Theory: An Illustration from the 2003 French Heat Wave Crisis Response	Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management	None
Afzalan, N., et al.	2015	From Big to Little Data for Natural Disaster Recovery: How Online and On-The-Ground Activities are Connected	I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Societ	None
Al-Saggaf, Y., & Simmons, P.	2015	Social Media in Saudi Arabia: Exploring its Use during Two Natural Disasters	Technological Forecasting and Social Change	None
Amankwah, A.	2016	Emerging Economies, Emerging Challenges: Mobilising and Capturing Value from Big data	Technological Forecasting and Social Change	None
Anson, S., et al.	2017	Analysing Social Media Data for Disaster Preparedness: Understanding the Opportunities and Barriers faced by Humanitarian Ac	International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction	None
Bunce, S., et al.	2012	Exploring Information Experience using Social Media during the 2011 Queensland Floods: A Pilot Study	Australian Library Journal	None
Buzzelli, M. M., et al.	2014	Information and Communication Technology: Connecting the Public and First Responders during Disasters	Journal of Emergency Management	None
Carley, K. M., et al.	2016	Crowd Sourcing Disaster Management: The Complex Nature of Twitter Usage in Padang Indonesia	Safety Science	NSF and ONR
Chatfield, A. T., et al.	2017	All Hands on Deck to Tweet #Sandy: Networked Governance of Citizen Coproduction in Turbulent Times	Government Information Quarterly	None
Chatfield, A. T., et al.	2013	Tsunami Early Warnings via Twitter in Government: Net-Savvy Citizens' Co-Production of Time-Critical Public Information Servi	Government Information Quarterly	None
Cinnamon, J., et al.	2016	Evidence and Future Potential of Mobile Phone Data for Disease Disaster Management	Geoforum	SHEAR, DFID, NERC, and ESRC (Part)
Deng, Q., Liu, et al.	2016	A New Crowdsourcing Model to assess Disaster Using Microblog Data in Typhoon Haiyan	Natural Hazards	None
Drosio, S., & Stanek, S.	2016	The Big Data Concept as a Contributor of Added Value to Crisis Decision Support Systems	Journal of Decision Systems	None
Goh, T. T., & Sun, P.	2015	Teaching Social Media Analytics: An Assessment Based on Natural Disaster Postings	Journal of Information Systems Education	MOST Grant
Graham, M. W., et al.	2015	The Role of Social media in Local Government Crisis communications	Public Relations Review	None
Guan, X., & Chen, C.	2014	Using Social Media Data to Understand and Assess Disasters	Natural Hazards	NSF
Horita, F. E. A., et al.	2017	Bridging the Gap between Decision-making and Emerging Big Data Sources: An Application of a Model-Based Framework to Disa	Decision Support Systems	CNDCT, CAPNS, and EPSRC (Partial)
Huang, Q., & Xiao, Y.	2015	Geographic Situational Awareness: Mining Tweets for Disaster Preparedness, Emergency Response, Impact, and Recovery	ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information	None
Kavanaugh, A. L., et al.	2012	Social Media Use by Government: From the Routine to the Critical	Government Information Quarterly	NSF
Kim, K., Jung, K., & Chilton, K.	2016	Strategies of Social Media Use in Disaster Management: Lessons in Resilience from Seoul, South Korea	International Journal of Emergency Services	NRFK
Landwehr, P. M., et al.	2016	Using Tweets to Support Disaster Planning, Warning and Response	Safety Science	NSF and ONR
Leidner, D. E.,et al.	2009	The Role of IT in Crisis Response: Lessons from the SARS and Asian Tsunami Disasters	The Journal of Strategic Information Systems	None
Leskens, J. G., et al.	2014	Why are Decisions in Flood Disaster Management so Poorly Supported by Information from Flood Models?	Environmental Modelling & Software	3Di Water Management
Martín, Y., et al.	2017	Leveraging Twitter to gauge evacuation compliance: Spatiotemporal analysis of Hurricane Matthew	PLoS one	USC FRI
McCallum, I., et al.	2016	Technologies to support Community Flood Disaster Risk Reduction	International Journal of Disaster Risk Science	GZFR
Mehta, A. M., et al.	2017	Trust, but Verify: Social Media Models for Disaster management	Disasters	
Panagiotopoulos, P., et al.	2016	Social Media in Emergency Management: Twitter as a Tool for Communicating Risks to the Public	Technological Forecasting and Social Change	None
Peckham, R., & Sinha, R.	2017	Satellites and the New War on Infection: Tracking Ebola in West Africa	Geoforum	RGCHK
Resnyansky, L.	2015	Social Media Data in the Disaster Context	Prometheus (United Kingdom)	None
Shaw, F., et al.	2013	Sharing News, Making Sense, Saying Thanks Patterns of talk on Twitter during the Queensland floods	Australian Journal of Communication	None
Smith, L., et al.	2017	Assessing the Utility of Social Media as a Data Source for Flood Risk Management using a Real-time Modelling Framework	Journal of Flood Risk Management	None
Scholl, H. J., & Patin, B. J.	2014	Resilient information infrastructures: Criticality and role in responding to catastrophic incidents	Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy	None
Sutton, J., et al.	2015	Terse Messaging and Public Health in the Midst of Natural Disasters: The Case of the Boulder Floods	Health Communication	NSF
Szymczak, H., et al.	2016	Trusting Facebook in Crisis Situations: The Role of General Use and General Trust toward Facebook	Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking	European Commission
Tang, Z., et al.	2015	Examining the Role of Social Media in California's Drought Risk Management in 2014	Natural Hazards	None
Velev, D., & Zlateva, P.	2016	An Analysis of the Relation between Natural Disasters and Big Data	International Journal of Data Science	BNSF (Partial)
Wang, Z., et al.	2016	Spatial, Temporal, and Content Analysis of Twitter for Wildfire Hazards	Natural Hazards	None
Watson, H., et al.	2017	Organizational and Societal Impacts of Big Data in Crisis Management	Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management	None
Wehn, U., & Evers, J.	2015	The Social Innovation Potential of ICT-enabled Citizen observatories to increase eParticipation in local Flood Risk Management	Technology in Society	
Wukich, C.	2016	Government Social Media Messages across Disaster Phases	Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management	None
Yates, C., & Partridge, H.	2015	Citizens and Social Media in Times of Natural Disaster: Exploring Information Experience	Information Research	auDA Foundation
Yates, D., & Paquette, S.	2011	Emergency Knowledge Management and Social Media Technologies: A Case Study of the 2010 Haitian Earthquake	International Journal of Information Management	None

Funders' List

NSF	National Science Foundation
ONR	Office of Naval Research
SHEAR	Science for Humanitarian Emergencies and Resilience programme
DFID	The UK Department for International Development
NERC	Natural Environment Research Council
ESRC	Economic and Social Research Council
CNDCT	Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
CAPNS	Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
EPSRC	Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) (Partial)
NRFK	National Research Foundation of Korea
GZFRA	Global Zurich Flood Resilience Alliance
USC FRI	University of South Carolina through the 2015 SC Floods Research Initiative
RGCHK	Research Grants Council of Hong Kong
BNSF	Bulgarian National Science Fund
EC	European Commission
auDA	auDA Foundation
MOST	MOST Grant
3Di	3Di Water Management

Appendix 12: AMSTAR Tool for assessing the quality of systematic reviews

1. Was an "a priori" design provided?
The research question and inclusion criteria should be established before the conduct of the review.

□ Yes □ No □ Can't answer □ Not applicable

2. Was there duplicate study selection and data extraction?
There should be at least two independent data extractors and a consensus procedure for disagreements should be in place.

□ Yes □ No □ Can't answer □ Not applicable

3. Was a comprehensive literature search performed?
At least two electronic sources should be searched. The report must include years and databases used (e.g. Central, EMBASE, and MEDLINE). Key words and/or MESH terms must be stated and where feasible the search strategy should be provided. All searches should be supplemented by consulting current contents, reviews, textbooks, specialized registers, or experts in the particular field of study, and by reviewing the references in the studies found.

□ Yes □ No □ Can't answer □ Not applicable

4. Was the status of publication (i.e. grey literature) used as an inclusion criterion?
The authors should state that they searched for reports regardless of their publication type. The authors should state whether or not they excluded any reports (from the systematic review), based on their publication status, language etc.

□ Yes □ No □ Can't answer □ Not applicable

5. Was a list of studies (included and excluded) provided?
A list of included and excluded studies should be provided.

□ Yes □ No □ Can't answer □ Not applicable

6. Were the characteristics of the included studies provided?
In an aggregated form such as a table, data from the original studies should be provided on the participants, interventions and outcomes. The ranges of characteristics in all the studies analyzed e.g. age, race, sex, relevant socioeconomic data, disease status, duration, severity, or other diseases should be reported.

□ Yes □ No □ Can't answer □ Not applicable

7. Was the scientific quality of the included studies assessed and documented?
'A priori' methods of assessment should be provided (e.g., for effectiveness studies if the author(s) chose to include only randomized, double-blind, placebo controlled studies, or allocation concealment as inclusion criteria); for other types of studies alternative items will be relevant.

□ Yes □ No □ Can't answer □ Not applicable

8. Was the scientific quality of the included studies used appropriately in formulating conclusions?
The results of the methodological rigor and scientific quality should be considered in the analysis and the conclusions of the review, and explicitly stated in formulating recommendations.

□ Yes □ No □ Can't answer □ Not applicable

9. Were the methods used to combine the findings of studies appropriate?
For the pooled results, a test should be done to ensure the studies were combinable, to assess their homogeneity (i.e. Chi-squared test for homogeneity, I^2). If heterogeneity exists a random effects model should be used and/or the clinical appropriateness of combining should be taken into consideration (i.e. is it sensible to combine?).

□ Yes □ No □ Can't answer □ Not applicable

10. Was the likelihood of publication bias assessed?
An assessment of publication bias should include a combination of graphical aids (e.g., funnel plot, other available tests) and/or statistical tests (e.g., Egger regression test).

□ Yes □ No □ Can't answer □ Not applicable

11. Was the conflict of interest stated?
Potential sources of support should be clearly acknowledged in both the systematic review and the included studies.

□ Yes □ No □ Can't answer □ Not applicable

Appendix 13: Research methodologies, methods, and designs

Author	Year	Phenomena of interest	Technology	Framework/Theory	Method	Methodology	Data Analysis
Adrot, A., & Moriceau, J.	2013	Heat Wave	Nil	The Concept of Performativity	Explorative and Interpretive Method	Qualitative - Triangulation	Interpretive
Afzalan, N., et al.	2015	Hurricane	Social Media- Facebook	Social Network Concepts	Social Network Analysis (Using Specific Network Metrics)/Web-Survey	Mixed	Network Analysis: Hyperlink-Induced Topic (HITS) Search and i5-Index Score using Facebook's Graph API/Demo-Psychographic Analysis
Al-Saggaf, Y., & Simmons, P.	2015	Flood	Social Media	Habermasian 'Public Sphere'	Digital Method: Twitter Mining	Qualitative – Thematic Analysis	Thematic Analysis
Amankwah, A.	2016	Ebola Disease	ICT (General)	Nil	Archival	Qualitative - Case Study	Document Analysis
Anson, S., et al.	2017	Nil	Social Media Analysis Tool SMAT	Nil	Desk-based Research (in-depth Literature Review)/ Survey of Semi-Structured interview/ On	Multi-Method	Descriptive Statistics (Percentile)
Bunce, S., et al.	2012	Flood	Social Media	Information Literacy	Semi Structured Interviews	Grounded Theory	Memo Writing, Reflexive Interpretation
Buzzelli, M. M., et al.	2014	Earthquake	ICT (General)	Nil	Database Search and Funnel Filtering	"Comprehensive" Review of Literature	Phenomenology
Carley, K. M., et al.	2016	Tsunami	Social Media - Twitter	Nil	Twitter API: with 5 pre-designed collection strategies C51-5	Twitter mining	Spatial Temporal Analyses of Tweets
Chatfield, A. T., et al.	2017	Hurricane	Social Media - Twitter	Citizen Co-Production Theory, Information Processing Theory & Networked Governance	Social Network Analysis/Case Study/Interview	Mixed	Social Network Analysis/ Reflexive Interpretation of Interview Data
Chatfield, A. T., et al.	2013	Tsunami/Earthquake	Social Media - Twitter	Citizen Co-production theory, Resilient Information Infrastructure Framework and Public Administration Theory	Case Study Research and Social Network Analysis	Qualitative- Case Study and Social Network Analysis	Policy Analysis and Social Network Analysis
Cinnamon, J., et al.	2016	Ebola Disease	Mobile Phone Call Detail Records	Nil	Literature (Scoping) review/In-depth Interviews	Qualitative Research	Thematic Analysis
Deng, Q., Liu, et al.	2016	Storm/ Typhoon	Sina Weibo (Internet Social Media)	Nil	Case Study/Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation/Semantic Analysis	Mixed	Semantic Analysis
Drosio, S., & Stanek, S.	2016	Nil	ICT (General)	Nil	Conceptual Review	Conceptual Review	SWOT (Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities and Threats) Analysis
Goh, T. T., & Sun, P.	2015	Earthquake/Tsunami	Social Media	Cooper's Analytics Framework	Content Analysis	Qualitative	Content Analysis
Graham, M. W., et al.	2015	General (Not Specific)	Social Media	Coombs' Situational Crisis Communication Theory	Digitised Survey	Quantitative - Survey	Descriptive (Simple Percentages and Central Tendency –M/SD) and Inferential Statistics
Guan, X., & Chen, C.	2014	Hurricane	Social Media - Twitter	Framework for Assessing Crisis in a System Environment (FACSE)	Social Network Analysis	Qualitative - Social Network Analysis	Spatial and Temporal Analyses of Twitter Data
Horita, F. E. A., et al.	2017	Nil	ICT (General)	oDMN – The Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN)	Case Study/Focus Group Sessions	Qualitative - Case Study	Modelling
Huang, Q., & Xiao, Y.	2015	Hurricane	Social Media - Twitter	Typologies Assessment	Content Analysis	Qualitative	Thematic Analysis
Kavanaugh, A. L., et al.	2012	Nil	Social Media	Nil	Social Network Data Mining/Exploratory Focus Group Interviews	Digitised and Digital Methods	Thematic Analysis
Kim, K., Jung, K., & Chilton, K.	2016	Flood	Social Media	Dimensional Approach to Social Media use on "Organisational Resilience"	Survey using Questionnaires and Interview Sessions	Mixed	Inferential Statistics - Hierarchical Regression Models/Thematic Analysis of Interview Data
Leidner, D. E.,et al.	2009	SARS Disease/Tsunami	ICT (General)	The Resource-based View	Interviews and Document Analysis	Qualitative - Case Study	Thematic Analysis
Leskens, J. G., et al.	2014	Flood	Nil	Nil	Document Review and Social Network Analysis and Interviews	Qualitative	Document Analysis and Using Interviews to draw a Social Network
Martin, Y., et al.	2017	Hurricane	Social Media - Twitter	Nil	Spatiotemporal Analysis	Quantitative - Digital Methods	Spatiotemporal Analyses of Tweets
McCallum, I., et al.	2016	Flood	Social Media and GIS	Nil	Conceptual review	Qualitative	Document Analysis
Mehta, A. M., et al.	2017	Cyclone/Flood	Social Media	Operational definition of trust both from a theoretical perspective and in the context of disaster.	Observation (Using Social Network Data) and Observation (in situ) of Social Media Activities	Mixed	Document Analysis and Note-taking
Panagiotopoulos, P., et al.	2016	Heavy Snow	Social Media - Twitter	Nil	Nil	Nil	Content Analysis
Peckham, R., & Sinha, R.	2017	Ebola Disease	Satellite Technologies and Remote	Nil	Document Analysis	Qualitative – Conceptual Review	Nil
Resnyansky, L.	2015	Nil	Nil	Nil	Literature Review	Qualitative- Conceptual Review	Document Analysis
Scholl, H. J., & Patin, B. J.	2014	Castrophic Incidents (General)	ICT (General)	The Concept of Resilient Information Infrastructure	Grey Literature	Qualitative - Conceptual Review	Nil
Shaw, F., et al.	2013	Flood	Social Media - Twitter	Nil	Social Network Data Mining	Qualitative	Thematic Analysis
Smith, L., et al.	2017	Flood	Social Media - Twitter	Application of two-dimensional hydraulic models to real-time surface water flooding	Retrospective Twitter Mining	Case Study	Spatial temporal Analysis of tweets
Scholl, H. J., & Patin, B. J.	2014	General (Not Specific)	ICT (General)	Resilient Information Infrastructure (RII)	Grey Literature	Qualitative - Conceptual Review	Nil
Sutton, J., et al.	2015	Flood	Social Media - Twitter	Nil	Digital Method: Social Network Analysis	Qualitative - Case Study	Content Analysis
Szymczak, H., et al.	2016	General (Not Specific)	Social Media - Facebook	Trust and its applicability to social media use during emergencies	Online Survey	Quantitative- Digitised Survey	Descriptive and Inferential Statistics – Hierarchical Regression (Step wise)
Tang, Z., et al.	2015	Drought	Social Media - Facebook, YouTube and Twitter	SWOT	Nil	Qualitative Study	SWOT (Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities and Threats)- Analysis
Velev, D., & Zlateva, P.	2016	Nil	New ICTs - Big Data	Nil	Grey Literature Review	Qualitative	Nil
Wang, Z., et al.	2016	Wildfire	Social Media - Twitter	Nil	Social Network Analysis	Digitised and Digital Methods	Social Network Analysis: Spatial-Temporal
Watson, H., et al.	2017	Typhoon	Nil	Nil	Interviews, Focus Groups and Review of Grey Literature (Documentary Analysis)	Qualitative (Multidimensional): Case Study	Document Analysis and Interpretive
Wehn, U., & Evers, J.	2015	Flood	WeSenseIt eParticipation Sensor	Social Innovation and eParticipation	Desk Research and Interviews (semi-structured)	Qualitative - Case Study and Action Research	Thematic Coding
Wukich, C.	2016	Multiple Disasters (floods, landslide and 56 other federally declared disasters)	Social Media - Twitter	Typologies Development and Assessment	Web and Content Analysis	Mixed	Content Analysis
Yates, C., & Partridge, H.	2015	Flood/Tropical Cyclone		Nil	In-depth interviews	Qualitative	Thematic Analysis
Yates, D., & Paquette, S.	2011	Earthquake	Social Media, Wikis and Collaborative Workspaces e.g. Share Point	3-T Framework	Action Research	Qualitative-Case Study	Network Analysis: Hyperlink-Induced Topic (HITS) Search and i5-Index Score using Facebook's Graph API/Demo-Psychographic Analysis

Phenomena of Interest

Flood = 12

Hurricane = 5

Storm = 1

Ebola= 3

Earthquake = 3

Wildfire = 1, Typhoon = 2, Cyclone = 2, Tsunami = 4, Heavy Snow = 1, Heat Wave = 1, Drought = 1, SARS Disease = 1

Methods of Data Analysis

Thematic Analysis = 8

Content Analysis = 4

Social Network Analysis = 5

Semantic Analysis = 1

Document Analysis = 6

Appendix 14: Summaries of Findings and Conclusions/Coding Scheme

A new crowdsourcing model to assess disaster using microblog data in typhoon Haiyan Qing Deng1 · Yi Liu2 · Hui Zhang1 · Xiaolong Deng3 ·Yefeng Ma4	
Technology	Sina Weibo (Internet Social Media)
Methodology	Mixed methods
Method	Case study + Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation and Semantic Analysis
Case/Phenomena of interest	Storm: Nov 7, 2013 Typhoon Haiyan, Philippines at Guiuan (East Samar) which crossed over to Hainan and Guangxi areas of China on Nov 10 and 11
Setting	China
Geographical	China
Cultural	
Participants	Initial 3098 pieces of keyword-related microblog messages were collected yielding 2539 pieces of usable microblog messages
Data analysis	Semantic analysis of microblog and Statistical analysis
1. Semantic analysis	Term Classification, Segmentation, Stop-word Removing & Term Frequency Analysis (TF-IDF)
2. Index model	Using Weighted TF-IDF
Author's conclusions	
	This paper proposes a new method for risk prediction and damage assessment using what the concerned people's microblog messages.
	An index is developed from three perspectives: disaster description, public demands and mitigation measures.
	The degree of risk can be evaluated quickly from weighted Term Frequency (TF-IDF)
	Through comparison with actual situation, the assessment result based on the index model is consistent with actual situation, which underlines the feasibility of implementation of the new model.

All hands on deck to tweet #sandy: Networked governance of citizen coproduction in turbulent times Akemi Takeoka Chatfield, Christopher G. Reddick	
Technology	Twitter (Social Media)
Methodology	Mixed methods
Method	Social network analysis + Case study interview
Framework/Theory	Citizen coproduction theory (Ferris 1984; Whitaker 1980), information processing theory (Galbraith 1974; 2002) & networked governance ((Eberhard, Margerum, Vella, Mayere, & Taylor, 2017; Janssen & van der Voort, 2016; Kellogg & Samanta, 2017; Ojo & Mellouli, 2016)
Case/Phenomena of interest	Hurricane Sandy, October 2012
Setting	Northeastern United States
Geographical	Northeastern United States
Participants	Tweets - #sandy: 132,922 between Oct 23, 2012 to Nov 10, 2012
Data analysis	Social network analysis (Cheong & Cheong, 2011; Marin & Wellman; Scott & Carrignton, 2011): Time series graph, top influencers
	Reflexive interpretation of interview data
Author's conclusions	
	It is critically important for the government to establish social media policy governance network during the mitigation phase of the disaster management cycle – before the government is struck by an EE, particularly if a social media platform is planned to be used by multiple government agencies and departments
	Government agencies and departments need to actively use social media during an EE and to pay attention to create positive network effects through their network behaviors:
	We recognized that governments have the potential power of networked citizens on the government's social media platform as coproducers of the delivery of critical public services and to steer and motivate them to take immediate actions such as retweeting the government tweet to their own followers.
	It shows the importance of identifying influential networked citizens (i.e., big nodes) with many followers of their own – because a majority of ordinary citizen #sandy users do not have many followers.
	Governments also need to recognize the influence of large (local/regional) mass media in networked coproduction, since they can propagate the government #sandy to their own large followers who may not follow governments' Twitter channels.

Analysing social media data for disaster preparedness: Understanding the opportunities and barriers faced by humanitarian actors Susan Ansona, , Hayley Watsona, Kush Wadhwaa, Karin Metzb (2017)	
Technology	Social Media Analysis Tool SMAT
Problem Statement/Focus	Paper examines the opportunities and barriers faced by humanitarian actors in using SMAT to analyse social media data for preparedness purposes.
Methodology	Multi-method
Method	Desk-based research (in-depth lit. review) + Survey of semi-structured interview + Online survey (Survey Monkey) + Workshop findings
Framework/Theory	
Case/Phenomena of interest	
Setting	Multiple
Geographical	
Participants	20 Humanitarian actors from 10 countries (6 continents) were interviewed via Skype + Online survey of RCRC actors
Data analysis	Descriptive statistics (percentile)
	Thematic analysis: 7 themes developed to conceptualise barriers to SMAT for DRR (disaster management) and preparedness
Author's conclusions	That social media and SMAT are not only tools to be used for responding to a disaster, but are currently being used by RCRC actors across multiple phases of disaster management, including for preparedness.
	The use of social media for preparedness is more mature than the use of SMAT. The majority of survey respondents use Twitter (61.5%) and Facebook (100%) to communicate with the public about disaster preparedness, however, only 36.66% of respondents use SMAT to analyse the data generated on social media.
	The different reasons for using SMAT identified by participants in this study correspond with the motivations for using social media for preparedness outlined in the literature. For instance, SMAT can be used to understand the effectiveness of preparedness information, to detect disasters and receive information on warnings, and to identify community networks that can be mobilised for preparedness purposes.
	The use of SMAT facilitates humanitarian organisations in meeting their social media goals and increases the effectiveness of their engagement with social media.
	the barriers to the use of SMAT are consistent with the barriers to the use of social media identified in the literature among other ones
	Barriers is but a product of the interaction between the user's context, their requirements for SMAT, and the features of the tool that influence the selection and use of SMAT. The different barriers will vary in their relevance to a particular context and not all barriers will apply to the same extent across different countries.

Assessing the utility of social media as a data source for flood risk management using a real-time modelling framework L. Smith1, Q. Liang1, P. James1 and W. Lin2	
Technology	Social Media: Twitter
Methodology	Case study
Method	Retrospective Twitter mining
Framework/Theory	Application of two-dimensional hydraulic models to real-time surface water flooding
Case/Phenomena of interest	August 5 & June 28, 2012 flood (Simulation)
Setting	United Kingdom
Geographical	Flooding in Tyne and Wear (Simulation)
Participants	Retrospective Tweets: N = 186 (Aug 5 event), N = 1834 Tweets June 28 2012
Data analysis	Spatial temporal analysis of tweets
Author's conclusions	The extent and depth of flooding is reproduced in most cases, even with small numbers of model criteria identified in social media.
	There are concerns as functionality of the model is dependent on data within the Tweets (geo-tag, timestamp, etc.) as well as other contextual factors

Citizens and social media in times of natural disaster: exploring information experience Christine Yates & Helen Partridge	
Technology	Social Media
Statement problem/Focus	Explore citizens' information experiences in social media during times of natural disaster
Methodology	Qualitative
Method	In-depth interviews
Framework/Theory	
Case/Phenomena of interest	Dec.-Jan, 2010-2011 Queensland floods and Tropical cyclone Yasi of February 3, 2011
Setting	Queensland, Australia
Geographical	
Participants	25 people who used social media during a natural disaster in Australia
Data analysis	Thematic analysis: 8 themes denote socialmedia users' information experience during a natural disaster: connected, wellbeing, coping, help, brokerage, journalism, supplementary and characteristics
Author's conclusions	Insights into social media's potential for developing community disaster resilience
	Value of social media use for civic participation during natural disasters

Crowd sourcing disaster management: The complex nature of Twitter usage in Padang Indonesia Kathleen M. Carley, Momin Malik, Peter M. Landwehr, Jürgen Pfeffer, Michael Kowalchuck	
Technology	Social Media: Twitter
Statement problem/Focus	Assessing the value of Twitter for disaster management; planning and early warning
Methodology	Twitter mining
Method	Twitter API: with 5 pre-designed collection strategies CS1-5
Framework/Theory	
Case/Phenomena of interest	Twitter use in support of tsunami warning and response
Setting	Padang, Indonesia
Geographical	
Participants	
Data analysis	Spatial temporal analyses of Tweets: Dynamics (i.e., selecting geotag Tweet), Geo-locate by user mention, Identification of (Influencers) opinion leaders,
Author's conclusions	The viability of using this data as part of the disaster management process for planning and early warning.
	We find wide spread usage, high prevalence of geo-information, accurate language markers, and active use of and support for Twitter among local officials and official disaster response groups.
	despite geo-information; the level of geo-information is such that it does not provide accurate information on the exact location of each population member.
	The lack of gender and age information means that Twitter cannot be used to estimate the location of certain at-risk groups.

Emergency knowledge management and social media technologies: A case study of the 2010 Haitian earthquake Dave Yates∗,1, Scott Paquette2	
Technology	Social Media: Wikis and Collaborative workspaces e.g., Share Point
Statement problem/Focus	Test the robustness of social media tools for knowledge management system during disaster, to examine the role of social media applications and technologies used by organizations responding to disasters.
Methodology	Qualitative/Case study
Method	Action research: a two-week period of participation by one of the authors with the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff's Crisis Action Team (AFCAT).
Framework/Theory	Carlile (2004) framework of knowledge sharing - how users rely on social media functions to more expediently and efficiently share knowledge in a disaster. Called the 3-T framework (for transfer, translate, and transform), the model illustrates how information boundary objects are utilized by organizations to span three forms of boundaries: syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic.
Case/Phenomena of interest	2010 Haiti earthquake
Setting	Haiti
Geographical	Haiti
Participants	
Data analysis	
Author's conclusions	Social media technologies hold great promise for leveraging public participation in disaster response, including when used within formal organizations to support open, collaborative knowledge sharing and reuse.

Evidence and future potential of mobile phone data for disease disaster management Jonathan Cinnamon, Sarah K. Jones, W. Neil Adger	
Technology	Mobile phone call detail records (CDRs) and two-way SMS
Statement problem/Focus	Examining existing evidence and future potential of mobile phone data for managing communicable disease disaster
Methodology	Qualitative research
Method	Literature (scoping) review + in-depth interviews
Framework/Theory	
Case/Phenomena of interest	2013-2015 Ebola in West Africa
Setting	West Africa
Geographical	
Participants	10 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with key informants from humanitarian agencies, international aid organizations, mobile data collection service providers, and mobile data focused research teams.
Data analysis	Thematic analysis
Author's conclusions	Mobile data sourcing has a real potential to support disaster management efforts and there is growing interest among the humanitarian community in exploring its uses.
	However, CDRs are limited in terms of the types of information that they can generate, yet their potential value for understanding population characteristics and dynamics in time sensitive situations is unparalleled.
	Mobile data collection and communication implementations during disaster situations are frequently technocratic, top down, and centralized, which can produce uneven and damaging power relations between disaster relief organizations and distant 'needy' victims
	Data must be weighed against prevailing uncertainties regarding SMS and CDR data validity and representativeness, user privacy, and broader concerns regarding the potential for decisions based on mobile phone data to deepen societal power imbalances.

Examining the role of social media in California's drought risk management in 2014 Zhenghong Tang1 • Ligang Zhang1 • Fuhai Xu2,3 • Hung Vo4	
Technology	Social Media: Facebook, YouTube and Twitter
Statement problem/Focus	Drought risk management using social media sites of governmental agencies directly involved in California's 2014 Drought Task Force
Methodology	Qualitative study
Method	
Framework/Theory	SWOT
Case/Phenomena of interest	2014 California drought
Setting	California
Geographical	
Participants	
Data analysis	SWOT analysis
Author's conclusions	California's state agencies in California Drought Task Force have used the major social media tools (Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter) for drought risk management.
	The major functions of social media in California's drought risk management include one-way information sharing, two-way information sharing, situational awareness, rumor control, reconnection, and decision-making, but not donation solicitation nor volunteer management.
	Facebook worked well in two-way information sharing for drought risk information and water conservation strategies. YouTube served as a robust platform that attracted many views on drought-related videos. Twitter played an effective role in reconnection of social networks to expedite the dissemination of drought risk information. Through social media, the public was able to provide information that was used in conducting a situational analysis and defining the course of action.

Exploring information experience using social media during the 2011 Queensland Floods: a pilot study Sharon Bunce , Helen Partridge & Kate Davis (2012)	
Technology	Social Media
Statement problem/Focus	Participants' information experiences in social media during a natural disaster.
Methodology	Grounded theory
Method	Semi structured interviews
Framework/Theory	Information Literacy (Bruce 1997). Bruce, Hughes, and Somerville (2011) suggest that as an informed learner, an individual is aware of their information use and experiences and the many different ways in which they can engage with information.
Case/Phenomena of interest	Australia: Toowoomba inland flood, leading to the flooding of the Brisbane River
Setting	Australia
Geographical	Australia
Participants	Four participants selected for the interviews, 3 females 1 male.
Data analysis	Memo writing, reflexive interpretation
Author's conclusions	Four different categories/information behaviours describe the experiences of participants using social media during the floods:
	Category 1: Monitoring information – to stay informed Category 2: Community and communication – perceived need to communicate with others (individual/organisations) in the affect zone. Category 3: Affirmation – to seek assurance with regards to safety (of self or loved ones, properties and threat to damage) Category 4: Awarenes – expansion of what is known about and consequences of the disaster

From Big to Little Data for Natural Disaster Recovery: How Online and On-the-ground Activities are Connected? NADER AFZALAN* **JENNIFER** EVANS-COWLEY, MAZIAR MIRZAZAD BARIJOUGH*	
Technology	Social Media; Facebook
Statement problem/Focus	How active and influential members of Facebook groups aided in disaster recovery following Hurricane Sandy.
Methodology	Mixed methods
Method	Social network analysis (using specific network metrics) and web-survey
Framework/Theory	Social Network concepts
Case/Phenomena of interest	Hurricane Sandy
Setting	USA
Geographical	Regions affected by Hurricane Sandy
Participants	Influencer members of 52 Facebook groups that were created after Hurricane Sandy with membership ranging from 202 to 3,735 participants. Average number is 709 participants, with cumulative total number of group members at 38,000.
Data analysis	Network Analysis: Hyperlink-Induced Topic (HITS) Search and i5-index score using Facebook's Graph API
	Demo-psychographic analysis
Author's conclusions	Social media is tightly connected to the offline environment when used for disaster management and recovery efforts. It facilitates the integration of the offline and online environments also
	Disaster management organisations should be equipped with skills and technologies to employ social media in their recovery processes during disasters.
	Disaster recovery organizations should consider actively searching big network data for identifying potential volunteers and stakeholders, instead of focusing on passive methods of volunteer recruitment.

Geographic Situational Awareness: Mining Tweets for Disaster Preparedness, Emergency Response, Impact, and Recovery Qunying Huang 1,* and Yu Xiao 2	
Technology	Social media: Twitter
Statement problem/Focus	Classifying and re-establishing social media data into stages of disaster management; investigating the nature of tweet content generated within the time span of a disaster, and define a list of content categories taking into consideration the information involved in disaster phases including preparedness, emergency response, and recovery.
Methodology	Qualitative
Method	Content analysis
Framework/Theory	Typologies assessment: with new framework developed
Case/Phenomena of interest	Hurricane Sandy, which struck the Northwestern US on 29 October 2012
Setting	United States
Geographical	Downtown New York
Participants	Tweets with geo-tags are examined, using messages posted on Twitter during 10 October and 27 November 2012, retrieved from Gnip (http://gnip.com/)
	1,763,141 tweets were collected. Each tweet includes metadata, such as the timestamp of posting, geo-tag (location), and author profile information (e.g. author location, profile description, number of tweets, number of followers and friends, *etc.*)
Data analysis	Thematic analysis of more than 10,000 tweets later pruned to 8807 tweets which were eventually used to train and test the multi-label classifier based on logistic regression for the development of a new framework for further analysis
Author's conclusions	Twitter messages can be used to monitor and track geopolitical and disaster events, support emergency response and coordination, and serve as a measure of public interest or concern about events.
	This work presents a coding schema for separating social media messages into different themes within different disaster stages.
	A logistic regression classifier is selected to train and automatically categorize the messages into 4 predefined categories. 47 message categories were found as indications of the 4 predefined phases: preparedness, response, impact, recovery.

Government Social Media Messages across Disaster Phases Clayton Wukich	
Technology	Social media: Twitter
Statement problem/Focus	Research on government messaging disproportionately addresses large-scale disaster response efforts, leaving smaller-scale incidents and activities across other disaster phases (e.g., prevention, mitigation, preparedness and recovery) unreported.
Methodology	Mixed-methods
Method	Web and content analysis
Framework/Theory	Typologies development and assessment
Case/Phenomena of interest	State-level emergency management agencies operating in the United States over a twelve-month period of observation (April 2013 through March 2014). A number of large-scale incidents (e.g., the Boston Marathon bombing, the West, Texas fertilizer plant explosion, the Colorado floods, the Oso, Washington landslide and 56 other federally declared disasters), including a larger number of more routine emergencies (e.g., smaller storms and accidents).
Setting	United States
Geographical	United States
Participants	State emergency management agencies' websites were first reviewed to identify 51 accounts for 48 agencies, minimising the risk of selecting unofficial accounts.
	With Twitter's API, 38,682 time and date-stamped messages were downloaded in an Excel spreadsheet format for analysis.
Data analysis	Content analysis following extant categories – 22 types – as presented in a number of previous studies.
	Descriptive statistics
Author's conclusions	Findings illustrate a range of messages, with response and preparedness being most prevalent.
	Response (55.2%) and recovery-related messages (6.8%) comprised the majority of all distributed messages (62.0%). The messages apply to natural hazards, including both routine incidents and large-scale disasters such as tropical storms, tornadoes and blizzards.
	There were fewer prevention (2.7%) and mitigation (1.2%) messages.
	All agencies frequently posted situational awareness information and protective action messages often in the lead up to and during smaller-scale incidents.

Information and communication technology: Connecting the public and first responders during disasters

Buzzelli, M. M., Morgan, P., Muschek, A. G. & Macgregor-Skinner, G. (2014)

Technology	ICT in the general sense
Statement problem/Focus	The integrated use of ICTs as multidirectional information-sharing tools throughout the disaster cycle will increase a community's resiliency and supplement the capabilities of first responders and emergency management officials by providing real-time updates and information needed to assist and recover from a disaster.
Methodology	"Comprehensive" review of literature
Method	Database search and funnel filtering. Articles included are the ones published by governmental agencies, non-governmental agencies, peer-reviewed journals, and news organisations covering the disaster.
	The search was conducted on search engines such as Homeland Security Digital Library, Google Scholar, and Google.
	Search terms: "social media use in disasters," "social media and disaster recovery," "disaster AND social media," and "social media AND disaster recovery"
Framework/Theory	
Case/Phenomena of interest	All man-made and natural disasters in the post-Haiti earthquake
Setting	USA
Geographical	USA
Participants	Material (Non-human): Published peer-reviewed articles and reports on ICT use in man-made and natural disaster
Data analysis	Phenomenology
Author's conclusions	ICT/social media hold the potential of being used in the context of disaster management – before and after the event.
	There is little qualitative and quantitative research about its effects on preparedness, readiness, and resourcefulness despite the claims found in the review.

Introducing Performativity to Crisis Management Theory: An Illustration from the 2003 French Heat Wave Crisis Response Anouck Adrot* and Jean-Luc Moriceau** (2013)	
Technology	N/A not applicable
Statement problem/Focus	To account for coordination during the 2003 French heat wave crisis response,
Methodology	Qualitative - triangulation
Method	Explorative and interpretive method using the public hearings documents at the parliamentary chambers, together with archival material and semi-structured interviews.
Framework/Theory	The concept of performativity (Denzin, 2003a).
Case/Phenomena of interest	The summer 2003 French heatwave crisis that led to the death of 14,802 people.
Setting	France
Geographical	Urban France
Participants	Archival materials and 13 interviews
Data analysis	Interpretive
Author's conclusions	Coordination did not solely depend on information transmission or individuals' abilities to share meanings. Responders performed primarily by endorsing roles, showing off both their professionalism and emotions.
	The crisis responders' performance was not directed towards an efficient action but fuelled on impression, interactions and personal approaches to organizational politics.
	By alternating between the roles of an actor and a spectator, crisis responders were more likely to base their decisions on an interpretation of others' performances rather than a univocal meaning or a single source of information.
	However, by developing communication strategies, crisis responders contributed to immediate action.

Organizational and Societal Impacts of Big Data in Crisis Management Hayley Watson, Rachel L. Finn and Kush Wadhwa	
Technology	
Statement problem/Focus	To outline the role of big data in the different stages of crisis management, as little is known about the contribution of big data to recovery efforts, and to explore the organizational and societal benefits associated with engagement with this data.
Methodology	Qualitative (multidimensional): Case study
Method	Interviews, focus groups and review of grey literature (documentary analysis)
Framework/Theory	
Case/Phenomena of interest	Typhoon Hagupit (Ruby) in the Philippines in 2014
Setting	USA
Geographical	USA
Participants	Text materials and representatives of two humanitarian agencies: one international governmental organisation and the other international humanitarian organisation.
	The study involved interviewing high-level decision-makers in RICC, IGO and IHO (all humanitarian organisations). In the case of RICC, researchers interviewed high-level decision makers, 3 scientists and senior scientists who were directly involved in the design and development of the systems utilized.
	A focus group with crisis informatics experts from academia, civil society, industry and civil protection.
Data analysis	Document analysis and interpretive
Author's conclusions	Big data is able to significantly contribute to crisis response efforts.
	Big data can support organizations in their efforts to be better informed as data are able to significantly contribute to situational awareness, which can in turn inform decision-making,
	That big data is also able to positively inform preparation and pre-crisis efforts

Resilient information infrastructures Criticality and role in responding to catastrophic incidents Hans Jochen Scholl and Beth Joy Patin	
Technology	Technologies, ITs in general.
Statement problem/Focus	Role and importance of the information infrastructure (II) have been studied so far mostly with regard to tangible and physical elements such as hardware, software, and networks. The "soft" and social/relational/less tangible elements of an II have rarely been studied. The interdependencies of physical/tangible and social/relational/knowledge/less tangible elements of resilient information infrastructure (RII)s are little understood. Traditionally, research has focused on the physical/tangible elements of IIs. However, the intangible/social/relational elements in these structures are not independent from their physical and tangible underpinnings, and vice versa (Chatfield et al., 2012; Schraagen, 2010). The paper attempts to address this particular gap in the understanding of IIs. The paper presents the interdependencies between the physical/tangible and social/relational/knowledge/less tangible elements of II. The outcome of the paper's contribution is to provide foundations for empirical studies of the complex phenomena observable in and around RIIs under duress, which involve both the tangible and less tangible (for example, social) elements of affected IIs and their interplay.
Methodology	Qualitative - Conceptual Review
Method	Grey literature
Framework/Theory	The concept of resilient information infrastructure (RII) (Scholl and Patin, 2012), which builds on earlier efforts of defining and describing the concept of information infrastructure (II) is being used to develop a new theoretical foundations for understanding the roles, vices, and criticality of RIIs under duress and to pave the path to systematic empirical study of phenomena and elements involving IIs under the impact of extreme events.
Case/Phenomena of interest	Catastrophic incidents otherwise called extreme events (i.e., natural disasters). Interest in using the new framework for post hoc analyses of extreme events as well as their preparedness and mitigation efforts.
Setting	
Geographical	
Participants	
Data analysis	
Author's conclusions	There's a connection of existing knowledge on infrastructure, the nature and characteristics of information with the understanding of disaster-related resiliency and information needs.
	The paper highlights infrastructural characteristics of information, IT, and II to the dimensions of resiliency thus providing a handle for accounting for resiliency in IIs under extreme events.

	The paper accounts for the situatedness and interplay of tangible and less tangible elements as prerequisites for the resiliency of the II under duress.
Satellites and the New War on Infection: Tracking Ebola in West Africa Robert Peckham ⇑, Ria Sinha	
Technology	Satellite technologies, remote sensing
Statement problem/Focus	Given the rapid integration of space technologies in epidemiology and health logistics, there is now a need to examine how and with what consequences remote-sensing and communication technologies may be reconfiguring the practices and scope of global health.
Methodology	Qualitative – Conceptual Review
Method	Document analysis
Framework/Theory	
Case/Phenomena of interest	2014-2015 Ebola virus disease epidemic in West Africa: analyses of the different uses to which satellite imagery has been put in tracking and mapping Ebola 'hotspots' across Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.
	US Geological Survey (USGS) on behalf of the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) monitored the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone (UK Space Agency, 2014). This marked the first time the International Charter for Space and Major Disasters' space assets had been deployed to assist in containing an epidemic (CERN, 2014).
Setting	West Africa: Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone
Geographical	West Africa
Participants	
Data analysis	
Author's conclusions	Geospatial technologies afford public health researchers the opportunity of monitoring populations and the environment
	Duringthe 2014–2105 Ebola outbreak, satellites were usefully deployed to assist in hazardous ground operations, and to identify potential sites at risk.
	Yet the outbreak also revealed limitations, in particular a need for caution in using the technology to predict and define the borders of Ebola hotspots.
	The parameterized view may work to promote a targeted perspective predicated on a disease threat, rather than to further understanding of disease ecologies.
	The temporary nature of such remote interventions in a crisis may serve to undermine the case for permanent health infrastructure, with critical consequences for countries where infectious disease risks and social challenges converge.
	There is a significant disparity between so-called 'end-users' and the beneficiaries of this technology – in other words, afflicted communities. Many satellite image-providers and organizations involved in creating geospatial content are driven by explicit commercial imperatives.
	Satellite imagery ignores the deeper socioecological dynamics that drive

	infection. Instead, it offers up surface views as objects for interpretation through the superimposition of data 'layers'.
	Biosurveillance for epidemics might be seen as an extension of imperialism.
Resilient information infrastructures Criticality and role in responding to catastrophic incidents Hans Jochen Scholl and Beth Joy Patin	
Technology	Technologies, ITs in general.
Statement problem/Focus	Role and importance of the information infrastructure (II) have been studied so far mostly with regard to tangible and physical elements such as hardware, software, and networks. The "soft" and social/relational/less tangible elements of an II have rarely been studied. The interdependencies of physical/tangible and social/relational/knowledge/less tangible elements of resilient information infrastructure (RII)s are little understood. Traditionally, research has focused on the physical/tangible elements of IIs. However, the intangible/social/relational elements in these structures are not independent from their physical and tangible underpinnings, and vice versa (Chatfield et al., 2012; Schraagen, 2010). The paper attempts to address this particular gap in the understanding of IIs. The paper presents the interdependencies between the physical/tangible and social/relational/knowledge/less tangible elements of II. The outcome of the paper's contribution is to provide foundations for empirical studies of the complex phenomena observable in and around RIIs under duress, which involve both the tangible and less tangible (for example, social) elements of affected IIs and their interplay.
Methodology	Qualitative - Conceptual Review
Method	Grey literature
Framework/Theory	The concept of resilient information infrastructure (RII) (Scholl and Patin, 2012), which builds on earlier efforts of defining and describing the concept of information infrastructure (II) is being used to develop a new theoretical foundations for understanding the roles, vices, and criticality of RIIs under duress and to pave the path to systematic empirical study of phenomena and elements involving IIs under the impact of extreme events.
Case/Phenomena of interest	Catastrophic incidents otherwise called extreme events (i.e natural disasters). Interest in using the new framework for post hoc analyses of extreme events as well as their preparedness and mitigation efforts.
Setting	
Geographical	
Participants	
Data analysis	
Author's conclusions	There's a connection of existing knowledge on infrastructure, the nature and characteristics of information with the understanding of disaster-

	related resiliency and information needs.
	The paper highlights infrastructural characteristics of information, IT, and II to the dimensions of resiliency thus providing a handle for accounting for resiliency in IIs under extreme events.
	Accounts for the situatedness and interplay of tangible and less tangible elements as prerequisites for the resiliency of the II under duress.
Sharing news, making sense, saying thanks Patterns of talk on Twitter during the Queensland floods Frances Shaw, Jean Burgess, Kate Crawford, and Axel Bruns	
Technology	Social media: Twitter
Statement problem/Focus	The study seeks to understand the communicative and informational needs of both local and distant stakeholders during disasters. We are also able to explore ways of improving the efficacy of social media use by emergency organisations and the general public, exploring communal sense-making processes and the social space of crisis communications.
Methodology	Qualitative
Method	Social Network Data mining: Tweet mining using (now defunct) Twapperkeeper to collect all available tweets that included the #qldfloods
Framework/Theory	
Case/Phenomena of interest	The floods in the summer of 2010–2011 in Queensland, Australia
Setting	Queensland, Australia
Geographical	Queensland, Australia
Participants	A representative sample of communication associated with the #qldfloods hashtag on Twitter collected during the main week of the South-east Queensland floods (10-16 January, 2011).
	More than 35, 000 tweets available in the hashtag archive for this week
	The author sampled every 20th tweet for further manual analysis out of which 5% of the 35,000 were selected
	Second sample of tweets were drawn from @QPSMedia account which was operated by the Queensland Police Service Media Unit
Data analysis	Manual thematic analysis following purposive categories developed by Qu, Wu and Wang (2009): information, opinion, action, and emotion
Author's conclusions	Three key phenomena emerged in the use of social media in crisis communication: communal sense-making practices, the negotiation of participant roles (a category which is not frequently discussed in the more instrumentalist crisis informatics literature), and digital convergence around shared events
	Uses include seeking help, providing information and assistance, and responding emotively or evaluatively to the situation, including through political statements or expressions of grief and support
	Disaster behaviour frameworks and typologies of communication strategies could benefit from including an analysis of how gratitude is expressed and circulated.

Social media data in the disaster context Lucy Resnyansky	
Technology	General approach: social media
Statement problem/Focus	Integrating social sciences into the development of tools that enable disaster SM data detection, filtering, analysis and representation, consequent upon the gap that: SM data need to be interpreted as manifestations of social processes related to community resilience, diversity and conflict of interests, and attitudes to particular response strategies. The paper argues for social media data to be conceptualised as a product of social and representational practices, and disaster context, and discusses their heuristic significance for the analysis of disaster SM as a manifestation of social and cultural practices.
Methodology	Qualitative: conceptual review
Method	Literature review
Framework/Theory	
Case/Phenomena of interest	
Setting	
Geographical	
Participants	
Data analysis	Document analysis
Author's conclusions	The paper proposes a disaster data-in-context framework which can potentially inform interdisciplinary dialogue on disaster research.
	The new framework stems from the argument that the themes discussed in SM may not represent the full spectrum of public needs. A SM theme's prominence does not necessarily signify its greater importance from the perspectives of disaster management and affected populations. Hence, data must be approached as products of social, institutional and representational practices.
	The framework relies on certain assumptions already evident among developers of information technologies and increasingly evident in areas of disaster management and communication with regards to SM data in disaster. These assumptions are: preoccupation with the quantitative-thematic approach to SM content; information-centric and SM-centric worldviews; while ignoring the specific nature of mediated reality.
	The proposed framework assists with adopting an anti-positivist stance in relation to disaster SM data, and with approaching SM as a locus of social processes.
	To put the framework to work, the focus of analysis needs to be shifted

	from information to representation and interaction. In this case, development of capabilities that enable disaster SM data analysis may be informed by such concepts as Goffman's (1981) response and Voloshinov's (1986) utterance, and may incorporate broader research on SM phenomena, such as performativity (Papaharissi, 2012), online semiotic identity (Resnyansky, 2010b) and digital drift (Goldsmith and Brewer, 2015). The concept of the chronotope may be particularly useful for approaching disaster SM data as semiotic representations of socio-geographical space and versions of the past, present and future that may have shaped participants' attitudes and opinions.
	The disaster data-in-context framework needs further development before it can be integrated into tools supporting SM data use in disasters (as well as the assessment criteria), it can, hopefully, orientate technology developers in the domain-specific aspects of data, meta information and context. Additionally, this framework may aid disaster managers and capability developers in adopting a critical-reflexive stance towards SM and in approaching SM as a non-neutral participant of the disaster management process.

Social media in emergency management: Twitter as a tool for communicating risks to the public **Panos Panagiotopoulos a, , Julie Barnett b, Alinaghi Ziaee Bigdeli c, Steven Sams d**	
Technology	Social Media: Twitter
Statement problem/Focus	Exploring the impact of Twitter as a tool for communicating risks to the public consequent upon two major emergencies: the heavy snow of December 2010 and the riots of August 2011.
Methodology	Qualitative Digital method: Social network analysis
Method	Twitter mining
Framework/Theory	Theories of risk and emergency communication: two theoretical perspectives in risk and emergency communication: (1) the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) (Kasperson et al., 1988) and (2) the Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication model (CERC) (Reynolds and Seeger, 2005). The combination of these perspectives facilitates an integrated consideration of risk communication themes and message framing (SARF) with the different emergency stages and risk reduction strategies suggested by CERC.
Case/Phenomena of interest	The heavy snow of December 2010 (aka the Big Freeze) and the riots of August 2011
Setting	United Kingdom
Geographical	United Kingdom
Participants	10,020 tweets posted by the official accounts of UK local government authorities (councils) in the context of two major emergencies: the heavy snow of December 2010 and the riots of August 2011 were selected from an initial pool of over 300,000 posts made by 187 general Twitter accounts of UK councils.
	These two national emergencies were selected due to their high impact and distinct characteristics; this corresponds to the diverse and influential case selection criteria for exploratory research recommended by Seawright and Gerring (2008).
Data analysis	The filtering, selection and analysis of tweets were carried out using MS Excel and NVivo. From all tweets posted by LGAs during November/ December 2010 and August 2011, only the emergency-related ones were selected for further analysis in each case respectively.
	For the 2010 snowfalls, due to the high volume and duration of events, the number of tweets had to be further narrowed down to the period 1–23 December 2010, which included the escalation of snowfalls around the beginning and middle of December 2010 (Met Office, 2014). This led to a total of 8274 tweets emanating from the majority of LGAs across the UK
	The investigation of the 2011 riots focused on 1746 messages mostly from London councils and other metropolitan areas in England where public disorder took place. The 1746 tweets were posted during a period of five days from the 9th to the 13th of August 2011.
	The 8274 snow tweets from December 2010 and the 1746 riot tweets from August 2011were coded as separate cases to systematically analyse their

	content and classify emerging themes in each emergency situation.
	An open coding approach for Twitter users' conversation analysis was used (Waters and Williams, 2011; Heverin and Zach, 2012). The approach comes from traditional qualitative content analysis methods (Krippendorff, 2013).
	The open coding was implemented by two coders who identified initial patterns using keyword frequency and distribution within the messages.
Author's conclusions	Twitter can be of particular value in large-scale emergencies like weather conditions, when public managers face pressures to demonstrate the effective allocation of resources (Boin and 't Hart, 2010; Henstra, 2010).
	Twitter was used in a variety of ways to communicate and manage associated risks including messages to provide official updates, encourage protective behaviour, increase awareness and guide public attention to mitigating actions.
	The value of Twitter to improve confidence in emergency management institutions centres around the fact that many tweets from both cases were devoted to information about emergency decisions, use of resources and progress of risk assessment activities.
	In the case of the 2011 riots, there was an ongoing struggle to show that authorities had the situation under control. Most themes of Twitter communication were clearly aligned with this objective, with many of them aiming to clarify ambiguities about the source of publicly distributed information or directly disprove rumours (Oh et al., 2013).
	The style of tweets adapted accordingly to show the alertness of authorities and decisiveness of actions in progress (e.g., legal actions, disproving rumours). Authorities' tweets deviated from traditionally official (norm) tone as many were informative in an informal way (e.g., "Colleague at meeting with police confirms nothing of note has happened in the borough. We and police will continue to keep our eyes open").
	Compared to traditional risk and emergency communications, social media interventions take place in spaces where official accounts are not isolated but act as hubs within a broader flow of information during emergencies (Jung and Park, 2014, 2016).
	SARF and CERC proved useful starting points to frame social media in relation to established emergency and risk communication theories (Rickard et al., 2013; Sellnow and Seeger, 2013).
	Findings regarding the different communication strategies supported by Twitter messages clearly reflect some of the good practice elements suggested by the CERC model (e.g., uncertainty reduction, self-efficacy). The application of the model illustrated the intention of LGAs to accelerate the transitions between emergency management stages whenever possible (riots) or show preparedness for next stages when transitions could not be controlled (snow).
	Given that interest in social media monitoring tools is rising, the CERC model can be a useful diagnostic framework to strengthen the connection between pre-crisis and evaluation.
	Although SARF and CERC were useful as a conceptual scaffolding for the analysis of this paper, further development of risk communication models is needed to better take into account the immediacy and nonlinear nature of social media interactions.
	In spite of the usefulness of the theoretical frame it is important to point out that social media may not be as useful for effective collaboration as systems directly designed for crisis planning and response.

Social media in Saudi Arabia: Exploring its use during two natural disasters Yeslam Al-Saggaf [a], , Peter Simmons [b] (2015)	
Technology	Social Media
Statement problem/Focus	This study explored the nature of social media interaction in Saudi Arabia that concerned the 2009 and 2011 floods in Jeddah which led to the death of 120 people. The exploration focused on the ways that social media in Saudi Arabia was used as a public space during times of intense social media use and peacetime natural disasters. Given that there is little consensus on what social media can actually do with regards to political participation and activism,
Methodology	Qualitative – Thematic Analysis
Method	Digital method: Twitter mining
Framework/Theory	The analysis draws on concepts of the public sphere (Habermas, 1989), the online public sphere (Poor, 2005), and previous research into social media and participation. The Habermasian 'public sphere' is used to articulate insights from the study and to reflect on the theory rather than to evaluate the extent to which the interactions are consistent with definitions of public sphere.
Case/Phenomena of interest	2009 and 2011 floods in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia which led to the death of 120 people.
Setting	Middle East, Saudi Arabia
Geographical	Saudi Arabia, Jeddah
Participants	Social network data: was used with data comprising a total of 100 consecutive threads, and the first 50 comments readers made on those threads (N = 5000). The threads were taken from YouTube, Facebook, Al-Saha Al-Siyasia and Al Arabiya. The threads selected were all related to the Jeddah 2009 and 2011 floods.
Data analysis	Social network data for Thematic analysis. NVivo was used to manage qualitative data
Author's conclusions	Social media is a public space for engaging in rational discussion.
	Social media is a public space for communicating to the government
	Social media is a public space for expressing feelings and emotions. Communication of emotion was much more evident than rational discussion and the negotiation of differences of opinions.
	The free expression of feelings and emotions over the death of the flood victims and the anger towards those responsible for the floods were salient features and common themes of the discourse evident across the four sites chosen for study.
	The prevailing feeling was of a deep collective sadness.
	During the Saudi floods the authors speculate that the intensity of the emotions expressed and shared through social media brought members of the 'crowd' closer to each other; and that a sense of unity and common focus emboldened many to public displays of protest, creating pressure on the government, that would not have occurred without the Internet.

Social media use by government: From the routine to the critical

Andrea L. Kavanaugh [a,1], Edward A. Fox [a,2], Steven D. Sheetz [b,3], Seungwon Yang [a,], Lin Tzy Li [d,e,4,5,6], Donald J. Shoemaker [c,7], Apostol Natsev [f,8], Lexing Xie [g,8,9]

[a] Department of Computer Science, Virginia Tech, VA 24061, USA

[b] Department

Technology	Social Media
Statement problem/Focus	Exploring how social media were being used by local citizens, community organizations and government, and how data analysis could be applied to improve services and communication with citizens. While many government agencies have recognized social media as an important information source and outlet, there has yet to be a comprehensive account about the needs and methods for social media use by government agencies and community organisations.
Methodology	Digitised and digital methods
Method	Social network data mining and exploratory focus group interviews after the initial online questionnaire to select participants based on their self-report social media use and their involvement in the local community.
	Social media data were collected in the form of official posts and public comment data from the Arlington County Facebook page, Twitter feeds from local civic organizations, YouTube videos, and crawls and searches of local web pages.
	Different Twitter analytical tools, such as '140 kit' (http://www.140kit.com) and the Archivist (http://archivist.visitmix.com) to collect tweets from 34 local organizations, including Arlington government, that were civic in nature (rather than commercial or residential) were used.
Framework/Theory	
Case/Phenomena of interest	Social media use by local county
Setting	Arlington and environs, USA
Geographical	Arlington County, USA
Participants	Government and community organisations in Arlington and areas, USA from where 25 participants for the focus group interviews were selected.
Data analysis	Thematic analysis of interview data
	Social network analysis of social network data. First were the semantic analyses of the Twitter data to identify popular topics and to characterise followers by their profiles data. This involved simple frequency counts to calculate number of followers and followers of followers of a given organisation.
	Then the researchers used the visualization software 'wordle' (http://www.wordle.net) to represent the results of the Twitter analyses as tag clouds in order to be able to distill and make greater sense of large amounts of data more quickly and easily. For the YouTube video collections, we used a Perl script to search all YouTube videos for the tags or video with the title 'Arlington County' and represented the search results in a tag cloud indicating the most frequent tags in the image collection.
Author's conclusions	There's no clear pattern or strategy for social media use and/or its effect of social media communications on the public (Arlington people). Making sense of social media data like tweets involved new tools and skills. And it has

	become imperative for the establishment of digital libraries to archive and curate social media content, especially for crisis and social convergence situations but also for analyses that cover longer time frames.
	Recognizing relevant information accurately and in a timely manner, especially from short content micro-blogging sites (e.g., Twitter)makes it difficult to identify tweet meaning and context which may lead to incorrect classification and misleading analysis of data.
	Alerting government officials to the analyzed information from multiple social media sources; due to the massive volume of the social media data stream, it is a challenge. Sense-making from large amounts of data required incorporating interaction methods with visualisation.
	By mining content and services covering multiple media types (i.e., text, audio, image, and video) we can develop tools to recognize events and alert government, citizens, and community groups to see quickly the 'big picture' through visualizations of social media activity and content and changes in both over time.
	That said, however, the interplay of traditional and emerging media may become quite blended over time. Until then, there are persistent costs (e.g., policies, legal concerns, and other issues) and benefits about which governments especially seek guidance
	many public relations managers are not comfortable with social media. It is possible that a public relations manager could focus on the traditional communication media such as, newsletters, press releases, and phone interviews with local TV and radio. To manage communication with a more diverse public, however, they need someone who uses social media. So, either they have to re-train current public relations managers, or they have the added cost of adding another person to manage public relations activities that involve social media.
	The benefits, especially to citizens, in terms of greater access to information (e.g., searchable online video of meetings of interest) and greater sharing of concerns and ideas will lead to increased awareness, collective efficacy and civic participation. The benefits to government include pro-active problem solving and positive public relations that lead to greater political efficacy and public trust.

Spatial, temporal, and content analysis of Twitter for wildfire hazards

Zheye Wang[1] • Xinyue Ye[1] • Ming-Hsiang Tsou[2]

Technology	Social media: Twitter
Statement problem/Focus	To gain insights into the usefulness of social media data in revealing situational awareness with regards to wildfire. Specifically the study seek to analyse the wildfire-related Twitter activities in terms of their inherent attributes, i.e., space, time, content, and network to gain insights into the usefulness of social media data in revealing situational awareness.
Methodology	Digital method
Method	Social network analysis: Twitter search API (https://search.twitter.com/) to collect wildfire-related Tweets.
Framework/Theory	
Case/Phenomena of interest	San Diego Wildfire of May 13 2014
Setting	San Diego, USA
Geographical	San Diego, USA
Participants	
Data analysis	Social network analysis: spatial-temporal using tweet metadata fields such as the user's name, the time stamp.
	The first phase focused on collecting general tweets related to wildfires, while the second phase centered upon the tweets pertinent to specific wildfires. Tweets collected in the first phase could be used in analysis of all dimensions (i.e., space, time, content, and network), whereas those tweets gleaned in the second phase are of particular importance for spatial analysis as only by identifying the accurate ignition locations of specific wildfires can we investigate the influence of geography (distance) on the spatial distribution of people's responses.
Author's conclusions	Social media data can characterize the wildfire across space and over time, and thus are applicable to provide useful information on disaster situations.
	People have strong geographical awareness during wildfire hazards and are interested in communicating situational updates related to wildfire damage (e.g., containment percentage and burned acres), wildfire response (e.g., evacuation), and appreciation to firefighters.
	Traditional news media and local authorities are opinion leaders and play a dominant role in the wildfire retweet network.

Teaching Social Media Analytics: An Assessment Based on Natural Disaster Postings Tiong T. Goh & Pei-Chen Sun (2015)	
Technology	Social media
Statement problem/Focus	To demonstrate an assessment structure for teaching social media analytics concepts with the goal of analyzing and interpreting social media content. The assessment is based on forum postings regarding two recent events: the Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand, and the Japanese earthquake and tsunami. The aim of the assessment is to discover social insights.
Methodology	Qualitative
Method	The forum postings related to two disasters (New Zealand earthquake and Japan tsunami) were extracted, and they represent Parts A and B of the analytical framework.
Framework/Theory	Cooper's Analytics Framework to cover such concepts as term frequency (TF), term frequency–inverse document frequency (TFIDF), data visualization, sentiments and opinions analysis, the Nearest Neighbor K-NN classification algorithm, and Information Diffusion theory.
Case/Phenomena of interest	Forum postings regarding two recent events: the Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand, and the Japanese earthquake and tsunami. A magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck the Canterbury region in New Zealand's South Island on Tuesday, February 22, 2011, at 12:51 p.m. The earthquake killed 185 people, ranking it as the second-deadliest natural disaster recorded in New Zealand. On March 11, 2011, at 5:46:23 a.m., a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the coast of Honshu, Japan's most populous island, near Sendai, the capital city of Miyagi Prefecture. The earthquake triggered a devastating tsunami that swept over cities and farmlands in northern Japan. The disaster reportedly killed at least 15,690 people (MCEER, 2011).
Setting	New Zealand and Japan
Geographical	New Zealand and Japan
Participants	Online paper with presumably local participants who post comments
	The "Event A" data file represents the Christchurch earthquake, and contains 769 postings extracted from February 22 to March 1. The "Event B" data file represents the Japan earthquake and tsunami, and contains 438 postings from March 11 to March 15. The data structure consists of *Name*, *Date* and *Postings*.
Data analysis	The researchers gave these two data files, together with an assignment description, to 45 IS students who enrolled in a one-trimester, advanced database course containing a social media analytics module as part of an assessment. The students had approximately four weeks to complete the assignment. They were required to analyze the data using RapidMiner text processing software to compare the content and to interpret the results.
	The assessment results showed that our approach is effective for teaching social analytics to undergraduates in an IS program in a business school environment.
Author's conclusions	Analysis of the students' performance indicates an inadequacy in their social, behavioral and cognitive skills, an indication of the need for teaching social media analytics.
	The interpretative aspect of data analytics normally receives less focus in the undergraduate IS curriculum but is necessary in graduate programs, especially IS programs that emphasize social policy research. Our analysis indicates that colleges should strengthen the interpretive aspect at the undergraduate level immediately.
	BI&A courses should include behavioral and social cognitive theory to provide an interpretation of analytics findings.
	Cooper's analytics framework includes embedded theories and has known "whose reality" issues. Failure to consider this issue risks compromising the framework's

	effectiveness in actual implementation.
	The embedded theories may also be insufficient to explain any newly discovered insights.
	The current SNA assessment also lacks an engagement plan: there is no task to access prior knowledge and help learners become engaged in a new concept.
	Lastly, the sample size for the student performance evaluation is small (45), and the evaluation involved only a single, one-trimester course.

Technologies to Support Community Flood Disaster Risk Reduction

Ian McCallum1• Wei Liu1• Linda See1• Reinhard Mechler1• Adriana Keating1•Stefan Hochrainer-Stigler1• Junko Mochizuki1• Steffen Fritz1• Sumit Dugar2•Miguel Arestegui3• Michael Szoenyi4• Juan-Carlos Laso Bayas1
• Peter Burek1•Adam French1• Inian Moorthy1

Technology	New technologies: Social media and GIS
Statement problem/Focus	However, the application of technologies in ex-ante risk reduction is still limited, in particular in assessing critical risk factors—hazards and vulnerability. The paper reviews the state of technologies used and identifies important areas for further application in community flood risk management.
Methodology	Qualitative
Method	Conceptual review
Framework/Theory	
Case/Phenomena of interest	Flood disaster risk reduction
Setting	
Geographical	
Participants	
Data analysis	Document analysis
Author's conclusions	While increasing use is being made of new technologies ex-post in disaster response and recovery, large potential lies in the application of these technologies ex-ante in disaster-prone regions.

Terse Messaging and Public Health in the Midst of Natural Disasters: The Case of the Boulder Floods Jeannette Sutton, Cedar League, Timothy L. Sellnow & Deanna D. Sellnow	
Technology	Social media: Twitter
Statement problem/Focus	Little research has been conducted on the content and amplification of these messages during periods of imminent threat, and there is limited guidance on how to craft instructional messages for health-related threats. The study addresses terse health-related warning messages sent by public safety agencies over Twitter during the 2013 Boulder, CO, floods. It is a data-driven research which seeks to inform on effective message design when using social media.
Methodology	Qualitative: Case Study
	Case study allowed us to capture dynamics among key stakeholders over a defined period of time and to answer research questions such as how terse warning messages are written to communicate emergency public health information during a disaster, what contents are included in these terse messages, and what features of message style are identifiable.
Method	Digital method: Social network analysis
	It follows from initial identification of the local, state and federal Twitter accounts that were posting messages on the primary event hashtag "#boulderflood" from 11-15, 2013
	Then snowball sampling to identify additional Twitter accounts that represented public safety organisations that were connected (as friends) to the initial set of accounts (regardless of their use of the #boulderflood hashtag).
	Also manual sifting through the websites of local government organisations to identify additional Twitter accounts that may not routinely tweet but could play a public information role.
Framework/Theory	
Case/Phenomena of interest	Twitter use during the September 11-15, 2013 Boulder, CO, floods. Because communication about water-related emergencies was a primary issue during the flood, we focus specifically on Twitter messages involving this topic.
Setting	Boulder Colorado, USA
Geographical	Boulder Colorado, USA
Participants	Twitter accounts belonging to state and federal accounts that have a primary role in disaster response, such as Colorado Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (@COEmergency), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (@FEMARegion8), and the National Weather Service (@NOAA and @NWSBoulder) were selected.
	It also included accounts that were posting health-related information and represented local, state, and federal-level organisations such as the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (@CDPHE) and the Ceners for Disease Control (@CDCEmergency and @CDCReady)
Data analysis	5,100 tweets from 52 Twitter accounts over the course of the 5-day flood period were mined for analysis
	Two researchers, the first and second authors, coded the message content of the entire data set manually to identify a subset of messages containing emergency public health content (N = 299 from 30 accounts; 22 of the 52 Twitter accounts

	contained no relevant public health content).
	Closed coding approach which used preidentified topics on the subject of water related emergencies and outbreaks was adopted for the coding of themes.
	Coders independently coded each tweet using the closed content categories and then exchanged tweets to determine intercoder agreement. Coders agreed on content theme codes in approximately 98% of cases. Disagreements were resolved by consensus, following discussion of problematic cases by the coders. Six health communication themes were identified: (a) drinking water safety
	(personal water storage, wells, community water systems), (b) septic/sewage and wastewater, (c) hygiene and handwashing, (d) cleaning and sanitizing, (e) standing flood water exposure (including food safety and animals), and (f) messages referring individuals to informational resources. Emergency public health messages were also coded for aspects of message
	style (see Table 1). Style aspects, which emphasize how content is relayed or displayed to affect message specificity or clarity (Mileti & Sorensen, 1990), include the following: how each tweet sentence functions within the English language as declarative, imperative, interrogative, or exclamatory; and whether a tweet includes a word or phrase in ALL CAPS and, if so, whether these words function as either a category signifier or to emphasize a portion of the tweet (to increase message clarity).
	Public health messages posted by local emergency management leaders are
Author's conclusions	most frequently retweeted by organizations. Emergency public health messages focus primarily on drinking water in this
	event. Terse messages can be designed in ways that include imperative/instructional
	and declarative/explanatory styles of content, both of which are essential for promoting public health during crises, and capable of providing information about the hazard event, its impact, and actionable instructions for self-protection. Regarding style, nearly 90% of the tweets examined in this study were declarative, 36% were imperative, and 29% contained a combination of both.
	We suggest that there is a direct link between sentence style and sentence function; where declarative sentences explain the hazard and its impact, imperative sentences are more instructional. Although previous research suggests warning messages be composed of a mix of declarative and imperative sentences (Frisby et al., 2013), the heavy reliance
	on declarative/explanatory style over imperative/instructional style could hinder desired behavioral actions from receivers. This study, however, reveals the tremendous potential for terse messages delivered over social media to play a prominent role in protecting the public's
	health during crises.

The role of IT in crisis response: Lessons from the SARS and Asian Tsunami disasters

Dorothy E. Leidner [a,*], Gary Pan [b,1], Shan L. Pan [c]

Technology	General, as in IS resources
Statement problem/Focus	Many of the extant studies bothering on centrality of information, and the systems used to gather, synthesise and distribute information during the crisis response mention information-related challenges, but few attempt to uncover the mechanisms through which IS facilitates crisis response nor the necessary preconditions to the use of IS during crises. Our case study of Singapore's responses to the SARS and Asian Tsunami crises – crises which can both be considered as societal level crises – seeks to address this gap.
	The study focuses on reconstructing how Singapore successfully deployed resources and capabilities in response to the SARS and Asian Tsunami crises and formulating an explanatory crisis response resource and capability deployment framework.
Methodology	Qualitative: Case study (Eisenhardt, 1989) – also referred to as soft positivism (Madill et al., 2000; Kirsch, 2004)
	Using soft positivism enabled us to bring certain a prior expectations to the data analysis, consistent with positivist research, and yet also allowed certain explanations to emerge from the data, as is characteristic of interpretive research. Consistent with a positivist view (i.e., Dubé and Paré, 2003; Benbasat et al., 1987), we assume the phenomena to be relatively objective and as such, assume that we can present a factual account of the case. Yet, in order to examine constructs that are not easily separated from the contexts, we also draw from interpretivists (i.e., Klein and Myers, 1999) in building our model of resource deployment in crisis response.
Method	Interviews and document analysis.
	Primary data obtained from 2 interview sessions, on each case respectively. Secondary data included reading the extensive news coverage off the crisis response efforts in Singapore, press releases from different government agencies, advisories for precautions and articles from multiple newspapers and other internet publications in Singapore and some internal reports.
Framework/Theory	The resource-based view (Barney, 1991)
Case/Phenomena of interest	Singapore's responses to the SARS and Asian Tsunami crises
Setting	Singapore (SARS outbreak) and Tsunami (Japan)
Geographical	Asia – Singapore and Japan
Participants	The researchers first interviewed 18 executives from Singapore's Defense Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) between August and November 2003, to find out how capabilities were deployed during the SARS outbreak. In August 2005, we re-entered DSTA for two months to collect further information regarding crisis response to the Asian Tsunami disaster. During this time, we interviewed 15 interviewees that include senior managers and members from the crisis response team from both DSTA and Singapore Armed Forces (SAF).
Data analysis	Thematic coding and analyses following literature- and data-driven analyses
	Our data analysis is thus positivist in the sense that we purposely set out to examine existing IS-related assets, capabilities, and actions, but interpretive in

	the sense that the specific bundle of resources and the coordination of the resources emerged from the data.
Author's conclusions	Findings suggest that IT infrastructure is a central resource in crisis response. Whereas past research using RBV in a competitive context suggests that infrastructure is not a valuable source of competitive advantage (Mata et al., 1995; Powell and Dent-Micallef, 1997), in the cooperative context where disparate organizations need to coordinate information, a strong and flexible IT infrastructure is highly valuable. In the same vein, the development skills of IS personnel has largely been considered as a mobile and imitable resource and therefore, of relatively low value in competitive environments except where those skills involve organization specific knowledge (Wade and Hulland, 2004; Bharadwaj, 2000; Feeny and Wilcocks, 1998). However, in the cooperative context of crisis response, the skills of the IS personnel (the DTSA staff) was essential in enabling quick crisis response.
	The IT skill itself has greater value in the context of the collaborative network just as the infrastructure was dependent upon having leadership that recognized the value of IT. In addition, refusal or inability to recognize signals often leads to inadequate design of crisis response systems (Turoff, 2002).
	Thus, the IT assets and capabilities were inextricably tied to the non-IS-related assets and capabilities, exhibiting the characteristics of enhancing complementarity (Wade and Hulland, 2004).
	Findings suggest that quickly establishing a crisis response structure is very important in linking existing assets and capabilities to the response activities and that IT and organizational structures complement each other and work hand in hand during crisis response. Traditionally, disaster planners and managers advocate top–down, centralized command and control during emergency situations (Moynihan, 2008; Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1997).
	In the SARS and Tsunami examples, the agile mobilization of people and technology was enhanced by the single-layer structure. Moreover, the top– down command structure also improved the overall efficiency and interoperability of deployment and distribution-related activities. This counters the argument in some studies that the centralized command and control may not be a good model, instead loosening rather than tightening the command structure may be more appropriate (Lin et al., 2006).

The role of social media in local government crisis communications

Melissa W. Graham[a,*], Elizabeth J. Avery[b], Sejin Park[b]

Technology	Social media
Statement problem/Focus	The adoption and use of social media tools for crisis communication and social media's part in managing a crisis, from the perspectives of local governments which until this study had not been explored. Therefore, there is scant research on the extent to which local governments are actually using social media for crisis communication efforts. Specific research questions explore the adoption and use of social media tools for crisis communication by local governments and the role social media play in managing a crisis.
Methodology	Quantitative: Survey
Method	Digitised Method: Survey: electronic questionnaires were used to collect data from more than 300 local government officials from municipalities across the United States
Framework/Theory	Coombs' situational crisis communication theory, SCCT, is used as theory to examine crisis communication and management (Coombs, 2004, 2007). Jin and Liu (2010) proposed a modification of the SCCT that incorporates social media, the social-mediated crisis communication model (SMCC) to guide crisis managers in their social media efforts and activities following a crisis. In particular, SMCC outlines the interactions between an organization involved in a crisis and the different types of publics who produce and consume information about the crisis via social media (Liu et al., 2013)
Case/Phenomena of interest	General / Not specific
Setting	USA
Geographical	USA
Participants	288 public officials and government employees who handle communication functions for their respective local government councils. A research firm was contracted to send email with a cover letter soliciting their participation in the study
Data analysis	Descriptive (simple percentages and central tendency –M/SD) and inferential statistics (using SPSS)
Author's conclusions	71% (N= 205 of 288) used social during crisis while 29%(N= 83) did not.
	The prevalent social media platforms for crisis communication among local government staffers in the communications department are: Facebook (N= 157, 53%) was the most popular social medium followed by Twitter (N= 81,27%), blogs (N= 17,6%), and YouTube (N= 13,5%). Others are Google Plus (N= 8,3%),and other (N= 19,6%).
	The level of usage of social media is marginal [(M = 2.86, SD = 1.48) on a scale of 1 to 5] with natural disaster as the dominant crisis type attracting social media use by LG crisis communicators. The fact that rural government officials are still lagging behind their larger population counterparts is troubling. Rural local governments officials' engagement of social media during crisis revealed here is troubling.

	There was a significant relationship between community size and the level of usage of social media [F (2,200) =4.81, p = .009]. Consistent with Avery et al.'s (2010) findings, this survey found that as community size increased so did the extent of use and number of social media tools engaged during a crisis.
	And both the extent of social media use and the number of social media tools used were positively related to the officials' crisis management.
	That the level of social media use was positively associated with the officials' ability to control the crisis, while the number of social media tools engaged was not.
	And that only the extent of social media use was a significant predictor of the strength of government's response to crisis.
	In addition, there was a significant relationship between crisis type and the level of social media usage, but no significant relationship exists between crisis type and the number of social media used. Social media were used significantly more for crisis communication during public health crises than for natural disaster, transportation, political, social, or criminal crises.
	The framework for crisis communication practices of local governments provided by this study can be used to investigate crisis communication practices of other spheres of government or government related entities as well as differences among users based on experience and demographics.

The social innovation potential of ICT-enabled citizen observatories to increase eParticipation in local flood risk management

Uta Wehn*, Jaap Evers

Technology	WeSenseIt eParticipation sensor
Statement problem/Focus	Analyses of the social innovation potential of ICT-enabled citizen observatories to increase eParticipation in local flood risk management.
Methodology	Qualitative: Case study and action research
Method	Desk research and interviews (semi-structured)
Framework/Theory	Social innovation and eParticipation
Case/Phenomena of interest	To identify the likely types of social innovations related to the WeSenseIt citizen observatories as used in local flood risk management in the UK and Netherlands.
Setting	Doncaster-UK and Delfland-Netherlands
Geographical	Europe: UK and Netherlands
Participants	Interviewees that were held with relevant local authorities, emergency services as well as regional and national policy makers. 14 extensive face-to-face interviews were conducted
Data analysis	Thematic coding – theory-and data-drive approach: The transcribed interviews were analysed according to the framework introduced in the previous sections and the collected data triangulated with information from desk research
Author's conclusions	Given the institutional structures identified in these cases and the obligation of authorities to be accountable for their decisions, citizen observatories have the potential, but do not automatically imply, that citizens will become more active players in flood risk management, gaining participation with higher impact on decision-making, nor that communication between stakeholders will improve.
	with respect to the current dynamics of citizen participation in existing flood risk management highlight the divergent roles that authorities conceive for citizens (from data providers to expressing preferences, albeit with varying degrees of authority, ranging from individual education/awareness raising to advising and consulting) and the role(s) that citizens in practice seem to assign to themselves during the four phases of flood risk management (e.g., problem reporters, voluntary disaster manager).
	In the UK case, citizens are considered as an important stakeholder in flood risk management who need to be engaged in the decision-making process to reach consensus. In the Dutch case, flood risk management is focused on the prevention of floods altogether and not on mitigation and preparedness, with more emphasis on infrastructural maintenance and improvements than the participation and resilience of citizens and communities.
	Regarding the extent to which current participation processes are already ICT-enabled, both cases thus far present limited ICT-enabled participation. While digital photo and video reporting of flooding incidents seems to be gaining currency in both cases with similar perceived benefits by the authorities (facilitating and speeding up their processes and possibilities to react, especially during the impact-intense

	phases), traditional, offline means of communication such as community face-to-face meetings and (fixed line) telephone calls are still very prevalent in both cases. In both cases
	Nevertheless, citizens are also already participating as social sensors (explicit data providers), providing observations, comments and photos via social media both directly and intentionally as well as implicitly.
	The two diverse cases studied here suggest that there are no inherent 'plug and play eParticipation' elements ready to be adopted, confirming earlier findings of the eParticipation literature [28,30]. Realising the potential of citizen observatories to improve stakeholder engagement and participation in decision-making seems to depend on the attitudes and expectations of both, authorities and citizens, as well as the formal division of responsibilities and accountability. In the Dutch case, ICTs are proposed to improve the current system of information sharing between government and citizens, but without real changes in the type of participation (i.e., regarding the role and impact of citizens in decision-making conform the communication and authority axess of the ICT-enabled observatories framework). ICTs are thus regarded as means to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the authority and not as a participation mechanism that grants citizens a more active role in flood risk management. In the UK case, a more active role for citizens in flood risk management is envisaged and encouraged and ICT-enabled data capture by citizens is welcomed.

Trust, but verify: social media models for disaster management Amisha M. Mehta, Axel Bruns & Judith Newton	
Technology	Social media
Statement problem/Focus	The study draws on the context of natural disasters to investigate the intersection between the management of natural disasters, trust, and social media in order to understand better how trust is verified online. This process builds on existing work that categorises the functionality of social media (Jung and Moro, 2014; Houston et al., 2015) by assessing the verification of information during disasters using a guardianship of trust model. This approach highlights the mechanisms that guide and assure trust and influence power in relationships between individuals and emergency services organisations. Specifically, it explores the potential mechanisms by which emergency management organisations may come to trust the information originating from the wider community of social media users in general, and may identify especially trustworthy individual users with whom it would be valuable to develop a closer relationship built on interpersonal trust.
Methodology	Mixed-methods quantitative and qualitative analysis
Method	Observation (using social network data) and observation (in situ) of social media activities by emergency management organisations (Queensland Fire and Emergency Services) and their followers.
Framework/Theory	Operational definition of trust both from a theoretical perspective and in the context of disaster. This is used to build and explore three models for social media and trust used in the study.
Case/Phenomena of interest	Social media activities of Queensland Fire and Emergency Services (QFES) during a number of recent disasters such as cyclones and storm-related flooding throughout the state's annual summer storm season between November and April.
Setting	Queensland, Australia
Geographical	Australia
Participants	Emergency workers at Queensland Fire and Emergency Services
Data analysis	Document analysis and note-taking
	There is a complex network of trust relationships with regards to incorporating large volume social media data into the emergency crisis communication plans of emergency organisations such as witnessed in the QFES's roles during natural disaster situations.
Author's conclusions	Three models were proposed to explore trust relationships between emergency management organisations and social media users during natural disaster/health crisis. The models are Intelligence Gathering, Quasi-journalistic Verification, and Crowdsourcing. The models are useful for evaluation and verification of user-generated content, at least in the context of crisis communication.
	Trust relationships has a tangible impact on the possibility and the efficiency of information flowing from social media sources into emergency management decision-making processes

	The verification models to some extent have the potential to affect trust relationships and to improve the quality of the information on which crisis response decisions are based. However, that this is not necessarily an argument for substantially greater or wholesale inclusion of social media content in emergency management decision-making: the purpose of verification is to work out what (or whom) to trust as much as what not to trust.

Trusting Facebook in Crisis Situations: The Role of General Use and General Trust Toward Facebook

Hermann Szymczak, MSc, Pinar Ku¨cu¨kbalaban, Dipl Psych, Sandra Lemanski, Dipl Psych, Daniela Knuth, PhD, and Silke Schmidt, Prof, PhD

Technology	Social media: Facebook
Statement problem/Focus	The perceived trustworthiness of Facebook in crisis situations was examined in this study. It explored factors influencing the perceived trustworthiness of Facebook in a crisis situation.
	Three factors: dispositional trust, general use of Facebook, and trust in Facebook as a communication channel (i.e., general trust toward Facebook) were explored. Dispositional trust and general use of a certain medium have been shown in previous research to impact perceived online trust positively. For this research, the applicability of these findings was tested in the context of crisis situations. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that general trust toward Facebook exerts an effect independent of the aforementioned factors on the perceived trustworthiness of Facebook in a crisis situation.
Methodology	Quantitative: Digitised survey
Method	Online survey was conducted in the context of the iSAR+ project (Online and Mobile Communications for Crisis Response and Search and Rescue). The survey targeted only Facebook users drawn from the UK, Germany and Ireland.
Framework/Theory	Trust and its applicability to social media use during emergencies and in crisis communications.
Case/Phenomena of interest	General approach
Setting	Europe: Contextualised in the UK, Germany and Ireland
Geographical	Europe
Participants	A sample of 340 European Facebook users was questioned as part of a large European study about social media in the context of emergency situations. 340 participants were analysed (71 percent female; 142 United Kingdom, 118 Germany, 80 Ireland). The mean age was 34.5 years (SD= 13.5).
Data analysis	Descriptive and inferential statistics – Hierarchical Regression (Step-wise)
Author's conclusions	It seems evident that especially in such high-risk situations, trust is crucial. European subjects (UK, Germany and Ireland) indicated their trust in Facebook during crisis situations. Trust in Facebook during crisis situations predicted from the general use of Facebook and individual dispositional trust as well as from individual general trusting attitude toward Facebook as a medium. The regression model explained about 24 percent of variance.
	Therefore, trusting Facebook in a crisis situation depends on more than general use of this medium, dispositional trust, and trust toward Facebook in general. For instance, one could assume that personal experience with crisis situations or risk perception also affects perceived trustworthiness.

Tsunami early warnings via Twitter in government: Net-savvy citizens' co-production of time-critical public information services

Akemi Takeoka Chatfield [a], Hans J. (Jochen) Scholl [b], Uuf Brajawidagda [c,d]

Technology	Social media: Twitter
Statement problem/Focus	The study examined Indonesian government use of Twitter Tsunami Early Warning Civic Network and citizens' roles in co-providing timely and actionable information
Methodology	Qualitative: Case study and social network analysis
Method	Case study research and social network analysis of Twitter information flows and exchanges among the BMKG's Twitter followers in the civic network during the April 2012 Northern Sumatra Earthquake.
Framework/Theory	Citizen co-production theory (Whitaker, 1980) and resilient information infrastructure framework (Scholl and Patin, 2012; 2014) as offshoots of public administration theory.
Case/Phenomena of interest	Tsunami hazards during the 2012 earthquake
Setting	Indonesia/ study by USA academics
Geographical	USA
Participants	The researcher conducted two semi-structured case study interviews with Executive Secretary of the Indonesian Agency for Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics (BMKG) and Senor IT Manager, the National Disaster Management Agency of Indonesia (BNPB) in Jakarta, Indonesia.
Data analysis	Case interviews were conducted. Also examination of Indonesian e-government websites of the central disaster management agencies was conducted to identify the key disaster management policies that are relevant to the operation of disaster early warnings. Policy analysis was also conducted to help us better understand the relationships among the agencies, the division of labour, shared resources, and the line of authority with regard to the sharing and flows of disaster information among Indonesia's disaster management agencies.
	Also, the researcher conducted a series of social network analysis (SNA) of Twitter information flows and exchanges within the BMKG's Twitter Tsunami Early Warning Civic Network during the April 11, 2011 earthquake.
	A social network graph is used to model a social network composed by nodes and links including other salient metrics associated with the BMKG Twitter accounts @BMKGnews and @infoBMKG. The BMKG's first tsunami warning Tweet issued to its Twitter followers on April 11, 2012.
	A third party data provider, Topsy.com, for searching the tweets. We collected the tweet data for the period of 16 days (June 18–July 3) in 2012. The search identified 6383 retweets (or 82%) of all the tweets generated by the followers of the BMKG Twitter Tsunami Early Warning Network. Of the 6383 retweets, we eliminated 137 duplicate retweets. Therefore, we traced 6246 retweets to the Twitter.com website to collect metadata such as the time of a retweet, Twitter user name, the number of followers the user has, and importantly, user location information. We then conducted a SNA of the 6246 retweets by the BMKG's followers during the EE period.

Author's conclusions	The SNA results clearly showed that the Indonesian government quite effectively warned its Twitter followers of the predicted tsunami hazards through @BMKGnews within 6 min, 7 s of the occurrence of the 8.6 magnitude earthquake on April 11, 2012, early warning tweets potentially reached as many as 4,115,164 Twitter followers within the 15 min acceptable lead-time. However without voluntary and collaborative efforts of Twitter followers, including individual citizens and organisations, the speed and enormous reach of BMKG Tsunami Early Warning Civic Network would not have had the dynamic and enabling effects that it finally achieved.
	The effectiveness of social media use to provide citizens with timely and actionable disaster information under the conditions of a rapidly evolving extreme event is a function of network users' interest in the role of emergency agencies (e.g., BMKG) as indicated in their being available to retweet early warning messages to their own followers and friends. Hence, The BMKG needed both the effective use of Twitter technology tools and active engagement of networked and comprehending citizens to warn their own followers of tsunami hazards in a timely manner as witnessed in the occurrence of magnitude 8.6 earthquake which occurred on April 11, 2012.
	Whitaker (1980) argued that citizens can co-produce public services in many different ways, ranging from passive roles to active and enabling roles. The followers of the BMKG civic network cooperated with government through direct participation in providing time-critical public information services. However, the followers of the BMKG civic network did not engage in negotiating with the BMKG to change public information services.
	In order for government to realize public value from social media in government in a specific context of EE such as we presented in this research — government use of social media to communicate disaster early warnings directly to citizens government not only needs to harness effective use of social media technologies and tools but also need to have effective disaster management reforms and citizen engagement policies. Government needs to launch a citizen engagement strategy aimed at driving more value from social media in government, including a culture of close collaboration with net-savvy citizens with the power of social influence on their fellow citizens. The net-savvy citizens with social influence can contribute to increase the size of the government Twitter civic network, hence improving the speed and reach of the network in informing citizens about natural hazards.
	Based on the citizen co-provision theory (Ferris, 1984), public policy needs to measure the citizen co-provision effects in reducing government resources or increasing the level of government efficiency in providing time-critical public information services.

Using social media data to understand and assess disasters

Xiangyang Guan • Cynthia Chen

Technology	Social media: Twitter
Statement problem/Focus	A measure based on Twitter activities that can be used to quantify the evolution of disasters and thus demonstrate temporal–spatial patterns of Twitter activities particularly near the coastline and in large urban areas during Hurricane Sandy. The study is routed through life-cycle perspective, which views the pre-impact phase as the reference point and compares it to the during- and post-impact phases. This perspective allows the researchers to understand disaster in a more holistic way.
Methodology	Qualitative: Social network analysis
Method	The researchers used social media data, more specifically Twitter data, to measure ‘‘degree of disaster’’ as a concept in order to understand how a disaster evolves over time from pre- to during- and post-impact phases and geographically throughout different regions.
Framework/Theory	Based on the notions expressed as statement problem, a conceptual framework for assessing crisis in a system environment (FACSE) (Chen et al. 2013) was proposed to quantify the rhythms of life (or the amount of social disruptions) exhibited in multiple systems (human and natural and technological systems) before, during and after a disaster.
Case/Phenomena of interest	Hurricane Sandy, the second costliest hurricane recorded in the US history (Sullivan and Uccellini 2012)
Setting	322km radius of Sandy landfall, which covers New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware and a majority of New York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia and some places in West Virginia and Massachusetts.
Geographical	USA
Participants	
Data analysis	Spatial and temporal analyses of Twitter data in relation to Hurricane Sandy.
	This research utilized the Twitter search API (https://search.twitter.com/)1 to access the tweets posted from October 26, 2012, to November 7, 2012, in our study area. Due to Twitter API’s rate limit of up to 180 requests every 15 min and up to 1,500 tweets per request, an area too large can cause the data collection to reach the rate limit and consequently result in incomplete datasets. We therefore restricted the spatial scale to a 200-mile circle as mentioned in 3.1 to avoid hitting the rate limit. The search requests specifying a series of successive tweet ids generated a total of 1,532,116 tweets with geo-coordinates attached. Subsequently, each tweet was labeled disaster-related or not. To identify disaster-related tweets, our study used a combination of key words and hashtags, a convention to indicate topics in Twitter (Boyd et al. 2010). Any tweet either containing at least one of our predefined key words, namely ‘‘sandy,’’ ‘‘hurricane’’ and ‘‘storm,’’ or with any of the government published hashtags (Ngak 2012) was categorized as disaster-related. Those hashtags are as follows: #Sandy, #HurricaneSandy, #njsandy, #MASandy, #StormDE, #SandyDC and #rigov. Two final datasets, one consisting of a total of 1.5 million general tweets (including the disaster-related ones) and the other consisting of 77,402 disaster-related tweets were captured. For each tweet (general or disaster-related), the information available is the tweet

	content, the time when this tweet was created and its location in x- and y-coordinate in the 1984 World Geodetic System (WGS 1984). We also defined and calculated a disasterrelated ratio (DRR), which is simply the number of disaster-related tweets in an area divided by the total number of general tweets in the same space.
	The actual hurricane damage data were retrieved from the modeling task force (MOTF) of FEMA. The study exploited county-level wind damages and storm surge damage data, part of the results of MOTF's Hurricane Sandy Impact Analysis project (FEMA 2012a). Those damages measured in thousand dollars are outputs of Hazus-Multi-Hazard (Hazus-MH) (FEMA 2012b), a nationally applicable standardized methodology that estimates losses from earthquakes, hurricane winds and floods. The models in Hazus-MH take inputs from various sources, including hurricane and tropical cyclone advisories to estimate wind loss and storm surge loss.
	A persistent notion throughout our study is that a disaster will leave its footprints on social media. On the one hand, activities on socialmedia reflect human life patterns or rhythm of life (Chen et al. 2013; Javaet al. 2007) that are closely related to the temporal and spatial process of a disaster; on the other hand, participation of governments and disaster response agencies in disseminating information and interacting with the general public on the Twitter platform makes Twitter activities an indicator of public attention to the disaster in local areas, which is potentially associated with the disaster's impact. Given the connection between disasters and social media, our study observes the ''social phenomenon'' (Chen et al. 2013) through Twitter.
Author's conclusions	Of the total 1.5 million tweets, only 77,402 tweets or about 5 % were identified as disaster related. The low percentage of disaster-related tweets implies that Twitter overall was not heavily involved in Hurricane Sandy.
	It is no surprise that most of our study area had very few disaster-related tweets or even general tweets (to make the maps clearer, the lowest density level is not displayed and therefore looks as if there were no data). However, large urban areas such as New York City, Philadelphia and Washington, DC saw an explosion of tweets. Given that cities have always been the centers of human activities (Chapin 1974), it makes sense that Twitter activities gathered in and around large cities. In fact, the numbers of disaster-related tweets and general tweets at county level are highly correlated (with a correlation coefficient of 0.85 at 0.05 significance level) that areas with a large number of disaster-related tweets are likely to have a large number of general tweets likewise and vice versa. Therefore, the pre-existent Twitter adoption should be the dominant factor leading to spatial variation in Twitter activities during Hurricane Sandy.
	Areas with inherently more active Twitter users will generate both more general tweets and more disaster-related tweets, regardless of the hurricane impact. The spatial pattern (shown in Figure 2b) corroborates with what we expected.
	Areas closer to the coastline are impacted more severely because of a higher chance of flooding and they have higher values of DRRs (Disaster Related Regions). Moving inland is associated with declining DRRs. This is also consistent with FEMA's assessment of Sandy's impact based on the number of people exposed to storm surge, in which generally decreasing impacts were reported in counties farther from the coastline (FEMA 2012a). The finding also indicates a major drop in DRR within 5 km of coastline, while the change from 5 to 20 km is quite steady. To further and more directly understand Twitter usage in large urban areas, a
	proximity analysis was conducted for 4 cities with a population larger than 500,000 in 2011 according to United States Census Bureau; these four cities are as follows: New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington, DC. It is expected that all these four cities saw peaked DRRs on October 29 (Figure 3a) when Sandy made its landfall. There is no doubt that the landfall of Sandy made a hot topic on Twitter. However, the differences between cities are

	interesting. First, New York City and Washington, DC tended to have higher DRRs than Philadelphia and Baltimore. The DRR in NYC was highest at all times, followed by DC until November 5, probably due to the presidential election. Moreover, the DRR actually dropped faster in DC, where an over 90 % decrease was observed from October 29 to October 31, whereas in NYC it declined by only 62 % during the same period.

Why are decisions in flood disaster management so poorly supported by information from flood models?

J.G. Leskens [a,*], M. Brugnach [a], A.Y. Hoekstra [a], W. Schuurmans [b]

Technology	
Statement problem/Focus	Rather than focussing on flood simulation models by evaluating information supplied by decision-makers against that obtained through models, the goal of this study is to investigate how model information is exchanged among participants in flood disaster organizations and how this exchange affects the use of modeling information.
Methodology	Qualitative
Method	Document Review and Social Network Analysis coupled with interviews
Framework/Theory	
Case/Phenomena of interest	Flood simulation
Setting	Hollands Noorderkwartier, North western part of Netherlands.
Geographical	Europe: Holland
Cultural	
Participants	Fifteen semi-structured interviews were conducted amongst professionals in the context of flood disaster management, selected from the Water board Hollands Noorderkwartier.
Data analysis	Document analysis and using interviews to draw a Social Network
	First, participants were asked what their roles and accompanying tasks are in the organization (Choo, 2001;Gemert-Pijnen et al., 2010; Maguire, 2001; Meadow and Yuan, 1997). Second, the participants were asked with whom they usually communicate to fulfill their tasks and which information is important in this communication. Second, the participants were asked with whom they usually communicate to fulfill their tasks and which information is important in this communication. To help in this process, information was coded into four different types: situational, technical, procedural and political information.
	The outcomes of the interviews were verified in a workshop with 10 of the interviewees (Leskens, 2011).
Author's conclusions	The extent to which a model is useful not only depends on the type and quality of its output, but also on how fast and flexible a model can be.
	evacuation plans are based on the maximum area of inundation, which is the result of a comparison between maximum water levels and the elevation map. Flow patterns of water are not considered in this, whereas they highly influence the area that can be inundated and give valuable information about the course over time of the inundation. In short, decision-makers rather used basic information in combination with assumptions for worst-case scenarios than using advanced flood simulation models.
	We identified different reasons for this limited use of model results. Obviously, decision-makers required predictions that specifically connect to the actual situations and to the available means to undertake action. First, this overview

	of the actual situation was often not known by the modelers, whereas this insight was required to make model predictions that fit to the actual circumstances. Second, even when these actual circumstances were known, the used models were not fast enough to make model calculations during a flood disaster event. The decisions that were made were therefore usually based on the information that was directly available, such as an elevation map and basic rules of thumb as mentioned above. In cases that pre-calculated flood scenarios were available, an interpretation of this information had to be made in order to make it applicable in the actual circumstances.
	A recurring theme was that decision-makers were unsure if this information from flood models was reliable and whether they should make decisions based on that information.
	Social Network Analysis has proven to be helpful to better understand the technical and organizational limitations of current flood disaster management. It provided valuable insights in which information the participants in the decision-making processes need in order to fulfill their tasks and it showed how information is passed on between different participants. One should be careful to draw generalized conclusions based on Social Network Analysis beyond flood disaster management. As the decision-making process during flood disasters is to a significant extent standardized in terms of tasks, roles and communication lines, generalized conclusions could be drawn for this specific field. Applying Social Network Analysis in other, less standardized decision-making contexts, such as decision-making about a flood resilient spatial planning, will yield mainly conclusions that count for that specific group of participants.
	The results of this research shed a new light on the methods proposed by scholars to overcome the discrepancy between what models provide and what decision-makers demand. The application of one of the methods proposed, direct involvement of decision-makers in the computation of flood predictions (Voinov and Bousquet, 2010), will only work if technical limitations of models are overcome in terms of computation time and flexibility to adapt models to actual circumstances.

Emerging economies, emerging challenges: Mobilising and capturing value from big data Joseph Amankwah-Amoah	
Technology	General approach
Statement problem/Focus	To explore how government can utilise big data to combat healthcare issues. The study focuses specifically on combating contagious diseases and reviews the technologies utilised. By examining how governments and multiple agencies mobilised and utilised data from multiple sources could enhance our understanding of how modern technologies could help underdeveloped countries improve their decision making process, governance and combat healthcare emergence (Chandler et al., 2014; Milinovich et al., 2015).
Methodology	Qualitative (Case Study): A case-based research method (Yin, 2003, 2011) was employed to shed light on the subject.
Method	Archival approach was adopted which entails examining publicly available records of governments and international agencies (see Welch, 2000; Ellis, 1993). Such archival sources are "critical and under-utilised research resource"which can be employed to illuminate our understanding aswell as advance a perspective on past events (Forbes and Kirsch, 2011, p. 589; Amankwah-Amoah and Durugbo, 2015).
	This study adopted three steps from data collection to data analysis, as illustrated in Table 1. This encompassed a review of the affected countries' press releases, locating actions of governments, analysis of technologies and strategies employed to combat the outbreak, and reporting key technologies used.
Framework/Theory	
Case/Phenomena of interest	Ebola outbreak in West Africa
Setting	West Africa
Geographical	
Participants	
Data analysis	Document analysis
Author's conclusions	Using insights from the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, the analysis indicates that the ability to harness and utilise big data partly depends on governments' ability to bring structure and clarity to the data to generate awareness and responsiveness.
	The ability to synthesise insights from both the traditional monitoring systems and modern technologies offers a path towards facilitating knowledge diffusion and effective government policies. Furthermore, the integration of both the internet-based surveillance systems and traditional monitoring techniques is essential for governments seeking to extract value from big data whilst concurrently combating infectious diseases.
	The analysis also suggests the need for countries to upgrade workforce skills in key aspects of data analytics and data management to be able to extract value from big data. Building big data analytics capability can help countries develop knowledge to ensure timely delivery of services.

Leveraging Twitter to gauge evacuation compliance: Spatiotemporal analysis of Hurricane Matthew **Yago Martín, Zhenlong Li*, Susan L. Cutter**	
Technology	Social media: Twitter
Statement problem/Focus	This paper examines the exchange of hazard information triggered by the most powerful Atlantic Basin hurricane of the 2016 season, Hurricane Matthew. Twitter data are used to gauge the social media reaction to the disaster and the protective actions taken by residents from both a spatial and temporal perspective. More significantly, the paper proposes an approach to leverage social media content to measure the evacuation response in terms of evacuation timing, re-entry, and destinations for safety.
	Two themes provide the focus for this paper. First, the paper explores the spatiotemporal variability in social media (Twitter) information exchange before, during, and after Hurricane Matthew and whether such differences are due to proximity to the areas of potential impact. The second theme takes a more granular look at South Carolina tweets and examines specific responses to mandatory evacuation orders in South Carolina regarding the number of evacuees, the timing of departure and re-entry, and geographic destination.
Methodology	Quantitative: Digital - The approach involves the retrieval of tweets from the Twitter Stream, the creation and filtering of different datasets, and the statistical and spatial processing and treatment to extract, plot and map the results.
Method	Over 418 million geo-tagged tweets within the continental U.S. were collected using the Twitter Stream Application Programming Interface (API), comprising a six-month period from July 7th, 2016 until December 31th, 2016. These tweets are stored and managed in a Hadoop (http://hadoop.apache.org) environment that served as tweet repository for this study. The repository was then queried with Apache Impala (https://impala.incubator.apache.org) using spatiotemporal criteria and keywords in the tweet message and hashtags, obtaining seven Twitter datasets covering different spatial regions, keywords, time periods, and spatial accuracies. The locational accuracy of a geo-tagged tweet depends on how a Twitter user shares his/her location when posting a tweet. The location can be shared in the format of place names (e.g. country, state, city) or the exact latitude and longitude (point-level, determined by the device's GPS or other signals such as cell tower).
Framework/Theory	
Case/Phenomena of interest	Hurricane Matthew, South Carolina
Setting	2016 South Carolina, US
Geographical	USA
Participants	
Data analysis	Spatiotemporal analyses of tweets, including response to the evacuation order.
	Twitter (tweets) response was reached during the pre-impact and preparedness phase, and decreased abruptly after the passage of the storm.
Author's conclusions	A comparison between two time periods - pre-evacuation (October 2th-4th) and post-evacuation (October 7th-9th) - indicates that 54% of Twitter users moved away from the coast to a safer location, with observed differences by state on the timing of the evacuation. A specific sub-state analysis of South

	Carolina illustrated overall compliance with evacuation orders and detailed information on the timing of departure from the coast as well as the destination location.
	These findings advance the use of big data and citizen-as-sensor approaches for public safety issues, providing an effective and near real-time alternative for measuring compliance with evacuation orders.

Bridging the gap between decision-making and emerging big data sources: An application of a model-based framework to disaster management in Brazil Flávio E.A. Horitaa,*, João Porto de Albuquerquea, b, e, Victor Marchezinid, Eduardo M. Mendiondoc, d	
Technology	General focus
Statement problem/Focus	oDMN+, a framework that connects decision-making with data sources through an extended modeling notation and a modeling process was presented and reviewed to combat disaster management in Brazil.
	This fills a gap both in the modeling practice and in literature, which is lacking clear procedures and guidelines about how to model the conceptual elements of decision-making (e.g., activities) within a specific application context.
Methodology	Qualitative: Case Study.
Method	Case Study including two focus group sessions were held on August 23rd, 2016 at Cemaden.
Framework/Theory	The oDMN of Horita et al. [13] is extended. oDMN – The Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) is a standard model and notation that defines a set of conceptual elements for modeling these processes. BPMN has been applied in different areas, such as customer services [28] and business management [8]. Sackmann et al. [27] proposed an extension to BPMN for including elements to represent place-related information, such as water hydrants or ambulances. Although process modeling notations are valuable to represent organizational activities that involve decision-making, they do not include an explicit consideration of the decisions involved.
Case/Phenomena of interest	
Setting	Cemaden, Brazil
Geographical	Brazil
Participants	
Data analysis	Modelling
Author's conclusions	The study findings showed that the oDMN+ is successful not only in linking the decision-makers' tasks and the emerging big data sources its objectives but also in supplementing the existing standard notations (e.g., BPMN) for making a connection between decision-making and data sources. It thus adds to existing work on the question of making a connection between decision-making and data sources [15,18–20] because it provides the Extended O&M that efficiently represents the abstraction of the data sources and connects it to the information required by a decision.
	The findings of this research also suggest that practitioners and researchers need to be aware that decisions and their requirements (e.g., business rules) have an impact on the flexibility of organizations, i.e., on their capacity to adapt to new conditions and situations. In the case of decision-making that relies on big data sources, this is even more challenging because new sources can emerge in real time, while existing sources may be rendered ineffective. As a result, the business rules and information requirements should be able to adapt to this new set of data sources.

An analysis of the relation between natural disasters and Big Data Dimiter Velev* & Plamena Zlateva	
Technology	General New ICTs – Big Data
Statement problem/Focus	The purpose of this paper is to investigate and analyse the relation between natural disasters and Big Data.
Methodology	Qualitative
Method	Grey literature review
Framework/Theory	
Case/Phenomena of interest	
Setting	
Geographical	
Participants	
Data analysis	
Author's conclusions	Big Data in natural disasters today is a work in progress. Despite the challenges and its recent coming to natural disasters, Big Data has a big future in emergency management.
	It is obvious that disaster plans of any type should include immediate action for securing, accessing and working with large volumes of data. Big Data will make it possible for relief organisations to reach their goals more quickly and effectively. Analysing Big Data generated through social media can help understand the identity and activity of people in these networks and examine the possibility of recruiting them as volunteers in recovery processes.

Using tweets to support disaster planning, warning and response

Peter M. Landwehr, Wei Wei, Michael Kowalchuck, Kathleen M. Carley ⇑

Technology	Twitter
Statement problem/Focus	Paper describes the strength and limitations of Twitter in the context of social media use to help mitigate disasters. It present a Tsunami Warning and Response Social Media System, TWRsms, a Twitter based web-application component for a socio-technical decision support system for extreme events – TWRsms is available at http://legion.casos.cs.cmu.edu:8011/. TWRsms is tailored to a specific community, Padang Indonesia, and a specific type of event – Tsunamis.
Methodology	Qualitative – Social network "technique"
Method	Model review
Framework/Theory	TWRsms – a Twitter tracking and analysis system developed for disaster management in Padang Indonesia
Case/Phenomena of interest	Padang Indonesia
Setting	Padang Indonesia
Geographical	Indonesia
Participants	
Data analysis	
Author's conclusions	TWRsms collects and analyzes tweets in approximately real time, while monitoring the city of Padang Indonesia in order to support early warning and planning for tsunamis. Using current and historical tweeting activity it provides guidance on where the population is, which is valuable when planning evacuation and response.
	Using near real time data TWRsms provides guidance on who the local opinion leaders are; thus making it possible to direct alerts to these individuals and so working within the community to add an extra layer of early warning.
	As TWRsms tracks what is tweeted in the region it provides information at, for now, a general level about who is saying what and from which sub-regions within the city. Thus, this information can be used to see where populations are that are unlikely to get a twitter warning and to understand what the key issues as evidenced bu hashtags are at that time in that region.
	TRWsms is a work in progress which requires further technology for sorting and categorising tweets by contexts.

The Big Data concept as a contributor of added value to crisis decision support systems Stanislaw Drosio & Stanislaw Stanek	
Technology	General – Big Data as a techno-concept
Statement problem/Focus	The paper seeks to emphasise the added value that stems from the use of Big Data in handling heterogeneous data sources accessed by crisis management structures. Authors want to highlight the ways in which the concept could support decision makers during the crisis management process by showing two cases: using Hybrid Decision Support System for Crisis/Disaster Management and highlighting application of Big Data in security management in order to illustrate the implications of using Big Data in practice.
Methodology	Qualitative – conceptual model appraisal
Method	Review
Framework/Theory	
Case/Phenomena of interest	
Setting	
Geographical	
Participants	
Data analysis	SWOT – Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities and Threats with regard to the use of Hybrid Decision Support System for Crisis/Disaster Management
Author's conclusions	Admittedly, the use of Big Data by offices and institutions of government is where the picture is least clear, as governments are, on the one hand, vested with responsibility for public safety, and on the other, commonly suspected of a penchant for mass surveillance. Evidence for the latter can be found e.g., in the case of former National Security Agency contractee Edward Snowden. It was not until he published his revelations that the public heard about US government agencies using such tools as XkeyScore, Tempora, Bullrun or EdgeHill to track their 'targets' almost in real time. What these tools track and look at is, no doubt about it, all sorts of things comprised by the term Big Data: emails, conversations held via Internet messaging and video chat services, people's activities on social networking sites, their web search queries, etc. The Snowden leaks also showed how ineffective electronic encryption is in protecting private information from accessing it by security services.
	Crisis management should be viewed not so much as a set of techniques and procedures to be applied in case of a specific emergency but, instead, as a complex of activities, involving all available powers and capacities, that are focused on predicting and preventing dangers from materialising (Bertrand & Chris, 2002). In light of the above discussion, Big Data appears as one of those technologies that, owing to the likely but not yet thoroughly researched potential inherent in advanced data analytics, could trigger a major change in approaches to deploying computer support for crisis management.

Strategies of social media use in disaster management Lessons in resilience from Seoul, South Korea

Kyungwoo Kim

Technology	Social media
Statement problem/Focus	To understand the effects of social media use on the resilience of organizations involved in emergency response. Based on the gap that while social media has been utilized as a critical tool in the field of emergency management, few researchers have systemically examined its effect on organizations'capacity to bounce back from catastrophic events. From the dimensional approach to social media use, this research focuses on the following three functions: providing information to local communities, transmitting information to local communities, and responding to the emotions of local communities.
Methodology	Quantitative and Qualitative; Mixed methods
Method	Survey using questionnaires and interview sessions
Framework/Theory	Dimensional approach to social media use on "organisational resilience"
Case/Phenomena of interest	2013 flood in Seoul, South Korea
Setting	Seoul, South Korea
Geographical	Asia, South Korea
Participants	79 key organisations (public and nongovernmental organisations) involved in emergency management to investigate the impact of social media use on resilience after a tragic flood in Seoul South Korea in 2013. The breakdown of participants are: 25 district offices, 23 fire stations, 21 police stations, two metropolitan agencies, and eight nongovernmental organisations.
	10 interviews were conducted with emergency management officials to understand what administrative challenges they confront in using social media for their tasks.
Data analysis	Inferential statistics: hierarchical regression models and thematic analysis of interview data
Author's conclusions	The provision of disaster information on social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube has a positive effect on the perceived level of organizational resilience. social media use for information provision to the general public is a strong predictor of organizational resilience (step 1: R_2=0.05; step 2: R_2=0.18; R=0.13), model explains 18 percent of the variance. The second model of the second stage indicates that social media use for information provision to specific groups leads to high organizational resilience (step 1: R_2=0.05; step 2: R_2=0. 21; R=0.16). The findings show that social media use for information provision to specific groups is positively associated with organizational resilience. Likewise, The third model of the second stage suggests that social media use for emotional support contributes to high levels of organizational resilience (step 1: R_2¼0.05; step 2: R_2¼0. 15; R¼0.10). The results confirm that social media use for emotional support is positively associated with organizational resilience. In addition, social media use correlates positively with community emotional responses.
	Findings suggest that social media provides opportunities for public and nonprofit agencies to improve responses to natural disasters. These findings confirm our expectations and the existing case studies that emphasize the utility of social media use in disaster management (e.g. Peary et al., 2012; Taylor, 2012). This study demonstrates that social

	media use for the three types of tasks can contribute to organizational resilience.

Appendix 15: List of Excluded Studies (With Reasons)

Ahmad, D. A. M. A., Ashari, N. M., & Bin Samani, M. C. (2017). Effect of rational and emotional framing on highly involved audience in severe crisis situation: An experimental study on MH370. *Journal Komunikasi: Malaysian Journal of Communication, 33*(2), 89-104.

Reason for Exclusion: Not natural disaster

Alexander R.M. Schellong. (2008). Government 2.0. *Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy, 2*(4), 225-242.doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17506160810917936

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Allaire, M. C. (2016). Disaster Loss and Social Media: Can Online Information Increase Flood Resilience?
Water Resources Research, 52(9), 7408-7423. doi:10.1002/2016WR019243

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Andersson-Sköld, Y., Bergman, R., Johansson, M., Persson, E., & Nyberg, L. (2013). Landslide Risk Management—A Brief Overview and Example from Sweden of Current Situation and Climate Change. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, *3*, 44-61. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2012.11.002

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Ang, L. M., & Seng, K. P. (2016). Big Sensor Data Applications in Urban Environments. *Big Data Research, 4*, 1-12. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bdr.2015.12.003

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Ansell, C., Boin, A., & Keller, A. (2010). Managing Transboundary Crises: Identifying the Building Blocks of an Effective Response System. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 18*(4), 195-207. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5973.2010.00620.x

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Aslam, M., Pervez, M. T., Muhammad, S. S., Mushtaq, S., & Enriquez, A. M. M. (2010). FMSIND: A Framework of Multi-Agent Systems Interaction During Natural Disaster. *Journal of American Science, 6*(5), 217-224.

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Bai, H., & Yu, G. (2016). A Weibo-based approach to Disaster Informatics: Incidents Monitor in Post-Disaster Situation via Weibo Text Negative Sentiment Analysis. *Natural Hazards, 83*(2), 1177-1196. doi:10.1007/s11069-016-2370-5

Reason for Exclusion: Focuses on how to filter negative sentiment messages from all of the disaster-concerned microblogging

Bakkour, D., Enjolras, G., Thouret, J. C., Kast, R., Mei, E. T. W., & Prihatminingtyas, B. (2015). The Adaptive Governance of Natural Disaster Systems: Insights from the 2010 Mount Merapi Eruption in Indonesia. *International journal of disaster risk reduction*, *13*, 167-188. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2015.05.006

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Baxter, P. J., Aspinall, W. P., Neri, A., Zuccaro, G., Spence, R. J. S., Cioni, R., & Woo, G. (2008). Emergency planning and mitigation at Vesuvius: A new evidence-based approach. *Journal of volcanology and geothermal research*, *178*(3), 454-473. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jvolgeores.2008.08.015

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Bean, H., Liu, B. F., Madden, S., Sutton, J., Wood, M. M., & Mileti, D. S. (2016). Disaster warnings in your pocket: How Audiences Interpret Mobile Alerts for an Unfamiliar Hazard. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 24*(3), 136-147. doi:10.1111/1468-5973.12108

Reason for Exclusion: Investigates how people interpret Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEAs) and Twitter-length messages ('tweets') delivered over mobile devices for an unfamiliar hazard.

Bernabé-Moreno, J., Tejeda-Lorente, A., Porcel, C., & Herrera-Viedma, E. (2014). Leveraging Localized Social Media Insights for Early Warning Systems. *Procedia Computer Science*, *31*, 1051-1060. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2014.05.359

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Borysiewicz, M., & Potempski, S. (2003). How to effectively manage crisis situation in the early phase of a radiological accident?. *International Symposium on Off-site Nuclear Emergency Management Book of abstracts,* (p. 170). Austria

Reason for Exclusion: Symposium

Bostenaru Dan, M., & Armas, I. (2015). Earthquake Impact on Settlements: The Role of Urban and Structural Morphology. *Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 15*(10), 2283-2297. https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-15-2283-2015

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is to create alternative to the classical GIS representation of the impact of earthquake hazards on urban areas

Bowers, M. R., Hall, J. R., & Srinivasan, M. M. (2017). Organizational Culture and Leadership Style: The Missing Combination for Selecting the Right Leader for Effective Crisis Management. *Business Horizons*, *60*(4), 551-563. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2017.04.001

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Bruzzone, A. G., Massei, M., Agresta, M., Tremori, A., Longo, F., Giuseppina, M., et al. Human Behaviour Simulation for Smart Decision-making in Emergency Prevention and Mitigation Within Urban and Industrial Environments. *3rd International Workshop on Simulation for Energy, Sustainable Development and Environment, SESDE 2015,* pp. P166-P174.

Reason for Exclusion: Conference Proceeding Article

Büyüktahtakın, İ. E., des-Bordes, E., & Kıbış, E. Y. (2017). A New Epidemics-Logistics Model: Insights into Controlling the Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa. *European Journal of Operational Research,* 1, 1-18. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.08.037

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Cai, H., Lam, N. S. N., Zou, L., Qiang, Y., & Li, K. (2016). Assessing Community Resilience to Coastal Hazards in the Lower Mississippi River Basin. *(Switzerland)*, 8(2) 46, 1-18. doi:10.3390/w8020046

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Callaghan, C. W. (2016). Disaster Management, Crowdsourced R&D and Probabilistic Innovation Theory: Toward Real Time Disaster Response Capability. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 17*, 238-250. doi:10.1016/j.ijdrr.2016.05.004

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Cangemi, J. P., Lazarus, H., McQuade, T., Fitzgerald, J., Conner, J., Miller, R., & Murphree, W. (2011). Successful Leadership Practices during Turbulent Times. *The Journal of Management Development, 30*(1), 30-43. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02621711111098343

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Cangemi, J. P., Lazarus, H., McQuade, T., Fitzgerald, J., Conner, J., Miller, R., & Murphree, W. (2011). Successful Leadership Practices during Turbulent Times. *The Journal of Management Development, 30*(1), 30-43. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02621711111098343

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Casagrande, D. G., McIlvaine-Newsad, H., & Jones, E. C. (2015). Social Networks of Help-Seeking in different types of Disaster Responses to the 2008 Mississippi River Floods. *Human Organization, 74*(4), 351-361. doi: https://doi.org/10.17730/0018-7259-74.4.351

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Chamlee-wright, E., & Storr, V. H. (2010). Expectations of Government's Response to Disaster. *Public Choice, 144*(1-2), 253-274. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9516-x

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Chen, Y., Crespi, N., Ortiz, A. M., & Shu, L. (2017). Reality Mining: A Prediction Algorithm for Disease Dynamics Based on Mobile Big Data. *Information Sciences, 379*, 82-93. doi:10.1016/j.ins.2016.07.075

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Chiu, D. K., W., Lin, D. T., T., Kafeza, E., Wang, M., . . . Zhuang, Y. (2010). Alert Based Disaster Notification and Resource Allocation. *Information Systems Frontiers, 12*(1), 29-47. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10796-009-9165-0

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Choi, S. (2016). The Analysis Technique of Social Media for Disaster Management. *International Journal of Design and Nature and Ecodynamics, 11*(3), 396-405. doi:10.2495/DNE-V11-N3-396-405

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Coletti, A., De Nicola, A., & Villani, M. L. (2016). Building Climate Change into Risk Assessments. *Natural Hazards, 84*(2), 1307-1325. doi:10.1007/s11069-016-2487-6

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Comes, T., Van de Walle, B., Laguna, L., & Lauras, M. (2015). Understanding the Health Disaster: Research Design for the Response to the 2014 West African Ebola Outbreak. *Procedia Engineering*, *107*, 81-89. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2015.06.061

Reason for Exclusion: focuses on research design for disaster response

Comfort, L. K., Chalfant, B. A., Song, J. E., Chen, M., & Colella, B. Managing Information Processes in Disaster Events: The Impact of Superstorm Sandy on Business Organizations. *11th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, ISCRAM 2014,* pp. 230-239.

Reason for Exclusion: Conference Proceeding Article

Commodore, A., Wilson, S., Muhammad, O., Svendsen, E., & Pearce, J. (2017). Community-Based Participatory Research for the Study of Air Pollution: A Review of Motivations, Approaches, and Outcomes. *Environmental Monitoring and Assessment, 189*(8), 378. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10661-017-6063-7

Reason for Exclusion: Literature Review

Comunello, F., Parisi, L., Lauciani, V., Magnoni, F., & Casarotti, E. (2016). Tweeting after an Earthquake: User Localization and Communication Patterns during the 2012 Emilia Seismic Sequence. *Annals of Geophysics, 59*(5): S0537 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.4401/ag-6945

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Conrado, S. P., Neville, K., Woodworth, S., & O'Riordan, S. (2016). Managing Social Media Uncertainty to support the Decision-making Process during Emergencies. *Journal of Decision Systems, 25*, 171-181. doi:10.1080/12460125.2016.1187396

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Davidson, M. W., Haim, D. A., & Radin, J. M. (2015). Using Networks to combine 'Big Data' and Traditional Surveillance to improve Influenza Predictions. *Scientific Reports,* 5, 1-5. doi:10.1038/srep08154

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

de Albuquerque, J. P., Herfort, B., Brenning, A., & Zipf, A. (2015). A Geographic Approach for combining Social Media and Authoritative Data towards Identifying Useful Information for Disaster Management. *International Journal of Geographical Information Science, 29*(4), 667-689. doi:10.1080/13658816.2014.996567

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

de Jong, M., & Helsloot, I. (2010). The Effects of Information and Evacuation Plans on Civilian Response during the National Dutch Flooding Exercise 'Waterproef'. *Procedia Engineering*, *3*, 153-162. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2010.07.015

Reason for Exclusion: explores disaster simulation exercise

De Marchi, B. (2007). Not just a Matter of Knowledge. The Katrina Debacle. *Environmental Hazards*, *7*(2), 141-149. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envhaz.2007.05.005

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Deen, S. (2015). Pakistan 2010 Floods. Policy Gaps in Disaster Preparedness and Response. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, *12*, 341-349. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2015.03.007

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

Denis, G., de Boissezon, H., Hosford, S., Pasco, X., Montfort, B., & Ranera, F. (2016). The Evolution of Earth Observation Satellites in Europe and its Impact on the Performance of Emergency Response Services. *Acta Astronautica*, *127*, 619-633. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actaastro.2016.06.012

Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

DeYoung, S. E., Wachtendorf, T., Farmer, A. K., & Penta, S. C. (2016). NOAA Radios and Neighbourhood Networks: Demographic Factors for Channel Preference for Hurricane Evacuation Information. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 24(4), 275-285. doi: 10.1111/1468-5973.12123

Reason for Exclusion: Literature Review

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Reason for Exclusion: Literature review on the use of geospatial information technologies in forestry

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Reason for Exclusion: identifies and evaluates future-oriented problem analysis and solution design tools

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Reason for Exclusion: explores business leadership preparedness in crisis situation

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Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

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Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

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Reason for Exclusion: focuses on human resource management during crisis situation

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Reason for Exclusion: The aim of study is not congruent with the objectives of this systematic literature review

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Appendix 16: Complex, Parsimonious and Intermediate Solutions (Effective Outcome)

Outcome		Solutions	Consistency	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
Effective Security-Leadership Decision-making (OUTCOME)	Complex	DIST_LEAD*DIST_CONV*btech_access*INFO_QUAL	1	0.463528	0.0346612	India Uttarakhand Floods(2013), India Kerala Floods(2018), Nigeria Ebola Epidemic(2014), Somalia Drought(2017), Indonesia Jakarta Floods(2015)
		DIST_CONV*btech_access*INFO_QUAL*DEMO_STATUS	1	0.412312	0.0175893	India Uttarakhand Floods(2013), India Chennai Floods(2015), India Kerala Floods(2018), Indonesia Jakarta Floods(2015), Philippines Typhoon Hagupit(2014)
		dis_prep*DIST_CONV*INFO_QUAL*DEMO_STATUS	1	0.515261	0.0351785	India Uttarakhand Floods(2013), India Chennai Floods(2015), India Kerala Floods(2018), Australia Queensland Floods(2010-2011), Chile Iquique Earthquake(2014), USA California

						Napa Earthquake(2014)
		DIST_LEAD*DIST_CONV*INFO_QUAL*DEMO_STATUS	1	0.567512	0.104501	USA Hurricane Sandy(2012), USA Hurricane Harvey(2017), India Uttarakhand Floods(2013), India Kerala Floods(2018), Indonesia Jakarta Floods(2015), USA California Napa Earthquake(2014) , USA Colorado Floods(2013), USA Missouri Joplin Tornado(2011)
		DIST_LEAD*dis_prep*btech_access*INFO_QUAL*demo_status	1	0.376617	0.0175893	Nepal Earthquake(2015) , Nigeria Ebola Epidemic(2014)
		DIST_LEAD*dis_prep*DIST_CONV*BTECH_ACCESS*DEMO_STATUS	1	0.274185	0.0346612	Brazil Zika Virus Outbreak(2015-2016), USA California Napa Earthquake(2014)
		dist_lead*DIS_PREP*dist_conv*btech_access*info_qual*DEMO_STATUS	1	0.239524	0.0346612	Vanuatu Cyclone PAM(2015)
		Solution Consistency: 1; **Solution Coverage:** 0.845318				**Cases**
	Parsimonious	DIST_LEAD	0.935294	0.7403	0.0522504	USA Hurricane Harvey(2017),USA Hurricane Sandy(2012), Brazil Zika Virus Outbreak(2015-2016), India Uttarakhand

						Floods(2013), India Kerala Floods(2018), Indonesia Jakarta Floods(2015), Nepal Earthquake(2015), Nigeria Ebola Epidemic(2014), Somalia Drought(2017), USA California Napa Earthquake(2014), USA Colorado Floods(2013), USA Missouri Joplin Tornado(2011)
		DIST_CONV*INFO_QUAL	0.978914	0.79255	0.103983	USA Hurricane Harvey(2017), USA Hurricane Sandy(2012), USA Colorado Floods(2013), Australia Queensland Floods(2010-2011), Chile Iquique Earthquake(2014), India Uttarakhand Floods(2013), India Chennai Floods(2015), India Kerala Floods(2018), Indonesia Jakarta Floods(2015),

						Nigeria Ebola Epidemic(2014), Philippines Typhoon Hagupit(2014), Somalia Drought(2017), USA California Napa Earthquake(2014), USA Missouri Joplin Tornado(2011)
		DIS_PREP*btech_access*DEMO_STATUS	1	0.274703	0.0175893	Vanuatu Cyclone PAM(2015), Indonesia Jakarta Floods(2015), Philippines Typhoon Hagupit(2014)
		Solution Consistency: 0.944969; **Solution Coverage:** 0.879462				
	Intermediate	DIST_LEAD*INFO_QUAL	0.975806	0.688567	0.121055	USA Hurricane Harvey(2017),USA Hurricane Sandy (2012), India Uttarakhand Floods(2013), India Kerala Floods (2018), Indonesia Jakarta Floods (2015), Nepal Earthquake (2015), Nigeria Ebola Epidemic (2014), Somalia Drought (2017), USA California Napa Earthquake (2014), USA Colorado Floods

						(2013),USA Missouri Joplin Tornado (2011),
		DIS_PREP*btech_access*DEMO_STATUS	1	0.274703	0.0346612	Vanuatu Cyclone PAM (2015), Indonesia Jakarta Floods(2015), Philippines Typhoon Hagupit (2014)
		DIST_CONV*INFO_QUAL*DEMO_STATUS	1	0.672012	0.0869116	USA Hurricane Sandy(2012), USA Colorado Floods(2013), Australia Queensland Floods(2010-2011), Chile Iquique Earthquake(2014), USA Hurricane Harvey(2017), India Uttarakhand Floods(2013), India Chennai Floods(2015), India Kerala Floods(2018), Indonesia Jakarta Floods(2015), Philippines Typhoon Hagupit(2014), USA California Napa Earthquake(2014), USA Missouri Joplin Tornado(2011)

		DIST_LEAD*DIST_CONV*BTECH_ACCESS*DEMO_STATUS	1	0.378686	0.0346612	USA Hurricane Sandy(2012), Brazil Zika Virus Outbreak(2015-2016), USA Hurricane Harvey(2017), USA California Napa Earthquake(2014), USA Colorado Floods(2013), USA Missouri Joplin Tornado(2011)
		Solution Consistency: 0.980588; **Solution Coverage:** 0.86239				

Frequency cutoff: 1
Consistency cutoff: 1

Appendix 17: Complex, Parsimonious and Intermediate Solutions (Ineffective Outcome)

Outcome		Solutions	Consistency	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
Ineffective Security-Leadership Decision-making (**outcome**)	Complex	dist_lead*dis_prep*dist_conv*info_qual	0.95498	0.792303	0.0379174	Guinea Ebola Epidemic (2014), Saudi Arabia Jeddah Floods (2009), Bangladesh Landslides (2017),Chile Earthquake (2010),DR Congo Kivu Ebola Epidemic (2018), Malaysia Floods (2014), Mozambique Cyclone Idai (2019), Nigeria Floods (2012),Nigeria Floods (2017), Pakistan Earthquake (2013), Pakistan Monsoon Floods (2010), Philippines Typhoon Haiyan (2013),Sierra Leone Mudslides (2017), Somalia Drought (2011)
		dist_lead*dis_prep*dist_conv*btech_access	0.952823	0.754386	0.0192417	Guinea Ebola Epidemic (2014), Bangladesh

						Landslides (2017), DR Congo Kivu Ebola Epidemic (2018), Ecuador Earthquake (2016), Mozambique Cyclone Idai (2019), Nigeria Floods (2012),Nigeria Floods (2017), Pakistan Earthquake (2013), Pakistan Monsoon Floods (2010), Philippines Typhoon Haiyan (2013), Sierra Leone Ebola Epidemic(2014),Sierra Leone Mudslides (2017), Somalia Drought (2011)
		dist_lead*dist_conv*info_qual*DEMO_STATUS	0.915935	0.41313	0.0192417	Australia Bundaberg Flood (2013), Chile Earthquake (2010), Malaysia Floods (2014), Philippines Typhoon Haiyan (2013), Vanuatu Cyclone PAM (2015)
		dist_lead*dis_prep*btech_access*info_qual*demo_status	0.92674	0.715903	0.0379174	DR Congo Kivu Ebola Epidemic (2018), Guinea

						Ebola Epidemic (2014), Bangladesh Landslides (2017), Haiti Earthquake (2010), Liberia Ebola Epidemic (2014), Mozambique Cyclone Idai (2019), Nigeria Floods (2012), Nigeria Floods (2017), Pakistan Earthquake (2013),Pakistan Monsoon Floods (2010), Sierra Leone Mudslides (2017), Somalia Drought (2011)
		dist_lead*dis_prep*btech_access*INFO_QUAL*DEMO_STATUS	0.903597	0.355405	0	Ecuador Earthquake (2016), India Chennai Floods (2015)
		DIST_LEAD*dis_prep*DIST_CONV*btech_access*INFO_QUAL*demo_status	0.855908	0.336163	0	Nigeria Ebola Epidemic (2014)
		Solution Consistency: 0.890038; **Solution Coverage:** 0.925297				
	Parsimonious	dist_lead*dis_prep*btech_access	0.877526	0.810979	0.0186756	DR Congo Kivu Ebola Epidemic (2018), Guinea Ebola Epidemic (2014), Haiti Earthquake (2010) (1,0.33), Sierra Leone Mudslides (2017), Bangladesh Landslides (2017),

						Ecuador Earthquake (2016),India Chennai Floods(2015), Liberia Ebola Epidemic (2014), Mozambique Cyclone Idai (2019), Nigeria Floods (2012), Nigeria Floods (2017), Pakistan Earthquake (2013),Pakistan Monsoon Floods (2010), Philippines Typhoon Haiyan (2013), Sierra Leone Ebola Epidemic (2014), Somalia Drought (2011)
		dis_prep*DIST_CONV*demo_status	0.865055	0.486135	0.0186757	Haiti Earthquake (2010), Liberia Ebola Epidemic (2014), Nigeria Ebola Epidemic (2014)
		dist_conv*info_qual	0.936184	0.830221	0	Guinea Ebola Epidemic (2014), Saudi Arabia Jeddah Floods (2009), Australia Bundaberg Flood (2013),Banglades h Landslides (2017), Chile Earthquake

						(2010), DR Congo Kivu Ebola Epidemic (2018), Malaysia Floods (2014), Mozambique Cyclone Idai (2019), Nigeria Floods (2012),Nigeria Floods (2017), Pakistan Earthquake (2013),Pakistan Monsoon Floods (2010), Philippines Typhoon Haiyan (2013), Sierra Leone Mudslides (2017), Somalia Drought (2011), Vanuatu Cyclone PAM (2015)
		dist_lead*dist_conv	0.88738	0.88738	0	Guinea Ebola Epidemic (2014), Saudi Arabia Jeddah Floods (2009), Australia Bundaberg Flood (2013), Bangladesh Landslides (2017), Chile Earthquake (2010), DR Congo Kivu Ebola Epidemic (2018), Ecuador Earthquake (2016), Malaysia

						Floods (2014), Mozambique Cyclone Idai (2019), Nigeria Floods (2012), Nigeria Floods (2017), Pakistan Earthquake (2013), Pakistan Monsoon Floods (2010), Philippines Typhoon Haiyan (2013), Sierra Leone Ebola Epidemic (2014), Sierra Leone Mudslides (2017), Somalia Drought (2011), Vanuatu Cyclone PAM (2015)
		Solution Consistency: 0.822534; **Solution Coverage:** 0.962648				
	Intermediate	dist_lead*dist_conv*info_qual	0.936184	0.830221	0.132994	Guinea Ebola Epidemic (2014), Saudi Arabia Jeddah Floods (2009), Australia Bundaberg Flood (2013),Bangladesh Landslides (2017), Chile Earthquake (2010), DR Congo Kivu Ebola Epidemic (2018), Malaysia Floods (2014), Mozambique Cyclone Idai

						(2019), Nigeria Floods (2012),Nigeria Floods (2017), Pakistan Earthquake (2013),Pakistan Monsoon Floods (2010), Philippines Typhoon Haiyan (2013), Sierra Leone Mudslides (2017), Somalia Drought (2011), Vanuatu Cyclone PAM (2015)
		dist_lead*dis_prep*btech_access	0.877526	0.810979	0.057159	DR Congo Kivu Ebola Epidemic (2018), Guinea Ebola Epidemic (2014), Haiti Earthquake (2010) (1,0.33), Sierra Leone Mudslides (2017), Bangladesh Landslides (2017), Ecuador Earthquake (2016), India Chennai Floods (2015),Liberia Ebola Epidemic (2014), Mozambique Cyclone Idai (2019), Nigeria Floods (2012), Nigeria Floods

						(2017), Pakistan Earthquake (2013), Pakistan Monsoon Floods (2010), Philippines Typhoon Haiyan (2013), Sierra Leone Ebola Epidemic (2014), Somalia Drought (2011)
		dis_prep*DIST_CONV*btech_access*demo_status	0.860417	0.467459	0	Haiti Earthquake (2010), Liberia Ebola Epidemic (2014), Nigeria Ebola Epidemic (2014)
		Solution Consistency: 0.86157; **Solution Coverage:** 0.943973				

Frequency cutoff: 1
Consistency cutoff: 0.855292

Appendix 18: The Comparative Ranking of Statements by Factor (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

Factor Scores with Corresponding Ranks

#	Statement	Factor 1		Factor 2		Factor 3		Factor 4	
		Z-score	Rank	Z-score	Rank	Z-score	Rank	Z-score	Rank
1	SE-1: Information was disseminated vertically (top-down) via traditional legacy media and social media.	-0.99	28	-1.29	30	0.16	15	-0.8	29
2	SE-2: Federal, State and Local government health parastatals rarely cooperated in crisis communication online during the outbreak.	-1.36	33	0.61	10	-0.62	26	-0.57	26
3	SE-3: Outdated news was recycled through different platforms using the same format.	-1.24	32	-1.88	35	-0.48	23	-1.15	32
4	SE-4: The government collaborated more with foreign NGOs and international institutions rather than local NGOs and CSOs.	-0.68	25	0.45	14	-0.79	28	-0.77	28
5	SE-5: SMS helped reach more citizens than the other digital technology platforms.	-1.7	35	-1.58	33	-0.38	20	-1.88	34
6	SE-6: Rumours and misinformation about the virus were controlled through the near-instant provision of quality information.	1.16	5	1.83	1	0.8	9	0.65	11
7	SE-7: The local (Lagos State) Emergency Operation Center contributed to better coordination and rapid and effective response.	0.04	18	-0.15	21	1.67	2	0.55	12
8	SE-8: There was shared, collaborative decision-making between different government agencies (Lagos state and Federal Government) with interconnected but independent leadership procedures demonstrated during the epidemic.	0.72	9	0.98	7	1.36	5	2.04	1

9	SE-9: Efforts of Contact tracers using digital forms and data inputting contributed immensely to rapid disaster response and effective leadership outcomes.	-0.25	21	-0.53	25	1.01	7	-0.93	30
10	SE-10: FG approved jingles to be produced in various languages produced for Nigerian Centre for Disease Control to be aired on Radio, TV and newspaper superseded other digital tech outlets.	-1.16	30	-1.57	32	-0.5	24	-1.68	33
11	SE-11: Previous data response experience with Polio (e.g., HealthMap App) pre-trained/prepared responders for Ebola.	0.51	12	0.68	8	0.68	10	-0.34	23
12	SE-12: An absence of baseline data, including commonly-used unique citizen identifiers and comprehensive and accessible geographic maps was a huge challenge during the outbreak response.	0.41	13	-0.09	19	-0.55	25	-0.04	19
13	SE-13: The predominance of non-machine-readable (mostly paper-based) epidemiological data restricted critical response.	0.54	11	0.47	13	-1.06	30	0.76	8
14	SE-14: Poor mobile and internet connectivity limited information flow during the outbreak response.	0	20	-0.68	27	-1.54	35	-1.09	31
15	SE-15: A lack of interoperability between the numerous data systems used to manage data before and during the response also contributed to the unclear and asynchronous data picture.	1.59	4	0.07	18	-1.28	32	0.01	18
16	SE-16: The effective security leadership demonstrated is attributable mainly to the Lagos government's early adoption of digital technologies.	1.72	2	0.17	17	1.36	4	-0.5	25
17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.	-1.06	29	-0.3	24	1.51	3	0.36	15
18	SE-18: Lagos has the highest number of active voice and internet subscribers in Nigeria thereby contributing to active social media engagements during the epidemic.	0.77	8	1.56	2	-0.46	22	0.91	5

19	SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.	-0.59	23	1.44	4	0.19	14	0.78	7
20	SE-20: Nigeria's economic middle class are predominantly in Lagos and they have high digital literacy and high digital accessibility which eventually contribute to the successful stemming of the disease spread.	-0.6	24	1.51	3	0.86	8	0.71	10
21	SE-21: Deployment of an active dedicated website with a live-chat messaging system (Post-outbreak) for educating the public helped control the spread of the virus.	1.6	3	1.11	5	1.29	6	1.38	3
22	SE-22: Social media engagements between the citizens and the government were not iterative.	-0.7	26	-0.23	23	-0.79	27	-0.4	24
23	SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.	0.29	14	-1.36	31	-1.45	34	2.01	2
24	SE-24: The incidence response and general leadership were not adaptive, rather pre-set, hence fitting for structured disasters like Ebola.	-1.64	34	-1.15	29	-0.15	17	-0.17	20
25	SE-25: In-house Big Data analytics and Machine Learning skills capabilities were lacking.	0.11	17	-0.22	22	-0.03	16	0.86	6
26	SE-26: The leading Apps were written in English including the website thereby cutting off the vast majority of the population who are illiterates from accessing real-time information on the disease.	0.29	15	1.1	6	-0.37	19	0.73	9
27	SE-27: Lagos has a large population of online activists, digital hubs and social influencers thereby encouraging active participatory citizenship who are politically aware.	0.85	7	0.62	9	0.55	12	0.39	14
28	SE-28: The feedback loops of Nigeria’s Integrated Disease Surveillance system permit local leadership among government actors across the different levels of	2.11	1	-0.78	28	2.2	1	1.02	4

	government with non-rigid central coordination - this contributed to the containment of the diseas.								
29	SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).	0.9	6	0.21	16	-1.4	33	-0.31	22
30	SE-30: The Open Data Kit/Form Hub technology were used in combination with the Dashboard technology and ArcGIS mapping for follow up of contacts, identification of cases, case investigation and management and also for strategic planning during the response.	0.03	19	0.53	12	0.65	11	-0.23	21
31	SE-31: Digital technologies and Big data did not have any significant impact on effective security-leadership decision-making during the Ebola outbreak.	-1.17	31	-1.65	34	-0.41	21	-2.3	35
32	SE-32: The electronic data collection and alert system reduced the turnaround time between identification of symptomatic contacts and evacuation to the isolation facility from between 3 to 6 hours to an hour.	0.6	10	-0.63	26	-0.36	18	0.45	13
33	SE-33: The deployment of mobile technology and improved and speed up daily reporting of contact follow up before 5 pm.	-0.74	27	-0.11	20	0.51	13	0.07	17
34	SE-34: There was a poor digital early warning system, most of the disaster response operations were paper-based before the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak.	0.12	16	0.61	11	-0.92	29	0.2	16
35	SE-35: There were infrastructural data inadequacies and low manpower (epidemiological big data analysts) which threatened the success of the operation.	-0.47	22	0.25	15	-1.27	31	-0.72	27

Appendix 19: Descending Array of Differences between Factor1 and Factor 2 (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

#	Statement	Factor 1	Factor 2	Difference
28	SE-28: The feedback loops of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance system permit local leadership among government actors across the different levels of government with non-rigid central coordination - this contributed to the containment of the disease.	2.105	-0.776	2.881
23	SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.	0.293	-1.361	1.654
16	SE-16: The effective security leadership demonstrated is attributable mainly to the Lagos government's early adoption of digital technologies.	1.72	0.169	1.551
15	SE-15: A lack of interoperability between the numerous data systems used to manage data before and during the response also contributed to the unclear and asynchronous data picture.	1.587	0.07	1.517
32	SE-32: The electronic data collection and alert system reduced the turnaround time between identification of symptomatic contacts and evacuation to the isolation facility from between 3 to 6 hours to an hour.	0.602	-0.632	1.234
29	SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).	0.898	0.209	0.689
14	SE-14: Poor mobile and internet connectivity limited information flow during the outbreak response.	-0.001	-0.684	0.683
3	SE-3: Outdated news was recycled through different platforms using the same format.	-1.243	-1.884	0.641
12	SE-12: An absence of baseline data, including commonly-used unique citizen identifiers and comprehensive and accessible geographic maps was a huge challenge during the outbreak response.	0.41	-0.091	0.501

31	SE-31: Digital technologies and Big data did not have any significant impact on effective security-leadership decision-making during the Ebola outbreak.	-1.165	-1.647	0.482
21	SE-21: Deployment of an active dedicated website with a live-chat messaging system (Post-outbreak) for educating the public helped control the spread of the virus.	1.596	1.114	0.482
10	SE-10: FG approved jingles to be produced in various languages produced for Nigerian Centre for Disease Control to be aired on Radio, TV and newspaper superseded other digital tech outlets.	-1.164	-1.566	0.402
25	SE-25: In-house Big Data analytics and Machine Learning skills capabilities were lacking.	0.112	-0.216	0.328
1	SE-1: Information was disseminated vertically (top-down) via traditional legacy media and social media.	-0.994	-1.289	0.295
9	SE-9: Efforts of Contact tracers using digital forms and data inputting contributed immensely to rapid disaster response and effective leadership outcomes.	-0.247	-0.528	0.281
27	SE-27: Lagos has a large population of online activists, digital hubs and social influencers thereby encouraging active participatory citizenship who are politically aware.	0.854	0.62	0.234
7	SE-7: The local (Lagos State) Emergency Operation Center contributed to better coordination and rapid and effective response.	0.04	-0.15	0.19
13	SE-13: The predominance of non-machine-readable (mostly paper-based) epidemiological data restricted critical response.	0.536	0.465	0.071
5	SE-5: SMS helped reach more citizens than the other digital technology platforms.	-1.702	-1.578	-0.124
11	SE-11: Previous data response experience with Polio (e.g., HealthMap App) pre-trained/prepared responders for Ebola.	0.508	0.68	-0.172
8	SE-8: There was shared, collaborative decision-making between different government agencies (Lagos state and Federal Government) with interconnected but independent leadership procedures demonstrated during the epidemic.	0.723	0.979	-0.256

22	SE-22: Social media engagements between the citizens and the government were not iterative.	-0.697	-0.229	-0.468
24	SE-24: The incidence response and general leadership were not adaptive, rather pre-set, hence fitting for structured disasters like Ebola.	-1.636	-1.153	-0.483
34	SE-34: There was a poor digital early warning system, most of the disaster response operations were paper-based before the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak.	0.116	0.605	-0.489
30	SE-30: The Open Data Kit/Form Hub technology were used in combination with the Dashboard technology and ArcGIS mapping for follow up of contacts, identification of cases, case investigation and management and also for strategic planning during the response.	0.027	0.533	-0.506
33	SE-33: The deployment of mobile technology and improved and speed up daily reporting of contact follow up before 5 pm.	-0.739	-0.109	-0.63
6	SE-6: Rumours and misinformation about the virus were controlled through the near-instant provision of quality information.	1.156	1.831	-0.675
35	SE-35: There were infrastructural data inadequacies and low manpower (epidemiological big data analysts) which threatened the success of the operation.	-0.468	0.252	-0.72
17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.	-1.057	-0.3	-0.757
18	SE-18: Lagos has the highest number of active voice and internet subscribers in Nigeria thereby contributing to active social media engagements during the epidemic.	0.77	1.563	-0.793
26	SE-26: The leading Apps were written in English including the website thereby cutting off the vast majority of the population who are illiterates from accessing real-time information on the disease.	0.293	1.095	-0.802
4	SE-4: The government collaborated more with foreign NGOs and international institutions rather than local NGOs and CSOs.	-0.68	0.452	-1.132
2	SE-2: Federal, State and Local government health parastatals rarely cooperated in crisis communication online during the outbreak.	-1.363	0.607	-1.97

19	SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.	-0.592	1.442	-2.034
20	SE-20: Nigeria's economic middle class are predominantly in Lagos and they have high digital literacy and high digital accessibility which eventually contribute to the successful stemming of the disease spread.	-0.598	1.507	-2.105

Appendix 20: Descending Array of Differences between Factor1 and Factor 3 (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

#	Statement	Factor 1	Factor 3	Difference
15	SE-15: A lack of interoperability between the numerous data systems used to manage data before and during the response also contributed to the unclear and asynchronous data picture.	1.587	-1.277	2.864
29	SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).	0.898	-1.398	2.296
23	SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.	0.293	-1.454	1.747
13	SE-13: The predominance of non-machine-readable (mostly paper-based) epidemiological data restricted critical response.	0.536	-1.064	1.6
14	SE-14: Poor mobile and internet connectivity limited information flow during the outbreak response.	-0.001	-1.54	1.539
18	SE-18: Lagos has the highest number of active voice and internet subscribers in Nigeria thereby contributing to active social media engagements during the epidemic.	0.77	-0.458	1.228
34	SE-34: There was a poor digital early warning system, most of the disaster response operations were paper-based before the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak.	0.116	-0.916	1.032
32	SE-32: The electronic data collection and alert system reduced the turnaround time between identification of symptomatic contacts and evacuation to the isolation facility from between 3 to 6 hours to an hour.	0.602	-0.355	0.957
12	SE-12: An absence of baseline data, including commonly-used unique citizen identifiers and comprehensive and accessible geographic maps was a huge challenge during the outbreak response.	0.41	-0.546	0.956

35	SE-35: There were infrastructural data inadequacies and low manpower (epidemiological big data analysts) which threatened the success of the operation.	-0.468	-1.268	0.8
26	SE-26: The leading Apps were written in English including the website thereby cutting off the vast majority of the population who are illiterates from accessing real-time information on the disease.	0.293	-0.366	0.659
16	SE-16: The effective security leadership demonstrated is attributable mainly to the Lagos government's early adoption of digital technologies.	1.72	1.358	0.362
6	SE-6: Rumours and misinformation about the virus were controlled through the near-instant provision of quality information.	1.156	0.795	0.361
27	SE-27: Lagos has a large population of online activists, digital hubs and social influencers thereby encouraging active participatory citizenship who are politically aware.	0.854	0.547	0.307
21	SE-21: Deployment of an active dedicated website with a live-chat messaging system (Post-outbreak) for educating the public helped control the spread of the virus.	1.596	1.289	0.307
25	SE-25: In-house Big Data analytics and Machine Learning skills capabilities were lacking.	0.112	-0.026	0.138
4	SE-4: The government collaborated more with foreign NGOs and international institutions rather than local NGOs and CSOs.	-0.68	-0.792	0.112
22	SE-22: Social media engagements between the citizens and the government were not iterative.	-0.697	-0.786	0.089
28	SE-28: The feedback loops of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance system permit local leadership among government actors across the different levels of government with non-rigid central coordination - this contributed to the containment of the disease.	2.105	2.199	-0.094
11	SE-11: Previous data response experience with Polio (e.g., HealthMap App) pre-trained/prepared responders for Ebola.	0.508	0.684	-0.176
30	SE-30: The Open Data Kit/Form Hub technology were used in combination with the Dashboard technology and ArcGIS mapping for follow up of contacts, identification of cases, case investigation and management and also for strategic planning during the response.	0.027	0.648	-0.621

8	SE-8: There was shared, collaborative decision-making between different government agencies (Lagos state and Federal Government) with interconnected but independent leadership procedures demonstrated during the epidemic.	0.723	1.355	-0.632
10	SE-10: FG approved jingles to be produced in various languages produced for Nigerian Centre for Disease Control to be aired on Radio, TV and newspaper superseded other digital tech outlets.	-1.164	-0.503	-0.661
2	SE-2: Federal, State and Local government health parastatals rarely cooperated in crisis communication online during the outbreak.	-1.363	-0.618	-0.745
31	SE-31: Digital technologies and Big data did not have any significant impact on effective security-leadership decision-making during the Ebola outbreak.	-1.165	-0.407	-0.758
3	SE-3: Outdated news was recycled through different platforms using the same format.	-1.243	-0.479	-0.764
19	SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.	-0.592	0.194	-0.786
1	SE-1: Information was disseminated vertically (top-down) via traditional legacy media and social media.	-0.994	0.157	-1.151
33	SE-33: The deployment of mobile technology and improved and speed up daily reporting of contact follow up before 5 pm.	-0.739	0.512	-1.251
9	SE-9: Efforts of Contact tracers using digital forms and data inputting contributed immensely to rapid disaster response and effective leadership outcomes.	-0.247	1.006	-1.253
5	SE-5: SMS helped reach more citizens than the other digital technology platforms.	-1.702	-0.382	-1.32
20	SE-20: Nigeria's economic middle class are predominantly in Lagos and they have high digital literacy and high digital accessibility which eventually contribute to the successful stemming of the disease spread.	-0.598	0.86	-1.458
24	SE-24: The incidence response and general leadership were not adaptive, rather pre-set, hence fitting for structured disasters like Ebola.	-1.636	-0.15	-1.486

7	SE-7: The local (Lagos State) Emergency Operation Center contributed to better coordination and rapid and effective response.	0.04	1.666	-1.626
17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.	-1.057	1.514	-2.571

Appendix 21: Descending Array of Differences between Factor1 and Factor 4 (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

#	Statement	Factor 1	Factor 4	Difference
16	SE-16: The effective security leadership demonstrated is attributable mainly to the Lagos government's early adoption of digital technologies.	1.72	-0.504	2.224
15	SE-15: A lack of interoperability between the numerous data systems used to manage data before and during the response also contributed to the unclear and asynchronous data picture.	1.587	0.01	1.577
29	SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).	0.898	-0.307	1.205
31	SE-31: Digital technologies and Big data did not have any significant impact on effective security-leadership decision-making during the Ebola outbreak.	-1.165	-2.298	1.133
14	SE-14: Poor mobile and internet connectivity limited information flow during the outbreak response.	-0.001	-1.087	1.086
28	SE-28: The feedback loops of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance system permit local leadership among government actors across the different levels of government with non-rigid central coordination - this contributed to the containment of the disease.	2.105	1.022	1.083
11	SE-11: Previous data response experience with Polio (e.g., HealthMap App) pre-trained/prepared responders for Ebola.	0.508	-0.34	0.848
9	SE-9: Efforts of Contact tracers using digital forms and data inputting contributed immensely to rapid disaster response and effective leadership outcomes.	-0.247	-0.931	0.684
10	SE-10: FG approved jingles to be produced in various languages produced for Nigerian Centre for Disease Control to be aired on Radio, TV and newspaper superseded other digital tech outlets.	-1.164	-1.682	0.518
6	SE-6: Rumours and misinformation about the virus were controlled through the near-instant provision of quality information.	1.156	0.646	0.51
27	SE-27: Lagos has a large population of online activists, digital hubs and social influencers thereby encouraging active participatory citizenship who are politically aware.	0.854	0.385	0.469

12	SE-12: An absence of baseline data, including commonly-used unique citizen identifiers and comprehensive and accessible geographic maps was a huge challenge during the outbreak response.	0.41	-0.04	0.45
35	SE-35: There were infrastructural data inadequacies and low manpower (epidemiological big data analysts) which threatened the success of the operation.	-0.468	-0.723	0.255
30	SE-30: The Open Data Kit/Form Hub technology were used in combination with the Dashboard technology and ArcGIS mapping for follow up of contacts, identification of cases, case investigation and management and also for strategic planning during the response.	0.027	-0.225	0.252
21	SE-21: Deployment of an active dedicated website with a live-chat messaging system (Post-outbreak) for educating the public helped control the spread of the virus.	1.596	1.381	0.215
5	SE-5: SMS helped reach more citizens than the other digital technology platforms.	-1.702	-1.884	0.182
32	SE-32: The electronic data collection and alert system reduced the turnaround time between identification of symptomatic contacts and evacuation to the isolation facility from between 3 to 6 hours to an hour.	0.602	0.448	0.154
4	SE-4: The government collaborated more with foreign NGOs and international institutions rather than local NGOs and CSOs.	-0.68	-0.765	0.085
34	SE-34: There was a poor digital early warning system, most of the disaster response operations were paper-based before the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak.	0.116	0.196	-0.08
3	SE-3: Outdated news was recycled through different platforms using the same format.	-1.243	-1.151	-0.092
18	SE-18: Lagos has the highest number of active voice and internet subscribers in Nigeria thereby contributing to active social media engagements during the epidemic.	0.77	0.912	-0.142
1	SE-1: Information was disseminated vertically (top-down) via traditional legacy media and social media.	-0.994	-0.797	-0.197
13	SE-13: The predominance of non-machine-readable (mostly paper-based) epidemiological data restricted critical response.	0.536	0.763	-0.227
22	SE-22: Social media engagements between the citizens and the government were not iterative.	-0.697	-0.395	-0.302
26	SE-26: The leading Apps were written in English including the website thereby cutting off the vast majority of the population who are illiterates from accessing real-time information on the disease.	0.293	0.729	-0.436

7	SE-7: The local (Lagos State) Emergency Operation Center contributed to better coordination and rapid and effective response.	0.04	0.548	-0.508
25	SE-25: In-house Big Data analytics and Machine Learning skills capabilities were lacking.	0.112	0.862	-0.75
2	SE-2: Federal, State and Local government health parastatals rarely cooperated in crisis communication online during the outbreak.	-1.363	-0.566	-0.797
33	SE-33: The deployment of mobile technology and improved and speed up daily reporting of contact follow up before 5 pm.	-0.739	0.065	-0.804
20	SE-20: Nigeria's economic middle class are predominantly in Lagos and they have high digital literacy and high digital accessibility which eventually contribute to the successful stemming of the disease spread.	-0.598	0.712	-1.31
8	SE-8: There was shared, collaborative decision-making between different government agencies (Lagos state and Federal Government) with interconnected but independent leadership procedures demonstrated during the epidemic.	0.723	2.044	-1.321
19	SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.	-0.592	0.78	-1.372
17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.	-1.057	0.357	-1.414
24	SE-24: The incidence response and general leadership were not adaptive, rather pre-set, hence fitting for structured disasters like Ebola.	-1.636	-0.172	-1.464
23	SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.	0.293	2.007	-1.714

Appendix 22: Descending Array of Differences Between Factor 2 and Factor 3 (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

#	Statement	Factor 2	Factor 3	Difference
18	SE-18: Lagos has the highest number of active voice and internet subscribers in Nigeria thereby contributing to active social media engagements during the epidemic.	1.563	-0.458	2.021
29	SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).	0.209	-1.398	1.607
13	SE-13: The predominance of non-machine-readable (mostly paper-based) epidemiological data restricted critical response.	0.465	-1.064	1.529
34	SE-34: There was a poor digital early warning system, most of the disaster response operations were paper-based before the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak.	0.605	-0.916	1.521
35	SE-35: There were infrastructural data inadequacies and low manpower (epidemiological big data analysts) which threatened the success of the operation.	0.252	-1.268	1.52
26	SE-26: The leading Apps were written in English including the website thereby cutting off the vast majority of the population who are illiterates from accessing real-time information on the disease.	1.095	-0.366	1.461
15	SE-15: A lack of interoperability between the numerous data systems used to manage data before and during the response also contributed to the unclear and asynchronous data picture.	0.07	-1.277	1.347
19	SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.	1.442	0.194	1.248
4	SE-4: The government collaborated more with foreign NGOs and international institutions rather than local NGOs and CSOs.	0.452	-0.792	1.244
2	SE-2: Federal, State and Local government health parastatals rarely cooperated in crisis communication online during the outbreak.	0.607	-0.618	1.225
6	SE-6: Rumours and misinformation about the virus were controlled through the near-instant provision of quality information.	1.831	0.795	1.036
14	SE-14: Poor mobile and internet connectivity limited information flow during the outbreak response.	-0.684	-1.54	0.856

20	SE-20: Nigeria's economic middle class are predominantly in Lagos and they have high digital literacy and high digital accessibility which eventually contribute to the successful stemming of the disease spread.	1.507	0.86	0.647
22	SE-22: Social media engagements between the citizens and the government were not iterative.	-0.229	-0.786	0.557
12	SE-12: An absence of baseline data, including commonly-used unique citizen identifiers and comprehensive and accessible geographic maps was a huge challenge during the outbreak response.	-0.091	-0.546	0.455
23	SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.	-1.361	-1.454	0.093
27	SE-27: Lagos has a large population of online activists, digital hubs and social influencers thereby encouraging active participatory citizenship who are politically aware.	0.62	0.547	0.073
11	SE-11: Previous data response experience with Polio (e.g., HealthMap App) pre-trained/prepared responders for Ebola.	0.68	0.684	-0.004
30	SE-30: The Open Data Kit/Form Hub technology were used in combination with the Dashboard technology and ArcGIS mapping for follow up of contacts, identification of cases, case investigation and management and also for strategic planning during the response.	0.533	0.648	-0.115
21	SE-21: Deployment of an active dedicated website with a live-chat messaging system (Post-outbreak) for educating the public helped control the spread of the virus.	1.114	1.289	-0.175
25	SE-25: In-house Big Data analytics and Machine Learning skills capabilities were lacking.	-0.216	-0.026	-0.19
32	SE-32: The electronic data collection and alert system reduced the turnaround time between identification of symptomatic contacts and evacuation to the isolation facility from between 3 to 6 hours to an hour.	-0.632	-0.355	-0.277
8	SE-8: There was shared, collaborative decision-making between different government agencies (Lagos state and Federal Government) with interconnected but independent leadership procedures demonstrated during the epidemic.	0.979	1.355	-0.376
33	SE-33: The deployment of mobile technology and improved and speed up daily reporting of contact follow up before 5 pm.	-0.109	0.512	-0.621
24	SE-24: The incidence response and general leadership were not adaptive, rather pre-set, hence fitting for structured disasters like Ebola.	-1.153	-0.15	-1.003

10	SE-10: FG approved jingles to be produced in various languages produced for Nigerian Centre for Disease Control to be aired on Radio, TV and newspaper superseded other digital tech outlets.	-1.566	-0.503	-1.063
16	SE-16: The effective security leadership demonstrated is attributable mainly to the Lagos government's early adoption of digital technologies.	0.169	1.358	-1.189
5	SE-5: SMS helped reach more citizens than the other digital technology platforms.	-1.578	-0.382	-1.196
31	SE-31: Digital technologies and Big data did not have any significant impact on effective security-leadership decision-making during the Ebola outbreak.	-1.647	-0.407	-1.24
3	SE-3: Outdated news was recycled through different platforms using the same format.	-1.884	-0.479	-1.405
1	SE-1: Information was disseminated vertically (top-down) via traditional legacy media and social media.	-1.289	0.157	-1.446
9	SE-9: Efforts of Contact tracers using digital forms and data inputting contributed immensely to rapid disaster response and effective leadership outcomes.	-0.528	1.006	-1.534
17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.	-0.3	1.514	-1.814
7	SE-7: The local (Lagos State) Emergency Operation Center contributed to better coordination and rapid and effective response.	-0.15	1.666	-1.816
28	SE-28: The feedback loops of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance system permit local leadership among government actors across the different levels of government with non-rigid central coordination - this contributed to the containment of the diseas.	-0.776	2.199	-2.975

Appendix 23: Descending Array of Differences Between Factor 3 and Factor 4 (Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1))

#	Statement	Factor 3	Factor 4	Difference
9	SE-9: Efforts of Contact tracers using digital forms and data inputting contributed immensely to rapid disaster response and effective leadership outcomes.	1.006	-0.931	1.937
31	SE-31: Digital technologies and Big data did not have any significant impact on effective security-leadership decision-making during the Ebola outbreak.	-0.407	-2.298	1.891
16	SE-16: The effective security leadership demonstrated is attributable mainly to the Lagos government's early adoption of digital technologies.	1.358	-0.504	1.862
5	SE-5: SMS helped reach more citizens than the other digital technology platforms.	-0.382	-1.884	1.502
10	SE-10: FG approved jingles to be produced in various languages produced for Nigerian Centre for Disease Control to be aired on Radio, TV and newspaper superseded other digital tech outlets.	-0.503	-1.682	1.179
28	SE-28: The feedback loops of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance system permit local leadership among government actors across the different levels of government with non-rigid central coordination - this contributed to the containment of the diseas.	2.199	1.022	1.177
17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.	1.514	0.357	1.157
7	SE-7: The local (Lagos State) Emergency Operation Center contributed to better coordination and rapid and effective response.	1.666	0.548	1.118
11	SE-11: Previous data response experience with Polio (e.g., HealthMap App) pre-trained/prepared responders for Ebola.	0.684	-0.34	1.024
1	SE-1: Information was disseminated vertically (top-down) via traditional legacy media and social media.	0.157	-0.797	0.954
30	SE-30: The Open Data Kit/Form Hub technology were used in combination with the Dashboard technology and ArcGIS mapping for follow up of contacts, identification of cases, case investigation and management and also for strategic planning during the response.	0.648	-0.225	0.873
3	SE-3: Outdated news was recycled through different platforms using the same format.	-0.479	-1.151	0.672

33	SE-33: The deployment of mobile technology and improved and speed up daily reporting of contact follow up before 5 pm.	0.512	0.065	0.447
27	SE-27: Lagos has a large population of online activists, digital hubs and social influencers thereby encouraging active participatory citizenship who are politically aware.	0.547	0.385	0.162
6	SE-6: Rumours and misinformation about the virus were controlled through the near-instant provision of quality information.	0.795	0.646	0.149
20	SE-20: Nigeria's economic middle class are predominantly in Lagos and they have high digital literacy and high digital accessibility which eventually contribute to the successful stemming of the disease spread.	0.86	0.712	0.148
24	SE-24: The incidence response and general leadership were not adaptive, rather pre-set, hence fitting for structured disasters like Ebola.	-0.15	-0.172	0.022
4	SE-4: The government collaborated more with foreign NGOs and international institutions rather than local NGOs and CSOs.	-0.792	-0.765	-0.027
2	SE-2: Federal, State and Local government health parastatals rarely cooperated in crisis communication online during the outbreak.	-0.618	-0.566	-0.052
21	SE-21: Deployment of an active dedicated website with a live-chat messaging system (Post-outbreak) for educating the public helped control the spread of the virus.	1.289	1.381	-0.092
22	SE-22: Social media engagements between the citizens and the government were not iterative.	-0.786	-0.395	-0.391
14	SE-14: Poor mobile and internet connectivity limited information flow during the outbreak response.	-1.54	-1.087	-0.453
12	SE-12: An absence of baseline data, including commonly-used unique citizen identifiers and comprehensive and accessible geographic maps was a huge challenge during the outbreak response.	-0.546	-0.04	-0.506
35	SE-35: There were infrastructural data inadequacies and low manpower (epidemiological big data analysts) which threatened the success of the operation.	-1.268	-0.723	-0.545
19	SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.	0.194	0.78	-0.586
8	SE-8: There was shared, collaborative decision-making between different government agencies (Lagos state and Federal Government) with interconnected but independent leadership procedures demonstrated during the epidemic.	1.355	2.044	-0.689

32	SE-32: The electronic data collection and alert system reduced the turnaround time between identification of symptomatic contacts and evacuation to the isolation facility from between 3 to 6 hours to an hour.	-0.355	0.448	-0.803
25	SE-25: In-house Big Data analytics and Machine Learning skills capabilities were lacking.	-0.026	0.862	-0.888
29	SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).	-1.398	-0.307	-1.091
26	SE-26: The leading Apps were written in English including the website thereby cutting off the vast majority of the population who are illiterates from accessing real-time information on the disease.	-0.366	0.729	-1.095
34	SE-34: There was a poor digital early warning system, most of the disaster response operations were paper-based before the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak.	-0.916	0.196	-1.112
15	SE-15: A lack of interoperability between the numerous data systems used to manage data before and during the response also contributed to the unclear and asynchronous data picture.	-1.277	0.01	-1.287
18	SE-18: Lagos has the highest number of active voice and internet subscribers in Nigeria thereby contributing to active social media engagements during the epidemic.	-0.458	0.912	-1.37
13	SE-13: The predominance of non-machine-readable (mostly paper-based) epidemiological data restricted critical response.	-1.064	0.763	-1.827
23	SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.	-1.454	2.007	-3.461

Appendix 24: Factor Scores for Factor 1 (Raw Sorts) - Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1)

				Raw Sorts						
#	Statement	Z-score	Sort Values	E2	E3	E14	E10	E7	E15	E32
28	SE-28: The feedback loops of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance system permit local leadership among government actors across the different levels of government with non-rigid central coordination - this contributed to the containment of the diseas.	2.105	4	4	2	4	2	3	4	4
16	SE-16: The effective security leadership demonstrated is attributable mainly to the Lagos government's early adoption of digital technologies.	1.72	4	3	2	2	3	4	3	1
21	SE-21: Deployment of an active dedicated website with a live-chat messaging system (Post-outbreak) for educating the public helped control the spread of the virus.	1.596	3	3	3	3	3	1	3	0
15	SE-15: A lack of interoperability between the numerous data systems used to manage data before and during the response also contributed to the unclear and asynchronous data picture.	1.587	3	4	2	1	4	2	0	4
6	SE-6: Rumours and misinformation about the virus were controlled through the near-instant provision of quality information.	1.156	3	0	2	3	2	4	-1	3
29	SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).	0.898	2	2	1	0	1	2	2	2
27	SE-27: Lagos has a large population of online activists, digital hubs and social influencers thereby encouraging active participatory citizenship who are politically aware.	0.854	2	1	0	4	2	-2	4	0
18	SE-18: Lagos has the highest number of active voice and internet subscribers in Nigeria thereby contributing to active social media engagements during the epidemic.	0.77	2	2	0	0	1	2	1	3

8	SE-8: There was shared, collaborative decision-making between different government agencies (Lagos state and Federal Government) with interconnected but independent leadership procedures demonstrated during the epidemic.	0.723	2	-2	4	3	4	-4	2	1
32	SE-32: The electronic data collection and alert system reduced the turnaround time between identification of symptomatic contacts and evacuation to the isolation facility from between 3 to 6 hours to an hour.	0.602	1	2	3	-1	0	1	0	1
13	SE-13: The predominance of non-machine-readable (mostly paper-based) epidemiological data restricted critical response.	0.536	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	2
11	SE-11: Previous data response experience with Polio (e.g., HealthMap App) pre-trained/prepared responders for Ebola.	0.508	1	-1	1	1	3	3	-1	-1
12	SE-12: An absence of baseline data, including commonly-used unique citizen identifiers and comprehensive and accessible geographic maps was a huge challenge during the outbreak response.	0.41	1	2	4	-2	-3	0	3	0
23	SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.	0.293	1	1	-1	0	1	2	0	0
26	SE-26: The leading Apps were written in English including the website thereby cutting off the vast majority of the population who are illiterates from accessing real-time information on the disease.	0.293	0	0	1	2	0	0	2	-3
34	SE-34: There was a poor digital early warning system, most of the disaster response operations were paper-based before the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak.	0.116	0	0	3	1	0	0	-3	-1
25	SE-25: In-house Big Data analytics and Machine Learning skills capabilities were lacking.	0.112	0	1	0	-1	0	0	-1	3

7	SE-7: The local (Lagos State) Emergency Operation Center contributed to better coordination and rapid and effective response.	0.04	0	-1	1	0	0	1	1	-2
30	SE-30: The Open Data Kit/Form Hub technology were used in combination with the Dashboard technology and ArcGIS mapping for follow up of contacts, identification of cases, case investigation and management and also for strategic planning during the response.	0.027	0	3	0	0	0	0	-2	-3
14	SE-14: Poor mobile and internet connectivity limited information flow during the outbreak response.	-0.001	0	-2	-2	2	2	1	1	-2
9	SE-9: Efforts of Contact tracers using digital forms and data inputting contributed immensely to rapid disaster response and effective leadership outcomes.	-0.247	0	-1	-1	-1	-2	3	0	0
35	SE-35: There were infrastructural data inadequacies and low manpower (epidemiological big data analysts) which threatened the success of the operation.	-0.468	-1	-3	-3	2	1	-1	0	0
19	SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.	-0.592	-1	0	-2	0	-1	-1	-1	-2
20	SE-20: Nigeria's economic middle class are predominantly in Lagos and they have high digital literacy and high digital accessibility which eventually contribute to the successful stemming of the disease spread.	-0.598	-1	-3	0	0	0	-2	0	-1
4	SE-4: The government collaborated more with foreign NGOs and international institutions rather than local NGOs and CSOs.	-0.68	-1	-2	0	1	-3	-2	2	-4
22	SE-22: Social media engagements between the citizens and the government were not iterative.	-0.697	-1	-1	-1	-3	-1	-3	1	2
33	SE-33: The deployment of mobile technology and improved and speed up daily reporting of contact follow up before 5 pm.	-0.739	-2	0	-2	-3	-1	-3	1	1

1	SE-1: Information was disseminated vertically (top-down) via traditional legacy media and social media.	-0.994	-2	0	-1	-2	-3	-2	-2	-1
17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.	-1.057	-2	-3	-3	-1	-1	1	-2	-2
10	SE-10: FG approved jingles to be produced in various languages produced for Nigerian Centre for Disease Control to be aired on Radio, TV and newspaper superseded other digital tech outlets.	-1.164	-2	-4	0	-1	-2	0	-2	-4
31	SE-31: Digital technologies and Big data did not have any significant impact on effective security-leadership decision-making during the Ebola outbreak.	-1.165	-3	0	-1	-4	-4	-1	-3	1
3	SE-3: Outdated news was recycled through different platforms using the same format.	-1.243	-3	-1	-3	-3	-1	-1	-4	0
2	SE-2: Federal, State and Local government health parastatals rarely cooperated in crisis communication online during the outbreak.	-1.363	-3	1	-2	-4	-4	-4	-3	2
24	SE-24: The incidence response and general leadership were not adaptive, rather pre-set, hence fitting for structured disasters like Ebola.	-1.636	-4	-4	-4	-2	-2	-1	-1	-3
5	SE-5: SMS helped reach more citizens than the other digital technology platforms.	-1.702	-4	-2	-4	-2	-2	-3	-4	-1

Appendix 25: Factor Scores for Factor 2 (Raw Sorts) - Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1)

				Raw Sorts					
#	**Statement**	**Z-score**	**Sort Values**	**E19**	**E25**	**E18**	**E21**	**E27**	**E23**
6	SE-6: Rumours and misinformation about the virus were controlled through the near-instant provision of quality information.	1.831	4	4	4	3	3	3	-1
18	SE-18: Lagos has the highest number of active voice and internet subscribers in Nigeria thereby contributing to active social media engagements during the epidemic.	1.563	4	4	3	0	1	4	1
20	SE-20: Nigeria's economic middle class are predominantly in Lagos and they have high digital literacy and high digital accessibility which eventually contribute to the successful stemming of the disease spread.	1.507	3	2	1	3	3	4	3
19	SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.	1.442	3	3	3	4	0	1	2
21	SE-21: Deployment of an active dedicated website with a live-chat messaging system (Post-outbreak) for educating the public helped control the spread of the virus.	1.114	3	2	3	0	0	2	4
26	SE-26: The leading Apps were written in English including the website thereby cutting off the vast majority of the population who are illiterates from accessing real-time information on the disease.	1.095	2	3	-1	2	2	0	3
8	SE-8: There was shared, collaborative decision-making between different government agencies (Lagos state and Federal Government) with interconnected but independent leadership procedures demonstrated during the epidemic.	0.979	2	3	1	3	1	-1	0

11	SE-11: Previous data response experience with Polio (e.g., HealthMap App) pre- trained/prepared responders for Ebola.	0.68	2	1	2	2	-1	0	3
27	SE-27: Lagos has a large population of online activists, digital hubs and social influencers thereby encouraging active participatory citizenship who are politically aware.	0.62	2	0	1	1	4	1	1
2	SE-2: Federal, State and Local government health parastatals rarely cooperated in crisis communication online during the outbreak.	0.607	1	1	2	1	1	-1	2
34	SE-34: There was a poor digital early warning system, most of the disaster response operations were paper-based before the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak.	0.605	1	1	1	1	4	-3	2
30	SE-30: The Open Data Kit/Form Hub technology were used in combination with the Dashboard technology and ArcGIS mapping for follow up of contacts, identification of cases, case investigation and management and also for strategic planning during the response.	0.533	1	2	2	1	-1	0	-1
13	SE-13: The predominance of non-machine-readable (mostly paper-based) epidemiological data restricted critical response.	0.465	1	0	2	-1	2	3	0
4	SE-4: The government collaborated more with foreign NGOs and international institutions rather than local NGOs and CSOs.	0.452	1	2	-2	2	1	3	-4
35	SE-35: There were infrastructural data inadequacies and low manpower (epidemiological big data analysts) which threatened the success of the operation.	0.252	0	0	4	-2	2	0	-1
29	SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).	0.209	0	1	-3	0	3	2	-2

16	SE-16: The effective security leadership demonstrated is attributable mainly to the Lagos government's early adoption of digital technologies.	0.169	0	-2	-1	4	-1	2	4
15	SE-15: A lack of interoperability between the numerous data systems used to manage data before and during the response also contributed to the unclear and asynchronous data picture.	0.07	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
12	SE-12: An absence of baseline data, including commonly-used unique citizen identifiers and comprehensive and accessible geographic maps was a huge challenge during the outbreak response.	-0.091	0	0	-2	0	0	1	0
33	SE-33: The deployment of mobile technology and improved and speed up daily reporting of contact follow up before 5 pm.	-0.109	0	1	0	-3	-2	1	0
7	SE-7: The local (Lagos State) Emergency Operation Center contributed to better coordination and rapid and effective response.	-0.15	0	-1	-3	2	0	2	0
25	SE-25: In-house Big Data analytics and Machine Learning skills capabilities were lacking.	-0.216	-1	-1	0	-1	1	1	-1
22	SE-22: Social media engagements between the citizens and the government were not iterative.	-0.229	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	1
17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.	-0.3	-1	0	0	-1	2	-4	-1
9	SE-9: Efforts of Contact tracers using digital forms and data inputting contributed immensely to rapid disaster response and effective leadership outcomes.	-0.528	-1	-1	1	-1	-3	-2	1
32	SE-32: The electronic data collection and alert system reduced the turnaround time between identification of symptomatic contacts and evacuation to the isolation facility from between 3 to 6 hours to an hour.	-0.632	-1	0	0	-4	-1	-3	0

14	SE-14: Poor mobile and internet connectivity limited information flow during the outbreak response.	-0.684	-2	-1	-1	0	-4	-1	0
28	SE-28: The feedback loops of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance system permit local leadership among government actors across the different levels of government with non-rigid central coordination - this contributed to the containment of the diseas.	-0.776	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	2
24	SE-24: The incidence response and general leadership were not adaptive, rather pre-set, hence fitting for structured disasters like Ebola.	-1.153	-2	-4	0	1	-2	-1	-2
1	SE-1: Information was disseminated vertically (top-down) via traditional legacy media and social media.	-1.289	-2	-2	-2	-3	-1	-3	-2
23	SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.	-1.361	-3	-2	-4	-2	0	-2	-4
10	SE-10: FG approved jingles to be produced in various languages produced for Nigerian Centre for Disease Control to be aired on Radio, TV and newspaper superseded other digital tech outlets.	-1.566	-3	-3	0	-3	-4	-2	-3
5	SE-5: SMS helped reach more citizens than the other digital technology platforms.	-1.578	-3	-3	-1	-4	-3	-1	-3
31	SE-31: Digital technologies and Big data did not have any significant impact on effective security-leadership decision-making during the Ebola outbreak.	-1.647	-4	-3	-3	-1	-2	-4	-3
3	SE-3: Outdated news was recycled through different platforms using the same format.	-1.884	-4	-4	-4	-2	-3	-2	-2

Appendix 26: Factor Scores for Factor 3 (Raw Sorts) - Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1)

#	Statement	Z-score	Sort Values	E12	E28	E17	E37	E24
28	SE-28: The feedback loops of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance system permit local leadership among government actors across the different levels of government with non-rigid central coordination - this contributed to the containment of the diseas.	2.199	4	4	4	-1	-2	-4
7	SE-7: The local (Lagos State) Emergency Operation Center contributed to better coordination and rapid and effective response.	1.666	4	1	3	-4	0	-4
17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.	1.514	3	2	4	-2	-3	0
16	SE-16: The effective security leadership demonstrated is attributable mainly to the Lagos government's early adoption of digital technologies.	1.358	3	3	2	0	-1	-3
8	SE-8: There was shared, collaborative decision-making between different government agencies (Lagos state and Federal Government) with interconnected but independent leadership procedures demonstrated during the epidemic.	1.355	3	3	2	0	-2	-2
21	SE-21: Deployment of an active dedicated website with a live-chat messaging system (Post-outbreak) for educating the public helped control the spread of the virus.	1.289	2	1	3	-1	-1	-3
9	SE-9: Efforts of Contact tracers using digital forms and data inputting contributed immensely to rapid disaster response and effective leadership outcomes.	1.006	2	-2	0	-4	-3	-2
20	SE-20: Nigeria's economic middle class are predominantly in Lagos and they have high digital literacy and high digital accessibility which eventually	0.86	2	1	0	-3	0	-2

	contribute to the successful stemming of the disease spread.							
6	SE-6: Rumours and misinformation about the virus were controlled through the near-instant provision of quality information.	0.795	2	4	-1	-1	0	-1
11	SE-11: Previous data response experience with Polio (e.g., HealthMap App) pre-trained/prepared responders for Ebola.	0.684	1	2	-1	0	-2	-1
30	SE-30: The Open Data Kit/Form Hub technology were used in combination with the Dashboard technology and ArcGIS mapping for follow up of contacts, identification of cases, case investigation and management and also for strategic planning during the response.	0.648	1	0	2	-2	0	-1
27	SE-27: Lagos has a large population of online activists, digital hubs and social influencers thereby encouraging active participatory citizenship who are politically aware.	0.547	1	3	0	2	0	-2
33	SE-33: The deployment of mobile technology and improved and speed up daily reporting of contact follow up before 5 pm.	0.512	1	0	-2	-2	0	-3
19	SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.	0.194	1	2	-1	0	0	0
1	SE-1: Information was disseminated vertically (top-down) via traditional legacy media and social media.	0.157	0	0	1	-3	-1	3
25	SE-25: In-house Big Data analytics and Machine Learning skills capabilities were lacking.	-0.026	0	2	0	0	-2	4
24	SE-24: The incidence response and general leadership were not adaptive, rather pre-set, hence fitting for structured disasters like Ebola.	-0.15	0	-1	-1	-1	-1	1
32	SE-32: The electronic data collection and alert system reduced the turnaround time between identification of	-0.355	0	0	-2	1	1	-1

	symptomatic contacts and evacuation to the isolation facility from between 3 to 6 hours to an hour.							
26	SE-26: The leading Apps were written in English including the website thereby cutting off the vast majority of the population who are illiterates from accessing real-time information on the disease.	-0.366	0	0	0	-1	2	1
5	SE-5: SMS helped reach more citizens than the other digital technology platforms.	-0.382	0	-2	-3	3	-3	-1
31	SE-31: Digital technologies and Big data did not have any significant impact on effective security-leadership decision-making during the Ebola outbreak.	-0.407	0	-3	-4	1	-4	0
18	SE-18: Lagos has the highest number of active voice and internet subscribers in Nigeria thereby contributing to active social media engagements during the epidemic.	-0.458	-1	0	1	2	2	0
3	SE-3: Outdated news were recycled through different platforms using the same format.	-0.479	-1	-2	1	-3	1	3
10	SE-10: FG approved jingles to be produced in various languages produced for Nigerian Centre for Disease Control to be aired on Radio, TV and newspaper superseded other digital tech outlets.	-0.503	-1	-4	-1	2	-4	1
12	SE-12: An absence of baseline data, including commonly-used unique citizen identifiers and comprehensive and accessible geographic maps was a huge challenge during the outbreak response.	-0.546	-1	1	1	0	3	2
2	SE-2: Federal, State and Local government health parastatals rarely cooperated in crisis communication online during the outbreak.	-0.618	-1	0	0	1	1	2
22	SE-22: Social media engagements between the citizens and the government were not iterative.	-0.786	-2	-1	3	0	4	2
4	SE-4: The government collaborated more with foreign NGOs and international institutions rather than local NGOs and CSOs.	-0.792	-2	-4	1	1	1	0

34	SE-34: There was a poor digital early warning system, most of the disaster response operations were paper-based before the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak.	-0.916	-2	-3	0	1	2	0
13	SE-13: The predominance of non-machine-readable (mostly paper-based) epidemiological data restricted critical response.	-1.064	-2	-2	-3	-2	3	1
35	SE-35: There were infrastructural data inadequacies and low manpower (epidemiological big data analysts) which threatened the success of the operation.	-1.268	-3	1	-3	2	1	4
15	SE-15: A lack of interoperability between the numerous data systems used to manage data before and during the response also contributed to the unclear and asynchronous data picture.	-1.277	-3	-1	2	3	4	2
29	SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).	-1.398	-3	-3	-2	3	2	0
23	SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.	-1.454	-4	-1	-4	4	-1	3
14	SE-14: Poor mobile and internet connectivity limited information flow during the outbreak response.	-1.54	-4	-1	-2	4	3	1

Appendix 27: Factor Scores for Factor 4 (Raw Sorts) - Lagos Ebola Study (Q-Study 1)

#	Statement	Z-score	Sort Values	E8	E13	E5	E33	E31	E1	E9	E34
8	SE-8: There was shared, collaborative decision-making between different government agencies (Lagos state and Federal Government) with interconnected but independent leadership procedures demonstrated during the epidemic.	2.044	4	3	4	4	3	1	4	2	2
23	SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.	2.007	4	4	3	4	2	2	2	3	3
21	SE-21: Deployment of an active dedicated website with a live-chat messaging system (Post-outbreak) for educating the public helped control the spread of the virus.	1.381	3	0	2	3	3	3	3	3	-1
28	SE-28: The feedback loops of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance system permit local leadership among government actors across the different levels of government with non-rigid central coordination - this contributed to the containment of the diseas.	1.022	3	4	1	-3	2	4	0	1	4
18	SE-18: Lagos has the highest number of active voice and internet subscribers in Nigeria thereby contributing to active social media engagements during the epidemic.	0.912	3	2	2	2	-1	1	0	4	0
25	SE-25: In-house Big Data analytics and Machine Learning skills capabilities were lacking.	0.862	2	2	1	3	-2	1	3	0	2
19	SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.	0.78	2	3	-1	0	1	2	0	3	2
13	SE-13: The predominance of non-machine-readable (mostly paper-based) epidemiological data restricted critical response.	0.763	2	0	0	1	4	-1	3	0	4

26	SE-26: The leading Apps were written in English including the website thereby cutting off the vast majority of the population who are illiterates from accessing real-time information on the disease.	0.729	2	0	1	2	1	3	2	0	-1
20	SE-20: Nigeria's economic middle class are predominantly in Lagos and they have high digital literacy and high digital accessibility which eventually contribute to the successful stemming of the disease spread.	0.712	1	1	3	2	0	-1	-1	4	-1
6	SE-6: Rumours and misinformation about the virus were controlled through the near-instant provision of quality information.	0.646	1	3	4	-1	2	2	-3	-3	1
7	SE-7: The local (Lagos State) Emergency Operation Center contributed to better coordination and rapid and effective response.	0.548	1	1	0	-1	2	3	-1	1	3
32	SE-32: The electronic data collection and alert system reduced the turnaround time between identification of symptomatic contacts and evacuation to the isolation facility from between 3 to 6 hours to an hour.	0.448	1	-2	2	3	3	0	1	-1	-2
27	SE-27: Lagos has a large population of online activists, digital hubs and social influencers thereby encouraging active participatory citizenship who are politically aware.	0.385	1	0	2	-1	1	1	-1	2	1
17	SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.	0.357	0	-1	3	-1	4	-1	-2	2	0
34	SE-34: There was a poor digital early warning system, most of the disaster response operations were paper-based before the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak.	0.196	0	-1	1	1	0	4	0	-3	0
33	SE-33: The deployment of mobile technology and improved and speed up daily reporting of contact follow up before 5 pm.	0.065	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	-4

15	SE-15: A lack of interoperability between the numerous data systems used to manage data before and during the response also contributed to the unclear and asynchronous data picture.	0.01	0	2	-2	-3	1	2	4	-2	-3
12	SE-12: An absence of baseline data, including commonly-used unique citizen identifiers and comprehensive and accessible geographic maps was a huge challenge during the outbreak response.	-0.04	0	0	-1	1	-1	0	-1	2	0
24	SE-24: The incidence response and general leadership were not adaptive, rather pre-set, hence fitting for structured disasters like Ebola.	-0.172	0	1	-1	0	-1	-1	0	1	-2
30	SE-30: The Open Data Kit/Form Hub technology were used in combination with the Dashboard technology and ArcGIS mapping for follow up of contacts, identification of cases, case investigation and management and also for strategic planning during the response.	-0.225	0	2	0	0	-3	-2	1	0	-3
29	SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).	-0.307	-1	1	-2	1	0	-4	-2	1	2
11	SE-11: Previous data response experience with Polio (e.g., HealthMap App) pre-trained/prepared responders for Ebola.	-0.34	-1	-2	1	-1	0	0	0	-1	-1
22	SE-22: Social media engagements between the citizens and the government were not iterative.	-0.395	-1	-3	-1	2	-1	0	-1	0	1
16	SE-16: The effective security leadership demonstrated is attributable mainly to the Lagos government's early adoption of digital technologies.	-0.504	-1	-1	0	0	-2	-2	1	-2	0
2	SE-2: Federal, State and Local government health parastatals rarely cooperated in crisis communication online during the outbreak.	-0.566	-1	1	-3	-2	1	-1	-2	-1	1

35	SE-35: There were infrastructural data inadequacies and low manpower (epidemiological big data analysts) which threatened the success of the operation.	-0.723	-2	-2	0	-2	-2	-4	2	0	1
4	SE-4: The government collaborated more with foreign NGOs and international institutions rather than local NGOs and CSOs.	-0.765	-2	0	0	0	0	-3	-3	-2	-4
1	SE-1: Information was disseminated vertically (top-down) via traditional legacy media and social media.	-0.797	-2	-1	-2	0	-4	0	2	-4	0
9	SE-9: Efforts of Contact tracers using digital forms and data inputting contributed immensely to rapid disaster response and effective leadership outcomes.	-0.931	-2	-1	-1	-3	-2	0	-4	-1	3
14	SE-14: Poor mobile and internet connectivity limited information flow during the outbreak response.	-1.087	-3	-4	-2	0	0	-3	0	-1	-2
3	SE-3: Outdated news were recycled through different platforms using the same format.	-1.151	-3	-2	-4	-2	-1	1	-3	0	-1
10	SE-10: FG approved jingles to be produced in various languages produced for Nigerian Centre for Disease Control to be aired on Radio, TV and newspaper superseded other digital tech outlets.	-1.682	-3	-3	-3	-4	-3	-2	1	-4	0
5	SE-5: SMS helped reach more citizens than the other digital technology platforms.	-1.884	-4	-3	-3	-2	-3	-2	-4	-3	-2
31	SE-31: Digital technologies and Big data did not have any significant impact on effective security-leadership decision-making during the Ebola outbreak.	-2.298	-4	-4	-4	-4	-4	-3	-2	-2	-3

Appendix 28: Descending Array of Differences Between Factor 1 and Factor 2 (Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2))

#	Statement	Factor 1	Factor 2	Difference
9	SF-9: LASEMA and LASEPA demonstrated more active social media engagements with the public than national agencies and other state agencies.	1.513	-0.653	2.166
23	SF-23: Nigeria has series of satellites in space for weather and communication. National emergency and space agencies such as NEMA, NASRDA and RECTAS have worked together to issue helpful charter calls for geo-spatial imaging for disaster response and damage assessments.	-0.088	-1.342	1.254
7	SF-7: Lagos State is effective in flood management and provision of resources to those affected by flood disasters. There are big data used in making these effective leadership decisions.	-0.587	-1.53	0.943
20	SF-20: GIS and Remote sensing are usually deployed to identify floodplain encroachment, assess flood vulnerability, and to ensure strict adherence to, and enforcement of flood management policies.	-0.664	-1.493	0.829
19	SF-19: Each agency operates clearly independently with little or no inter-agency collaboration in flood disaster early warning, response, and management. Inter- agency technology and data sharing is almost non-existent.	2.393	1.651	0.742
1	SF-1: Lagos State has the best flood preparedness plan in Nigeria combined with data from meteorological agencies, it has failed to effectively mitigate the perennial flood disasters and their impacts on the health of the people.	-0.502	-1.157	0.655
5	SF-5: Meteorological, satellite hydrological and other associated data are not easily accessible to researchers and environmental NGOs without going through burdensome government bureaucracies thereby restricting complimentary data-driven analytics and decision making.	1.032	0.519	0.513
11	SF-11: There are popular independent websites for correcting fake news, misinformation and for actively engaging citizens during flood disasters.	-1.191	-1.318	0.127

12	SF-12: Citizens and local institutions (media and researcher) trust independent actors - local and foreign for information than government actors during flood disasters. They rely more on foreign databases (e.g., EM-DAT) and sources for data than on government sources.	0.339	0.356	-0.017
6	SF-6: Flood emergency preparedness agencies hardly take flood predictions and warnings made by Nigerian Hydrological Agency and NiMet seriously because disaster response is more lucrative than preparedness and mitigation.	0.653	0.717	-0.064
8	SF-8: Pre-disaster information are insufficient, NEMA show more PR information of meetings and international conferences attended by principal officials, events, and pictures of palliative distribution during flood disasters rather than useful early warning and mitigation information.	0.091	0.171	-0.08
2	SF-2: Poorly regulated nature of town planning, impact assessments, limited data, and information on how much land use contribute to people building on floodplains, reducing the surface areas for water to travel without constructing drainage systems.	0.539	0.676	-0.137
13	SF-13: Flood modelling, early warning system etc. require well-trained expertise which are not sufficiently available.	0.423	0.628	-0.205
22	SF-22: Weather data collation stations in the state and across the country are either non-functional or not sufficient. This impacts data-driven decision for flood disaster preparedness, resilience, and response.	0.479	0.695	-0.216
15	SF-15: Data inconsistency is attributed to poor hydrological data management systems and lack of standards, resulting in unreliable, fabricated and data format inconsistency.	0.072	0.293	-0.221
14	SF-14: Social media users and content creators (images, memes) mock those in Lagos, especially the Lekki area because it is believed that a lot of Nigeria's rich elite reside there.	-0.172	0.108	-0.28
3	SF-3: There is a scarcity of up-to-date data on the rising sea levels in Nigeria.	0.417	0.741	-0.324
21	SF-21: Flood disasters are seasonal and predictable to a certain degree, hence, the differential in preparedness and response when compared with other disasters. Digital technologies do not affect human perception of predictable and unpredictable risks.	-1.497	-0.787	-0.71
10	SF-10: Communication and Information sharing is distributed across the different levels of government. NEMA and LASEMA jointly disseminate information and data to the public.	-1.792	-0.996	-0.796
16	SF-16: There are poor standards of hydro-meteorological data management leading to unreliable data format which renders the data almost useless for leadership decision-making during floods disaster.	0.283	1.13	-0.847

17	SF-17: In Lagos, there are robust flood data collection procedures about different wards, urban areas, and informal settlements available to emergency leaders for making location-specific decisions during flood disasters.	-1.764	-0.738	-1.026
18	SF-18: Online platforms of emergency agencies are only for informing the public not for engaging with the public.	0.429	1.575	-1.146
4	SF-4: No political incentives to enforce laws that will forestall predicted flood risks in affected areas.	-0.407	0.755	-1.162

Appendix 29: Descending Array of Differences Between Factor 1 and Factor 3 (Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2))

#	Statement	Factor 1	Factor 3	Difference
9	SF-9: LASEMA and LASEPA demonstrated more active social media engagements with the public than national agencies and other state agencies.	1.513	-1.326	2.839
19	SF-19: Each agency operates clearly independently with little or no inter-agency collaboration in flood disaster early warning, response, and management. Inter- agency technology and data sharing is almost non-existent.	2.393	-0.418	2.811
6	SF-6: Flood emergency preparedness agencies hardly take flood predictions and warnings made by Nigerian Hydrological Agency and NiMet seriously because disaster response is more lucrative than preparedness and mitigation.	0.653	-0.837	1.49
18	SF-18: Online platforms of emergency agencies are only for informing the public not for engaging with the public.	0.429	-0.429	0.858
11	SF-11: There are popular independent websites for correcting fake news, misinformation and for actively engaging citizens during flood disasters.	-1.191	-1.598	0.407
12	SF-12: Citizens and local institutions (media and researcher) trust independent actors - local and foreign for information than government actors during flood disasters. They rely more on foreign databases (e.g., EM-DAT) and sources for data than on government sources.	0.339	0.01	0.329
17	SF-17: In Lagos, there are robust flood data collection procedures about different wards, urban areas, and informal settlements available to emergency leaders for making location-specific decisions during flood disasters.	-1.764	-2.036	0.272
3	SF-3: There is a scarcity of up-to-date data on the rising sea levels in Nigeria.	0.417	0.186	0.231
23	SF-23: Nigeria has series of satellites in space for weather and communication. National emergency and space agencies such as NEMA, NASRDA and RECTAS have worked	-0.088	-0.313	0.225

	together to issue helpful charter calls for geo-spatial imaging for disaster response and damage assessments.			
+	SF-2: Poorly regulated nature of town planning, impact assessments, limited data, and information on how much land use contribute to people building on floodplains, reducing the surface areas for water to travel without constructing drainage systems.	0.539	0.721	-0.182
22	SF-22: Weather data collation stations in the state and across the country are either non-functional or not sufficient. This impacts data-driven decision for flood disaster preparedness, resilience, and response.	0.479	0.751	-0.272
7	SF-7: Lagos State is effective in flood management and provision of resources to those affected by flood disasters. There are big data used in making these effective leadership decisions.	-0.587	-0.303	-0.284
10	SF-10: Communication and Information sharing is distributed across the different levels of government. NEMA and LASEMA jointly disseminate information and data to the public.	-1.792	-1.482	-0.31
5	SF-5: Meteorological, satellite hydrological and other associated data are not easily accessible to researchers and environmental NGOs without going through burdensome government bureaucracies thereby restricting complimentary data-driven analytics and decision making.	1.032	1.568	-0.536
13	SF-13: Flood modelling, early warning system etc. require well-trained expertise which are not sufficiently available.	0.423	0.993	-0.57
20	SF-20: GIS and Remote sensing are usually deployed to identify floodplain encroachment, assess flood vulnerability, and to ensure strict adherence to, and enforcement of flood management policies.	-0.664	-0.02	-0.644
1	SF-1: Lagos State has the best flood preparedness plan in Nigeria combined with data from meteorological agencies, it has failed to effectively mitigate the perennial flood disasters and their impacts on the health of the people.	-0.502	0.146	-0.648
16	SF-16: There are poor standards of hydro-meteorological data management leading to unreliable data format which renders the data almost useless for leadership decision-making during floods disaster.	0.283	1.044	-0.761
15	SF-15: Data inconsistency is attributed to poor hydrological data management systems and lack of standards, resulting in unreliable, fabricated and data format inconsistency.	0.072	0.867	-0.795

21	SF-21: Flood disasters are seasonal and predictable to a certain degree, hence, the differential in preparedness and response when compared with other disasters. Digital technologies do not affect human perception of predictable and unpredictable risks.	-1.497	-0.605	-0.892
14	SF-14: Social media users and content creators (images, memes) mock those in Lagos, especially the Lekki area because it is believed that a lot of Nigeria's rich elite reside there.	-0.172	0.721	-0.893
8	SF-8: Pre-disaster information are insufficient, NEMA show more PR information of meetings and international conferences attended by principal officials, events, and pictures of palliative distribution during flood disasters rather than useful early warning and mitigation information.	0.091	1.159	-1.068
4	SF-4: No political incentives to enforce laws that will forestall predicted flood risks in affected areas.	-0.407	1.2	-1.607

Appendix 30: Descending Array of Differences Between Factor 2 and Factor 3 (Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2))

#	Statement	Factor 2	Factor 3	Difference
19	SF-19: Each agency operates clearly independently with little or no inter-agency collaboration in flood disaster early warning, response, and management. Inter- agency technology and data sharing is almost non-existent.	1.651	-0.418	2.069
18	SF-18: Online platforms of emergency agencies are only for informing the public not for engaging with the public.	1.575	-0.429	2.004
6	SF-6: Flood emergency preparedness agencies hardly take flood predictions and warnings made by Nigerian Hydrological Agency and NiMet seriously because disaster response is more lucrative than preparedness and mitigation.	0.717	-0.837	1.554
17	SF-17: In Lagos, there are robust flood data collection procedures about different wards, urban areas, and informal settlements available to emergency leaders for making location-specific decisions during flood disasters.	-0.738	-2.036	1.298
9	SF-9: LASEMA and LASEPA demonstrated more active social media engagements with the public than national agencies and other state agencies.	-0.653	-1.326	0.673
3	SF-3: There is a scarcity of up-to-date data on the rising sea levels in Nigeria.	0.741	0.186	0.555
10	SF-10: Communication and Information sharing is distributed across the different levels of government. NEMA and LASEMA jointly disseminate information and data to the public.	-0.996	-1.482	0.486
12	SF-12: Citizens and local institutions (media and researcher) trust independent actors - local and foreign for information than government actors during flood disasters. They rely	0.356	0.01	0.346

	more on foreign databases (e.g., EM-DAT) and sources for data than on government sources.			
11	SF-11: There are popular independent websites for correcting fake news, misinformation and for actively engaging citizens during flood disasters.	-1.318	-1.598	0.28
16	SF-16: There are poor standards of hydro-meteorological data management leading to unreliable data format which renders the data almost useless for leadership decision-making during floods disaster.	1.13	1.044	0.086
2	SF-2: Poorly regulated nature of town planning, impact assessments, limited data, and information on how much land use contribute to people building on floodplains, reducing the surface areas for water to travel without constructing drainage systems.	0.676	0.721	-0.045
22	SF-22: Weather data collation stations in the state and across the country are either non-functional or not sufficient. This impacts data-driven decision for flood disaster preparedness, resilience, and response.	0.695	0.751	-0.056
21	SF-21: Flood disasters are seasonal and predictable to a certain degree, hence, the differential in preparedness and response when compared with other disasters. Digital technologies do not affect human perception of predictable and unpredictable risks.	-0.787	-0.605	-0.182
13	SF-13: Flood modelling, early warning system etc. require well-trained expertise which are not sufficiently available.	0.628	0.993	-0.365
4	SF-4: No political incentives to enforce laws that will forestall predicted flood risks in affected areas.	0.755	1.2	-0.445
15	SF-15: Data inconsistency is attributed to poor hydrological data management systems and lack of standards, resulting in unreliable, fabricated and data format inconsistency.	0.293	0.867	-0.574
14	SF-14: Social media users and content creators (images, memes) mock those in Lagos, especially the Lekki area because it is believed that a lot of Nigeria's rich elite reside there.	0.108	0.721	-0.613
8	SF-8: Pre-disaster information are insufficient, NEMA show more PR information of meetings and international conferences attended by principal officials, events, and pictures of palliative distribution during flood disasters rather than useful early warning and mitigation information.	0.171	1.159	-0.988
23	SF-23: Nigeria has series of satellites in space for weather and communication. National emergency and space agencies such as NEMA, NASRDA and RECTAS have worked together to issue helpful charter calls for geo-spatial imaging for disaster response and damage assessments.	-1.342	-0.313	-1.029

5	SF-5: Meteorological, satellite hydrological and other associated data are not easily accessible to researchers and environmental NGOs without going through burdensome government bureaucracies thereby restricting complimentary data-driven analytics and decision making.	0.519	1.568	-1.049
7	SF-7: Lagos State is effective in flood management and provision of resources to those affected by flood disasters. There are big data used in making these effective leadership decisions.	-1.53	-0.303	-1.227
1	SF-1: Lagos State has the best flood preparedness plan in Nigeria combined with data from meteorological agencies, it has failed to effectively mitigate the perennial flood disasters and their impacts on the health of the people.	-1.157	0.146	-1.303
20	SF-20: GIS and Remote sensing are usually deployed to identify floodplain encroachment, assess flood vulnerability, and to ensure strict adherence to, and enforcement of flood management policies.	-1.493	-0.02	-1.473

Appendix 31: Factor Scores for Factor 1 (Raw Sorts) - Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2)

				Raw Sorts						
#	Statement	Z-score	Sort Values	F13	F23	F24	F3	F16	F22	F25
19	SF-19: Each agency operates clearly independently with little or no inter-agency collaboration in flood disaster early warning, response, and management. Inter-agency technology and data sharing is almost non-existent.	2.393	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	4
9	SF-9: LASEMA and LASEPA demonstrated more active social media engagements with the public than national agencies and other state agencies.	1.513	3	2	2	3	3	1	3	3
5	SF-5: Meteorological, satellite hydrological and other associated data are not easily accessible to researchers and environmental NGOs without going through burdensome government bureaucracies thereby restricting complimentary data-driven analytics and decision making.	1.032	3	3	1	3	2	1	0	0
6	SF-6: Flood emergency preparedness agencies hardly take flood predictions and warnings made by Nigerian Hydrological Agency and NiMet seriously because disaster response is more lucrative than preparedness and mitigation.	0.653	2	2	3	2	1	-1	-1	-1
2	SF-2: Poorly regulated nature of town planning, impact assessments, limited data, and information on how much land use contribute to people building on	0.539	2	1	0	1	1	2	2	-2

	floodplains, reducing the surface areas for water to travel without constructing drainage systems.									
22	SF-22: Weather data collation stations in the state and across the country are either non-functional or not sufficient. This impacts data-driven decision for flood disaster preparedness, resilience, and response.	0.479	2	-1	2	0	-1	4	0	2
18	SF-18: Online platforms of emergency agencies are only for informing the public not for engaging with the public.	0.429	1	-1	3	-1	-2	0	4	3
13	SF-13: Flood modelling, early warning system etc. require well-trained expertise which are not sufficiently available.	0.423	1	0	0	0	0	3	2	0
3	SF-3: There is a scarcity of up-to-date data on the rising sea levels in Nigeria.	0.417	1	1	1	0	2	0	2	-3
12	SF-12: Citizens and local institutions (media and researcher) trust independent actors - local and foreign for information than government actors during flood disasters. They rely more on foreign databases (e.g., EM-DAT) and sources for data than on government sources.	0.339	0	3	1	-2	2	0	0	-2
16	SF-16: There are poor standards of hydro-meteorological data management leading to unreliable data format which renders the data almost useless for leadership decision-making during floods disaster.	0.283	0	1	0	2	0	1	1	-4
8	SF-8: Pre-disaster information are insufficient, NEMA show more PR information of meetings and international conferences attended by principal officials, events, and pictures of palliative distribution during flood disasters rather than useful early warning and mitigation information.	0.091	0	0	2	2	-4	-2	1	2
15	SF-15: Data inconsistency is attributed to poor hydrological data management systems and lack of	0.072	0	0	-1	1	-1	2	0	0

	standards, resulting in unreliable, fabricated and data format inconsistency.									
23	SF-23: Nigeria has series of satellites in space for weather and communication. National emergency and space agencies such as NEMA, NASRDA and RECTAS have worked together to issue helpful charter calls for geo-spatial imaging for disaster response and damage assessments.	-0.088	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0
14	SF-14: Social media users and content creators (images, memes) mock those in Lagos, especially the Lekki area because it is believed that a lot of Nigeria's rich elite reside there.	-0.172	-1	0	0	-2	0	0	1	-1
4	SF-4: No political incentives to enforce laws that will forestall predicted flood risks in affected areas.	-0.407	-1	2	-3	1	-2	-1	-1	-1
1	SF-1: Lagos State has the best flood preparedness plan in Nigeria combined with data from meteorological agencies, it has failed to effectively mitigate the perennial flood disasters and their impacts on the health of the people.	-0.502	-1	-2	-2	-1	3	-1	-2	1
7	SF-7: Lagos State is effective in flood management and provision of resources to those affected by flood disasters. There are big data used in making these effective leadership decisions.	-0.587	-2	-1	-2	-3	0	2	-2	1
20	SF-20: GIS and Remote sensing are usually deployed to identify floodplain encroachment, assess flood vulnerability, and to ensure strict adherence to, and enforcement of flood management policies.	-0.664	-2	-2	-1	0	1	-3	-3	2
11	SF-11: There are popular independent websites for correcting fake news, misinformation and for actively engaging citizens during flood disasters.	-1.191	-2	-2	-1	-4	0	-2	-2	-2
21	SF-21: Flood disasters are seasonal and predictable to a certain degree, hence, the differential in preparedness	-1.497	-3	-3	-4	-3	-2	-2	-1	1

	and response when compared with other disasters. Digital technologies do not affect human perception of predictable and unpredictable risks.									
17	SF-17: In Lagos, there are robust flood data collection procedures about different wards, urban areas, and informal settlements available to emergency leaders for making location-specific decisions during flood disasters.	-1.764	-3	-4	-3	-1	-3	-3	-4	0
10	SF-10: Communication and Information sharing is distributed across the different levels of government. NEMA and LASEMA jointly disseminate information and data to the public.	-1.792	-4	-3	-2	-2	-3	-4	-3	-3

Appendix 32: Factor Scores for Factor 2 (Raw Sorts) - Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2)

				Raw Sorts								
#	Statement	Z-score	Sort Values	F8	F6	F11	F1	F14	F5	F10	F20	F7
19	SF-19: Each agency operates clearly independently with little or no inter-agency collaboration in flood disaster early warning, response, and management. Inter- agency technology and data sharing is almost non-existent.	1.651	4	4	4	4	2	0	2	-2	-2	-2
18	SF-18: Online platforms of emergency agencies are only for informing the public not for engaging with the public.	1.575	3	3	3	2	3	-1	4	-2	-4	-3
16	SF-16: There are poor standards of hydro-meteorological data management leading to unreliable data format which renders the data almost useless for leadership decision-making during floods disaster.	1.13	3	3	0	0	0	2	3	-3	0	-4
4	SF-4: No political incentives to enforce laws that will forestall predicted flood risks in affected areas.	0.755	2	0	2	1	1	3	2	-3	-3	0
3	SF-3: There is scarcity of up-to-date data on the rising sea levels in Nigeria.	0.741	2	2	2	2	0	4	-3	-2	-1	1
6	SF-6: Flood emergency preparedness agencies hardly take flood predictions and warnings made by Nigerian Hydrological Agency and NiMet seriously because disaster response is more lucrative than preparedness and mitigation.	0.717	2	2	0	3	4	2	-1	-1	1	0
22	SF-22: Weather data collation stations in the state and across the country are either non-functional or not sufficient. This impacts data-driven decision for flood disaster preparedness, resilience, and response.	0.695	1	0	2	0	1	2	1	-4	-2	-1
2	SF-2: Poorly regulated nature of town planning, impact assessments, limited data, and information on how much land use contribute to people building on floodplains, reducing the surface areas for water to travel without constructing drainage systems.	0.676	1	2	0	1	-1	0	0	-1	-1	-3

13	SF-13: Flood modelling, early warning system etc. require well-trained expertise which are not sufficiently available.	0.628	1	1	1	3	-2	1	3	0	-2	-1
5	SF-5: Meteorological, satellite hydrological and other associated data are not easily accessible to researchers and environmental NGOs without going through burdensome government bureaucracies thereby restricting complimentary data-driven analytics and decision making.	0.519	0	1	1	0	0	1	2	0	-3	0
12	SF-12: Citizens and local institutions (media and researcher) trust independent actors - local and foreign for information than government actors during flood disasters. They rely more on foreign databases (e.g. EM-DAT) and sources for data than on government sources.	0.356	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	-1	0	0
15	SF-15: Data inconsistency is attributed to poor hydrological data management systems and lack of standards, resulting in unreliable, fabricated and data format inconsistency.	0.293	0	0	1	0	3	3	0	0	0	0
8	SF-8: Pre-disaster information are insufficient, NEMA show more PR information of meetings and international conferences attended by principal officials, events, and pictures of palliative distribution during flood disasters rather than useful early warning and mitigation information.	0.171	0	0	0	1	-1	0	1	0	-1	-1
14	SF-14: Social media users and content creators (images, memes) mock those in Lagos, especially the Lekki area because it is believed that a lot of Nigeria's rich elite reside there.	0.108	0	0	-2	2	1	0	0	1	0	-2
9	SF-9: LASEMA and LASEPA demonstrated more active social media engagements with the public than national agencies and other state agencies.	-0.653	-1	-1	-1	-1	-3	0	-2	3	2	-2
17	SF-17: In Lagos, there are robust flood data collection procedures about different wards, urban areas, and informal settlements available to emergency leaders for making location-specific decisions during flood disasters.	-0.738	-1	-2	3	-2	0	-1	-1	2	2	2

21	SF-21: Flood disasters are seasonal and predictable to a certain degree, hence, the differential in preparedness and response when compared with other disasters. Digital technologies do not affect human perception of predictable and unpredictable risks.	-0.787	-1	-1	-1	-2	-2	-3	0	0	3	1
10	SF-10: Communication and Information sharing is distributed across the different levels of government. NEMA and LASEMA jointly disseminate information and data to the public.	-0.996	-2	-1	-2	-3	-1	-2	-4	4	0	1
1	SF-1: Lagos State has the best flood preparedness plan in Nigeria combined with data from meteorological agencies, it has failed to effectively mitigate the perennial flood disasters and their impacts on the health of the people.	-1.157	-2	-3	-1	-4	2	-2	-2	2	1	2
11	SF-11: There are popular independent websites for correcting fake news, misinformation and for actively engaging citizens during flood disasters.	-1.318	-2	-2	-3	-3	-2	-4	1	1	4	2
23	SF-23: Nigeria has series of satellites in space for weather and communication. National emergency and space agencies such as NEMA, NASRDA and RECTAS have worked together to issue helpful charter calls for geo-spatial imaging for disaster response and damage assessments.	-1.342	-3	-2	-3	-1	-4	-1	-2	1	3	4
20	SF-20: GIS and Remote sensing are usually deployed to identify floodplain encroachment, assess flood vulnerability, and to ensure strict adherence to, and enforcement of flood management policies.	-1.493	-3	-3	-4	-2	0	-3	-1	3	2	3
7	SF-7: Lagos State is effective in flood management and provision of resources to those affected by flood disasters. There are big data used in making these effective leadership decisions.	-1.53	-4	-4	-2	-1	-3	-2	-3	2	1	3

Appendix 33: Factor Scores for Factor 3 (Raw Sorts) - Lagos Floods Study (Q-Study 2)

				Raw Sorts		
#	Statement	Z-score	Sort Values	F2	F9	F19
5	SF-5: Meteorological, satellite hydrological and other associated data are not easily accessible to researchers and environmental NGOs without going through burdensome government bureaucracies thereby restricting complimentary data-driven analytics and decision making.	1.568	4	4	0	3
4	SF-4: No political incentives to enforce laws that will forestall predicted flood risks in affected areas.	1.2	3	1	4	2
8	SF-8: Pre-disaster information are insufficient, NEMA show more PR information of meetings and international conferences attended by principal officials, events, and pictures of palliative distribution during flood disasters rather than useful early warning and mitigation information.	1.159	3	3	2	0
16	SF-16: There are poor standards of hydro-meteorological data management leading to unreliable data format which renders the data almost useless for leadership decision-making during floods disaster.	1.044	2	1	3	2
13	SF-13: Flood modelling, early warning system etc. require well-trained expertise which are not sufficiently available.	0.993	2	3	0	1
15	SF-15: Data inconsistency is attributed to poor hydrological data management systems and lack of standards, resulting in unreliable, fabricated and data format inconsistency.	0.867	2	2	1	1
22	SF-22: Weather data collation stations in the state and across the country are either non-functional or not sufficient. This impacts data-driven decision for flood disaster preparedness, resilience, and response.	0.751	1	0	2	3
2	SF-2: Poorly regulated nature of town planning, impact assessments, limited data, and information on how much land use	0.721	1	2	1	0

	contribute to people building on floodplains, reducing the surface areas for water to travel without constructing drainage systems.					
14	SF-14: Social media users and content creators (images, memes) mock those in Lagos, especially the Lekki area because it is believed that a lot of Nigeria's rich elite reside there.	0.721	1	2	1	0
3	SF-3: There is a scarcity of up-to-date data on the rising sea levels in Nigeria.	0.186	0	-1	3	0
1	SF-1: Lagos State has the best flood preparedness plan in Nigeria combined with data from meteorological agencies, it has failed to effectively mitigate the perennial flood disasters and their impacts on the health of the people.	0.146	0	0	0	1
12	SF-12: Citizens and local institutions (media and researcher) trust independent actors - local and foreign for information than government actors during flood disasters. They rely more on foreign databases (e.g., EM-DAT) and sources for data than on government sources.	0.01	0	-1	0	2
20	SF-20: GIS and Remote sensing are usually deployed to identify floodplain encroachment, assess flood vulnerability, and to ensure strict adherence to, and enforcement of flood management policies.	-0.02	0	1	-1	-1
7	SF-7: Lagos State is effective in flood management and provision of resources to those affected by flood disasters. There are big data used in making these effective leadership decisions.	-0.303	0	0	-1	-1
23	SF-23: Nigeria has series of satellites in space for weather and communication. National emergency and space agencies such as NEMA, NASRDA and RECTAS have worked together to issue helpful charter calls for geo-spatial imaging for disaster response and damage assessments.	-0.313	-1	0	-2	0
19	SF-19: Each agency operates clearly independently with little or no inter-agency collaboration in flood disaster early warning, response, and management. Inter- agency technology and data sharing is almost non-existent.	-0.418	-1	-3	-1	4

18	SF-18: Online platforms of emergency agencies are only for informing the public not for engaging with the public.	-0.429	-1	-1	0	-1
21	SF-21: Flood disasters are seasonal and predictable to a certain degree, hence, the differential in preparedness and response when compared with other disasters. Digital technologies do not affect human perception of predictable and unpredictable risks.	-0.605	-2	0	-2	-2
6	SF-6: Flood emergency preparedness agencies hardly take flood predictions and warnings made by Nigerian Hydrological Agency and NiMet seriously because disaster response is more lucrative than preparedness and mitigation.	-0.837	-2	-2	2	-4
9	SF-9: LASEMA and LASEPA demonstrated more active social media engagements with the public than national agencies and other state agencies.	-1.326	-2	-2	-3	-2
10	SF-10: Communication and Information sharing is distributed across the different levels of government. NEMA and LASEMA jointly disseminate information and data to the public.	-1.482	-3	-2	-4	-2
11	SF-11: There are popular independent websites for correcting fake news, misinformation and for actively engaging citizens during flood disasters.	-1.598	-3	-3	-2	-3
17	SF-17: In Lagos, there are robust flood data collection procedures about different wards, urban areas, and informal settlements available to emergency leaders for making location-specific decisions during flood disasters.	-2.036	-4	-4	-3	-3

Appendix 34: Lagos Ebola Study Statements (Q-Sample/S-Study 1)

SE-1: Information was disseminated vertically (top-down) via traditional legacy media and social media.

SE-2: Federal, State and Local government health parastatals rarely cooperated in crisis communication online during the outbreak.

SE-3: Outdated news was recycled through different platforms using the same format.

SE-4: The government collaborated more with foreign NGOs and international institutions rather than local NGOs and CSOs.

SE-5: SMS helped reach more citizens than the other digital technology platforms.

SE-6: Rumours and misinformation about the virus were controlled through the near-instant provision of quality information.

SE-7: The local (Lagos State) Emergency Operation Center contributed to better coordination and rapid and effective response.

SE-8: There was shared, collaborative decision-making between different government agencies (Lagos state and Federal Government) with interconnected but independent leadership procedures demonstrated during the epidemic.

SE-9: Efforts of Contact tracers using digital forms and data inputting contributed immensely to rapid disaster response and effective leadership outcomes.

SE-10: FG approved jingles to be produced in various languages produced for Nigerian Centre for Disease Control to be aired on Radio, TV and newspaper superseded other digital tech outlets.

SE-11: Previous data response experience with Polio (e.g., HealthMap App) pre-trained/prepared responders for Ebola.

SE-12: An absence of baseline data, including commonly-used unique citizen identifiers and comprehensive and accessible geographic maps was a huge challenge during the outbreak response.

SE-13: The predominance of non-machine-readable (mostly paper-based) epidemiological data restricted critical response.

SE-14: Poor mobile and internet connectivity limited information flow during the outbreak response.

SE-15: A lack of interoperability between the numerous data systems used to manage data before and during the response also contributed to the unclear and asynchronous data picture.

SE-16: The effective security leadership demonstrated is attributable mainly to the Lagos government's early adoption of digital technologies.

SE-17: Lagos was well-resourced materially and infrastructural including digital technologies to handle the disease.

SE-18: Lagos has the highest number of active voice and internet subscribers in Nigeria thereby contributing to active social media engagements during the epidemic.

SE-19: The headquarters of major news media organisations (local and International) are in Lagos and they have a solid internet presence and reach.

SE-20: Nigeria's economic middle class are predominantly in Lagos and they have high digital literacy and high digital accessibility which eventually contribute to the successful stemming of the disease spread.

SE-21: Deployment of an active dedicated website with a live-chat messaging system (Post-outbreak) for educating the public helped control the spread of the virus.

SE-22: Social media engagements between the citizens and the government were not iterative.

SE-23: Although there were isolated information nodes in spaces dominated by individual actors, there were fewer connections across the digital conversation graphs.

SE-24: The incidence response and general leadership were not adaptive, rather pre-set, hence fitting for structured disasters like Ebola.

SE-25: In-house Big Data analytics and Machine Learning skills capabilities were lacking.

SE-26: The leading Apps were written in English including the website thereby cutting off the vast majority of the population who are illiterates from accessing real-time information on the disease.

SE-27: Lagos has a large population of online activists, digital hubs and social influencers thereby encouraging active participatory citizenship who are politically aware.

SE-28: The feedback loops of Nigeria's Integrated Disease Surveillance system permit local leadership among government actors across the different levels of government with non-rigid central coordination - this contributed to the containment of the disease.

SE-29: Non-governmental health providers, private organisations and academic institutions were not fully integrated into the digital tech system design (analysis, open data exchange and access).

SE-30: The Open Data Kit/Form Hub technology were used in combination with the Dashboard technology and ArcGIS mapping for follow up of contacts, identification of cases, case investigation and management and also for strategic planning during the response.

SE-31: Digital technologies and Big data did not have any significant impact on effective security-leadership decision-making during the Ebola outbreak.

SE-32: The electronic data collection and alert system reduced the turnaround time between identification of symptomatic contacts and evacuation to the isolation facility from between 3 to 6 hours to an hour.

SE-33: The deployment of mobile technology and improved and speed up daily reporting of contact follow up before 5 pm.

SE-34: There was a poor digital early warning system, most of the disaster response operations were paper-based before the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak.

SE-35: There were infrastructural data inadequacies and low manpower (epidemiological big data analysts) which threatened the success of the operation.

Appendix 35: Lagos Floods Study Statements (Q-Sample/Q-Study 2)

SF-1: Lagos State has the best flood preparedness plan in Nigeria combined with data from meteorological agencies, it has failed to effectively mitigate the perennial flood disasters and their impacts on the health of the people.

SF-2: Poorly regulated nature of town planning, impact assessments, limited data and information on how much land use contribute to people building on floodplains, reducing the surface areas for water to travel without constructing drainage systems.

SF-3: There was a scarcity of up-to-date data on the rising sea levels in Nigeria.

SF-4: No political incentives to enforce laws that will forestall predicted flood risks in affected areas.

SF-5: Meteorological, satellite hydrological and other associated data are not easily accessible to researchers and environmental NGOs without going through burdensome government bureaucracies thereby restricting complimentary data-driven analytics and decision making.

SF-6: Flood emergency preparedness agencies hardly take flood predictions and warnings made by Nigerian Hydrological Agency and NiMet seriously because disaster response is more lucrative than preparedness and mitigation.

SF-7: Lagos State is effective in flood management and provision of resources to those affected by flood disasters. There are big data used in making these effective leadership decisions.

SF-8: Pre-disaster information is insufficient, NEMA show more PR information of meetings and international conferences attended by principal officials, events and pictures of palliative distribution during flood disasters rather than useful early warning and mitigation information.

SF-9: LASEMA and LASEPA demonstrated more active social media engagements with the public than national agencies and other state agencies.

SF-10: Communication and Information sharing is distributed across the different levels of government. NEMA and LASEMA jointly disseminate information and data to the public.

SF-11: There are popular independent websites for correcting fake news, misinformation and for actively engaging citizens during flood disasters.

SF-12: Citizens and local institutions (media and researcher) trust independent actors - local and foreign for information than government actors during flood disasters. They rely more on foreign databases (e.g., EM-DAT) and sources for data than on government sources.

SF-13: Flood modelling, early warning system etc. require well-trained expertise which is not sufficiently available.

SF-14: Social media users and content creators (images, memes) mock those in Lagos, especially the Lekki area because it is believed that a lot of Nigeria's rich elite reside there.

SF-15: Data inconsistency is attributed to poor hydrological data management systems and lack of standards, resulting in unreliable, fabricated and data format inconsistency.

SF-16: There are poor standards of hydro-meteorological data management leading to an unreliable data format which renders the data almost useless for leadership decision-making during floods disaster.

SF-17: In Lagos, there are robust flood data collection procedures about different wards, urban areas and informal settlements available to emergency leaders for making location-specific decisions during flood disasters.

SF-18: Online platforms of emergency agencies are only for informing the public not for engaging with the public.

SF-19: Each agency operates independently with little or no inter-agency collaboration in flood disaster early warning, response and management. Inter-agency technology and data sharing are almost non-existent.

SF-20: GIS and Remote sensing are usually deployed to identify floodplain encroachment, assess flood vulnerability, and ensure strict adherence to, and enforcement of flood management policies.

SF-21: Flood disasters are seasonal and predictable to a certain degree, hence, the differential in preparedness and response when compared with other disasters. Digital technologies do not affect human perception of predictable and unpredictable risks.

SF-22: Weather data collation stations in the state and across the country are either non-functional or not sufficient. This impacts data driven-decision for flood disaster preparedness, resilience and response.

SF-23: Nigeria has series of satellites in space for weather and communication. National emergency and space agencies such as NEMA, NASRDA and RECTAS have worked together to issue helpful charter calls for geospatial imaging for disaster response and damage assessments.