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Critical Early Warning
Reframing the Study and Practice of Conflict Early Warning

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King's College London

**Critical Early Warning:
Reframing the Study and
Practice of Conflict Early
Warning**

Tadakazu Kanno

**A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in War Studies,
King's College London, September 2013**

Abstract

This thesis investigates conflict early warning and early response through the lens of Critical Theory. It argues that the field of conflict early warning has exclusively taken problem-solving approaches by focusing on developing early warning and response instruments such as the indicators for prediction and how to connect warnings with effective responses. On the other hand, it has been unaware of its own theoretical and epistemological foundations. As a result, the studies of conflict early warning have been conducted in a particular manner that works for the interests of liberal western states rather than for those at risk. The thesis argues that the emergence of conflict early warning and response was only possible in the post-Westphalian global order, where the equity of state sovereignty is no longer absolute but conditional, and interventions in internal affairs are justified by appealing for human security. In this global context, unlike the popular belief that conflict early warning is motivated by humanitarianism, conflict early warning emerged as a liberal technique of government that makes those to be governed visible, calculable, comparable and interventionable through data collection and analysis. In other words, conflict early warning systems have been used for the protection and expansion of the western community's security and economic interests. In addition, this particular theory/ideology has marginalized small scale collective violence and local capacity for early warning and response. The thesis regards community-based early warning and response systems as a more emancipatory form of practice in this particular historical moment because they see local actors as the active subject of conflict early warning and early response rather than the mere object of western rescue. Then, this research examines two cases from Kyrgyzstan and Sri Lanka, and identifies their limitations and prospects.

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London, September 2013

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introducing Critical Early Warning	1
Chapter 2: A Theoretical Framework of Critical Early Warning	23
Chapter 3: Deconstructing Conflict Early Warning and Early Response: Immanent Contradictions and the Problems of Traditional Studies	55
Chapter 4: Conflict Early Warning as a Liberal Technique of Government	91
Chapter 5: Emancipatory Early Warning Study and Practice	127
Chapter 6: Case Study 1: The Foundation for Tolerance International (Kyrgyzstan)	158
Chapter 7: Case Study 2: The Foundation for Co-Existence (Sri Lanka)	196
Chapter 8: Conclusion	236

Chapter 1

Introducing Critical Early Warning

‘We can decide to study in ways that replicate a world politics that does not work for countless millions of our fellow human beings; or we can decide to study in ways that seek to help lift the strains of life-determining insecurity from the bodies and minds of people in real villages and cities, regions and states. The stakes could not be higher.’¹

Ken Booth’s book *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* ends with this strong remark. This is in fact a decision that those who engage themselves in conflict early warning must make. While the conflict early warning field has witnessed much development in its variety of forecasting methodologies and preventive actions, it is commonly understood that early warning systems have been ineffective in invoking preventive actions and preventing violent conflicts.² What this research terms “traditional early warning” has exclusively been a tool for the western community to help strangers elsewhere in the world. The central concern for most of scholars has been based on instrumental reason. Their studies have focused on two major issues: (1) how one can predict when and where violent conflict will take place; and (2) how early warnings can persuade western policy makers, who are often reluctant to consume precious resources for the hypothetical violent conflicts, to take effective early response measures, that is, how to overcome so-called warning-response gap.³ The aim of this traditional mainstream approach, or early warning and early response studies, is to improve the effectiveness of conflict early warning and early response by learning lessons from cases and fixing utility functions.

¹ Booth, K. (2005b) ‘Beyond *Critical Security Studies*.’ In Booth, K. (ed.) *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Ch.11. P.276.

² David Nyheim argues that ‘today it cannot be said that, however, that the international community is in a position to prevent another Rwandan genocide. Conflict early warning faces challenges similar to those it faced 15 years ago.’ See Nyheim, D. (2009) *Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse: The Future of Conflict Early Warning and Response*. OECD. P.13.

³ Meyer, C. O., Otto, F., Brante, J. & et al. (2010) ‘Recasting the Warning-Response Gap: Persuasion and Preventive Policy.’ *International Studies Review*. Vol.12, No.4, pp.556-578.

In spite of the fact that conflict early warning and early response is based on the norm of emancipation and humanitarianism, this thesis argues that its actual development was contradictory in terms that it has marginalized particular themes and group of people from their debates. More specifically, the mainstream understanding of conflict early warning and early response has been framed by western policymakers and academics for their own purposes. This thesis further claims that the most significant issue existing in the field of conflict early warning is not the deficiency of effective early warning instruments that the mainstream studies have attempted to develop, but the unawareness of its overall theoretical framework and epistemological foundation that led to the particular form of the understanding of early warning and early response, and the exclusion of particular groups of people and issues from the political and academic agendas. Therefore, this thesis does not intend to take part in the traditional warning-response-gap debate or develop more effective early warning models. Rather, it initiates a radical rupture with this tradition and focuses on critically reflecting on the study and practice of the traditional early warning field.

For this purpose, this research adopts Critical Theory, which, according to Robert Cox, is ‘clearly aware of the perspective which gives rise to theorizing and its relation to other perspectives, and to open up the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective from which the problematic becomes one of creating an alternative world.’⁴ In Fierke’s words, Critical Theory ‘makes us look again, in a fresh way, at that which we assume about the world because it has become overly familiar.’⁵ It is also guided by the conception of *emancipation*, which can be a guideline to suggest a new direction. In reality, by drawing on Critical Theory, ‘thinking anew’⁶ has already been attempted by some scholars in the security studies⁷ and peacebuilding field⁸ and has suggested alternatives to the problematic traditional approaches. Now, in turn, this

⁴ Cox, R. (1981) ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.’ *Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 126-155. p.128.

⁵ Fierke, K. M. (1998) *Changing Games, Changing Strategies: Critical Investigations in Security*. Manchester: Manchester University Press. P.13

⁶ This term was used by Bellamy, A. J. & Williams, P. (2004) ‘Introduction: Thinking Anew about Peace Operations.’ *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.11, No.1, Spring, pp.1-15.

⁷ Currently there exists Aberystwyth, Copenhagen and Paris schools within critical security studies. See Peoples, C. & Vaughan-Williams, N. (2010) *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction*. Oxon: Routledge.

⁸ See Bellamy, A. J. & Williams, P. (2004) op. cit., Pugh, M. (2004) Pugh, M. (2004) ‘Peacekeeping and Critical Theory.’ *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 39-58., and Zanotti, L. (2011) *Governing the Disorder: UN Peace Operations, International Security, and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

thesis argues that a new approach informed by Critical Theory – *critical early warning* - is required in the conflict early warning field. In addition, the field must be directed towards *emancipatory early warning*.

In particular, the thesis problematizes the fact that the studies of early warning and early response have not paid substantial attention to the capacity of those in conflict zones as warners and responders. In general, *early warning* is defined as ‘a broader process of collecting, analysing and communicating information about situations of escalating risks to promote preventive and/or mitigating actions,’⁹ and then, *early response* is defined as any conflict management initiative that is taken in the latent stages of a perceived potential violent conflict.¹⁰ Conflict early warning and early response is, therefore, a mechanism or a tool which can be used by anyone who needs it, and the definitions do not articulate that the system must be used by western policy makers.¹¹ Nonetheless, I will argue that the scope of the traditional early warning study has been very narrow in the sense that they have developed within a particular perspective and pre-given issues, and in this context the perspective of those who live in conflict zones and need conflict early warnings the most has been neglected.

The thesis argues that the reasons for the narrowness and the exclusion of particular people and issues is that the field of conflict early warning has not been self-reflective, and those who engage themselves in conflict early warning have been unaware that the current form of study and practice and the issues they are dealing with have been constructed in a particular manner. In particular, conflict early warning scholars have been generally unaware of the theories by which their research are guided such as political theories and social science approaches – and, more fundamentally their epistemological foundations. As a result, when one comes to the field of conflict early warning, there already is a common understanding of what is to be studied. Accordingly, they automatically follow the pre-given research themes unconsciously or without enough reflection. Although most of the studies in conflict early warning are based on some kind of criticism and reflection, they are done so at most within

⁹ Woocher, L. (2008) ‘The Effects of Cognitive Biases on Early Warning.’ This paper was presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, on March 19th, 2008. p.3.

¹⁰ Austin, A. (2004) ‘Early Warning and the Field: a Cargo Cult Science?’ *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Available: <http://www.berghof-handbook.net/> p.2.

¹¹ The term “conflict early warning” in this thesis encompasses early response mechanisms too.

what Robert Cox calls ‘problem-solving theory,’ which is ‘a guide to help solve the problems posed within the terms of the particular perspective which was the point of departure.’¹² The particular perspective (framework/theory) which has guided the orthodoxy has not been a subject of study. By regarding the traditional early warning field as dominantly being guided by problem-solving theory, this thesis reveals some significant defects and limitations of the traditional early warning field. Cox argues that ‘problem-solving theory takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action.’¹³ As a result, it serves ‘particular national, sectional, or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order.’¹⁴

This point is significant considering Cox’s famous remark that ‘theory is always for someone and some purpose.’¹⁵ Ken Booth supports Cox’s proposition by stating that ‘all investigations of social phenomena are guided by some theory or other, whether we recognize it or not.’¹⁶ Moreover, he argues that ‘theories help us to make sense of complex and seemingly random social interactions. They tell us what to look for, what types of actors are important, and what counts as valid or valuable knowledge about particular phenomena. Theories inform the methods we use and the causal connections we draw, our values and our politics.’¹⁷ As a result, when one conducts a social research, s/he tends to overlook and ignore some things and people. Therefore, this thesis claims that what the conflict early warning field needs most at the stage when there exists many problem-solving theories is not to develop reliable early warning indicators and develop problem-solving theories to overcome the warning-response gap, but to examine the theoretical perspective and its epistemological foundation that the traditional approaches have been based on. In particular, traditional early warning studies have not examined what theory has guided conflict early warning and early response in relation with world politics.

¹² Cox, R. (1981) op. cit. p. 129.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid. p.128.

¹⁶ Booth, K. (2007) *Theory of World Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp.182-208
Cited in Bellamy, A. J. & Williams, P. (2010) *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Cambridge: Polity. p.20.

¹⁷ Ibid.

This thesis argues that the modality of the traditional early warning and early response systems is a liberal technique of government. The major characteristics of the traditional early warning such as data collection, statistics, reporting and warnings to higher levels of decision-makers are all significant aspects of liberal global governance, which is a mechanism to make the illiberal and irresponsible states more legible and transparent to the international community. It further argues that it is the post-Cold War global order that enabled the traditional form of conflict early warning systems to emerge. The international sphere that used to be based on the Westphalian order began to be transformed into a Post-Westphalian global order, where the equity of state sovereignty is no longer valid, and emphasis is given to the security of individuals. It is only in this context that intrusive nature of conflict early warning and early response can be justified by referring to human insecurity. This thesis further claims that conflict early warning could be used to justify humanitarian wars in particular after the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. This means that traditional early warning acts in contradiction to its own principle: the prevention of wars.

Moreover, the thesis attempts to reframe the study and practice of conflict early warning on the basis of the belief that the conflict early warning field can be constructed in a different way, and that it does not have to be what it is now. It further insists that by questioning the fundamental framework, or theory, the traditional form of the study and practice of conflict early warning and early response can be drastically changed by becoming a force to lead the field to alternative directions. In this change-oriented research, the very firm tie of theory and practice is assumed. Unlike the traditional and dominant understanding of the nexus between theory and practice, which assumes the complete separation of theory from practice due to its epistemological separation of facts and values, Critical Theory argues that they are connected and that they must be “a two-way dialectical process”¹⁸.

It has always been the early warning academic researchers who have conceptualized and defined conflict early warning, and developed early warning models and discussed the warning-response gap. It is they who have constructed the particular form of conflict early warning and early response. Although the early warning academic researchers believed that their research was objective and neutral, this

¹⁸ How, A. (2003) *Critical Theory*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p.21.

instrumental and unreflexive tendency resulted in dominating the field, legitimating the status quo of early warning studies, and contributing to the interest of a particular group while marginalizing others. Conversely, it is also true that the dominant approach – what is to be studied - also has come from political concerns in the sense that most of the academic research on early warning and early response followed political decision makings and was initiated and donated by some governmental bodies. The origin of the popularity of conflict early warning can be traced back to Boutros Ghali's "*an Agenda for Peace*"¹⁹.

For this reason, this research considers that it is a logical attempt to focus on deconstructing conflict early warning studies, and it also assumes that it can change the practice of conflict early warning and early response by so doing. Based on the Critical Theorist understanding of the nexus between theory and practice, Richard Wyn-Jones, who developed a theory of Critical Security Studies informed by the Frankfurt School Critical Theorists, argues that critical intellectuals and their critical theories play a significant role in helping to undermine the "natural," "commonsense," internalized nature of the status quo in security studies.²⁰ He claims that 'this in turn helps create political space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created.'²¹ Similarly, this understanding of the nexus between theory and practice can be understood as the relationship between critical intellectuals' agency and structure, in which agency has a potential to change structure. It would be possible to interpret that academic researcher's theorising is in fact practicing (doing things) because theory and practice are not separated. This thesis adopts this Wyn-Jones' view of the nexus between intellectuals' agency and structure. By criticizing the dominant discourse and suggesting alternative conceptions of the conflict early warning and early response, the thesis assumes that it is simultaneously playing a part in undermining the legitimacy of the traditional approaches and contributing to opening up a place for discussion to develop alternatives: in Critical Theorist term "emancipatory" - approaches.

¹⁹ Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992) *Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. Report of the Secretary-General, adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June. New York, United Nations.

²⁰ Wyn Jones, R. (1999) *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

²¹ Ibid.

1.1 Research Question

The main purpose of this research is to answer the following question:

How can Critical Theory reframe the study and practice of conflict early warning?

In order to answer the question, there are some sub-questions to be answered. The first question is *what are the immanent contradictions existing in the field of conflict early warning*. This is premised on the idea of immanent critique, which is a significant principle of Critical Theory. It is based on a dialectical idea which ‘regards each order or condition as the bearer of its own negation.’²² By so doing, one can reveal unfulfilled potential for emancipation in the contradictions. This is also related to the ethics of critique – unlike “mere criticism” that applies one’s own theory to particular cases, immanent critique ‘presupposes the criteria that are present in the situation, criteria by which the situation judges itself, and ask whether it meets its own *raison d’être*.’²³ In order to find out immanent contradictions within the field of conflict early warning, this research compares the concept of early warning and the modality of early warning studies. This is because of the belief that it is academics and researchers who have constructed the field in a particular manner.

Following the identification of contradictions, the thesis asks *why these contradictions have been constructed and how they have been sustained*. If one accepts the claim that we human beings are always guided by some theories whether consciously or unconsciously when we see and understand something, then we must pay attention to the guiding theories underlying these concepts. It can be argued that the concept of conflict early warning is closely related to international relations theory in the sense that ‘contending theories about world politics produce different conceptualization of what security is all about in world politics.’²⁴ On the other hand, the concept is also guided by particular social science theoretical perspectives in terms of how to understand human society and their behaviour. Therefore, the following third question needs to be answered: *what kinds of theoretical perspective in politics and social*

²² Ibid. p.77.

²³ How, A. op. cit.

²⁴ Booth, K. (2005) ‘Critical Explorations.’ In Booth, K. (ed.) *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Ch.1. p.13.

science underlie the concept of conflict early warning? By so doing, this research attempts to reveal *who and what is marginalized in the current debate*, and seeks to identify possibilities for change.

Based on the critique, or deconstruction, this thesis examines *what a new form of the concept of conflict early warning that is informed by Critical Theory would look like*. Critical Theory is ‘not solely concerned with developing critiques of past and present thought and action. It is also fundamentally concerned with proposing reconstructive agendas based on possibilities immanent within the current global order.’²⁵ In particular, Critical Theorists insist that *emancipation* is their key concept. In his research on critical security studies, Booth argues that it is significant to rethink security from the ‘bottom-up’, and from ‘the perspective of those people(s) without power: those who have been traditionally silenced by prevailing structures.’²⁶ Similarly, in reframing the concept of conflict early warning, the concept of emancipation plays the role of a guiding principle. It has to be understood here that the thesis does not mean to suggest the “best” conflict early warning system, but rather suggests an orientation towards emancipatory early warning. Since conflict is always changing its form and different communities perceive conflict in quite different manners, it is not desirable to suggest a one-size-fit-all early warning mechanism. Nonetheless, this thesis picks up one particular conflict early warning mechanism and its case studies as an example of emancipatory early warning. However, it does not mean that it is the best mechanism and system of conflict early warning. Rather, it should be understood as one of various other possibilities.

As a potential form of emancipatory early warning, this research introduces community-based early warning and early response systems. The minimum criteria to be considered a community-based system are: (1) it has a systematic data collection, analysis and warning mechanism; (2) it is located in actual conflict zones; and (3) it is conducted by local civil society actors. An obvious reason why it can be seen as an emancipatory form of early warning is that it has been marginalized from the mainstream early warning studies. In other words, it might be able to fill the unfulfilled potential that exists within the immanent contradictions.

²⁵ Bellamy, A. J. & Williams, P. (2004) op. cit. pp.6-7.

²⁶ Booth, K. (2005) op. cit. pp.13-14.

As a case study of the community-based systems, this thesis examines the community-based system of the Foundation for Co-Existence (FCE, Sri Lanka) and the Foundation for Tolerance International (FTI, Kyrgyzstan) with the awareness that both are highly context-specific and should not be generalized. Although CBEWER systems have seldom been taken up in academic and political agendas, there are/were a couple of early warning and early response systems that local civil society actors utilize(d) in order to protect their lives, and their properties, by preventing violent conflicts.²⁷ They were born from the needs on the ground. Most notably, in 2003, FCE, a local Sri Lankan NGO, began to use an early warning and early response mechanism in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. Although the mobile phone networks established by the Community Development Centre (CDC) in Northern Ireland in 1997 can be seen as a prototype, the early warning and early response mechanism developed by the FCE was probably the first and most comprehensive one. Now it is possible to see some movements to establish localized early warning and early response systems in some fragile societies such as FTI in Kyrgyzstan, Belun in East Timor, Burundi IT Election Warning Project and Ushahidi in Liberia. These systems are also referred to as ‘third generation’²⁸ or ‘people-centred’²⁹ early warning and early response.

However, there is a significant question about community-based early warning and early response systems. Is it truly justifiable to call it “emancipatory” early warning without knowing if community-based early warning systems can truly prevent collective violence and save people’s lives? It is justifiable, if it is judged only from a deontological point of view in terms that it pays considerable attention to some marginalized groups and that they themselves are empowered and encouraged to do early warning and early response. However, if it is judged from a consequentialist point of view - in terms of the competency of preventing and saving people, could it

²⁷ Barrs argues, ‘ninety-nine percent of what we read about conflict early warning refers to regional or international mechanism.’ See Barrs, C. (2006) “Conflict Early Warning: Warning Who?” *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, February. Available: <http://jha.ac/articles/a184.pdf>

²⁸ Nyheim, D. (2009) op. cit. and Rupesinghe, K. (ed.) (2009) *Third Generation Early Warning*. Colombo: The Foundation For Co-Existence.

²⁹ Coyle, D. & Meier, P. (2009) *New Technologies in Emergencies and Conflicts: The Role of Information and Social Networks*. Washington, D. C. and London, UK: UN Foundation – Vodafone Foundation.

still be called “emancipatory”? This is a crucial point to consider because the telos of conflict early warning and early response is to protect people’s security from violent conflict by detecting its symptoms, sharing information and acting on it in a preventive and emancipatory manner.

Accordingly, it has to be examined *what are the limitations and prospects of community-based early warning and early response systems?* The assessment of the limitations and prospects of community-based early warning system should not be judged only by whether it prevented conflict or not. This is because in some cases the failure of prevention can be attributed to individual errors and competences such as an incorrect analysis, wrong selection of responders or inappropriate way of dealing with conflict parties. These are not specific issues to community-based systems. The specific issues of community-based systems in effectiveness are considered to be brought from the security and power issues of civil society actors. In addition, the context in which community-based early warning and early response systems were implemented could also influence their impact.

The research regards the most significant point in assessing the prospects of a community-based system as whether their early warning systems manage to mobilize people for preventive actions without exposing participants to life-threatening danger when responses are needed. For that purpose, the research assumes that participants need to establish an extensive network of conflict early warning and early response that is made up of people who are willing to contribute to preventing violent confrontations and trained to take preventive actions. Through this network, information that is needed for early warning will be collected and at the same time this network can be used for the dissemination of warnings and interventions as stakeholders. If they have established a network in which many actors can communicate with each other smoothly and are mobilized for preventing violence when the situation is pressing, it is possible to claim that this community-based system has a high possibility to prevent violent conflict. Furthermore, if these preventive actions are followed by stability, the research regards the community-based system as effective.

Table.1 Research Questions

How can Critical Theory reframe the study and practice of conflict early warning?

Q1: What are the immanent contradictions existing in the field of early warning and early response?

Q2: Why have these contradictions been constructed and sustained? What kinds of theoretical perspective in politics and social science underlie traditional conflict early warning? Who and what is marginalized in the current debates?

Q3: What would a new form of the concept of conflict early warning that is informed by Critical Theory look like?

Q4: What are the limitations and prospects of community-based early warning systems?

1.2 Criticism against Traditional Early Warning

The research on conflict early warning has focused on the development of accurate forecasting tools and how to overcome the warning-response gap. The mainstream research therefore has shared the idea that early warnings that come from conflict zones are vertically sent up to western policy makers, and responses come from them. On the other hand, a handful of people began to problematize the Eurocentric approach of conflict early warning. In fact, these critics highly influenced and motivated this research “critical early warning”. However, it has been revealed through a critical examination based on Critical Theory that even these critics failed to look into the assumptions and theories that have guided the traditional conflict early warning and early response studies and practices, which in fact brought about the particular understanding of the traditional early warning. Most importantly, even after 20 years have passed since Boutros Ghali’s “an agenda for peace”, there is no research that can be sufficiently termed “critical early warning”. There has been no attempt to achieve a paradigm shift in the field of conflict early warning by deconstructing and reconstructing its problematic theoretical perspectives, and epistemological and ontological assumptions. In addition, under the Eurocentric understanding of conflict early warning and early response, there is little literature which critically and systematically examines the limitations and prospects of community-based early warning and early response systems. The following space is used to discuss the state-of-the-art critiques against the traditional early warning

approaches by introducing three significant critics: Kumar Rupesinghe, Casey Barr and Patrick Meier.³⁰ Though the history of the development of conflict early warning tools, systems and studies will be discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, it will be useful to take an overview of the field of conflict early warning and early response through the lens of critics. However, this is done to argue that their criticism is not critical enough to capture the real issues of the traditional early warning field.

Kumar Rupesinghe was the first to categorise early warning and early response systems into three generations and criticised the approach of the first and second generation systems.³¹ His categorization of three generations of conflict early warning and early response systems, and identification of the Eurocentric nature of first and second generation early warning and early response systems was the first attempt to change the dominant discourse of traditional early warning (first and second generations). According to him, the first generation early warning systems were ‘the systems where the entire early warning mechanism (including conflict monitoring) was based outside the conflict region (namely, in the West).’³² The second generation, according to him, amended this approach ‘by basing the monitoring mechanism in the conflict zones, namely by having the field monitors to gather primary event data.’³³ However, he identifies that ‘the analysis continued to be conducted outside the conflict region.’³⁴ The third generation early warning systems, on the other hand, are ‘entirely located in the conflict regions and integrate early warning and early response together as simultaneous processes.’³⁵ He criticises the first and second generation systems by pointing out that their weak connection of early warning and early response due to the geographical gap. He argues that “the centres that collected information and delivered early warning were based in the West whereas the actual conflict situations were experienced in Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe, East

³⁰ Rupesinghe, K. (2005) Rupesinghe, K. (2005) *A New Generation of Conflict Prevention: Early Warning, Early Action and Human Security*. Paper presented at the Global Conference on the “Role of Civil Society in the Prevention of Armed Conflict and Peacebuilding”, 19-21st July 2005.; Barrs, C. (2006) op. cit.; and Meier, P. (2007) ‘Disaster Preparedness: From Disaster to Conflict Early Warning – A People-Centred Approach.’ *Monday Developments*. Vol.25. No.4.

³¹ Rupesinghe, K. (2005) op. cit.

³² Ibid. p.2.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

Asia, South East Asia, and South Asia.”³⁶ Although warnings are delivered to Track 1 actors such as multilateral agencies and government officials, he holds that due to the cultural and geographical discrepancy the early warning agencies in the West had little influence over the institutions that could execute preventive diplomacy in actual conflict situations.³⁷

Casey Barrs’ paper *Conflict Early Warning: Warning Who?* is most critical of traditional early warning and response among the three. He himself articulates that his paper’s purpose is to challenge the traditional way of thinking about early warning.³⁸ He points out that traditional early warning has neglected the capacity of the endangered population by describing them as ‘egocentric’ in that they are designed ‘by outsiders to be used by outsiders.’³⁹ He quotes Howard Adelman as saying that ‘the quest for defining “early warning” is an exercise in understanding how what is happening over there comes to be known by us “over here.”’⁴⁰ Barrs holds that the fundamental orientation of the orthodoxy is that we⁴¹ are the ‘rescuers’ and therefore aid does not start till we arrive.⁴² He also points out the vertical nature of the orthodoxy.⁴³ For example, early warnings fly through cyberspace, high over the heads of victims, up to higher powers.⁴⁴ They are not shared ‘locally’ and ‘laterally’.⁴⁵ As a result, response to early warnings is top down – what he calls ‘rescue-from-above’.⁴⁶ He also mentions that the traditional early warning implies that civilians lack the authority, mandate and expertise to save their own lives. Conversely, he argues that the endangered populations are ‘the most motivated to respond to warnings’ and ‘best positioned in terms of local knowledge and tactical options to react to warnings immediately.’⁴⁷ Furthermore, according to him, the earliest relief resources

³⁶ Ibid. p.3.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Barrs, C. (2006) *Page numbers are not given in his paper. Available: <http://jha.ac/articles/a184.pdf>

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Barrs does not identify what exactly “we” mean. However, it can be read as “the west” or “the international community.”

⁴² Barrs, C. (2006) op. cit.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid

consistently come from the lending, remittance, solidarity and faith-based networks of the endangered population.⁴⁸

Patrick Meier argues that the early warning and early response field involving disaster and conflict is shifting to a people-centred approach.⁴⁹ He raises three tipping points that led to the shift: ideology, complexity and locality. He pointed out the change in the concept of security after end of Cold War, where human security took the centre stage. Under this circumstance, the centralized models of action and thinking did not match the complexities of contemporary disasters. Finally, he argues that the shift towards people-centred disaster management also reflected the belated recognition that local communities had consistently developed sophisticated strategies and complex institutions to manage the constant threat of security in their lives. He supports his argument by saying that ‘in fact, estimates suggest that no more than 10 percent of survival in emergencies is attributable to external sources of relief aid.’⁵⁰ However, Meier further argues that while the disaster management field has shifted towards a people-centred approach, the conflict management community has yet to embrace the new discourse and practice. He states that conflict early warning and early response remains ‘centralized’ and ‘hierarchical’ exercises.⁵¹ As Casey Barrs points out, Meier states that formal early warning systems still emphasize the division of labor between ‘warners’ and ‘responders’ in that they are still designed to trigger responses external to the immediate disaster environment.⁵²

While Rupesinghe, Barrs and Meier point out the fundamental issues of the traditional early warning and suggest different perspectives, their approaches do not suggest how the contradictions have been constructed and sustained in early warning studies. In other words, they are still based on the problem-solving mentality, and do not examine the political, methodological and epistemological stances that have guided the early warning and early response field. Furthermore, they do not suggest what theories should guide the field. In this context, it would be possible to claim that this thesis takes a deeper approach to examining conflict early warning and early response

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Meier, P. (2007) op.cit.

⁵⁰ Ibid. p.12.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid. p.13.

than they do, and thus suggests a new form of early warning and early response studies guided by an emancipatory theory (Critical Theory). This thesis argues that even in the conflict early warning and early response field, which is seemingly a pragmatic field, epistemology and theoretical perspectives play significant roles in shaping a particular form of understanding of conflict early warning and early response which has contributed to the interest of western states.

While these figures criticize the traditional early warning, they also suggest new approaches to conflict early warning and early response. Rupesinghe developed the above mentioned CBEWER system with the Foundation for Co-Existence (FCE, Sri Lanka) which is described as an early warning and early response system of citizens, by citizens and for citizens.⁵³ Compared to Barrs and Meier's *preparedness* approach, Rupesinghe's idea is more oriented to violence prevention. His significant contribution to the field is that he realised that an ideal and effective modality of early warning and early response mechanism which has been discussed and developed in the traditional early warning (in other words, within the scope of problem-solving theory) could be used at the community level. In fact, the FCE's system satisfied all the criteria which Nyheim pointed out as an effective early warning system which (a) is based "close to the ground" or has strong field-based networks of monitors; (b) use multiple sources of information and both quantitative/qualitative analytical methods; (c) capitalises on appropriate communication and information technology; (d) provides regular reports and updates on conflict dynamics to key national and international stakeholders; and (e) has a strong link to responders or response mechanisms.⁵⁴

Barrs and Meier's suggestion is more radical in the sense that they emphasises the significance of *fleeing* and *its beforehand preparedness* rather than prevention. For instance, Barrs suggests Locally-Led Advance Mobile Aid (LLAMA) to assist fleeing based on his thought that when conflict prevention fails, people must flee from the potential violence (he calls it "plan B").⁵⁵ He insists that 'when civilians are

⁵³ Kanno, T. (2009) 'An Overview of Conflict Early Warning and Its Three Generations.' In Rupesinghe, K. (ed.) *Third Generation Early Warning*. Colombo: The Foundation For Co-Existence. P.79.

⁵⁴ Nyheim, D. (2009) op. cit. p.99.

⁵⁵ Barrs, C. (2006) op. cit. The rest of the paragraph is the summary of his argument.

forewarned about potential attack or abuse, they can better prepare their own evasive protection and discreet relief.⁵⁶ Based on this, he holds that people need to be trained. One of the LLAMA's major purposes is to help form teams of locals who have been recruited, trained, equipped, and deployed back home to help them do these things since local people are often too overwhelmed to devise this level of tactical planning by themselves. Another purpose is to give a 'healthy fear' towards an approaching threat. Meier suggests that crowd-sourcing platforms such as Ushahidi could contribute to finding a way out by mapping violent incidents and human rights abuses and accordingly suggests that the vulnerable must be empowered to secure their lives.⁵⁷

However, general perceptions towards these "bottom-bottom" approaches in conflict early warning and early response might be sceptical. Commonly understood in the traditional field is, as Aall argues, that 'mediation is generally the province of individual states or international organizations that have the power – whether moral or material – to influence the parties, that can produce positive and negative inducements to promote settlement. NGOs, by and large, do not have this kind of power.'⁵⁸ This is even so in conflict early warning and early response: when people are facing life-threatening danger they have to take realistic measures to save their lives, under which not much space is left for civil society to persuade conflict parties not to resort to violence compared to state-like actors. In this context, a thorough examination of community-based systems such as FCE would give significant insights into the field. In general, the significance of civil society actors in peacebuilding is almost uncontroversial. The changes in approaches to peacebuilding from traditional conflict management, through conflict resolution to conflict transformation have opened space where civil society can play a crucial role.⁵⁹ Similarly, the literature on conflict early warning and early response has recognized civil society's advantages in early warning

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ See Patrick Meier blog on conflict early warning and early response. <http://earlywarning.wordpress.com/>

⁵⁸ Aall, P. (2001) 'What Do NGOs Bring to Peacebuilding?' In Crocker, C. A., Hampson, F. O. & Aall, P. (eds) *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. pp.373-374.

⁵⁹ Forster, R. & Mattner, M. (2006) *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Potential, Limitations and Critical Factors*. World Bank. P.8.

due to its proximity to and actual presence in conflict zones.⁶⁰ Yet, what is absent in the literature on civil society in conflict early warning and early response is how local civil society can prevent impending violence and how it can respond to early warnings. Early response has been seen as a purview of conflict management, where civil society is thought to play only a secondary role or none at all.⁶¹

Considering that most of the scholars, practitioners and policy-makers assume high profile violent conflicts such as fourth generation warfare⁶² and genocide when they discuss the role of civil society in conflict early warning and early response, it is too early and simplistic to conclude that civil society is powerless when violence is imminent from the existing literature on the role on civil society. At the community level, there are several types of direct violence from which those living in the community suffer, such as violence from rebel groups, government armed forces, civilians from different identity groups, terrorism and various kinds of human rights abuses.

Although there are some working papers published by the community-based practitioners themselves, they tend to avoid writing on critical weaknesses because their projects highly rely on donor funding. As a result, their arguments on the success stories, effectiveness and justification of community-based early warning and early response systems are based on unsystematic and subjective judgments. In addition, their studies are short-sighted focusing only on whether they prevented conflict or not

⁶⁰ Bakker holds that it is very important for domestic and international NGOs in conflict areas to be able to foresee trouble because they must be prepared and have to evacuate when violence is about to occur. Therefore, the sheer need to act in time in such situations makes the disincentives of the governmental actors to sound the alarm bell less relevant to NGOs. In this sense, he holds that NGOs have an extra advantage in addition to being the spot. See Bakker, E. (2002) 'Early Warning by NGOs in Conflict Areas.' In Arts, B., Noortmann, M. & Reinalda, B. (eds.) *Non-State Actors in International Relations*. Aldershot: Ashgate. Pp.263-277.

⁶¹ Marchetti, R. & Tocci, N. (2009) 'Conflict Society: Understanding the Role of Civil Society in Conflict.' *Global Change, Peace & Security*, Vol.21, No.2, 201-217. p. 210.

⁶² Donald Reed argues that the fourth generation warfare enables 'quantitatively and qualitatively inferior forces to win over superior forces of size or armament. It uses asymmetrical strategy and tactics, applied over long periods of time, to shift focus away from the destruction of an enemy's superior conventional military forces—which it cannot defeat—and instead toward defeat of the enemy political will to fight. It matches the political strength of one opponent against the political strength of the other.' According to Reed, it is Mao Tse Tung who applied fourth generation warfare first from 1925–1927, during the Chinese Revolution, and used successfully to eventually defeat the Nationalist armies of Chang Kai-shek and install a communist government in China. Within the fourth generation warfare, modern civil wars and internal-conflicts are included. See Reed, D. J. (2008) Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. 31: 684-722. P.688.

without looking at the long-term impact on the society as a whole. Furthermore, their research rarely takes the context into account in which early warning and early response projects were implemented. It is known that the impact of civil society activities is highly influenced by various contextual factors.⁶³ The research which examined community-based systems from these perspectives does not exist, and a thorough examination on its limitations and prospects has not been done.

1.3 Research Approach and Methodology

This research's overall approach is to look into the practices and studies of the traditional early warning field through the lens of Critical Theory. Critical Theory 'is not a general theory, but is instead a method of analysis.'⁶⁴ Since the detailed description of Critical Theory and the research approach and methods are given in Chapter 2, they are only briefly explained here.

This research is guided by an immanent critique which is composed of *deconstructing (deepening)* and *reconstructing (broadening)*. In critical security studies, *deepening* means 'uncovering and exploring the implications of the idea that attitudes and behavior in relation to security are derivative of underlying and contested theories about the nature of world politics' and 'the starting point for analysis must be deepening: every security agenda should be interrogated to discover the interests and assumptions that shaped it.'⁶⁵ This research aims at taking similar steps in the conflict early warning and early response field. Therefore, the research approaches are mostly literature-based because the primary role of the research is to deconstruct the mainstream concept and way of studies in the field of early warning.

Broadening is the second step which comes after deepening. It means again in critical security studies that 'expanding the agenda of security studies beyond that of the

⁶³ Marchetti, R. & Tocci, N. (2011) 'Conflict Society and Human Rights: An Analytical Framework.' In Marchetti, R. & Tocci, N. (eds.) *Civil Society, Conflicts and the Politicization of Human Rights*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. Ch.3.

⁶⁴ Antonio, R. J. (1981) 'Immanent Critique as the Core of Critical Theory: Its Origins and Developments in Hegel, Marx and Contemporary Thought.' *The British Journal of Sociology*. Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 330-345. p.332.

⁶⁵ Booth, K. (2005) op. cit. p.15.

hitherto militarized and statist orthodoxy.’⁶⁶ If this is applied to early warning, it means to avoid the legacy of the traditional early warning and rethink conflict early warning and early response, which is to suggest a new form of conflict early warning and early response based on: (1) an ontology embracing a more extensive set of referents for early warning and early response than the orthodox early warning and early response; (2) an epistemology that is always willing to engage with the real in world politics but that reject naturalist approaches to knowledge that assume we can scientifically access social world in the same way as we do the natural world; (3) an orientation toward praxis that is explicitly emancipatory (culturally-sensitive and pragmatic but also universalistic).⁶⁷

This research examines community-based early warning systems as case studies of the practice of emancipatory early warning. Two cases were selected from community-based early warning systems developed in Sri Lanka (FCE) and Kyrgyzstan (the Foundation for Tolerance International, FTI). This research does not intended to generalize the pattern or a law-like causation from a case study as they were used under very different circumstances. They were selected because they have operated long enough to be empirically examined. The case studies are used to examine the limitations and prospects of community-based early warning systems. The detailed research framework of case studies are developed in Chapter 5 by reflecting on the contradictions identified through a critical examination of the traditional early warning systems.

The case studies highly relied on the documents that are publicly available and were provided by the FCE and FTI. As I worked for the FCE for two years from 2007 to 2009, it has to be acknowledged that I have more knowledge on the FCE’s early warning and early response though I was not directly involved in the early warning project at FCE. In order to narrow the deficit of data and understanding of the early warning and early response projects between FCE and FTI, I visited the head office of FTI in Bishkek, and their Osh and Jalal-Abad branch offices in August, 2012. The field research included semi-structured interviews, and self-completion questionnaire composed of both open-ended and closed questions. Due to the researcher’s lack of

⁶⁶ Ibid. p.14.

⁶⁷ This referred to Booth’s approach. See Booth, K. (2005) op.cit. p.14.

knowledge in local languages, translators were used when needed. What needs to be taken into account is that the margin of error can be bigger in simultaneous translation however skillful the translators are, which makes interviews difficult. Therefore, the research mainly relies on well prepared questionnaires which are already translated before he conducts questionnaire surveys. Therefore, the questions in the questionnaires are designed to be answered and understood easily and to reduce the margin of error.

There is another reason for the case studies' dependence on these documents, which is that it was hard to contact those who were actually involved in conflict early warning and early response. A major issue of this is the fact that both FCE and FTI's early warning and early response projects had already ended. FCE not only ended its early warning project but also was forced to close the entire organization as a peacebuilding NGO due to a financial issue after one of their main donors, the Norwegian Embassy, decided to stop funding.⁶⁸ FTI's project "early warning for violence prevention" operated from 2005 to 2009. They still exist, play a crucial role in conflict prevention in the region, and began a new early warning project in 2012. But, almost none of those who were involved in conflict early warning and early response project were still at FTI when the field research was conducted. While the researcher managed to meet some former FTI officers and some outsider participants to the project, the information gained was limited. The closures of both early warning and early response projects in 2009 caused difficulties in contacting those who were actually involved in conflict early warning and early response.

1.4 Outline of the Thesis

The structure of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, the thesis has two purposes. First, it discusses the characteristics of Critical Theory in comparison with Horkheimer's traditional theory and Cox's problem-solving theory. In particular, it focuses on the concept of emancipation, a method of immanent critique and

⁶⁸ A case was opened against the Norwegian ambassador over the nonfulfilment of the agreed contract. Available: <http://www.dailymirror.lk/news/29516-sl-court-gives-green-light-to-sue-norwegian-ambassador.html> (Accessed on 24/08/2013)

theoretical reflexivity. Secondly, the chapter develops a research framework for a critical inquiry into traditional early warning, which is informed by a method of immanent critique. The following chapters are guided by the research framework developed here.

The next chapter, Chapter 3, tries to investigate the first and second sub-research questions, which are: (1) what are the immanent contradictions existing between the traditional concept of conflict early warning and early response and the practice of early warning and early response?; and (2) Why have these contradictions been constructed and sustained? What kinds of theoretical perspective in politics and social science underlie the concept of conflict early warning? Who and what is marginalized in the current debates?

This chapter is the first step of the immanent critique of the traditional early warning. In other words, it is the deepening/deconstructing part of the thesis. It aims to reveal the immanent problems that exist in the field of conflict early warning studies. This chapter first summarises the concept of conflict early warning and that is compared with what has actually developed in practice and studies. It also examines the roles of academics in shaping a particular understanding of conflict early warning and early response. Moreover, it investigates their guiding theories and epistemology and problematizes these foundations. It argues that traditional early warning studies have been predicated on objectivist epistemology, positivist theoretical perspective in social research and problem-solving mentality. It also discusses what and who is marginalized in these particular theoretical perspectives. Then, it is argued that traditional early warning studies have marginalized the capacity of those at risk and local issues from their agendas. It is further claimed that this is because traditional early warning has been Eurocentric and based on an oppressive dichotomous relationship between the West and the others, which is similar to Orientalism.

Chapter 4 is also concerned with the second sub-research question. But, it is more interested in what kind of theoretical perspective in world politics underlies the concept of conflict early warning. Therefore, it places and investigates conflict early warning in the current global context – liberal peacebuilding - and then analyses what role conflict early warning and early response plays in this particular historical

moment. The research draws on Foucault's governmentality in order to understand the true nature of conflict early warning and early response. Then, it argues that conflict early warning and early response is a liberal technique of government, in which the thesis claims conflict early warning has become egoistic and Eurocentric. In addition, it argues that the traditional form of conflict early warning and early response emerged in the particular historical moment of the shift from Westphalian order to a post-Westphalian order.

Then, Chapter 5 is a reconstructive/broadening chapter, which suggests a new orientation towards a more emancipatory form of conflict early warning on the basis of the immanent critique conducted in the second and third chapters. Therefore, this is the chapter that answers the third sub-research question (What would a new form of the concept of conflict early warning that is informed by Critical Theory look like?) More specifically, this chapter attempts to develop conflict early warning mechanisms based on more sophisticated epistemology than the traditional one, a wider ontological view, and the concept of emancipation. Although there are various alternative approaches, the chapter suggests a community-based early warning and early response mechanism can be a practice of emancipatory early warning.

Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are case studies of community-based early warning and early response systems and here this thesis enters into the realm of a problem-solving. Chapter 6 deals with the case of FTI, Kyrgyzstan. This is a community-based system which was used to prevent street protests, ethnic tension and other issues from escalating into violence under a failing corrupt state. Chapter 7 examines the early warning and early response of FCE. This system was used under the circumstance of impunity and the context in which a 25 year-war had devastated the country. The case studies are focused on the limitations and prospects of FTI's and FCE's systems in order to investigate if community-based systems are more emancipatory.

In the Conclusion, the thesis summarizes the findings of the critical inquiry into the traditional early warning by answering the research questions. It also discusses how critical early warning should be applied to future research by referring to the ever-changing nature of society.

Chapter 2

A Theoretical Framework of Critical Early Warning

The second chapter of the thesis has two main purposes. The first aim is to specify the epistemological and theoretical orientation of a critical inquiry into conflict early warning. For this purpose, this chapter introduces some relevant principles of Critical Theory such as *a theory of emancipation* and a method of *immanent critique*. Critical Theory is supposed to help shed light on the marginalized people and things within the current debate of conflict early warning and on other possible ways of thinking by problematizing the traditional concept of conflict early warning. Since one of the thesis's main arguments is that the traditional early warning field is based on a particular and problematic theoretical foundation – problem-solving theory (we can also use the terms traditional theory and positivism interchangeably), it is crucial to clarify the differences between the two different theories and their epistemological positions. The second aim of this chapter is to develop a concrete research framework for critical early warning. For that purpose, this chapter discusses how the Frankfurt School Critical Theorists criticize the problematic and suggest new approaches. In particular, this thesis adopts the method that is used to criticise the orthodox security studies by Critical Security Studies (CSS) advocates, most notably by Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones.

The structure of the following part of the chapter is as follows. First of all, it provides the reader with an introduction to Critical Theory as an approach in the social science. Then, the chapter discusses the most fundamental idea of Critical Theory – emancipation, which is the guiding principle for any Critical Theorist. Following the explanation of the concept of emancipation, the chapter discusses how Critical Theorists actually contribute to emancipation. Therefore “immanent critique”, the method that Critical Theorists use to reveal the contradictions which exist in the human society, is introduced. It is followed by an introduction to Critical Theorists’

view of “theory” since it gives significant insights into this thesis. The concept of Critical Theory is discussed along with Mark Neufeld’s account on theoretical reflexivity, Max Horkheimer’s ‘traditional theory and Critical Theory’ and Robert Cox’s ‘problem-solving theory and Critical Theory’. Here, the Critical Theory’s epistemological foundation - constructionism - is also discussed in comparison with objectivist epistemology. Finally, this chapter establishes a research framework for critical early warning, which is informed by a method of immanent critique and the insights of theoretical reflexivity.

2.1 Introducing Critical Theory

Critical Theory is critical in the sense that ‘it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about’⁶⁹ rather than taking it for granted. In Fierke’s words, ‘it makes us look again, in a fresh way, at that which we assume about the world because it has become overly familiar.’⁷⁰ Critical Theory seeks to overcome particularly the domination of the positivist view of the world, to find out the contradictions within the human society by basing itself on a different epistemological foundation and to claim that our knowledge is historically and culturally specific and linked with the interests of a particular group. In addition to this critical aspect of Critical Theory, it is also regarded as a theory for change. Especially, Critical Theory guides us to a more emancipatory politics and society. Therefore, Critical Theory has been adapted by those who seek ‘possibilities for theorizing in a manner that challenges the injustices and inequalities built into the prevailing world order.’⁷¹

The term ‘critical theory’ is in fact ambiguous because it does not form either a unity nor mean the same thing to all its adherents.⁷² Kincheloe and McLaren point out three reasons for this: (a) there are many critical theories not just one; (b) the critical tradition is always changing and evolving; and (c) critical theory attempts to avoid too

⁶⁹ Cox, R. (1981) op. cit. p.129.

⁷⁰ Fierke, K. M. (1998) op. cit. p.13.

⁷¹ Devetak, R. (2009) ‘Critical Theory.’ In Burchill, S. , Linklater, A. & Devetak, R. et al (eds) *Theories of International Relations*. 4th Edition. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. p.165.

⁷² Held, D. (1980) *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas*. Berkley: University of California Press. P.14.

much specificity since there is room for disagreement among critical theorists.⁷³ For example, in their book “Critical Security Studies: An Introduction,” Peoples and Vaughan-Williams introduce several critical approaches such as Critical Theory, feminism, postcolonial perspective, poststructuralism and securitization theory as examples of critical security studies.⁷⁴ However, we can also find some common points among these critical theories. For example, they all offer a ‘critique of positivism, interrogating taken-for-granted assumptions about the ways in which people write and read science’ and ‘reject presuppositionless representation, arguing explicitly that such representation is both politically undesirable and philosophically impossible.’⁷⁵ It can also be described as “antifoundationalism”, in which ‘claims about what is true in human society cannot be finally decided against any ultimately objective or perfectly neutral standard.’⁷⁶

Among these critical theories, this thesis uses the term “Critical Theory (upper case)” rather than critical theory (lower case). The former denotes a Marxist tradition of theorizing and is associated with the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. The latter embrace a wider range of approaches from feminism to Foucauldian. While Critical Theory has a particular (emancipatory) purpose, critical theory is more heterogeneous in its concerns and goals.⁷⁷ Moreover, Critical Theory’s criticism is traditionally described as “critique”, and what makes Critical Theory unique is its need to ground or justify its “critique” of the status quo.⁷⁸ Critique is not a mere criticism. Drawing on Marx, Alan How argues that

‘mere criticism involves imposing norms onto facts, as it were, from the outside. The (mere) critic objects to particular things for his or her own reasons, and criticises them on this basis. This approach privileges the critic’s position but doesn’t justify it. It involves a kind of dogmatism in that it assumes the critic’s position is valid prior to applying it, and exempts the

⁷³ Kincheloe, J. L. & McLaren, P. (2002) ‘Rethinking Critical Theory and Qualitative Research.’ In Zou, Y. & Trueba, E. T. (eds.) *Ethnography and Schools: Qualitative Approach and the Study of Education*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Ch.5. p. 89.

⁷⁴ Peoples, C. & Vaughan-Williams, N. (2010) op. cit.

⁷⁵ Agger, B. (1991) ‘Critical Theory, Poststructuralism, Postmodernism: Their Sociological Relevance.’ *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol.17, pp. 105-131. p.106.

⁷⁶ Booth, K. (2005) op. cit. p. 10.

⁷⁷ Peoples, C. & Vaughan-Williams, N. (2010) op. cit. p.18.

⁷⁸ How, A. (2003) op. cit.

position from having to meet its own critical criteria. In making its own position invisible (mere) criticism is self defeating as it is prone to infinite regression. Once (mere) critic's views can be criticised by another (mere) critic's views, and so on, ad infinitum, without one view ever being found more valid than any other.⁷⁹

On the other hand, critique is immanent or dwelling, and presupposes the criteria that present in the situation; criteria by which the situation judges itself, and asks whether it meets its own *raison d'être*. On this account critique seeks to pull reality towards what is ought to be, what is immanent to it, and what it would become. Even Habermas, who made a clear shift away from his predecessors, was concerned about how to ground or justify critique.

This thesis greatly draws on Robert Cox's Gramsci-influenced Critical Theory and the Frankfurt school's Critical Theory, most notably Horkheimer, Adorno and Habermas.⁸⁰ The reason why this thesis adopts this particular Critical Theory for its research is that it embraces a normative theory towards emancipation which greatly differs from the other critical theories, in particular postmodernism that rejects any kind of norms as foundationalism. Considering the current form of the study and practice of conflict early warning, it is thought that the idea of emancipation can be a guiding principle for a future form. Those influenced by Gramsci tend to be more concerned about issues relating to the subfield of international political economy. On the other hand, those influenced by the Frankfurt school have involved themselves with questions concerning international society and security.⁸¹ However, since there are a number of common characteristics in Cox's 'problem-solving theory and Critical Theory' and Horkheimer's 'traditional theory and Critical Theory'⁸², they are used interchangeably in this thesis.⁸³

⁷⁹ How, A. (2003) op. cit. p.4.

⁸⁰ Frankfurt School critical theory is not a unified body of thought. See Wyn Jones, R. (1999). op. cit.

⁸¹ Hobden, S. & Wyn Jones, R. (2005) 'Marxist Theories of International Relations.' In Baylis, J. & Smith, S. (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. 3rd Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.10. p.239.

⁸² Horkheimer, M. (1972) *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*. Translated by O'Connell, M. J. and others. New York: Herder and Herder.

⁸³ They are also referred to as microtheory and macrotheory by Roland Paris. See Paris, R. (2000) 'Broadening the Study of Peace Operations.' *International Studies Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 27-44. In addition, Paulo Freire's banking education and problem-posing education have also have many points

2.2 Critical Theory as an Emancipation Theory

In spite of significant differences in their thoughts between Critical Theorists, it is the orientation towards *emancipation* which still unites them as the members of a school. Stephen Eric Bronner precisely defines the Frankfurt Critical Theory as “a cluster of themes inspired by an emancipatory intent.”⁸⁴ Horkheimer himself declared that the telos of Critical Theory is “to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them.”⁸⁵ It is also known as a theory for change. All Critical Theorists from Horkheimer to Habermas take seriously Marx's injunction that “philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.”⁸⁶ In particular, they have concentrated their studies on ‘how theory can be used to inform an emancipatory project.’⁸⁷ Ken Booth defines emancipation as follows.

‘Emancipation is the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view to freeing people, as individuals and collectivities, from contingent and structural oppressions. It is a discourse of human self-creation and the politics of trying to bring it about. Security and community are guiding principles, and at this stage of history the growth of a universal human rights culture is central to emancipatory politics. The concept of emancipation shapes strategies and tactics of resistance, offers a theory of progress for society, and gives a politics of hope for common humanity.’⁸⁸

Booth further argues that the concept of emancipation can play a significant role in three ways: (1) a philosophical anchorage, (2) a strategic process and (3) a guide for

in common respectively. See Freire, P. (1996) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Translated by Ramos, M. B. London: Penguin Books.

⁸⁴ Bronner, S. E. (1994) ‘Of Critical Theory and Its Theorists.’ Oxford: Blackwell. P.3. Cited in Wyn Jones, R. (2005) ‘On Emancipation: Necessity, Capacity, and Concrete Utopias.’ In Booth, K. (ed.) *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Ch. 9. p.216.

⁸⁵ Horkheimer, M. (1982) *Critical Theory*. New York: Seabury Press. p.244.

⁸⁶ Wyn Jones, R. (1999) op. cit. p.145.

⁸⁷ Steans, J. & Pettiford, L. (2001) *Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*. Longman. P.123.

⁸⁸ Booth, K. (ed.) (2005) *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 181.

tactical goal setting.⁸⁹ By the *philosophical anchorage*, he means that ‘emancipation can serve as a basis or test for saying whether something is true; in other words, whether particular claims to knowledge should be taken seriously.’⁹⁰ Further, he argues that ‘an anchorage is not a neutral foundation but rather a historically contingent yet powerful position from which people can begin to discuss what to do next in their political projects.’⁹¹

This point is to target postmodernist criticism of Critical Theory because they see the conception of emancipation as a form of foundationalism. In the view of a number of poststructuralist critics, according to Wyn Jones, emancipation has become indelibly tainted by association with the metanarratives of modernity, especially Marxism and liberalism.⁹² As such, it has become complicit in the suffering engendered by the practices and pathologies of modernism.⁹³ As a result, even for some putative radicals, emancipation has come to be seen as “part of the problem and not part of the solution.”⁹⁴ However, Wyn Jones argues that some concept of emancipation is a necessary element of any form of analysis that attempts to problematize and criticize the status quo.⁹⁵

By *strategic process*, Booth means that ‘emancipation should not be considered in terms of any timeless endpoint but as a dynamic process with changing targets. It is strategic in the sense that it is concerned with bringing about practical results, but it is a process in the sense that it is a project that can never be completed. Its practicality lies in its being based in immanent critique.’⁹⁶ This understanding of emancipation lies in a dialectical approach which ‘regards each order or condition as the bearer of its own negation.’⁹⁷ Wyn Jones states that the view that critical theory is an unfinished project—that it is work in progress—should not be regarded as surprising given Critical Theory’s conception of thought as being historically situated and reflecting

⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 182.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Wyn Jones, R. (2005) op. cit. p.216.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Wyn Jones says that “these were the words used to me by a senior IR scholar whose work is one of the foundations stones of the poststructuralist approaches to the field.” See Wyn Jones (2005) op. cit. p.216.

⁹⁵ Wyn Jones, R. (2005) op. cit. p.216.

⁹⁶ Booth, K. (ed.) (2005) op. cit. p. 182.

⁹⁷ Wyn Jones, R. (1999) op. cit. p.77.

particular constellations of interests.⁹⁸ It should be apparent that, logically, Critical Theorists must view their own work as perpetually unfinished.⁹⁹ As society changes over time—as interests and identities alter—so must theory if it is to retain any critical purchase and perspective.¹⁰⁰

As a guide for tactical goal setting, Booth argues that ‘as a result of engaging in immanent critique emancipatory ideas can develop that in turn can be translated into tactical action. Praxis is the coming together of one’s theoretical commitment to critique and political orientation to emancipation in projects of reconstruction.’¹⁰¹ Wyn Jones explains this feature by referring to the political nature of making choices:

*‘choices between different visions of the ends pursued and choices between different means of pursuing them. But, choices are seldom clear-cut. Means and ends may conflict, short-term goals may contradict longer-term objectives, and of course, actions often have unintended consequences. Thus part of the task of theory with emancipatory intent is to delineate and clarify the choices being faced in the practical realm and to examine and illuminate conflicts and contradictions between them.’*¹⁰²

It is also important to note here that Critical Theory is not guided by a blueprint of “the good life” which assumes an endpoint.¹⁰³ Rather, it attempts to enhance certain potentialities immanent in the current world.¹⁰⁴ Horkheimer described it as the “unfulfilled potential” that already exists within it.¹⁰⁵ If Critical Theorists succumb to the temptation of suggesting a blueprint for an emancipated order that is unrelated to the possibilities inherent in the present, they have no way of justifying their arguments epistemologically.¹⁰⁶ It is in fact immanent critique that makes Critical Theory’s “critical” legitimate because a significant issue in applying Critical Theory is whether

⁹⁸ Ibid. p.89.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Booth, K. (ed.) (2005) op. cit. p. 182.

¹⁰² Wyn Jones, R. (1999) op. cit. p. 76.

¹⁰³ Stannnes, E. (2005) ‘Critical Security Studies and the United Nations Preventive Deployment in Macedonia.’ In Bellamy, A. J. & Williams, P. (eds.) (2005) *Peace Operations and Global Order*. New York: Routledge. P. 163.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Wyn Jones, R. (1999) op. cit. p.24.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. p.77.

one can question how ethical judgements about the prevailing world order can be made if there is no objective truth outside history or society in the human world.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, Critical Theory resorts to immanent critique rather than problematizing the existing order in the view of some blueprint for an ideal society. In the next part, a core component of Critical Theory – immanent critique – is discussed further.

2.3 Immanent Critique

As already mentioned above, *immanent critique* plays a significant role in finding out possibilities for social change. Roberto Antonio says that immanent critique is ‘a means of detecting the social contradictions which offer the most determinate possibilities for emancipatory social change.’¹⁰⁸ Therefore, immanent critique is a means to achieve emancipatory transformation by finding out the contradictions existing in the current society. Antonio views immanent critique as the core of Critical Theory and claims that ‘critical theory is not a general theory, but is instead a method of analysis deriving from a nonpositivist epistemology.’¹⁰⁹ David Held summarized a method of immanent critique briefly.

‘starts with the conceptual principles and standards of an object, and unfolds their implications and consequences. Then it reexamines and reassesses the object (the object’s function, for instance) in light of these implications and consequences. Critique proceeds, so to speak, ‘from within’ and hopes to avoid, thereby, the charge that its concepts impose irrelevant criteria of evaluation on the object. As a result, a new understanding of the object is generated – a new comprehension of contradictions and possibilities. Thus, the original image of the object is transcended and the object itself is brought partly into flux.’¹¹⁰

Therefore, the first step of immanent critique is to compare ‘the existent, in its historical context’ with ‘the claim of its conceptual principles’ in order to criticize the

¹⁰⁷ Devetak, R. (2009) op. cit. p.166.

¹⁰⁸ Antonio, R. J. (1981) op. cit. p.332.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Held, D. (1990) op. cit. p.184.

relation between the two and thus transcend them.¹¹¹ For example, by drawing on Marx, Horkheimer illustrated that there exists a discrepancy between the bourgeois' concept and ideal of liberal capitalism and its reality.¹¹² He argues:

*'The bourgeois social order places the great universal ideals, "justice, equality, and freedom", at the centre of its political and moral philosophy. It claims to put universality into practice by creating the conditions for free and just exchange. The commodity or market system is held to create a dynamic equilibrium between demand and supply, utility and disutility, individual interests and scarce resources, etc.; it is held to be the most efficient and fairest mode of satisfying individual needs and wants.'*¹¹³

However, in practice these concepts of capitalism are negated.

*'Through the immanent critique of capitalism, there is a transformation of the concepts that thoroughly dominate the economy into their opposites: fair exchange into a deepening of social injustice; a free economy into the domination of monopolies; productive labour into the strengthening of relations which hinder production; the maintenance of society's life into the impoverishment [Verelendung] of the people's.'*¹¹⁴

It is significant to understand the fact that in applying immanent critique to find out social contradictions Critical Theorists accept the prevailing order as real in spite of the fact that they reject accepting the prevailing order as it is.¹¹⁵ Devetak states that one has to be careful about the relations between Critical Theory and the prevailing order.¹¹⁶ Referring to Marx, Devetak argues that Critical Theory accepts that 'humans do not make history under conditions of their own choosing,' and therefore he states

¹¹¹ Ibid. p.183.

¹¹² Ibid. pp.183-184.

¹¹³ Ibid. p.184.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Also, Cox argues that problem-solving theory sees the world as it finds it. On the other hand, Critical Theorists refuse to take the prevailing order as it is. This point is discussed at the next section Theoretical Reflexivity. See Cox, R. (1981) op. cit. p.129.

¹¹⁶ Devetak, R. (2009) op. cit. p.165.

that ‘a detailed examination of present conditions must necessarily be undertaken.’¹¹⁷ Notwithstanding this, he claims that ‘the order which has been “given” to us is by no means natural, necessary or historically invariable.’¹¹⁸ As Held’s account of a method of immanent critique illustrates above, Critical Theorists accept the existent ‘in its historical context’.¹¹⁹ As an example, Devetak illustrates that critical international theory takes the global order of power relations as its object and investigates how that order was brought about, what costs it generates, and what alternative approaches still exists immanently in history.¹²⁰

On the basis of the identified contradictions, Critical Theorists urge one to explain why the contradictions arose. Booth uses the method of *deepening*, by which he means ‘drilling down into theories and practice’ so as to identify what political and philosophical assumptions they might be based on.¹²¹ Bellamy and Williams also supports it by stating that ‘thinking anew (in the field of peace operations) requires an engagement with the dominant philosophical assumptions of the day relevant to the topic under consideration.’¹²²

As Held argues, immanent critique is not just a method to find out contradiction but also it aims at transcending the contradictions. It implies that there are two significant elements of immanent critique – *deconstructive* and *reconstruction* elements. And, for Booth, they mean *deepening* and *broadening* respectively.¹²³ Deepening is therefore crucial as a first step to be taken in the sense that it does not only contribute to providing a significant means to critically examine the traditional approach, but it also is a crucial part of transcending the problematic and reconstructing it on an alternative, more emancipation-oriented basis.

2.4 Theoretical Reflexivity

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Held, D. (1980) op. cit. p.183.

¹²⁰ Devetak, R. (2009) op. cit. p.165.

¹²¹ Booth, K. (2005) op. cit. p. 15.

¹²² Bellamy, A. & Williams, P. (2004) op. cit. p.2.

¹²³ Stamnes, E. (2005) op. cit. p. 164.

Although immanent critique was applied to many issues, one of the most significant contributions of Critical Theorists is that they applied immanent critique to the concept and function of *theory*, in that they compared the currently prevailing concept of theory with its actual role. Therefore, Critical Theory can be viewed as a product of an immanent critique of the dominant understanding of theory. If a particular discipline is dominated by a particular theory (either in social science methodology or in political theory), especially by an unreflexive theory, then *theoretical reflexivity*, which is defined as ‘theoretical reflection on the process of theorizing itself,’¹²⁴ gives useful insights into the deconstructing of the status quo. Neufeld points out three core elements of theoretical reflexivity: (1) self-consciousness about underlying premises, (2) the recognition of the inherently politico-normative dimension of paradigms and the normal science tradition they sustain and (3) the affirmation that reasoned judgments about the merits of contending paradigms are possible in the absence of a neutral observation language.¹²⁵ In the following part, each point raised by Neufeld is discussed along with Horkheimer’s view of *traditional theories and critical theory* and Robert Cox’s *problem-solving theory and critical theory*, whose main arguments are also theoretical reflexivity.

2.4.1. Self-consciousness about underlying premises

The first element of theoretical reflexivity – *self-consciousness about underlying premises* – is to pay attention and unfold ‘the too-often unstated presuppositions upon which theoretical edifices are erected.’¹²⁶ According to Cox, Critical Theory is ‘clearly aware of the perspective which gives rise to theorizing and its relation to other perspectives, and to open up the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective from which the problematic becomes one of creating an alternative world.’¹²⁷ In other words, it is ‘an appraisal of the very framework for action, or problematic, which problem-solving theory accept as its parameters.’¹²⁸ Accordingly, it does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted as immutable

¹²⁴ Neufeld, M. A. (1995) *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 40.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid. p. 41.

¹²⁷ Cox, R. (1981) op. cit. p. 128.

¹²⁸ Ibid. p. 129.

but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing.¹²⁹

Michael Crotty's four basic elements which he claims that any social research embraces - methods, methodology, theoretical perspective and epistemology – are very useful in understanding the premises of various theories (See Table.1). According to Crotty, *Methods* are 'the techniques or procedures used to gather and analyse data related to some research question or hypothesis.'¹³⁰ *Methodology* means 'the strategy, plan of action, process or design lying behind the choice and use of particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the desired outcome.'¹³¹ *Theoretical perspective* is 'the philosophical stance informing the methodology and thus providing a context for the process and grounding its logic and criteria.'¹³² *Epistemology* is 'the theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical perspective and thereby in the methodology.'¹³³

It is the relationship of the four elements that one must understand. Epistemology informs theoretical perspective, theoretical perspective informs methodology and finally methodology tells us about what methods we should take.¹³⁴ For example, objectivism is the epistemological view that 'things exist as meaningful entities independently of consciousness and experience, that they have truth and meaning residing in them as objects ('objective' truth and meaning), and that careful (scientific?) research can attain that objective truth and meaning.'¹³⁵ This is the epistemology underpinning the positivist stance. Research based on positivism might select to engage in survey research and employ the quantitative method of statistical analysis.¹³⁶ One can also start research with constructionist epistemology and critical inquiry as a theoretical perspective. As Critical Theorists point out, Crotty's four elements of social research illustrates that theoretical perspectives and our research methods have some presuppositions. According to Cox, this is the case not only in the

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Crotty, M. (1998) p.3. Crotty, M. (1998) *The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process*. London: SAGE Publications. P.3.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid. pp.2-8.

¹³⁵ Ibid. pp. 5-6.

¹³⁶ Ibid. p.6.

theories of social research but also any kind of theory – ‘theory is always for someone and some purpose.’¹³⁷

Table. 2 Michael Crotty’s Four Elements of Social Research¹³⁸

Epistemology	Theoretical Perspective	Methodology	Methods
Objectivism Constructionism Subjectivism (and their variants)	Positivism (and post-positivism) Interpretivism - Symbolic interactionism - Phenomenology - Hermeneutics Critical Inquiry Feminism Postmodernism <i>etc.</i>	Experimental research Survey research Ethnography Phenomenological research Grounded theory Heuristic inquiry Action research Discourse analysis Feminist standpoint research <i>etc.</i>	Sampling Measurement and scaling Questionnaire Observation - participant - non-participant Interview Focus group Case study Life story Narrative Visual ethnographic methods Statistical analysis Data reduction Theme identification Comparative analysis Cognitive mapping Interpretive methods Document analysis Content analysis Conversation analysis <i>etc.</i>
→	→	→	

In spite of the fact that there are various theories based on different epistemological assumptions, Horkheimer believed that most researchers are unaware of this. Horkheimer claims that

‘theory for most researchers is the sum total of propositions being so linked with each other that a few are basic and the rest derive from these. The smaller the number of primary principles in comparison with the derivations, the more perfect the theory. The real validity of the theory depends on the derived propositions being consonant with the actual facts. If experience and theory contradict each other, one of the two must be reexamined. Either the scientist

¹³⁷ Cox, R. (1981) op. cit. p.128.

¹³⁸ Crotty, M. (1998) op. cit. p.5.

*has failed to observe correctly or something is wrong with the principles of the theory.*¹³⁹

According to Horkheimer, this dominant understanding of what he calls traditional theory was developed in the natural sciences and applied to understand the social world.¹⁴⁰ In other words, he described the domination of the positivistic approaches in social science. Ben Agger supports this view by stating that the positivist theory of science has become a new mythology and ideology.¹⁴¹ In the field of international relations, Steve Smith argues that positivism is viewed ‘not merely as one explicit alternative among many but rather as the implicit “gold standard” against which all approaches are evaluated.’¹⁴²

The positivist approach to social science can be explained by referring to Anthony Giddens’ accounts on positivism. Giddens raises two main characteristics of positivism.¹⁴³ First, he claims ‘the uniqueness of experience as the basis of knowledge.’¹⁴⁴ In this respect, Mautner refers to Auguste Comte’s idea in saying that ‘inquiry must be true to the data of experience and that it should establish laws on the basis of these data’.¹⁴⁵ The laws are basically articulated by the nexus of cause and effect, which is possible because it assumes an immutable human world. These are the reasons why positivism is described as an empirical and scientific approach.

Second, positivism claims ‘the idea that judgements of value have no empirical content of a sort which renders them accessible to any tests of their “validity” in the light of experience. There is no kind of observation of the sensory environment which can have a direct bearing upon the content of value judgements or normative assertions.’¹⁴⁶ Therefore, ‘inquiry must not go beyond data of experience in a fruitless search for causes at a supposed deeper level.’¹⁴⁷ As a result, scientists are required to

¹³⁹ Horkheimer, M. (1972) p.188 Cited in Wyn Jones, R. (1999) op. cit. p.16.

¹⁴⁰ Wyn Jones, R. (1999) op. cit. p.17.

¹⁴¹ Agger, B. (1991) op. cit. p.109.

¹⁴² Smith, S. (1996) ‘Positivism and Beyond.’ In Smith, S., Booth, K. & Zalewski, M. (eds.) *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P.13.

¹⁴³ Giddens, A. (ed.) (1974) *Positivism and sociology*. London: Heinemann. Pp. 2-3.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. p.2.

¹⁴⁵ Mautner, T. ed. (2005) *The penguin dictionary of philosophy*. 2nd ed. London, Penguin Books. p.114.

¹⁴⁶ Giddens, A. (1974) op. cit. p.3.

¹⁴⁷ Mautner, T (2005) op. cit. p.114.

be aware of the separation between objective as empirically verifiable knowledge and subjective as unverifiable knowledge.

As Crotty's four elements of social research shows, the positivist, or empirical, theoretical perspective is based on objectivist epistemology, which presupposes that 'meaning, and therefore meaningful reality, exists as such apart from the operation of any consciousness.'¹⁴⁸ In this view, there exists 'a dichotomy between human beings and the world'¹⁴⁹ and 'a strict dividing line is drawn clearly between thought/subject and reality/object.'¹⁵⁰ Therefore, within this framework, traditional theorists believe that we (subject) are simply discovering a meaning that has been lying there (object) in wait for us all along.¹⁵¹ They assume that 'the genesis of particular objective facts, the practical application of the conceptual systems by which it grasps the facts, and the role of such systems in action, are all taken to be external to the theoretical thinking itself.'¹⁵²

The positivist and epistemologically objectivist nature of traditional theorists – particularly the separation of subject and object and of observer and observed – make them assume that 'the proper application of research design and techniques, the researcher(s) can be "factored out", leaving behind a description of the world "as it truly is"'.¹⁵³ It is 'the expression of the goal of rendering science a "process without a subject."'¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, they believe that they themselves can be removed even from the social world they inhabit and can be untainted by the dominant ideology and power.¹⁵⁵ As a result, traditional theorists imagine that

'they work in isolation from brute societal pressures and that their theorizing, despite possibly having socially useful applications, is propelled by the immanent logic of the research itself – a logic enforced by the research

¹⁴⁸ Crotty, M. (1998) op. cit. p.8.

¹⁴⁹ Freire, P. (1996) op. cit. p.56.

¹⁵⁰ Wyn Jones, R. (1999) op. cit. p.17.

¹⁵¹ Crotty, M. (1998) op. cit. p.8.

¹⁵² Horkheimer, M. (1972) op. cit. p. 208.

¹⁵³ Neufeld, M. A. (1995) op. cit. p. 41.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Bellamy, A. J. (2004) 'The 'Next Stage' in Peace Operation Theory?' *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.11, No. 1, pp. 17-38. p.30.

*materials themselves and the methodology employed, even if leavened, perhaps, by some insights or intuition on the part of the individual researcher.*¹⁵⁶

Robert Cox's problems-solving theory shares a number of characteristics in common with Horkheimer's traditional theory, or positivism. The purpose of problem solving theory is to establish instrumental practices to address pre-given issues.¹⁵⁷ It is named so because it is 'a guide to help solve the problems posed within the terms of the particular perspective which was the point of departure.'¹⁵⁸ It contributes to making relationships and institutions function smoothly by tackling specific sources of issues effectively and thus it is fragmented among a multiplicity of spheres or aspects of action.¹⁵⁹ As a result, many micro theories arise from problem-solving theory. In this sense, Cox argues that the strength of the problem-solving approach lies in its ability to fix limits or parameters on a problem area to reduce the statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination.¹⁶⁰ As problem-solving theory fulfils an important function by identifying lessons that ought to be learned, it can propose new strategies and offer practical advice to policy-makers.¹⁶¹

Cox argues that problem solving theory 'sees the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action.' This implies that problem-solving theory is given its foundation by objectivist epistemology. Accordingly, problem-solving theory regards the issues which arose in a particular field as pre-given.¹⁶² The assumption of fixity, or immutability, is therefore one of problem-solving theory's characteristics. As a result, Cox maintains that problem-solving theory is non-historical (ahistorical) since it posits a continuing present - the permanence of institutions and power relations.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁶ Wyn Jones, R. (1999) op. cit. p.18.

¹⁵⁷ Bellamy, A. (2004) op. cit. p. 19.

¹⁵⁸ Cox, R. (1981) p.128.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. p.129.

¹⁶⁰ Cox, R. (1981) op. cit. p.129.

¹⁶¹ Bellamy, A. (2004) op. cit. p.18.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Cox, R. (1981) op. cit. p.129.

2.4.2 Politico-Normative Dimension of Theory

The second point of theoretical reflexivity is on the negation of the positivist's claim of its value-freeness and on the negative result of its domination. The main point here is that theory is not politically neutral.¹⁶⁴ It is important to understand that a theoretically reflexive orientation stands in radical opposition to positivism in epistemology. While positivism is sustained by objectivist epistemology, Critical Theory stands on *constructionist epistemology*. The constructionist epistemology assumes that 'there is no objective truth waiting for us to discover it. Truth, or meaning, comes into existence in and out of our engagement with the realities in our world. There is no meaning without mind. Meaning is not discovered, but constructed.'¹⁶⁵ This is based on the assumption that 'world and human beings do not exist apart from each other, they exist in constant interaction.'¹⁶⁶ Simply put, it maintains that subject and object are not separable. Furthermore, the claim that 'theoretical explanations will be true to the extent that they accurately reflect empirical reality; to the extent that they correspond to the facts' is rejected by constructionism.¹⁶⁷

More precisely, the epistemology of Critical Theory, which has its origin in Hegel and Marx, is referred to as "social" constructionism. Although the term "constructionism", in particular "social constructionism", inherits much from the work of Karl Mannheim (1893-1947) and from Berger and Luckman's *The Social Construction of Reality* (1967), Hegel and Marx had already developed the idea a long time before they took it up.¹⁶⁸ Hegel and Marx claim that 'knowledge is always, and irreducibly,

¹⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 128.

¹⁶⁵ Crotty, M. (1998) op. cit. pp.8-9. He introduces three epistemological stances: objectivism, constructionism and subjectivism. By subjectivism, he means that meaning does not come out of an interplay between subject and object but is imposed on the object by the subject. Therefore, subjectivist epistemology assumes that the object as such makes no contribution to the generation of meaning. He holds that humans are not so much creative as making meaning out of nothing.

¹⁶⁶ Freire, P. (1996) op. cit. p.32.

¹⁶⁷ Neufeld, M. A. (1995) op. cit. p.41.

¹⁶⁸ Crotty, M. (1998) op. cit. p.60

conditioned by historical and material contexts.’¹⁶⁹ Mark Rupert describes it as “situated knowledge.”¹⁷⁰

Vivien Burr’s four pillars of social constructionism are very useful in understanding the epistemological assumptions that Critical theory is based on.¹⁷¹ First, ‘*a critical stance toward taken-for-granted knowledge*’: it urges people to be critical about the positivist thought that their observations of the world automatically produce its reality to them and that conventional knowledge is based on objective, impartial observation of the world. Social constructionism advises them to be ever sceptical of their conceptions about how the world seems to be. In other words, the categories with which human beings understand the world are not always genuine divisions.

Second, ‘*historical and cultural specificity*’: the way in which we commonly understand the world, the categories and concepts we use, are historically and culturally specific. They are also regarded as products of particular culture and history, and are dependent on the particular societal and economic orders which are dominant in that culture at that time.

Third, ‘*knowledge is sustained by social process*’: the knowledge of the world is constructed between people through the everyday interactions in the course of social life. The acts between people in their everyday lives are seen as the practices during which their common versions of knowledge are fabricated. Therefore, social constructionists have a great interest in all versions of social interaction, in particular language.

Fourth, ‘*knowledge and social action go together*’: negotiated knowledge can take various forms, and we can therefore represent a great number of possible social constructions. However, each different construction also draws a different sort of action from human beings. People’s constructions of the world are closely related to

¹⁶⁹ Devetak, R. (2009) op. cit. p.161.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Burr, V. (1999) pp.2-5 and Burr, V. (2003) pp.2-5. She claims that there is no one-fit-all description of social constructionism. What connects them all together is, according to her, like “family resemblance”. See Burr, V. (1995) *An introduction to social constructionism*. London, Routledge. P.2.

power relations because they imply what people can do, and how they may deal with others.

These constructionist epistemological assumptions have significant implications beyond the mere rejection of the objectivist epistemology.¹⁷² They imply that a defining condition of science – the separation of subject and object – ignores the active and crucial role played by the community of researchers in the production and justification of knowledge.¹⁷³ Further, it is claimed that this results in unawareness of the fact that the criteria by which reliable knowledge is decided are not independent from their acceptance and adoption by a research community.¹⁷⁴ Accordingly, it leads us to see that ‘the standards which determine what is to count as reliable knowledge are not nature’s, but rather always *human* standards – standards which are not give but made, not imposed by nature but adopted by convention by the members of a specific community.’¹⁷⁵ Here, we must acknowledge the politico-normative aspect of scholarly investigation.¹⁷⁶ Cox argues on theory:

‘Theory is always for someone and some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and place, specifically social and political time and space. The world is seen from a standpoint defineable in terms of nation or social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or of present crisis, of past experience, and of hopes and expectations for the future....There is no such things as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space. When any theory so represents itself, it is the more important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its concealed perspective.’¹⁷⁷

¹⁷²Crotty argues that social constructionism is realist and relativist at the same time. He claims that ‘to say that meaningful reality is socially constructed is not to say that it is not real’; rather, ‘constructionism in epistemology is perfectly compatible with a realism in ontology.’ He illustrates it by drawing an example from baseball. He argues: “‘balls” and “strikes” are certainly socially constructed. They exist as such because of the rules of the game. Yet they are real. Some people are paid \$3.5 million to produce them or prevent their production! They are constructions, and may change in their nature tomorrow if the powers-that-would-be decide to change the rules, but they are real, nonetheless.’ Crotty, M. (1998) op. cit. pp.63-64.

¹⁷³ Neufeld, M. A. (1995) op. cit. p.42.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. p.43.

¹⁷⁷ Cox, R. (1981) op. cit. p.128.

Critical Theory, therefore, takes the form of a critique of ideology that seeks to explain why social agents accept or consent to systems of collective representations that do not serve their objective interests but legitimate the existing power structure, and exposes the falsity of non-cognitive beliefs (such as value-judgements) that are presented as cognitive structures.¹⁷⁸ Critical Theorists argue that all knowledge-seeking privileges certain interests over others, and favours a certain political economic configuration to the detriment of alternatives.¹⁷⁹ As we thus find, virtually and authority – whether a scientist, scholar, supreme court judge, or religious leader – could be subjected to ideological critique, that is , critique aimed at revealing the interests, values, doctrines, or myths that underlie seemingly neutral claims to truth.¹⁸⁰ As ideological critique suggests, their words are not pictures of the world, rather their interests lead them to select certain accounts not others.¹⁸¹

Given the domination of positivism and its claims of neutrality and value-freeness, it is understandable that Critical Theory has come to play to those schools of thought that have challenged the positivist orthodoxy in Western social science.¹⁸² For Horkheimer, Critical Theory is an ideological critique of traditional theory and for Cox it is that of problem-solving theory. Cox insists that the problem-solving approach's belief in the clear distinction between value and fact, subject and object, neutrality and the assumption of fixity are ideological bias.¹⁸³ He further argues that 'it is methodologically value free insofar as it treats the variables it considers as objects (as the chemist treats molecules or the physicist forces and motion); but it is value bound by virtue of the fact that it implicitly accepts the prevailing order as its own framework.'¹⁸⁴ Therefore, problem-solving theory defines certain forms of action as relevant, identifies particular lines of causality, and renders certain practices legitimate at the expense of others.¹⁸⁵ Critical theorists argue that problem-solving theory serves 'particular national, sectional, or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order.'¹⁸⁶ As a result, they claim that problem-solving theory as a

¹⁷⁸ Macey, D. (2000) *Dictionary of Critical Theory*. London: Penguin Books. p.74-76

¹⁷⁹ Gergen, K. (1999) *An Invitation to Social Construction*. London: Sage Publications. P.22.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Booth, K. (2005) op. cit. p.10.

¹⁸³ Cox, R. (1981) op. cit. p.129.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. p.130.

¹⁸⁵ Bellamy, A. & Williams, P. (2004) op. cit. p.6.

¹⁸⁶ Cox, R. (1981) op. cit. p.129.

positivist approach ‘tend[s] to work in favor of stabilizing prevailing structures of world order and their accompanying inequalities of power and wealth.’¹⁸⁷

A good example of this is found in the field of international relations. Critical Theory problematizes currently dominant international theories – neo-realism and neo-liberalism – as “system maintaining theories.”¹⁸⁸ Mark Rupert succinctly summarizes the issue of these theories from the perspective of Marxism and Critical Theory:

‘both liberalism and realism (and their neo variants) are profoundly limited, and limiting, for each takes as its premise world of preconstituted social actors (whether self-interested individuals or security-seeking states) and is therefore unable to understand the social processes through which these kinds of actors have been historically constructed, and implicitly denies the possibilities for alternative possible worlds which may be latent within those those processes social self-production. In addition to the analytical blinders which this entails, the presuppositions of liberalism and realism are exposed as embodying political commitments which are profoundly conservative in effect. In order to recover the analytical and political possibilities denied by liberalism and realism, Marxism and critical theory have sought to illuminate processes of social self-production and the possibilities they may entail.’¹⁸⁹

They are both problem-solving theories in the sense that they deal with issues and problems that ‘could disrupt the status quo, namely, the issues of security, conflict, and cooperation.’¹⁹⁰ Therefore, they do not suggest any major reforms and thoroughgoing transformation of the international community.¹⁹¹ Rather, they seek to maintain the existing international system and its actors, values, and power

¹⁸⁷ Devetak, R. (2009) op. cit. p.164.

¹⁸⁸ Lamy, S. T. (2005) p.207. Neo-realism is traditionally concerned with security issues and their interests are in power and survival. On the other hand, neo-liberalism is concerned with political economy and their focus is on cooperation and institutions. Lamy, S. T. (2005) ‘Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism.’ In Baylis, J. & Smith, S. (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. 3rd Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.9.

¹⁸⁹ Rupert, M. (2010) ‘Marxism and Critical Theory.’ In Dunne, T., Kurki, M. & Smith, S. (eds.) *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.158.

¹⁹⁰ Lamy, S. T. (2005) op. cit. p. 207.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

relations.¹⁹² As a result, the inequalities of power and wealth in the current order are also maintained.

2.4.3 The Affirmation of the Possibility of Reasoned Judgments in the Absence of Objective Standards

The politico-normative feature of scholarship has a significant implication for social sciences in terms of the incommensurability thesis: ‘contending paradigms are not only incomparable but actually have “no common measure.”’¹⁹³ This problem of incommensurability does not arise in positivism because it claims that they can make a reasoned judgment by applying ‘neutral observation language.’¹⁹⁴ On the other hand, once we accept incommensurability, for positivist it means that we are caught up in what Popper termed the ‘Myth of the Framework.’ According to this, ‘we are prisoners caught in the framework of our theories; our expectations; our past experiences; our language.’ As a consequence we cannot communicate with or judge those working in terms of a different paradigm.¹⁹⁵ However, According to Neufeld, although Critical Theorists accept incommensurability of different paradigms (as discussed above) it does not mean that they reject that recognizing contending paradigms as incommensurable means reasoned assessments about the merits of contending paradigms are impossible.¹⁹⁶ Rather, the central point of his argument is that ‘judgements about contending paradigms are possible by means of reasoned assessments of the politico-normative content of the projects they serve, of the ways of life to which they correspond.’¹⁹⁷ This mechanism is briefly explained below.

Neufeld argues that both the positivist position and Popper’s radical relativism as the logical consequences of incommensurability are an expression of a common philosophical apprehension: the Cartesian Anxiety.¹⁹⁸ This is the notion ‘central to identitarian thinking from Rene Descartes to the present, that should we prove unsuccessful in our search for the Archimedean point of indubitable knowledge which

¹⁹² Ibid. p.208.

¹⁹³ Neufeld, M. A. (1995) op. cit. p.43.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid. pp. 43-44.

¹⁹⁵ Popper, K. (1970) p.56. Cited in Neufeld, M. A. (1995) op. cit. p.44.

¹⁹⁶ Neufeld. M. A. (1995) op. cit. p.44.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid. p.46.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. p.44.

can serve as the foundation for human reason, then rationality must give way to irrationality, and reliable knowledge to madness.’¹⁹⁹ He claims that the Cartesian Anxiety is tied to Aristotle’s concept of knowledge ‘*episteme*’, which means ‘apodictic knowledge of the order and nature of the Cosmos.’²⁰⁰ According to him, the fear of irrationality and chaos as a result of undermining of the validity of *episteme* arises from the limiting of the modern notion of knowledge and rationality to *episteme*.²⁰¹ Further, he argues that it is this limiting of reason to *episteme* that leads to the marginalization and impoverishment of normative discourse.²⁰² Due to the positivist emphasis on the centrality of a neutral observation language, he argues, the reasoned judgment of the inherent value of competing normative claims is foreclosed.²⁰³ The strong hold of positivism makes us incapable of seeing how reason does and can really function in the realm of normative discourse.²⁰⁴

In order to overcome the Cartesian Anxiety, Neufeld suggests a conception of reason ‘which is not limited to *episteme*, and which does not depend on a fixed Archimedean point outside of history or on the existence of a neutral observation language’²⁰⁵ and develops a form of reason ‘which is suited to a consideration of normative claims.’²⁰⁶ He states that such an attempt has been underway in contemporary social and political theory. He raised some examples, one of which is Jurgen Habermas’s theory of *communicative action* in which he developed the discursive validation of truth claims.²⁰⁷ By claiming normative discourse is a domain in which reason can and does function, Critical Theorists argue that ‘what makes paradigms incommensurable – the politico-normative content of the normal science they generate – also makes reasoned assessments of them possible.’²⁰⁸ Therefore, Neufeld affirms that reasoned judgments about the merits of contending paradigms are possible in the absence of a neutral

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid. p.45.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid..

²⁰⁶ Ibid. p.46.

²⁰⁷ Ibid. p.45.

²⁰⁸ Ibid. p.46.

observation language ‘once one extends the grounds of assessment to include the politico-normative dimensions of rival theoretical enterprises.’²⁰⁹

For example, Neufeld argues that in spite of the fact that Robert Cox recognizes the incommensurability of problem-solving theories and Critical Theory, he compares them by critically examining the politico-normative contents.²¹⁰ Neufeld points out that, in spite of the fact that Cox admits some strengths of problem-solving theory, he at the same time claims that problem-solving theory’s assumption of a fixed order

‘is not merely a convenience of method, but also an ideological bias. Problem-solving theories can be presented ... as serving particular national, sectional, or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order. Indeed, the purpose served by problem-solving theory is conservative, since it aims to solve the problems arising in various parts of a complex whole in order to smooth the functioning of the whole.’²¹¹

In comparison with the characteristics of problem-solving theory, Neufeld raised three significant aspects of Cox’s Critical Theory. First, Critical Theory understands that it is generated from a perspective.²¹² Second, ‘critical theory contains problem-solving theories within itself, but contains them in the form of identifiable ideologies, thereby pointing to their conservative consequences.’²¹³ Third, Critical Theory, which has the clarification of the ‘range of possible alternatives’ as a ‘principal objective,’ ‘allow[s] for a normative choice in favour of a social and political order different from the prevailing order.’²¹⁴ Neufeld, therefore, argues that while Cox admits the strengths of problem-solving theories, he judges that Critical Theory is superior to problem-solving theories on the basis of its emancipatory political-normative content.²¹⁵

²⁰⁹ Ibid. p.60.

²¹⁰ Ibid. p.59.

²¹¹ Cox, R. (1986) *Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory*. In Keohane, R. O. (ed.) *Neoliberalism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press. p.209. Cited in Neufeld, M. A. (1995) Ibid. p.59.

²¹² Neufeld, M. A. (1995) Ibid. p.59.

²¹³ Cox, R. (1986) op. cit. p.209. Cited in Neufeld, M. A. (1995) Ibid. p.59.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Neufeld, M. A. (1995) op. cit. p.60.

2.5 A Research Framework for Critical Early Warning:

So far this chapter has discussed the characteristics of Critical Theory such as the conception of emancipation, a methodology of immanent critique and theoretical reflexivity. In this section of the chapter, how Critical Theory can be used to reframe the study and practice of conflict early warning and early response is discussed. The research framework of this thesis is designed by applying a method of immanent critique, which is composed of two major parts: deconstruction (deepening) and reconstruction (broadening). The framework gained some crucial ideas from Eli Stamnes's research on Critical Security Studies, which is also based on the principles of immanent critique. She attempts to develop how the principles and precepts of Critical Security Studies that are highly meta-theoretical can be applied to the analysis of a particular UN operation in Macedonia as an alternative to traditional problem-solving research. This research adopted her overall research structure in which she firstly compares the concept of security and the actual practice of UN, then identifies the discrepancies between them and reconstructs by utilising the unfulfilled potential that currently exists.

In the introductory part of this research, four research questions were set. They are: (1) what are the immanent contradictions existing in the field of conflict early warning and early response?; (2) why have these contradictions been constructed and sustained? What kinds of theoretical perspective in politics and social science underlie the traditional conflict early warning? Who and what is marginalized in the current debates?; (3) what would a new form of the concept of conflict early warning informed by Critical Theory look like?; and, (4) are community-based early warning and early response systems really effective? The first two questions consist of the deconstruction part of the research. The latter two questions will be investigated in the reconstruction part.

This thesis's focus in the deconstruction part is on the contradictions that can be found between the concept of conflict early warning and what in fact has been developed in the studies and practice of conflict early warning. This research regards the studies of conflict early warning and early response as a practice of conflict early warning and early response. This is because it is the academics that have shaped particular forms

of conflict early warning tools and systems. If we accept the claim that we are always guided by some theories whether consciously or unconsciously when we see and understand something, and these theories have a politico-normative aspect, we must pay attention to the guiding theories underlying traditional early warning studies and practice. This research assumes that traditional early warning studies have been guided by a particular epistemology and theoretical perspective in terms of how to see human society and behaviour. In addition, it is also assumed that the current particular form of conflict early warning has been guided by a particular political theory in the sense that ‘contending theories about world politics produce different conceptualizations of what security is all about in world politics.’²¹⁶ Therefore, the following questions need to be answered: *what kind of theoretical perspective in social science and politics are guiding the studies and practice of traditional early warning?* More fundamentally, *what kind of epistemology are they based on?* By so doing, the thesis attempts to identify possibilities for change by revealing who and what has been silenced in these theories and therefore the current mainstream debates. Based on the findings in the deconstruction part, the research searches more emancipatory form of conflict early warning and early response. The research framework for critical early warning is designed as follows.²¹⁷

Step 1: Deconstructing Conflict Early Warning and Early Response

The first step of immanent critique is *deconstruction* (See Figure1). This tries to answer the first and second research questions: (1) what are the immanent contradictions existing in the field of conflict early warning and early response?; (2) why have these contradictions been constructed and sustained? What kinds of theoretical perspective in social science underlie the traditional conflict early warning? Who and what is marginalized in the current debates?

In order to find out immanent contradictions existing in the field of conflict early warning and early response, the deconstruction part of immanent critique requires one to compare the claim of the conceptual principles of conflict early warning with the

²¹⁶ Booth, K. (2005) op. cit. p.13.

²¹⁷ The thesis referred to Eli Stamnes’s research framework for a critical security studies. See Stamnes, E. (2005) op. cit. pp.163-166.

existing form of the traditional early warning studies in order to problematize the relation between the two (see figure.1). Therefore, in order to reveal the contradictions in the traditional early warning field, first the concept of conflict early warning in the field is summarised by referring to some influential texts on conflict early warning such as Ghali's an agenda for peace, the report by the Carnegie Commission and the report on the responsibility to protect (R2P) compiled by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).²¹⁸ Then, the research investigates what has actually been studied in the traditional early warning studies. For this purpose, this research looks into the academic articles published in academic journals, books, and research papers published by governmental organisations, think tanks and NGOs. Then, as the first row of Figure.1 shows, the concept and practice are compared and examined to find if there are contradictions between them.

Moreover, the thesis drills down into the particular theory that has guided traditional studies. This is based on the assumption that theories tell us about 'what to look for, what types of actors are important, and what counts as valid or valuable knowledge about particular phenomena' and that they guide us in 'the methods we use and the causal connections we draw, our values and our politics.'²¹⁹ Accordingly, what and who is marginalized in the theories that have guided the traditional early warning field are examined. Based on the analysis, the immanent critique of conflict early warning is supposed to reveal 'unfulfilled potential', or the possibilities for emancipatory change.

Step 2: Conflict Early Warning in the Global Politics

The second step is also a deconstructive part but this time its focus is on the theory of world politics that has guided the practice of conflict early warning and early response.

²¹⁸ Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992) *Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. Report of the Secretary-General, adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June. New York, United Nations.; Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997) *Preventing Deadly Conflict*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Corporation of New York.; and International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001) *The Responsibility to Protect*. Ottawa: The International Development Research Centre.

²¹⁹ Booth, K. (2007) pp.182-208 Cited in Bellamy, A. & Williams, P. (2010) op. cit. p.20.

This section comes under the second research question, in particular what kind of theory in world politics has underlain traditional conflict early warning? This section attempts to prove that the changes in the concept of security and peacebuilding in the West and the changes in the form of conflict early warning and early response have come together by looking at the historical development of conflict early warning and early response tools and systems. This section takes into account that conflict early warning and early response as a significant international agenda has emerged in a particular historical moment after the end of Cold War. In addition, it examines the role of the traditional conflict early warning and early response by locating it in the current global order.

Drawing on the literature by the critical school of peacebuilding, the research first examines the relationship between the liberal peace ideology, which critical thinkers claim has guided the post-Cold War peacebuilding, and the traditional conflict early warning and early response practice. In order to construe the role of conflict early warning and early response in the post-Cold War era, the research adopts the Foucaudian notion of global governmentality developed by Laura Zanotti since it explains the role of early warning most accurately. The research provides some empirical evidence by illustrating how different forms of early warning systems were developed at different historical moments by comparing the Cold War period, post-Cold War period and post- 9/11.

This section is also used to propose some possible danger of the traditional form of conflict early warning and early response if it is used under the liberal peacebuilding ideology by referring to some critics who accuse the US of invading Afghanistan and Iraq for their own interest by using the rhetoric of human security.

Step 3: *Reconstruction of Conflict Early Warning*

After the deconstruction of the traditional early warning studies and practice, a *reconstructive* part follows. This is a section that answers the third research question: what would a new form of the concept of conflict early warning that is informed by Critical Theory look like? Unlike the deconstructive process, there is no specific


method to reconstruct the concepts of conflict early warning. However, as the first arrow in Figure1 shows, a reconstructive process must be based on the identified unfulfilled potential for change. This section takes what and who has been marginalized into account. The reconstruction of conflict early warning does not mean to suggest a one-type-fit-all conflict early warning mechanism because there are many realities of conflict and in each case, those who need conflict early warning and its purposes are assumed to be greatly different.

Among these, the thesis focuses on developing a concept of community-based early warning and early response mechanism as one of the possible forms of emancipatory early warning. The minimum criteria to be called as a community-based system are as follows: (1) it has a systematic data collection, analysis and warning mechanism; (2) it is located in actual conflict zones; and (3) it is conducted by local civil society actors. The reason why this particular form of conflict early warning mechanism gains more attention than the others is that (a) traditional early warning studies have not paid attention to the prevention of low profile conflicts, particularly ethnic riots, which ‘are probably the most common form of collective violence’²²⁰ and ‘are a frequent forerunner of secessionist warfare, of terrorism, and of several major forms of political change, including coups, martial law, and suspension of democratic liberties’²²¹; (b) it has not fully understood or has underestimated the local capacity, especially that of local civil society in conflict prevention. Therefore, it is thought that a community-based mechanism has a potential to tackle both problems at the same time.

²²⁰ Richardson, R. P. (1970) *An Analysis of Recent Conflicts*. Arlington: Center for Naval Analyses. Pp. 43-44. Cited in Horowitz, D. L. (2001) *op. cit.* p.1.

²²¹ Horowitz, D. L. (2001) *op. cit.* p.12.

Figure 1 A Research Framework for Critical Early Warning²²²



²²² The thesis referred to the format of Eli Stamnes's figure on a critical security studies in developing this figure. See Stamnes, E. (2005) op. cit. p.165.

Step 4: Problem-solving

The final stage of this process is in fact a problem-solving approach. In this step, the research tries to answer the fourth research question by using case studies: are community-based early warning and early response systems really effective? One can hardly conclude that an early warning system that is not effective at all, which means it cannot prevent conflict and protect people, is emancipatory. Civil society actors have some limitations in practicing early warning and response, which is considered to be caused by their lack of coercive power and security issues. In addition, their projects are largely influenced by the context in which they are embedded. In order to examine the effectiveness of community-based early warning and early response systems, this research adopts a framework developed by Marchetti and Tocci because their framework is sufficiently concerned with the relationship between the context in which the civil society projects are implemented and its impact.²²³ For this purpose, FTI's early warning and early response project in Kyrgyzstan and FCE's project in Sri Lanka were chosen as case studies and the thesis examines their effectiveness and structure.

As already discussed above, Cox argues Critical Theory contains problem-solving approaches within it.²²⁴ Therefore, for achieving fully emancipatory early warning, problem-solving approaches are a crucial part of critical early warning. Only after what community-based systems can do under a given set of conditions is made clear, can one claim that it is an emancipatory form of conflict early warning and suggest that scholars and practitioners should pay more attention.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter served two purposes: first, to specify the theoretical and epistemological foundations of the thesis; second, to construct the research framework for the thesis. For the first purpose, this chapter has discussed some defining characteristics of Critical Theory such as its constructionist epistemology, the concept of emancipation,

²²³ Marchetti, R. & Tocci, N. op. cit. (2011)

²²⁴ Cox, R. (1986) op. cit. p.209. Cited in Neufeld, M. A. (1995) op. cit. p.59.

a method of immanent critique and the idea of theoretical reflexivity. Most importantly, the chapter articulated the problems of problem-solving theory (this term was used interchangeably with traditional theory and positivism) in comparison with Critical Theory. In particular, drawing on Neufeld, Cox and Horkheimer, the chapter problematized the positivist assumption of the separation of subject and object, its unreflexive nature, the recognition that researchers can conduct their research neutrally, the concept of immutability and its domination in social science. Nonetheless, it was claimed that problem-solving approaches used within a framework of Critical Theory is significant.

For the second purpose, this chapter discussed how Critical Theorists actually criticise the problematic and reconstruct it by introducing a method of immanent critique. Based on the method of immanent critique and the concept of theoretical reflexivity, this chapter constructed a four-step research framework, which is composed of: (1) to deconstruct the traditional conflict early warning studies, (2) to understand the role of conflict early warning in the current global context, (3) to reconstruct the concept of conflict early warning and suggest more emancipatory forms of conflict early warning and (4) to do a problem-solving of the suggested new forms of conflict early warning. Each step constitutes one chapter in the following part of the thesis. Therefore, in the next chapter, the thesis will engage in the deconstruction of mainstream conflict early warning studies as the first step of critical early warning.

Chapter 3

Deconstructing Conflict Early Warning and Early Response: Immanent Contradictions and the Problems of Traditional Studies

3.1 Introduction

It is academic researchers who have conceptualized and defined what conflict early warning and early response should be like. Even if the idea of conflict early warning and early response has been advocated by political figures or governmental organisations, it is early warning scholars who refined and fixed its concept, and defined the research themes. The study of early warning has been developed as the study of systematic forecasting models by scholars. Nyheim argues that “the evolution of the conflict early warning field has been driven by the advances made in quantitative and qualitative analytical tools.”²²⁵ In the initial stage, academics played significant roles in developing early warning methodologies which relied heavily on quantitative approaches.²²⁶ Nyheim argues that “as the capabilities and value of the tools grew, they were integrated into the different early warning systems operated by governments, inter-governmental organizations and NGOs.”²²⁷ In addition, many early warning studies are funded by inter-governmental or governmental organizations. Therefore, the study and practice of conflict early warning and early response is integrated and inseparable.

Although the attention and increasing popularity to early warning was led by the international community’s and scholars’ shift in their attention from the Cold War to

²²⁵ Nyheim, D. (2009) op. cit. p.14.

²²⁶ Leaning, J. & Meier, P. (2008) Unpublished paper. Humanity United Conference Call. Shared Learning Group on Early Warning.

²²⁷ Nyheim, D. (2009) op. cit. p.14.

intra-state conflicts, the history of early warning in preventing wars can be traced back to the foundation of the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1957, although the term “conflict prevention” was not used at that time. For Kenneth Boulding, who is the founder of the journal, conflict resolution in its early stage meant the development of a knowledge base in which ‘social data stations’ would emerge, forming a system analogous to a network of weather stations.²²⁸ It aimed to identify ‘social temperature and pressure’ and predict ‘cold or warm fronts’.²²⁹ Similarly, in the first issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, Quincy Wright proposed a ‘project on a world intelligence centre’, what has now come to be called early warning and conflict prevention.²³⁰ In practice, Charles McClelland,²³¹ David Singer²³² and Edward Azar²³³ developed their databases to learn about the causal patterns of wars. The history of the academic endeavour to develop early warning databases shows how scholars have contributed to establishing the concept of conflict early warning.

If it is academic researchers who have shaped the current dominant form of conflict early warning and early response, the purpose of critical early warning is to deconstruct the discourses and assumptions that prevailed in traditional early warning and early response studies. A method of immanent critique and theoretical reflectivity, as introduced in Chapter 2, are the most relevant concepts to this chapter. By applying them to conflict early warning, this chapter identifies the contradictions that exist between the concept of conflict early warning and what academics actually developed. In order for the comparison, this paper first summarizes the concept of conflict early warning. Then, it shows how the studies of conflict early warning have been developed and points out problems. This chapter argues that the concept of conflict early warning embraces an explicitly emancipatory and humanitarian intent because it has been regarded as a significant approach in preventing conflict and eventually protecting people at risk. However, it claims that the emancipatory intent has already

²²⁸ Kerman, C. (1974) *Creative Tension: The Life and Thought of Kenneth Boulding*. Ann Arbor: Michigan. p.82. Cited in Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. & Miall, H. (2005) *Contemporary conflict resolution*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press. p.41.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. & Miall, H. (2005) op. cit. p.41.

²³¹ McClelland, C. (1978) *World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) 1966-1978*. ICPSR 5211.

²³² Singer, J. D. & Wallace, M. D. (eds) (1979) *To Augur Well: Early Warning Indicators in World Politics*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

²³³ Azar, E. (1980) ‘The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) Project.’ *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 24, No.1, pp. 143-152.

been lost due to the domination of “problem-solving” approaches in the field. Furthermore, it is argued that its epistemologically objectivist and theoretically positivistic approach narrowed the scope of studies of conflict early warning and early response and resulted in marginalising particular groups of people and things.

3.2 The Concept of Conflict Early Warning

Before deconstructing the dominant way of studying conflict early warning and early response, the thesis clarifies how conflict early warning has been conceptualized. Unlike a “definition”, a “concept” means a general idea about a particular object, which is derived or inferred from specific instances or occurrences.

- **Early warning as systematic data collection, analysis and warning**

The ends of conflict early warning and early response have been considered to be achieved by *systematic* data collection and analysis of latent violent conflicts. The *Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms* compiled by Alex Schmid defined early warning as

"the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purpose of: a) anticipating the escalation of violent conflict; b) the development of strategic responses to these crises; and c) the presentation of options to critical actors for the purposes of decision-making."²³⁴

As the definition shows, *systematization* is one of the key factors in the means of conflict early warnings. For example, van Walraven’s definition also argues that ‘the collection of data on the basis of uniform, systematized procedures; their analysis according to a proper scientific methodology; and, if it would be concluded that those data pointed to a high probability of impending violent conflict, the transmission of a warning to political decision-makers.’²³⁵ While there are many early warning signals

²³⁴ Schmid, A. (1998) *Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms*. London: Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER).

²³⁵ van Walraven, K. (ed.) (1998a) ‘Introduction.’ In van Walraven, K. (ed.) *Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Limitations and Possibilities*. Kluwer Law International: The Hague. Ch.1. p.3

coming from potential and on-going conflict zones (e.g. news papers²³⁶), the added value of early warning systems is that if information collection, analysis and wiring of warnings are systematised, it is thought that early warnings become more objective and trustworthy, and can cover a large part of the world. Therefore, the study of early warning in its infant stage has been the study of systematic forecasting models either in quantitative, qualitative or mixed ways.²³⁷

- **Early warning is crucial for conflict prevention**

The concept of conflict early warning was strongly influenced by the Boutros Boutros-Ghali's report published in 1992 – *An Agenda for Peace*. It can be said that due to his report, early warning has truly gained popularity among practitioners and scholars and began to be seen as a significant component of *conflict prevention*, or *preventive diplomacy*.²³⁸ The fact that the academic literature that includes the terms both “early warning” and “conflict prevention” consistently appears only after 1991 would owe to his report (see Figure.2).²³⁹ In the report, he argues that ‘the most desirable and efficient employment of diplomacy is to ease tensions before the result in conflict – or, if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes.’ A need for conflict early warning was introduced as one of the

²³⁶ Clarke says that ‘those who gamble on horses, commonly have criteria that they use to place bets – the pedigree of a horse, the condition of the track, the reputation of the jockey and so on. In addition, however, having weighed the different factors many end up betting based not only on the objective information, but also upon hunches. Early warning analysis is sometimes viewed in a similar manner, and it is commonly greeted in equal measures by amusement and scepticism. For many, it is either missing the point (really, the absence of political will and financial resources to engage in preparedness and prevention), an unnecessarily complex academic exercise, or an exercise in predicting what is patently obvious: “for early warning”, one friend who works for an NGO laughed “read the New York Times”.’ Clarke, J. (2005) “Early Warning Analysis for Humanitarian Preparedness and Conflict Prevention.” *Civil Wars*, vol.7, no.1, pp. 71-97. p. 73.

²³⁷ Nyheim, D. (2009) op. cit. and Leaning, J. & Meier, P. (2008) op.cit.

²³⁸ Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992) op. cit..

²³⁹ Google Scholar search engine was used for this purpose in August, 2011. The researcher simply searched for articles and books that contain the two key words “early warning” and “conflict prevention.” The term “early warning” is the most significant key word for the research. The second term “conflict prevention” was selected to narrow down the result. Just using the term “conflict” is not good enough because causality of conflict, health and natural disaster is closely related, therefore, there is a fear that the result can include those focusing on health and natural disaster early warnings. Then, using the term “prevention” only is not good enough either because there are many health- and natural disaster- related preventive measures using early warning systems. For these reasons, the research selected “early warning” and “conflict prevention” as the key words. In addition, it must be noted that the articles and books that were hit by the key words do not necessarily talk about conflict early warning as their main subjects. In addition, this figure does not show the actual number of articles and books published in each year because some of them mention the key words only in their references. This figure is used simply to show that there were almost no articles and books that used both term “early warning” and “conflict prevention” together before 1991.

most significant components of conflict prevention in the report along with the significance of fact-finding, preventive deployment and demilitarized zones. He states that ‘there is a need, however, to strengthen arrangements in such a manner that information from these sources can be systemized with political indicators to assess whether a threat to peace exists and to analyse what action might be taken by the United Nations to alleviate it.’²⁴⁰ In this context, the role of early warning has been recognised as anticipating where and when the most harmful conflicts and confrontations are likely to occur, and therefore regarded as the first significant task in preventing violent conflict.²⁴¹ The Carnegie Commission’s report argues that ‘the capacity to anticipate and analyze possible conflicts is a prerequisite both for any prudent decision to act and for effective action itself.’²⁴² Lund explains its significance by using the analogy of the “wolf cry” effect.²⁴³ He argues that ‘a policy of preventive diplomacy that acts on any and all signs of trouble would quickly exhaust its resources and credibility – and, like the boy who cried “wolf!” too often, would ultimately leave real dangers unchecked.’²⁴⁴ By sorting out real dangers and those which are not, he holds that ‘appropriate levels of preventive response might be activated and appropriate resources committed to averting these dangers.’²⁴⁵




Figure.2

²⁴⁰ Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992) op cit.

²⁴¹ Carnegie (1997) op. cit. P.43, Lund, M. (1996) op. cit. P.108.

²⁴² Carnegie (1997) op. cit. P.43

²⁴³ Lund, M. (1996) op. cit. p.108

²⁴⁴ Ibid

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

- **Early warning as operational (light, short-term) prevention**

The study by Carnegie Commission further conceptualized early warning as a core element of operational prevention. The report differentiates two different conflict prevention roles – structural prevention and operational prevention. *Structural (deep, long-term) prevention* aims at preventing crises from arising in the first place, or from recurrence if they do.²⁴⁶ As the name suggests, it is a long-term conflict prevention approach in order to tackle root causes of violent conflicts. On the other hand, early warning is regarded as part of *operational (light, short-term) prevention*, which is taken when violence seems to be imminent and/or when it is escalating.²⁴⁷ Its aim is to prevent latent or threshold conflicts from becoming severe armed conflicts and its practitioners do not necessarily concern themselves with the root causes of the conflict, or with remedying the situation which led to the crisis which the measures address.²⁴⁸ Simply put, operational prevention can be seen as the prevention of what Galtung calls “direct violence”²⁴⁹. Dress and Rosenblum-Kumar, for example, regards conflict prevention as “violence prevention”.²⁵⁰ This influential study by Carnegie Commission has certainly contributed to constructing the discourse that *conflict early warning and early response is a mechanism to prevent impending violent conflict*. Early warning and early response therefore have been discussed with the discourse of “immediacy” in which the debate about whether early warning and early response is a good thing to do or not, or feasible or not have not been questioned when violent

²⁴⁶ Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997) op. cit.

²⁴⁷ Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict op. cit. The four factors which are identified as measures to avoid imminent violence are: (1) early warning and response, (2) preventive diplomacy, (3) economic measures, such as sanctions and incentives and (4) the use of force. P.40.

²⁴⁸ Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. & Miall, H. (2005) op.cit, p. 108. According to Alice Ackermann (2003:341-2), the relationship between the two types of prevention remains ‘complicated’ since it is not always necessarily one of time sequencing but also one by which operational prevention may run parallel to structural prevention, or the two may even support each other. Moreover, operational and structural prevention affect ‘different parts of a society for different length of time’ (Wallenstein, P. 2002:213-228. Cited in Ackermann, 2003:341-2). Although early warning and early response are seen as a part of operational prevention, it is insisted that response to conflict should link short-term peacemaking with long-term peace-building effort (Rupesinghe, Nyheim with Khan, 2001).

²⁴⁹ Galtung, J. (1969) ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research.’ *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 167-191.

²⁵⁰ Dress, T. P. & Rosenblum-Kumar, G. (2002) ‘Deconstructing Prevention: A System Approach to Mitigating Violent Conflict.’ In Hampson, F. O. & Malone, D. M. (eds) *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner. P.241.

conflict is imminent. This kind of argument is put aside and early warning and early response are automatically taken as necessary and good to save people.

- **Early warning as emancipatory and humanitarian**

Without doubt, the above-mentioned practical ends of conflict early warning are backed by a more supreme end for the human society as a whole – to make the world a safer place by establishing effective early warning and early response systems. Particularly after the agenda for peace by Ghali, conflict early warning has been promoted as a significant tool to emancipate people at risk and to make the world less violent by preventing violent conflicts.

In addition, it has been articulated that the central idea of conflict early warning is based on humanitarianism, whose aim is to save strangers in other countries, mostly in developing countries. Leon Gordenger claims that ‘interest in early warning has primarily humanitarian aims.’²⁵¹ This humanitarian and emancipatory orientation of conflict early warning can be highlighted by comparing “early warning” with “intelligence”. Early warning is considered to be different from intelligence systems in spite of the fact that early warning and intelligence are the same in the sense that ‘both engage in collection and analysis of information, scenario building, and recommending options to decision-makers.’²⁵² However, they are different in their goals.²⁵³ While intelligence stresses state security and therefore is a commodity collected to protect the national interest and integrity of state borders, early warning is supposed to focus on the welfare of others; their ‘human security.’²⁵⁴ In comparison to intelligence, Schmeidl calls conflict early warning “disinterested intelligence.”²⁵⁵ Adelman argues that early warning is motivated by “universal humanitarian”²⁵⁶ concerns and further he argues that early warning is ‘concerned with protection of, or

²⁵¹ Gordenker, L. (1992) “Early Warning: Conceptual and Practical Issues.” In Rupesinghe, K. & Kuroda, M. (eds.) *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution*. St. Martin’s: New York. Ch.1. p.2.

²⁵² Rubin, B. R. (2002) *Blood on the Doorstep: The Politics of Preventive Action*. New York: Century Foundation Press. P.140.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Schmeidl, S. (2002) Conflict Early Warning and Prevention: Toward a Coherent Terminology. In Mwaura, C. & Schmeidl, S. (2002) *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*. U.S.: Red Sea Press. Ch. 3. p. 73.

²⁵⁵ Ibid. p.76.

²⁵⁶ Adelman, H. (1998c) ‘Difficultis in Early Warning: Networking and Conflict Management.’ In van Wolraven, K. (ed.) *Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Limitations and Possibilities*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. Ch.4. p.53.

the provision of emergency aid to, a population within a territory in which there is an inability or an unwillingness to provide protection by the state with jurisdiction over the territory, either because the state itself or its agents are the victimisers, or because of the breakdown in the state itself.’²⁵⁷ This is the same as what is now conceptualised as the responsibility to protect (see below). It is in fact only this humanitarian motivation that can justify using conflict early warning systems. Schmeidl states that ‘if early warning were anything like intelligence, it would fail because most countries will not share information vital to their national security. However, the common goal of human welfare can slowly build trust in information sharing among nations.’²⁵⁸ Therefore, conflict early warning must be humanitarian for the purpose of emancipating people from impending threats.

- **Early warning as responsibility**

At the beginning of the 21st century, the significance of early warning for conflict prevention was confirmed under the rubric of “the responsibility to protect (R2P)” in the report compiled by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).²⁵⁹ The report draws two conclusions regarding the R2P: (1) state sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself; (2) where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.²⁶⁰ The report further argues that the responsibility to *prevent* composes a significant part of the R2P along with the responsibility to *react* and the responsibility to *rebuild*.²⁶¹ The report argues that ‘there is a need for more official resources to be devoted to early warning and analysis. Preventive action is founded upon and proceeds from accurate prediction.’²⁶² The very same idea was articulated in the 2005 World Summit, which was held at United Nations Headquarter in New York from 14th to 16th September 2005 (A/60/L.1)²⁶³ and

²⁵⁷ Ibid. p.53

²⁵⁸ Schmeidl, S. (2002) op. cit. p.76.

²⁵⁹ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, op. cit.

²⁶⁰ Ibid. p. XI

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid. p.21

²⁶³ United Nations General Assembly (2005) *2005 World Summit Outcome*. A/60/L.1. September 14-16th. Available: <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/A60L.pdf> (Accessed on 14 September 2013.)

reaffirmed in the follow-up report of the Secretary General, which was published in 2010 (A/64/864)²⁶⁴. As illustrated here, the supreme goal of conflict early warning is considered to be to protect those who face grave dangers from violent conflicts and to contribute to building a sustainable peace.

To sum up, it can be said that conflict early warning and early response have been conceptualized as follows:

if in advance we know that a violent conflict is likely to occur through the systematic collection and analysis of information, we should/must prevent it in order to protect people at risk and emancipate them from threats and fear.

Early warning and early response systems are meant to be used to protect people at risk by preventing conflict, and they are especially concerned about the security of those in intra-state conflicts. The point here is that the concept of conflict early warning and early response has been supported by a *humanitarian/emancipatory* norm (we *should* prevent it and save the suffering) and more recently by the idea of the *responsibility to protect* (we *must* prevent it). Moreover, as Kant said “ought implies can”, it also embraces the assumption of the feasibility (*can*) of preventing violent conflicts through an early warning and early response mechanism. Therefore, conflict early warning and early response has been regarded as an explicitly emancipatory practice.

3.3 Conflict Early Warning Studies

Since *an Agenda for Peace* by Boutros-Ghali, a number of studies have been conducted in search of more effective early warning systems. These studies can be categorized into two major approaches: (1) accurate forecasting/prediction and (2) warning-response gap. Both approaches are explained below.

²⁶⁴ United Nations General Assembly (2010) *Early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary General*. A/64/864. July 14th. Available: [http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/N1045020\(1\).pdf](http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/N1045020(1).pdf) (Accessed on 14 September 2013.)

3.3.1 Development of Early Warning / Forecasting Tools²⁶⁵

In their infant phase, studies of conflict early warning were concerned about developing better quantitative methodologies to predict the occurrence of violent conflict and understand the nature of violent conflict. The studies of conflict early warning have therefore been highly scientific. This is driven by the belief that better warning is achieved primarily through improving the quality and timeliness of the analysis²⁶⁶, and by so doing it is considered possible to raise the motivation of political actors. Studies of quantitative forecasting models contributed greatly to deepening our understanding of the mechanism of violent conflict and state fragility.

Initiatives for developing reliable early warning tools came from North America and Europe in the 90s. Although some see World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS)²⁶⁷ developed by Charles McClelland and Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB)²⁶⁸ by Edward Azar well before the 90s as early warning tools, they were not specifically intended to be used as an early warning tool to invoke early responses from due actors for conflict prevention purpose. However, it is true that the two models highly influenced the development of conflict forecasting tools that followed.²⁶⁹ The most notable early warning models that developed in US are the Minority at Risk (MAR) project at the University of Maryland²⁷⁰, Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) at the University of Kansas²⁷¹, Life Integrity Violation Analysis (LIVA) by Helen Fein²⁷², Global Event Data System (GEDS) at the University of Maryland²⁷³, Protocol for the

²⁶⁵ In this paper, *tools* mean methodologies to identify where and when violent conflicts are likely to occur. They are generally categorised into *quantitative* and *qualitative* approaches. Moreover, they are also categorized by the phenomena they represent (early warning for what). Then, when they are incorporated into organizations for preventive purpose, they are called early warning *systems*.

²⁶⁶ Meyer, C. O., Otto, F., Brante, J. & et al. (2010) op. cit.

²⁶⁷ McClelland (1978) *World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS)*, 1966-1978. Michigan: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

²⁶⁸ Azar, E. (1980) "The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) Project." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 143-152

²⁶⁹ For example, GEDS is an updated version of COPDAP.

²⁷⁰ Gurr, T. (1993b) "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945." *International Political Science Review*, Vol.14, No.2, pp.161-201.

²⁷¹ Schrodtt, P.A., Davis, S. & Weddle, J. (1994) "KEDS – A Program for the Machine Coding of Events Data." *Social Science Computer Review*. Vol.12, No.4, pp.561-587.

²⁷² Fein, H. (1992) "Dangerous States and Endangered Peoples: Implications of Life Integrity Violations." In Rupesinghe, K. & Kuroda, M. (eds.) *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution*. St. Martin's: New York. Ch.3.

²⁷³ Davies, J. (1998) *The Global Event-Data System: Coders' Manual*.

Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA)²⁷⁴ and Virtual Research Associate (VRA)²⁷⁵ at Harvard, “a pattern recognition approach” by Peter Brecke,²⁷⁶ State Failure Task Force²⁷⁷, Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA)²⁷⁸, and Conflict Carrying Capacity model²⁷⁹. In Europe, though not as many as US, some early warning tools were developed by academics such as KOSIMO²⁸⁰ and AKUF both in Germany²⁸¹, and Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Root Causes of Human Right Violations (PIOOM) in the Netherlands²⁸².

A more recent trend is a shift of attention to developing tools to analyse the fragility and failure of states. Since its establishment in 1994, the Political Instability Task Force (PITF, formerly State Failure Task Force) has played a significant role in developing an early warning tool for state fragility. PITF is a panel of scholars and methodologists who represent several of the United States’ leading research institutions such as Arizona State, Columbia, George Mason, Harvard, Maryland, Minnesota, Stanford, and Texas universities.²⁸³ They developed a global forecasting model of political instability.²⁸⁴ The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger began at the University of Maryland, and on the basis of the data collected and analysed publishes an annual report titled “Peace and Conflict.”²⁸⁵ The Polity IV project led by Monty

²⁷⁴ Bond, D. & Jenkins, J.C. & Schock, K. (1997) “Mapping mass political conflict and civil society: Issues and Prospects for the Automated Development of Event Data.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol.41, no.4, pp.553-579.

²⁷⁵ Virtual Research Associates. <http://vranet.com/>

²⁷⁶ Brecke, P. (1998b) “A Pattern Recognition Approach to Conflict Early Warning.” In Davies, J. & Gurr, T. (eds) (1998) *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield. Ch.9.

²⁷⁷ Esty, D., Goldstone, J. A., Gurr, T., Surko, P. T. & Unger, A. N. (1995) *The State Failure Task Force Report*.

²⁷⁸ Bond, D., Jenkins, J.C., Taylor, C. L. et al. (2003) “Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA): An Event Typology for Automated Events Data Development.” *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 40, no. 6, pp.733-745.

²⁷⁹ Jenkins, J. C. & Bond, G. (2001) “Conflict-carrying capacity, political crisis, and reconstruction: A Framework for the Early Warning of Political System Vulnerability.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol.45, no.1, pp.3-31.

²⁸⁰ KOSIMO is acronym for conflict simulation model. The project was initiated in 1988. Pfetsch, F. R. & Rohloff, C. (2000) “KOSIMO: A Databank on Political Conflict.” *Journal of Peace Research*, vol.37, no.3, pp.379-89.

²⁸¹ AKUF is Hamburg University’s Conflict dataset.

<http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/Ipw/Akuf/index.htm>

²⁸² Schmid, A. & Jongman, A. J. (1997) “Violent Conflicts and Human Rights Violations in the Mid-1990s.” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.9, No.4, pp.166-192.

²⁸³ Center for Global Policy. <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/political-instability-task-force-home/>

²⁸⁴ Goldstone, J. A., Bates, R. H., Epstein, D. L., et al. (2010) “A Global Model of Forecasting Political Instability.” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 54, No. 1, Pp. 190–208.

²⁸⁵ Peace and Conflict. Available at:

<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/publications/pub.aspx?pubType=book&id=33>

Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr monitors and analyses the characteristics of political regime of states.²⁸⁶ Under the project, they also developed State Fragility Index and Matrix.²⁸⁷ Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) was developed at Carleton University, Canada. The Brookings Institution developed Index of State Weakness in the Developing World²⁸⁸, and U.S. Center for Army Analysis also developed Analyzing Complex Threats for Operations and Readiness.²⁸⁹

As the number of early warning models has increased, some studies overviewed different models and mapped them out in terms of the methodologies they use.²⁹⁰ For example, Alexander Austin categorises the quantitative early warning tools into five models: (a) structural models, (b) accelerator models, (c) threshold models, (d) conjunctural models, and (e) response models.²⁹¹ Early warning tools are also categorized by the phenomena they represent – “early warning about what?”.²⁹² There are two significant surveys about early warning tools and systems conducted by Alex Austin in 2004 and by David Nyheim in 2009.²⁹³ Austin’s survey categorises the early warning systems into 13 types, though strictly speaking some of them (e.g. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) are not necessarily considered to be early warning systems. His survey is based on a broader meaning of “early warning” that includes refugee early warning and also famine and food early warning tools. On the other hand, Nyheim’s categorization is composed of only two types – violent conflict and state fragility. This is significant in terms that failed state, which is related to conflict but not exactly conflict, consists of one of two pillars of conflict

²⁸⁶ Polity IV Project. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>

²⁸⁷ State Fragility Index and Matrix. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/SFIMatrix2012c.pdf>

²⁸⁸ Rice, S. E. & Patrick, S. (2008) *Index of State Weakness in the Developing World*. Washington: The Brookings Institution.

²⁸⁹ O’Brien, S. P. (2001) *Analyzing Complex Threats for Operations and Readiness*. Virginia: U.S. Center for Army Analysis.

²⁹⁰ Austin, A. (2004) op. cit.; Barton, F. & von Hippel, K. (2008) “Early Warning?: A Review of Conflict Prevention Models and Systems.” *PCR Project Special Briefing*.; Brecke, P. (2000) Brecke, P. (2000) *Risk Assessment Models and Early Warning Systems*. Arbeitsgruppe, Internationale Politik.; Nyheim, D. (2009) op. cit.; Verstegen, S. (1999) *Conflict Prognostication: Toward a Tentative Framework for Conflict Assessment. Revised Version*. The Hague, Netherlands Institute of Internal Relations. Available: http://www.nbiz.nl/publications/1999/19990900_cru_paper_verstegen.pdf (Accessed on 17th Oct 2007); and Wulf, H. & Debiel, T. (2009) “Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms: Tools for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Regional Organisations? A Comparative Study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and PIF.” Working Paper, No.49, Regional and Global Axes of Conflict.

²⁹¹ Austin, A. (2004) op. cit.

²⁹² Austin, A. (2004) op. cit.

²⁹³ See Austin, A. (2004) op. cit. and Nyheim, D. (2009) op. cit.

early warning. Furthermore, he argues that while quantitative conflict analysis tools emerged in the 90s, those of state failure/fragility warning tools were developed since 2000 onwards. In addition, his survey shows that the emergence of qualitative early warning tools established for state fragility is a very recent phenomenon.

Furthermore, these dominant quantitative approaches have often been critically compared to qualitative approaches.²⁹⁴ Qualitative approaches are referred to as “Watch” group, which includes Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and International Crisis Group (ICG).²⁹⁵ They employ field-based monitors, analysts, special envoys who are often posted within the region in question to monitor and conduct specific research which enables them to read the context of a conflict. The resulting recommendations are then lobbied with key decision makers and policymakers.²⁹⁶ Unlike the quantitative approaches that were initiated by academics, the qualitative systems were initiated by NGOs and then incorporated into studies. The comparison and critical examinations are conducted by learning from the past and referring to the fundamental natures and differences of quantitative and qualitative approaches.

For example, contrary to the quantitative approaches, the advantage of qualitative approaches is that ‘qualitative monitoring offers vastly more content-rich and contextual information than quantitative statistical analysis’.²⁹⁷ On the other hand, Ramsbotham et al. question the effectiveness of quantitative approaches by stating that “these statistical approaches blur the case-specific and context-specific information which area experts would use”.²⁹⁸ Another account is given by Austin, who argues that “grievance is not an empirical state and the search for the causes of conflict outside of perception will remain similar to a search for unicorns ... Levels of grievance tolerance vary considerably from person to person, and cannot be known empirically – only conceptually. As a result, Quantitative early warning system will

²⁹⁴ For a good comparison between qualitative and quantitative approach in conflict early warning, see Goldstone, J. A. (2008) “Using Quantitative and Qualitative Models to Forecast Instability.” *Special Report 204*. United States Institute of Peace.

²⁹⁵ Adelman, H. & Suhrke, E. (1996) “Early Warning and Conflict Management”. In Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*. Copenhagen, DANIDA. P.47. Cited in Austin, A. (2004) op. cit. p.16.

²⁹⁶ Austin, A. (2004) op.cit.

²⁹⁷ Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. & Miall, H. (2005) op. cit.

²⁹⁸ Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. & Miall, H. (2005) op.cit, p. 113.

remain to be a quest for a mythical beast”.²⁹⁹ Ramsbotham et al therefore argue that ‘given the current state of the art, qualitative monitoring is likely to be most useful for gaining early warning of conflict in particular cases: the expertise of the area scholar and the local observer, steeped in situational knowledge, is difficult to beat’.³⁰⁰

On the other hand, the weaknesses of qualitative approaches are also pointed out. For instance, there is a significant problem in the criteria that monitors use in analysing the possibility of the emergence of violence are not explicit.³⁰¹ It is seen as too subjective.³⁰² In addition, there are the problems of noise and information overload.³⁰³ Therefore, it is feared that the data collected by qualitative approaches are biased, and that because of this, some intervention recommendations based on qualitative research are not taken seriously and/or are questioned by decision makers.

In spite of the weaknesses and strengths of both quantitative and qualitative approaches, there has been an attempt to combine both approaches.³⁰⁴ Comparatively - not completely - objective quantitative approaches can be used to find trends in which conflict is more likely to occur as ‘good enough models’³⁰⁵. Since it can complement qualitative approaches’ subjectivity, intervention options based on both approaches are more reliable and can be taken seriously by policy makers and end users. On the contrary, the fields in which quantitative approaches cannot be used to gauge such phenomenon as people’s perceptions are complemented by qualitative approaches. In this regard, the framework of FAST system of the Swiss Peace Foundation developed by Krummenacher and Schmeidl is unique because it developed an early warning system which employs both quantitative and qualitative approaches which has enabled more comprehensive early warning.³⁰⁶

²⁹⁹ Austin, A. (2004) op. cit.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ Moore, H. W. & Gurr, T. (1998) Assessing Risks of Ethno-rebellion in the Year 2000: Three Empirical Approaches. In Schmeidl, S. & Adelman, H. (eds) (1998). *Early Warning and Early Response*. Columbia International Affairs Online, Columbia University Press.

³⁰² Rupesinghe, K. with Anderlini, S. N. (1998) *Civil Wars, Civil Peace: An Introduction to Conflict Resolution*. London, Pluto Press. P.76.

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Goldstone, J. A. (2008) op. cit. and Krummenacher, H. & Schmeidl, S. (2001) Practical Challenges in Predicting Violent Conflict. FAST: An Example of a Comprehensive Early-Warning. Bern: Swisspeace.

³⁰⁵ Matveeva, A. (2006) op.cit.

³⁰⁶ Krummenacher, H. & Schmeidl, S. (2001). Op. cit.

3.3.2 Warning-Response Gap

Another critical issue in the early warning research field has been considered to be how early warnings can invoke early responses. The research of conflict early warning has also been obsessed with the so-called “warning-response gap.” Even those who have engaged themselves into developing quantitative early warning tools such as Davies and Gurr argue that ‘the only real problem would then appear to be how governments and organizations can be mobilized into effective early action, how to create the political will and the institutional and policy frameworks needed for them to be ready to act on warnings before the cost is already too great.’³⁰⁷ George and Holl see the warning-response gap as emerging because ‘policymakers are often not inclined to take early warning seriously or to act upon it in situations that pose the possibility of severe ethnic and religious conflicts, humanitarian disasters, or gross human rights violations.’³⁰⁸ Schmeidl summarizes the following five points that explain why responses do not follow warnings and why they are late and incomplete.³⁰⁹

1. **Situation dynamics** (some regions are more interesting to outside actors, certain situations are more familiar than others, in some conflicts incentives are more readily at hand, i.e. the EU membership)
2. **Political dynamics** (constraints at home, overall relationship with a government in question, i.e. Russia with regard to the conflict in Chechnya)
3. **Human-Psychological factors** (cognitive structures that impair our perception and judgment, fear of failure, delayed learning)
4. **Institutional-Bureaucratic factors** (the capacities and mandates of organizations, UN inertia which played a detrimental role in Rwanda genocide case)

³⁰⁷ Davies, J. & Gurr, T. (eds) (1998) *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield. P.5.

³⁰⁸ George, A. L. & Holl, J. E. (1997) *The Warning- Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy*. A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York.

³⁰⁹ Schmeidl, S. (2001) ‘Early Response and Integrated Response Development.’ *Romanian Journal of Political Science*. Vol.1, No.2, pp.4-50. Cited in Matveeva, A. (2006) op. cit. p.31.

5. **Analytical capacity** (early warning needs to be unique to the situation, counterintuitive and draw attention to what could be done. This is not always the case)

As she illustrates, major factors of the warning-response gap are considered to be attributed to the response side rather than the warning side. In particular, a number of studies highlighted the lack of “political will” as the most significant factor. For example, Jentleson argues that in most violent conflicts such as Rwanda, Somalia, Congo, Chechnya, Baltics, Croatia-Bosnia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Macedonia, there was no shortage of early warnings.³¹⁰ However, as Adelman points out, it has been believed that responders, in particular western policy-makers, have less motivation to intervene in other countries’ internal affairs.³¹¹ It is considered that key decision makers in major governments and organizations are unwilling to take the risks associated with committing political and financial capital to a situation that either may not require such outlays or may not in fact respond positively to such actions.³¹² Nick Grono succinctly summarizes this: “the real problem is one of political will. Early warning rarely leads to effective and timely response. And one of the reasons for this is that early warning is largely a technical exercise, while early response is a political exercise.”³¹³ Gregory Stanton asked two questions regarding the failure of preventing the Rwandan genocide: (1) why, with all the early warnings, did the U.S., U.K., France and U.N. not do what needed to be done to prevent the Rwandan genocide?; (2) why, once the genocide began, did the U.N. security Council order UNAMIR to withdraw, rather than sending reinforcements to stop the genocide?³¹⁴ His answer is very clear: “lack of the political will is at the heart of the answers to both

³¹⁰ Jentleson, B. (2000b) Preventive Diplomacy: Analytical Conclusions and Policy Lessons. In Jentleson, B. W. (ed.) *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World*. Lanman, Rowman & Littlefield.

³¹¹ Adelman, H. (1998c) op.cit.

³¹² Cockell, J. G. (2003) “Early Warning Analysis and Policy Planning in UN Preventive Action.” In Carment, D. & Schnabel, A. (eds.) *Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion*. United Nations University Press: Tokyo. Ch.10. p.184.

³¹³ Grono, N. (2008) ‘Early Warning and the Responsibility to Prevent Conflicts.’ In European Commission External Relations (eds.) *From Early Warning to Response?* Luxembourg: the European Communities. p. 450.

³¹⁴ Stanton, G. H. (2004) “Could the Rwandan Genocide Have Been Prevented?” *Journal of Genocide Research*, 6 (2), pp. 211-228.

questions.”³¹⁵ Anna Matveeva states that it is a myth that early warning is apolitical.³¹⁶

The most commonly accepted image of early warning is therefore that it is conceptually sound, but it is practically unsuccessful due to the lack of political will. For example, James Miskel and Richard Norton argue that ‘even though the idea of an early warning system seems to have been widely accepted as conceptually sound, early warning data about the RBZ (Rwanda-Burundi-Zaire) crisis has been largely ignored.’³¹⁷ David Nyheim’s report on conflict early warning and response also argues, ‘the field has evolved significantly since its initial conceptualisation, and early warning has been integrated into the policies of many organisations. Today it cannot be said, however, that the international community is in a position to prevent another Rwandan genocide.’³¹⁸ As Nyheim mentioned, the most often referred to case of the failure of early warning within the research on conflict early warning is that of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994.³¹⁹ Stanton claims that although there were a number of early warnings of genocide, they were ignored.³²⁰ As a result, approximately one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus lives were claimed in the space of a few months. This Rwandan discourse has contributed to directing the study of early warning towards a particular direction. Suifon holds that the genocide was a turning point in the field of early warning. He argues that ‘since the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the debate over early warning has shifted from “whether it is important” to “how to generate an early coordinated and appropriate response”’.³²¹

³¹⁵ Ibid. p.224.

³¹⁶ Matveeva, A. (2006) op. cit. p.8.

³¹⁷ Miskel, J. F. and Norton, R. J. (1997) ‘The Paradox of Early Warning.’ *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (First posted on 4 July1997) Available: <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a017.htm> Accessed on 11th October 2007.

³¹⁸ Nyheim, D. (2009)op. cit. p.13.

³¹⁹ A number of papers discuss the Rwandan genocide and the failure of early warning and conflict prevention, in particular see Adelman, H. (1996) ‘Early Warning and Response: Why the International Community Failed to Prevent the Genocide?’ *Disasters*. Vol.20, no.4, pp.295-304.; Adelman, H. & Suhrke, A. (1996) op. cit.; Dorn, W. A. and Matloff, J. (2000) ‘Preventing the Bloodbath: Could the UN Have Predicted and Prevented Genocide in Rwanda?’ *Journal of Conflict Studies*. Vol.20, No.1.; Stanton, G. H. (2004) op. cit.; and Suhrke, A. & Jones, B. (2000) *Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda: Failure to Act or Failure of Action?* In Jentleson, B. W. (ed.) *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.

³²⁰ Stanton, G. H. (2004). op. cit.

³²¹ Suifon, T. Z. (2005) ‘Early Warning, Early Response: Preventing Violent Conflicts.’ In van Tongeren, P., Brenk, M., Hellema, M. & Verhoeven, J. (eds) *People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. P.421.

A significant development in the study of conflict early warning came from King's College London's FORESIGHT project led by Christoph Meyer.³²² His team argues that the traditionally accepted idea that there was no shortage of early warning but of political will is a false statement based on hindsight bias. They argue that if conflict early warning is expected to work as a warning it has to include *intentionality* as a warning as well as an assessment of whether critical actors at the time could really be expected to consider a particular warning as credible and important enough to merit attention and further action.³²³ Contrary to the popular belief prevailing among academics and practitioners, their research proves that there was no clear early warning before the onset of the Rwandan genocide. As well as the lack of political will of the response side, academics also study other characteristics of the response side that hinder early and effective responses. For example, Cockell argues that major international organizations are unable to engage in effective conflict prevention due to the demands they encounter from existing conflicts and crises. They were oriented for the most part towards responding to the symptoms of full-brown conflicts and wars, and thus had done little to develop a repertoire of conflict prevention strategies.³²⁴ Meyer et al and Woocher examine cognitive factors that hinder early response.³²⁵ Some others hold that part of the problems is more institutional and processional.³²⁶ Cockell argues that the "political will" charge often fails to acknowledge these (organisational) constraints.³²⁷ The problem of applied early warning is not that its outputs should somehow be closely linked to, or received by, the procedure that decides on possible response measures. It is, rather, that the practice of early warning should itself be understood to be part of the process of determining and executing preventive action. As Kuroda argues, this means viewing early warning as being integrated into a "management cycle" comprised of "early warning, preparedness, action, and post-action evaluation." Cockell argues that our thinking about early warning thus needs to be reframed: it should be viewed as an integral element in the very process that supports the operational planning and implementation of conflict prevention.³²⁸

³²² An overview of the project can be found at:
<http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/foresight/index.aspx>
 (Accessed on 24/June/2013)

³²³ Meyer, C. O., et al. (forthcoming)

³²⁴ Cockell, J. G. (2003) op. cit. p.183.

³²⁵ Meyer, C. O., Otto, F., Brante, J. & et al. (2010) op. cit. and Woocher, L. (2008) op. cit.

³²⁶ For more about the early warning structure in UN, see Zenko, M. & Friedman, R. R. (2011) "UN Early Warning for Preventing Conflict." *International Peacekeeping*, vol.18, no.1, pp. 21-37.

³²⁷ Cockell, J. G. (2003) op. cit. p.185.

³²⁸ Cockell, J. G. (2003) op. cit. p.188.

It needs to be emphasized here that while majority of the early warning research examines inter-governmental and international NGO systems, little attention has been paid to local NGO (community-based) early warning systems. In addition, most early warning studies focus their attention on potentially large-scale violent conflicts in spite of the fact that there are many small-scale conflicts which could be studied.

3.4 Traditional Early Warning as Positivism/Problem-solving

It was discussed above that the concept of conflict early warning is strongly based on emancipatory and humanitarian motivation – early warning systems should and must contribute to emancipating people at risk from threats and fear by preventing violent conflict. However, this thesis claims that in spite of the intention of an explicitly emancipatory practice, the study of conflict early warning and early response has lost its emancipatory intent, and rather contributed to forming a particular form of conflict early warning and early response which serves the interests of a particular group of people. It is claimed that the loss of the emancipatory intention is attributed to the dominance of positivist and problem-solving approaches that have dominated the field of conflict early warning and early response.

Traditional early warning studies are based on an objectivist point of view in epistemology. Objectivism views that ‘things exist as meaningful entities independently of consciousness and experience, that they have truth and meaning residing in them as objects (‘objective’ truth and meaning, therefore), and that careful (scientific?) research can attain that objective truth and meaning.’³²⁹ Since this epistemological concept implies that there are immutable laws in the human world, like the natural world, positivism, which is based on objectivist epistemology, assumes that its role is to discover the laws in the human world. Therefore, social research based on positivism tends to use quantitative approaches in order to find out the nexus between cause and effect. In addition to this, their belief in the separation of subject and object leads them to believe that they can conduct their research without being influenced by values or ideologies.

³²⁹ Crotty, M. (1998) op. cit. pp. 5-6.

It is quite obvious that early warning studies have largely been based on a positivist point of view considering that their main task has been to forecast where and when the most harmful conflicts occur because this kind of prediction assumes a law-like nexus between cause and effect in human world. In particular, the belief that the future would be like the past underlines quantitative approaches. This assumption is clearly seen in Schmid's way of testing the accuracy of the prediction of individual indicators or groups of indicators empirically in early warning models. He suggests two ways: (1) prospective: 'establish which past forecasts turned out to be correct, copy the methodology, and reapply it to present cases for which one requires forecasts'; (2) retrospective: 'engage in postdiction, i.e., "forecast" with indicators and models created after the phenomenon to be forecasted has already occurred. Apply these indicators to past situations where the outcome is known, using data antedating those outcomes.'³³⁰ This illustrates that the both prospective and retrospective approaches are premised on the assumption of immutability, which assumes that the future would repeat what has happened in the past.

The positivist dominance in studies also corresponds with its focus on developing *quantitative* early warning models in early warning studies. The main objective of quantitative analysis is to 'isolate factors that contribute to the outbreak of war or make warfare more likely... [and] one tries to reveal a direct link between them and the outbreak of war'.³³¹ Here it is possible to point out a strong belief that there is a law-like nexus between cause and effect in the human world. Their methodology also shows a typical positivist approach, which is based on the systematic collection and processing of empirical information according to a given set of criteria.³³² David Nyheim refers to this approach as "the number-crunchers".³³³ They have in fact composed the most unique characteristics of early warning.

³³⁰ Schmid, A. (2001) 'A Comparative Look at Early Warning Indicators: PIOOM, the State Failure Project, and CEWS Cases'. In Alker, H. R., Gurr, T. & Rupesinghe, K. (eds.) *Journeys through Conflict: Narratives and Lessons*. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield. Ch.10, p.292.

³³¹ Conrad, P. & Schlichte, K. (2000) *Quantitative Research: Four Limits and One Alternative*. Paper presented at the Uppsala Conflict Data Conference, 8-9th June, p.4. Cited in Austin, A. (2004) op.cit.

³³² Austin, A. (2004) op. cit.

³³³ Nyheim, D. (2009) op. cit. p.39.

It has already been mentioned above that *qualitative* approaches in practice are also common approaches in conflict early warning. In social science, the distinction between quantitative and qualitative approaches is considered to be based on two distinguished epistemological foundations. Quantitative approach is based on objectivist epistemology, and qualitative approach on constructionist epistemology. Constructionist epistemology assumes that ‘there is no objective truth waiting for us to discover it. Truth, or meaning, comes into existence in and out of our engagement with the realities in our world. There is no meaning without mind. Meaning is not discovered, but constructed.’³³⁴ This is based on the assumption that the ‘world and human beings do not exist apart from each other, they exist in constant interaction.’³³⁵ Simply put, it maintains that subject and object are not separable. Therefore, the positivist claim that ‘theoretical explanations will be true to the extent that they accurately reflect empirical reality; to the extent that they correspond to the facts’ is rejected by constructionism.³³⁶

Whether recognized or not, qualitative approaches in conflict early warning are based on the constructionist epistemology. Although probably those who advocate qualitative approaches correspondences may not be aware of the constructive nature of knowledge in analyzing situations, they understand that ‘qualitative monitoring offers vastly more content-rich and contextual information than quantitative statistical analysis.’³³⁷ This actually shows that traditional early warning studies are not exclusively positivist in their theoretical foundation and epistemology. In spite of the fact that there are some constructionist approaches in conflict early warning, why did not those who use quantitative approaches realize that they have “constructed” their own research schemes? This is probably because the qualitative approach in conflict early warning was brought about by practical side. What they want to learn in general is how to resolve the existing issues they face. It is most likely to result in a problem-

³³⁴ Crotty, M. (1998) op. cit. pp.8-9. He introduces three epistemological stances: objectivism, constructionism and subjectivism. By subjectivism, he means that meaning does not come out of an interplay between subject and object but is imposed on the object by the subject. Therefore, subjectivist epistemology assumes that the object as such makes no contribution to the generation of meaning. He holds that humans are not so much creative as making meaning out of nothing.

³³⁵ Freire, P. (1996) op. cit. p.32.

³³⁶ Neufeld, M. A. (1995) op. cit. p.41.

³³⁷ Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. & Miall, H. (2005) op. cit. p.114.

solving approach, which attempts to find a solution to work things smoothly in a particular framework and does not examine the framework itself but accepts the framework as it is. This has concealed the fact that their research themes have been constructed in a particular manner.

Traditional early warning studies can also be described as what Robert Cox calls *problem-solving theory*. As discussed in Chapter 1, the aim of problem solving theory is to establish instrumental practices to address pre-given issues that arose from within the terms of the particular perspective.³³⁸ It contributes to making relationships and institutions function smoothly by tackling with particular sources of issues effectively and thus it is fragmented among a multiplicity of spheres or aspects of action.³³⁹ As a result, many micro theories arise from problem-solving theory. In addition, problem-solving theory is closely related to objectivist epistemology. Therefore, the above mentioned positivist assumption of the separation of object and subject, and fact and values can also be applied to problem-solving theory. Traditional early warning studies have seen the existing issues in the field as pre-given rather than constructed in a particular manner. As a result, for the early warning academics their research themes have been confined to two major themes: (1) accurate forecasting, and (2) warning-response gap. When someone comes to the field, there already exists the research themes and they accept them as the starting point of their research. Within this limited scope, they have attempted to develop many micro theories rather than critically examining early warning's starting point and assumptions.

3.5 Problems of Problem-Solving Early Warning Studies

The positivist and problem-solving approaches that have been dominant in traditional early warning studies have contributed to limiting the scope of the studies. Bellamy and Williams hold that problem-solving theory results in 'managerist solutions based upon the prevailing definitions of common sense that privileges particular types of knowledge and experience as relevant, and draw spatial and temporal limits.'³⁴⁰ They

³³⁸ Cox, R. (1981) op. cit. p.128.

³³⁹ Ibid. p.129.

³⁴⁰ Bellamy, A. & Williams, P. (2004) op. cit. p.6.

also argue that it is done so at the expense of others.³⁴¹ In traditional early warning studies, the positivist assumption of the separation of fact and value has developed a particular way of understanding the social world and the role of early warning intellectuals themselves. In addition, problem-solving approach's instrumental and technological focus with the acceptance of the prevailing world order and assumptions results in it somewhat missing its supreme ends and concealing its political and historical nature of the research. Due to this problem-solving nature, mainstream early warning studies have marginalized some particular issues and people from their research agendas and served a particular group by accepting the currently prevailing order. The thesis claims that the reasons for the problematic ontological assumptions are attributed to three significant characters of problem-solving approaches in social science: (1) their research became a political instrument (the role of intellectuals), (2) its instrumental and technological focus diverts scholars attention from supreme ends, and (3) conflict early warning and early response cannot be separated from world politics.

3.5.1 Early Warning Study as a Political Instrument

One of the problems of problem-solving approach in conflict early warning studies is that the study became a mere political instrument. In other words, the purpose of research became to give policy-relevant technical solutions to make things work smoothly without considering the current social order and fixed framework. While there is a positive point such as the increased level of communication between scholars and practitioners, Roland Paris claims that in the studies of peacebuilding it has resulted in imposing hidden costs on the academic participants in this relationship.³⁴² Paris further argues that 'most studies of peace operations have focused on the design, conduct and outcome of the operation.'³⁴³ A very similar situation exists in conflict early warning studies. While a number of projects on conflict early warning and early response are funded by international organizations and individual governments, negative impacts on the academic work have not been

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² Paris, R. (2000) op. cit. p.32.

³⁴³ Ibid. p.29.

explicitly articulated by early warning and early response scholars because a good communication between academic researchers and policy-makers has been considered to be a virtue in the field of conflict early warning and early response. The study of conflict early warning is probably the most policy-relevant study because its main themes have been recognized as (1) how to predict the occurrence of violent conflicts for the international community, and (2) how to communicate early warnings with policy makers.

Keith Webb argues that ‘the world of practice and the world of scholarship are two very different worlds, and each will benefit from the other if they remain relatively disengaged and loyal to their own roles.’³⁴⁴ He further states that ‘the social scientist does have a role in the (policy-making) process, but it is a role that is constrained by the nature of the academic profession and is best performed at some distance from the political process of policy-making.’³⁴⁵ Moreover, Roland Paris argues that ‘the academic’s mandate is not primarily, or necessarily, to contribute to policy discussions; it is to analyze and explain complex phenomena, even if doing so yields no specific policy recommendations.’³⁴⁶

3.5.2 The Lack of Normative Debates

The problem-solving theory’s obsession with its instrumental function (means) blurs the ends of the study. According to Kincheloe and McLaren, critical theorists insist that instrumental/technological rationality is obsessed with means in preference to ends.³⁴⁷ Under this circumstance, questions are limited to “how to” rather than “why should.”³⁴⁸ As discussed above, “how to” questions were discussed only within two major research themes in the field – (1) how one can forecast future violent conflicts accurately and (2) how one can close the gap between warning and response. Also

³⁴⁴ Webb, K. (1995) *An Introduction to Problems in the Philosophy of Social Sciences*. London: Pinter. P.157.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ Paris, R. (2000) *op. cit.* p.32.

³⁴⁷ Kincheloe, J. L. & McLaren, P. (2002) *op. cit.* p. 91.

³⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 91-92.

discussed is that the two questions are further split into many small “how to” questions, and as a result many “micro theories” arose.³⁴⁹

Kincheloe and McLaren further insist that research based on problem-solving approaches tends to disregard the humanistic aim of the research act.³⁵⁰ Problem-solving approaches are explanatory in the sense that they aim at finding solutions by explaining what has happened. The explanatory nature sees the world as it is and contributes to preserving the status quo. This means that the social inequality that comes from the current social order is kept unquestioned. Kincheloe and McLaren further make a strong claim that instrumental/technological rationality is viewed as one of the most oppressive features of contemporary society by critical theorists.³⁵¹ If so, does this mean that the traditional conflict early warning studies that became a policy instrument based on instrumental rationality have oppressed some particular people? This will be answered in the next chapter.

In fact, the inclusion of normative aspects in policy making has become more popular. In particular, it has been discussed in regards to the field of humanitarian intervention and the moral responsibility of international organizations. However, in spite of the fact that conflict early warning and early response is a subfield of peacebuilding, conflict early warning and early response has not been subjected to these debates. Significant normative questions (what Roland Paris calls “macro theory”) such as “why do we need early warning”, “what are the nexus between conflict early warning and response and world politics?”, “does early warning really work in the current world politics?” and “is early warning and early response always good?” have rarely been discussed.

Howard Adelman seems to have realized the lack of normative debates in conflict early warning. His concern in his paper *Defining Humanitarian Early Warning* has less to do with the utility functions of early warning in translating warnings into action, than the more basic question of “why we want humanitarian early warnings”.

³⁴⁹ Paris, R. (2000) op. cit.

³⁵⁰ Kincheloe, J. L. & McLaren, P. (2002) op. cit. p. 92.

³⁵¹ Ibid. p. 91.

³⁵² This is perhaps the only paper that discusses the ends of conflict early warning rather than the effectiveness of particular means. His contribution to the field is significant in the sense that it reveals that the subject of early warning and early response is not people in conflict area but the west. However, the problem with his argument is that in spite of his recognition of the true nature of conflict early warning, he does not problematize the structure of traditional conflict early warning - the west as the subject of conflict early warning and early response. Therefore, his question can be understood as “why do *western* governments want humanitarian early warning?.” The starting point of his discussion begins from a limited ontological assumption that excludes some significant actors in conflict early warning and early response. Therefore, his research resulted in justifying the traditional concept of conflict early warning and response. What he has developed in his paper is a limited normative view that can be explained only from a western point of view. The perspectives of other actors are not included. Although the close relationship between politics and academics has been seen as a virtue in the field, it is considered necessary ‘to uncouple the academic study of peace operations from the perceived utility of these missions as policy instruments’³⁵³ and pave the way for more normative discussions.

3.5.3 The Lack of International Relations Theory in Early Warning Studies

The thesis has so far identified some contradictory issues existing in the field of conflict early warning and early response by examining their research approaches. If one wishes to go further in order to identify a hidden agenda, or normative ideology, one has to investigate conflict early warning and early response in relation to global politics. The domination of problem-solving approaches reduced the study of conflict early warning and early response into the study of technical solutions by isolating it from world politics. Furthermore, it has been ignored that conflict early warning and early response has a continuity with other peace building activities taken at the different stages of conflict cycle, such as conflict prevention, conflict management

³⁵² Adelman, H. (1998a) “Defining Humanitarian Early Warning”. In Schmeidl, S. & Adelman, H. (eds.) *Early Warning and Early Response*. New York: Columbia International Affairs Online (Columbia University Press). Ch.1.

³⁵³ Paris, R. (2000) op. cit. p.32.

(peace keeping), conflict resolution (peacemaking) and conflict transformation (peacebuilding). This ignorance can also be attributed to the discourse of immediacy - that conflict early warning is a significant part of operational prevention whose main concern is about the prevention of impending conflict - because 'constructions that focus on the immediacy of a crisis distance us from underlying causes in the workings of the global economy and practical acts and negligence.'³⁵⁴

Roland Paris argues that 'the role of interests, ideas and norms in international politics, the possibilities of cooperation among are questions that peace operations also raise.'³⁵⁵ This logic can be applied to early warning and early response too because if the subject of the traditional early warning and early response is western governments, then the role of interests, ideas and norms in international politics highly influence their behaviour in conflict early warning and early response. In addition, Ken Booth argues that 'contending theories about world politics produce different conceptualizations of what security is all about in world politics.'³⁵⁶ For example, Booth argues that views regarding security studies that were developed during the Cold War period and were dominated by Realism have exclusively focused on national security and interests. In this situation what was more important than early warning was traditional intelligence. However, the end of the Cold War saw a significant increase of the number of conflict early warning tools and systems.

The traditional policy-relevant approaches in early warning research imply that they accept its humanitarian claim that early warning and early response mechanisms are inherently good and desirable, and that taking policy relevant approaches means that they already accept the feasibility of conflict early warning and early response. Therefore they result in seeking only for more effective instrumental and technological mechanisms. This results in the justifying of the currently dominant fundamental value and world order. Considering that our knowledge and theories are always politico-normative, this is a crucial question for early warning and early

³⁵⁴ Campbell, D. (2002) 'Salgado and the Sahel: Documentary Photography and the Imaging of Famine.' In Debrix, F. and Weber, C. (eds.) *Mediating Internationals*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Cited in Pugh, M. (2004) op. cit. p.48.

³⁵⁵ Paris, R. (2000) op. cit. p.32.

³⁵⁶ Booth, K. (2005) op. cit. p.13.


response and it can be examined by viewing conflict early warning and early response through the scope of world politics.

If conflict early warning and early response is guided by a particular theory or ideology, there might be some people who do not enjoy the benefits of conflict early warning and early response as envisaged in the original humanitarian and emancipatory concept. In the next chapter, the thesis shows that early warning and early response (conflict prevention) contributes to projecting and promoting a particular version of peace - liberal peace - in the illiberal periphery countries, which can be seen as problematic due to past failures.

3.5.4 Unreflexive Ontological Assumptions

As a result of marginalizing the problems of problem-solving approaches in their studies, the ontological assumptions of traditional early warning studies have rarely been acknowledged in their studies. They share ontological assumptions regarding *who* should be warned about *what* kind of conflict. The research themes of traditional conflict early warning and early response studies – accurate forecasting and warning-response gap – assume at least three main ontological components: conflict, warners and responders. Their studies therefore revolve around the following ontological triangle (see Figure.3).

Figure.3



Arrow 1: *how to forecast violent conflicts through accurate data collection and analysis.*

Arrow 2: *how to connect warnings with responses (warning-response issue).*

Arrow 3: *how to respond (intervene in conflict)*

In particular, it has been discussed a number of times above that the first two research questions (Arrow 1 and 2) have been dominant in the studies of early warning and early response. The question of how to respond (arrow 3) has usually been discussed under the banner of “conflict prevention” rather than “early warning and early response”. *Conflicts* (and the people there) are the places that are being monitored by early warning systems. *Warners* collect, analyse the situation based on the collected information, and send warnings to decision-makers at a higher level. *Responders* are regarded mainly as western policy makers and more recently regional intergovernmental organizations who possess abilities such as the power and force to influence conflicting parties to change their behaviours. More recently, responders are expected to have a responsibility to protect people in conflict zones from violence.

Traditional studies of warning-response-gap clearly illustrate they assume that responders are high ranking policy-makers (in particular western policy-makers) as they see the lack of political will as a major factor in the failure of conflict early warning and response. The other approaches to the warning-response gap such as the cognitive school and institutional school also assume the same. Their research has been based on the ontological foundation that if western policy makers are informed in advance through a systematic early warning mechanism that violent conflict is likely to occur and people may suffer from it, they can and must prevent it. This image has been the standard of conflict early warning and early response.

Moreover, this ontological assumption has a more profound implication, which illustrates a dichotomous assumption between the early warners (western governments) and people at risk - we westerners know how to make peace and they do not know how to make peace. Casey Barrs succinctly describes the nature of this problem:

‘perhaps ninety-nine percent of what we read about conflict early warning refers to regional or international mechanisms. They are egocentric in that

*they are primarily built by outsiders to be used by outsiders. As Howard Adelman says, “The quest for defining ‘early warning’ is an exercise in understanding how what is happening over there comes to be known by us ‘over here.’”..... The fundamental orientation is that we are the rescuers; that aid does not start until we arrive.”*³⁵⁷

His account also implies that ultimately the survival of the people at risk is determined by the decisions of the policy makers of the international community. According to Oliver Richmond, this kind of dichotomous assumption is similar to “Orientalism.”³⁵⁸ He argues:

*‘it may well be that many assumptions about peace are actually a form of ‘orientalism’ in that they depend upon actors who know peace then creating it for those that do not, either through their acts or through the peace discourses that are employed to describe conflict and war in opposition to peace. This entails an enlightened and rational actor being able to define what peace should be for others, and how it can be achieved. This implies that actors involved in conflict are somehow inferior, deluded, or obsessed by violence, identity claims, power, territory or resources.’*³⁵⁹

Traditional early warning studies have assumed that information is collected by the West, analysed by the West, and then warnings are given to the western governments. The discourses on peace and conflict are constructed on the basis of the experience and beliefs of those in the zone of peace who knows how to prevent and manage violent conflict and those in the zone of conflict who is powerless and does not know how to deal with conflict. Therefore, it includes educational or disciplinary intent - we in the west must teach them. This relationship is quite similar to the relationship between teachers and students, and is described by Paulo Freire in his book *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*.³⁶⁰ In conflict early warning studies, the nexus between “people in the west” and “people in conflict zones (so-called third world)” has been viewed by

³⁵⁷ Barrs, C. (2006) op. cit. p.1.

³⁵⁸ Richmond, O. (2007) *The Transformation of Peace*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p.5.

³⁵⁹ Ibid. pp.5-6.

³⁶⁰ Freire, P. (1996) op. cit.

intellectuals in the same way as between teachers and students.³⁶¹ In mainstream early warning studies, western governments, NGOs and scholars have been regarded as the *subject* of conflict early warning and early response; on the other hand, the people in conflict zones have been seen merely as the *object* of research or the recipient of conflict prevention. In this view, similar to banking education system, early warning and early response became an act of giving to people who face grave danger in conflict zones. Several dichotomous assumptions in the field of conflict early warning and early response are summarized below:

- We westerners know how to prevent and stop conflicts and people in conflict zones know nothing
- We westerners think and the locals are thought about
- We westerners give and the locals receive
- We westerners discipline and the conflict parties are disciplined
- We westerners choose and enforce our choice and the locals comply
- Western countries confuse the authority of knowledge with their own authority, which they set in opposition to the freedom of the local people.
- Western countries are the subject of early warning and response, while the local people are mere objects.
- We westerners rescue and people in conflict zones are rescued
- We westerners are heroes from the zone of peace and are dispatched to the zone of conflict
- We westerners are civilized and do good, while all the problems of violent conflict exist in the uncivilized conflict regions.

Freire argues that an ‘educator’s role is to regulate the way the world “enters into” the students’.³⁶² In the field of conflict early warning and early response, the role of

³⁶¹ Freire argues that ‘the teacher teaches and the students are taught; the teacher knows everything and the students know nothing; the teacher thinks and the students are thought about; the teacher talks and the students listen – meekly; the teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined; the teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the students comply; the teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through the action of the teacher; the teacher chooses the program content, and the students (who were not consulted) adapt to it; the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his or her own professional authority, which she and he sets in opposition to the freedom of the students; the teacher is the Subject of the learning process, while the pupils are mere objects.’ Freire, P. (1996) op. cit. p.54.

³⁶² Ibid. p.57.

scholars has been to regulate the way a particular form of conflict early warning and early response enters into people by reproducing the dichotomous assumptions existing in western society. These assumptions raise a significant question: Can't people in conflict zones be the subject of conflict early warning and early response, and thus use conflict early warning systems actively to prevent the issues they face in their everyday life rather than the mere object and receiver of western early warning and early response systems?

3.5.5 Prioritization and Exclusion

There is another significant issue in relation to ontology. Traditional early warning studies driven by problem-solving mentality have been highly concerned with prioritizing limited resources. The international community, such as UN, can only utilize what limited resources they have. Almost all the conflict early warning literature assumes and discusses how to prevent potentially large-scale violent conflict, as seen in Lund's description of conflict early warning – "when and where the most harmful conflict will occur".³⁶³ By so doing, he argues that 'appropriate levels of preventive response might be activated and appropriate resources committed to averting these dangers.'³⁶⁴ This prioritization of potentially large-scale violent conflict is also underpinned by the Rwandan discourse that exists in mainstream studies. Many of the traditional studies directly research or briefly mention the failure of conflict early warning and early response in the genocide that took place in 1994.³⁶⁵ The dominance of Rwandan discourse prevailing in the field of conflict early

³⁶³ Lund, M. (1996) op. cit. p.108.

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

³⁶⁵ See Anderlini, S. N. & Nyheim, D. (1999) 'Preventing Future Wars: State of the Art Conflict Early Warning Systems.' *Conflict Trends*, Issue 1, pp. 20-22. South Africa: the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD).; Des Forges, A. (1996) 'Making Noise Effectively: Lessons from the Rwandan Catastrophe.' In Rotberg, R. (ed.) *Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies*. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press. Ch.9.; Dorn, W. A. and Matloff, J. (2000) op. cit.; Feil, S. R. (1998) *Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda*. Washington, D. C., Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.; Harff, B. (2001) 'Could Humanitarian Crisis Have been Anticipated in Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire?: A Comparative Study of Anticipatory Indicators.' In Alker, H. R., Gurr, T. & Rupesinghe, K. (eds) op.cit, Ch.4.; Jones, B. (1998) 'NGOs and Early Warning: The Case of Rwanda.' In Schmeidl, S. & Adelman, H. (eds) *Early Warning and Early Response*. Columbia International Affairs Online, Columbia University Press. Ch.6.; Livingston, S. (1998) American Network Coverage of Genocide in Rwanda int the Context of General Trends in International News. In Schmeidl, S. & Adelman, H. (eds) *Early Warning and Early Response*. Columbia International Affairs Online, Columbia University Press. Ch.8.; Stanton, G. H. (2004) op. cit.; and Suhrke, A. & Jones, B. (2000) op. cit..

warning resulted in exclusively focusing on the prevention of potentially large-scale conflicts. Additionally, what most of the literature focuses on is so-called armed conflict in which one side is a government actor and the other side is a rebel who challenges the government.³⁶⁶

Under this context, traditional early warning studies excluded some particular forms of violent conflicts from their research, such as ethnic riots, in spite of the fact they are one of the most common forms of collective violence. This omission of ethnic riots does not fit well within the rubric of humanitarianism and emancipation. Nordstrom argues that ‘there is the political reality: the doctrines, deeds, and behind-the-scenes machinations of power brokers. There is the military reality...There is the intellectual reality...There are the front-line vignettes of journalists...and there is the reality of life on the frontlines. This reality represents the most profound aspect of war, and the most silenced.’³⁶⁷ Therefore, this implies that there should be various approaches in conflict early warning and early response on the bases of the different realities they are faced in their daily life.

Since the idea of conflict early warning gained popularity in the academic field in 1992 due to the Boutros-Ghali’s report, we have witnessed a great number of ethnic riots all over the world. They have not been discussed within the field of conflict early warning studies, while the failure of early warning in Rwanda that took place in 1994 is still discussed in 2013, 19 years later. Some of the well-known ethnic riots are listed below.

- Gujarat, located in the West of India, has a population of approximately fifty million, and has experienced several deadly inter-communal conflicts between the Hindus (89%) and Muslims (9%). The most recent riots occurred in 2002, and claimed the lives of approximately 850 people, the majority of which were Muslim.
- In Indonesia, people have experienced a number of deadly ethnic riots

³⁶⁶ Uppsala University <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/> (Accessed on 24/June/2013)

³⁶⁷ Nordstrom, C. (1997) *A Different Kind of War Story*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. p.7.

between the Muslims and the Christians in Moluccas, Poso in Sulawesi and some other parts of the country. In the case of the Moluccas, a quarrel between a Christian bus driver and two Muslim passengers at the Ambon bus terminal in January 1999 triggered inter-communal violence. It eventually claimed 4,000 lives and approximately 500,000 people were displaced.³⁶⁸

- Another well-known case is Kenya, which had been regarded as one of the most stable states in Africa. Ethnic conflict in Kenya started with the introduction of competitive politics in September 1991.³⁶⁹ The most recent inter-communal conflict which took place from the end of 2007 to the beginning of 2008 was the worst conflict in the recent history of Kenya. The conflict claimed over 1,000 lives and 300,000 people were displaced.
- Deadly ethnic riots are common in Nigeria. According to the BBC³⁷⁰, a riot took place near the city of Jos in Nigeria early in the morning on the 7th of March and claimed over 500 people's lives. Many of the dead in the villages of Zot and Dogo-Nahawa, largely inhabited by Christian members of the Berom community, are reported to be women and children. It was reported that the attacks were reprisal killings for violence in January, when an inter-communal clash between the Hausa Fulani settlers (Muslim nomadic herders) claimed at least 326 people's lives. Most of the victims were Hausa-speaking Muslims.

As mentioned above, while most of the literature mentions Rwanda, Kosovo, and Sudan as examples of the failures of early warning and early response, the ethnic riots mentioned above are not recognized as significant violent conflicts that conflict early warning and early response can be applied to. Whereas the number of casualties is significant for politicians and outsiders, for those who face collective violence, the difference between “small” and “large” may not matter. There are a great number of

³⁶⁸ Jones, S. (2000) *Causes of Conflict in Indonesia*. Asia Society. Available: <http://asiasociety.org/countries/conflicts/causes-conflict-indonesia> (Accessed on 14 September 2013)

³⁶⁹ Kimenyi, M. S. & Ndung'u, N. S. *Sporadic Ethnic Violence: Why Has Kenya Not Experienced a Full-Blown Civil War?* Inter Region Economic Network (IREN). Available: http://www.irenkenya.com/modules/articles/index.php?article_title_id=29

³⁷⁰ BBC (2010) Nigeria Ethnic Violence 'Leaves Hundreds Dead.' 8 March. Available: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8555018.stm> (Accessed on 14 September 2013)

small and large ethnic riots occurring all over the world. In addition, ethnic riots do not take place only in developing countries. For example, in France, there was an ethnic riot by Muslim African immigrants in 2005.

The traditional early warning scholars may argue that if the international community tries to intervene in all violent conflicts from large-scale to very small, it would quickly consume limited resources. Prioritising is considered to be a significant component of conflict early warning, considering the fact that the resources that can be allocated to early response is limited. However, it should be understood that prioritising is significant for policy-makers. It reflects only on a particular reality of western policy makers in spite of the fact that realities take many forms depending on who is viewing what from what culture.³⁷¹ Therefore, policy-makers would insist that they concentrate on preventing the most harmful conflicts. This is probably a right thing to do because policy-makers need to make decisions for maximizing the happiness or pleasure and probably they are based on what Jeremy Bentham called utilitarianism. However, early warning scholars do not necessarily, and there is no special need to support this particular position, especially western politicians' positions. Besides, this may not be maximizing the welfare of majority since one of the most common types of collective violence has been marginalized. Conflict early warning studies should bring to the forefront marginalised groups and issues. Although most academics hope that their studies contribute to making the world a better place by emancipating people from fear and threats, their unreflexive research approaches have marginalized the voiceless and vulnerable.

3.6 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to point out the problems of traditional early warning studies. It argued that in spite of the emancipatory and humanitarian intent of the concept it has been lost in traditional studies due to the dominance of the problem-solving and positivist research perspectives and approaches. The unreflexive nature of conflict early warning and early response led it to become merely a political

³⁷¹ See Nordstrom, C. (1997) op. cit. p.7.

instrument, for which the studies have focused on instrumental and technological aspects of conflict early warning and early response in order to solve the problems existing in the current systems. On the other hand, normative debates have rarely been dealt with in the existing research. Moreover, this chapter pointed out that there has been no research on the nexus between conflict early warning and early response, and world politics. These propensities of traditional early warning studies resulted in research based on particular ontological assumptions which reflect the reality of the western policy makers. In this context, the thesis claimed that the ontological assumptions are based on a dichotomous understanding between western warners and responders who know how to bring about a peace, and those in conflict zone, who are described as powerless and mere objects of western rescue. Moreover, this dichotomous relationship is very similar to Orientalism. The traditional studies further neglected violent conflict which was not large-scale armed-conflict. Other common forms of conflict such as ethnic riots have largely been absent in traditional studies. In the next chapter, reflecting on the conclusion of this chapter, the thesis attempts to examine the role of conflict early warning and early response within present-day global politics.

Chapter 4

Conflict Early Warning as a Liberal Technique of Government

4.1 Introduction

There is no such thing as “conflict early warning” out there that objectively exists and waits to be discovered. Rather, it has been constructed in a particular way by a particular group of people. The previous chapter pointed out that traditional early warning studies have been dominated by problem-solving approaches, whose instrumental and technological focus has accepted the prevailing world order as it is and has not investigated the assumptions that they have been based on. This resulted in the overlooking of the supreme ends of conflict early warning and early response and in the concealing of the political and historical nature of conflict early warning and early response. As a result of the unreflexive approaches to conflict early warning and early response, traditional early warning studies have not examined what theory has guided conflict early warning and early response in relation with world politics. It is crucial to understand the theories that inform the way we see conflict early warning and early response and its relationship with world politics more generally because without knowing it correctly, as Bellamy and Williams argue in relation to peacebuilding, ‘we are likely to overlook the way in which our unspoken theories and assumptions determine what we think is important and the way that the theory and practice of peace operations is informed by certain political commitments.’³⁷²

Early warning, as discussed in the previous chapter, developed initially as quantitative forecasting tools, and this trend still continues today, though the objective of conflict

³⁷² Bellamy, A. J. & Williams, P. D. (2010) op. cit. p.39.

early warning has changed over time (e.g. the rapid growth of state failure early warning systems in the new millennium). Then, international NGOs, most notably that of the International Crisis Group, began their qualitative reporting early warning systems. In addition, regional early warning systems such as OSCE's early warning system, AU's CEWS, IGAD's CEWARN, or ECOWAS's ECOWARN have been established. As a new trend, once a state has become under the control of a United Nations Peacekeeping project through peace-, or state-, building, a national conflict early warning system is installed within the state in order to monitor and analyze the possibilities of the recurrence of violent conflict (e.g. South Sudan and DRC).³⁷³ What does this development mean in the current global context? By what theory has this development been driven? The purpose of this chapter is to investigate what theory has guided conflict early warning and early response in relation to world politics and also find out if there are immanent contradictions between the concept of conflict early warning and early response and its actual development.

In order to answer this question, this chapter draws on literature from the critical school of peacebuilding which argues that post-Cold War peacebuilding has been guided by the liberal peace ideology. This thesis hypothesizes that conflict early warning and early response has also been part of liberal peacebuilding and has been driven by it. However, most of the critical studies on liberal peacebuilding have been focused on post-conflict peace operations because the projection of liberal peace is most clearly seen in post conflict statebuilding through such projects as democratization, development and marketisation. As a result, the relation between liberal peace and conflict early warning and early response, regarded as part of conflict prevention, has not gained sufficient attention even in the critical schools of peacebuilding. A relationship between conflict early warning and early response and liberal peace theory is probably only seen in the literature of Oliver Richmond, in which he claims that 'the genre of conflict prevention indicates that an anticipated threat to peace both requires and justifies a liberal organization and state response.'³⁷⁴

This research tries to overcome this lack of knowledge on the relationship between the liberal peace and conflict early warning and early response by referring to the

³⁷³ See Mamiya, R. & Willmot, H. op. cit.

³⁷⁴ Richmond, O. (2007) op. cit. p.263.

governmentality school who argues that inscription and calculation are a crucial liberal technique to govern illiberal and abnormal states. In particular, the thesis draws on Laura Zanotti's Foucauldian view of post-Cold War peacebuilding as discipline and governmentality. In addition, the research focuses on the fact that conflict early warning was developed under a particular historical moment: the shift from the Westphalian order to a post Westphalian order. Therefore, the thesis examines the relationship between the liberal peace and conflict early warning and early response by taking a genealogical approach in order to illustrate that the currently dominant form of conflict early warning emerged along with the prevalence of liberal peacebuilding after the end of the Cold War.

This chapter argues that the modality of traditional early warning and early response systems is a liberal technique of government. In the post-Cold War era, the liberal western bloc faced new threats that came from within "failed" and "illiberal" states. But, these states were equally given sovereignty and autonomy. Liberal technique of governmentality was used along with biopolitics to exert power over these problematic states without overtly imposing power. In the post-Cold War era, a new concept of global order emerged, a post-Westphalian global order, where the equity of state sovereignty is no longer valid, and the emphasis is given to the welfare of individuals, or human security. Under this new concept, interventions in the internal affairs of sovereign states are justified. The major characteristics of traditional early warning such as data collection, statistics, reporting and warnings to higher levels of decision-makers are all significant aspects of liberal governmentality, which is a mechanism to make the illiberal and irresponsible states more legible and transparent to the international community. Combining both governmentality and biopolitics justifies the intrusive nature of conflict early warning and early response. Furthermore, this chapter claims that traditional early warning as a technique of government has been used not for people at risk but for those in the liberal western bloc to stabilize the international sphere.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, it discusses how the discourses on international threats and peace changed before and after the end of Cold War in order to show that conflict early warning emerged in a particular historical moment. It also discusses different types of power that was exerted by superpowers in order for global

governance. Second, the chapter discusses what theory has guided post-Cold War peacebuilding in general because it is considered that early warning and early response cannot be separated from peacebuilding. Then the chapter investigates what kind of role conflict early warning has in the post-Cold War environment by referring to the concept of governmentality. The thesis also revisits the traditionally accepted assumptions of conflict early warning and early response by seeing it as a liberal technique of government. Finally, it discusses a possible danger of conflict early warning as a liberal technique of government.

4.2 Changing Threats

Conflict early warning and early response gained popularity as a political and academic agenda after the end of Cold War and in particular after *an Agenda for Peace* by Boutros-Ghali. In order to find out what theory has guided conflict early warning, it is significant to examine why it has been developed in this particular way and not in another way by looking at the historical background of the emergence of conflict early warning. This section discusses a change in discourses on threats that was caused by the end of Cold War. In the post-Cold War context, the international community's security concerns significantly shifted from the single most important bipolar rivalry to various threats coming from unstable and failing states. At the same time, the power that the post-Cold War liberal global governance exerts has shifted from the power that Soviet and US had exerted during the Cold War. In addition, the emergence of a new global order required a new innovative technique to govern new threats.

During the Cold War, the major security threat came from the Cold War. For the US, it was the USSR, and for the USSR it was the US. Accordingly, there were two different kinds of concept of peace during this period. Roland Paris argues that 'both the Soviet Union and the United States had been conducting their own versions of peacebuilding during the Cold War, within their respective spheres of influence.'³⁷⁵ For the United States, that means managing internal conflicts by propping up friendly

³⁷⁵ Paris, R. (2004) *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P.34.

regimes that were often touted as democratic (even if the real character of the regimes was different. e.g. Guatemala and Afghanistan). For the Soviet Union, dealing with civil conflict within its client states meant building up socialist regimes on the Soviet model.³⁷⁶

The US claimed that they would look after issues arising in their sphere of influence, and the Soviet Union said the same. The superpower rivalry in the third world was the major source of international instability. This is because many third world states emerged from the control of western imperialism after 1947, and they were often ill disposed towards the former western colonial powers, but felt that they needed economic development assistance from more advanced industrial countries.³⁷⁷ Therefore, superpowers put in a lot of effort to establish governments that are cooperative with them. In addition, the US government actively supported “illiberal” and “abnormal” regimes with appalling records on human rights due to the fact that these regimes were anti-communist.³⁷⁸ This illustrates that they were not concerned about democratizing and normalizing these states. For example, the government of Guatemala was supported by the United States through military training and financial support. The Guatemala government received financial and military support from the US to stay in power and in exchange they opposed communists and rebels.

Another good example is a policy called “rollback”, which is a strategy to forcefully replace the regime of a state. For example, the US used this strategy in Nicaragua and Afghanistan. Afghanistan is in particular a good example because the US government gave military support to Taliban to fight against the invasion of the Soviet Union. The US government’s primary aim was to control the territory, but they are not concerned about the Islamic fundamentalist policy installed by Taliban. All territories and populations, however desperate and poor, were understood in this bipolar rivalry because if anything was neglected it could have risked the “domino effect.”³⁷⁹ However, ironically, the US then made war in 2001 against the Taliban due

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ Dockrill, S. R. (2005) *The End of the Cold War Era: The Transformation of the Global Security Order*. London: HodderArnold.

³⁷⁸ Evans, G & Newnham, J (1998) *Dictionary of International Relations*. London: Penguin Books. p.306.

³⁷⁹ Larner, W. & Walter, W. (2002) ‘The Political Rationality of “New Regionalism”: Toward a Genealogy of the Region.’ *Theory and Society*. Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 391-432.

to their support of Al-Qaida. The war was led under the rubric of war on terror. Following the war in Afghanistan, what we saw was statebuilding based on liberal peace theory. This normalization process from the abnormal to the responsible member of the international community is a new technique of global governance that the liberal western bloc utilized after the end of the Cold War.

The end of Cold War dramatically changed the concepts of threat and peace. Gareth Evans described the post-cold war environment, saying ‘the end of cold war created a much more fluid environment for many small and middle size states.’³⁸⁰ Therefore, ‘there is now more room for states to maneuver, and some are bound to seek to do so.’³⁸¹ At the same time, he argues that ‘the release of Cold War pressures has been associated with the resurgence of ethnonationalism.’³⁸² In this regard, Oliver Richmond argues that ‘since the end of Cold War, the main threats to the liberal peace have emerged in the following areas: in statelessness (as in Somalia); in the lack of development, free markets, and democracy; in ethnic and other forms of identity conflict; and in political violence and terrorism.’³⁸³ Such threats relate to multiple issues taking place in underdeveloped regions such as conflict, terrorism, underdevelopment, poverty, disease, geography, boundaries, identity, and human rights.³⁸⁴ These issues are thought to create international terrorism and criminality, refugee flows and mass migration that disrupt the functioning of global capital and, thus, the conditions for liberal markets on a global scale, and result in the disorder and instability in the international sphere.³⁸⁵

Since the end of the Cold War there has been an implicit consensus among scholars, policy-makers and practitioners that “liberal peace” is the most effective guiding principles that lead peace operation in tackling these issues.³⁸⁶ Bellamy and William state that ‘in arguing that peace operations are informed by liberal peace theory, we

³⁸⁰ Evans, G. (1993) *Cooperating Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990 and Beyond*. New South Wales: Allen & Unwin. p.4.

³⁸¹ Ibid

³⁸² Ibid

³⁸³ Richmond, O. (2007) op. cit. p.81.

³⁸⁴ Richmond, O. (2006) ‘Patterns of Peace.’ *Global Society*. Vol. 20, No. 4, pp.367-394. p.386.

³⁸⁵ Kartas, M. (2007) *Post-conflict Peace-building – Is the Hegemony of the ‘Good Governance’ Discourse Depoliticising the Local?* Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Nordic International Studies Association (NISA) in Odense, Denmark, from 24–25 May.

³⁸⁶ Bellamy, A. J. & Williams, P. D. (2010) op. cit. p.23.

mean – by and large – that peace operations have tried to create stable peace by promoting and defending the principles that underpin liberal peace.³⁸⁷ According to Richmond, in academic and policy writings related to peacebuilding and statebuilding, liberal peace is normally taken to mean ‘the processes, actors, and ‘technologies’ associated with humanitarian intervention, with security sector reform (and DDR), with institution building, good governance, democratisation, rule of law programming, human rights, reconstruction, development, and freemarket reform.’³⁸⁸ Roland Paris sees that major peacebuilding missions after the end of Cold War such as Namibia, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Liberia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Croatia, Guatemala, East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone are all internationally supported liberalization efforts.³⁸⁹ Richmond critically examines the nature of liberal peacebuilding and argues that ‘the liberal peace has become a model through which western-led agency, epistemology, and institutions, have attempted to unite the world under a hegemonic system that replicates liberal institutions, norms, and political, social, and economic systems.’³⁹⁰ The post-cold war peacebuilding projects which have been conducted in many states are therefore seen as a duplication of western-style states based on their experience. Liberal peace and liberal peacebuilding have been seen as an uncontroversial solution for reconstructing war-torn society, and some people even argue that the liberal peace has become a “universal prescription.”³⁹¹

In this context, the failed states came to be a target of liberal global governance. As David Chandler argues, it is not surprising that ‘in the current discourses of international security, statebuilding is seen as central to address the threats allegedly posed by weak states, which are understood to harbor terrorists, drug traffickers and international criminal networks and therefore export instability, refugees, crime and terror.’³⁹² Furthermore, within contemporary liberal peace discourse, poverty and underdevelopment are also constructed as ‘new threats’ that feed conflict and

³⁸⁷ Ibid. p.24.

³⁸⁸ Richmond, O. (2011) *A Post-Liberal Peace*. London: Routledge. p.5

³⁸⁹ Paris, R. (2004) op. cit.

³⁹⁰ Richmond, L. (2011) op. cit. p.1.

³⁹¹ Chua, A. (2003) *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability*. London: Arrow Books. p.8.

³⁹² Chandler, D. (2010) *International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance*. London and New York: Routledge. p.4.

terrorism.³⁹³ This perception has encouraged a growing convergence between the security and development policies of the major donors.³⁹⁴ In this context, therefore, failed states need to become the subject of administrative guidance as well. Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart clearly state that ‘this problem – failed state – is at the heart of a worldwide systemic crisis that constitutes the most serious challenge to global stability in the new millennium.’³⁹⁵

The most significant issue at this stage was therefore how the liberal western bloc would govern the source of insecurity - the abnormal and the illiberal states. Post Cold War peacebuilding has been implicitly understood among scholars and practitioners as peace-as-governance or statebuilding. Laura Zanotti, who examined the political rationale that sustained the post-Cold War international security regime by drawing on Michel Foucault, holds that ‘in time of proliferating threats, where total control of variables becomes impossible, international security is sought through techniques aimed at reducing risk and increasing predictability through the normalization of potentially dangerous actors.’³⁹⁶ By so doing, the international community tries to transform the abnormal to “responsible, peace-loving, predictable, transparent and well-functioning members of the international community.”³⁹⁷ In other words, they attempt to transform the abnormal/illiberal into self-governed entities. Therefore, she holds that international order no longer relies on the containment and confinement of perceived sources of danger, but upon “capillary and widespread techniques” of transformation of abnormal elements into responsible and well-functioning members of a community.³⁹⁸ Zanotti refers to this as *disciplinarity*.³⁹⁹

Drawing on Foucault, Zanotti argues that in classical Europe social control of deviant elements (paupers, lepers, fools) shifted from confinement to disciplinarity in order to

³⁹³ Duffield, M. (2001) *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*. Zed Books.

³⁹⁴ Willet, S. (2005) ‘New Barbarians at the Gate: Losing the Liberal Peace in Africa.’ *Review of African Political Economy*. Vol. 32, No. 106, pp.569-594.

³⁹⁵ Ghani, A. & Lockhart, C. (2009) *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*. New York: Oxford University Press. P.4.

³⁹⁶ Zanotti, L. (2011) op. cit. p.41.

³⁹⁷ Ibid. p.20

³⁹⁸ Ibid. p.20.

³⁹⁹ Ibid.

produce domesticated and socially productive individuals.⁴⁰⁰ Similarly, it is possible to see that the strategy taken during the Cold War was a containment policy and that of the post-Cold War period is a disciplinary and governmental approach. Post conflict peacebuilding, whose main components are the establishment of good governance, democratization, election, development, poverty reduction and so on, is therefore a major sphere where capillary and widespread techniques are used. In this context, it is not only the states but also NGOs that play a significant role as a capillary technique. For NGOs focus on the governance of society. In terms of bottom-up peacebuilding, different actors contribute to the liberal peace model by installing forms of peace-as-governance associated with the regulation, control, and protection of individuals and civil society.⁴⁰¹

However, the liberal western bloc had to face a significant problem in implementing statebuilding, or disciplinarity in that sovereignty and autonomy is equally given to each state. Non-interference in the internal affair is an international norm. While the liberal western bloc after their victory in the Cold War faced new threats posed by failing and failed states, the problem for liberalism and liberal peace is that international threats came from these abnormal and illiberal states: states which enjoy a sovereignty and autonomy that should not be interfered by any other state. Each state is equipped with the right of self-determination, a notion that was strengthened during the 1950s and 60s when many past colonies came to be independent from the western countries. Therefore, a major question that arose from the victory of the liberal western bloc was how to govern the world without exercising too much power, in particular the peripheries where most of the international threats come from.

4.3 Governmentality and Biopolitics

Zanotti argues that the Post-Cold War international government of insecurity is carried out ‘through the normalization of “abnormal” actors, pursued through the transformation of institutions into disciplinary ones, the proliferation of instruments

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid. p.20.

⁴⁰¹ Richmond, O. (2006b) ‘The Problem of Peace: Understanding the “Liberal Peace.”’ *Conflict, Security & Development*. Vol.6, No.3, pp. 291-314. p.299.

for knowing and steering states' behavior, and the intensification of biopolitical instruments for the international management of populations.'⁴⁰² Zanotti views post-cold war peacebuilding as a practice of government, which is a mechanism for achieving global liberal governance through the technique of governmentality.⁴⁰³ Governmentality is a concept developed by Michel Foucault. The term "government" used here is often, in the simplest term, defined as "conduct of conduct".⁴⁰⁴ Mitchell Dean states that "'to conduct" means to lead, to direct or to guide, and implies some sort of calculations.'⁴⁰⁵ In another sense, the term means 'our behaviours, our actions and even our comportment.'⁴⁰⁶ Therefore, simply speaking, "conduct of conduct", or government, means to guide people's behavior. In other words, government is a form of power that 'seeks to fashion and guide the bodily comportments and inward states of others and of the self.'⁴⁰⁷ Miller and Rose argue that 'central to the possibility of modern forms of government... are the associations formed between entities constituted as 'political' and the projects, plans and practices of those authorities – economic, legal, spiritual, medical, technical – who endeavor to administer the lives of others in the light of conceptions of what is good, healthy, normal, virtuous, efficient or profitable.'⁴⁰⁸ While the control of human behavior no longer relies on coercive power, knowledge is the power mobilized in a practice of government. Mitchell Dean defines the term government as follows:

'government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes.'⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰² Zanotti, L. (2011) op. cit. p.17

⁴⁰³ Zanotti, L. (2011) op. it.

⁴⁰⁴ Dean, M. (2010) *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*. London: Sage. P.17.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ Huxley, M. (2007) 'Geographies of Governmentality.' In Crampton, J. W. & Elden, S. (eds) *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography*. Hampshire: Ashgate. Ch.20. p.187

⁴⁰⁸ Miller, P. & Rose, N. (2008) *Governing the Present: Administering Economic, Social and Personal Life*. Cambridge: Polity. P.55.

⁴⁰⁹ Dean, M. (2010) op. cit. p. 18.

For the purpose of this study, it is significant to understand how governmentality and liberal peace are connected because in the post-Cold War context, authorities are required to govern problematic states liberally. Here, Miller and Rose's account of a liberal technique of government is briefly summarized.⁴¹⁰ Firstly, liberal strategies tie government to the ideal knowledges of human conduct developed within the social and human sciences. The activities of government become connected up to all manner of facts, theories, diagrams, techniques and knowledgeable persons. Secondly, liberal strategies of government become dependent upon the technique of disciplining, which promises to create individuals who do not need to be governed by others, but will govern themselves, master themselves, and care for themselves. It simultaneously specifies subjects in terms of certain norms of civilization, and effect a division between the civilized member of society and those lacking the capacities to exercise their citizenship responsibly. Finally, a number of frictions and disturbances were reduced as 'social' problems that had consequences for national well-being and thus called for new forms of remedial authoritative attention. In each case, experts attempt to mobilize political resources such as legislation, funding or organizational capacity for their own ends. Political forces seek to give effect to their strategies through utilizing and instrumentalizing forms of authority other than those of 'the State' in order to govern – spatially and constitutionally – 'at a distance'. Authority is accorded to formally autonomous expert authorities, and simultaneously the exercise of that autonomy is shaped through various forms of licensure, through professionalization and through bureaucratization. From this time forth, the domain of 'politics' will be distinguished from other spheres of authoritative rule, yet inextricably bound to the authority of expertise.⁴¹¹

Miller and Rose argue that the rise of expertise is linked to a transformation in the rationalities and technologies of government. They hold that expertise emerged as a possible solution to a problem that confronted liberal mentalities of government: how might one reconcile the principle that the domain of the political must be restricted, with the recognition of the vital political implications of formally private activities?

⁴¹⁰ Miller, P. & Rose, N. (2008) op. cit. pp. 202-6. This paragraph is a summary of their account of liberalism.

⁴¹¹ Miller, P. & Rose, N. (2008) op. cit. pp. 202-6.

Miller and Rose claim that ‘experts hold out the hope that problems of regulation can remove themselves from the disputed terrain of politics and relocate onto the tranquil yet seductive territory of truth.’⁴¹² They further argue that

‘on the one hand, they would ally themselves with political authorities, focusing upon their problems and problematizing new issues, translating political concerns about economic productivity, innovation, industrial unrest, social stability, law and order, normality and pathology, and so forth, into the vocabulary of management, accounting, medicine, social science and psychology. On the other hand, they would seek to form alliance with individuals themselves, translating their daily worries and decisions over investment, child rearing, factory organization or diet into a language claiming the power of truth, and offering to teach them the techniques by which they manage better, earn more, bring healthier or happier children, and no more beside.’⁴¹³

In the case of peacebuilding, experts such as academics can achieve this by relocating fundamentally political projects of the west with the domain of truths and justify their intervention in the internal affairs of states.

There is another technique that justifies the liberal interventions in the internal affair of states: biopolitics. ‘At the UN, the beginning of the new millennium brought an increasing concern with knowing, managing, and protecting the wealth and health of populations, which converged with UN governmental and disciplinary techniques for monitoring, steering, and reforming the institutions of disorderly states. In conjunction with the conceptualization of international security as “human security” and the reorganization of the task of international organizations around the notion of a “responsibility to protect” populations, biopolitics became a prominent trajectory of international government of insecurity. Instruments for assessing people’s security proliferated, and intervention was legitimized on the grounds of a state’s failure to protect its own citizens from gross violations of human rights.’⁴¹⁴

⁴¹² Miller, P. & Rose, N. (2008) op. cit. p.69.

⁴¹³ Miller, P. & Rose, N. (2008) op. cit. p.68.

⁴¹⁴ Zanotti, L. (2011) op cit. p.21.

This emergence of biopolitics is also described as a post-Westphalian global order. After the end of the Cold War, the absolute sovereignty that used to be given to every state began to be problematized by the international community in spite of the fact that it is one of most significant principles of liberalism. Vivienne Jabri also argues that “a central transformation of the late modern era has been a shift in our understanding of the sphere of the international.”⁴¹⁵ What she claims is that while in the modern era the international is understood as one based on the sovereign equality of states, in the late modern era it is one that is defined in terms of humanity. The former is also referred to as the Westphalian global order and the latter the post-Westphalian global order.⁴¹⁶

The most significant point here is that while the various threats to the liberal governance and international security are located within sovereign states, the principle of non-aggression and non-interference is given to all states. In the Westphalian global order, sovereignty/autonomy was considered to be “the necessary starting point upon which modern liberal democratic forms of government are constituted.”⁴¹⁷ In this context, ‘peace operations were initially conceived as a tool for maintaining orders between states in an international society based on rules arising from state sovereignty, especially non-aggression and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states.’⁴¹⁸ Even if they assist states in the suppression of separatist movements or in the building of state capacity, in order to uphold and protect Westphalian values ‘such operations acted only with the consent of the sovereign states involved and sought merely to create the conditions necessary to facilitate the resolution of conflicts by state parties.’⁴¹⁹

However, ‘since the end of the Cold War the Westphalian order – and its attendant conception of peace operations – has come under challenge from the processes of globalization and changing ideas about the meaning of sovereignty.’⁴²⁰ After the Cold

⁴¹⁵ Jabri, V. (2010) *War and the Transformation of Global Politics*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. p.125.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

⁴¹⁷ Chandler, D. (2010) op. cit. p.2.

⁴¹⁸ Bellamy, A. J. & Williams, P. D. (2010) op. cit. p.29.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid. p.32.

⁴²⁰ Bellamy, A. J. & Williams, P. D. (2010) op. cit.

War, ‘the fact that states, which are held to lack capacity – or to potentially lack adequate capacity – are making sovereign decisions is held to be a major threat both to their own citizens and to the security of the international society of states itself.’⁴²¹ Therefore, sovereignty is no longer seen as an absolute right that is given to sovereign states. Sovereignty is now understood as “a state’s responsibility to protect its neediest citizens”⁴²² under the rubric of “responsibility to protect (R2P)”. According to the post-Westphalian perspective, ‘peace operations need to be in the business of protecting human rights where host states prove unwilling or unable to do so, and of helping to build states capable of fulfilling their responsibilities in the long term.’⁴²³ Therefore, Jabri argues that ‘the post-Westphalian global order seeks to move beyond a statist understanding of the international and towards a conception that highlights the human, variously conceived in terms of human rights and human security.’⁴²⁴ She further argues that in the late modern era, military intervention could take place for the realisation of human security.⁴²⁵

Jabri argues that humanitarian intervention set the stage for a post-Westphalian order that is not based on the sovereignty of states any more as the baseline of legitimacy, but ‘on the judgement of conduct in relation to the realm of the human and its expression in human rights.’⁴²⁶ Intervention, therefore, could be justified by referring to humanitarian emergency and the international sphere and the agencies that possessed the capacity to function in this sphere could take over governance functions from states deemed failed or weak, states perceived to be both a danger to their own and to others.⁴²⁷ “The emergence of a late modern international imperial order was built and rendered possible by a hierarchy of states defined in terms of both capacity and legitimacy.”⁴²⁸

4.4 Conflict Early Warning as a Liberal Technique of Government

⁴²¹ Chandler, D. (2010) op. cit. p.3.

⁴²² Bellamy, A. J. & Williams, P. D. (2010) op. cit. p.38.

⁴²³ Ibid.

⁴²⁴ Jabri, V. (2010) op. cit. p. 125

⁴²⁵ Ibid. p.126.

⁴²⁶ Ibid. pp.120.

⁴²⁷ Ibid. pp.120-121.

⁴²⁸ Ibid. p.126.

4.4.1 Making it Visible and Interventionable

With the advent of the concept of the post-Westphalian global order discussed above, the international community could intervene in the internal affairs of states by referring to the realization of human security. What is needed here is a technique to make what is to be governed visible by using objectively collected expert information. Accordingly, good governance doctrines promote visibility, codification, and simplification at both the state and international level. According to Zanotti, international organisations need to develop ‘performance techniques to assess, reward, or punish the behaviour of governments with regard to fields that were previously considered to fall within their sovereign jurisdiction.’⁴²⁹ She argues that by utilizing ‘database, standards, and indicators of performance’, each government of the state is ‘placed within a mechanism of constant scrutiny, comparison, and discipline.’⁴³⁰ In the post Cold War period, she argues, each state was regarded as the subject of “exams” and “clinical observation”.⁴³¹ In clinical observation, each subject is located within a domain of standardized statistical data and at the same time treated as an individual who must be responsible for a unique path to sanity.⁴³² Furthermore, the performance of each is recorded and ranked.⁴³³ According to Heathershaw, ‘the number of research projects aimed at identifying variables and “measuring” state sovereignty in quantitative and qualitative terms proliferated.’⁴³⁴ Zanotti argues that

“in the post-Cold War era, governments are scrutinized through the collection of an array of statistical data and indicators of performance, as well as an intensification of reporting to and by international organizations (the EU, the UN, the World Bank, the international Monetary Fund, the organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], and many other multilateral and bilateral organizations).’ These methods of government/knowledge constitute the international arena as an object to be known and transformed through political interventions. The international community looks increasingly like a

⁴²⁹ Zanotti, L. (2011) op. cit. p.29.

⁴³⁰ Ibid.

⁴³¹ Ibid.

⁴³² Ibid.

⁴³³ Ibid.

⁴³⁴ Heathershaw, J. (2008) ‘Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding Discourses.’ *Millennium - Journal of International Studie*. Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 597-621. p.611.

series of “centers for calculation” (the UN and its agencies, the EU, and NATO, just to name a few) where information and data are elaborated and adopted as the criteria for delivering rewards and punishment. The performance of government institutions is represented in standardized terms, measured, and included in a field of comparison.”⁴³⁵

Foucault argues that ‘legitimate government will not be arbitrary government, but will be based upon intelligence concerning those whose well-being it is mandated to enhance.’⁴³⁶ He holds that modern disciplinary society resorts to “writing” as an instrument of control.⁴³⁷ Here, by the term writing he means that ‘everything that happens, everything that the individual does and says, is graded and recorded, and then to transmit this information from below up through the hierarchical levels, and then, finally, to make this information accessible and thereby assure the principle of omnivisibility.’⁴³⁸ Miller and Rose argue that “written reports, drawings, pictures, numbers, charts, graphs and statistics”⁴³⁹ are a crucial technology of government. The accumulation of inscriptions in certain locals, by certain persons or groups, make them powerful in the sense that it confers upon them the capacity to engage in certain calculations and to lay a claim to legitimacy for their plans and strategies because they are, in a real sense, in the know about that which they seek to govern. Therefore, conflict early warning systems do not only make the internal affairs of states visible and calculable but also justify early response, or interventions in internal affairs. The peacefulness, illiberalness, abnormality of each state and their abuses in human rights are inscribed and calculated by conflict early warning tools in order to allow interventions. By utilizing these “inscription devices”, Miller and Rose argue that

‘it is rendered in a form in which it can be debated and diagnosed. Information in this sense is not the outcome of neutral recording function. It is itself a way of acting upon the real, a way of devising techniques for inscribing it in such a

⁴³⁵ Zanolini, L. (2011) op. cit. p.31.

⁴³⁶ Foucault, M. (1980a) cited in Miller, P. & Rose, N. (2008) op. cit. p.203.

⁴³⁷ Foucault, M. (2008) *Psychiatric Power*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p.48.

⁴³⁸ Ibid.

⁴³⁹ Miller, P. & Rose, N. (2008) op. cit. p.65.

way as to make the domain in question susceptible to evaluation, calculation and intervention.’⁴⁴⁰

It is in this line of development that we can see that conflict early warning as an inscription and calculation mechanism is a crucial liberal technique of government by making those to be governed visible, calculable, comparable and eventually interventionable. As mentioned above, conflict early warning and early response systems emerged and developed as a significant political and academic agenda after the post-Cold War era under the post-Westphalian concept of global governance. Conflict early warning systems therefore were needed and developed as a technique of government in order to make those to be governed legible and interventionable. Miller and Rose argue that “eighteenth-century European conceptions of government articulated a notion of statistics, or science of state, in which the operation of government was to be made possible by the accumulation and tabulation of facts about the domain to be governed.”⁴⁴¹ Similarly, liberal global governance emerged in the international sphere after the Cold War in a post-Westphalian global order where conflict early warning and early response also emerged as a significant political agenda.

As *Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms* defines, early warning systematically collects and analyzes information coming from areas of crises.⁴⁴² The areas of crises such as failed states particularly after September 11th have begun to be seen as one of the major sources of threats to the international community, and therefore are regarded as the domain to be governed. As a result, as David Nyheim’s research shows, quantitative indices of state fragility have been developed from 2000 onward.⁴⁴³ Moreover, the qualitative approaches were also developed for state fragility since 2005.⁴⁴⁴

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid. pp.65-66.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid. p.65.

⁴⁴² Schmid, A. (1998) op. cit.

⁴⁴³ Nyhemi, D. (2009) op. cit. p. 39.

⁴⁴⁴ Nyhemi, D. (2009) op. cit

Here, it is also possible to see the role of experts. Heathershaw argues that the academic idea of the ‘failed state’ has been incorporated in the grand narratives of policy-makers, and developed as the justification for interventions and post-conflict operations in Afghanistan and Iraq under the mantra of the ‘war on terror.’”⁴⁴⁵ It was crucial for liberal government that conflict early warning and early response tools were quantitative approaches developed by academics. This is because experts, who ‘embodies neutrality, authority and skill in a wise figure, operate according to an ethic code “beyond good and evil”, play a significant role in relocating the domain of politics onto the domain of truths.’⁴⁴⁶

Table.3 David Nyheim’s Survey on Qualitative Tools⁴⁴⁷

[Violent Conflict]

- Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction (CPR) Network: Early Warning and Early Response Handbook (V2.3) (2005); Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Handbook (V2.2) (2005); Guide de Diagnostic des Conflits (2003)
- Bush: A Handbook for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (2004)
- Department for International Development (UK): Conducting Strategic Conflict Assessments (2002)
- Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (Germany): Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Management (2001)
- FEWER, International Alert, Saferworld (UK): Development in Conflict: A Seven Step Tool for Planners (2001)
- Clingendael Institute (Netherlands): Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework (2000)
- German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ): An Indicator Model for Use as an Additional Instrument for Planning and Analysis in Development Co-operation (1998)
- Fund for Peace (USA): Conflict Assessment System Tool (1996)
- United States Agency for International Development (USA): Conflict Assessment Framework (2005); Conducting a Conflict Assessment – A Framework for Strategy and Program Development (2004)
- UNDP: Conflict-Related Development Analysis (2002); Peace and Development Analysis (2003)
- World Bank: Conflict Analysis Framework (2002)
- Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (UK): Conflict Analysis and Response Definition (2001)
- CARE International (USA): Benefits-Harms Handbook (2001)
- European Commission: Check-List for Root Causes of Conflict (1999); Peace-building and Conflict Prevention in Developing Countries – A Practical Guide (1999); Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment – A Practical Working Tool for Prioritising Development Assistance in Unstable Situations (1999)
- Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (UK): A Manual for Early Warning and Early Response (1998)

⁴⁴⁵ Heathershaw, J. (2008) op. cit. p.611.

⁴⁴⁶ Miller, P. & Rose, N. (2008) op. cit. pp.68-69.

⁴⁴⁷ Nyheim, D. (2009) op. cit. p.46.

[State Fragility]

- Canadian International Development Agency (Canada): On the Road to Recovery: Breaking the Cycle of Poverty and Fragility - A Guide for Effective Development Cooperation in Fragile States (2007)
- Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Netherlands): The Stability Assessment Framework – Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development (2005)
- Department for International Development (UK): Scenario and Contingency Planning for Fragile States (2007); Country Governance Analysis (2006); Drivers of Change (2003)
- Prime Minister's Strategy Unit (UK): Countries at Risk of Instability – Country Strategy Formulation Process Manual (2005)

Conflict early warning systems as a technique of government have developed at various organisations. They are categorized into four different types of organizations: inter-governmental, governmental, international NGO and local NGO early warning systems. It was the UN that took initiatives to promote the significance of conflict early warning and developed several early warning systems within its structure in order to visualise potential violent conflict. For example, the seven UN bodies either have, or plan to make progress toward developing, early warning systems.⁴⁴⁸ The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)'s Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) is a well known inter-net based early warning service.⁴⁴⁹ UNDP's country early warning systems are unique in term that, rather than monitoring a number of states globally, their early warning systems build early warning systems within a country (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina).⁴⁵⁰ In spite of the existence of various early warning systems within the UN structure, Zenko and Friedman argue that the UN has not had a system-wide early warning and assessment function due to the fear of some sceptical states.⁴⁵¹

Recently, the UN invented a new form of government (early warning system) which can achieve even stronger control. Since the UN Security Council Resolution 1996 in 2011, which provided the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) with the first explicit mandate to build an early warning system within the country, conflict early warning began to be incorporated into UN peacekeeping projects in support of the

⁴⁴⁸ See Zenko, M. & Friedman, R. R. (2011) op. cit.

⁴⁴⁹ For UNOCHA: <http://www.unocha.org/>, for IRIN: <http://www.irinnews.org/> (Accessed on 24/June/2013)

⁴⁵⁰ UNDP <http://www.undp.ba/index.aspx?PID=21&RID=63> (Accessed on 24/June/2013)

⁴⁵¹ See Zenko, M. & Friedman, R. R. (2011) op. cit. p.22.

protection of civilians (POC).⁴⁵² The new development of conflict early warning is seen in the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO).⁴⁵³ Mamiya and Willmot argue that the UN's challenges and failures to "protect civilians" in some occasions such as the Rwandan genocide or more recent atrocities in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) made evaluators think that a lack of early warning information is a major factor.⁴⁵⁴ The uniqueness of this inter-governmental approach is that, unlike the other inter-governmental systems that evaluate which state is at risk of conflict or state failure and then make a decision to intervene in the internal affairs, external actors (UN peacekeeping forces) are already in the states concerned and the early warning systems focus on the security of people within a particular state. Therefore, their early warning mechanism is largely different from traditional inter-governmental early warning systems. What Zanotti calls an array of discipline is taking place within the UN.

As the UN has been overburdened and there are sceptical members states within the UN, regional early warning systems have gained popularity and have been established in Europe and Africa. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)'s High Commissioner on National Minorities is one of the most successful early warning systems. What made it special is that it has a built-in early response mechanism,⁴⁵⁵ which is considered to have played a crucial role in preventing conflict in Macedonia.⁴⁵⁶ The regionalisation of inter-governmental early warning systems is most clearly seen in Africa. The African Union (AU) developed the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development developed the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), and the Economic Community of Central African States is planning to establish the Early Warning Mechanism of Central Africa (Mecanisme d'alerte rapide de l'Afrique centrale: MARAC). Regional governments' early warning systems are seen to be the best

⁴⁵² Mamiya, R. & Willmot, H. (2013) op. cit.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ Mamiya, R. & Willmot, H. (2013) op. cit.

⁴⁵⁵ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)'s High Commissioner on National Minorities. <http://www.osce.org/hcnm/43265> (Accessed on 24/June/2013)

⁴⁵⁶ See Nyheim, D. (2009) op. cit. p.58.

places to exercise the liberal technique of government. One of the reasons for it is that joining a regional organization that replaces some state functions of its member states is voluntary. As long as states join the organization voluntarily, rules are not imposed on from above. Therefore, without imposing power, it can govern member states liberally. Therefore, regional early warning and early response systems have justification for monitoring and intervening in internal affairs of member states. Wallensteen argues that the OSCE is more active than the UN in Europe ‘due to its unintrusive nature, as well as the fact that it does not represent the interests of any particular major power.’⁴⁵⁷

Governmental early warning systems are a little different from others because they share a characteristic of intelligence. For example, France’s *Système d’Alerte Précoce* (SAP) and the US National Intelligence Office for Warning pay particular attention to threats that are posed by violent conflict and state fragility to their national interests.⁴⁵⁸ Sean O’Brien’s early warning analysis tool was developed for the US Army in order to ‘deepen and extend the ACT (Analyzing Complex Threats) methodology to validate and apply a model to forecast the likelihood of country instabilities that could challenge US national security interests.’⁴⁵⁹

NGO early warning systems and their early warning reports are as important as the quantitative early warning systems. As discussed above, traditional conflict early warning studies have been based on the post-Westphalian concept of global order where interventions in internal affairs of sovereign states are justified by referring to the abuse of human rights. But, almost all states use the norm of Westphalian order - equal right of sovereignty states and non-interference – for the defense of their sovereignty. In this context, NGOs, who are perceived to be separate from the interests of particular powerful states in spite of the fact that they are strongly motivated by the western mode of human rights, can penetrate the wall of sovereignty

⁴⁵⁷ Wallensteen, P. (2002) “Reassessing Recent Conflict: Direct Versus Structural Prevention.” In Hampson & Malone (2002). Ch.9. p.224.

⁴⁵⁸ Nyheim, D. (2009) op. cit.

⁴⁵⁹ O’Brien, S. P. (2001) op. cit. Also see O’Brien, S. P. (2002) “Anticipating the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: An Early Warning Approach to Conflict and Instability Analysis.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol.46, no.6, pp.791-811.

and provide the international community with early warning reports.⁴⁶⁰ International Crises Group (ICG) is the best example of an operational early warning system by an *international NGO*. Their early warning systems are based on qualitative analysis of potential violent conflicts by country experts. They regularly publish reports and anyone can receive their *Weekly Update* once they have signed up for it. Their reports contain not only analyses of some concerned situations in specific states but also concrete recommendations to stakeholders. When they find that a crisis is pressing, they issue *Alerts*⁴⁶¹ or *Media Releases* to inform stakeholders. They all come out with specific recommendations in support of responses from concerned actors. For example, in the case of the civil war in Sri Lanka, ICG issued some analytical reports with specific recommendations to the government of Sri Lanka, LTTE, political parties, the international community and donor states. An Alert was also issued on the 9th of March, 2009, when they found that a humanitarian crisis was pressing in Sri Lanka, two months before the civil war was declared over by the president of Sri Lanka. On the 20th of April they also urged stakeholders to take actions in order to prevent an expected atrocity in the North of Sri Lanka through a *Media Release*.⁴⁶² In addition, they sent letters directly to specific stakeholders to urge them to take decisive action on the 11 of May, 2009, when a humanitarian crisis became imminent.⁴⁶³

Apart from these early warning systems, there are also ranking-based early warning systems. These are usually developed by think tanks. For example, the Failed State Index developed by the Fund for Peace for the purpose of conflict early warning and assessment ranks each state numerically and also allows us to compare data visually by using a map.⁴⁶⁴ Which state is more potentially dangerous to the international community's security can be easily seen from conflict early warning systems. This

⁴⁶⁰ Steele, B. J. & Amoureux, J. L. (2005) 'NGOs and Monitoring Genocide: The Benefits and Limits to Human Rights Panopticon.' *Journal of International Studies*. Vol.34, No.2, pp.403-432.

⁴⁶¹ You can see the past Alerts issued by ICG at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/alerts.aspx> (Accessed on 24/June/2013)

⁴⁶² International Crisis Group (2009) *Crisis in Sri Lanka*. 20 April. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2009/crisis-in-sri-lanka.aspx> (Accessed on 24/June/2013)

⁴⁶³ They sent a letter to the then prime minister of Japan Taro Aso. International Crisis Group (2009) *Japan: Back UN Action on Sri Lanka*. 11 May. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2009/japan-back-un-action-on-sri-lanka.aspx> (Accessed on 24/June/2013)

⁴⁶⁴ The Fund for Peace. *Failed State Index*. <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi> (Accessed on 25/08/2012).

type of early warning system has the power to label which state is failing and abnormal. Therefore, as Miller and Rose claim, it can identify which one requires interventions.

It is also significant to understand where the warnings are sent in the disciplinary society. The data collected in the mainstream model is processed and analysed and is supposed to be sent to international and western governments. Foucault argues that in the modern “disciplinary” society *hierarchical observation* is a significant technique for controlling people, which means that control over people can be achieved merely by observing them and by sending the data collected to a higher level.⁴⁶⁵ A perfect system of observation is considered to be something like Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon where one guard can see all the inmates from a central tower.⁴⁶⁶ However, since this is usually impossible in our society, ‘there is a need for “relays” of observers, hierarchically ordered, through whom observed data passes from lower to higher level.’⁴⁶⁷ This hierarchical structure of conflict early warning was pointed out by Casey Barrs.⁴⁶⁸ However, Kumar Rupesinghe already observed the hierarchical information flow of humanitarian early warning from lower to higher in his work written in 1989 by saying that ‘a more serious assumption behind the monolithic approach is how rich North can predict and develop the warning capacity for the victims, i.e. the rich North will analyze the information from the raw material derived from the South.’⁴⁶⁹

Having said that, to claim that conflict early warning and early response is a technique of government is not to say that it has been working successfully. It has not. The international community has been struggling to rule the world through the liberal technique of government. As many critical thinkers on liberal peacebuilding argue, liberal peacebuilding has encountered many resistances and has not worked well in many states. The implementation of conflict early warning as government is not free from objections either. Those who want to stick to the Westphalian global order

⁴⁶⁵ Gutting, G. (2011) ‘Michel Foucault.’ *Stanford Encyclopaedia of philosophy*. p. 8.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid. p.9

⁴⁶⁸ Barrs, C. (2006) op. cit.

⁴⁶⁹ Rupesinghe, K. (1989) ‘Early Warning: Some conceptual problems.’ *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*. Vol.20, No.2, pp.183-191. P.186

strongly criticize the proponents of the post-Westphalian global order for its disguised form of interventionist and western hegemony. Therefore, early warning and early response is a battle field between those who stick to the Westphalian global order and those who promote the post-Westphalia global order.

4.4.2 Biopolitics and Early Warning

The nature of the traditional conflict early warning and early response is post-Westphalian. Conflict early warning and early response was born in the process of a shift from the Westphalian global order to the post-Westphalian global order. The concept of the equity of sovereign states and non-intervention and that of conflict early warning and early response - monitoring the internal affairs of sovereign states, giving warnings to policy-makers, and, if necessary, intervening in the internal affairs (often without the consent of the states concerned) – do not sit together comfortably. The mainstream concept of conflict early warning and early response is premised on the post-Westphalian assumption that the meaning of the international is understood not in terms of nations but in term of humans, and interventions in other states are justified by referring to humanity and human security.⁴⁷⁰

Conflict early warning and early response as a post-Westphalian concept can be found in some political texts. The wedding of conflict early warning and early response and the responsibility to protect is very symbolic in this sense. The report compiled by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) argues that ‘peace operations need to be in the business of protecting human rights where host states prove unwilling or unable to do so, and of helping to build states capable of fulfilling their responsibilities in the long term.’⁴⁷¹ It further argues that ‘prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect.’⁴⁷² In relation to conflict prevention, the report clearly articulates its liberal peace intention to build a safer world:

⁴⁷⁰ Jabri, V. (2010) op. cit.

⁴⁷¹ Bellamy, A. J. & Williams, P. D. (2010) op. cit. p.38.

⁴⁷² ICISS (2001) op. cit. p.XI.

‘conflict prevention is not merely a national or local affair. The failure of prevention can have wide international consequences and costs. Moreover, for prevention to succeed, strong support from the international community is often needed, and in many cases may be indispensable. Such support may take many forms. It may come in the form of development assistance and other efforts to help address the root cause of potential conflict; or efforts to provide support for local initiatives to advance good governance, human rights, or the rule of law; or good offices missions, mediation efforts and other efforts to promote dialogue or reconciliation. In some cases international support for prevention efforts may take the form of inducements; in others, it may involve a willingness to apply tough and perhaps even punitive measures.’⁴⁷³

The report then claims that early warning is one of the most significant conditions for the effective prevention of conflict by arguing that ‘there has to be knowledge of the fragility of the situation and the risk associated with it – so called “early warning.”’⁴⁷⁴ Moreover, the 2005 World Summit directly linked the R2P and early warning.

‘Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.’⁴⁷⁵

If the international community strongly sticks to the Westphalian concept of sovereignty, it would have been hard to talk about conflict early warning and early response within the international sphere and to develop this kind of intrusive mechanism. In fact, even now when the concept of conflict early warning has been accepted by many states, some states who fear intervention in their own soils stick to

⁴⁷³ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid, p.20. The other two conditions other than early warning are preventive toolbox and political will.

⁴⁷⁵ United Nations General Assembly. A/60/L.1. September 14-16th, 2005.

the Westphalian concept of sovereignty and oppose the implementation of conflict early warning and early response mechanism within the UN.⁴⁷⁶

It is in fact possible to find some fear of using the humanitarian early warning systems in the literature written by Kumar Rupesinghe in 1989. The point is that it was written before conflict early warning became an international agenda. He succinctly argues that:

‘often in discussions suspicious are aroused by the concept. People are generally suspicious of attempts to develop intelligence systems which make them vulnerable. Images of George Orwell’s 1984 loom large, as do fear of thought control and the capacity of computers to monitor and ultimately control people and their freedom. The increased use of computers by the police and other agencies has provoked debates about computer privacy. The development of transborder data flows has conjured up discussions about the very notion of state sovereignty. Often information gathering for early warnings is associated with national security systems, where information is gathered in order to monitor riots, revolutions and other sorts of “trouble from below”.’⁴⁷⁷

This sort of argument has since disappeared with the international sphere transformed towards a post-Westphalian global order. Instead, the debates on conflict early warning and early response have been dominated by problem-solving approaches.

4.4.3 Intelligence and Early Warning

Another set of evidence that illustrates that traditional early warning and early response is deeply embedded in the post-Westphalian ideology can be seen by comparing “intelligence” and “early warning.” During the cold war, there were no “conflict” early warning and early response systems that took the current form of conflict early warning, and they never became a major international agenda. However,

⁴⁷⁶ Zenko, M. & Friedman, R. (2011) op. cit.

⁴⁷⁷ Rupesinghe, K. (1989) op. cit. p.185.

something very similar to early warning played a crucial role under the name of “intelligence”, which is characterized with national security interests, a closed-nature and centralization (See Table.4). Both early warning and intelligence in fact use the same methodology for anticipating future threats whether it is to national security or human security: the “intelligence cycle” (1. planning and direction, 2. collection, 3. processing, 4. analysis and production, 5. dissemination). It is understandable why intelligence was a more suitable form rather than “humanitarian” early warning considering that during the Cold War each side was preparing to fight the other for their own interests. For example, the US intelligence apparatus during the Cold War focused on threats of nuclear or conventional attacks on the US and NATO forces.⁴⁷⁸ The major role of intelligence therefore consisted of the collection of “secrets” that could help answer well-defined questions⁴⁷⁹ – for example, the opposing sides’ intentions, military and technology. The prime security issues were defined by the bipolar system, and most of the practitioners, academics and lay people were preoccupied with the Cold War’s bipolar structure during this period.

Although the World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS), developed by Charles McClelland⁴⁸⁰ at the University of Southern California in the 70s, is often viewed as a prototype of conflict early warning by some, its primary purpose was to monitor the flow of action and response between states unlike the intrastate conflict early warning systems developed after the end of the Cold War.⁴⁸¹ This was not intended to prevent conflicts or to be used for human security. Rather, its aim was more academically oriented – an attempt to find a pattern in the international sphere. Another well-known data set developed during the Cold War was that of the Conflict and Peace Data Bank Project led by Edward Azar at the University of North Carolina.⁴⁸² Most early warning systems were not intended to be developed in order to invoke early response. Although “humanitarian” early warning systems in fact existed during the Cold War, major early warning systems were focused on famine and refugee flow early warnings, not intrastate conflicts and state failure. For example, the Food and Agriculture

⁴⁷⁸ Rubin, B. R. (2002) *Blood on the Doorstep: The Politics of Preventive Action*. New York: Century Foundation Press. P.140.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid. p.141.

⁴⁸⁰ McClelland, C. (1978) op. cit.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid.

⁴⁸² Azar, E. (1980) op. cit.

Organization of the UN (FAO) established the Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) in 1975 for the prediction of food crisis.

Table.4 Summary of Differences between National Security Intelligence Analysis and Conflict Assessment⁴⁸³

	National security intelligence analysis	Conflict assessment and analysis
Subject, process, and outcome of analysis	Threats to national security Clandestine and open sources Typically distinct from data collection No policy recommendations Secretive, private, classified Value in product	Threats to human security Open sources Typically not distinct from data collection Frequently includes policy recommendations Collaborative, consultative, public Value in both product and (participatory) process
Organizational issues	Governments' intelligence organizations Analyst set off from decision maker Analysis is core function Relatively significant resources for analysis	International organizations, NGOs, aid agencies, foreign ministries Analyst and decision maker are often one and the same Analysis is rarely core function Relatively minimal resources for analysis

If intelligence and conflict early warning use the same methodology, intelligence can also be used for conflict prevention. However, why does the post-Cold War “humanitarian” or “conflict” early warning have to be characterized by its humanitarian goals, openness and decentralization in data collection? The characteristics of conflict early warning and early response - “humanitarian”, “open” and “decentralized” - are crucial elements in post-Westphalian early warning because if conflict early warning expects early response, which means intervening in the internal affairs of sovereign states through mediation, negotiation, economic sanctions and often military intervention, conflict early warning has to be open, accountable, decentralized and humanitarian in order to justify their intervention. In addition, it has to look “objective” by generating warnings through sophisticated tools or by relying on expert knowledge. Contrary to intelligence whose characteristics are easily linked with the state power, law enforcement agency and force, those characteristics of conflict early warning are significant component of global liberal peace because the

⁴⁸³ Woocher, L. (2011) *Conflict Assessment and Intelligence Analysis: Commonality, Convergence, and Complementarity*. Washington: United States Institute for Peace (USIP). P.5.

international regime of security no longer relies on coercive power, in Foucault's term "sovereign power", after the Cold-War. If post-Cold War peacebuilding uses a technique of government that is a type of power of knowledge, the data collected and analysed through early warning systems allows people and governments to compare their position with others and tell them about where they are and where they should be. Simultaneously, it divides the international sphere into the normal and abnormal, or the liberal and illiberal.

4.5 Immanent Contradictions in Conflict Early Warning

4.5.1 Humanitarianism is not a rationale but a technique of liberal governance

Once we understand the theory by which mainstream conflict early warning and early response has been guided, the traditional concept of early warning and early response needs to be substantially revisited. What was discussed above is that, unlike the traditional belief that conflict early warning is motivated by universal humanitarianism, it has in fact played the role of biopolitics which justifies liberal interventions by claiming the insecurity of individuals (human security) under the post-Westphalian concept of global order.

As discussed in Chapter 2, it has been believed that the foundation of conflict early warning is based on humanitarianism. As Howard Adelman points out, it is "universal humanitarianism" that underpins conflict early warning and early response. Universal humanitarianism is comprised of the following four discourses: 'humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and universality.'⁴⁸⁴ The principle of *humanity* was based on the desire to assist the wounded and suffering without discrimination, recognizing a common humanity, and that "our enemies are men"; the principle of *impartiality* derived from the desire to assist without discrimination except on the basis of needs, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress, the principle of *neutrality* bound ones from taking sides in conflict or engaging in political or social controversies; and the principle of *universality* claims that the humanitarian values were shared

⁴⁸⁴ Chandler, D. (2001) 'The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda.' *Human Rights Quarterly*. Vol.23, No.3, pp.678-700.

universally. These four principles were predicated on separating the humanitarian sphere from the political one. The avoidance of politics was essential to the definition of humanitarianism. Cornelio Sommaruga, President of the ICRC, in his speech to the UN General Assembly, in November 1992, made this clear: "humanitarian endeavour and political action must go their separate ways if the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian work are not to be jeopardized."⁴⁸⁵

It has been thought that humanitarianism can justify utilizing conflict early warning systems – disinterested actors collect and analyse information coming from within sovereign states for the prevention of violent conflict in order for the protection of welfare of people. In addition, the dominant discourse assumes that responders, or recipients of early warning, who are often western policy-makers, are passive actors who receive warnings and act on them though their decisions are influenced by a number of factors. Schmeidl described conflict early warning as “disinterested intelligence.”⁴⁸⁶ Similarly, when conflict early warning failed to lead to an early response, it is usually understood that “good people do nothing.”⁴⁸⁷

However, humanitarianism is also used by the western liberal block in order to justify interventions in internal affairs of sovereign states for the purpose of disciplining. As mentioned above, under the post-Westphalian concept of global order, the term “international” is understood as individuals and human security. Humanitarianism is, therefore, strongly connected with the liberal technique of government and disciplining. Unlike the traditional concept of disinterested intelligence, conflict early warning and early response has been driven by a strong political desire and was developed as a technique to govern unpredictable threats through collecting data, analysing it, publishing it as warnings and then making it a true issue to be addressed by the authorities who know how to make peace.

4.5.2 Whose Peace and Security?

⁴⁸⁵ Sommaruga, C. (1995) Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping Operation. Cited in Chandler, D. (2001).

⁴⁸⁶ Schmeidl, S. (2002) p.76.

⁴⁸⁷ Whittall, J. (2010) “Humanitarian Early Warning Systems: Myth and Reality.” *Third World Quarterly*, vol.31, no.8, pp.1237-1250.

The previous point leads us to question whose security conflict early warning has represented. Again in the original concept of conflict early warning, it has been articulated that it was developed to prevent violent conflict in order to secure the lives of people at risk. But, as discussed above in this chapter, post-Cold War peacebuilding including conflict early warning emerged in the global shift to a post-Westphalian concept of global order, where the western states address potential threats through various techniques of disciplining and government. Zanutti points out that ‘despite its apparent anodyne neutrality and strict technicality, good governance the formation of oppositional identities between the orderly space of civilized and the unpredictable and obscure borderlands of the uncivilized.’⁴⁸⁸ Therefore, contrary to its concept, conflict early warning has been a tool to address insecurity for the liberal western states.

In addition, the growing number of state-failure related early warning systems is consistent with the fear that failed states can become a seabed of international terrorist. As mentioned above, state failure has been regarded as a significant threat to the international community. For example, Call argues that it was the 9/11 attacks which, ‘drew attention to state failure, bringing ‘failed states’ into the top tier of US security interests.’⁴⁸⁹ The subsequent 2002 US National Security Strategy identified ‘failing’ states as a source of insecurity and terrorism.⁴⁹⁰ When the western countries perceived that state failure is a source of insecurity for them, the number of failed state early warning systems significantly increased. The growth of the number of failed state early warning systems reflected on and was guided by the particular concept of security that was defined by the liberal western states.

In relation with security, David Roberts argues that in the post-Cold War era global security is defined with regard to ‘the priorities and needs of the global North, or those in “secure” state.’⁴⁹¹ He holds that security is far from global, since a wide range of subjective insecurities that plague billions of people in the maldeveloped

⁴⁸⁸ Zanutti, Z. (2011) op.cit. p.41.

⁴⁸⁹ Call, C. (2006) *The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State’*. A paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting, San Diego, 25 March. pp.20-21. In Heathershaw, J. (2008) op.cit. p.611.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁹¹ Roberts, D. (2010) p.13. Roberts, D. (2010) *Global Governance and Biopolitics: Regulating Human Security*. London: Zed Books. P.13.

world remain unaddressed.⁴⁹² Similarly, in the previous chapter, the thesis argued that traditional early warning studies have marginalised particular types of conflict. As an example, it pointed out that one of the most common forms of conflict, ethnic riots, has not been incorporated into mainstream studies.

4.5.3 From Warning to Response?

When conflict early warning is understood as a liberal technique of government, the traditionally accepted understanding of “from warning to response” must be revisited. All early warning scholars and practitioners have thought that “warning side wants response.” However, conflict early warning as a liberal technique of government assumes that “response side wants warning (information)”. The conventional debates of the warning-response gap assumes that “objective”, “neutral” and “impartial” warnings were not responded due to the political, cognitive, bureaucratic or organisational hindrance of the international community, where it is implicitly accepted that these responders are passive actors. Therefore, some argue that early warning is a technical/instrument field (which means not political) and early response is political. They have not assumed that response side actively uses early warning in some particular cases. The rapid growth of failed state early warning systems along with the growing western fear of failed states since 2000 also shows that response sides want warnings.

4.6 Proposition: Conflict Early Warning Could Wage Wars

What happens, if conflict early warning is not motivated by universal humanitarianism? A handful of people have discussed this question. Schmeidl points out the problem of legitimacy - some states would not allow the use of conflict early

⁴⁹² Ibid.

warning systems because the information coming from inside the state is highly sensitive.⁴⁹³ Adelman points out that it could precipitate wars.⁴⁹⁴

Traditionally, conflict early warning and early response has been conceptualized as a mechanism that should be used to prevent violent conflicts and to contribute to making a safer and more peaceful world by examining when and where violent conflicts are likely to occur, by giving warnings to due actors, and by responding to warnings of potential cases of violent conflict. However, after it has been revealed that conflict early warning and early response is a child of the post-Westphalian global order, it is possible to argue that early warnings can be a pretext which allows the powerful countries to intervene in the internal affairs of abnormal states with force, and could wage humanitarian intervention.

Humanitarian intervention is defined as “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.”⁴⁹⁵ Drawing on the fact that the R2P was adopted at the UN General Assembly in 2005, de Waal argues that R2P ‘seems to promise a new world order in which international military forces are used to protect civilians at risk.’⁴⁹⁶ On the other hand, he reminds us that:

‘there is no such thing as humanitarian military intervention distinct from war or counterinsurgency. Intervention and occupation should not be confused with classic peacekeeping, which is difficult enough even with a ceasefire agreement and the consent of the parties. If we want an intervention to

⁴⁹³ Schmeidl, S. (2002) op. cit.

⁴⁹⁴ Adelman, H. (1998c) “Difficulties in Early Warning: Networking and Conflict Management.” In van Walraven, K. (ed.) *Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Limitations and Possibilities*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. Ch.4.

⁴⁹⁵ Holzgrefe, J. L. (2003) ‘Humanitarian Intervention Debate.’ In Holzgrefe, J. L. & Keohane, R. O. (eds.) *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas*. Cambridge University Press. p.18. Cited in Newman, M. (2009) *Humanitarian Intervention: Confronting the Contradictions*. London: Hurst & Company. P.3.

⁴⁹⁶ de Waal, A. (2007) ‘No Such Thing as Humanitarian Intervention: Why We Need to Rethink How to Realize the “Responsibility to Protect” in Wartime.’ *Harvard International Review*. Available: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154/26062.html> (Accessed on 21 September 2013)

overthrow a tyranny, protect citizens from their own government, or deliver humanitarian aid during an ongoing conflict, we should be honest with ourselves – we are arguing for a just war. And if we wish to make this case, let us be clear that the war is political (and must be very smartly political to succeed); that military logic will dictate what happens (including probable escalation and various unpredictable factors); and that it will entail bloodshed including the killing of innocent people.’⁴⁹⁷

His remark is highly relevant to the field of early warning because, nowadays, it is recognised that the responsibility to “prevent” is the single most important dimension of the R2P. Bellamy succinctly argues that ‘a broad license for interference in their name of conflict prevention might be used as a pretext for self-interested interventionism by the powerful.’⁴⁹⁸ Jonathan Whittall already raised a similar point by referring to the war in Iraq. He claims that humanitarian early warning agenda was used as a way of justifying ‘humanitarian wars’ in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁴⁹⁹ He is not the first figure who pointed out this point. Howard Adelman was aware of the risk even before these wars took place in spite of the fact that he defines conflict early warning as being universal humanitarian. He argues that ‘the way in which any early warning works can serve as one factor helping either to precipitate a conflict or mitigate it. Early warning is not neutral in relationship to the conflict itself. Nor is the theory of early warning.’⁵⁰⁰ This kind of debate will give depth to the studies of conflict early warning and early response.

4.7 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to identify what theory has guided conflict early warning and early response in terms of world politics and if there are immanent contradictions within the field. This chapter argued that conflict early warning that emerged as a popular political agenda after the end of the Cold War is in fact a liberal

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁸ Thakur, R. (2004) “Iraq and the Responsibility to Protect,” *Behind the Headlines*. Vol.61, No. 1, pp.1–16. Cited in Bellamy, A. (2008) *Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect*. Global Governance. Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 135-156. p.144.

⁴⁹⁹ Whittall, J. (2010) op. cit. p. 1248.

⁵⁰⁰ Adelman, H. (1998c) op. cit. p.51.

technique of government that was invented to make those to be governed visible, calculable, comparable and interventionable.

After the end of the Cold War, there was a significant shift in the discourse on threats from bipolar rivalry between the US and the USSR to various threats that come from weak and unstable states. In the post-Cold War era, more emphasis has been put on conflict, terrorism, underdevelopment, poverty, disease, geography, boundaries, identity, and human rights. Therefore, illiberal and abnormal states became a target of peacebuilding, or statebuilding. Drawing on Zanotti, this chapter argued that the liberal western states began to maneuver abnormal states into normalization through installing democratic governance, by which illiberal states were thought to come to govern themselves from within rather than they were forcefully controlled by the outside powerful states.

But, the liberal western states faced a significant dilemma. After their victory in the Cold War, they no longer relied on forceful containment of the problematic states that was seen during the Cold War. But they were required to govern the problematic in a liberal way. This meant that they had to respect sovereignty of each state and the rule of non-interference in the internal affairs of states in spite of the fact that most threats to the international security come from within those problematic states. It is in this context that a number of conflict early warning and early response systems emerged. Conflict early warning is a sphere where disciplinarity, governmentality and biopolitics function in a very subtle way.

This chapter therefore claimed that the modality of the traditional early warning such as data collection, data analysis and warnings are devices that enable us to transform the domain to be governed into a legible, simple, comparable and administrable object. Various forms of conflict early warning systems have been developed by various actors such as inter-governmental, governmental, NGO and think tank and contributed to making problematic states visible through calculation, mapping or reporting. Once states were labelled as “illiberal” or “failed” under the post-Westphalian concept of global order, interventions in various forms are justified by referring to human security and the principles of the responsibility to protect. The chapter identified a link between early warning and biopolitics in the text of the responsibility to protect.

It also argued that the humanitarian, open and decentralized character of conflict early warning was crucial in terms of the justification of the usage of intrusive nature of conflict early warning.

This new view of conflict early warning suggested that the traditionally accepted concept of the relationship between warning and response must be revisited. In particular, while early response is seen as political, conflict early warning is usually seen as a technical, or apolitical, field. But, conflict early warning as a liberal technique of government is highly political. This chapter showed that the subject of conflict early warning is the west, and it is in fact utilized for their own purpose. In this sense, there is a huge contradiction between the concept of “humanitarian” early warning and the actual development of conflict early warning as a liberal technique of government. It also means that conflict early warning is concerned with the security of liberal western states rather than that of people at risk.

When conflict early warning is understood as a liberal technique of government, the popular belief of “from warning to response” has to be reconsidered. Almost all those who have engaged themselves into early warning have thought that “warning side wants response.” But, under the new interpretation of conflict early warning as a liberal technique of government, it is regarded that “response side wants warning (information)”. The traditional discussions of the warning-response gap have assumed that “objective”, “neutral” and “impartial” warnings were not responded due to the political, cognitive, bureaucratic or organisational hindrance of responders, where it is implicitly accepted that they are passive actors. In this context, there is a fear that conflict early warning can be used as pretext for humanitarian intervention (war) particularly after the world witnessed the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq where humanitarian crisis was used as part of the justification of intervention.

Although various issues have been talked about conflict early warning as a liberal technique, like other liberal peacebuilding projects, conflict early warning and early response as a technique of government has not been very successful. This is because there are some opponents who stick to the Westphalian global order. The field of conflict early warning and early response is therefore a battle field between the advocates of the Westphalia order and those of the post-Westphalia.

Chapter 5

Emancipatory Early Warning Study and Practice

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, the thesis looked into particular assumptions and theories that have been taken for granted in the field. By examining the studies and practices of mainstream conflict early warning and early response from a critical point of view, the chapters above have offered a rather different picture of conflict early warning and early response from what the traditional approach has envisioned. In spite of the fact that the concept of conflict early warning has emphasized on its emancipatory, humanitarian and altruistic intent, the past record shows that it has been developed as a liberal technique of government by the west for their purpose in the particular historical moment of the post-Cold War era. The unreflexive nature of problem-solving approaches prevailing in mainstream studies of conflict early warning failed to point out that the traditional conflict early warning field has been based on the realities of the West, and it has marginalized the realities of people at risk on the ground. The egoistic form of conflict early warning has jeopardized the full potential of conflict early warning and early response. Therefore, one has to think about how we can make conflict early warning and response more emancipatory in the current global context by fulfilling the unfulfilled potential.

Considering the narrowly defined scope of traditional problem-solving studies, it is important to broaden it in order to make it more emancipatory. In the traditional conflict early warning field, the subject of conflict early warning has been implicitly regarded as the west, and people in the conflict zones have been seen as the object of rescue by the west. The thesis has pointed out some problematic dichotomous ways of

thinking. As a result, mainstream conflict early warning studies have also failed to pay attention to local realities of conflict – in particular, that of small-scale conflicts, and local capacities of conflict early warning and early response. In spite of the fact that there are a couple of community-based early warning and early response systems developed by local civil society organisations, traditional studies have not taken them up as the main subject of their studies.

The purpose of this chapter is therefore to broaden the concept of conflict early warning and early response and to explore a more emancipatory form of early warning. The thesis argues that an emancipatory form of study and practice should be based on (1) a wider ontological view, (2) constructionist epistemology and (3) explicitly emancipatory intent. The thesis sees community-based conflict early warning and early response as an emancipatory form of conflict early warning and early response in the current global context since it meets the first and third criteria of emancipatory early warning.

But there is a significant question here: are community-based early warning and early response systems part of global liberal governance? They are, after all, funded by western donors and supported by external actors through collaborations. Therefore, they are under the umbrella of liberal global governance, which is what Zanotti called a “capillary” technique of disciplining. It must be noted here that the term “emancipation” in this research does not necessarily mean to be emancipated from the liberal global governance exercised by the liberal western states. Although some may raise an ethical issue of early warning as surveillance, government itself is not ethically wrong because it could also prevent violent conflict and protect people. The most fundamental assumption of this research is that if a conflict early warning and early response system effectively functions it can prevent violent conflict and save people’s lives. Therefore, this research promotes conflict early warning systems if they function well. In this sense, the term “emancipation” in this research means to free people from fear and threats that are brought about by violent conflicts not from liberal global governance. Based on this, this research also problematizes the marginalization of particular issues and people from main stream studies and practices for emancipation.

It should be understood that the reason why governmentality was applied in the previous chapter for this research is not to blame it and find a solution to free people from liberal global governance but to explain the nature of conflict early warning and early response and find out the immanent contradictions existing between the concept of early warning and its practice. This stance is the same as that of Steele and Amoureux who examined NGOs' roles in monitoring genocide by using the Panopticon as a metaphor and 'discipline' to understand the role of NGOs in preventing genocide.⁵⁰¹ They claim that NGOs are part of a human rights panopticon; however, they hold that it is 'just' in terms that they could protect the lives of individuals.⁵⁰² Ken Booth also argues that "security" means the absence of threats. He further states that 'emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin.'⁵⁰³

In the following part, this chapter first defines an emancipator form of early warning study and practice based on the findings of the previous chapters. Second, it discusses the potentiality of community-based early warning and early response systems as an emancipatory form of conflict early warning and early response. It also points out some potential weaknesses of community-based systems that may be brought about due to the fact that they are operated by civil society actors. Thirdly, it discusses how conflict early warning research can be based on the constructionist epistemology by referring to securitization theory. Finally, the chapter makes a research framework for case studies to investigate if community-based early warning and early response systems are really an emancipatory form of conflict early warning.

Before going to the next section, some points need to be made clear about emancipatory early warning. By examining the potentiality of the marginalized subject in the traditional studies, this research also practices critical early warning because writing and saying are in fact "doing". It also needs to be made clear that

⁵⁰¹ Steele, B. J. & Amoureux, J. L. (2005) op. cit. p.431.

⁵⁰² Ibid.

⁵⁰³ Booth (1991) p.319. Cited in Wyn Jones (1999) op. cit. p.118.

what the thesis means by the term “emancipatory early warning” is not a particular early warning system but an orientation and new way of thinking that is needed at this particular historical moment. What “emancipatory” signifies is not eternal but temporal, which means it needs to be continuously rewritten as the society changes.

5.2 Defining an Emancipatory Early Warning Study and Practice

Since emancipation is arguably the most significant concept of Critical Theory, Wyn Jones argues that “critical theory stands or falls by the possibility that emancipatory politics exist.”⁵⁰⁴ Further he argues, “epistemologically, it is only this possibility that gives critical theory coherence and, indeed, purpose. Without it, critical theory cannot demur from the positivist /traditional theory emphasis on repetition, calculability, and predictability...without the ability to claim that a better world is possible or even conceivable, there is no means by which the present can be criticized.”⁵⁰⁵ Therefore, he holds that it is crucial for Critical Theorists to find out the locus of this promise of a better world – “the site of emancipatory potential.”⁵⁰⁶ Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 (in particular Chapter 2) played this role by critically examining mainstream/traditional conflict early warning and early response studies and practices. Emancipatory early warning should not be an imposition of a particular ideology. If someone succumbs to the temptation of this kind, it results in ruling out some other possibilities in the process, and what is worse is that it marginalises some particular groups of people. Clues to emancipation therefore reside in the object itself - “unfulfilled potential”⁵⁰⁷ that can be found in the contradictions between the concept and reality. What one has to do is to broaden the concept and practice of conflict early warning and early response on the basis of the unfulfilled potential that exist within the wall and found between what it actually is and what it should be.

Given the critical examinations of traditional early warning and early response above, a more emancipatory form of conflict early warning study should be based on:

⁵⁰⁴ Wyn Jones, R. (1999) op. cit. p.56.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid. p.24.

- (1) an ontology that supposes a more extensive set of referents for early warning and early response;
- (2) an epistemology that reject naturalist approaches to knowledge that assume we can scientifically access social world in the same way as we do the natural world, nonetheless understands the usefulness of positivist approaches in some occasions;
- (3) an orientation toward praxis that is explicitly emancipatory.⁵⁰⁸

The first step to be taken is to pay attention to those who have been marginalized in the studies of conflict early warning and early response. As this thesis takes the view of Critical Theory, writing (about those who have been marginalized) is not merely a description of things, but “doing” things. Traditional early warning studies have reflected the realities that exist in the West and their expertise has been accepted as the golden standard of conflict early warning and early response. However, the reality often differs greatly from place to place.

The second point which is about epistemology has already been detailed in Chapter 3. Based on the constructionist epistemology and Critical Theory, the research attempted to emancipate the early warning field from the dominance of positivism and problem-solving approaches. However, there is another issue regarding epistemology. The field of conflict early warning has understood conflict as a phenomenon that can be understood by causes and effects. Based on this assumption, traditional early warning and early response mechanisms have explained the possibility of the occurrence of violent conflict, and it limited their analytical capacity. Therefore, it would be beneficial to see conflict as a social construction which is strongly influenced by various actors’ cultures and identities. The most relevant is the theory of securitisation developed by the Copenhagen School. It enables us to shift our attention from “what causes conflict” to “how people construct conflict.”

Finally, the practice of conflict early warning and early response should be explicitly emancipatory unlike traditional early warning and early response that is not solely designed for preventing and protecting people at risk. The previous chapters showed

⁵⁰⁸ These were made by referring to Booth’s approach. See Booth, K. (2005) op. cit. p.14.

that the traditional early warning has a characteristic of oppression, surveillance and policing by the liberal western states. In this sense, it cannot be seen as “explicitly” emancipatory, though the traditional early warning practitioners use the language of emancipation for the justification of what they do.

5.3 Community-Based Early Warning as a More Emancipatory Form?

Given the discussions above, the thesis suggests that community-based early warning and early response systems by local civil society actors can be a candidate for explicitly emancipatory early warning. The thesis defines the minimum criteria to be called as a community-based system as follows: it has a systematic data collection, analysis and warning mechanism; it is located in actual conflict zones; and it is conducted by local civil society actors. From the criteria, community-based systems satisfy the first and third criteria of emancipatory early warning defined above; an ontology that supposes a more extensive set of referents for early warning and early response; and an orientation toward praxis that is explicitly emancipatory.

5.3.1 Shedding Light on the Marginalised

The previous chapters pointed out some ontological limitations of mainstream early warning and early response studies. In the traditional dominant concept, we can find two problematic points in ontology:

- (1) while the traditional early warning field has focused on the prevention of large-scale armed conflicts, it has not paid attention to the prevention of small-scale violent conflicts.
- (2) it has not fully understood or has underestimated the capacity of local civil society and therefore they do not consider local people as responders.

Although it has not been discussed in traditional early warning studies, there are some community-based early warning and early response systems that deal with local collective violence by local civil society actors. The pioneers of these systems are that

of the Foundation for Co-Existence (FCE, Sri Lanka) and that of the Foundation for Tolerance International (FTI, Kyrgyzstan). Very recently, some other community-based early warning systems were installed in a couple of countries (e.g. Belun in East Timor, Election Early Warning Project in Burundi). Therefore, study about these community-based systems can significantly broaden the scope of conflict early warning in terms of referent actors and referent conflicts. Of course, if it is found that they are not effective at all, it cannot broaden the referents of conflict early warning.

5.3.2 Explicitly Emancipatory Practice

The previous chapters argued that the traditional early warning has been the dichotomous relationship between the west elites, who assume that they know how to make peace and those who do not know it. It was also pointed out that it has not been based on universal humanitarianism that is underpinned by impartiality and neutrality. They further argued that conflict early warning has been developed as a technique of government to make the abnormal and illiberal states visible and interventionable. Although early warning has traditionally been described as altruistic, it is in fact developed for the west and their own purpose. It is also discussed that their response is selective not in terms of the potential seriousness or scale of violent conflict but in terms of the threats to western security and economic interests. Therefore, this form of conflict early warning, which looks like surveillance and policing, can hardly be described as an explicitly emancipatory praxis and compatible with the humanitarian and emancipatory concept of early warning.

On the other hand, community-based systems seem to be largely different from the traditional early warning systems in many ways. Here, the generation-wise categorisation of conflict early warning by Kumar Rupesinghe, the advocate of community-based early warning and early response systems and the founder of Foundation for Co-Existence, is useful to highlight the differences between the traditional early warning systems and community-based systems that he refers to as “third generation” early warning systems.⁵⁰⁹ According to him, first generation early

⁵⁰⁹ Rupesinghe, K. (2005) op. cit. pp.2-3.

warning systems were the systems where the entire early warning mechanism (including conflict monitoring) was based outside the conflict region (namely, in the West). Second generation amended this approach by basing the monitoring mechanism in the conflict zones, namely by having field monitors to gather primary event data. The analysis, however, continued to be conducted outside the conflict region. Third generation early warning systems are entirely located in the conflict regions. They integrate early warning and early response together as simultaneous processes.⁵¹⁰ The first and second generations are correspondent with what this research terms “traditional early warning.” He further argues that these systems fail on two accounts. Firstly, he claims that they were too far removed from the conflict context to enable effective early response and serve as a preventative tool, and secondly, they excluded micro level conflict scenarios and the contributing factors for these, such as local perceptions.⁵¹¹

In contrast to the first and second generations, he claims that third generation early warning systems take all the operational procedures of early warning within the conflict region, which enables it to intervene in conflict rapidly and accurately. Unlike the conventional early warning systems in which early warnings were wired to someone outside conflict, this new approach is operated by those who are in a conflict situation. In addition, this new approach is highly oriented to interventions and the gap between warning and response which has existed in the conventional macro-level early warning systems is no longer an issue.⁵¹²

It also needs to be emphasised here that the third generation conflict early warning systems, or community-based systems, meet all the criteria of an “effective” early warning system compiled by David Nyheim’s extensive research on conflict early warning systems. He claims that an effective early warning system: (a) is based on “close to the ground” or has strong field-based networks of monitors; (b) uses multiple sources of information and both qualitative/quantitative analytical methods; (c) capitalises on appropriate communication and information technology; (d) provides regular reports and updates on conflict dynamics to key national and

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹¹ Ibid.

⁵¹² Rupesinghe, K. (2009) op. cit.

international stakeholders; and (e) has a strong link to responders or response mechanism.⁵¹³

From discussion above, the thesis suggests four hypotheses to explain why community-based systems have the potential to be emancipatory early warning:

- (1) their early warning systems are based on their own realities that they face in their everyday life, not the realities of the west or other outsiders;
- (2) unlike the traditional early warning systems, community-based systems are less hierarchical in the sense that warnings are shared with local actors, where there are no dichotomous ways of thinking, such as the one between the western rescuers and local victims;
- (3) they keep impartiality and neutrality at a practical level and therefore intervene in almost all the impending situations on the basis of needs rather than the interests of early warners or responders except when interventions are deemed to be very dangerous;
- (4) they have a strong connection between warning and response.

5.3.3 Effective Response

The above debates pointed out that community-based early warning and early response systems may be more emancipatory than traditional ones because they can broaden the scope of conflict early warning, and they might be more explicitly emancipatory in their intent and practice than traditional ones. However, the romanticizing of civil society actors is not always benign. Is it truly justifiable to call it “emancipatory” early warning without knowing if community-based early warning systems can truly prevent collective violence and save people’s lives? It is justifiable, if it is judged from a deontological point of view in terms that it pays attention to some marginalized groups and they themselves are empowered to do early warning and early response. However, if it is judged from a consequentialist point of view - in terms of the competency of preventing and saving people, could it still be called

⁵¹³ Nyheim, D. (2009) op. cit. p.99.

“emancipatory”? This implies that without properly understanding the limitations and prospects of community-based early warning and early response systems, it cannot be said that it is emancipatory considering the fact that the telos of conflict early warning and early response is to free people at risk from threats caused by violent conflict by detecting its symptoms, sharing information and acting on it in a preventive and emancipatory manner.

Civil society organisations can have some limitations in conflict early warning and early response. It would be true that civil society actors can be mobilized in various kinds of violent conflicts if their role is confined to the early warning aspect such as data collection, analysis, risk assessment and giving warning to potential response actors, though there is a risk to be seen as a spy from their collection of sensitive information. At this stage of the conflict early warning cycle (collecting information, analysis and giving warnings), community-based early warning actors do not necessarily have to interact with conflict parties. In other words, early warning systems are not yet part of conflict.⁵¹⁴ However, interventions are required to be involved in conflict as a mediator, facilitator or peace-enforcer. What civil society organisations can employ to prevent the impending violence is usually constrained to dialogue, unlike the traditional responders who possess coercive power, or force, which is monopolized by the state in functional states and inter-governmental organisations. The necessary interactions between interveners and conflict parties in preventing violence can narrow the scope of civil society in early response dramatically. Besides, it is highly influenced by external factors such as the nature of conflict and conflict parties and the characteristics of the state government.⁵¹⁵ Under these limitations, how can civil society influence conflict parties and change their behaviours and attitudes, or stop securitisation?

Considering that civil society must interact with conflict parties, compared to the state and state-like actors, civil society has two possible disadvantages. The first possible disadvantage is a security concern. Civil society actors are considered to be vulnerable to violence. That is, it can be too dangerous to intervene in the conflict

⁵¹⁴ Some cases are expected where some significant information for conflict parties should be kept secret even early warning systems detect it for the security reason of early warning practitioners.

⁵¹⁵ Marchetti, R. & Tocci, N. (2011) *op. cit.*

when violence is about to occur and when violence is ongoing. Aall argues that “NGOs cannot function in a hostile, volatile environment and must depend on security forces to protect their staff and resources.”⁵¹⁶ In addition, in some conflicts, the motivation of conflict parties is based on greed. Under such a condition, if civil society actors are seen as an obstacle to achieve their goals, they can be a target of violence too. The security concern of civil society practitioners could dramatically narrow the capacity of community-based early warning and early response and set the absolute condition of applicability of community-based early warning and early response. Although it was argued above that civil society can do a lot in early warning activities, it is also risky to collect information on the symptoms of violence in the first place because some conflict parties are not happy about it when they are gaining profit from conflict and when they have well planned strategies in attacking their enemies. Moreover, it is especially the case when civil society intervenes with those who are about to fight or kill each other. Not being armed or well protected, the practitioners of early warning and early response are vulnerable to violence. This is quite different from Track 1 third party intervention, which is generally formal and their vulnerability to violence is quite low. In contrast, intervention at a grass-root level is informal and if those who want to wage collective violence possibly see the early warning and early response practitioners who try to prevent their plans as their obstacles to achieve their goals, it can jeopardize practitioners. Moreover, it is also dangerous for civil society actors to intervene in impending violence when there is a state of impunity and lawlessness. Given this, theoretically it is risky to apply community-based systems to greed-motivated conflicts in which violence is strategically used until conflict parties achieve their material goals. More broadly, community-based approaches have some risk if they are applied to well-planned violence. Barnes insists that “few (civil society actors) are able to effectively deal with the political economy of war.”⁵¹⁷

A second potential disadvantage of community-based early warning and early response is its capacity in intervention, or the power to influence conflict parties. Civil

⁵¹⁶ Aall, P. (2001) What Do NGOs Bring to Peacebuilding? In Crocker, C. A., Hampson, F. O. & Aall, P. (eds) *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. P.377.

⁵¹⁷ Barnes, C. (2005) ‘Weaving the Web: Civil Society Roles in Working with Conflict and Building Peace.’ In van Tongeren, P. Brenk, M., Hellema, M. et al (eds.) *People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. p.21.

society organisations may not have coercive power or the incentives necessary to influence and change conflict parties' attitudes and behaviours in some situations. This has been considered to be the field of UN peacekeeping which aims at preventing large-scale armed conflicts. Considering the characteristics of "early" warning and "early" response, one cannot wait until both conflict parties feel they are at a stalemate. If civil society organisations have limitations in interventions, there is a possibility that they can cooperate with state actors. In other words, they send warnings to state actors and request that they do something. Cooperation between state and civil society is often seen as a positive aspect in conflict prevention and conflict resolution in general. However, in many cases, some causes of violent conflict lie in a malfunctioning and irresponsible government. When a situation is pressing, it is doubtful that relying on the state actors is a wise choice. They might cooperate on some minor issues but not core issues that are the main causes of conflict.

5.3.4 Ury, Varshney and Anderson

If civil society organisations wish to play the main role in early response as well, it is important to think about what kind of power they possess to influence conflicting parties. In order for effective interventions, the limited capacity of civil society in early response must be maximized by using available resources. Ury's research on the third side offers a significant insight about a form of power that civil society organizations can exert.⁵¹⁸ He argues that we tend to see conflict as two-sided. For example, he points out that 'there's husband versus the wife; there's the union versus the employers; there are Arabs versus Israelis; Hutus versus Tutsis.'⁵¹⁹ Moreover, he argues that 'the introduction of a third party almost always comes as somewhat of an exception, an aberration, or as someone meddling in someone else's business.'⁵²⁰ However, from his empirical research, he concludes that conflict is not two-sided but actually three-sided. He argues that there are always others around, and there is a community that forms what he calls 'the third side.'⁵²¹

⁵¹⁸ Ury, L. W. (2002) *Must We Fight? From the Battlefield to the Schoolyard – A New Perspective on Violent Conflict and Its Prevention*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid. p.42.

⁵²⁰ Ibid. p.42.

⁵²¹ Ibid.

The third side, Ury argues, consists of both insiders, people who are very close to the parties, such as family friends, and outsiders, such as neighbours, neutrals, bystanders. According to him, the third side is composed of people from the community using a certain kind of power. For example, ‘the power of peers, from a certain perspective, which is a perspective of common ground; supporting a certain process, which is the process of dialogue and nonviolence; and aiming for a certain product, which is a triple win – a solution that’s good for the community and good for both of the parties.’⁵²² Therefore, he holds that the third side plays the role of a kind of “container for contention.”⁵²³ He states that within that container, conflict can often be gradually transformed from confrontation into cooperation.⁵²⁴

Ury suggests three functions of the third side in conflict prevention, which are also crucial for successful community-based early warning and early response. The first function is that of *provider*, who helps people meet their needs. This is because one of the reasons that escalate conflict is frustrated needs. Second, the third side can play a role of *teacher*. This is based on the fact that tensions over conflicting needs can also easily escalate when people lack the proper skills or the attitudes to defuse them. Teachers can provide those skills. The third role that the third side plays is that of *bridge builder*, who establish relationships across potential lines of conflict.⁵²⁵

Some readers might associate the roles of the third side in conflict prevention with those of traditional early warning and early response. In particular, the second role (teacher) reminds us of the dichotomous ways of thinking between the West (teacher) and local (students) which is problematic. However, the third side is decisively different from traditional early warning and early response in that ‘the third side is the community itself taking responsibility for its own conflicts.’⁵²⁶ Ury further claims that

‘unlike a king or an authoritarian state... the third side is not a transcendent individual or institution which dominates everyone. Rather, it is the emergent

⁵²² Ibid. p.43

⁵²³ Ibid.

⁵²⁴ Ibid.

⁵²⁵ Ibid. pp.44-45.

⁵²⁶ Ibid. p.78.

will of the community. It's an impulse that arises from the vital relationships that link each member to every other member of the community. The third side, in other words, is a creation of a host of individuals and organizations freely interacting with each other. People can contribute to the third side, but no one command it. In other words, it's a self-organizing phenomenon with its own natural laws. If each person contributes his or her bit, a powerful collective phenomenon slowly materializes.⁵²⁷

In this sense, Ury's concept of third side resonates with the idea of emancipatory early warning.

Another way to maximize the power of civil society can be found in the research of Ashtosh Varshney. Since civil society lacks coercive power to influence conflict parties who are about to fight, the advanced preparation for early warning and early response can be a crucial methodology. It is likely that civil society actors cannot prevent impending violence from the vacuum. However, if they establish a network of people, it is more likely to manage to prevent violence. The effectiveness of the existence of inter-ethnic networks and groups in conflict regions is attested to by Ashutosh Varshney, who conducted research on the nexus between the structure of civil society and ethnic or communal violence. In particular, he focuses on the role of inter-communal network of civil life, which gives opportunities to bring different groups together.⁵²⁸ He argues that the robust "associational" forms of inter-communal civic engagement such as "business associations, professional organisations, reading clubs, film clubs, sports clubs, festival organisations, trade unions and cadre-based political parties" can promote peace particularly when people face the attempts by politicians to polarize ethnic groups.⁵²⁹ They focus on the provision of some overarching superordinate goal, something that everyone wants, regardless of their religion or caste. In India for example, neighbourhood committees have been formed around such goals as ensuring a proper electricity supply, clean water, or better service from local government official. A successful case is that of Bhiwandi, western India, where local neighbourhood committees are only about five to ten years old. But,

⁵²⁷ Ibid. p.43

⁵²⁸ Varshney, A. (2002) *Ethnic Conflict and Civil Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. 2nd ed. London: Yale University Press.

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

local officials and citizens in Bhiwandi said that because of the trust and social ties built up through the neighbourhood committees, Hindus and Muslims are now much less likely to believe rumours about the other community or to misinterpret a random event, for example a Hindu cyclist accidentally knocking over a Muslim pedestrian when he is carrying a copy of the Koran. They are much less likely to interpret events like this in negative terms. If a community-based early warning and early response system is built on the foundation of inter-ethnic organizations, the power of civil society to intervene could be more powerful than intervention from a vacuum.

Although there are still some doubts about whether it is possible to establish such inter-ethnic groups in a highly ethnically-divided society, Mary Anderson holds it is possible. Anderson argues that ‘conflict situations are characterized by intergroup tensions and divisions. Everyone knows this, expects it and focuses on it. More interesting is the fact that conflict situations are also characterized by local capacities for peace and by connectors that interlink the people who fight.’⁵³⁰ Further, she states that:

*“Even in societies where civilian-based civil war rips daily patterns apart, many aspects of life continue to connect people rather than divide them. Common history, culture, language and experience; shared institutions and values; economic and political interdependence; and habits of thinking and acting exist in all societies, including those embroiled in civil war. In addition, all societies have systems for handling disagreements and tensions without violence. Often they designate specific categories of people, such as elders or women, as negotiators or reconcilers. All have systems for limiting and ending violence if it erupts and all have individuals who assert the values of peace even when prevalent warfare makes such positions unpopular and dangerous.”*⁵³¹

Reflecting on all that discussed above, the research assumes that a key to successful community-based early warning and early response is to establish an extensive

⁵³⁰ Anderson, M. (1999) *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - or War*. Colorado, Lynne Rienner, p.23.

⁵³¹ Ibid.

network of people who have a will for peace and those who can connect people beyond differences even under political manipulation and conflicting situations. These people can be a third side and if mobilized properly, they can be a strong force to prevent violence.

5.4 Applying Constructionist Epistemology to Early Warning Studies

It was mentioned above that one criterion of emancipatory early warning study is to apply the constructionist epistemology to the studies of conflict early warning and early response. In the traditional early warning studies, conflict has been understood by the cause-effect nexus, which created a firm foundation for problem-solving dominance in the field. In fact, the studies of community-based early warning systems as a tool to prevent ethnic riots offer a good location to apply the constructionist epistemology. As many scholars pointed out, conflict is a socially constructed phenomenon.

5.4.1 Mechanism of Ethnic Riots

This thesis hypothesises that community-based early warning and early response systems can play a significant role in preventing small-scale violent conflicts especially in inter-ethnic riots. Horowitz defines an inter-ethnic riot as ‘an intense, sudden, though not necessarily wholly unplanned, lethal attack by civilian members of one ethnic groups on civilian members of another ethnic group, the victims chosen because of their group membership.’⁵³² Ethnic riots are violence used by civilians on other civilians belonging to a different ethnic group, which leaves some room for civil society to intervene in the imminent violence. Horowitz’s account on ethnic riots further provides evidence that civil society can intervene in them. He argues that an ethnic riot is “a passionate but highly patterned event. In the first instance, such an episode has at least an immediate cause. It is triggered by events – precipitants – that are regarded as sufficient to warrant violence. The ethnic riot is not a random phenomenon.”⁵³³ However, “precipitants do not always evoke an immediately violent response. There is often a period, measured in several hours or a few days, during

⁵³² Horowitz, D. L. (2001) *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*. California: University of California Press. P.1.

⁵³³ Ibid.

which the impact of the precipitating event is felt and forces are mobilized for the assault.”⁵³⁴ He calls this period a “lull”, which is a period when people construct a consensus for violence. Collective violence takes place after going through this process.

Horowitz’s account on the process of ethnic riots implies that early warning and early response has the best opportunity to prevent imminent violence in the period of a lull. The lull is ‘the time when the nature of the precipitant is interpreted, usually through the magnifying lens of rumor. At the same time, the significance of the precipitant is connected to the wider ethnic situation.’⁵³⁵ During the lull, people engage themselves with constructing a social reality and building consensus for violence through various kinds of interactions. If they construct a social reality which legitimates the use of violence through interaction, it may also be interaction that can create a more peaceful and positive reality to address issues.

5.4.2 Securitisation in Ethnic Conflicts

Although ethnic riots seemingly take place all of sudden, they go through the process of the construction of ethnic identity and the building of consensus for violence, or legitimating violence through interactions. As Horowitz’s empirical research describes, people construct the consensus for violence during the period of a lull after a precipitating event and rumours become truths through people’s interactions. This thesis regards ethnic conflict as a socially constructed phenomenon by drawing on Bonacker, Diez, Gromes and et al.⁵³⁶ They view ethnic conflict as ‘the discursive invocation of particular groups as ethnies’⁵³⁷ that oppose each other in a struggle or contest.’⁵³⁸ In order to capture the discursive formation of threats, they refer to the concept of *securitisation* developed by the Copenhagen School.⁵³⁹ They argue that a

⁵³⁴ Ibid. p.89

⁵³⁵ Ibid. p.90

⁵³⁶ Bonacker, T., Diez, T., Gromes, T. & et al. (2011) “Human Rights and the (De)Securitization of Conflict.” In Marchetti, R. & Tocci, N. (eds.) *Civil Society, Conflicts and the Politicization of Human Rights*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. Ch.2.

⁵³⁷ The term “ethnie” refers to a set of cultural characteristics that separate one group from another. See Smith, A. D. (1986) *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford: Blackwell. Cited in Bonacker, T., Diez, T., Gromes, T. and et al. (2011) p.15.

⁵³⁸ Bonacker, T., Diez, T., Gromes, T. and et al. (2011) p.16

⁵³⁹ Ibid.

“securitising move” is a speech act that constructs an other as an existential threat to a particular group, calling for emergency measures to deal with the threat. If and when this construction is accepted by the majority of the group to whom the securitising move was addressed, an issue is “securitised” and then the extraordinary measures that would normally not be regarded as legitimate come to be seen as legitimate and can be implemented. Therefore, securitisation is normatively problematic. Securitisation is made successful when conditions are present that are historically associated with threats such hostile sentiments.⁵⁴⁰ Especially in ethnic conflicts, rumours play a significant role in the speech act. Horowitz argues that rumors ‘mobilize ordinary people to do what they would not ordinarily do. They shift the balance in a crowd toward those proposing the most extreme action.’⁵⁴¹

Bonacker, Diez, Gromes and et al. suggest two approaches to counter securitising moves. *Desecuritisation* takes place after securitisation has taken place and the decision to apply extraordinary means is still in force. Desecuritising moves demand that an audience returns to normal politics by presenting five types of arguments in order to leave the realm of extraordinary politics: ‘(1) the asserted existential threat never existed; (2) the existential threat existed but has been avoided; (3) ordinary measures suffice in order to respond to the existential threat; (4) panic politics are not effective in addressing the threat; and (5) the extraordinary measures avoid the existential threat, but their side costs are too high.’⁵⁴² While desecuritisation signifies bringing an issue back to normal politics, *non-securitisation* signifies situations where securitising moves fail or do not occur at all. They distinguish four types of non-securitisation moves in general and by civil society actors in particular: ‘(1) denying the asserted existence of an existential threat; (2) warning that an addressed audience does not possess the legitimacy to decide on the adoption of extraordinary means; (3) recommending that the addressed audience rejects the call to panic politics; and (4) resisting the implementation of extraordinary measures.’⁵⁴³

⁵⁴⁰ Wæver, O. (2000) ‘The EU as a Security Actor. Reflection from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post Sovereign Security Orders.’ In Kelstrup, M. & Williams, M. C. (eds.) *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration*. London: Routledge, pp.250-294. p.252, 286. Cited in Bonacker, T., Diez, T. & Grome, T. (2011) op. cit. p.17.

⁵⁴¹ Horowitz, D. L. (2001) op.cit. p.74.

⁵⁴² Bonacker, T., Diez, T. & Grome, T. (2011) op. cit. pp.19-20.

⁵⁴³ Ibid. p.20.




Figure.4 Securitisation, Non-Securitisation & Desecuritisation

By looking at conflict and conflict resolution through the lens of securitisation, desecuritisation and non-securitisation, one can see conflict early warning and early response in a rather different way. Traditionally, early warning is defined as "the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purpose of: a) anticipating the escalation of violent conflict; b) the development of strategic responses to these crises; and c) the presentation of options to critical actors for the purposes of decision-making."⁵⁴⁴ By regarding conflict as a form of securitisation, early warning also should be reinterpreted as the systematic information collection and analysis of securitisation, and early response as non-securitising and desecuritising moves. The most significant advantage in taking a securitisation approach in conflict early warning and early response is that it enables one to see conflict early warning and response in a more dynamic way - "how people securitise issues" rather than "what causes violent conflicts".

⁵⁴⁴ Schmid, A. (1998) op. cit.

As Figure.1 illustrates, if early warning and early response is successfully carried out, an issue will not be securitised (non-securitisation). However, if it is not successful, the issue will be securitised (securitisation). At this point, while there is still a chance to desecuritise the issue (desecuritisation), if it fails, the audience might justify extraordinary means to resolve the conflict, and the conflict parties might resort to violence (extraordinary means). At this moment, conflict early warning and early response practitioners must think about the prevention of escalation through desecuritisng moves (desecuritisation). If they are failed, it is likely that the violence will be intensified further.

5.5 The Framework for Case Studies

Community-based early warning and early response can hypothetically be a form of emancipatory early warning and early response due to a wider ontological scope and explicitly emancipatory practice. The last missing evidence to judge the emancipatory potential of community-based systems is to understand their limitations and prospects. The research seeks to find out them by examining two community-based systems from Kyrgyzstan and Sri Lanka, both of which meet the criteria of community-based early warning systems.

5.5.1 Assessment of Effectiveness

The assessment of the effectiveness of a community-based early warning system should not be judged only by whether it prevented conflict or not, because in some cases the failure of prevention can be attributed to individual errors and competences such as an incorrect analysis, wrong selection of responders or inappropriate way of dealing with conflict parties. These are not specific issues to community-based systems. The specific issues of community-based systems in effectiveness are considered to come from two points discussed above: security and power issues. The research regards the most significant point in assessing the effectiveness of a community-based system as whether the systems manage to mobilize people for preventive actions without exposing participants to life-threatening danger when responses are needed. For that purpose, the research hypothesises that they need to

establish a network of conflict early warning and early response that is made up of people who are willing to cooperate with preventing violent confrontations and trained to take preventive actions. Through this network, information that is needed for early warning is also collected. At the same time this network can be used for the dissemination of warnings and interventions as stakeholders. If they establish a network in which many actors communicate with each other smoothly and are mobilized for preventing violence when the situation is pressing, it is possible to claim that this community-based system has a high possibility to prevent violent conflict. Furthermore, if these preventive actions are followed by stability, the research regards the community-based system as effective.

In addition, considering the fact that civil society's projects are highly influenced by the nature of the state and its relationship to civil society, the context in which community-based early warning and early response is implemented is also a significant indicator for effective early warning and early response. Paffenholz and Spurk argue that "constructive civil society functions are not exclusively provided by civil society actors. They can and are also provided by others. Protection for example should be mainly provided by the state, the judiciary and law enforcement authorities."⁵⁴⁵ In this regard, the framework developed by Marchetti and Tocci is very useful because they provide us with an analytical framework to construe the complicated nexus between the projects of civil society organisations, the context in which they are implemented and their impact on conflict.⁵⁴⁶

There are two advantages in using their framework. First, it takes into account various factors that could influence the impact of civil society organisations in a conflict situation. Marchetti and Tocci argue that the cumulative interaction between *context*, *Conflict Society's Organisations (CoSOs)*⁵⁴⁷ *identity*, *frameworks of action* and *political opportunity structures* determines CoSOs' impact on conflict. Figure.5

⁵⁴⁵ Paffenholz, T. & Spurk, C. (2006) 'Civil Society, Civil Engagement, and Peacebuilding.' *Social Development Papers*. No.36. Washington: Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction Social Development Department, The World Bank. p.14.

⁵⁴⁶ Marchetti, R. & Tocci, N. (2011) op. cit.

⁵⁴⁷ In order to denote the nature of the civil society more accurately, they coined a new term "conflict society". By the term, they intended to emphasise that civil society encompasses both "civil" and "uncivil" elements particularly in conflicts. Therefore, they call the actors in conflict society "conflict society actors", or "conflict society organisations (CoSOs)".

illustrates that an arrow reaches from “context” to “CoSOs’ identity” and “political opportunity structures,” which means that context shapes the identities of CoSOs and influences political opportunity structures. Then, the next arrow illustrates that these identities determine their goals and frameworks of actions. In turn, the ability of CoSOs to navigate the political opportunity structure of conflicts determines their overall direct and contextual impact; the latter of which feeds back into the original conflict context.




Figure.5 Determinants of CoSO Impact⁵⁴⁸

Second, their framework is very useful from a “do no harm” point of view in terms that they consider both direct and contextual impact. It is often only direct impact which most researchers are concerned with. Mary Anderson and Lara Olson argue that peacebuilding projects need to be assessed at both the programme level and peace-writ-large level,⁵⁴⁹ which can be equivalent to Marchetti and Tocci’s distinction of the direct and contextual impact.⁵⁵⁰ The programme level assessment, according to Anderson and Olsen, is concerned about whether a specific peacebuilding project has accomplished its intended goals.⁵⁵¹ On the other hand, the peace-writ-large level/contextual assessment investigates whether, in meeting specific program goals, an agency makes a contribution to the bigger picture. To understand this, agencies

⁵⁴⁸ Marchetti, R. & Tocci, N. (2011) op. cit. p.66.

⁵⁴⁹ “Writ” means written. By this, they mean “the big peace”. Anderson, M. & Olson, L. (2003) *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners*. Massachusetts: the Collaborative for Development Action, Inc. p.12.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid. p.14

⁵⁵¹ Ibid.

need to gauge changes in the overall environment that did or did not come about as a result of actions taken. Assessing effectiveness at this level puts the onus on agencies to look for changes outside the things for which they are directly responsible. They must assess how their efforts have, or have not, supported the ending of violence or the achievement of justice.⁵⁵² This is particularly relevant to the study and practice of conflict early warning because while conflict early warning and early response, or conflict prevention, is usually regarded as a normatively positive act, it can also prevent some people from achieving the betterment of their social status and the quality of their life. It should not be forgotten that conflict, if not violent, can have some positive aspects too. In relation to this, contextual impact (the peace writ large level assessment) is crucial since it is highly related to the notion of “Do No Harm.”⁵⁵³ According to Austin, ‘one area that has received no attention is the relationship between early warning/early response and the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)’.⁵⁵⁴ The term PCIA is a generic term which signifies a number of attempts to aim at ‘Do No Harm’ interventions.⁵⁵⁵ Therefore, this research adopts this notion of “do no harm” and examines the impact of a community-based early warning and early response system on the context through case studies.

Drawing on the framework of Marchetti and Tocci, this research arranged a framework to investigate the impact of community-based early warning and early response systems. Since the framework of action of CoSOs in this research is an invariable (conflict early warning and early response), this research first discusses what types of violent conflict CoSOs tried to prevent through what kinds of early warning and early response measures.

(1) What types of violent conflict did they try to prevent?

(2) What kind of early warning and early response mechanism did they establish?

Marchetti and Tocci argue that CoSOs can contribute to conflict escalation, conflict management, resolution and transformation. The framework of action in this research

⁵⁵² Ibid.

⁵⁵³ Anderson, M. (1999). op. cit.

⁵⁵⁴ Austin, A. (2004) op. cit.

⁵⁵⁵ Anderson, M. (1999) op.cit.

is conflict early warning and early response, or non-securitisation and de-securitisation. Conflict early warning and early response is generally seen as part of conflict management in terms that it aims to prevent impending violence rather than resolving fundamental issues or transforming the attitudes of conflict parties or people. As discussed above, community-based systems can have some difficulties in implementing conflict early warning and early response due to limited capacity and security. The research also examines what kind of non-securitisation and de-securitisation strategies were used by referring to the frequently-used strategies in non-securitisation and de-securitisation suggested by Bonacker, Diez and Grome.⁵⁵⁶ Moreover, the security provision for the practitioners is also explained in this section.

(3) What was the context like?

The assessment of effectiveness secondly requires an examination of context. By *context*, Marchetti and Tocci suggest four significant elements that shape the character of civil society. The first contextual distinction is whether civil society organisations operate in a state or non-state context, in other words, if the state is a failed, failing or stable state. They further state that when a state does not exist or is weak, fragmented or failing, civil society comes to occupy part of the space normally filled by the functioning state. This is a crucial point for this research because it is possible to see community-based early warning and early response systems as a provider of a space for local dispute resolution in place of a state that is failing and/or malfunctioning. If they are viewed this way, community-based early warning and early response systems could play more significant role than they are usually expected. Secondly, the actual nature of the state in question influences the impact of CoSOs. Marchetti and Tocci argue that in so far as civil society needs to be both permitted and protected by the state, its existence, nature and role are determined by the degree of democracy, delineating the extent of associative freedom, as well as by the existence of other basic rights and freedoms normally enshrined within democratic states. The degree of freedom of speech is an important point to see because early warnings may not be able to be disseminated to a number of people when there is a high level of the

⁵⁵⁶ Bonacker, T., Diez, T., Gromes, T. and et al. (2011) op. cit.

surveillance of speech. A third contextual factor is whether the society is a segmentalized society or a modular society. In a segmentalized society, which is often found within developing countries, civil society is characterised by the even more prominent role of non-voluntary associations such as family, tribe, ethnic or religious communities over voluntary ones. On the other hand, modular society essentially exists in developed world. The point is that the bonds, loyalties and solidarity are often much stronger and more binding than those found in voluntarily gathered groups. For community-based systems that connect people from different identity (ethnic or religious) groups and mobilise them for preventive actions, this is a significant indicator that affects an effective early warning and early response. A fourth factor is the nature and role of the international community. Marchetti and Tocci claim that an overall global trend or changing international security agenda also contributes to shaping the nature and role of civil society.⁵⁵⁷ As discussed in Chapter 4, post-Cold war peacebuilding has been based on the liberal peace ideology. Community-based early warning systems cannot be separated from this ideology as long as they are funded by western donors.

(4) How did the context and the action framework (early warning and early response) shape the identity of CoSOs?

A third key point is *the identity of CoSOs*. One significant variable is the degree of inclusiveness of membership and of the targeted public. There are two extreme sides in CoSO identities - an inclusive and universalistic approach and an exclusive and particularistic one, which means that either a group is open to accept as members or as receiving agents all those involved in conflict, or it focuses only on a limited section of the population distinguished by ethnic boundaries. In terms of community-based early warning systems, this is an important variable for the relationship between the degree of impartiality and neutrality of community-based early warning and early response systems and their direct and contextual impact on conflict.

⁵⁵⁷ Marchetti, R. & Tocci, N. (2011) op. cit. pp.48-51.

An inclusive outlook entails the promotion either of a single cultural identity or the creation of a civic or multi-tiered hybrid identity. An exclusive outlook bases its approach on the existence of primordial and unchanging identities. Another fundamental variable characterizing CoSO identities is their egalitarian or non-egalitarian nature. Egalitarian CoSOs accept as equal all actors across the conflict divide, while a non-egalitarian approach would attempt to assert the primacy of one group over another. If we combine these two variables, we can identify four main stylized CoSO identities determining their overall normative outlook on the conflict. The four major identities of CoSOs are summarised below.

Table. 5⁵⁵⁸

	Inclusive	Exclusive
Egalitarian	(a)Civic/post-national	(b)Multi-culturalist
Non-Egalitarian	(c)Assimilationist	(d)Ethnicist/Racist

- (a) *civic or post-national CoSOs* (inclusive + egalitarian): Contrary to other categories, this is the only identity that places primary emphasis on the individual. It thus promotes either a liberal civic (as opposed to ethnic) identity or it accepts and fosters multiple identities freely chosen by each individual. While these groups are normally associated with peacemaking functions, they may also contribute, at times necessarily, to escalate conflicts through their securitizing moves, by voicing, monitoring and denouncing previously silenced and repressed facts.
- (b) *multi-culturalist identity CoSOs* (exclusive + egalitarian): while accepting the right of all actors to an equal footing, recognizes and values their different cultural identities, rather than attempting to transcend them. Especially when inter-religious groups at international levels highlight and denounce the non-egalitarian treatment of specific communities within conflict contexts, they may raise, again at times necessary awareness and induce the countermobilization of discriminated communities. These movements can be either elitist or grassroots.
- (c) *assimilationist CoSOs* (inclusive + non-egalitarian): accepts the ideal of promoting an undivided society, yet does so in a non-egalitarian fashion by promoting a homogenous society in which the dominant ethnic group asserts its own identity over the others. If others comply they are accorded equal treatment within the state.

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid.

- (d) *the racist/ethnicist CoSOs* (exclusive and non-egalitarian): believing in the primacy of a single and primordially given and thus non-assimilable identity. It advocates either ethnic cleansing or an effective apartheid system with permanent second-class citizenship.

Traditional early warning by INGOs has been based on the civic or post-national identity considering their emphasis on human security and the responsibility to protect. A good example is the early warning project by International Crisis Group. The previous chapter discussed how their early warnings could securitise a particular issue and enable the international community to intervene in it. They have also been strongly linked with the liberal peace ideology. Given this, it is interesting to question if community-based early warning systems have the same identity as that of INGOs.

This research hypothesises that community-based systems are based on the multi-cultural identity in order to keep impartiality and neutrality. This is probably significant in operating an early warning and early response project on the ground because if it cannot gain a strong cooperation with stake holders or conflicting parties who have various kinds of existing interests, it would be hard to achieve successful conflict prevention. For example, Wallensteen claims that preventive actions are neutral or at least impartial in their approaches to a conflict.⁵⁵⁹ Further he argues that ‘this does not exclude the possibility that a third party is close to one side than the other; what matters is the acceptability by the primary parties of the action taken.’⁵⁶⁰ Therefore, at the same time, it is not likely that those who engage themselves in community-based early warning and early response are not civic- or post-national CoSos because if they openly denounce particular conflict parties, it is unlikely that they can establish a strong cooperation with all the conflict parties involved.

(5) What was political opportunity structure like when the early warning project was implemented?

Political opportunity structure is the fourth variable of Marchetti and Tocci’s framework. It is similar to what they call the “context” just discussed above. However,

⁵⁵⁹ Wallensteen, P. op.cit.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid. p.214.

one of the most significant differences from “context” is timing. Effective civil society operations are carried out at a precise moment. In addition, the domestic institutional system is also a crucial factor, which includes the character of political actors who act within the institutional system.⁵⁶¹ For example, if a government has a policy that is very cooperative with civil society, it is easy to implement civil society’s projects.

(6) Did the early warning and early response project establish a network of early warning and early response across different ethnicities and identities?

(7) Were people (or the network) mobilised for the prevention of conflict?

(8) Did the preventive actions result in the stability of the situation?

In terms of direct impact, this research is concerned about above three points. This research assumes that a key to successful community-based early warning and early response is to establish an extensive network of people who have a will for peace and those who can connect people beyond differences even under political manipulation and conflicting situations. This research holds that if the network is mobilized and then intervention was followed by stability, it is possible to say that the early warning and early response system was effective.

(9) Are there any immanent contradictions between the long-term goals of civil society organisations operating early warning system and their short-term outcome?

The *peace writ large level* assessment is also significant in conflict early warning and early response. This is because while conflict early warning that is usually regarded as a short-term conflict prevention it can do harm to the long-term positive development of the society. Usually, those civil society organisations who implement conflict early warning and early response have not only the short-term goal of the prevention of violent conflict but also a long-term policy. This thesis examines if there are

⁵⁶¹ Marchetti, R. & Tocci, N. (2011) op. cit. pp.63-65.

immanent contradictions between the long-term goal of civil society actors and the outcome of their short-term project. Preventive actions may hinder the bringing of individuals to justice over human rights abuses, deny those who have suffered from structural violence for decades, and obstruct the possibility to change the unjust status-quo through violent measures.⁵⁶² It should not be forgotten that conflict, if it is not violent, can have some positive aspects too. Even if violent, conflict can have some positive effects if looked at from a long-term point of view. Therefore, it is examined here whether early warning and early response, or short-term conflict prevention, contributed to addressing the fundamental causes of violent conflict or if it exacerbated the situation further.

(10) What were the limitations and prospects of the community-based system?

In final section of case study, the thesis investigates correlations between variables. Then, it points out the limitations and prospects of community based early warning and early response systems.

5.6 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to broaden the conception of conflict early warning and early response and define what an emancipatory early warning would be like in the current global context. Reflecting on the unfulfilled potential in mainstream early warning and early response studies and practices, this chapter suggested that an emancipatory early warning study and practice must be based on a wider ontology, constructionist epistemology and explicitly emancipatory practice. The thesis argued that community-based early warning and early response systems that are developed by local civil society actors for local problems meet the criteria of the emancipatory early warning. However, letting civil society do conflict early warning and early response is deontologically emancipatory; however, it is yet to be emancipatory from

⁵⁶² Meyer, C. O. (forthcoming)

a consequentialist point of view - without knowing what civil society can do in conflict early warning and early response, we can hardly call it “emancipatory”. The chapter claimed that community-based early warning and early response could play a significant role in the prevention of ethnic riots in which civilians attack civilians belonging to different ethnic groups. The paper applied securitisation theory in order to understand the mechanism of ethnic riots through the constructionist epistemology. It redefined early warning as the warning of securitisation move and response as non-securitisation and desecuritisation moves. Based on this conceptualisation of conflict early warning and early response, the chapter introduced the framework for case studies to investigate whether community-based early warning systems have the potential to be emancipatory early warning. In the following two chapters, the thesis examines two different community-based early warning and early response systems in Kyrgyzstan and Sri Lanka.

Table.6 Case Study Framework⁵⁶³

- | |
|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) What types of violent conflict did they try to prevent? (2) What kind of early warning and early response mechanism did they establish? (3) What was the context like? (4) How did the context and the action framework (early warning and early response) shape the identity of CoSOs? (5) What was political opportunity structure like when the early warning project was implemented? (6) Did the early warning and early response project establish a network of early warning and early response across different ethnic groups? |
|---|

⁵⁶³ Although the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is a significant issue existing in the field of early warning, it is not a major theme of my research. Therefore, I do not discuss this issue in my thesis for the following reasons. First, FTI was not using ICT for their early warning. As Kristel Maasen, the former director of the early warning for violence prevention at FTI, said: “ICT was not really a part of the project. I was aware of some of the technology (not so much developed then as today) and I think we considered it briefly but it didn't seem so useful because we were mainly trying to inform potential interveners and there was little need to alert the big public. The people at the place of conflict usually already knew that something was going on so alerting of danger was often not the main goal (rather analysis and a call to intervene). When the weekly bulletin was not sufficient, we issued a few times an additional email or contacted relevant people directly through our networks. But in cases where intervention was urgently needed a team of FTI related interveners could be deployed (interview with Kristel Maasesn).” Second, FCE was not a good case to investigate the relationship between ICT and the responsibility warners assume for the quality of their warning and potential action that may follow from it. As described in the thesis, FCE’s early warning should be seen as “early detection and early action”, which means that when FCE detected some symptoms of violence by using their wide network of monitors, they intervened in impending situations rather than giving clear “warnings” to a wide variety of people. In a sense, FCE was warned by the monitors rather than giving warnings, and then FCE intervened in potentially violent situations for the purpose of prevention. For the two reasons, the two case studies are not the best cases to examine the relationship between the use of ICT and responsibilities for qualities and the following actions. This issue should be studied in depth in another research project.

- (7)** Were people (or the network) mobilised for the prevention of conflict?
- (8)** Did the preventive actions result in the stability of the situation?
- (9)** Are there any immanent contradictions between the long-term goals of civil society organisations operating early warning system and their short-term outcome?
- (10)** What were the limitations and strengths of the early warning and early response system?

Chapter 6

Case Study 1: The Foundation for Tolerance International (Kyrgyzstan)

6.1 Introduction

Kyrgyzstan is a country in Central Asia that is bordered by China to the East and South, Uzbekistan to the West, Tajikistan to the Southwest, and Kazakhstan to the North. There is a geographical, political and social divide between north and south within the country.⁵⁶⁴ The capital of Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek (formerly Frunze) is a city in the north that is predominately inhabited by ethnic Kyrgyz. The southern part of the country that is composed of Batken, Osh and Jalal-abad oblasts has borders with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and composes a part of the Ferghana Valley. The city of Osh, where 48% of the population are ethnic Uzbek and 43% Kyrgyz, is the second largest city in Kyrgyzstan after Bishkek. The southern part is considered to be the most conflict-prone region. The 2009 census shows that Kyrgyzstan as a whole has a population of 5,362,793, out of which 3,804,788 are ethnic Kyrgyz (70.9%), 768,405 are Uzbek (14.3%), 419,583 are Russian (7.8%) and other ethnic groups compose the rest of the population (Dungans, Uygurs, Tajiks, etc.).⁵⁶⁵ Approximately 80% of the population are Muslims, and 17% are Russian Orthodox.⁵⁶⁶ Most of the Muslims are Sunni.⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶⁴ Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (2011) *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in South Kyrgyzstan in June 2010*. p.8.

⁵⁶⁵ UN Data. Available: <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Kyrgyzstan#Social> (Accessed on 14 September 2013)

⁵⁶⁶ United States Department of State (2001) International Religious Freedom Report 2001: Kyrgyzstan. Available: <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2001/5598.htm> (Accessed on 14 September 2013)

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid.

Table.7 The 2009 Census: Ethnicity-wise Population⁵⁶⁸

Ethnicity	Kyrgyz	Uzbek	Russian	Others	Total
Population	3,804,788	768,405	419,583	370,017	5,362,793
Population (%)	70.9%	14.3%	7.8%	7.0%	100%

The Foundation for Tolerance International (FTI) is a local NGO of Kyrgyzstan established in 1998 in order to take initiatives in the field of peacebuilding and conflict prevention. FTI was developed from the work of the “Conflict Transformation and Teaching Tolerance” initiative implemented in 1996 with the support of the UNHCR.⁵⁶⁹ Following the completion of the original project it became clear that further work was needed in this area and FTI was designated as the professional team to continue peacebuilding initiatives in the region.⁵⁷⁰ FTI is also the regional coordinator for Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) in Central Asia.⁵⁷¹ FTI has been a leading conflict prevention NGO in Kyrgyzstan since they were established in 1998.

FTI’s early warning and early response project was chosen as a case study for this research because Kyrgyzstan has suffered from ethnic violence between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek, and in fact they have experienced two large-scale ethnic riots in 1990 and 2010 in the southern city of Osh. Therefore, Kyrgyzstan was considered to be a good case to investigate the hypothesis that community-based systems can be effectively applied to ethnic riots. A report compiled by FTI *the Role and Capacity of Civil Society in the Prevention of Violent Conflict in Southern Kyrgyzstan*⁵⁷² in 2005 expressed pressing demand for establishing conflict prevention mechanism in the Southern Kyrgyzstan. In the report, it was recommended that civil society should develop conflict early warning and early response systems.⁵⁷³ FTI began its early warning and response project “Early Warning for Violence Prevention” in 2005 right

⁵⁶⁸ UN Data. Op.cit.

⁵⁶⁹ The Foundation for Tolerance International. <http://fti.org/kg/en/about-us/about-fund> (Accessed on 22 September 2013.)

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁷¹ Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) is a member-led civil society organisation made up of 15 regional networks. More information available at: http://www.gppac.net/en_GB/home (Accessed 22 September 2013).

⁵⁷² FTI (2005) *The Role and Capacity of Civil Society in the Prevention of Violent Conflict in Southern Kyrgyzstan*

⁵⁷³ Ibid.

after the Tulip Revolution, and the project lasted until 2009.⁵⁷⁴ FTI's project was initiated in order to prevent violence related to not only ethnic issues but also political protests. During and after the Tulip revolution, FTI says, a strong need was felt for multi-perspective information and analysis regarding conflicts in all the regions of Kyrgyzstan, as well as for a mechanism for rapid and flexible intervention.⁵⁷⁵ The project was started in June 2005 with participation of OSCE, International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Swiss and US governments.

Although the project was funded and supported by foreign donors, the idea of early warning came from FTI themselves mainly by the founder and executive director Raja Kadyrova and partly by the director of the Early Warning for Violence Prevention project Kristel Maasen and others without strongly influenced by donors. They wrote a concept paper for the early warning project less than a week after the 2005 revolution. With this concept paper, they contacted a few donors. Therefore, their project was not a mere reflection of the realities of the western donors but a reflection of the local realities.

As mentioned above, community-based early warning systems are not free from liberal global governance as long as they are funded by western donors. Donors tend to allocate their funds to NGOs with managers who are well-educated and share the same approaches to peacebuilding, and this is a way that they implicitly impose their liberal peace ideology by allocating and not by allocating funds.⁵⁷⁶ However, FTI also managed to keep autonomy to some extent. This is due to professionals such as Raja Kadyrova and Kristel Maasen and their trust among donors. Kadyrova graduated from the University of Bishkek and then joined the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). She was also nominated as one of the most influential women

⁵⁷⁴ The project implemented from June 2006 to February 2008 was titled 'Early Warning for Violence Prevention'. The early warning and response project in 2009 was called 'Early Warning for Early Response project.'

⁵⁷⁵ Foundation for Tolerance International. *Early Warning for Violence Prevention: Foundation for Tolerance International Overview*.

⁵⁷⁶ See Bougheas, S., Isopi, A. & Owens, T. (2012) 'How Do Donors Allocate Funds to NGOs? Evidence from Uganda.' *Credit Research Paper*. No.12/08.; and, Ebrahim, A. (2003) *NGOs and Organisational Change: Discourse, Reporting and Learning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005. Ebrahim argues that these professionals can keep autonomy from their donors.⁵⁷⁷ He states that

‘they (professionals) act as spokespersons in defence of their organisations...to smooth communication between NGOs and funders. These professionals share with funders a common development language – terms such as participation, sustainability, cost-benefit analysis, impacts, indicators, and so on. Thus, the professionals are able to communicate their activities in terms acceptable to funders. By justifying their work in terms of dominant currency, the NGOs are able to deter probes into their work.’⁵⁷⁸

Although there were a few cases when the donors requested some changes in their early warning project, they were able to keep their core agenda. Although OSCE and UNDP wanted them to work with the IFES EVER (Election Violence Education and Response) project and share resources, they managed to keep their project concepts that intended to focus on useful analysis in the post-revolution time, not only about the electoral process.⁵⁷⁹ Even when one donor asked them not to report a few issues regarding the US air base in Kyrgyzstan, they did not stop reporting though they instead had to give extra care to the reporting.⁵⁸⁰ While there were budgetary issues pointed out by the donors such as the amount of staff costs in relation to the overall cost, there were no interference on the concept and intentions from the donors.⁵⁸¹ In this sense, one can argue that FTI’s community-based early warning project is more emancipatory than traditional ones in terms that their system is based on local people’s realities.

The goal of their project was to increase the conflict-carrying capacity of the social and political system in Kyrgyzstan and thus contribute to the ability to regulate and channel intense internal conflicts in such a way that violence is avoided.⁵⁸² FTI set three objectives:

⁵⁷⁷ Ebrahim, A. (2003) op.cit.

⁵⁷⁸ Ebrahim, A. (2003) op.cit. P.99.

⁵⁷⁹ Interview with Kristel Maasen.

⁵⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁸¹ Ibid.

⁵⁸² Foundation for Tolerance International. *Early Warning for Violence Prevention: Foundation for Tolerance International Overview*.

- a) Early warning of tensions and conflicts involving (potential of) violence in Kyrgyzstan,
- b) Promotion of commitment to non-violent and consensus-oriented approaches to conflict management/resolution among key decision-makers including government, parliament, law enforcement agencies and civil society,
- c) Support of potential interveners from civil society, government structures, and law enforcement agencies willing to contribute to non-violent intervention in particular conflict situations in order to prevent violence

The early warning mechanism of FTI in fact is very similar to that of the International Crisis Group as FTI produced “Weekly Bulletins” as their early warning products and disseminated them to a number of people. This small and national version of an early warning system is therefore a warning-oriented approach in comparison to response-oriented approach such as that of the Foundation for Co-Existence Sri Lanka (next case study). This does not mean that FTI did not have a response mechanism.

This chapter argues that FTI’s early warning and early response system provided a space to resolve local disputes in a democratic way in the state which was malfunctioning and failing. In addition, it argues that their intervention in street protests against the Bakiev government worked in favour of the highly corrupt government. It points out an immanent contradiction between FTI’s long-term goal (transformation of structure) and their short-term goal (prevention of violence).

In the following part of the case study, the research follows the research framework detailed in the previous chapter. First, this case study briefly discusses the nature of violence in Kyrgyzstan, and then introduces what kind of early warning and early response mechanism FTI established in order to prevent it. Then, the case study investigates how context influenced FTI’s community-based early warning and early response project, what kind of identity FTI developed under the particular context and action framework, and if there were any political opportunity structures that worked for/against FTI’s project. Then, the research examines both the direct and contextual

impacts of FTI's early warning project. Finally, from these findings, the case study analyses the limitations and prospects of FTI's early warning and early response system.

6.2 The Nature of Violence: What types of violent conflict did they try to prevent?

FTI intended to prevent large-scale violence like the Tulip Revolution by intervening in smaller conflicts. The idea was that if they were not resolved, it might result in generating grievances that lead to mass protests and violent clashes. The following types of violence were paid attentions by the early warning project:

- mobilization of the population by political and economic actors
- personnel hiring policy in government structures
- north/south division
- socio-economic conflicts over resource distribution
- criminalization of politics
- elections, particularly additional parliamentary elections and referendum
- interethnic conflicts, cross-border conflicts and tensions caused by instability in neighbouring Uzbekistan
- conflicts over distribution and access to natural resources (water, but in particular land)
- religious tensions/extremism

Before FTI began their early warning project in 2005, Kyrgyzstan had had experienced the 1990 riots and the 2005 revolution (Tulip Revolution). The former is a case in which ethnic grievances escalated into large-scale riots. The latter is a case where political disputes became a large-scale violent mass-protest. Here, how smaller disputes escalated into the large-scale violent incidents are briefly explained by particularly focusing on structural causes, proximate causes and the roles of rumours in mobilising people to violence.

Kyrgyzstan experienced large-scale ethnic riots between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Osh in 1990, which took place under very unstable political situations. The 1990 riots broke out about a year before Kyrgyzstan became independent from the Soviet Union.⁵⁸³ It is also important to note that it was not only Osh but also some other Central Asian states that experienced deadly clashes from 1985 to 1990 at the dusk of the Soviet Union under the policy of *perestroika*.⁵⁸⁴ The unprecedented political, social and economic changes hit then Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic. Asankanov argues that:

‘from the middle to the late 1980s, there was considerable growth in political activity and national self-consciousness among all the people of Kyrgyzstan. A gradual liberation from totalitarianism in the republic, as elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, was marked by the active growth of informal public unions: national movements, national cultural centres, associations, societies, and the like.’⁵⁸⁵

The National Democratic Front of Kyrgyzstan, consisting of Kyrgyz, and Adalat, consisting exclusively of Uzbeks, appeared in the Osh region in 1989. Later, Osh Aimagi, which was exclusively Kyrgyz, emerged. In these two informal groups, nationalistic Osh Aimagi and separatist Adalat objectives took shape. Asankanov claims that separatist claims such as the establishment of the Uzbek autonomy in Osh and the recognition of the Uzbek language was the principal cause of the 1990 riots.⁵⁸⁶ The interethnic clashes that started on the 4th of June, 1990, in the city of Osh and lasted till June 10th, claimed the lives of 120 Uzbeks, 50 Kyrgyz and one Russian.⁵⁸⁷ Although this is not directly related to this research as it took place in

⁵⁸³ On the 31st of August, 1991, Kyrgyzstan came to be independent and became the Kyrgyz Republic.

⁵⁸⁴ Ashkhabad (Turkmenistan), Novyi Uzen (Kazakhstan), Ferghana (Uzbekistan) experienced deadly ethnic riots in 1989. The ethnic riots again broke out in Dushanbe (Tajikistan) and Osh-Uzgen (Kyrgyzstan) in 1990.

⁵⁸⁵ Asankanov, A. (1996) ‘Ethnic Conflict in the Osh Region in Summer 1990: Reasons and Lessons.’ In Rupasinghe, K. & Tishkov, V. A. (eds.) *Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. Ch.6. p.121.

⁵⁸⁶ Asankanov, A. (1996) op.cit.

⁵⁸⁷ Tishkov, V. (1995) ‘“Don't Kill Me, I'm a Kyrgyz!”: An Anthropological Analysis of Violence in the Osh Ethnic Conflict.’ *Journal of Peace Research*. vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 133-149. The number of victims largely differs in different reports and articles. Tishkov op.cit. states it was about 200. Asankanov op. cit. argues that it was more than 300.

2010, there was another large-scale ethnic riot in Osh and spread to Jalal-abad, which claimed that about 470 people were killed in the ethnic clashes.⁵⁸⁸

Although there were some significant structural factors that caused the riots as discussed above, there was another proximate cause that triggered the riots. While the ethnic cleavage between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek were there, the ethnic tension itself does not explain why it escalated into large-scale violence at a particular time in spite of the fact that there are some other similar cases of interethnic tension. In order to understand it, it is significant to learn the short-term construction of consensus for violence within an ethnic group. It is said that the trigger cause of the riots was the unfair distribution of housing and land. In Osh region nearly 60,000 families, or every sixth family, was on the waiting list for housing.⁵⁸⁹ For years they have been waiting for dwellings and plots of land, while living in hostels. Among their actions, some Kyrgyz people formed the informal organization Osh Aimagi.⁵⁹⁰ They demanded the territory of the Lenin kolkhoz of the Kara-Suu district, planning to create a Kyrgyz village there. However, the bulk of population living in this kolkhoz was Uzbek.⁵⁹¹ The Kyrgyz group in fact seized 32 hectares of the collective farms forcefully. The Uzbek residents protested; however, it was not heard by the authorities. Rather, the authorities made a decision to grant the forcefully taken land to the Kyrgyz people without the proper consent of the leaders of the area. After the six protesters were killed, some Uzbek people began to resort to violence, attacking police and Kyrgyz communities.⁵⁹² During the first days of the unrest, the Uzbek had the upper hand, then groups of Kyrgyz arrived from the surrounding countryside, inflicting serious casualties on them.⁵⁹³

A significant point is that these violent confrontations were done by civilians not by armed forces. Both sides committed arson, killed horses, and plundered shops and offices. They were armed with small-bore guns, pistols, sticks, and rods. Murders in

⁵⁸⁸ Cited in Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission report. op. cit. P.44. In fact, Kylym Shamy used the methodology recommended by KIC, which is more reliable than that of the Kyrgyz official.

⁵⁸⁹ Sovetskaya Kirghizia (1990) 15 August. Cited in Asankanov, A.

⁵⁹⁰ Asankanov, A. op. cit. p.119.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid.

⁵⁹² International Crisis Group Asia Report (2010) *The Pogrom In Kyrgyzstan*. No.193. 23 August. Available: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/193%20The%20Pogroms%20in%20Kyrgyzstan.ashx>

⁵⁹³ Ibid.

Uzgen, Osh, and other regions were committed by strangulation with wire or rope; torture and beating; assault and battery using axes, stones and other hard objects; and guns. There were cases victims were burnt, to make identification impossible. Rape was characteristic of both sides, as were various forms of humiliation and torture, such as parading women naked in the street.⁵⁹⁴

Valery Tishkov recorded the further details of the 1990 riots, which focuses particularly on the roles of rumours and myths in mobilising people.⁵⁹⁵ He claims that ‘rumours formulated in terms of the myth proved to be the most important factor in provoking intergroup aggression.’⁵⁹⁶ Tishkov argues that though Uzgen is not located far from the ethnic violence sites, not a single source of information in this zone had been a first-hand witness to the supposed events. According to his findings, although some kinds of leadership existed, it is not known who has spread such rumours for what purpose. In addition, Tishkov points out the absence of media in the role of mobilisation, which is usually the most common measure taken in mobilisation in the modern society. Every family in Osh oblast had TV and radio sets. Subscription rates to periodicals were also high. However, it was not mentioned at all in the court sentences. Although there are many explanations for it, Tishkov argues that verbal communications in the form of rumours play the major role in mobilizing people to attacking the Uzbeks in the 1990 Riots.⁵⁹⁷ Tishkov’s account coincides with Horowitz’s findings of the roles of rumours in ethnic riots. If we take this case in order to explain FTI’s approach in conflict early warning and response, FTI’s

⁵⁹⁴ Asankanov, A. op. cit. p.117.

⁵⁹⁵ His anthropological analysis of the Osh riots used the texts of court sentences as the source of the analysis. This approach is very fruitful in that it is usually hard to learn what happened during the riots. He claims that the testimonies of the defendants and the witnesses contain rich information, and calls his research a micro-analysis because it refers to a ‘local’ context of the conflict behaviour in contrast to longer-term or structural explanations of the riots. He used data from 10 closed court trials that took place in 1991. The defendants were ethnically Kyrgyz – those who killed, assaulted or raped Uzbeks. Therefore, his findings do not illustrate the opposing side – how Uzbek people were mobilized to ethnic violence. Considering the fact that it is the Uzbek side that initially started to resort to violence, it is hard to capture a whole picture of ethnic violence that took place during the early June, 1990. However, it is still very useful in that majority of the killings was caused by the ethnic Kyrgyz.

⁵⁹⁶ Tishkov, V. (1995) p.146.

⁵⁹⁷ Tishkov holds that this may be explained by several hypothetical reasons. First, participants in ethnic violence belonged to the category of citizens that does not read newspapers, does not listen to the radio and does not watch TV. Second, no information came out via the mass media - either because of censorship or because of the inefficiency of journalists and publishers. Third, the official accounts, imposed from above, were denied or the participants in ethnic violence mistrusted them. Participants did not ‘hear’ them psychologically. Finally, it could be assumed that other means of communication and mobilization were powerful enough to make the mass media influence decidedly peripheral. See Tishkov, V. (1995)

approach is to intervene in the land issues at the point when violent confrontation is yet to occur.

In addition to the 1990 riots, it is the 2005 riots that made FTI start their early warning project, in which the then president Akaev was overthrown by people's mass protests. Kyrgyzstan has nurtured a culture of protests which often turned violent. Every year, there are over 1000 protests across the country.⁵⁹⁸ Akaev, who became the first president of the republic of Kyrgyzstan at independence, remained in power till 2005. During his term, he was re-elected twice in 1995 and 2000 (he was in power for three terms) in spite of the fact that the constitution prohibits one president from staying in power for more than two terms. After the controversial election in 2000, he shifted to a more authoritarian direction.⁵⁹⁹ His regime was eventually overthrown by popular protests after the 2005 parliamentary election, which is referred to as the Tulip Revolution.⁶⁰⁰

Jones identified the pattern of violent protests by examining the cases of Aksy in 2002, the 2005 revolution and the 2010 revolution, and describes it as follows:

‘the government attacked popular local leaders, the public protested, security forces overreacted in response, protesters seized government buildings, and the national government collapsed.’⁶⁰¹

⁵⁹⁸ Heathershaw, J. (2012) state that during the period from January to October 2011, over 1,000 protests were recorded across Kyrgyzstan. Heathershaw, J. (2012) *Protests in Kyrgyzstan: Disorder or Democratisation?* 22 May. Central Eurasian Scholars and Media Initiative. Available: <http://cesmi.info/wp/?p=142> (Accessed on 13 September 2013); The BBC cites the statement of prime minister Jantoro Satybaldiev saying that there were 1,286 protests across Kyrgyzstan in 2012 (available: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22852857>).

⁵⁹⁹ International Crisis Group *Asia Report* (2005) *Kyrgyzstan after the Revolution*. No.97. 4 May. Available: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/centralasia/kyrgyzstan/097_kyrgyzstan_after_the_revolution.ashx (Accessed on 13 September 2013.)

⁶⁰⁰ His successor Kurmanbek Bakiyev was also ousted by people's protests in April 2010. An interim government was established by the opposition party led by then foreign minister Roza Otunbayeva. In June, a referendum approved a reform to shift from a presidential system to a parliamentary system. In October of the same year, a parliamentary election was held. In 2011, a presidential election was held and Almazbek Atambayev was elected as the new president of Kyrgyzstan.

⁶⁰¹ Jones, K. D. op.cit. p.22.

He argues that ‘the tactics of the March 2002 protests, the blocking of roads, the seizing of government buildings, the taking of hostages, the large-scale local protests, etc., were all reused in March 2005 and April 2010.’⁶⁰² In the 2005 revolution, the government alienated local politicians from parliamentary election held in February and March.⁶⁰³ The government’s political repression was the most important factor in the protest’s increased intensity and in the collapse of the Akaev government.⁶⁰⁴ In addition, the central government increased physical pressure on protesters and opposition leaders through the ineffective deployment of security forces. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) deployed 175 observers and criticised ‘deregistration of candidates, interfering with independent media, vote buying and a low level of confidence in electoral and judicial institutions on the part of candidates and voters.’⁶⁰⁵ A number of protests were held by the supporters of defeated candidates after the election in many parts of the country. On March 24th, opposition leaders organised a large-scale protest against the government after the president Akaev fired the interior minister and the prosecutor general on the previous day. Jones argues that this rally turned violent when ‘young men started running toward the crowd with shields, wearing helmets and blue ribbons, and throwing stones at the protesters.’ According to his interview, opposition leaders called out to the members of the crowd to restrain themselves, but the “crowd was not able to restrain themselves very long.” A participant said to Jones that “none of the people would have gone to the White House if rocks had not been thrown.” Eventually, this protest resulted in ousting the president. One of FTI’s early warning project’s main response options was to tell the organisers of mass protests not to resort to any violence and the government not to overreact. In the following section, the research introduces how FTI tried to prevent violent incidents like these by using an early warning and early response mechanism.

⁶⁰² Ibid. p.5.

⁶⁰³ In Kyrgyzstan, election law demands that a candidate must secure more than 50% of the vote, otherwise a second ballot is required between the two strongest candidates. Beachain, D. O. (2009) ‘Tulip Revolution, Kyrgyzstan’. In Ness, I. (ed.) *International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest*. Blackwell Publishing. pp.3328-3333.

⁶⁰⁴ Jones, K. D. op. cit.

⁶⁰⁵ OSCE (2005) *Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions*. 28 February. Available: <http://www.osce.org/item/13831.html>. Cited in International Crisis Group *Asia Report* (2005) *Kyrgyzstan after the Revolution*. No.97. 4 May. Available: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/097_kyrgyzstan_after_the_revolution.ashx (Accessed on 13 September 2013.)

6.3 FTI's Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism:

What kind of early warning and early response mechanism did they establish?

The FTI's early warning project had a comprehensive framework to prevent violence in Kyrgyzstan, especially in Osh, Jalal-abad and Batken oblast, which included long-, medium- and short-term preventive measures. By the short-term approach, they meant violence prevention through early warning and early response; the medium-term approach means conflict resolution through working with the causes of conflict/violence; the long-term approach means conflict transformation through working with the structural issues such as governance processes and policy issues.⁶⁰⁶ FTI adopted short-term and medium term approaches as their conflict early warning and early response mechanism.

Early Warning

FTI's data collection relied on FTI staff field monitors spread into each oblast. They collected raw information about some social issues that had not been resolved yet by asking their contacts, who ranged from government officers to women's organisation members. They often used their personal network in order to gain information. The information collected was sent to each regional coordinator first by using a sheet made of 15 questions and then it was sent to the head office in Bishkek weekly. The data was analysed by analysts and early warnings were issued as the form of a Weekly Bulletin.

The most unique and significant component of FTI's early warning mechanism is this Weekly Bulletin.⁶⁰⁷ It is the early warning product of FTI, which usually contains (1) alerts, (2) weekly review, (3) focused analyses and recommendations, (4) updates, and (5) project information. These topics are summarized into 4-8 pages.⁶⁰⁸ Alerts were

⁶⁰⁶ Foundation for Tolerance International.op.cit.

⁶⁰⁷ The research examined the weekly bulletins that were issued during the second phase of the EWVP project from No. 43 (25 October 2006) to No.98 (7 February 2008).

⁶⁰⁸ The number of pages depends on the number of incidents that took place over the past one week and depth of analyses and recommendations.

given only when some turmoil was expected in the near future. As far as the second phase of the EWVP project is concerned, alerts were issued only twice⁶⁰⁹ out of the 31 issues that included the section of alerts (eventually, the section of alerts was removed from the bulletin with issue number 74). *Weekly review* is the section that summarises the political, social and economic disputes that took place over the past one week and might develop into violent conflict unless they are addressed. *Focused analysis and recommendations* prioritize some disputes to be resolved. This section gives further detailed information such as historical background of the events and conflicting parties, analyzes the situation deeply and gives recommendations to relevant actors. This is the core part of Weekly Bulletin and functions as early warning. The section of *updates* provides information on the positive outcomes of interventions by relevant actors when interventions were made according to the FTI Weekly Bulletins. The *project information* section gives information on how to contact FTI in order to resolve disputes and it also asks for cooperation with FTI. This section in each issue basically has the same content.

The bulletin was disseminated to approximately 1200 direct receivers every week: about 700 receivers of the electronic version and 500 receivers of hard copies. It was prepared in three different languages: Russian, Kyrgyz and English.

The List of the Receivers of the Bulletin⁶¹⁰

- Prime Minister, President's Administration, Prime Minister's Office, Department of Regional Issues under the prime minister's administration, Adviser to the prime minister, Governmental Spokesperson, Special representative of the president in the parliament;
- All oblast administrations, all rayon administrations, city administrations, mayor of Bishkek, heads of ayil okmotu; their deputies;
- Oblast and Rayon Departments of Ministry of Interior Affairs and National Security Service, Head of Border Control for the Southern oblasts. Department of Defense and Security under the presidential administration, Department of Defense and Law Enforcement Agencies under the presidential administration, Secretariat of the Security Council, eight Parliament members, Center for Parliamentarism and Drafting, Head of department for international cooperation in the parliament;

⁶⁰⁹ Issue No.44 and 45.

⁶¹⁰ Foundation for Tolerance International. op. cit.

- Central Election Commission head and members;
- Ombudsman, Human Rights Committee under the presidential administration, Consultative Council for Good Governance;
- Informal leaders of ethnic minority groups, local religious leaders, political party activists;
- NGOs, international organizations, academic institutions, media outlets.

Early Response

FTI adopted a multi-stakeholder approach for their early response strategies. They established a quasi-formal network of interveners on the basis of the National Coordination Council (NCC) and Regional Coordination Councils (RCCs) which had already been established aimed by FTI for the purpose of facilitating communication among civil society, authorities, law enforcement, and the media to prevent and resolve violent conflict. The network members participated in some training to increase their capacity to deal with disputes. On an ad hoc basis (depending on characteristics and location of a conflict) the members of the intervention network formed the core of the FTI's crisis intervention with other stakeholders invited to problem-solving workshops and dialogue. Within the workshops, joint analyses were often conducted in order to come to common understanding of issues and needs of the conflicting parties, elaborating and strategizing of joint solutions. The analytical team provided analytical support for it. These interventions were initiated by various actors such as civil society organisations, local governments, conflict parties and FTI themselves.

Although they were not systematized in FTI's early response mechanism, it is possible to see that most of the non-securitisation moves that Bonacker, Diez and Grome consider useful were seen in their interventions. In the problem-solving workshops, for example, it was often denied that an existential threat did exist by providing unbiased information by referring to Weekly Bulletins. In addition, FTI told stakeholders that they do not possess the legitimacy to decide on the adoption of extraordinary means, and suggested to wait for a legal decision and abide by it. When it comes to the prevention of street protests from escalating into violence, FTI told the

organisers that they should avoid the call to panic politics, and also reminded them to tell protesters not to implement any extraordinary measure.⁶¹¹

Mid-Term Early Warning & Response

FTI's data collection relied not only on field monitors but also on workshops. For example, FTI organized some workshops by inviting people from various sectors, and discussed (1) political, economic and social obstacles, and (2) the issues to be resolved as soon as possible, otherwise expected to escalate into violence. FTI, in cooperation with UNDP, organized and facilitated 7 three-day workshops on "Peace and Development Analysis (PDA)" process in Kyrgyzstan in 2008. The essence of the process was to prompt the collection of information on conflict dynamics and tendencies in 7 oblasts of Kyrgyzstan. Participants were invited from state structure, civil society, mass media, law enforcement bodies, religious figures and business structure. Analytical reports were created after each workshop and later sent to all stakeholders.

For instance, the participants from Jalal-abad and Osh oblasts identified the following political, economic and social obstacles, and the obstacles that were related to security issues.

Table. 8

Jalal-Abad	• Corruption in state structure and society • Low level of legal knowledge • Absence of ideology and patriotism among citizens, "mankurtism" • Disregard of ecology • Incompletion of the delimitation and the demarcation of Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan borders • Religious conflicts
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⁶¹¹ Bonacker, T., Diez, T. & Grome, T. (2011) op. cit. p.20.

Osh	• The members of the election committee have poor knowledge regarding the “ Election code” • Gaps in the legislature that regulate the religious organizations activities; moreover population’s lack of knowledge on religious matters is also a handicap. • The corruption in administrative structures and the absence of a political will among leaders of higher rank to fight it. • Absence of common national ideology • Frustrated civil identity leads to the division of the population • Feeling of insecurity among the population
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The same participants also identified the following local tensions that must be resolved immediately, and otherwise might lead to social outbreaks.

Table. 9

Jalal-Abad	• Ban of headscarves for girls in schools. • Students miss lessons to visit juma namaz (Friday prayers). • Juvenile delinquency. • Ineffective management during natural disasters. • Religious radicalization of Muslims.
Osh	• Racketeering in schools and fighting between schools • Unfair distribution of property in Osh city • Conflict between local government and religious believers • Conflicts between different branches of Islam

Security Measures

They did not develop thorough security provisions for their staff members and participants. But, two security provisions were raised by an ex-FTI officer. Firstly, on-the-ground monitors tried not to identify themselves as monitors collecting information. Secondly, analysts in the Bishkek office were also anonymous: FTI did not issue early warnings under particular staff member’s name but under the project name.⁶¹²

6.4 Context:

⁶¹² Interview with an ex-FTI officer.

What was the context like when the early warning project was implemented? How did contextual factors affect the performance of community-based early warning and early response system?

The context in which FTI's early warning and early response project was implemented was a very harsh environment for civil society actors in terms that (1) the state was failing and malfunctioning because of the lack of democracy and corruption, and (2) Kyrgyz society was highly segmented in terms of ethnicity. However, it is under this context that FTI community-based early warning and early response system offered a democratic space to resolve disputes through dialogue and workshops instead of the malfunctioning government.

Kyrgyzstan is a highly unstable state. Some argue that Kyrgyzstan is a failing state, if not failed.⁶¹³ According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank, which report six aggregate governance indicators: (1) Voice and Accountability, (2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence, (3) Government Effectiveness, (4) Regulatory Quality, (5) Rule of Law, and (6) Control of Corruption, Kyrgyzstan was ranked the worst 10% in the categories of Rule of Law and Control of Corruption during the period from 2005 to 2009.⁶¹⁴ As Kyrgyzstan was ranked very low in the other categories, it shows how fragile and weak Kyrgyzstan was.⁶¹⁵ The Kyrgyzstan experienced two revolutions that toppled governments within twenty years of independence. The politics of Kyrgyzstan has a character of authoritarianism in spite of its democratic facade. For most of the decade since independence, Kyrgyzstan had been regarded as an island of democracy and stability in Central Asia.⁶¹⁶ In comparison with other Central Asian countries, the beginning of the country was seen

⁶¹³ See McGlinchey, E. (2009) *Islamic Revivalism and State Failure in Kyrgyzstan*. Seattle: The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research.; McMillan, C. (2005) 'Failed State or Democratic Revolution?' *Policy Option*. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy.; and Wilkinson, C. (2011) 'Giving a State a Bad Name? Kyrgyzstan and the Risk of State Failure.' *Global Dialogue*. Vol.13, No.1.

⁶¹⁴ World Bank (2013) *Worldwide Governance Indicators Country Data Report for Kyrgyz Republic, 1996-2012*. Available: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/> (Accessed on 13 May 2014)

⁶¹⁵ Ibid.

⁶¹⁶ International Crisis Group *Asia Report* (2001) *Kyrgyzstan at Ten: Trouble in the Island of Democracy*. No.22. 28 August. Available: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/Kyrgyzstan%20at%20Ten%20Trouble%20in%20the%20Island%20of%20Democracy.pdf> (Accessed on 13 September 2013.)

as successful. Constitutional standards guarantee a free press, many basic religious freedoms and the separations of powers between the executive, judicial and legislative branches of government.⁶¹⁷ However, under the presidency of Askar Akaev, constitutional revisions were made and a distinctively Eurasian form of semi-presidentialism emerged, in which 'the parliament was unable to hold either prime minister or president accountable through traditional parliamentary means, such as a vote of no confidence or a rejection of the president's nominee as prime minister.'⁶¹⁸

Kevin Jones concisely points out a major problem of Kyrgyzstan by stating that all political and social issues are resolved through street protests and violence in Kyrgyzstan.⁶¹⁹ He holds that this means a failure of the Kyrgyz democratic system because a functioning democracy relies on a functioning legal system.⁶²⁰ He further argues that 'if leaders can be chosen by mass protests, courts overthrown by the most vocal opponent, and presidents removed by a crowd of a few hundred, democracy does not exist.'⁶²¹ On the other hand, there is another aspect of protests, which is often positive in terms of social change. As Heathershaw claims, it is a means to communicate socio-economic grievances to government.⁶²² His findings show that of about 500 protests that took place in Bishkek in 2012, nearly half of them had a social-economic character that usually demanded the provision of basic utilities and services.⁶²³ Medet Tiulegenov, a political analyst from the American University in Central Asia, state that "formal mechanisms to communicate with the authorities are weak or completely absent," therefore "street protests are often the only option."⁶²⁴

In addition to the political instability, Kyrgyzstan's corrupt nature of socio-economics must be noted. According to the Corruption Perception Index, which is published by

⁶¹⁷ Ibid.

⁶¹⁸ Huskey, E. (2007) 'Eurasian Semi-Presidentialism: The Development of Kyrgyzstan's Model of Government.' In Elgie, R. (ed.). *Semi-Presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study*. London: Routledge. P.161.

⁶¹⁹ Jones, K. D. (2011) *A Culture of Protests: The Government Overthrow in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2010*. Maryland: Center for International and Security Studies.

⁶²⁰ Ibid.

⁶²¹ Ibid.

⁶²² Heathershaw, J. (2012) Protests in Kyrgyzstan: Disorder or Democratisation? 22 May. Central Eurasian Scholars and Media Initiatives. Available: <http://cesmi.info/wp/?p=142> (Accessed on 13 September 2013)

⁶²³ Ibid.

⁶²⁴ BBC (2013) *What is driving Kyrgyzstan's Protest Culture?* 12 June. Available: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22852857> (Accessed on 13 September 2013)

Transparency International annually, Kyrgyzstan is considered to be one of the most corrupt states.⁶²⁵ Corruption is endemic not only in Kyrgyzstan but also in the entire Central Asia region. The deeply systematic and entrenched corruption and organized criminality that became an integral part of the Central Asian economies was one of the legacies of Soviet rule in central Asia.⁶²⁶ Corruption has been widespread particularly among those with control over goods and services in short supply (service- and trade-oriented ministers, business) and those with power over economic activities (high government officials, law enforcement, the procuracy and courts).⁶²⁷ Erica Marat argues that the high ranking politicians informally control the major economic sectors such as banking and energy.⁶²⁸ The president Kurmanbek Bakiyev did not deny his connection with influential criminal leaders.⁶²⁹ Erica Marat's research further shows that even the political, economy and security sectors are under the influence of criminal groups.⁶³⁰ Centre for Preventive Action sees corruption as the single biggest impediment to carrying out democratization and market reform.⁶³¹ They argue that due to the deep and lucrative vested interests, few at the highest levels are seriously interested in revamping the system into something more transparent and fair.⁶³²

Table.10 Corruption Perception Index - Kyrgyzstan⁶³³

Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Ranking	130/159	142/163	150/180	166/180	162/180	164/178	164/183

Many of the social issues in Kyrgyzstan were more or less connected with the corruption of the state authorities. The government of Kyrgyzstan, local government, law enforcement agencies and judiciaries are highly corrupted, and have a strong connection with criminal groups.⁶³⁴ The Centre for the Control of Narco-trafficking, which was the only joint organisation dealing with the drug trafficking problem, was

⁶²⁵ Transparency International. *Corruption Perception Index*.

Available: <http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview>

⁶²⁶ Lubin, N., Martin, K. & Rubin, B, R. (1999) *Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia*. New York: the Center for Preventive Action. P.68

⁶²⁷ Ibid.

⁶²⁸ Marat, E. (2008) 'Criminalization of the Kyrgyz State before and after the Tulip Revolution.' *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*. Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 15-22.

⁶²⁹ Ibid.

⁶³⁰ Ibid.

⁶³¹ Lubin, N., Martin, K. & Rubin, B, R. op.cit. p.68.

⁶³² Ibid.

⁶³³ Transparency International. Op.cit.

⁶³⁴ See Marat, E. (2008) op. cit.

closed by Bakiyev and resulted in allowing the drug trade to flourish and criminal groups to strengthen.⁶³⁵

While the government of Kyrgyzstan is highly corrupt, civil society has not been strong enough to change the nature of the government. Kanykey Jailobaeva argues that any issue can be solved only by working closely with the government in Kyrgyzstan.⁶³⁶ She further argues that most of her NGO interviewees said that even if they worked very hard to try to address issues, they could not do so because they were addressing only the consequences of the issues and not the fundamental causes that created them.⁶³⁷ In the post-Soviet period, to establish a strong culture of civil society has been seen as a significant part of democratization in Kyrgyzstan. The statehood and social framework that existed in Kyrgyzstan had been shaped in the Soviet period, designed to assert the policy of the Soviet Union.⁶³⁸ However, Kyrgyzstan has been regarded as the most democratic country in the region, and the NGO sustainability index published by the United States Agency of International Development (USAID) shows that Kyrgyzstan's NGO sector has been the second most sustainable in Central Asia, though in all the states in Central Asia, NGO sustainability is very low.⁶³⁹ In Kyrgyzstan, the term civil society is often used to denote NGOs and used interchangeably.⁶⁴⁰ In the post-Soviet period, the western liberal democratic model has been promoted by the external donor community.⁶⁴¹ The NGOs in Kyrgyzstan are therefore often regarded as the institutions of democracy to promote democratic values. Moreover, some NGOs are regarded as pro-USA.⁶⁴² In fact, FTI was regarded as such.⁶⁴³

⁶³⁵ Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission. op. cit.

⁶³⁶ Jailobaeva, K. (2008) p. 86. Jailobaeva, K. (2008) 'Enhanced Government Commitment: A Key to an Effective Government-NGO Relationship in Kyrgyzstan.' In Couper, J. (ed.) *Kyrgyzstan Today*.

Bishkek: Social Research Center, American University of Central Asia. p.86.

⁶³⁷ Ibid.

⁶³⁸ Schulte, Y. (2008) 'Benchmarking the Process of Democratization in Kyrgyzstan by Defining the Role and Functions of NGOs.' In Couper, J. (ed.) *Kyrgyzstan Today*. Bishkek: Social Research Center, American University of Central Asia.

⁶³⁹ USAID (2011) *2010 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia*, 14th Edition.

⁶⁴⁰ Schulte, Y. op. cit.

⁶⁴¹ Ibid.

⁶⁴² Baktygulov, S. (2008) 'Participation of Kyrgyzstan's NGOs in Public Decision-Making: Issues and Prospects.' In Couper, J. (ed.) *Kyrgyzstan Today*. Bishkek: Social Research Center, American University of Central Asia.

⁶⁴³ Ibid.

Another significant characteristic of Kyrgyzstan is that it is a highly segmentalised society. For example, the Uzbek people are often described as “diasporas” by the Kyrgyz people. There is a clear social division in the south of Kyrgyzstan, where ethnic Uzbeks mostly engage in business and the government sectors are dominated by ethnic Kyrgyz. Political parties are also established along ethnic line. For example, Rodina, which is a southern, predominantly Uzbek political party led by a Uzbek businessman Kadyrjan Batyrov, was influential among the Uzbek people. Batyrov also headed a very influential organisation Uzbek National Cultural Centre, which is a political group and publishes newspaper Diydor. He also established his university People’s Friendship University⁶⁴⁴, which was closed by the government after the ethnic riots in 2010.

6.5 Identity of FTI:

How did the context and the action framework (early warning and early response) shape the identity of FTI?

As the Kyrgyzstan society is highly segmentalised, FTI took a multi-cultural stance in order to implement their early warning and early response project. They respect all the ethnic groups’ cultures and identities in Kyrgyzstan. This is because they had to keep impartiality and neutrality in order to establish a good relationship with all identity groups in Kyrgyzstan. They would select monitors from different ethnic groups and in some cases have information cross-checked by two monitors.⁶⁴⁵ Moreover, they selected those who had been working with inter-ethnic conflicts for a long time.

It must be noted here again that FTI’s early warning project not only aimed at preventing ethnic riots but also violence that arose from many other issues existing in

⁶⁴⁴ This is a private university founded by Batyrov with 4 million US dollars of his own money. See Shishkin, P. (2010) “A Murder in Kyrgyzstan.”

Available: <http://asiasociety.org/countries/conflicts/murder-kyrgyzstan?page=0,5>

(Accessed on 06/November/2012.)

⁶⁴⁵ Interview with Kristel Maasen.

Kyrgyzstan, which ranged from political issues to land issues. In addition to the ethnic division, a North-south division was also present in Kyrgyzstan. According to Kristel Maasen, there was a fear of bias coming from the North-South division within FTI.⁶⁴⁶ The staff members of FTI were also aware of the fear of the biases coming from the division.⁶⁴⁷ In order to keep impartiality and neutrality in this regard, they would select two analysts who were originally from North, and South. Since part of Maasen's roles in the project was to check the bulletin on biases, she acknowledges that she sometimes spotted them, and then rechecked and reworded.

6.6 Political Opportunity Structure

What was political opportunity structure like?

FTI began the project right after the ousting of President Akyev by popular protests and at the same time it was the beginning of the Bakiev regime. In spite of some optimism right after the demise of the Akaev's authoritarian rule, Bakiev gradually strengthened his authoritarian rule. Human Rights Watch's World Report 2007 states that:

“Kyrgyz authorities were increasingly hostile toward civil society groups during 2006. On January 24 the minister of justice publicly instructed the ministry's registration department to launch an investigation into all nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Kyrgyzstan that receive foreign funding. Minister Marat Kaipov specifically called on the registration department to determine which NGOs funded from abroad might threaten Kyrgyzstan's national security. In March the ombudsman sent a letter to Prime Minister Feliks Kulov suggesting a ban on foreign NGOs working in Kyrgyzstan and on domestic NGOs receiving foreign funding. Civil society groups were deeply concerned about these initiatives and called on the Bakiev

⁶⁴⁶ Interview with Kristel Maasen.

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid.

government not to implement them. To the government's credit, both initiatives were rejected.”⁶⁴⁸

A good indicator to further show this is the degree of freedom of speech. Freedom House's annual reports from 2006 to 2010 show that during the period Kyrgyzstan's press was “not free”.⁶⁴⁹ As the table below shows, the Press Freedom Score of Kyrgyzstan under the Bakiev regime had gradually deteriorated, as the higher the score is the less freedom there is. The unstable political situation led the government to curb media outlets that threatened to undermine its position. While Kyrgyz law protects freedom of speech and prohibits censorship, it is ineffectively and unevenly applied.⁶⁵⁰ Independent journalists reporting on politically sensitive issues like government corruption and the improper privatization of state companies continued to endure aggressive harassment from tax inspectors, security officers, and the state antimonopoly committee.⁶⁵¹ Some journalists were assaulted and murdered. The murder of an Uzbek journalist Alisher Saipov in 2007 shed light on a number of issues surrounding the media in Kyrgyzstan. Human Rights Watch's World Report 2008 also states that the year of 2007 was characterized by a rapid increase in politically motivated prosecutions of civil society actors and opposition activists.⁶⁵² Libel is also used as a means to suppress journalists. Libel is a criminal offense and carries up to three years in prison. In spite of the repeated calls to decriminalise it, it remained illegal.⁶⁵³ Therefore, collecting information and revealing sensitive issues regarding the government was a risky task in Kyrgyzstan.

Table. 11 Freedom of the Press by Freedom House

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Press Status	Not Free	Not Free	Not Free	Not Free	Not Free
Press Freedom Score ⁶⁵⁴	64	67	70	72	73
Legal Environment	22	22	22	23	23
Political Environment	22	25	28	29	30
Economical	20	20	20	20	20

⁶⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch (2007) *World Report 2007*. p.401.

⁶⁴⁹ Freedom House (2010) *Freedom of the Press 2010*. Available:

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2010/kyrgyzstan>.

Kyrgyzstan's press is still not free at the 2013 score. (Accessed on 14 September 2013)

⁶⁵⁰ Freedom House (2007) *Freedom of the Press 2007*. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2007/kyrgyzstan> (Accessed on 14 September 2013)

⁶⁵¹ Freedom House (2010) op. cit.

⁶⁵² Human Rights Watch (2008) *World Report 2008*. p.408.

⁶⁵³ Freedom House (2010) op.cit.

⁶⁵⁴ Press Freedom Score = Legal Environment + Political Environment + Economic Environment

Environment					
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When FTI carried out its early warning projects, one of the main debates surrounding civil society in Kyrgyzstan was how it could work together with the government effectively. Schulte claims that ‘up to now, no effective forms of cooperation between the state and NGOs have been established besides common participation in round tables and conferences aimed at discussing draft laws or legal reforms, often organized with the support of international organizations.’⁶⁵⁵ Chinara Esengul also points out that the relation between the government and NGOs has been of an ad hoc nature.⁶⁵⁶ Numerous attempts by donors to promote the idea of social partnership to complement the watchdog approach of NGOs in relations with the state have not yielded any feasible results.⁶⁵⁷

The government did try to create some rules for working with NGOs, though they were not fully implemented. The first attempt to create a special government body to work with the non-governmental sector occurred on April 19, 2001. This resulted from a meeting between representatives of almost hundred NGOs and the Head of President’s Administration. The idea was to establish a Council of NGO affairs. However, this progressive step was not properly formalized and did not develop further, mostly because of the lack of interest from the state.⁶⁵⁸ Another significant decree that conceptualized government-NGO collaboration was signed by the president in 2004 and again not implemented.

Jailobaeva’s research on the relationship between the government of Kyrgyzstan and NGOs argues that their relationship was still in a nascent stage as of 2008.⁶⁵⁹ However, compared to the other Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan has the most advanced relationship between a government and the NGO sector.⁶⁶⁰ Jailobaeva says that NGOs can register easily and carry out their projects.⁶⁶¹ There are two laws that regulate the relationship between the government and NGOs. The first one is called a

⁶⁵⁵ Schulte, Y. op. cit. p.10.

⁶⁵⁶ Esengul, C. (2008) ‘Institutionalizing Dialogs between Non-governmental Organizations and the Government.’ In Couper, J. (ed.) *Kyrgyzstan Today*. Bishkek: Social Research Center, American University of Central Asia. p.91.

⁶⁵⁷ Schulte, Y. op.cit. p.10.

⁶⁵⁸ Esengul, C. op. cit. p.90.

⁶⁵⁹ Jailobaeva, K. op. cit.

⁶⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁶¹ Ibid.

law on non-commercial organisations (NCOs), which was codified in 1999. Another one, referred to as a Decree approving a Concept on government-NGO collaboration, was signed by the president.

However, Jailobaeva claims that it has not been implemented effectively. She points out a significant character of the relationship between the government and NGOs in Kyrgyzstan by claiming that ‘the government and its institutions tend to work more with social service NGOs than with civil activist groups since the latter are considered to be more active in advocacy and policy-making process.’⁶⁶² USAID claims regarding advocacy that ‘the political and advocacy environment must support the formation of coalitions and networks, and offer NGOs the means to communicate their messages through the media to the broader public, articulate their demands to government officials, and monitor government actions to ensure responsibility.’⁶⁶³ Given the nature of the civil society in Kyrgyzstan and the corruption of the government, if those in power would like to secure the existing interests, it is unlikely that the government and other responsible bodies for social and economic issues are willing to cooperate with NGOs. Transparency International claims that ‘it is well-known that corruption arrests economic development, and it often remains entrenched because a rich and corrupt elite has a strong self-interest in retaining power.’⁶⁶⁴

6.7 Direct Impact

According to the political opportunity structure discussed above, it looks very difficult to implement a community-based early warning and early response project effectively. It must be emphasized again that (1) under the Bakiev regime, media was suppressed by the government and (2) the cooperation between the government and civil society was ad hoc, and in particular the cooperation with advocacy and policy-making NGOs was very rare. However, the following accounts show that FTI established a good relationship with government officials. Moreover, FTI highly relied on government’s

⁶⁶² Jailobaeva, K. op. cit. p.85.

⁶⁶³ USAID (2010) 2009 *NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia*, 13th Edition. p.13.

⁶⁶⁴ Transparency International. Op.cit.

interventions in resolving local disputes. This shows that FTI's community-based early warning and early response systems favourably functioned for the government.

6.7.1 Did they manage to establish an early warning and early response network that was made up of those who were willing to cooperate with the early warning and early response project?

Kyrgyzstan was a highly segmentalized society where there was a chasm between ethnic Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks. In this sense, it is considered to be significant to establish an inter-ethnic network to prevent ethnic related violence. However, FTI's network was not very concerned with ethnic differences. For example, during the first phase of the early warning project (June 2005 to May 2006), there were 31 monitors, among which there were 27 Kyrgyz, 2 Uzbek, 1 Tartar and 1 Dungan. As this figure shows, the ethnic representation was not an important criterion in selecting field monitors. A former FTI officer said that FTI put more emphasis on their ability to understand conflict and speak both Kyrgyz and Uzbek languages, and motivation for intervention rather than their ethnicities. According to him, the ethnic division was one of many divisions in their society and the ethnic division became salient particularly after the 2010 riots.⁶⁶⁵

As FTI's early warning project was implemented from 2005 to 2009, FTI focused more on connecting various people from different sectors. The quasi-formal network of interveners that they established - the National Coordination Council (NCC) and Regional Coordination Councils (RCCs) - was a network for the purpose of facilitating communication among civil society, authorities, law enforcement, and the media for the prevention and resolution of violent conflict. In addition, in the above mentioned mid-term early warning mechanism (PDA), representatives from state structure, civil society, mass media, law enforcement bodies, religious figures and business structure were gathered in workshops. They discussed the issues that could lead to violence in the future. As a result, the National Steering Committee was established at the national level in order to assist in the use of workshop results.

⁶⁶⁵ Interview with a former FTI officer A.

Oblast Advisory Committees were also founded under oblast administrations, where governors were appointed to be members of these committees, in order to ease PDA process and to root process' results into oblast development plans. This illustrates that as a result of early warnings, they established various networks to deal with issues. But again their focus was not connecting different ethnic groups but connecting people from various sectors.

In particular, FTI saw establishing cooperation with government officials as a significant mechanism. FTI reports that a Jalal-Abad oblast project officer successfully built cooperation with the governor of Jalal-Abad in terms of providing him with the Bulletin's analysis and recommendations. According to a FTI report, the governor considered the Weekly Bulletin a source of information on aspects he should pay attention to as a governor – such as land distribution, interethnic conflicts, and possible property seizures. The same report says that he had personal motivation to take preventive actions for his career development. The governor used the analysis to get a general view about the conflicting parties, their weaknesses/strengths and recommendations on how a conflict could be mitigated in a peaceful way so that its resolution would maintain/increase his personal popularity on the local level. In return, the governor shared information with the project officers. There is another example of cooperation with the government body. Some departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (analytical department, high-rank supervision, local police officers) used the analysis of Weekly Bulletin and included parts of it into their documents as background information. In addition, parts of the recommendations were included into internal instructions. According to FTI, the National Security Service also noted that the Border Service Department has included certain recommendations on Kyrgyz-Tajik conflicts (namely, structure of law enforcement actions and patrols for peacekeeping mission) in their instructions. On that basis, preventive actions were taken.

6.7.2 Was the network mobilised for the prevention of securitisation?

Although FTI did not have an early response mechanism that systematically intervened in potentially violent conflict, FTI early warning systems made various stakeholders take preventive actions on many occasions. As two good examples of mobilization will be discussed in the next section, here one good example of the mobilization of the network is introduced. It came from a protest following the death of an imprisoned demonstrator in Naryn oblast in 2007. An arrested participant in national demonstrations died in unclear circumstances while he was imprisoned in Naryn. On the day of his funeral, family members, friends and supporters started a demonstration and threatened to seize the building of the Naryn oblast administration. The Regional Coordination Council initially brought together by FTI initiated preventive action. A representative of the Governor's administration and member of the Coordination Council asked FTI to provide special recommendations on the situation which were personally delivered to the Governor of Naryn oblast. A civil society member of the Council contacted the leaders of the possible seizure and advised them on alternative - non-violent and legal - ways to protest against what happened. The oblast administration followed the recommendations provided, which satisfied the demonstrators and ended open conflict.

6.7.3 Were the preventive actions followed by the stability of the situation?

FTI's early warning and early response systems functioned well to resolve local disputes in some cases. For example, EurasiaNet reported that FTI successfully prevented an ethnic clash from escalating into serious violence on January 12, 2006, near the Uzbek exclave of Sokh, which is surrounded by Kyrgyzstan's Batken Province. In this incident, Uzbeks reportedly beat up two Kyrgyz citizens. The next day roughly 150 residents of the Kyrgyz village Sogment gathered, intending to retaliate. However, according to EurasiaNet, a potentially more serious incident was averted largely through FTI's mediation efforts.⁶⁶⁶ Here, two other cases are introduced from their intervention in a large political protest about a year after the

⁶⁶⁶ Eurasia.Net. (2006) 'Ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan Voice Complaints Over Discrimination, Corruption.' Accessed on 13 September 2013. Available : <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav012506.shtml>.

Tulip Revolution and intervention in an issue that combined both ethnic and land issue.

Case 1: Preventing Street Protest from Escalating into Violence

(a) Early Warning

FTI came to know that a large street protest was planned on April 29th, 2006, nearly a year after the 2005 Tulip Revolution, in order to demand promised political changes from the president Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Instead of reporting in a Weekly Bulletin, they decided to make a special and detailed analysis, prognosis and recommendations.

(b) Early Response

The analysis was hand-delivered to the organizers of the demonstration, to selected members of the President's and Prime Minister's administration, and to long-standing partners in law enforcement agencies. Two members of the organizing committee said that the analysis reminded them of the dangers associated with the planned demonstration and that the recommendations were studied and taken into account. One member (a human rights activist) asked FTI to invite both sides to dialogue, as there was certain openness for dialogue but no initiative from either side (without FTI's support the organizing committee began continued talks with the President). The organizing committee also exchanged information and coordinated with law enforcement agencies.

(c) Aftermath of the Intervention

The national demonstration on April 29 was well organized both from the side of the organizers and from the side of law enforcement agencies. About 6000 people participated in the demonstration. Speeches were relatively moderate and the organizers repeatedly stressed that they do not intend replacement of the President. There were no clashes between protesting groups and the meeting ended peacefully three hours after its start. The President has fulfilled a number of demands of the opposition. A high-ranking officer of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and an officer at the terrorism department of

National Security Service (SNB), in conversation with project staff (prior to the demonstration), confirmed that their leadership took advantage of the analysis on violence potential and included part of the recommendations into their internal instructions.

Case 2 Prevention in Ethnicized Land Issue

This case is a land-related issue that took place between Kyrgyz and Uzbek in 2006. It is worth paying attention to because the nature of the interethnic tension between the Uzbek and Kyrgyz is very similar to that of the 1990 Osh Riots, which was caused by the unfair distribution of land. In addition, the situation deteriorated due to the rape of a girl by a group of young men from the opposing village. This is similar to the 2010 Osh riots in which the rumour that female Kyrgyz university students were raped by the Uzbeks mobilized a number of people from the outside of the Osh city. This case study describes below how FTI alerted the situation, escalated the alerts and gave recommendations, and how warnings were responded.

(a) Securitisation⁶⁶⁷

The villagers of Arslanbob felt that the land distribution was done unfairly in spite of the fact that the size of the territories that the both villages received was almost the same – Arslanbob 16482 hectares and Jaiterek 16266 hectares. The reasons for the frustration of the Arslanbob villagers were as follows:

- while Arslanbob village has a nearly 5 times larger population – 10712 people and 2014 households, only 2323 people and 363 households lived in Jaiterek village. Besides, demographic growth in Uzbek communities is higher than that of Kyrgyz communities;
- the territory which belongs to Arslanbob is closer to the mountains, and therefore trees grow more densely, which leaves less space for

⁶⁶⁷ FTI Weekly Bulletin No.46, 47 & 48.

cultivation in comparison with the Jaiterek village territory. Because of the limited number of other sources of income, agriculture is the main source of income and profit for the local population;

- inequality in the distribution of infrastructure (hospitals, kindergardens, etc.);
- since 2005, 22 hectares of land, which was formally included into Jaiterek forestry (can be used both as pasture as well as arable land) had been rented to the Arslanbob villagers; Jayterek villagers wanted to get it back and resorted to aggressive actions

FTI understood that from May till August in 2006, the relationship between villagers of Arslanbob and Jaiterek was tense, and that the interethnic character of hostilities and disposition to forceful actions were high. FTI project staff recorded fights, small clashes and beatings between the two villages. The FTI's Weekly Bulletins also pointed out that the tension further escalated after a group of young men from Jaiterek village raped a girl of Arslanbob village on the 25th of August. Another source confirms that the incident of rape was highly politicised and almost securitised.⁶⁶⁸ The report by Voice of Freedom reported that:

*“Three days after the tragedy (rape), about three thousand people gathered together in the centre of the village and asked the authorities to punish those responsible. However, young people from the humiliated village did not believe in the integrity of law enforcement bodies. They captured the rapists and tried him according to “mountain law.” Arslanbobers believe that it was after this event that the militia responded and held the rapists liable. One of those who applied the Lynch law was also taken to prison for resisting a militia inspector, which aggravated the uneasy situation. Many people are inclined to think that all these events may trigger other tragedies in the near future.”*⁶⁶⁹

⁶⁶⁸ Voice of Freedom Central Asia (2006) *No Action by Authorities Led to Tragic Results*. 6 November. Available: <http://vof.kg/?p=259> (Accessed on 18/July/2013.)

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid.

(b) Early Warning

This issue was dealt with in three consecutive Weekly Bulletins (issue no.46 to 48, November 2006). This implies that the FTI saw it as a significant issue and gave a priority to it. In fact, they clearly stated in no.47 and 48 Weekly Bulletins that ‘the potential for violence in this conflict is high’.⁶⁷⁰

(c) Early Response

The Weekly Bulletin no.49 (issued on December 6th, 2006) reported positive responses to the recommendations regarding the interethnic tension in Arslanbob, which were given in Weekly Bulletins no.46-48. According to the bulletin, the content of the response was that, on the basis of his instructions, an officer of Jalalabad oblast prosecutor’s department surveillance unit started tracking the conflict situation. FTI staff was invited to a consultative meeting with officers of Jalalabad oblast prosecutor’s office to which the following members were also invited: representatives of Jalalabad oblast administration, Bazarkorgon rayon administration and the state register. However, the bulletin said that those invited could not come to the meeting, and that a new meeting was planned.

Weekly Bulletin no.57 (issued on February 7th, 2007) reported the aftermath of the response that was mentioned in Weekly Bulletin no.49. According to the bulletin, on January 31, FTI together with Jalalabat oblast state administration organized a round table meeting. The subject of this event was “Peaceful resolution of the problem concerning the using of land recourses of forestry “Arslanbob” and “Jaiterek” in Jalalabat”. The officials of the oblast and Bazar-Korgon rayon took part in a round-table meeting, including the heads staff of the all involved oblast departments and law-protection services, community representatives of the abovementioned settlements, and forestry workers. The round table was covered by the mass media (“Azattyk”, Jalalabad Tongi”, JTR, “Akyikat”).

(d) Aftermath of the Intervention

⁶⁷⁰ FTI. Weekly Bulletin. No.47, p.3. and No.48, p.4.

The round table participants came to the conclusion that from the point of view of peaceful and stable life bridging, the optimal decision was a purposeful using of the indicated lands in accordance with Kyrgyz Republic Legislation, i.e. making the pastures for the combined use of both villages. The round table participants took a resolution and a joint plan of activities, which included:

1. Cancellation of the forestry lots rent agreement, which was declared by the state commission as illegal. Responsible persons: forestry “Jaiterek” and “Arstanbap”, environment protection administration and Jalalabat forestry administration;
2. The lots return, which was declared as illegal into the “Jaiterek” and “Arstanbap” authority. Responsible persons: forestry’s “Jaiterek” and “Arstanbap”;
3. Information stands created in front of Arstanbap country administration buildings and forestry’s “Jaiterek” and “Arstanbap”, comprising information:
a) about legal ways and terms of lease and the using of forest fund lands; **b)** about all available land recourses; **c)** the period and the terms of lease, land tenants and the rented lands’ space. Responsible persons: Forestry regional administration, Arstanbap country administration, with the “Early warning for violation prevention” project.
4. To track and cover the realization of the given activities plan in a weekly bulletin “Early warning for violation prevention”.

After this intervention, no significant violent confrontation was reported.

6.8 Contextual Impact

It must be taken into account that FTI’s early warning project was carried out in a highly corrupt state. The effective mechanism of violence prevention in street protests by civil society in a highly corrupted state like Kyrgyzstan could have a negative impact as well if it is looked at from a long-term point of view. By reducing and removing the fear of violence in political protests, FTI’s early warning system could contribute to extending the life of the criminalized government while lay people were

suffering from poverty. The major cause of the 2010 revolution that ousted Bakiev through a street protest was the corruption of the Bakiev regime and the deterioration in citizens' life. What is certain about FTI's early warning systems is that it contributed to reducing the pressure against the government. In other words, it reduced the impact of the only effective approach to politico-economic change for good in Kyrgyzstan. This short-term prevention contradicts FTI's long term goal: conflict transformation through working with the structural issues such as governance processes and policy issues.⁶⁷¹

Though there is no evidence to conclude that FTI's early warning system extended the corrupt government's life, one thing that is sure is that FTI's early warning system worked in favour of the government. For example, the fact that their Weekly Bulletins were incorporated into some government bodies and security sectors and that they established a close relationship with government officials shows that it functioned well for the government when Bakiev regime was still unstable. In addition, FTI was allowed to disseminate Weekly Bulletins in spite of the fact that collecting information and revealing sensitive information about the government is a risky job in Kyrgyzstan. In fact, their Weekly Bulletins reported some violent conflict cases in which government officials were involved. Although it was reported that there were some instances in which government officials would respond to the reports with scepticism, denying the issues raised or citing a lack of financial resources with which to address them (this in itself means that Weekly Bulletins were at least referred to by the government officials),⁶⁷² this does not disprove that FTI's early warning system contributed to the government, both nationally and locally.

6.9 Analysis

FTI's community-based early warning and early response project was carried out in a failing state where corruption was endemic, and political, economic and social issues were solved through street protests which often gathered thousands of protesters. Some argue that this is the only way to let the national and local governments hear

⁶⁷¹ Foundation for Tolerance International.op.cit.

⁶⁷² Babaud, S. & Judge, K. Q. (2011) Early Warning and Early Response?: Learning Lessons from the 2010 Crisis in Kyrgyzstan. Brussels: Initiative for Peacebuilding.

their voices.⁶⁷³ They often turned violent and had a significant impact on politics. This specific contextual factor demanded civil society organizations to provide a sphere to discuss political, economic and social issues through dialogues and conflict resolution workshops without resorting to violence. FTI identified issues existing in Kyrgyz society through their early warning network and offered conflicting parties a place to discuss them with stakeholders. FTI's early warning system was utilized to prevent mainly local disputes and street protests from escalating into violence. Unlike the traditional early warning systems that aim at preventing armed conflict in other states, FTI's early warning system aims at preventing local violent conflicts between different identity groups (including ethnic and political groups). Ethnic conflict between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek is one of many forms of issues that exist in Kyrgyzstan.

From the study above, three strengths of FTI's early warning and early response system can be drawn. However, the third strength can both a weakness and strength. First, FTI's Weekly Bulletin was a significant source of objective information for those who wished to resolve local disputes. Their analysis of the conflicting situation was detailed and deep on the basis of their profound knowledge on the local context and the information collected by the wide informant network they established. Weekly Bulletins were referred to directly or indirectly by those who intended to solve disputes. In some cases, the recommendations were adopted directly as recommended in the bulletins. In some other cases, the information provided by the bulletins was used to understand the context of the issues and help in resolving them. When it was difficult to gain reliable information due to the censorship of the government, the bulletins were considered to be a useful source of information by various actors. This is highly related to FTI's impartial and neutral nature on the basis of multi-cultural identity. Therefore, their unbiased reports were referred to and taken seriously by various actors including government officials.

Second, FTI's early warning system functioned well in some cases as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.⁶⁷⁴ Though FTI did not have a strong connection

⁶⁷³ BBC (2013) op. cit.

⁶⁷⁴ The cases where responses were not made are not recorded in details. Therefore, this research can say that FTI's early warning and early response system functioned well only in "some cases".

between warning and response (usually they gave warnings and recommendations through Weekly Bulletins, and waited for responses from concerned actors), they sometimes took initiatives in intervening in tense situations. The case of the intervention in the large-scale street protest in 2006 is a good example. FTI advised how to behave in such a situation by emphasising on nonviolent response. By so doing, it made it possible to non-securitize/de-securitize a particular issue and avoid using extraordinary measures. FTI also established a network of responders such as the National Coordination Council (NCC) and Regional Coordination Councils (RCCs), and they were mobilized to prevent violence. In the case of conflict prevention in Naryn Oblast in 2007, RCC was mobilized to resolve the issue. If needed, other stakeholders were also invited to conflict resolution workshops at ad hoc bases in order to resolve disputed issues. Their interventions were followed by stability in many cases. FTI's early warning mechanism functioned very well as a local dispute resolution tool in some cases.

Third, FTI established a close relationship with government authorities. In many cases, FTI relied on national and local authorities to resolve disputes. As Kanykey Jailobaeva argues, any issue can be solved only by working closely with the government in Kyrgyzstan.⁶⁷⁵ FTI's relationship with government bodies shows how important it is to work with them in Kyrgyzstan in order to solve political, economic and social issues.

However, the third strength also show the limitation of FTI's early warning and early response project at the same time. When FTI implemented their early warning and early response project, the political opportunity structure of Kyrgyzstan seemed to be all against FTI's community-based system. Bakiev government strengthened authoritarian rule and censorship, and there was no freedom of press. A number of media were harassed. The cooperation between the government and civil society organisations were rare. Then, how did FTI manage to establish a good relationship with the government official? This is because FTI's early warning and early response system functioned in favour of the government. It was the government of Kyrgyzstan that had the most benefit from the early warning function of FTI. As mentioned above,

⁶⁷⁵ Jailobaeva, K. (2008) op. cit.

FTI intervened in the large street demonstration that took place on April 29th, 2006 in order to prevent it from escalating into violence. This event took place when the Bakiev regime was still unstable following the demise of the Akiev regime. It certainly reduced the pressure felt from people's protests by removing the fear of violence. Considering that many social, political and economic issues that were the sources of violence in Kyrgyzstan were in fact deeply embedded in the corruption of authorities, FTI's interventions in street protests could have a contradictory outcome to their long-term goal. The limitation of FTI's early warning therefore came from a 'do no harm' point of view.

It is confirmed that their early warning and early response was effective in terms of short-term violence prevention as a dispute resolution mechanism. A significant proposition that came from the Kyrgyzstan case study is that conflict early warning and early response used to prevent popular protests from escalating into violence in a highly corrupted state could have a contradictory impact because it could assist the incumbent government by reducing pressure felt from street protests.

6.10 Conclusion

Kyrgyzstan is often referred to as a failing state. She has experienced the ousting of president in 2005 and 2010 by street protests. The latter turned violent and claimed the lives of 86 people. In addition, Osh, a city in the south, became a theatre of deadly ethnic riots in 1990 and 2010, both of which took place amid political turmoil. In this context, the Foundation for Tolerance International, a local NGO in Kyrgyzstan, established a community-based early warning system in order to prevent various kinds of violence.

This case study examined both direct and contextual impacts of FTI's early warning project that was carried out from 2005 to 2009. FTI's early warning system was used in a fragile state where political, economical and social issues were resolved through street protests or violence. In this context, FTI offered a space to resolve issues through a more democratic way such as dialogue and workshops. They as a multiculturalist organisation kept impartiality and neutrality, in order to be accepted by various stakeholders.

This case study showed 3 strengths of FTI early warning and early response systems. First, their Weekly Bulletins were used by many actors and their recommendations were taken seriously in resolving local disputes. Second, their early warning and early response system as a dispute resolution mechanism functioned well in some cases. They established a network of early warning and early response for effective interventions. In particular, their cooperation with authorities was very effective because Kyrgyzstan was a society where critical issues were resolved only through cooperating with them. FTI also intervened in various kinds of disputes, such as street protests, economic related issues, or land issues. This case study introduced two successful cases of intervention: intervention in a large-scale street protest and intervention in ethnicized land issue. The both cases showed that FTI's early warning system contributed to short-term conflict prevention.

While their short-term prevention was effective, if it is judged from a long-term point of view, it looks problematic. This case study concluded that FTI's community-based early warning system in fact functioned in favour of the government. In particular, their intervention in street protests organized against the government could have contributed to reducing the pressure on the highly corrupted government. In addition, FTI successfully established a good relationship with authorities in spite of the fact that the cooperation between the government and NGOs in Kyrgyzstan was very limited at that time. Therefore, this short term prevention contradicts their long term goal of transforming the fundamental causes of social issues and violence such as corruption.

Chapter 7

Case Study 2: The Foundation for Co-Existence (Sri Lanka)

7.1 Introduction

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka is an island country which lies to the southeast of India, and has a population of approximately twenty million people. The Sinhalese, most of whom believe in Theravada Buddhism and speak Sinhala, compose 74% of the population. The Tamil, who have Hindu tradition and speak Tamil, comprise 18%. The Muslim population comprises 7%, and Burgher (descendants of Dutch and Portuguese colonist) and others comprise 1%. There is also a diverse religious population, of which, Buddhism comprises 70%, Hinduism 16%, Christianity 7% (Sinhalese 5%, Tamil 2%), and Islam 7%.

Sri Lanka experienced a deadly armed conflict between the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from 1983 to 2009. The separatist group LTTE had claimed that the Northeast of the country belonged to the Tamil people. In order to establish an independent Tamil state, “Tamil Eelam”, they began fighting against the Sinhalese dominant GoSL. Most of the literature on the Sri Lankan conflict has talked about this large-scale and long-lasting conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamil.

On the other hand, it has often been neglected that there has been rather small-scale violence in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka, in which one of the main actors was the Muslim population. In spite of the fact that the Tamils and Muslims speak the same

language (Tamil) and share the same cultural traditions, the Muslims in the Eastern Province have established their own identity. The Sinhalese and Tamil also started to recognize the Muslims as a distinct group from the Tamils. The perceived division between “self” and “other” was clearly developed in the course of the long-lasting violence between the GoSL and LTTE, where the Muslims interests and security had been underrepresented.

The Eastern Province of Sri Lanka is one of the nine provinces of Sri Lanka, and it is made up of three districts – Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara. Ethnic Tamil compose approximately 40% of the population, Muslims 37%, and Sinhalese 23% according to the 2012 census. There are also a small number of other ethnic groups. Many parts of the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka had long been under the control of the LTTE until the Sri Lankan armed forces completely “cleared” these areas in July, 2007. The violence in the Eastern Province is characterized by the violence against the Muslims by the LTTE, and later on Muslims began retaliation attacks against the Tamils in some instances. It was also the theatre of the intra-conflict within the LTTE between the mainstream LTTE based in North led by Prabhakaran and the Karuna Faction based in the East.

Table. 12 Ethnic-Wise Demography in Three Districts in Eastern Province (2012)⁶⁷⁶

District	Total	Sinhalese	Tamil	Muslim	Other
Trincomalee	378,182(100%)	101,991(27.0%)	115,549(30.6%)	152,854(40.4%)	7,788 (2.0%)
Batticaloa	525,142(100%)	6,127(1.2%)	381,285(72.6%)	133,844(25.5%)	3,886 (0.7%)
Ampara	648,057(100%)	251,018(38.7%)	112,750(17.4%)	282,484(43.6%)	1,805(0.3%)
Eastern Pro	1,551,381 (100%)	359,136(23.1%)	609,584(39.3%)	569,182(36.7%)	13,479(0.9%)

The relationship between the Muslims and Tamils is particularly important to understand the nature of the violence in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. Their recent relationship is characterized by mutual mistrust and violence. Particularly important are the two mass killings of Muslims by the LTTE in 1990. On August 3rd, 1990, 103 Muslims were shot to death at the Meera Jummah Mosque and 17 people at the Hussainiya mosque in Kattankudy. Then, the killing of 145 Muslims followed on

⁶⁷⁶ Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka: (2012) Sri Lanka Census of Population and Housing. Available: <http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/index.php?fileName=pop42&gp=Activities&tpl=3>

August 11th in Eravur. According to K. M. de Silva, the LTTE initially attempted to expel the Muslims from strategic points in the Eastern Province. However, having failed to do so, they shifted their target to the Muslims in northern part of Sri Lanka - Jaffna and Mannar, who were more vulnerable and less numerous.⁶⁷⁷ In October, 1990, the LTTE executed a brutal campaign against the Muslim population in the North of Sri Lanka. All the Muslim residents who lived in north at that time were forced to leave their homeland and only allowed to take a small amount of money and a handful of their belongings. It is reported that approximately 15,000 families were living in the North at that time and almost all the families were expelled from their homeland and 75,000 people in total were forced out.⁶⁷⁸ Moreover, it is estimated that as much as 5,000 million rupees (\$46 million) of property and valuables were left behind.⁶⁷⁹ Although 23 years have passed since it took place, many of those expelled are still waiting for the day when they can return to their homeland. More recently, the relationship between the Tamils and Muslims in the east has been characterized by land issues. The land of the Muslims was forcibly taken by the LTTE.

The type of violence in the eastern province is not an armed conflict, where military personnel fight against their enemies. The nature of the violence is very unique because it often takes the form of a proxy war where unknown persons were hired to kill their opponent's ethnic groups' people. In addition, it is similar to ethnic riots (but, not exactly the same as a typical ethnic riot defined by Horowitz) due to the reason that the violent acts were frequently carried out by civilians, in particular youths, and also instigated by them.

In this context, a local NGO in Sri Lanka, the Foundation for Co-Existence (FCE) began their early warning and early response project in order to prevent the violence in the east. FCE is the pioneer of community-based early warning and early response systems. The founder of FCE, Kumar Rupesinghe, who had long contributed to spreading and permeating the idea of conflict early warning when he was in the

⁶⁷⁷ De Silva, K.M. (1998) *Reaping the Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka*. New Delhi: Penguin Books. p. 269.

⁶⁷⁸ Hasbullah, S. H. (2001) *Muslim Refugees: The Forgotten People in Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict*. Research Action Forum for Social Development, p.45. In International Crisis Group (2007) *Sri Lanka's Muslims: Caught in the Crossfire*. Asia Report N^o 134, May 29th. p.7.

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid.

position of the director of International Alert, realised the need for conflict early warning and early response for his own country Sri Lanka. In particular, he thought that the very fragile 2002 ceasefire agreement would easily fail due to the turmoil in the eastern province. A FCE paper published in 2005 explained the necessity of an early warning and early response mechanism in the Eastern Province as follows:

“The volatility of the present context is threatening to the sustenance of the CFA (Ceasefire Agreement). The Eastern Province has been a theatre of war for the 20 year conflict in Sri Lanka and, since the CFA, has been the stage for continued political conflicts and low intensity warfare. Directly following the CFA there was an alarming rise in clashes between the Tamils and Muslims in the region. It has also been the setting of the internal fighting between northern and eastern commands of the LTTE.....The Eastern Province is host to many protracted issues, including land, poverty and internally displaced persons. The long years of inter-ethnic conflict and hardship have resulted in tragedy and devastation, fostering a culture of violence and deep mistrust among communities. There is a severe lack of community coexistence. The Eastern Province is an important place to sustain peace, dispel the heavy mistrust, prevent escalation of direct violence and begin to build community coexistence. This is where FCE implements its approach for Early Warning, Early Action and Human Security.”⁶⁸⁰

For this reason, FCE began an early warning and early response programme in 2003 in order to prevent the violent conflict between the Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim communities. The programme was continued until 2009 when the funding was stopped by the Norwegian government.

This is a project reflected on the realities of the people living in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. Although the project was funded by western donors (mainly the Norwegian government and the UK High Commission), the agenda of their early warning and early response project in the Eastern Province was shaped by Kumar

⁶⁸⁰ Rupesinghe, K. (2005) op. cit. p.1.

Rupesinghe himself in his paper *Enhancing Human Security in the Eastern Province*, which was written in 2002. Rupesinghe's research on the Eastern Province was conducted as part of the Road Map Programme on Negotiating a Political Settlement and Promoting Conflict Transformation in Sri Lanka, which was a joint initiative of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) and the Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies. Considering the fact that this is the paper that FCE used as the cornerstone of their early warning project, it is possible to claim that the agenda was shaped by Kumar Rupesinghe on the basis of his research on the ground not by the aforementioned donors.

In addition, as discussed in the previous chapter, Rupesinghe's personal standing as a professional worked well to keep FCE's autonomy from their donors. In general, NGO managers who are well educated and share the same language in peacebuilding with donors can deter donor's probes into their work.⁶⁸¹ Rupesinghe, who was educated at London School of Economics (LSE), awarded a PhD degree from the City University London, and then worked at PRIO as a researcher and at International Alert as a director, was seen as one of the most reliable persons to allocate funds by western donors. In addition, they all shared the same negotiated approach to the violent conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka and LTTE. However, the sudden termination of the funds from Norway posed an issue of sustainability.

One of the most significant features of the FCE early warning and early response project is that they have a strong orientation towards responses, or interventions. While they did give warnings to the so-called stake holders, it was FCE themselves who mediated conflicting actors and facilitated meetings. Although whether they were successful or not was something that one cannot easily conclude, they intervened in about 180 incidents that could potentially escalate and had already escalated into violent conflicts.

This chapter argues FCE's community-based early warning and early response project received legitimacy to operate in the Eastern Province partly due to the lack of legitimacy of the state. Therefore, they played a role in providing a space to discuss

⁶⁸¹ Ebrahim, A. (2003) op. cit.

and resolve local disputes without resorting to violence. It further points out the positive influence of the ceasefire agreement between the GoSL and LTTE signed in 2002 on the early warning and early response system of FCE. Even after the *raison d'être* of the ceasefire was lost, the situation favourably worked for FCE's early warning and early response project in the East. The thesis argues that this was because the government wanted to make the Eastern Province a showcase of democracy. It further argues that while FCE successfully intervened in many cases, FCE's early warning systems showed a weakness when conflicting parties did not have a strong will for peace.

In the following part of the case study, the research follows the research framework detailed in the previous chapter. First, this case study briefly discusses the nature of violence in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. Then it introduces what kind of early warning and early response mechanism FCE established in order to prevent it. Then, the case study investigates how context influenced FCE's community-based early warning and early response project, what kind of identity FCE developed under the particular context and action framework, and if there were any political opportunity structures that worked for/against FCEs project. Then, the research examines both the direct and contextual impacts of FCE's early warning project. Finally, from these findings, the case study analyses the limitations and prospects of FCE's early warning and early response system.

7.2 The Nature of Conflict in the Eastern Province: What types of violent conflict did FCE try to prevent?

The communal violence in the eastern province took place sporadically between Sinhalese-Tamil, Tamil-Muslim, and Muslim-Sinhalese. However, most cases took place between the Muslims and Tamils. According to the International Crisis Group, 'some inter-ethnic tensions had existed for decades between Tamils and Muslims in areas on the east coast but for the most part the communities mixed well, were strongly, interdependent in economic affairs and had significant cultural and linguistic

ties.’⁶⁸² Actors who were engaged in killings and harassments were perceived as LTTE, TMVP, Muslim thugs, and the Sri Lanka Armed Forces. There were also some cases in which agitated youths organized retaliation attacks. But, in reality, the perpetrators of killings and kidnappings were never identified. Extrajudicial killings with impunity were very common. It looked like a proxy war. As both the LTTE and Sri Lankan Army (SLA) could not resort to overt violence under the 2002 ceasefire agreement and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), they used proxies such as gunmen.

Depending on the types of trigger causes, the nature of the inter-ethnic violence in the east is categorized into two different types.

Type A: Slow Securitisation

Type A is a form of interethnic disputes. In Type A, the causes of the interethnic tension are clear, such as the erection of a Buddha statue in a Tamil majority area, competition for fishing, and competition for land. If these issues were not resolved, they were easily ethnicized and securitised considering the tension that had existed between different ethnic groups in the Eastern Province. In other words, if these are addressed in a proper manner, there is a high chance to non-securitise the issues successfully before any violent incident occurs. However, if one is unable to handle it properly, these issues are securitised, and people tend to resort to violence. The role of *hartals* and rumours was significant in securitisation in the east. A *hartal* is a kind of community-based protest staged to demonstrate people’s grievances by closing shops, offices and roads. *Hartals* were organised by communities when they felt their interests and security were being threatened. *Hartals* disrupted normal daily life and often made the situation worse and more chaotic. They helped to make more violence-prone situations. Therefore, they were described as a “platform for violence” by FCE. Rumours contributed to justifying violence and mobilising people to violence. Unless addressed properly at this point, the disputes can become intractable and scope to intervene in the disputes decreases gradually as time goes on. There were some instances in which violence followed even after conflict parties had resolved the issue

⁶⁸² International Crisis Group. (2007) *Sri Lanka’s Muslims: Caught in the Crossfire*. Asia Report N°134, May 29th, p. 6.

through a mutual agreement. It implies that once an incident has been securitised, people are more likely to resort to violence even after the core dispute has been resolved. Here there are three examples of Type A conflicts in the eastern province.

Issue of Buddha Statue in Trincomalee⁶⁸³:

On May 17, 2005 clashes broke out in the City of Trincomalee in the Eastern Province between the Tamils and Sinhalese following the erection of a Buddha statue in the city by a group of Sinhalese scooter taxi drivers. Violence began when malicious rumours began to spread in the area, causing injuries to people and property. It took the form of a religious riot as the core issue was whirling around the notion of keeping or removing the Buddha statue in dispute.

Dispute between Tamil Cultivators and Muslim Cattle Owners in Ampara⁶⁸⁴:

On September 18th, 2004, three tractors belonging to Muslims were seized by the LTTE. The tractor owners and cultivators contacted FCE's District Manager for Ampara. They wanted to ask for the return of their tractors. The FCE District Manager contacted the Ampara Political Head of the LTTE, and arranged a meeting at a LTTE office. He agreed that the tractors would be returned. Although after several days the three tractors were returned, the tillers were damaged beyond repair and the tractors required Rs. 50,000 for repairs. In spite of the fact that the initial dispute was resolved, tractor owners and cultivators created instability and tense Tamil-Muslim relations in the nearby large town of Akkaraipattu. In further protest against the Vattamadu dispute, members of local Muslim youth groups decided to declare a hartal on 30th September.

Disputes Between Tamil and Muslim Fishermen⁶⁸⁵:

⁶⁸³ FCE Internal paper. Not published.

⁶⁸⁴ Bock, J. G., Lawrence, P. & Gaasbeek, T. (2009) 'Foundation for Co-Existence's Human Security Programme in the Eastern Province : Final Assessment.' In Rupesinghe, K.. (ed) *Third Generation Early Warning*. Colombo:The Foundation for Co-Existence. Ch.8.

⁶⁸⁵ FCE internal paper. Not published.

In May 2008 during the harvesting season of fish, Muslims from the neighboring villages started harvesting the yield in the Vahaneri tank by using illegal fishing gear that would damage the regeneration of the fish crop. This practice was the cause of anger among Tamil fishermen (whose living conditions were far below that of the Muslims) and disputes began between Tamils and Muslims. In July the disputes between Tamil and Muslim fishermen led to the burning of illegal fishing gear belonging to Muslims by Tamils. The situation turned volatile in the area afterwards. Rumours spread amongst Muslims that Tamils had begun reprisals against Muslims for the past violence. Muslims, especially, youths, were found gathering in public places expressing anger and wrath against Tamils. Information was found where some Muslim groups were preparing for unleashing armed violence against Tamils in order to evacuate them from the area. By mid-August 2008, some Muslim groups had allied with a politician in the area to use force against Tamils whilst Tamils were found allying with a non-state armed group for defending themselves against Muslims in case of threat of violence.

Type B: Rapid Securitisation

Type B is a form of interethnic violence that occurs after a killing of an individual. The killing of a member of their own ethnic group was rapidly securitised and strongly justified retaliation attacks. After the killing, the tension between different ethnic groups significantly increased and further violence followed the murder. It is almost impossible to prevent the first killing of individuals (precipitating events) because in most cases it is precipitated by unknown persons. This is something like a proxy war of the GoSL and LTTE because it was thought that they hired some people and carried out their missions by assassinating and kidnapping particular individuals. The reason why it became a proxy war is probably because they were aware of the ceasefire agreement and monitoring mission. The most significant point that differentiates Type B from Type A is that Type B did not begin with a dispute, which means dispute resolution does not work. One FCE staff members told the researcher that the FCE's early intervention was aimed at reducing overreaction by either the

LTTE or SLA by convincing the local leaders of threats to the civilian population, particularly of their respective civilian population, in the event of an escalation.⁶⁸⁶

Riots in Seruvila, Trincomalee⁶⁸⁷:

On June 18, 2005, communal clashes broke out between Tamils and Sinhalese in the township of Seruvila in the Trincomalee district of the Eastern Province following a killing of a Sinhalese Police sergeant who was a resident in the area by unidentified gunmen. Seruvila is a Sinhalese township through which people access to the nearby Tamil villages. Rumors spread that the police sergeant was assassinated by Tamil militants, which resulted in agitating the Sinhalese youths in Seruvila. They started violent acts including assaulting a group of Tamil civilians who were traveling on the road, damaging vehicles and blocking the supplies to the Tamil areas. In retaliation the Tamil youths also unleashed violence against the Sinhalese at the border, doing things such as throwing hand grenades.

7.3 FCE's Early Warning and Early Response System

What kind of early warning and early response mechanism did they establish?

FCE carried out their early warning and early response programme within the scope of human security. They say that:

‘Ensuring human security has been presented as a means of reducing the human costs of violent conflict. We take this a step further and seek to employ human security as a preventative mechanism to violent conflict. FCE’s approach consists of a holistic and comprehensive vision and method, integrating early warning and early response with a conflict prevention

⁶⁸⁶ Conversation with a FCE staff member.

⁶⁸⁷ Senevirathna, P. (2009a) ‘FCE’s Early Warning and Early Response System.’ In Rupesinghe, K.. (ed) *Third Generation Early Warning*. Colombo: The Foundation for Co-Existence. Ch.4.

through intervention strategies based on human security and a multiple engagement, multi-track approach to address sources of violence.’

Based on this vision, the framework of FCE’s early warning project is a combination of conflict management and conflict resolution. While it attempted to prevent violence from arising and escalating by implementing an early warning and early response project (management), it also tried to address the source of the conflict (resolution).

Early Warning

The FCE’s early warning mechanism employed both quantitative (event data coding and analysis) and qualitative (real time monitoring on the ground) approaches as information collection and analysis methodologies.⁶⁸⁸ The most significant point in the FCE’s EWS was the strong presence of on-the-ground monitors at the grass-roots level. The early detection of the communal tensions through real-time monitoring by those actors generates early warnings. They consisted of over thirty FCE’s field monitors operating in the conflict zone, who were “organic”⁶⁸⁹ members of the communities they represent. Once they have identified and verified the growing tensions between the different ethnic groups, they informed the headquarters in Colombo and then plans for interventions were made. What enabled them to get much information on the ground in a timely manner is a unique community-based network called Co-Existence Committees (CECs) at the grassroots level. These committees were spread across the province (95 in number) and comprised of representatives from different ethnic groups (Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese), religious leaders, women, traders, youth, farmers and fishermen organisations (5281 members in

⁶⁸⁸ The FCE’s system is based on the FAST system developed by the SwissPeace Foundation, which is not a CBEWER system but a traditional macro-level early warning system. The FAST system employing field monitors deployed in the conflict region, specific data capture formats, scientific indicators and the use of information technology for quantification of primary event data, it is learnt that the system had the flexibility to be adopted in a localised EWS which is meant to help execute ER in the conflict region. The FAST system utilizes four sources: constant monitoring (qualitative analysis, daily), event data analysis (quantitative analysis, weekly), expert network (external expertise) and fact finding missions (field investigations, annually). These sources feed into the core outputs, which are (a) FAST Country Risk Profile (annually): baseline studies, risk assessment, policy options and supportive data (b) FAST Up-Dates (quarterly): regular, executive summary, risk assessment and supportive data. For further information, see Krummenacher, H. & Schmeidl, S. (2001) *Practical Challenges in Predicting Violent Conflict. FAST: An Example of a Comprehensive Early-Warning Methodology*. Working Paper 34. Berne, Swisspeace.

⁶⁸⁹ Rupesinghe, K. & Kanno, T. (2009) FCE’s Early Warning and Early Response System and Its Applicability to Other Countries. Colombo: The Foundation for Co-Existence.

total).⁶⁹⁰ The members of these committees were trained and mobilised to monitor and identify the peace and conflict indicators at local levels. This extensive and dense network of monitoring enabled FCE to identify the possibility of violent outbreaks between communities. It is worth noting here that Information Communication Technology (ICT) such as mobile phone Short Message Service (SMS) played a significant role in the communication of these actors by sending and receiving the collected information and warnings.

FCE also employed quantitative approaches; however, they played only a secondary role in generating early warning and early response. During the initial stage of the establishment of an early warning system for the Eastern Province, FCE collaborated with the SWISSPEACE Foundation and gained access to their FAST database for conflict event data recording and analysis. The FAST system enabled FCE to generate quantitative trend analysis of the situation in the Eastern Province during a given period. In addition to the FAST mechanism, FCE developed an original Media Report Monitoring – which monitors various local newspapers and websites written in the English, Sinhala and Tamil languages. FCE also developed a database called “InfoSys”, which employs IDEA⁶⁹¹ categories with a micro level breakdown of events for further analysis in order to capture the symptoms of micro-level violence. The ‘InfoSys’ differs from the FAST system on two accounts. “First, it was purposefully built for the Eastern Province which enabled the database to gather and compile information from the smallest unit of analysis, which is the village level of the Eastern Province. Secondly, it provided space to include micro level conflict indicators such as rumours to be also recorded into the database. In that scenario, it can be said that the FCE InfoSys database was developed to cater to context specific conflict Early Warning and Early Response requirements, whilst taking into account the importance of analysing the micro level conflict indicators in order to effectively engage in track 03 level conflict Early Response activities.”⁶⁹² There was also a human-assisted data coding system in the FCE’s early warning system. They collected local information on peace and conflict indicators and sent it to the Information Centre at the Colombo

⁶⁹⁰ Senevirathna, P. (2009b) ‘Dynamics of Social Identities, Relationships for Conflict Prevention: Case of Co-Existence Committees in Sri Lanka.’ In Rupesinghe, K.. (ed) Third Generation Early Warning. Colombo: The Foundation for Co-Existence. Ch.6.

⁶⁹¹ Ibid.

⁶⁹² Senevirathna, P. (2009a) op. cit.

head office on a daily basis. The field monitors collect information through CECs, state and non-state actors, local media and interpersonal relationships. The Information Centre in the headquarters located in Colombo received 30 event data forms a day. In total, this amounts to 600 event data sheets on average per month. This density of first-hand information allowed for adept situation analysis at the early stages of the cycle of violence.⁶⁹³

The FCE's early warning mechanism was also supplemented by the GIS mapping system in order to geographically identify conflict sensitive areas. The most volatile regions were marked daily and identified at headquarters to analyse the ground level situation and to take timely action. It helped the conflict preventive practitioner to realise that not all regions within a given district were volatile and, from there, to understand the reasons behind their volatility.⁶⁹⁴ Based on the data collection and analysis, the FCE produced some Early Warning products: Daily Human Security Situation Reports, Monthly Human Security Risk Assessment Reports, Monthly Human Security Roundtable Meetings, Annual Reports, Geographic Information System (GIS) Maps and SMS alert service. These products were distributed to various stakeholders.⁶⁹⁵ However, these focused on the description of the situations and did not contain any warnings or recommendations in them.

Early Response (Early Action)

There were two pillars in the FCE's early response mechanism: fact-finding and multi-stake holder intervention. FCE conducted fact finding missions every time the symptoms of inter-communal violence emerged. The rationale of fact finding was based on the thought that rumors that play important roles in the escalation of tension, and the justification of violence has to be disrupted. Therefore, the fact finding mission can be seen as a mechanism for the prevention of securitization. Bock, Lawrence and Gaasbeek, who evaluated the FCE's project, state that FCE was particularly successful in preventing violence when distinguishing "acts against an individual" from "communal violence." The basis of each was what appears to have been a targeted attack on an individual, which was then re-interpreted ever more

⁶⁹³ This paragraph relies on Senevirathna, P. (2009a) op. cit.

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid.

strongly as being communal, as the cycle of violence unfolded and new incidents were added to the picture. The success of breaking this “chain reaction” lay to a large extent in “de-communalising” a violent event, and re-presenting it as an act against an individual.⁶⁹⁶ If fact-finding was seen as de-communalising, it should be seen as a measure to be taken for non-securitisation and de-securitisation because communalisation of an incident was a process of securitisation to mobilize people to take reactions that are outside the law.

Another component of the FCE’s early response mechanism was multi-stakeholder intervention. It was based on the thought that the limited capacity of a local NGO in intervention could be overcome by working directly with stakeholders at the appropriate time so that the organization could enhance the role it can play in reducing tension and preventing violence.⁶⁹⁷ The mechanism took the form of a network of stakeholders that include the field monitors, CECs, Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), peace committees, zonal committees, humanitarian agencies, government agencies, the security establishment, NGOs, local authorities, religious organisations and victims of violence. FCE, as a facilitator, convened meetings and these stakeholders were brought together into networks that worked collaboratively to formulate and implement early responses when tensions increased and there was a heightened potential for violence. In the meetings, FCE and stakeholders discussed and tried to resolve the core dispute that caused the tension between ethnic groups. If violence had already taken place, FCE convinced stakeholders to calm down and not to resort to any retaliation acts. In addition, as FCE also viewed hartals as a sign of problems, they tried to retain normalcy by asking community leaders to call them off. A hartal is usually understood as “a platform for protest”, a way of protesting by closing shops and roads. This implies that a hartal was often understood as a justification for violence. The closure of shops and other businesses brought about chaotic situations to the region. In many meetings, FCE and stakeholders succeeded in retaining normalcy by cancelling them.

It is worth noting that the FCE’s early warning and early response project was not just aimed at the prevention of impending violence. They combined both the short term

⁶⁹⁶ Bock, J. G., Lawrence, P. & Gaasbeek, T. (2009) op. cit.

⁶⁹⁷ Rupesinghe, K. & Kanno, T. (2009) op. cit. p. 247

approach (early warning and early response) and medium-term approaches (addressing root causes, confidence building). Medium-term approaches were meant to address the issues that lead to a conflict over time. This method was deemed useful instead of only assisting sudden interventions when conflicts were likely to occur. Its basic idea was to bring the communities together, provide a space for grievances to be voiced and new forms of interaction found and implemented between different ethnic groups. Therefore, medium-term approaches support the development of relations between the communities and the reduction of structural violence.

A good example of the medium-term approach by FCE was the establishment of the North Eastern Muslims Peace Assembly (NEMPA) in order to tackle Muslims' issues, particularly their land issues. NEMPA's agreement with the LTTE regional commanders in the Eastern Province is a significant example of promoting reconciliation where joint zonal committees have been appointed. Within this framework, there was a registration of lands belonging to Muslims being carried out by the Muslim Rights Organisation. Over 45,000 families have been interviewed and a register of claims created in the North and East. In principle, the LTTE commanders in the East have agreed to hand over the agricultural lands back to the Muslims and through the zonal joint committees, problems on the ground have been resolved.⁶⁹⁸

7.4 Context

As a result of the 25 year civil war, the state of Sri Lanka has become a weak and failing state. The protracted war had been the central topic in politics and characterised the Sri Lankan society. The government of Sri Lanka lost their control of the north-east of the country, which was under the control of LTTE. In addition, their legitimacy in the Sinhalese dominant so-called "south" was shook by the 1971 and 1988 violent insurgences by the Janatha Vimukth Peramuna (JVP), a group organized by nationalist Sinhalese youth. Government's influence in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka was more complicated. There were the LTTE controlled areas (so-called "uncleared areas") and government controlled areas ("cleared-areas").

⁶⁹⁸ Rupesinghe, K. (2005) op.cit.

Lawlessness was a serious issue in the east. The police and jurisdiction were malfunctioning. The rule of law did not exist and extrajudicial killings took place frequently. Orjuela argues that ‘in the northeast, more than two decades of armed conflict resulted in the brutalization of society as violence, emergency legislation, and limits on the freedoms of association and expression became part of everyday life.’⁶⁹⁹

The nature of the state is ostensibly democracy. However, Sri Lanka, which had been viewed as the Asian country with ‘the best chance of making a successful transition to modern statehood,’⁷⁰⁰ soon went from being a potential liberal democracy to a full-fledged ethnocracy.⁷⁰¹ The claimed democracy has been reduced to merely the rule of a majority in the multiethnic state, where the government of Sri Lanka was always dominated by the Sinhalese nationalists. Accordingly, there had been no appropriate system to deal with the issues of ethnic minorities. The protracted violent conflict in Sri Lanka has its roots in the inability of the central government of dealing with the demands of ethnic minorities. In 1956, the Sinhala only bill, which enacted Sinhalese as the national language, was passed. In 1972, a new constitution, which reinforced Sinhala-Buddhist line, was introduced. In 1979, the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), gave the government the right to arrest and detain alleged people without adequate judicial procedure. It is said that the background of these acts lies in the Sinhalese grievance that ‘Tamils had been overrepresented in professional occupations such as medicine, engineering, police, judiciary, and in the universities in relation to their percentage of the total population’.⁷⁰² As a result, people have witnessed several anti-Tamil riots in 1958, 1977-78, and 1983.⁷⁰³ Furthermore, human rights activists claim that the GoSL was responsible for a great number of abductions and disappearances, most of whose victims are feared dead.⁷⁰⁴ Moreover,

⁶⁹⁹ Orjuela, C. (2010) ‘Sri Lanka: Peace Activists and Nationalists.’ In Paffenholz, T. (ed) *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Ch.13. p.303.

⁷⁰⁰ Wriggins, H. W. (1961) ‘Impediments to Unity in New Nations: The Case of Ceylon’, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 55, no. 2. p.316. Cited in DeVotta (2005) ‘Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organisations in Sri Lanka: Peacemakers or Parasites?’ *Civil Wars*, Vol.7, No.2, pp.171-182. p.173.

⁷⁰¹ DeVotta, N. (2000) ‘Control Democracy, Institutional Decay, and the Quest for Eelam: Explaining Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka.’ *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 73, no.1, pp.55–76. Cited in DeVotta (2005) op. cit.

⁷⁰² Ibid.

⁷⁰³ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁴ Human Rights Watch (2008) Sri Lanka: ‘Disappearances’ by Security Forces a National Crisis. 7 March. Available: <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/03/05/sri-lanka-disappearances-security-forces-national-crisis> (Accessed on 13 September 2013.)

Sri Lanka has been considered to be one of the most dangerous states for journalists. The Impunity Index of Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) ranked Sri Lanka 4th.⁷⁰⁵

It is therefore not surprising that Sri Lanka is a highly segmentalized society. DeVotta argues that ‘within ten years of independence, ‘bonding’ groups had triumphed over ‘bridging’ groups and come to dominate the entire political process.’⁷⁰⁶ During the periods of full-scale war as well as after the war, freedom of the press has shrunk considerably.⁷⁰⁷ The media sector, highly politicized and polarized, has reflected and contributed to the ethnic and political polarization within Sri Lankan society.⁷⁰⁸ Sinhala- and Tamil-language media have perpetuated fundamentally different pictures of the armed conflict. During the periods of full-scale war as well as after the war, freedom of the press has shrunk considerably; independent reporting has been hampered by unofficial and official censorship, restrictions on travel to war zones, and violence against journalists.⁷⁰⁹

However, it is also true that Sri Lanka has a rich history of active civil society.⁷¹⁰ Many civil society organisations working for peace, human rights, and democratic reform were founded in Sri Lanka in the 70s when ethnic riots and government suppression took place.⁷¹¹ In particular, after the Black July, an anti-Tamil riot in 1983, the international community began to pay attention to the situation of Sri Lanka, which generated an influx of foreign aids to NGOs.⁷¹² The 80s and 90s saw a rapid increase in foreign relief funding.⁷¹³ The peacebuilding NGOs, which were funded mostly by western donors, were advocating a negotiated settlement as the only solution to the long-lasting conflict.⁷¹⁴ One of their propositions was that it was

⁷⁰⁵ Committee to Protect Journalists (2012) Impunity Index 2012.
<http://www.cpj.org/reports/2012/04/impunity-index-2012.php#index>
(Accessed on 13 September 2013.)

⁷⁰⁶ Devotta, N. (2005) op. cit. p.173.

⁷⁰⁷ Orjuela, C. (2010) op. cit.

⁷⁰⁸ Kandiah, T. (2001) *The Media and the Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka*. Marga monograph series on Ethnic Reconciliation no.19. Colombo: Marga Institute. Cited in Orjuela, C. (2010) op. cit.

⁷⁰⁹ Orjuela, C. (2010) op. cit.

⁷¹⁰ See Orjuela, C. (2010) op. cit.; Goodhand, J. & Lewer, N. (1999) ‘Sri Lanka: NGOs and Peace-Building in Complex Political Emergencies.’ *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.20, No.1, pp.69-87.; De Votta, N. (2005) op. cit.; and (2008) Walton, O. (2008) ‘Conflict, Peacebuilding and NGO Legitimacy: National NGOs in Sri Lanka.’ *Conflict, Security & Development*, Vol.8, No.1, pp.133-167.

⁷¹¹ Orjuela, C. (2010) op. cit.

⁷¹² Orjuela, C. (2010) op. cit.

⁷¹³ Goodhand, J. & Lewer, N. (1999) op. cit.

⁷¹⁴ Devotta, N. (2005)

necessary to provide the northeast, which the Tamil people see as their historical homeland, with devolutionary powers.⁷¹⁵ However, this had always been objected to by the Sinhalese nationalists.⁷¹⁶ They viewed such an arrangement as a sign of surrender to the LTTE.⁷¹⁷

7.5 CoSO Identity

Due to the highly segmentalized character of the society, it is understandable that FCE as a peace-promoting NGO became multiculturalist, whose identity was to accept the right of all the ethnic groups equally and to recognize and value their different cultural identities. They hired their staff members from all the major ethnic groups, they could establish a strong connection with them in the East - the Muslims, Tamils and Sinhalese. In addition, their network was extended to Sri Lankan Army, Special Task Force⁷¹⁸, LTTE and TMVP. While the action framework of FCE was strongly influenced by their multiculturalist character, the context of the Eastern Province, where the state power was very weak, played an important role too. As Marchetti and Tocci point out, in this kind of situation civil society often comes to occupy the void left by the malfunctioning state.⁷¹⁹ When FCE started their project in the east, there was no functioning dispute resolution mechanism between ethnic groups and no effectively functioning police system. In addition, as the government and police were Sinhalese dominant spheres, they were not fully trusted by the Muslim and Tamil populations. In particular, the eastern Muslims, who did not have any strong protective body unlike Sri Lankan Army and LTTE, often used the FCE as a facilitator to negotiate disputes with the Sinhalese dominant state bodies and LTTE.

However, it has to be acknowledged that when the conflict is ongoing, it is hard to keep this multiculturalist character all the time as staff members themselves are the parties concerned. Although no reports or documents are kept, the author heard about

⁷¹⁵ Devotta, N. (2005) op. cit.

⁷¹⁶ Ibid.

⁷¹⁷ Ibid.

⁷¹⁸ Special Task Force is a police organisation specialized for counter-terrorism.

⁷¹⁹ Marchetti, R. & Tocci, N. (2011) op. cit.

a story that there was a conflict within a FCE district office over how to allocate funds to which project. Staff members from different ethnic groups wanted to support their own ethnic communities.

Moreover, it was pointed out that this FCE's multiculturalist identity could have been jeopardized by Kumar Rupesinghe's high profile standing by Jonathan Goodhand and Oliver Walton. They argue that

'FCE's identity and public profile are too closely associated with Kumar Rupesinghe - who is a high profile peace activist in his own right internationally and domestically - and consequently overlaps with other organisations he helped initiate, including the National Anti War Front (NAWF).' The blurred organisational boundaries (at least in the eyes of many outsiders) may have an adverse effect on FCE's organisational identity and programmes; the high media profile of Dr Rupesinghe and the adversarial approach of the NAWF carry the potential to have a negative impact on FCE's flag ship human security programme; the impact of which depends to a large extent on sensitive and low key support for communities and key intermediaries in the east. Therefore, in the current political climate, too close an association between Dr Rupesinghe's peace campaigning and his work with FCE may impede the development of a strong organisational identity, as well as undermine programmes on the ground.'⁷²⁰

Rupesinghe established a strong connection with political actors and foreign donors, in particular with Norway. He was also a high media profile and commented about the Sri Lankan conflict on TV and posted newspaper articles very often. Although he seriously challenged the government of Sri Lanka, he and his approaches to peace – negotiated peace with the LTTE - were bitterly criticized by Sinhalese nationalists. For example, the peace rally organised by NAWF in 2006 was strongly criticised by Buddhist monks, who have considerable influence in the Sri Lankan society. Although there is no evidence that it really jeopardized the early warning project in

⁷²⁰ Goodhand, J. & Walton, O. (2007) *Assessment of Norwegian economic support to Foundation for Co-existence (FCE), Sri Lanka*. P.5.

the Eastern Province, one of the reasons for the sudden termination of funding by Norway might have been related to his high profile standing more or less.⁷²¹

7.6 Political Opportunity Structure

When FCE began its early warning and early response project just after the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, there was prevailing optimism among the donor community.⁷²² A number of new donors entered, and older donors intensified their programs in a quest to become part of the Sri Lankan peacebuilding success story and to lay the ground for sustainable peace by promoting reconciliation and popular support for negotiation.⁷²³ In this context, FCE's early warning and early response project was launched.

The ceasefire agreement facilitated by Norway can be seen as a contributor to creating the environment in which FCE was able to implement their project. It established a monitoring mission called "Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)" that consisted of the representatives of Scandinavian countries. The presence of SLMM made both GoSL and LTTE aware that they were being watched by the international community and made the both sides hesitate to resort to overt military operations. It was particularly so during the first two to three years after the 2002 agreement. In addition, SLMM was often invited to FCE's interventions and watched the engagement of conflicting parties with peace in the East.

However, as Korf argues, after more than three years of 'not war, but not yet peace', the excitement for peace had largely vanished in the public discourses and one finds rather a 'frozen peace' where dialogue has been suspended.⁷²⁴ In 2005, a presidential election was held, and the then prime minister Mahinda Rajapaksa won the election and was appointed as the president. He was strongly determined to finish the war by resorting to any means – war for peace. Eventually, the violent conflict was resumed

⁷²¹ This case was brought to court by Rupesinghe himself. The reason of the termination of funding is not known publicly. However, there was a rumour that Rupesinghe suddenly justified the military victory by the government of Sri Lanka and then Norway stopped funding.

⁷²² Orjuela, C. (2010) op. cit.

⁷²³ Ibid.

⁷²⁴ Korf, B. (2006) 'Who is the rogue? : Discourse, power and spatial politics in post-war Sri Lanka'. *Political Geography*, 25, pp. 279-297. p.283.

in 2006 and the situation deteriorated to the point of no return. In the south, the military measures taken by the GoSL received popularity. Under this circumstance, it was very difficult for peacebuilding NGOs to promote nonviolent settlement.⁷²⁵ Those who supported the peace process were described as “opportunists, traitors, anti-Sinhalese operatives, and parasites feasting on the misfortunes of the majority community.”⁷²⁶ On the other hand, the Sinhala Buddhist nationalist position gained wide popularity as “peace organisations.”⁷²⁷ NGOs have been viewed suspiciously by the state as well as the general population and have often been perceived as corrupt entities serving foreign interests that need to be controlled by the state.⁷²⁸ Despite the difficult environment for NGOs, FCE’s project in Eastern Province was not very affected. Oliver Walton, who researched the legitimacy of national NGOs in Sri Lanka, argues that a significant strategy of FCE was “to shift from a focus on national level conflict, to an approach that focused principally on local-level conflicts.”⁷²⁹ He further argues that “addressing these conflicts avoided using the divisive discourse of national politics and it could often be done under the radar of political activists.”⁷³⁰

When FCE implemented the early warning and early response project in the Eastern Province during the period from 2003 to 2009, there were some changes in the leadership of the state. While the then president Chandrika Kumaratunga was a hardliner against the LTTE with the “war for peace” strategy, the then pro-peace talk prime minister Ranil Wickramasinghe, who was a member of parliament of the opposition party and was appointed as a prime minister after the victory in the 2001 general campaign, proceeded with a peace talk with the LTTE. This eventually led to a signing of a ceasefire agreement in 2002 between the GoSL and LTTE. While Chandrika Kumaratunga was from the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP), Ranil Wickramasinghe was from the opposition United National Front (UNF). This was the first time in the history of Sri Lanka that the president and prime minister were from different political parties. According to the Sri Lankan constitution, the prime minister

⁷²⁵ Orjuela, C. (2010) op. cit.

⁷²⁶ Devotta, N. (2005) op. cit. p.176.

⁷²⁷ Orjuela, C. (2010) op. cit. p.305.

⁷²⁸ Uyangoda, J. (2001) ‘Sri Lanka’s Left: From Class and Trade Unions to Civil Society and NGOs.’ In Philips, E. (ed.) *Sri Lanka: Global Challenges and National Crises*. Colombo: Social Scientists’ Association and the Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue. Cited in Orjuela, C. (2010) op. cit.

⁷²⁹ Walton, O. (2008) op. cit. p.159.

⁷³⁰ Ibid.

can control the parliament. Because of too much compromise by Ranil Wickramasinghe towards the LTTE, Chandrika felt that his approach gave too much to the LTTE. She therefore dissolved the parliament and had a general election. In the general election, UNF lost, and Chandrika's SLFP became the ruling party. After the following election, Mahinda Rajapaksa of SLFP was appointed as the prime minister. Then, in 2005, a presidential election was held, and then prime minister Mahinda Rajapaksa won the election and was appointed as president. He was strongly determined to finish the war by any means and eventually he ended it through military means in 2009. The failure of the past peace talks was perceived in the South that negotiations with the LTTE would not work. Strong feelings of nationalism dominated the south. This atmosphere made it difficult for NGOs to raise their voices for peaceful solutions to the conflict. The GoSL also started to criticise the NGOs who advocated a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

Another significant point in timing is the split of LTTE and the defeat of the LTTE in the east. In the northeast of Sri Lanka, there was a split in the LTTE in 2004. Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, known as Colonel Karuna, and who was number two in the LTTE, broke away from the mainstream LTTE led by Vellupilai Prabhakaran and declared his own administration in the east of Sri Lanka. It is reported that Karuna, who is from Batticaloa, one of the three districts that makes up the Eastern Province, was unhappy about the way Prabhakaran treated the Tamils in the East. After the breakaway, fierce fights followed between the Karuna faction and the mainstream LTTE. It was reported a month after Karuna's breakaway that the mainstream LTTE defeated Karuna faction and gained the control of the entire eastern province.⁷³¹ However, Karuna's faction still kept strongholds in the east and their fights against LTTE lasted until the government force took the control of the Eastern province from LTTE in 2007. Since then, Karuna Faction and its political wing TMVP became the representative group of the Eastern Tamils.

After the government "cleared" the Eastern Province in July, 2007, then foreign minister Rohitha Bogollagama said that the Eastern Province would become "a

⁷³¹ BBC (2004) *Tigers Defeat Breakaway Faction*. 13 April. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3621415.stm (Accessed on 07/01/2013)

showcase of democratic pluralism to the outside world.’’⁷³² Therefore, stability in the East was crucial for the government. Interestingly, even after the *raison d’etre* of the ceasefire agreement was lost, the situation still favourably worked for FCE’s early warning and early response project in the East. The government’s seriousness in bringing about stability in the Eastern Province was demonstrated by the assignment of the former LTTE leader in the east, Colonel Karuna, as a member of parliament. In this context, it is understandable why the government was cooperative with the FCE. The most evident cooperation was seen after the 2008 Kattankudy incident. The president of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapaksa, assured FCE of his full-support to calm down any further violence in Kattankudy.⁷³³ Moreover, MP Basil Rajapaksa, a brother of the president and senior presidential advisor, invited the FCE to help the Government to coordinate all the organizations concerned and develop proposals to establish lasting peace in the Eastern Province.⁷³⁴

7.7 Direct Impact

7.7.1 Did they establish an early warning and early response network that was made up of those who were willing to cooperate with the early warning and early response project?

FCE created an extensive networking of Co-existence Committees (CECs) in the Eastern province of Sri Lanka. CECs were formed in each district of the Province to represent religious leaders, community leaders, trade leaders, youths, women, farmers, fishermen, local journalists and etc. Each CEC was composed of the members from three major ethnic groups. For example, womens CECs were composed of women from Muslim, Tamil and Sinhalese communities. As of 2009, there were 95 such co-existence committees established across 7 districts of the country comprising of 5281

⁷³² Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, Sri Lanka (2010) *LTTE Can Come for Talks*. Available: http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20070723_01 (Accessed on 15 September 2013)

⁷³³ Ranasinghe, H. (2009) ‘A Case Study: Ethnic Violence in Kattankudy and Eravoor in 2008.’ In Rupasinghe, K.. (ed) *Third Generation Early Warning*. Colombo: The Foundation for Co-Existence. Ch.7.

⁷³⁴ Ibid.

members.⁷³⁵ The co-existence committees that had been established were categorised to represent a diversified set of community groups that were considered to be vital for conflict prevention, management as well as successful conflict transformation process within the respective districts that they represent.⁷³⁶

The CECs also functioned as the first point of contact to inform on local disputes and violent incidents through their regular contact with FCE staff members. They also acted as the stakeholders in order to non-securitise and de-securitise a situation when necessary. In particular, the inter-religious committees are considered to be a vital part of the CEC structure established in the Eastern Province. This is mainly due to their influence in the region and strong capacity to engage in conflict prevention. Religious leaders of the Province hold a very strong position in their communities and the recognition and respect that they enjoy enabled them to successfully engage in non-securitising and de-securitising problems and preventing them from escalating to violence.⁷³⁷

While the roles of CECs have been focused on early warning and early response so far, their roles went beyond that; not only the short-term effect of preventing and managing violence, but also in their role as actors in the longer-term process of conflict transformation. This implies that the CECs play three significant roles in conflict prevention as a connector at the same time. First of all, as mentioned above, their aims are to strengthen inter-communal networks. Therefore, they are considered as *the connectors of different ethnic groups*. Then, as they work as the first informants of the symptoms of inter-communal violence and became stakeholders in interventions, they are seen as *the connectors of early warning and early response*. Finally, if we see the connectors of different groups work as a long-term solution for conflict prevention as they establish a strong and confident relationship between different ethnic groups, and if we see the connectors of early warning and early response as a short term solution for conflict prevention, it would be possible to claim that they play the role of the *connectors of short-term and long-term conflict prevention approaches*.

⁷³⁵ FCE established CECs not only in the three districts in the Eastern Province but also in other districts where there was potential for interethnic violence.

⁷³⁶ Senevirathna, P. (2009b) op. cit.

⁷³⁷ Ibid.

One of the reasons why FCE was able to establish a wide network of early warning and early response is its multi-culturalist stance in their early warning and early response project. FCE employed staff members from all the major ethnic groups. This enabled them to deal with disputes impartially and neutrally. The legitimacy of FCE's early warning and early response project was also a significant point in carrying out it in the Eastern Province. Without legitimacy, or acceptance, civil society actors would not be able to exercise any influence on the local population and conflicting parties. What one must understand is that FCE was accepted by the Muslim, Tamil and Sinhalese in the Eastern Province as a provider of alternative dispute resolution. While FCE's competence to deal with local disputes and their neutrality was a significant reason for it, another crucial reason for the acceptance is that the state agencies, which were a Sinhalese dominant sphere, were not trusted by the Muslim and Tamil populations. Also, when the government actors attempted to do something, many of their events tended to be seen through an ethnicized lens by the other ethnic groups in the highly ethnically oriented society. The legitimacy for operating early warning came partly from the lack of the legitimacy of the state. FCE offered a place to discuss local issues without resorting to violence.

In particular, the eastern Muslims, who did not have any protective body like the Sri Lankan Army and LTTE (but it is said that there were some lightly armed groups among the Muslims community though they were not as organized and strong as the government forces and LTTE or TMVP), often used the FCE as a facilitator to negotiate disputes with the Sinhalese dominant state bodies and LTTE. The close relationship between FCE and Muslims began when they established NEMPA to discuss their issues with the LTTE. FCE were often asked to intervene in local disputes by Muslim members of CECs. This does not necessarily means that FCE acted partially. FCE tried to resolve other ethnic groups' issues equally.

FCE also succeeded in establishing a connection with Sri Lankan Army and LTTE, though this was a very complex relationship. The LTTE represented the Tamil community in the Eastern Province, whether the Tamil people gave them legitimacy or not, until they were defeated by the government forces in July, 2007. Most of the precipitating killings were considered to be related to the LTTE (in most of the cases,

the perpetrators were unknown). In addition, the Special Task Force, a police organisation specialized for counter-terrorism, was also notorious for extrajudicial killings and kidnappings. They were very important actors in preventing overreaction to the killing and kidnappings of civilians especially in Type B situation.

FCE seems to have had a closer relationship with the LTTE in the initial stage of the early warning and early response project. This is because there was more space for FCE to freely communicate with them right after the 2002 ceasefire agreement. However, when the ceasefire agreement lost its force and the fight between the government forces and LTTE was intensified, FCE was no longer able to communicate with the LTTE. The LTTE closed their political offices in the Eastern province by 2006. As the elimination of the LTTE from the Eastern Province by the government forces in July 2007 did not stop the violence between the Tamils and Muslims, TMVP became the FCE's main interlocutors.

7.7.2 Was the network mobilised for the prevention of securitisation?

It is safe to conclude that FCE's early warning and early response system successfully mobilised the network they established for non-securitisation and de-securitisation, though this does not guarantee the success of prevention. In some cases, they successfully involved even LTTE members to their meetings.

Resolving a communal dispute over the suspension of quarry work in the 64th milepost rock, Pachchanoor Muttur, Trincomalee⁷³⁸

The rock at 64th Mile Post Pachchanoor is located at the border of Muslim, Sinhalese as well as Tamil villages of Muttur and Seruvila DS divisions. In 2003, a communal dispute over its religious importance led to a violent conflict between Muslims and the Tamils and the killing thirteen people as well as damage to properties. In July 2007, the Government Agent issued a work suspension order to stop the quarrying done at this rock with immediate

⁷³⁸ Senevirathna, P. (2009b) op. cit.

effect claiming that it holds archaeological ruins of a Buddhist Monastery, creating tension amongst Tamils and Muslims living in the nearby border villages of Muttur. In the mean time it was observed that some Sinhalese extremist groups were trying to erect a Buddha statue on the rock which would further tension between the communities.

The main causes for tension amongst the Tamils and the Muslims at this stage was that by claiming the area as a historically important to the Sinhalese it would lead to the establishment of a Buddhist Temple and in turn a Sinhalese colony in the region (which has happened in the past), changing the demography. Second, the sudden suspension of quarry work created tension amongst the quarry workers. The religious co-existence committee in Trincomalee played a major role in first identifying the problem and addressing the issue in a timely manner without letting it erupt in communal violence. First the Muslim religious leaders who are part of the inter-religious committee were actively involved in preventing a hartal (protest campaign) organized by the Muslims regarding the matter. Also, the committee members, through dialogue along with the participation of government and military officials who were involved in the problem, were able to resolve most of the concerns each party had at the time. A fact finding mission was organized by the Buddhist priest who plays a leading role in the Sinhalese community to the rock together with community leaders from all ethnic groups. Upon observing the Buddhist priest gave assurance to both Tamil and Muslim community leaders as well as the religious leaders that there will be no measures to establish a Buddhist temple in the area. On behalf of the quarry workers who were grieved by suspension of their work all religious leaders made an official request to the Government Agent to allow the resumption of quarry work in the area till the archaeological site was properly demarcated.

Here it was observed that the members of inter religious co-existence committees had effectively used their influence over their communities to prevent an eruption of violence. The conflict that arose out of the archaeological claims was effectively used to build communal relationships rather than creating further polarization of communities. The main methodological instrument used was a multi-party dialogue

involving all stakeholders of the present conflict. The strong networking capacity of the religious leaders between other stakeholders, such as the government officials, enabled a conducive climate to engage in this type of dialogue that helped to address all immediate issues that were revolving around the conflict. FCE played a major role in facilitating dialogue whilst the ownership of the entire process and the outcome was kept with the communities involved in the conflict.

7.7.3 Were the preventive actions followed by the stability of the situation?

It is possible to observe there were both cases of stability and instability after FCE's interventions with fact finding and multi-stakeholder interventions.

Case1: Preventive Action in Type A⁷³⁹

(a) The Symptoms of Securitisation

On 10th May 2006 the Tamil Resurgence Movement issued a notice in the city of Trincomalee, calling for a hartal on the 11th, 12th and 13th of May 2006. This hartal coincided with the Vesak festival (the holy season for the Buddhists to commemorate the birth, enlightenment, and the demise of the Lord Buddha. Moreover, the hartal coincided with the 2550th commemoration of the Buddha). Trincomalee is a town where Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese live in nearly equal proportions.

(b) Early Warning

The FCE early warning system identified the impending threat and decided to intervene. They saw that the calling for a hartal, to which the Buddhists had shown severe concern, during the holy season for the Buddhists who are mostly Sinhalese, would create a hot bed for the rise of a series of ethnic and religious riots in Trincomalee.

⁷³⁹ Extracted from Endaragall, D. (2009) 'Theoretical Justifications for FCE's Early Warning and Early Response System.' In Rupesinghe, K. (ed) *Third Generation Early Warning*. Colombo: The Foundation for Co-Existence. Colombo: The Foundation for Co-Existence. Ch.5.

(c) Early Response (Non-Securitisation Moves)

On the 10th of May, FCE contacted the leaders of the Tamil Resurgence Movement and the leaders of the Sinhalese community and convinced them that they should negotiate with each other given the impending threat to all communities in Trincomalee. As a consequence, on the 11th of May, the representatives of the two sides met at the FCE office, and the FCE officers facilitated the parties to look into their interests and helped them to visualize the risk of taking part in violence. The two sides agreed to resolve issues by negotiation and refrain from violent acts. The hartal was called off by the Tamil party in respect of Sinhalese interests.

(d) Aftermath of the Intervention

A peaceful situation prevailed during the Vesak season. Therefore, this intervention by FCE is viewed as a successful non-securitisation move.

On the other hand, it was more difficult for FCE to address Type B issue than Type A. Although FCE had meetings with stakeholders to convince them not to react overly and agreements were reached between concerned parties not to resort to violence, there were some cases in which these agreements were not followed by a stable situation. In this type of issue, the successful interventions depended on the will of the conflict parties. This is a critical weak point of a community-based early warning and early response system whose legitimacy is not based on strong foundations such as a constitution or the legitimate use of violence that is usually exercised by the state. Below, two cases of the FCE's intervention in Type B conflicts are listed. The first case can be seen as successful, while the second one is a case in which FCE's early warning and early response system was overwhelmed by the growing securitisation and violence.

*Case 2: Preventive Action in Non-realistic Conflict*⁷⁴⁰

⁷⁴⁰ Extracted from Bock, J., Lawrence, P. & Gaasbeek, T. (2009) op. cit.

(1) Securitisation

On November 18, 2005, there was a grenade attack on the Jumma Grand Mosque in Akkaraipattu during an early morning prayer. A large-scale hartal followed the attack not only in Akkaraipattu but also in surrounding towns such as Kalmunai, Kattankudy and Eravur. The event occurred on the morning after presidential elections and five days prior to the Heroes' Day ceremonies of LTTE.

(2) Early Warning

FCE detected some rumours. First, in spite of the fact there was no certain evidence that the LTTE conducted the attack, rumours in the Muslim community immediately implicated the LTTE as perpetrators. On the other hand, there were rumours in the Tamil community that expressed anxiety over preparation by Muslim youth organizations to attack Tamils. Therefore, FCE realized that tense circumstances needed an immediate, accurate analysis of the event, as well as meetings with stakeholders including the LTTE, Mosque Federations, influential members of civil society and the defence establishment. The FCE's early warning - response methodology was activated, and FCE's human security field coordinators identified the signs of an impending communal riot in Akkaraipattu.

(3) Early Response (Desecuritising Moves)

FCE's Early Response team in Colombo was alerted and a FCE conflict mediator travelled to Akkaraipattu to assist. To deconstruct the potency of circulating rumours, FCE performed a detailed analysis of the attack and communicated the findings in public meetings to both the Muslim and Tamil communities. FCE first held discussions with the main aggrieved party, the Muslims. The project manager contacted and met the Mosque Federation Chairman. Two days after the event, to ensure continued support for the maintenance of law and order, meetings were convened by FCE staff in Batticaloa with the Mosque Federation of Batticaloa District, which includes the Muslim communities of Kattankudy, Eravur, Valachenai and

Oddamavaddy. An accurate presentation of the analysis of events was included in the meetings.

On November 22, 2005, the fourth day of the hartal, the SLMM met with the LTTE. FCE then held discussions with the LTTE Political Wing Leader of Ampara District, Tamil and Muslim leaders, and the Special Task Forces. Also on the same day, FCE organized a meeting with the LTTE, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization, SWEIDO Vision⁷⁴¹, SANDOW⁷⁴², Al Ameen (“Muslim Peace Foundation”), and Action Aid. Those present decided that when a violent event occurs, the ethnic communities involved must meet and present a joint statement to protest the act of violence. They agreed to establish a district office for all three communities (Muslim, Tamil, and Sinhalese). Before the meeting dispersed, every government office was called and asked to reopen their offices. On November 24, 2005, FCE met with the District Secretary Tamil Division and the District Secretary Muslim Division of Akkaraipattu and urged the police to take action. The meeting held on November 26, 2005, resulted in the Tamil community leaders’ agreement to ensure that the Muslims would not be hurt in the Tamil villages and Muslim community leaders’ agreement to ensure the safety of Tamils in Muslim areas.

(4) Aftermath of the Interventions

The hartal that had been imposed by the Muslim community was at last discontinued. The police announced the agreement over loudspeakers to the public and informed the public that they could return to their normal activities. In spite of the tense circumstances that prevailed for nine days in Akkaraipattu, no violent riots broke out.

*Case 3: Preventive Action and Failure*⁷⁴³:

(1) Securitisation

⁷⁴¹ A local NGO based in Ampara.

⁷⁴² A local community-based organisation.

⁷⁴³ Extracted from Endaragalle, D. (2009) op. cit.

The tension between the Muslim and Tamil communities in the east was high after the provincial council election that was held on May 10, 2008. In spite of the fact that the Muslims gained the majority of the seats, TMVP assumed power due to the influence of the central government.

(2) Failure of Early Warning

At this stage, FCE did not take any preventive action in spite of the tension between the Muslims and Tamils.

(3) Securitisation and Escalation to Extraordinary Measures

On May 22, 2008 the local leader of the TMVP was murdered by an unidentified gun man in front of a mosque in Kattankudy. There was an immediate retaliation to this incident by the TMVP militant group, who presumed that the assassination of their local leader was perpetrated by the Muslims. Three Muslims were killed in retaliation.

(4) Early Warning (systematic information collection and analysis of securitisation)

The FCE's field monitors found an incident of abduction by Tamil Militants of two Muslims who were from Eravoor. Townships of Kattankudy and Eravoor have witnessed long term atrocities between Tamils and Muslims during the recent history despite Tamils depending on Muslims in these two townships for trade and conversely, the Muslims on Tamils for supplies of agricultural and fishery goods. The FCE's Human Security Team in Batticaloa was alarmed that this situation could lead to the outbreak of ethnic violence in the district.

(5) Early Response (Desecuritisation Moves) and Failure

The FCE's Human Security Team decided to intervene in this conflict and established contact with the Mosque Federations of the Muslims, the TMVP and the Tamil community leaders in the district through the support of its influential network of the CECs. Simultaneously, the FCE's team established contacts with the Tamil (TMVP) and Muslim (Hisbulla Faction) political parties in the newly elected provincial council. The Human Security Team's

effort was to bring about negotiations between the TMVP and the Muslim community in Kattankudy and Eravoor. No sooner was this intervention planned than acute violence broke out in Eravoor on May 26, 2008 between Muslims and Tamils following false rumours of two Tamil women being killed by Muslims and an abduction of a Muslim by Tamil militants. This resulted in the actual death of one Muslim woman by police gunfire. This situation was exacerbated by another false rumour of a Muslim being killed by Tamil militants in Kattankudy on June 05, 2008. It resulted in the outbreak of large-scale violence between Muslim youths and Tamils where 35 people were injured along with extensive damage to private and public property.

It is safe to conclude that they successfully resolved a number of local disputes in Type A because they began intervention . While how many of the disputes would have escalated into violence, if not addressed, is unknown, it is again possible to claim that they would have prevented violence by addressing some fundamental issues such as the Muslim's land issues, fishing issues or pasture issues because they are directly related to the living conditions of the people in the Eastern Province.

It is worth noting that FCE rarely documented the cases of missed opportunities and failed interventions. As far as the post-election Kattankudy incident in 2008 is concerned (Case 3), FCE did not react quickly to the growing tension right after the 2008 election in spite of the fact that they noticed the increasing tension. Eventually an intractable level of violence erupted in the region. FCE intervened in the situation only after a TMVP local leader was killed. This probably made conflict prevention even more difficult.

Type B model was a difficult case for FCE. For example, the killings of civilians by unknown individuals often raised tension between the different ethnic communities in the east. Although FCE had meetings with stakeholders and succeeded in mitigating the tension by agreeing not to resort to more violence, there were some cases where these agreements were ignored. The successful interventions depended on the will of the conflict parties. For example, it was perceived that LTTE was behind many of the

killings of civilians. In this case, FCE had to convince them not to use violence further. They succeeded in doing so in a number of cases. But, it is also true that if the LTTE was unwilling to cooperate with FCE, FCE's influence on them was very limited.

7.8 Contextual Impact

While FCE made a direct impact on the individual case of inter-ethnic tension, FCE did not have an impact on the wider context in which the low-intensity conflict occurs. This means that while the context highly influenced FCE's project, FCE's project influenced the context very little (of course, it was out of the scope of FCE's early warning and early response project). Even if FCE and conflict parties agreed not to resort to violence on one occasion, killings and kidnappings by the unknown did not disappear. What FCE was able to do was to prevent overreaction by conflicting parties such as retaliation attacks from the victim's sides. It was a temporary solution because the killings and kidnappings of individuals were repeated almost endlessly. It is undeniable that the fundamental problems of the violence in Eastern Province came from the long-lasting conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE. FCE could not give any impact on it to change the context. In their research on the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka, Jonathan Goodhand and Nick Lewer point out that "Top-down violence" fuelled by conflict entrepreneurs have created the conditions in which bottom-up violence can thrive.'⁷⁴⁴ Although FCE thought that keeping stability in the East thorough an early warning and early response mechanism was a key to sustain the CFA, they could not achieve it. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that FCE's early warning and early response system could make a direct impact on non-securitisation and desecuritisation in the Eastern province, however, they could not make a contextual impact.

This is also related to their multi-culturalist indentity and their policy of neutrality and impartiality. As their project was focusing on the prevention of local violence, they had to sacrifice restoring justice. In a normal context, if somebody was killed, the

⁷⁴⁴ Goodhand, J. & Lewer, N. op. cit. p.75.

murderer has to be condemned and eventually arrested. However, the Eastern Province had experienced serious impunity, in which extrajudicial killings were frequent and a number of individuals were abducted. FCE couldn't make any more impact than local dispute resolution and mitigating the tension between the conflict parties (though these points should be highly appreciated). Due to their claimed neutrality, they could not condemn particular groups. If they do so, they could have lost their credibility. They could have even been threatened by conflicting parties.

7.9 Analysis: The Limitations and Prospects

FCE began their early warning and early response project under a very complex and fragile relationship between the GoSL and LTTE after the 2002 ceasefire agreement. Two significant points of the ceasefire agreement can be seen as the contributors to creating the environment in which FCE was able to carry out their project. First, the ceasefire agreement facilitated by Norway called for monitoring missions "Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)" consisted of the representatives of Scandinavian countries. The presence of SLMM was significant in the sense that both GoSL and LTTE had to be aware that they were watched by the international community. The watchdog function made the both sides hesitate to resort to overt military operations. It was particularly so during the two to three years after the 2002 agreement. Furthermore, SLMM was often invited to FCE's interventions and monitored the confidence-building process between conflicting parties in the East. Secondly, it allowed people to move more easily between the LTTE controlled areas (so-called "uncleared areas" from the government point of view) and government controlled areas ("cleared-areas"). The freedom of mobility is crucial in deploying a wide network of CECs and rapid interventions.

Interestingly, even after the *raison d'être* of the ceasefire was lost, the situation favourably worked for FCE's early warning and early response project in the East. After the government "cleared" entire Eastern Province in July, 2007, the then foreign minister Rohitha Bogollagama said that the eastern province would become "a

showcase of democratic pluralism to the outside world.”⁷⁴⁵ Therefore, stability there was crucial for the government. The government even assigned Karuna as a member of the parliament. In this context, it is understandable why the government was cooperative towards FCE. Otherwise, peacebuilding NGOs (including FCE and a sister organization Anti-War Front who promoted a negotiated settlement for the civil war) were bitterly criticized by the Buddhist nationalist Sinhalese and the government which was pursuing a military solution. The most evident cooperation was seen after the 2008 Kattanudy incident. The president of Sri Lanka Mahinda Rajapaksa assured FCE of his full-support to calm down any further violence in the Kattankudy.⁷⁴⁶ Moreover, MP Basil Rajapaksa, a brother of the president and senior presidential advisor, invited the FCE to help the Government to coordinate all the organizations concerned and develop proposals to establish lasting peace in the Eastern Province.⁷⁴⁷ It is unusual that the president of Sri Lanka promised a full support to a peacebuilding NGO and that the GoSL cooperated with such a peacebuilding organization at this stage of the civil war. This shows that FCE’s early warning and early response system worked favourably for the government of Sri Lanka.

The argument above is very suggestive. FCE was able to carry out their early warning and early response project because it did not (could not) deal with the most fundamental issue – the conflict between the GoSL and LTTE. As mentioned above, FCE and its sister organisation Anti-War Front actively promoted a negotiated solution to the conflict. However, they faced harsh criticism from the nationalist Buddhist Sinhalese. Since the breakdown of the 2002 ceasefire agreement and Mahinda Rajapaksa’s victory in the 2005 presidential election, the GoSL shifted their strategy to military means and took an antagonistic position against the NGOs that promoted peaceful solutions to the war. Although it did not happen, it could have affected FCE’s early warning and early response project in the Eastern Province. As Oliver Walton says, a significant strategy of FCE was their shift from a focus on the civil war between the GoSL and LTTE, to an approach that focused principally on local-level conflicts.⁷⁴⁸ What was important in implementing a community-based

⁷⁴⁵ Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, Sri Lanka. op. cit.

⁷⁴⁶ Ranasinghe, H. op. cit.

⁷⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁸ Walton, O. (2008) op. cit.

early warning system was that this shift in focus enabled them to ‘avoid using the divisive discourse of national politics and it could often be done under the radar of political activists.’⁷⁴⁹ This implies that the practitioners of civil society early warning and early response system should not deal with the fundamental sources of violence – the civil war. They probably should focus on local disputes resolution and mitigation of tension and must accept that their project is a temporary solution.

A significant weakness of FCE’s early warning and early response system was that the success of violence prevention was highly dependent on stakeholders’ willingness to participate in peaceful processes. If they are not willing to mitigate the tension and violence, there would be no success in intervention. Since militant groups like LTTE and TMVVP were behind a number of confrontations between ethnic communities, the prevention of violence and their over-reactions was subject to the will of these groups. The people’s will for peace was lost when an incident was securitised. Killings, abductions and harassments were easily communalized and securitized in the Eastern Province because the long-lasting war had increased mistrust between ethnic groups. Once a violent confrontation had become highly intense, what the FCE EW/ER system could do was highly limited because their intervention strategies were mainly fact-finding and dialogues. Related to this is another weak point. The FCE could not anticipate the killings conducted by armed personnel. It was these killings that often triggered inter-communal violence.

7.10 Conclusion

FCE’s seven year engagement into community-based early warning and early response in the eastern province of Sri Lanka offered us rich information to think about what a civil society organisation can do to prevent violence by using an early warning and early response system. The case study of FCE’s early warning and early response system revealed both the limitations and prospects of a community-based early warning and early response system. Nonetheless, the findings of the case study are very encouraging in terms that it was effective enough to say that they prevented

⁷⁴⁹ Ibid. p.159.

some impending cases of violence in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. FCE's early warning system established a wide network of people called CECs who functioned as warners and responders, and their record shows that they successfully mobilized people for preventive actions without exposing them to life-threatening danger when a situation was pressing.

In addition, the case study showed that FCE had a multi-culturalist identity and kept impartiality and neutrality, and tried to intervene in almost all potentially violent cases. Their identity is represented in their selection of staff members. They employed staff members from three major ethnic groups Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim. Furthermore, they did not condemn those who were responsible for violence in order to get people together and discuss significant matters. These factors allowed them to be accepted as a legitimate organisation to conduct early warning and early response. However, Kumar Rupesinghe's high profile standing as a peace activist could have jeopardized the legitimacy of FCE on the ground as his personal identity and the FCE's organisational identity were closely linked. On the other hand, his professional standing also worked to keep the autonomy of FCE from the donors.

The nature of violence in the eastern province was highly complex. A small dispute between ethnic groups was easily securitised. In the cases of the killings of individuals, securitisation was rapid. In this context, FCE's project was focusing on dispute resolution before any violence occurred, and prevention of overreaction by conflict parties after a killing. However, they did not and could not deal with the fundamental cause of the violence in the east – the civil war between the GoSL and LTTE.

One of the significant features of FCE's early warning and early response was that FCE's system was highly response-oriented. Though they gave warnings through some early warning products, their actual procedure was more like "early detection" and "early action". That is, FCE detected symptoms of violence and then FCE themselves intervened in the situation immediately by using a fact-finding and multi-stakeholder dialogues. These measures were strongly sustained by the CECs. They played the role of connecting different ethnic groups, connecting early detection and early action, and therefore connecting long-term and short-term conflict prevention

approaches. In particular, religious CECs were a very useful resource in preventing violence since their influence to their communities was very strong.

The case study identified two different types of conflict escalation models: Type A: slow securitisation and Type B: rapid securitisation. It was proven that FCE's early warning and early response worked quite effectively as a local dispute resolution mechanism (Type A), though it's still hard to say how much violence this could prevent. But, it is still possible to see there were cases in which stability followed their interventions. FCE also have evidence that they intervened in some critical situations where killings of civilians caused rapid securitisation (Type B). However, this type was difficult to deal with since the issues they were dealing with were not disputes that they could resolve. In many cases, FCE attempted to find facts because securitisation can sometimes be prevented by telling stakeholders that it was not violence against community but a crime against an individual. FCE also convinced stakeholders to call off hartals because they could justify to take extraordinary measures and FCE thought they were a platform for violence. The participants to meetings abided by the decisions made. However, there were cases in which they were ignored. This is a limitation of civil society early warning and early response. Successful interventions highly depend on the will of stakeholders.

Their project was highly influenced by the contextual environment too. For example, the 2002 ceasefire agreement was a significant factor that enabled them to start their early warning and early response. Furthermore, the government's policy to make the east a showcase of democracy, after the defeat of the LTTE in 2007, created a favourable situation for the FCE's early warning and early response project. Even the government promised their support for FCE early warning and early response project in the east in spite of the fact that FCE was a strong advocate for a negotiated settlement to the 25 year-old civil war (a position that was bitterly criticized by Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists). Considering that their promotion for the peaceful settlement could have affected their entire project, including the early warning and early response project, civil society early warning and early response actors might be better off to strictly focus on local issues rather than dealing with the core issues of the conflict.

Most fundamentally, the FCE's community-based early warning and early response received legitimacy to operate in the eastern province partly due to the lack of legitimacy of the state. Therefore, they played a role in providing a space to discuss and resolve local disputes without resorting to violence.

Chapter 8 Conclusion

Since the end of Cold War and Boutros-Ghali's influential report *an agenda for peace*, in 1992, conflict early warning has been a popular subject in the political and academic sphere. It is not surprising that the search for effective early warning systems became a first priority after the world witnessed a number of violent conflicts and humanitarian crises. The most crucial of these events was most certainly the genocide in Rwanda. Since then, various early warning tools have been developed by western scholars. Early warning systems have also been incorporated into various organisations' conflict prevention strategies. This thesis acknowledges the enormous contribution of scholars who have engaged themselves in developing more accurate early warning models and searching for an answer for the warning-response gap to the field of conflict early warning and conflict studies. Since Charles McClelland's WEIS, Edward Azar's COPDAP, western scholars, such as Ted Gurr, John Davies, Barbara Harff, Doug Bond, Craig Jenkins, Philip Schrodtt, Alex Schmid, Sean O'Brien, Monty Marshall, Peter Brecke, David Carment to name a few, have developed quantitative early warning models. Some of their models have recorded 80% accuracy in the prediction of violent conflict. Some others such as the International Crisis Group developed qualitative methods for prediction. Krummenacher and Schmeidl of the Swiss Peace Foundation combined both quantitative and qualitative approaches.⁷⁵⁰ On the other hand, the major purpose of the rest of the scholars in the field of conflict early warning and early response has been to find an answer for the warning-response gap. They either directly or indirectly deal with the issue in their research.

However, in spite of their sincere efforts in making a more peaceful world, the studies of conflict early warning and early response have become a form of oppression due to their dominant positivist and problem-solving mentality. Scholars have failed to realise that conflict early warning and early response has been constructed in a particular manner, and their research has been based on particular ontological

⁷⁵⁰ Krummenacher, H. & Schmeidl, S. (2001) op. cit.

assumptions based on the realities of western policy-makers. Many early warning research projects are funded by inter-governmental organisations and individual governments. The nature of conflict early warning and early response itself – giving warnings and recommendations to policy-makers – is closely related to politics. This particular way of development unconsciously marginalized particular groups of people and issues. They are the vulnerable and voiceless, those who need a conflict early warning and early response system the most.

Moreover, traditional early warning studies failed to develop the theory of conflict early warning in relation with world politics in spite of the fact that conflict early warning and early response is used in the international sphere. They did not take into account that the current form of conflict early warning emerged only after the end of the Cold War, a time when peacebuilding became driven by liberal peace ideology. Whereas most of scholars think that early response/intervention is a political field, they failed to see that conflict early warning as data collection and analysis itself is also highly political and guided by the liberal peace ideology. They usually hold that early warning is a technical and apolitical field. Contrary to traditional belief, this thesis argued that conflict early warning is a liberal technique of government that emerged after the end of the Cold War. It also showed that conflict early warning as a liberal technique of government has a dichotomous relationship between governors and those to be governed.

The research on conflict early warning and early response therefore has been conducted within a very limited framework. As a result, it has produced a number of micro theories without paying substantial attention to macro theories. While the concept of conflict early warning and early response clearly embraces the intent to emancipate people at risk by preventing violent conflict, the practice of traditional early warning and early response has developed contradictorily in the sense that it has exclusively been a tool for the western community. Collected information from a potential conflict zone flies over the people's head and is sent to western policy makers. In many cases, no response was forthcoming. Despite the original humanitarian and emancipatory intent of conflict early warning, it has developed in a contradictory way.

In order to investigate the propensity prevailing in the field and reconstruct the study and practice of conflict early warning, this research adopted Critical Theory as a guideline. This research examined how Critical Theory can reframe the study and practice of conflict early warning and early response. Specifically, the research referred to some significant insights of Critical Security Studies. The application of Critical Theory to this research meant that it was not concerned with developing more accurate forecasting tools or overcoming the so-called warning-response gap. Rather, it meant to stay back, to keep some distance from the traditional approaches, and explore what theories and assumptions had guided traditional early warning practices and studies. By so doing, this research also tried to identify who and what has been marginalized in the mainstream debates on conflict early warning and early response. The research critically examined the way conflict early warning has been studied as it is academics who had conceptualised and defined what conflict early warning and early response should be like.

For this purpose, this research set four questions: (1) What are the immanent contradictions existing in the field of early warning and early response?; (2) Why have these contradictions been constructed and sustained? What kinds of theoretical perspective in politics and social science underlie traditional conflict early warning? Who and what is marginalized in the current debates?; (3) What would a new form of the concept of conflict early warning that is informed by Critical Theory look like? (4) What are the limitations and prospects of community-based early warning and early response systems? The concluding part of the thesis ends by answering these questions.

8.1 Immanent Contradictions

This research tried to find the immanent contradictions that exist in the field of conflict early warning and early response by comparing the concept of conflict early warning with the actual development of early warning studies. This task was undertaken due to the belief that it is academics and researchers who have constructed the field of conflict early warning and early response in a particular way. The thesis argued that conflict early warning is conceptualized as follows: if in advance we

know that a violent conflict is likely to occur through the systematic collection and analysis of information, we should/must prevent it in order to protect people at risk and emancipate them from threats and fear. In addition, it emphasized that the concept of conflict early warning and early response has been underpinned by a *humanitarian/emancipatory* norm (we *should* prevent it and save people from suffering). Those who have contributed to the development of conflict early warning such as Howard Adelman and Susanne Schmeidl clearly distinguished intelligence and early warning, emphasizing early warning's humanitarian intent. Conflict early warning and early response has been regarded as an explicitly emancipatory practice.

However, this humanitarian and emancipatory intent was lost due to traditional studies' focus on the development of technical and instrumental aspects. Traditional studies led by western scholars have been concerned with two major research themes: developing accurate forecasting tools and overcoming the warning-response gap. Since the infant phase of conflict early warning, scholars in North America and Europe developed various quantitative forecasting models. These include structural models, accelerator models, threshold models, conjunctural models or response models. The studies on the warning-response gap were also influenced by cognitive-psychological⁷⁵¹, institutional-bureaucratic⁷⁵² or political aspects⁷⁵³.

Under this particular way of study, particular groups of people and issues have been marginalized. While a majority of early warning research investigates inter-governmental and international NGO systems, little attention has been paid to local NGO (community-based) early warning systems. In addition, most early warning studies focus their attention on potentially large-scale violent conflicts in spite of the fact that there are many small-scale conflicts which could also be studied. The thesis pointed out some major ethnic riots such as those of Gujarat in 2002, the Moluccas in 1999, Kenya in 2008, and Jos (Nigeria) in 2010 have not been discussed in mainstream studies. Therefore, the thesis argued that traditional early warning and early response studies and practices have been based on the reality of the west and not that of the people at risk.

⁷⁵¹ See Meyer, C. O., Otto, F., Brante, J. & et al. (2010) op. cit. and Woocher, L. (2008) op. cit.

⁷⁵² See Cockell, J. G. (2003) op. cit. and Zenko, M. & Friedman, R. R. (2011) op. cit.

⁷⁵³ See Jentleson, B. (2000b) op. cit., Adelman, H. (1998c). op. cit., Cockell, J. G. (2003) op.cit. and Grono, N. (2008) op. cit.

8.2 Negative Effects of Positivism and Problem-solving Dominance

The reason why the immanent contradiction occurred and was sustained can be attributed to the positivist and problem-solving nature of conflict early warning studies. Traditional early warning studies have been based on an objectivist epistemology and positivist theoretical perspective. This particular way of seeing the world and research approach draws a clear line between subject and object. In other words, between observers and observed. This assumption further leads to the belief that if research design and techniques are properly applied, the researchers can be “factored out” and objectively observe. The adoption of the natural scientific approach to social science also assumes that researchers are not influenced by the dominant ideology and power prevailing in the world. This stance led the studies of conflict early warning to problem-solving approaches that attempt to solve instrumental problems posed within the framework of a particular perspective without reflecting on it. Therefore, traditional early warning studies failed to realize that there is no such thing as conflict early warning out there that objectively exists and waits to be discovered. It has in fact been constructed by scholars and researches.

In this context, the emancipatory and humanitarian intent that the concept of conflict early warning embraces has been lost. The unreflexive nature of traditional early warning studies has become a mere political instrument, for which the studies have focused only on instrumental and technological aspects of conflict early warning and early response in order to solve the problems existing in the current framework. Many early warning research projects are funded by inter-governmental organisations and individual governments (e.g. developing early warning tools in the US has been funded by the US government). Policy-makers are required to prioritize in which conflict they should intervene because the resources they can use are very limited. As a result of the policy-relevant studies, conflict early warning studies came to reflect on the reality of western policy-makers and developed a number of quantitative early warning models. The central concern for most of the scholars therefore has been how one can predict when and where violent conflict would take place and how early warnings can persuade western policy makers to react to warnings effectively (how to

overcome the so-called warning-response gap). While the two major research themes in conflict early warning were split into a number of micro theories under the dominant problem-solving approaches, normative debates, or macro theories, have rarely been dealt with in traditional studies.

Traditional early warning studies therefore failed to take it into account that they have been based on particular ontological assumptions which reflect only on the reality of the western policy makers. This contributed to marginalize the realities, or threats, that people on the ground face. The traditional way of understanding conflict early warning and early response has been founded on a dichotomous relationship between western warners and responders who know how to make a peace, and those in conflict zone who are described as powerless and mere objects of western rescue. This dichotomous relationship that exists in the field of conflict early warning is very similar to the relationship between students and teachers described by Paulo Freire.⁷⁵⁴ The West as a teacher gives support and the other states as students receive it. Moreover, it was further argued that this dichotomous relationship was very similar to Orientalism. As traditional studies are based on the realities of the West, they have been more concerned with the prevention of potential conflicts that could damage western interests. Therefore, other forms of frequently-occurring conflicts such as ethnic riots have largely been absent in traditional studies.

8.3 Early Warning as a Liberal Technique of Government under the Post-Westphalian Global Order

Traditional studies also failed to take it into account that post-Cold War peacebuilding has been guided by liberal peace ideology. This is in spite of the fact that conflict early warning and early response cannot be discussed separately from other peacebuilding projects. Even the critical school of peacebuilding, which has identified the issues of liberal peacebuilding, failed to connect conflict early warning and liberal peace. Drawing on the concept of governmentality, the thesis argued that conflict early warning is a liberal technique of government which emerged after the end of the

⁷⁵⁴ Freire, P. (1996) op. cit.

Cold War. The thesis examined the role of conflict early warning by seeing it in the changing global context since the end of the Cold War. In particular, the thesis focused on the shift from the Westphalian global order to post-Westphalian global order because it was a crucial event in the emergence of the current form of conflict early warning systems.

After the end of the Cold War, there was a significant shift in the discourse on threats, from the bipolar rivalry between the US and the USSR, to various threats that come from weak and unstable states. The most significant issue for the liberal western block after the end of the Cold War was how they would govern the source of insecurity - the abnormal and the illiberal states. They are believed to create international terrorism and criminality, refugee flows and mass migrations that disrupt the functioning of global capital and, thus, the conditions for liberal markets on a global scale. This results in disorder and instability in the international sphere.⁷⁵⁵ Therefore, peacebuilding is often regarded as state building since it focuses on the institutions of state as the basis for the construction of liberal peace. In this context, failed states have become the subject of administrative guidance as well. Drawing on Zanotti, this thesis argued that the liberal western states began to maneuver abnormal states into normalization through installing democratic governance, by which illiberal states were thought to come to govern themselves from within rather than being forcefully controlled by outside powerful states (*disciplinarity*). But, the liberal western states faced a significant dilemma. After their victory in the Cold War, they no longer relied on forceful containment of the problematic states that was seen during the Cold War. They were required to govern the problematic states in a liberal way. This meant that they had to respect the sovereignty of each state and the rule of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. This was in spite of the fact that most threats to international security came from within those states.

It is in this context that a number of conflict early warning and early response systems emerged along with the permeating concept of the responsibility to protect and human security. When the western liberal states attempted to achieve the establishment of global liberal governance, conflict early warning as an inscription

⁷⁵⁵ Kartas, M. (2007)

and calculation device played a crucial role by making those to be governed visible, calculable, comparable and eventually interventionable. The modality of traditional early warning, such as data collection, data analysis and warnings, are devices that can transform the domain to be governed into a legible, simple, comparable and administrable object. Various forms of conflict early warning systems have been developed by various actors, including inter-governmental, governmental, NGO and think tanks. This contributed to making problematic states visible through calculation, mapping and/or reporting. Although various UN bodies developed early warning systems, they could not develop a system-wide early warning system due to the existence of some skeptical states. Due to the overload of the UN, regional early warning systems have been established in Europe and Africa. Regional organizations are the best place to govern problematic states in a liberal way because joining a regional organization is voluntary. NGO early warning, such as that of the International Crisis Group, is also a significant liberal technique of government because NGOs can penetrate the wall of sovereignty and report what is happening within a concerned state. Think tanks' early warning systems, such as that of the Fund for Peace 'Failed State Index,' help identify which state is failing and requires interventions. Once states were labeled as "illiberal" or "failed" under the post-Westphalian concept of global order, interventions in various forms are justified by referring to human security and the responsibility to protect. ICISS's report on the responsibility to protect and the agenda of the World Summit 2005 clearly shows the connection of early warning and biopolitics. Conflict early warning is a sphere where disciplinarity, governmentality and biopolitics function in a very subtle way.

The nature of traditional conflict early warning and early response is therefore post-Westphalian. The concepts of the equity of sovereign states and non-intervention are the major norms of the Westphalian order. They do not sit well with norms of conflict early warning and early response (monitoring the internal affairs of sovereign states, giving warnings to policy-makers, and, if necessary, intervening in the internal affairs without the consent of the states concerned). The mainstream concept of conflict early warning and early response is premised on the post-Westphalian assumption that the meaning of the international is understood in terms of humans, and interventions in other states are justified by referring to humanity and human security.

This thesis also argued that the humanitarian, open and decentralized character of conflict early warning was crucial in terms of the justification of the usage of the intrusive nature of conflict early warning. As many scholars (most notably Howard Adelman and Susanne Schmeidl) suggest, conflict early warning is clearly distinguished from intelligence due to its humanitarian, open and decentralized nature. This is in spite of the fact that both approaches use the same methodology (planning, collection, processing analysis and dissemination). In spite of the fact that intelligence can be used for the purpose of conflict prevention, the particular form of conflict early warning emerged after the end of the Cold War. The characteristics of conflict early warning and early response - “humanitarian”, “open” and “decentralized” - are crucial elements in post-Westphalian early warning because if conflict early warning expects early response, which is often humanitarian intervention, conflict early warning has to be open, accountable, decentralized and humanitarian in order to justify its intervention. Contrary to intelligence and its characteristics that are easily linked with state power, law enforcement, and force, the above mentioned characteristics of conflict early warning are significant components of global liberal peace because the international regime of security no longer explicitly relies on coercive power.

This new view of conflict early warning suggested that the traditionally accepted concept of the relationship between warning and response must be revisited. In particular, while early response is seen as political, conflict early warning is usually seen as a technical, or apolitical, field. But, conflict early warning as a liberal technique of government is highly political. This thesis showed that the subject of conflict early warning is the liberal western states, and it is in fact utilized for their own security purpose. In this sense, there is a huge contradiction between the concept of “humanitarian” early warning and the actual development of conflict early warning as a liberal technique of government. When conflict early warning is understood as a liberal technique of government, the popular belief of “from warning to response” has to be reconsidered. Almost all those who have engaged themselves in early warning have thought that the “warning side wants response.” But, under the new interpretation of conflict early warning as a liberal technique of government, it is argued that the “response side wants warning (information)”. The traditional debates on the warning-response gap have assumed that “objective”, “neutral” and “impartial” warnings were not responded due to the political, cognitive, bureaucratic or

organizational hindrances facing responders. This implicitly accepted that responders are passive actors. In the context where the response side uses warnings actively, there is a fear that conflict early warning can be used as a pretext for humanitarian intervention (war) particularly after the world witnessed the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq where humanitarian crisis was used as part of the justification for intervention.

Although various issues have been talked about in regards to conflict early warning as a liberal technique of government, conflict early warning and early response as a technique of government has not been very successful. This is because there are some opponents who stick to the Westphalian global order. The field of conflict early warning and early response is therefore a battle field between the advocates of the Westphalia order and those of the post-Westphalia.

8.4 Emancipatory Early Warning Study and Practice

Reflecting on the unfulfilled potential of conflict early warning, this thesis suggested that an emancipatory early warning system must be based on a wider ontology, constructionist epistemology and explicitly emancipatory practice. More specifically, a more emancipatory form of conflict early warning study and practice should be based on:

- (1) an ontology that supposes a more extensive set of referents for early warning and early response;
- (2) an epistemology that rejects naturalist approaches to knowledge that assume we can scientifically access social world in the same way as we do the natural world, yet nonetheless understands the usefulness of positivist approaches in some occasions;
- (3) an orientation toward praxis that is explicitly emancipatory.⁷⁵⁶

The first step is to pay attention to those who have been marginalized in the studies of conflict early warning and early response. Since it is scholars and researchers who

⁷⁵⁶ These were made by referring to Booth's approach. See Booth, K. (2005) p.14.

have constructed what conflict early warning is, it is significant for the studies of conflict early warning to pay more attention to the marginalized. The second point is about epistemology. The field of conflict early warning has understood conflict as a phenomenon that can be understood through causes and effects. Conversely, a new early warning study should be based on a constructionist epistemology. Relevant to this is the theory of securitization developed by the Copenhagen School, which enables us to shift our attention from “what causes conflict” to “how people construct conflict.” Finally, the study and practice of conflict early warning and early response should be explicitly emancipatory unlike the traditional early warning and early response field in which conflict early warning and early response is not solely designed for preventing and protecting people at risk. Traditional early warning has tendency towards oppression, surveillance and policing by the liberal western states. In this sense, it cannot be seen as “explicitly” emancipatory. What is important is to empower those in conflict zone by viewing them as the active subjects of conflict early warning, rather than seeing them merely as the objects of the western rescue.

The thesis argued that community-based early warning and early response systems that are developed by local actors for local problems meet the criteria of emancipatory early warning. The thesis defined the minimum criteria to be called community-based system as follows: it has a systematic data collection, analysis and warning mechanism; it is located in actual conflict zones; and it is conducted by local civil society actors. This thesis particularly emphasized that community-based early warning and early response could play a significant role in the prevention of ethnic riots in which civilians attack civilians belonging to a different ethnic group. It applied securitization theory in order to understand the mechanism of ethnic riots through the constructionist epistemology. It redefined early warning as the warning of securitization move and response as non-securitization and de-securitization moves.

While empowering local civil society actors and letting them do conflict early warning and early response is deontologically emancipatory, it cannot necessarily be called emancipatory from a consequentialist point of view. Without knowing what civil society can do in conflict early warning and early response, we can hardly call it “emancipatory”. The romanticizing of civil society actors is not always benign. They have some limitations in preventing violence in terms that they are often considered to

lack power to influence conflicting parties. Moreover, their projects are highly influenced by the context under which they operate. Also, preventive actions may hinder the bringing of individuals to justice over human rights abuses, deny those who have suffered from structural violence for decades, and obstruct the possibility to change the unjust status-quo through violent measures.⁷⁵⁷ Drawing on Ury, Varshney and Anderson, the research assumed that effective early warning and early response systems at the local level need to establish a network of conflict early warning and early response that is made up of people who are willing to cooperate with preventing violent confrontations and trained to take preventive actions. These people can be a third side, and if mobilized properly, they can be a strong force to prevent violence. Through this network, information that is needed for early warning is also collected. At the same time, this network can be used to send warnings and intervene in conflicts as stakeholders. If community-based systems establish a network in which many actors communicate with each other smoothly and are mobilized for preventing violence when the situation is pressing, it is possible to claim that this community-based system has a high possibility to prevent violent conflict. Furthermore, if these preventive actions are followed by stability, the community-based system can be considered effective.

8.5 The Limitations and Prospects of Community-Based Early Warning Systems

This research examined two community-based early warning and early response systems developed in Kyrgyzstan and Sri Lanka. Both systems were developed to prevent violent conflict that took place in local people's daily life. FTI's early warning and early response mechanism in Kyrgyzstan aimed to prevent street protests and local disputes from escalating into violence. They were related to various issues from political to ethnic issues. FCE, in Sri Lanka, focused on the prevention of inter-ethnic violence in the Eastern Province. Unlike the traditional early warning systems' vertical flow of early warnings to policy-makers, warnings in community-based

⁷⁵⁷ Meyer, C. O. (forthcoming)

systems were disseminated laterally to stakeholders such as local NGOs, government officials and influential individuals.

Both Kyrgyzstan and Sri Lanka cases showed that community-based early warning and early response systems were implemented in the countries where the states are malfunctioning and failing in so far as they cannot provide neutral conflict resolution mechanisms to their citizens. In Kyrgyzstan, political, economic and social issues were usually resolved through street protests, which often escalated into violence. In addition, the government of Kyrgyzstan was highly corrupt. In Sri Lanka, state officials, in particular law enforcement agencies, were dominated by ethnic Sinhalese in spite of the existence of considerable number of other ethnic minorities. In addition, extra-judicial killings with impunity prevailed in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. The government of Sri Lanka had been accused of abducting a number of Tamil citizens. Under these circumstances, both FTI and FCE who developed multi-cultural identity were accepted by different identity groups as a provider of space for dispute resolution. Another characteristic of community-based early warning and early response systems is that they took a needs-based approach. This means that the criterion they used to decide whether they should intervene or not was based on the likeliness and seriousness of the occurrence of collective violence they perceived not on a particular ideology or interest.

The both cases showed the potential of community-based early warning systems in resolving local disputes. In the case of FTI, their early warnings were also effective in the prevention of street protests from escalating into violence. FTI's early warning and early response mechanism "early warning for violence prevention" was warning-oriented in comparison to FCE's response oriented approach. FTI's early warning system can be characterized by their "Weekly Bulletins", which were disseminated to more than 1000 receivers. The recommendations given in the bulletins were used directly as an intervention strategy and/or as a useful source of information in resolving issues. FTI has established a network of early warning and early response, but the link between warnings and responses were weak and slow. But, in some cases they succeeded in convening stakeholders in meetings when they felt the situation was pressing. In these cases, problem-solving workshops were held in order to solve disputes through dialogue.

On the other hand, FCE's early warning and early response mechanism was response oriented. They did not have as clear warnings as FTI's. Their early warning and early response mechanism was more suitable to be described as "early detection and early action." Their uniqueness came from the network of field monitors and Co-Existence Committees they established. They functioned both as the monitors of situations and responders when needed. Moreover, they played the role of connectors of different ethnic groups. Potential weaknesses, such as the lack of power to influence the behavior of conflict parties, were attempted to be overcome by creating a network of people from various identity groups. It was particularly significant that religious leaders were incorporated into the network since they had strong influence over people. By using this mechanism, FCE effectively non-securitized situations when the process of securitization was slow. On the other hand, they had difficulties in de-securitization when securitization was fast (e.g. retaliation attacks).

They also applied medium-term early warning and early response approaches. FTI organized peacebuilding workshops by inviting people from various sectors. There, participants discussed what could lead to violence in the future and established institutions to tackle these fundamental issues. For its part, FCE also tackled land issues that were the sources of many violent confrontations between the Muslims and Tamils in the Eastern Province. This combination of short- and medium-term prevention is a unique feature of community-based systems, and is not seen in traditional early warning systems.

From these, it was confirmed that the following emancipatory characteristics existed in both FTI and FCE early warning systems:

- (1) their early warning systems were based on their own realities that they face in their everyday life, not the realities of the west or other outsiders;
- (2) unlike the traditional early warning systems, community-based systems are less hierarchical in the sense that warnings are shared with local actors, where there are no dichotomous ways of thinking, such as the one between the western rescuers and local victims;

- (3) they keep impartiality and neutrality at a practical level and therefore intervene in many impending situations on the basis of needs rather than the interests of early warners or responders except when interventions are deemed to be very dangerous;
- (4) they have a stronger connection between warning and response.

However, the case studies of FTI and FCE posed some critical issues related to the first three criteria. Firstly, although their early warning projects were established on the basis of local realities, their donors allocated their funds on the basis of their own realities. This poses a serious concern about the sustainability of community-based early warning systems. Fund for FTI's early warning project was stopped in 2009, and they did not have an early warning system when the 2010 revolution and riots broke out in Kyrgyzstan. Meanwhile, Norway suddenly stopped funding FCE in 2009, and as a result, a number of staff members lost their jobs. It is highly doubtful that if they really looked at the performance of district officers who were working on the ground when they stopped funding rather than the performance of Kumar Rupesinghe, CEO of FCE as FCE's identity was closely linked with his identity. Secondly, while there were no hierarchical relationship and dichotomous ways of thinking, such as the one between the western rescuers and local victims, there was a hierarchical organisational structure, in particular at FCE. While most of the fund they received was used at the headquarters in Colombo, district officers are not well equipped and protected. The report by Goodhand and Walton reveals that some donors expressed their wishes to work directly with FCE district offices.⁷⁵⁸ Thirdly, although both FTI and FCE carried out their early warning project with the principle of neutrality and impartiality, it was actually difficult to keep the principles. This is because both FTI and FCE's early warning systems in fact worked in favour of the governments who were part of the causes of violent conflicts. Furthermore, Kumar Rupesinghe of FCE as a high profile peace activist in Sri Lanka, could have jeopardized FCE's legitimacy on the ground. He strongly challenged very popular Rajapaksa regime that was pursuing a military defeat of the LTTE, and was strongly criticized by Sinhalese nationalists. Therefore, there was a possibility that it would make their early warning project very difficult in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka.

⁷⁵⁸ Goodhand, J. & Walton, O. (2007) op. cit.

Moreover, these criteria have not shown the actual nature of community-based systems until applying political opportunity structure in which they were implemented. In Kyrgyzstan, FTI's early warning and early response project was implemented under Bakiev regime whose government was very unstable and strengthened authoritarian rule by harassing media. During this period, cooperation between the government and civil society was not very active. In particular, most cooperation was with service providers rather than advocacy and policy-making civil society organisations. Moreover, those who collect and publish sensitive information about the government such as a number of news agencies were harassed and suppressed by the government. In Sri Lanka, after Mahinda Rajapaksa came to power, the president was adamant about his military solution to end the 25 year civil war. Under this context, peacebuilding NGOs who advocated a peaceful negotiated solution were bitterly criticized by Sinhala nationalists.

Even under these situations in which everything seemed to work against peacebuilding civil society organizations, both FTI and FCE could implement effective early warning projects. Why was it possible? There are two possible answers: (1) their projects were not effective at all and (2) their projects worked in favor of the government of Kyrgyzstan and Sri Lanka.

From the intervention record of FTI and FCE, it is hard to conclude that their early warning and early response projects were ineffective at all. At least, they resolved local disputes in some occasions through their early warning and early response mechanisms. Therefore, it is more likely that both FTI and FCE's community-based early warning systems worked in favour of the governments of Kyrgyzstan and Sri Lanka. In Kyrgyzstan, FTI established a good relationship with some government officials and did not experience harassment from the government. One of FTI's early warning project's main concerns was to prevent street protests from escalating into violence. This research introduced the example of the successful prevention of violence in a large-scale protest that gathered 6000 people in April, 2006. Considering the fact that a number of large-scale protests were carried out against the Bakiev government when FTI implemented their early warning project, it is no doubt that it is the government who gained the most benefit out of FTI's early warning project. Their

interventions in street protests certainly lowered the degree of pressure felt from street protests. In Sri Lanka, the government promised their full support to FCE's early warning and early response project after they regained full control of the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka from the LTTE in 2007. The government wanted to make the Eastern Province a showcase of plural democracy. In this sense, FCE's early warning project, which promised to bring stability to the Eastern Province, became a favourable project to the government.

Three significant propositions can be derived from the above. First, effective community-based early warning and early response systems necessarily work in favour of the government if they are used in a state that is itself part of the causes of violent conflict and has a bad record in treating civil society organisations. It is unlikely that community-based early warning and early response system that effectively functions against the government policy and interests can be allowed to operate within the concerned state. But, as Kyrgyzstan and Sri Lanka illustrate, it is the states that occupy a large part of the causes of violent conflict. Both FTI and FCE as peacebuilding NGOs have their long organizational or project goals. FTI clearly states that their long-term approach to conflict prevention is conflict transformation through working with governance processes and policy issue. FCE's early warning and early response system was fully supported by the Sri Lankan government after they restore the Eastern Province from the LTTE. Therefore, their short-term conflict prevention contradicts their long-term goals. This does not mean that short-term prevention is malign. But, it has to be very careful to keep the balance between them. Otherwise, community-based early warning and early response system works contradictorily against its emancipatory intent.

Second, if a civil society organisation wishes to implement a community-based early warning and early response project successfully, it should focus on the prevention of violence and may be better not to deal with the fundamental causes of violent conflict. This is because, as the both cases show, part of the causes of violent conflict lay in the government. In Kyrgyzstan, the corruption and the authoritarian rule of the government frustrated citizens in Kyrgyzstan. In Sri Lanka, the violent confrontations between different ethnic groups in the Eastern Province were caused by the conflict between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. In both Kyrgyzstan and Sri

Lanka, the structural/long-term prevention of violent conflict required changes in fundamental state structure. In the situation where those in power were gaining profit from the existing structure, if both FTI and FCE had tried to tackle these issues, they would not have been able to carry out their early warning projects. FCE as a peacebuilding NGO had many other projects besides early warning and early response. FCE's sister organization, Anti-War Front (both founded by Kumar Rupesinghe), strongly advocated a peaceful solution to the long-lasting conflict between the government and LTTE, and criticized the military solution pursued by the Rajapaksa regime. Considering the fact that peacebuilding NGOs in Sri Lanka (including FCE) and Anti-War Front were bitterly criticized by Sinhalese nationalists for their suggested peace solution, this could potentially jeopardize the entire early warning project of FCE.

Third, "closeness to the ground"⁷⁵⁹, one of the criteria of a good early warning system suggested by David Nyheim, needs to be revisited. Nyheim's findings do not consider the influence of the context under which early warning systems are used and their long-term impacts. Considering the fact that the projects of local civil society organisations are highly influenced by the character of governments and many other contextual factors, it is hard to conclude that closeness to the ground is always good. While community-based early warning systems are good at collecting information and intervening in potential conflict rapidly due to its proximity to the ground, they need to be backed by the governments in order to implement their early warning projects, and therefore they result in functioning in favour of the governments. Similar issues that challenge Nyheim's theory are in fact reported in regard with UNMISS by Jort Hemmer, in which a domestic early warning system was officially installed for the protection of civilians.⁷⁶⁰ He argues that in spite of the fact that the government of South Sudan also commit violence against their civilians, UNMISS cannot play the role of a watchdog.⁷⁶¹ This means that their early warning system cannot keep impartiality and does function in favour of the problematic government.

⁷⁵⁹ Nyheim, D. (2009) op.cit. p.99.

⁷⁶⁰ Hemmer, J. (2013) 'We are laying the groundwork for our own failure: The UN Mission in South Sudan and its civilian protection strategy: an early assessment.' *CRU Policy Brief*. No.25.

⁷⁶¹ Ibid.

Therefore, similar to traditional early warning, community-based early warning and early response systems also carries a significant immanent contradiction. Traditional early warning says that it tries to prevent violent conflict for others. But, it in fact functions for the security and interests of the liberal western states. On the other hand, community-based early warning system says that it tries to prevent local issues for themselves in a neutral and impartial way. But, it in fact works for the interests of the government. Both traditional early warning and community-based early warning have different normative problems. When donors consider funding community-based early warning systems in a conflict-affected society, the following three points need to be kept in their mind:

1. effective community-based early warning and early response systems work in favour of the government if they are used in a state that is itself part of the causes of violent conflict and has a bad record in dealing with civil society organisations;
2. if a civil society organisation wishes to implement a community-based early warning and early response project successfully, it should focus on the prevention of violence and may be better not to deal with the fundamental causes of violent conflict because there is a possibility that the project is disturbed by the government;
3. donors must examine the organisational structure and culture of recipient local civil society organisations carefully in order (1) to establish a long-term relationship with them in terms of sustainability and (2) to learn about how these factors affect their early warning project on the ground.

8.6 How Can Critical Theory Reframe the Study and Practice of Conflict Early Warning and Early Response? And Implications for Future Research

Finally, this thesis answers the main research question: *how can Critical Theory reframe the study and practice of conflict early warning and early response?* The answer to the question is straight forward - Critical Theory can reframe conflict early warning study and practice in more emancipatory and practical ways. Although this

research took up and examined community-based early warning and early response systems as an example of emancipatory form of early warning, it refrains from insisting that they are the best emancipatory form of conflict early warning. This thesis argued that while there are immanent contradictions in traditional early warning there are immanent contradictions within community-based early warning systems. Then, how is it possible to suggest new forms of practices and studies as envisioned in the research framework developed in Chapter 2 (see p.52). What the thesis termed “emancipatory early warning” is not a particular early warning system but an orientation and new way of thinking that is needed at this particular historical moment. What “emancipatory” means in this research is not eternal but temporal, which needs to be continuously rewritten as the society changes. Moreover, Critical Theory can reframe the study and practice in more practical ways in spite of the fact that this thesis did not take part in the traditional warning-response-gap debate or develop more effective early warning models. As declared in Introduction, this thesis initiated a radical rupture with the tradition, and critically investigated the traditional ways of studies and the history of conflict early warning. Although self-reflection does not seem to make any practical suggestions, it is within immanent contradictions that we can find a seed of more emancipatory early warning and early response that works for those who have been marginalized in mainstream studies. Therefore, whereas this thesis does not suggest any particular form of practices and studies as emancipatory early warning, it offers a process or method that leads us to examine conflict early warning critically and rewrite it continuously.

Critical Theory manages to make the field of conflict early warning both emancipatory and practical by hybridizing seemingly contradictory two approaches - Critical Theory and problem-solving approaches. The hybridity of problem-solving approaches and Critical Theory can make policy-makers, practitioners and researchers more self-critical and therefore propose realistic alternatives to traditional early warning studies. The dominance of problem-solving approaches in the field of conflict early warning made early warning researchers and practitioners blind to the theory that has guided the field of conflict early warning. On the other hand, Critical Theory helps us to reveal it. This is significant because theories tell us about what to see and what is important. Here, one can find out clues to alternatives. This research showed that conflict early warning has developed with the advent of liberal

peacebuilding as the golden theory for peace. It has marginalized local perspectives and capacities. Then, the research suggested that community-based early warning systems can be a more emancipatory form of conflict early warning.

However, the thesis was concerned about what community-based early warning systems can do under what conditions because civil society actors can often do harm rather than make society better and cannot make impacts on conflict situation due to its limited power. Here, one needs to acknowledge the significance of problem-solving approaches. Although the dominance of problem-solving approaches are highly problematic as it is closely related to policy makers and unaware of the theory it has been based on, problem-solving approaches become very useful and more emancipatory if they are used within the framework of Critical Theory. The purpose of this study is not to exclude problem-solving approaches but hybridize Critical Theory and problem-solving in the way that can reframe the study of conflict early warning in a more emancipatory way. The future research of conflict early warning must be aware of the hybridity of the two. Although this thesis investigated the potential of community-based early warning and early response systems, there are some other potentially emancipatory forms of early warning study and practice. This thesis ends by introducing them.

First and most importantly, it is significant to incorporate the theories of hybridity developed by Oliver Richmond and John Heathershaw. For example, Oliver Richmond emphasizes on hybridizing both the liberal peace and local perspective in peacebuilding. In terms of the both studies and practice of conflict early warning, it is useful to hybridize the perspectives of the marginalized and the liberal peace in order to make it more emancipatory and practical. Why is it required to hybridize them in spite of the fact that traditional early warning as a technique of liberal global governance has been accused throughout this thesis? Oliver Richmond argues that ‘hybridity is an inevitable outcome of the liberal peace and its contextual engagements.’⁷⁶² This study argued that the traditional early warning has been a liberal technique of government and it is almost impossible for any early warning project to escape from it including community-based early warning systems as they

⁷⁶² Richmond, O. (2011) *A Post-Liberal Peace*. London: Routledge. p.17.

are usually funded by western donors. Richmond argues that ‘the question is more whether hybridity offers a transformation and an emancipatory version of peace, especially when it represents partially at least, the agency of local actors recently engaged in conflict and international actors recently involved in instrumental forms of peacebuilding and state-building?; How might international actors enable such local processes?’⁷⁶³ Heathershaw’s theory of hybridity might be useful for theorizing conflict early warning. Similar to this research, he also insists that peacebuilding is ‘a form of governmentality where ethical, spatial and temporal markers and policy modalities shift inconsistently under a hybrid liberal-conservative-humanitarian mode of hegemonic governance.’ It would be fruitful to examine conflict early warning through the view of the hybridity of liberal-conservative-humanitarian.

Second, conflict early warning and early response study should be reconstructed by referring to securitization. Although this thesis attempted to do it, it has not been fully developed. By seeing conflict not from the nexus of cause and effects but from how people construct and justify violence, conflict early warning and early response study could develop new strategies for early warning and early response.

Third, the study and use of real-time mapping (e.g. Ushahidi⁷⁶⁴) is also a possible emancipatory form of early warning. Mapping is a crucial liberal technique to make those to be governed visible. However, this technology is not used by authorities but used by citizens. What is unique is that their source of information is social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter. On the basis of what people commented and wrote about what they witnessed in the situation of wars or other humanitarian disasters, a map is created. Though it looks more like a mechanism for protection rather than prevention, it has been applied to many humanitarian disasters from conflict to natural disasters such as the earthquake in Haiti.

Fourth, a thorough investigation of the nexus between a highly corrupt state and the impact of community-based early warning and early response on it is required. In particular, it is important from a “do no harm” point of view to investigate if a community-based system can extend the life of the corrupt and unpopular government.

⁷⁶³ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁴ Ushahidi. <http://www.ushahidi.com/>

This study could not carry out this research due to the limited time frame and budget. It is also interesting to study the correlation between the closure of FTI's early warning for violence prevention project in 2009 and the eruption of the 2010 revolution and ethnic riots in Kyrgyzstan.

Finally, community-based early warning and early response systems must be incorporated into mainstream early warning and early response studies. This thesis does not deny the enormous contribution of traditional studies, and rather acknowledges their contribution to academia and conflict prevention. However, this thesis criticized their dominance in the field. Paying more attention to community-based systems automatically broadens the scope of conflict early warning and could undermine the dominance of traditional positivist and problem-solving approaches. The more community-based systems are studied, the more effective they would become.

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